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Hazop.1092475 Appendix 30.hazop
Hazop.1092475 Appendix 30.hazop
Hazop.1092475 Appendix 30.hazop
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 1 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow (waste)
1 2
Hydraulic system has duty/stand-by Unable to load waste. Economic consequence from shut down of a single pump chamber. (refer to hydraulic system)
Two units on site. Service contract. 3 TELLY HANDLER FAILED Unable to load waste. Economic consequence from shut down of a single chamber. B More flow 1 TOO MUCH WASTE LOADED Waste could be drawn into the secondary Waste would burn off in secondary chamber. chamber. Waste material could block cross over duct. Visual check after loading to ensure ducts are clear. Depending on stage of rest of system. Too much air in secondary system and burners would ignite to maintain temperature. Emergency operation would be initiated by pressure differential. All fans in primary chambers and ID fans would shut down Interlock to prevent door opening with crossover valve open. 3 BURNERS START Health and safety issue. Waste would start to burn in open chamber. PLC interlock. Secondary hard wired switch for burner power to be considered. OSL to advise action on EEL PLC interlock. PLC interlock. Valve should be closed via PLC interlocks Interlock to prevent door opening with crossover valve open. EEL EEL/OSL EEL
EEL (SOP)
4 5 C Reverse flow 1
UNDER FANS START OVER FANS START GAS BACK THROUGH CROSS OVER
Odour issue but low volume. Odour issue but low volume. Flammable gases into open PGC. Health and safety issue.
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 2 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Also Flow
HAZARDOUS WASTE Explosion during burning sequence may Material is segregated during presupply stage. ITEMS (E.G. PROPANE cause damage to plant. GAS CYLINDER) ADDED Operators to be vigilant during TO CHAMBER loading. Waste may ignite when chamber is still CHAMBER NOT SUFFICIENTLY COOLED open PRIOR TO FILL (>100) Chamber to be emptied before loading High temperature interlock Chamber to be visually checked prior to fill. Chambers are only filled prior to operation.
EEL (SOP)
High Temperature
EEL (SOP)
Personnel Protection
1 Hand railing and or access for visual inspection and cleaning design to be risk assessed with respect to operation. Inadequate ventilation in building environment may lead to noxious/explosive gas build up (see also gasification phase below). Building design and ventilation to be reviewed. AEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 3 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
ONE OR MORE DOORS Unable to start ignition. PLC will attempt Operator observation prior to closure NOT FULLY CLOSED to close doors hydraulically. Doors opened and fault rectified. CROSS OVER VALVE DOESNT OPEN (AUTOMATIC INITIATION) Unable to start ignition. Valve fault rectified. Non applicable
B C
1 NO WASTE IN CHAMBER PGC wouldnt reach temperature inefficient operation. 1 POOR MIXING/ COMPOSITION OF WASTE
Adverse pressure difference would Temperature may increase too rapidly and/or too high. Pressure difference may initiate emergency sequence. become adverse. High temperatures would cause under/over air shut down. Regular cleaning and maintenance EEL (SOP)
LEAK THROUGH DOOR Leak wouldnt be high enough to cause OR OTHER SEAL any significant consequence FAN FAILURE
Reduced gasification rate. Burner would Alarm would sound and operator attempt to maintain/achieve temperature. would need to attend fault. Spare fan unit on site. Interlock to prevent burner from starting if fan is not available EEL EEL EEL (SOP)
BLOCKAGE IN DUCTING Total blockage is highly unlikely. More likely that a proportion of ducting would be blocked causing localised poor carbonisation. AUTO VALVE FAILED CLOSED Total blockage of duct.
Operator observation to spot poor carbonisation and blockages during de-ashing. Regular duct cleaning. Actuation method to be considered (pneumatic can fail in one direction) Closed limit switch to be included
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 4 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
E F G H I 2 A
More flow (under air) Reverse flow (under air) More flow (over air)
1 OPERATOR STARTS AIR Airflow is initially too high. FLOW TOO HIGH 1 1 HIGHER PRESSURE IN Gas forced back down over air duct. PGC OVER AIR OUT OF SEQUENCE Waste would incinerate in PGC.
Maximum value cannot be exceeded during ignition. Non-return valve to be included in over air duct PLC prevents Over air running at this stage. Non-return valve to be included in over air duct EEL EEL
HIGHER PRESSURE IN Gas forced back down over air duct. PGC
1 NOT ANALYSED, AS THIS IS A PROPRIETARY ITEM AND THERE ARE DUTY/STANDBY BURNERS. PLC WOULD ALARM IF BURNER DID NOT IGNITE. 1 BURNER FAILURE See above
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 5 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
PLC interlock on cross over valve ID fan would feedback to increase the under air fan flow, causing over pressure would shut fans/system down. in PGC. Obnoxious gas would leak SIL to be carried out and additional through doors etc. hard wired interlocks to fans to be included. Gas build up could be extremely explosive and dangerous. Economic consequence. Alarm would sound and operator would need to attend fault. Spare fan unit on site.
EEL/OSL
Less flow
EEL
More flow
1 2
OVER AIR FAN STARTS Temperature would rise to incineration levels leading to poor gasification. TOO MUCH AIR DRAWN High temperature may trigger the next IN THROUGH OVER AIR stage FAN EXCESSIVE DRAFTS High temperature may trigger the next THROUGH DOOR LEAKS stage Gas generated and vented into building EMERGENCY VENT FAILS TO OPEN ON ID risking health hazard etc. FAN FAILURE
PLC interlock prevents Over air starting during this phase. Non-return valve will provide some resistance to minimise this. Shut off valve to be considered Maintenance and cleaning of doors. Emergency vent to be regularly maintained and inspected. SIL assessment to be carried out. Zoned study required for flammable gases. EEL
3 D Reverse flow 1
Also Flow
Water added to assist rapid cool down if Quench water via a flexible hose temp is under 450C. Steam would drive (normally disconnected). Regulations to be checked up cross over duct. Door safety to be considered
EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 6 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
High Temperature
Two temperature probes (duty/backup). Refractory lining capable of 1400C Note type and method to be reviewed EEL/OSL
B 3 A
1 1
None required Spare fan available Top door lifts to relieve pressure, Limit switches would indicate opening event. Electrical equipment local to door to be designed to consider zoning. EEL EEL EEL
Spike increase in pressure in the PGC SMALL LOCALISED EXPLOSION FROM WASTE ITEM (E.G. GAS CANISTER)
Pressure fluctuation
CONTROL FAILURE
Pressure too high gives risk of explosion. Ensure adequate pressure control is Low pressure increases burner demand provided. on Secondary chamber Fine tuning during commissioning Fluctuating will cause release of smoke and gas through doors. Pressure too high gives risk of explosion. Ensure adequate pressure control is Low pressure increases burner demand provided. on Secondary chamber Fine tuning during commissioning Fluctuating will cause release of smoke and gas through doors.
EEL EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 7 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
Temperature would feedback to increase PLC interlock on cross over valve would shut fans/system down. the under air fan flow, causing over pressure in PGC. Obnoxious gas would SIL to be carried out and additional leak through doors etc. hard wired interlocks to fans to be included. Gas build up could be extremely explosive and dangerous. Economic consequence. Alarm would sound and operator would need to attend fault. Spare fan unit on site.
EEL/OSL
Less flow
EEL
Alarm would sound and operator would need to attend fault. Spare fan unit on site. EEL None required. Emergency vent to be regularly maintained and inspected. SIL assessment to be carried out. Zoned study required for flammable gases. EEL (SOP) EEL/OSL
C D
1 1
OVER AIR FAN TO FAST Temperature would reduce and trigger cool down too early. Gas generated and vented into building EMERGENCY VENT FAILS TO OPEN ON ID risking health hazard etc. FAN FAILURE
Also Flow
Water added to assist rapid cool down if Quench water via a flexible hose temp is under 450C. Steam would drive (normally disconnected). Regulations to be checked up cross over duct. Door safety to be considered Two temperature probes (duty/backup). Refractory lining capable of 1400C
AEL
2 2 A High Temperature 1
DOOR ACCIDENTALLY Smoke/gas released into building OPENING CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE Temperature rises, potentially up to 1300C.
EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 8 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
B C
1 1
Pressure too high gives risk of explosion. Ensure adequate pressure control is Low pressure increases burner demand provided. on Secondary chamber Fine tuning during commissioning Fluctuating will cause release of smoke and gas through doors.
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 9 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
Obnoxious gas would leak through doors PLC interlock on cross over valve would shut fans/system down. etc. Economic consequence. Cool down taking too long Economic consequence Cool down taking too long Alarm would sound and operator would need to attend fault. Spare fan unit on site. EEL Alarm would sound and operator would need to attend fault. Spare fan unit on site. EEL EEL
Less flow
More flow
Economic consequence Overall system Limiting factors for fans to be added flow imbalance after commissioning Emergency vent to be regularly maintained and inspected. SIL assessment to be carried out. Zoned study required for flammable gases.
Reverse flow
Gas generated and vented into building EMERGENCY VENT FAILS TO OPEN ON ID risking health hazard etc. FAN FAILURE
Also Flow
Water added to assist rapid cool down if Quench water via a flexible hose temp is under 450C. Steam would drive (normally disconnected). Regulations to be checked up cross over duct. Door safety to be considered
AEL
EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 10 of 67 pages
No Flow (ash)
1 2 3
DOOR FAILURE
None required Regular maintenance/inspection More than one plough available Service contract Ash to be removed from front of chamber. Duct routing to be optimised to reduce risk of blockage. Duct size/flow to be optimised to reduce risk of blockage. EEL
PLOUGH BREAKDOWN Economic consequence. Unable to remove ash. CHAIN CONVEYOR FAILURE LINE BLOCKED Economic consequence. Unable to remove ash. Ash blocks suction line and ash dust is released from the ash conveyor.
MANUAL RESTRICTION No dust extraction VALVE CLOSED PLOUGH MOVES TOO Conveyor shroud damaged FAR AND DAMAGES CONVEYOR SHROUD WATER DAMPING FAILURE RESULTS IN ASH DUST RELEASE See water system.
Possible local dust extraction to be considered Plough access design to be reviewed to prevent plough from extending too far.
EEL EEL
High Temperature
DOORS OPENED TOO Ash >200C with risk to personnel and EARLY machinery
Interlock to door
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 11 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
A B
1 1
NOT CONSIDERED POSSIBLE LOCALISED POWER FAILURE ONE PGC (SAY) PGC Alarms Secondary air fans will reduce flow & burners will maintain temperature some steam generated economic consequences
Operator training & SOPs POOR SEQUENCING OF Secondary air fans will reduce flow & PGCS burners will maintain temperature some steam generated economic consequences POOR SEQUENCING OF PGCs out of sequence with too much PGCS gas being produced. High flow may cause high temperature. Feedback from ID fan to reduce the air flow through PGCs. High pressure will trip emergency vent. High temperature to bag house will trip emergency vent.
More flow
D 2 A B
1 SEE PGC NODES ABOVE 1 1 2 CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE No consequence. Fans would maintain temperature Burners will maintain temperature Alarms on PGCs Burners will maintain temperature Alarms on PGCs Non required
POOR SEQUENCING OF Economic consequence. No PGCS consequence. LOW CV OF WASTE EXPLOSION IN PGC Economic consequence. No consequence. Volume of SCC will absorb pressure waves from PGCs
High Pressure
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 12 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Damper on ID fan closes only when vent Consider manual operation of damper. feedback = open. PGC fans will stop. Gas will leak out of PGCs. Independent safety related, pressure triggered emergency fan shut down Consider gas monitoring for personnel protection to be considered Evacuation procedures to be developed
Composition (gas)
OUT OF SPEC WASTE No consequence on secondary chamber GAS refer to down stream nodes.
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 13 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
Fan failure alarm would sound Fans in PGC tripped If temperature continued to rise, the emergency vent would open. (Temperature/timings to be agreed & set during commissioning) EEL/OSL/ AEL EEL AEL/OSL/ EEL
Less Flow
Temperature will rise as for no flow. Capacity can be reduced to 75% until new fan is installed.
Auto capacity reduction in all PGCs to be included. Note accessibility & lifting requirements for fans to be reviewed. Locking check valve to enable on-line maintenance/replacement?
More flow
Alarm would sound. Pressure rises and temperature would drop. PGC will drop back on feed back Manual intervention to switch one fan from ID fan. Burners will start up on low off whilst fault is investigated. temperature. Economic consequence High pressure might force flammable gas Duct to ensure gas would be directed back through the fan. away from plant/electrics. Fan zoning to be reviewed. EEL OSL/EEL
Reverse flow
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 14 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
FAN FAILURE
Economical & environmental consequence. Air increases from fans to cool chamber resulting in more NOx, reduced throughput and higher flue gas to main stack. This will place higher demand on urea input.
Fan will alarm. Spare & replacement method to be reviewed Flue gas recirc to be sized similar to other demands to commonise spare parts. Isolation valves to be included for maintenance EEL/OSL/ AEL EEL
EEL EEL
BLOCKAGE
Economical & environmental consequence. Air increases from fans to cool chamber resulting in more NOx, reduced throughput and higher flue gas to main stack. This will place higher demand on urea input. Economical & environmental consequence. Air increases from fans to cool chamber resulting in more NOx, reduced throughput and higher flue gas to main stack. This will place higher demand on urea input. As above but less severe As above but less severe Reduced combustion due to lack of oxygen. Temperature would increase and NOx would reduce. Reduced combustion due to lack of oxygen. Temperature would increase and NOx would reduce.
Layout to be optimised to minimise the opportunity for blockage Secondary air fans would show high demand
Secondary air fans would show high demand Visual indication on NRV would indicate failure
Less flow
1 2
As above. Feedback signal would indicate failure O2 Alarm from the CEM in stack Fan sized to prevent excessive recirculation. O2 Alarm from the CEM in stack Fan sized to prevent excessive recirculation.
More flow
OPERATOR ERROR
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 15 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Reverse flow
Safety arrangement to be included to NON RETURN VALVE Hot gas pushed back down to boiler FAILURE DURING HIGH exhaust. Safety issue as re-circ line and stop reverse flow on fan failure, and fan is not rated for higher temperatures consider route of FGR into secondary PRESSURE IN SCC air channel. Implication on secondary air fans to be considered if recirculation is taken back to that intake.
EEL
High Temperature
BOILER FOULED
This will gradually happen over time. FGR gas temp would rise
At 240C the emergency vent would open. FGR line designed to cope with 240C for a short period. EEL
At 240C the emergency vent would open. FGR line designed to cope with 240C for a short period
Lower temperature
EEL (SOP)
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 16 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
Higher NOx emissions. The system can CEM would alarm run on 400mg/Nm3 for hour or daily De-NOx system would alarm. average of 200mg/Nm3 . Changeover valve to enable stream Batch would be completed and plant shut cross over if required. down. Mixing system to include buffer facilty Higher NOx emissions. The system can CEM would alarm run on 400mg/Nm3 for hour or daily Consider leaving air on to keep nozzle average of 200mg/Nm3 . clear. Batch would be completed and plant shut Nozzle location design to minimise down. risk of blockage. Urea solution boils off leaving residue which, builds up. Consider leaving air on to keep nozzle clear.
NOZZLE BLOCKAGE
3 B Less flow 1
EEL
Atomisation would not occur reducing the Air alarm if total failure effective mixing. This might result in an NOx reduction might fail. increase in urea usage. CEMs are calibrated on 6 month minimum intervals.
CONTROL FAILURE OR Economic due to excessive urea use. FAULTY NOX READING SEPA limit on ammonia emission at 10mg/Nm3 for daily average, 20mg/Nm3 for hr average
2 UREA FLOWING DURING Urea may be wasted in secondary SHUT DOWN chamber. SEPA limit on ammonia emission at 10mg/Nm3 for daily average, 20mg/Nm3 for hr average
EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 17 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Corrosion
LOW TEMPERATURE Corrosion of pipe work and possible leak. AROUND INLET CAUSING CONDENSATION FROM ACID GAS INCORRECT MAKEUP Ineffective or excessive use of urea.
Consider leaving air on to keep nozzle clear. Nozzle location design to minimise risk of gas condensate accumulation. Ensure make up system can be monitored.
EEL
Composition
EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 18 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
VALVE FAILED CLOSED Massive gas leakages throughout system. Health & safety risk.
Manual override to force valve open. Valve is set to fail open. Ensure hydraulic accumulator is sized for two streams minimum. Duty/standby hydraulic motors. Additional independent system to be included. Independent direct hydraulic hand pump to be consider
Reverse flow
Air drawn into SCC causing temperature Limit switch on valve will prompt fans to drop and burners to come on in PGC and ID fan to shut down.
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 19 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Thermal shock
E.G. COLD AIR DRAWN Damage to refractory if repeated DOWN HOT BY-PASS
Limit switch on stack will shut ID fan if open. Parameters fixed during operation to minimise risk
Composition
Incomplete combustion.
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 20 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
NO OIL IN RESERVOIR Unable to operate hydraulic plant DUE TO LEAK including vents and doors.
Reservoir has level switches to indicate low level. Pressure switches in system will cause alarm to sound Unit located under secondary chamber and protected from mechanical damage Biodegradable oil to be used in case of spillage. Independent circuit and pipe route to emergency damper system required Emergency isolation valves to be included to isolate circuits. EEL/AEL/ OSL EEL/AEL EEL
Pressure switches in system will Unable to operate hydraulic plant including vents and doors. Loss of level cause alarm to sound switches would prevent low level warning Ensure design of pack enables vent to open even on pack failure. Critical spares and oil to be kept on site. Contract with specialist for maintenance to be considered.
EEL
Maximise independence of systems Common maintenance on some filters may require careful management of plant and ensure valves are included to allow on-line removal. outages. Dual/duplex filters to be provided Plant damage and blockage. Contract with specialist for maintenance to be considered.
EEL
EEL
Low flow
CONTAMINATED OIL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 21 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Viscosity to high.
Problem will be determined (if applicable) during commissioning, and heaters connected if required.
3 2 A Low level 1
Ineffective operation. Possible trip out on Contract with specialist for high pressure maintenance to be considered. Oil leaking on floor risking hazard and pollution. Bund system to be checked/ considered. EEL/AEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 22 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
NO FUEL IN TANK
No operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas.
Low-level and ultra low alarms in tank. Open vent interlock on low temperature on secondary chamber to reduce probability of explosion. Ensure plant is not started if fuel level is below minimal level. Ensure pumps dont trip on low level Pumps can run dry for a short period. EEL
LINE BLOCKED DUE TO No operation economic consequence. NO STRAINER ON PUMP Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in INLET secondary there is a build up of residual gas. PUMP FAILURE No operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas. No operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas. Failure of this valve would result in No operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas.
Add dual strainer between fuel tank and pumps Ensure strainers/filters are inspected and maintained on a regular basis. Duty standby pumps on auto changeover. Pumps started on alternate basis
EEL (SOP)
EEL (SOP)
AUTO VALVE
EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 23 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
6 PRESSURE REGULATOR Failure of this valve would result in No FAILS operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas. 7 PIPE WORK LEAK No operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas. Risk of oil spillage leading to health & safety issues B Less flow 1 No operation economic consequence. PUMPS RECIRCULATING IN PUMP Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in LOOP secondary there is a build up of residual gas. RETURN NRV STICKS No operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas.
Provide manual isolating valves for maintenance. Provide manual bypass branch.
EEL EEL
Regulatory requirements and standards to be reviewed, with flanges/joints minimised if possible. Generally this is a low pressure system (1.5 bar)
EEL/OSL
EEL
Delete NRV from return line and fit return with anti-siphon to tank.
Also Flow
CONTAMINATION FROM No operation economic consequence. WATER Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas.
Filters have a water separation capability. Drain on tank below outlet with separate collection facility.
Ascot Environmental
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Page 24 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
AIR LOCKS
No operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas. No operation economic consequence. Risk of compliance failure for temperature limit. If flame goes out in secondary there is a build up of residual gas.
Low temperature
Ensure correct standard of fuel is delivered according to season. This has implications on design of tank size. Local level indicator for delivery purposes. High level probe will cause actuated inlet valve to close and alarm Overflow will run to floor. Final location (outside) and method to be agreed. Local bund and rain cover required Dispense point to have a trigger action and manual override for fuel pumps. NOTE Standards regarding earth connections relevant to materials used to be reviewed and included
AEL/OSL
High level
2 OVERFILLING VEHICLES Vehicle tank overfilled resulting in oil FROM FUEL TANK spillage
Low level
Office heating system runs off fuel oil and Storage method and location to be low level would result in heating failure investigated
OSL/AEL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 25 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow (gas)
Reduced operation. Economic consequence. Cold start could take 3-4 hours Hot start would take 20-30 mins.
None required.
Water spray unit will control to a point START UP/ABNORMAL Super heater temperature will rise and CONDITIONS cause possible damage to super heaters. (to be advised). This will happen on start up for up to UHTemp will alarm and steam vented 2-3 hrs. via high temperature vent valve. Route and termination of vent to be decided. TOO MUCH GAS Economical consequences. Emergency Vent will be opened by either high exhaust temp or low gas pressure ID fans will trip if vent is opened.
TIBS AEL/TIBS
Reduced operation. Economic consequence. Reduce plant life from thermal shocks.
ABNORMAL UPSTREAM 1400C is the limit of refractory material in ducting. CONDITION (SEE ABOVE) Super heater would cope with temperatures up to 1200C for a short period but with a reduced life. RAPID TEMP RISE DURING WARM UP ID FAN PULLING AGAINST DEAD END Damage to plant from thermal shock Possible plant damage.
UHTemp will alarm and steam vented via high temperature vent valve. Route and termination of vent to be decided. Thermal loadings between SCC and boiler to be matched through dialogue Ensure ID fan doesnt exceed design pressures (+/- 100mBarg)
AEL/TIBS
EEL/TIBS EEL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 26 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
EXCESSIVE PARTICULATES,
Sticky deposits caused by sodium and potassium elements blockage and erosion of plant. Stickiness is also affected by temperature Loss of performance
Gasification design to minimise the particulate. Retrofit of soot blower to be provisioned for. Note design spec is 25mg/m3 of soot, which is considered low. Ash analysis facility will be available on site. Design parameters are set to ensure levels are correct. Mixing waste prior to processing will assist levels are optimised. TIBS AEL TIBS
2 EXCESSIVE CORROSIVE Chlorine & fluorides etc can reduce the PRODUCTS life of the plant.
A B C
VALVE CLOSED
1 SEE ABOVE 1 TURBINE, VENT OR Economic consequence if steam goes to Flow and temperature measurement CONDENSER OPENING waste designed to balance. Turbine trips on low steam pressure. FLOW BACK FROM SECOND BOILER. Economic consequence Steam drum overflows NRV on header.
D 6 7 A A
1 SEE ABOVE 1 2 VALVE CLOSED TURBINE TRIP VALVE Pressure would be exceeded and the plant damaged. Health & safety risk Pressure would be exceeded and the plant damaged. Health & safety risk Relief valves on drum & line. Relief valves on drum & line.
Ascot Environmental
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Page 27 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
1 2
A A
1 EXCESS GAS THROUGH Possible plant damage SYSTEM 1 EXCESSIVE PARTICULATES, Sticky deposits caused by sodium and potassium elements blockage and erosion of plant. Stickiness is also affected by temperature Loss of performance
Flow limited by design of ID fan. Gasification design to minimise the particulate. Retrofit of soot blower to be provisioned for. Note design spec is 25mg/m3 of soot, which is considered low. Ash analysis facility will be available on site. TIBS
Level in drum falls, high risk of explosion Low level alarm sounds in boiler. Health & safety consequences. Low low level trips system. High integrity safety trip required to trip ID fan & vent valve. Flow alarm to be considered on water supply to economiser EEL/TIBS/ OSL OSL/TIBS
BLOW DOWN FAILURE Water level in boiler increases. Water carried through to super heater and turbine plant damage. (Note turbine has its own protection against water carry over)
Level control system with high level alarm and high high level dump valve opens if alarm for a period of time. Consider steam trap in dump line as alternative option. Consider steam trap in dump line as alternative option. TIBS
Water level in boiler increases. Water carried through to super heater and turbine plant damage. (Note turbine has its own protection against water carry over)
Ascot Environmental
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Page 28 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Water level in boiler increases. Water carried through to super heater and turbine plant damage. (Note turbine has its own protection against water carry over)
Consider removing or repositioning valve and ensuring valves suitable for on-line maintenance..
Steam/water leaking from economiser or NRV on water inlet to drum. BREAK IN LINE TO ECONOMISER OR PUMP pipe. Pumps have inbuilt NRVs. FAILURE VALVES CLOSED Concentration of solids in boiler increases causing carry over to super heater Water sampled every day. Conductivity meter required with alarm to control blow down Water supply is from RO plant and therefore low in solids. TIBS
More flow (to blow down) Excess cooling water flow (to blow down) Low cooling water flow (to blow down)
1 2 3 1
VALVE STUCK OPEN. CONTROL FAILURE COOLING WATER SUPPLY FAILS AS SUPER HEATER ABOVE RO PLANT FAILURE
Water waste economic consequence Economic consequence due to water tanking costs.
Blow down vessel would become hot with Temperature probe to alarm and trip excessive steam released. ash water pumps Plant rupture Health & safety risk Two PRVs on drum and one on super heater. High pressure alarm
High pressure
TIBS TIBS
Water sampled every day. Conductivity meter required with alarm to control blow down
Ascot Environmental
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Page 29 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
FEED WATER DOSING Low pH, high hardness or excessive FAILURE oxygen causes internal (water side) corrosion.
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 30 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
1 EXCESS GAS THROUGH Steaming in economiser causing water SYSTEM hammer and mechanical damage. Outlet gas temperature too high for bagging stage. (bags can cope with 220C for short period)
EEL
Gasifier system design to limit Outlet gas temperature too high for bagging stage. (bags can cope with 220C throughput on high temperature. for short period) See poor composition below. Sticky deposits caused by sodium and potassium elements blockage and erosion of plant. Stickiness is also affected by temperature Loss of performance Gasification design to minimise the particulate. Retrofit of soot blower to be provisioned for. Note design spec is 25mg/m3 of soot, which is considered low. Ash analysis facility will be available on site.
EEL
EXCESSIVE PARTICULATES,
TIBS
2 EXCESSIVE CORROSIVE Sulphur oxides etc can reduce the life of Design parameters are set to ensure PRODUCTS the plant. levels are correct. Mixing waste prior to processing will assist levels are optimised. Boiler feed water pre-heated to reduce the risk of condensing acidic deposits.
TIBS AEL
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Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow (water)
Steaming in economiser causing water hammer and mechanical damage. Possible damage to recirc pump and system.
At high temperature, the emergency vent would trip Consider means of tripping on loss of water flow prior to high temperature and include trip of recirc pump
EEL TIBS/OSL
Outlet gas temperature too high for bagging stage. (bags can cope with 220C Boiler water feed pumps are duty/stand-by. (See water feed node) for short period)
Flow alarm to be considered on water supply to economiser 2 CONTROL VALVE FAILS Steaming in economiser causing water CLOSED hammer and mechanical damage. Possible damage to recirc pump and system. At high temperature, the emergency vent would trip Boiler water feed pumps are duty/stand-by. (See water feed node)
TIBS/OSL EEL
Flow alarm to be considered on water Outlet gas temperature too high for bagging stage. (bags can cope with 220C supply to economiser for short period) 5 A High temperature (water from economiser) Low temperature (water from economiser) 1 LOW WATER FLOW FROM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE Pulse steam/water causing vibration and Temperature control method on possible mechanical damage. recirculation loop.
TIBS/OSL
TIBS
RECIRC PUMP TRIPPED Outlet gas temperature rises too high for Spare pump to be available. bagging stage. (bags can cope with 220C Pump stop alarm for short period) Cold water through economiser may cause acid deposit condensation
TIBS/AEL TIBS
1 INLET VALVE TO BOILER Pumps can develop up to 60bar with risk PRV fitted to economiser header CLOSED of economiser damage
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Page 32 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
A B
1 1 1
Bi-carb & carbon build up in line Bi-carb & carbon drawn back into boiler causing sticky deposits. Bag filter damage.
ID fan stop causes dosing & recirc stop. ID fan has damper, which will close. High temperature trip to emergency vent. Generally as described above. See SCC Node
2 HOT GAS PULLED FROM Bag filter damage SECONDARY CHAMBER DOWN RECIRC LINE B Low temperature (gas) Composition 1 SEE ABOVE Potential corrosion due to acidic condensate No reaction in tower and breach of regulations for emissions Economic consequence
Bag house is coated for protection. Shutdown on low temperature at end of batch CEM feedback would alarm and system would need to be shut down if problem not promptly resolved. System design prevents excessive use of material. Operator training EEL (SOP) EEL (SOP)
Ascot Environmental
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Page 33 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
NO BI-CARB IN SILO
Silo level alarms and daily supply contract. 3-4 days storage capacity. CEM feedback would alarm and system would need to be shut down if problem not promptly resolved. Consider standby bagged material of pre-mix bicarb/carb AEL
NO CONVEYING AIR
3-4 hours capacity in line silos Cross over facility in lines. Consider standby bagged material of pre-mix bicarb/carb
Line hopper alarms on low level. Consider standby bagged material of pre-mix bicarb/carb CEM feedback would alarm and system would need to be shut down if problem not promptly resolved
BLOCKAGE
Line hopper alarms on low level. Consider standby bagged material of pre-mix bicarb/carb CEM feedback would alarm and system would need to be shut down if problem not promptly resolved
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Page 34 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Line hopper alarms on low level. Consider standby bagged material of pre-mix bicarb/carb CEM feedback would alarm and system would need to be shut down if problem not promptly resolved Consider manual facility for feeding bicarb directly into bag house/gas duct EEL/AEL
More flow
1 LEVEL SWITCH FAILURE Line silo would over fill and block line. IN LINE HOPPER 1 AIR FLOW BACK INTO Dust in atmosphere STORAGE METERING HOPPER BLOCKED MAIN SILO FILTER Relief valve would cause dust in atmosphere
Blower flow switch would cut out Consider Hi-Hi level alarm on line hopper. Metering rotary valve and/or other prevention system in metering hopper discharge Ensure filter has alarm. Ensure clean up facility available (minimal water usage) Consider CCTV for silo top Consider ways of disposing of waste water OSL OSL AEL AEL/EEL OSL OSL AEL/EEL OSL
Reverse flow
High Pressure
Ensure filter has alarm. Ensure clean up facility available (minimal water usage) Consider ways of disposing of waste water
Low Pressure
BLOCKED FILTER
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Page 35 of 67 pages
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Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
3 4
A A
1 1 2
INCORRECT MATERIAL Ineffective reactions leading to regulation Quality and purchasing control. SUPPLIED breach. LIME/BICARB MIX Bicarb or lime not cleaned out on changeover. Mix would tend to clump causing ineffective reactions. Quality control and operator training.
3 5 A Erosion 1
Prolonged storage may cause material to Check availability of silo emptying cake and block silos/lines (see above) contractors. Wear of plant & pipe work Unlikely due to fine nature of material and experience indicates this is not an issue.
AEL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 36 of 67 pages
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Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Reverse flow
Ascot Environmental
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Page 37 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow to CT
PUMP FAILURE
Cooling tower failure would result in condenser failure and turbine boiler shutdown Returning hot water would damage cooling tower.
Pond holds water sufficient for 4-6hrs operations. Relief valve on condenser Blow down from cooling tower will stop. Consider tripping emergency vent valves on low-low CT pond level and tripping level. Consider manual emergency water supply to CT pond. Boxed spare pump available. Level alarms in CT pond will sound. AEL/OSL
AEL/OSL
Cooling tower failure would result in condenser failure and turbine boiler shutdown Returning hot water would damage cooling tower.
Pond holds water sufficient for 4-6hrs operations. Relief valve on condenser Blow down from cooling tower will stop. Consider tripping emergency vent valves on low-low CT pond level and tripping level. Consider manual emergency water supply to CT pond. Boxed spare pump available. Consider dual ball valves Level alarms in CT pond will sound. SPX AEL/OSL
AEL/OSL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 38 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Cooling tower failure would result in condenser failure and turbine boiler shutdown Returning hot water would damage cooling tower.
Pond holds water sufficient for 4-6hrs operations. Relief valve on condenser Blow down from cooling tower will stop. Consider tripping emergency vent valves on low-low CT pond level and tripping level. Consider manual emergency water supply to CT pond. Boxed spare pump available. Two bore holes available Level alarms in CT pond will sound. AEL/OSL
AEL/OSL
Cooling tower failure would result in condenser failure and turbine boiler shutdown Returning hot water would damage cooling tower.
Pond holds water sufficient for 4-6hrs operations. Relief valve on condenser Blow down from cooling tower will stop. Consider tripping emergency vent valves on low-low CT pond level and tripping level. Consider manual emergency water supply to CT pond. Two bore holes available Level alarms in CT pond will sound. AEL/OSL
AEL/OSL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 39 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
VALVE CLOSED
Cooling tower failure would result in condenser failure and turbine boiler shutdown Returning hot water would damage cooling tower.
Pond holds water sufficient for 4-6hrs operations. Relief valve on condenser Blow down from cooling tower will stop. Consider tripping emergency vent valves on low-low CT pond level and tripping level. Consider manual emergency water supply to CT pond. Level alarms in CT pond will sound. AEL/OSL
AEL/OSL
Cooling tower failure would result in condenser failure and turbine boiler shutdown Returning hot water would damage cooling tower.
Pond holds water sufficient for 4-6hrs operations. Relief valve on condenser Blow down from cooling tower will stop. Consider tripping emergency vent valves on low-low CT pond level and tripping level. Consider manual emergency water supply to CT pond. Level alarms in CT pond will sound. AEL/OSL
AEL/OSL
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Page 40 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
PIPE FROZEN
Cooling tower failure would result in condenser failure and turbine boiler shutdown Returning hot water would damage cooling tower. Only likely during winter shut downs resulting in start up problems. Condition of bore hole water and size of main reduce this possibility.
Pond holds water sufficient for 4-6hrs operations. Relief valve on condenser Blow down from cooling tower will stop. Consider tripping emergency vent valves on low-low CT pond level and tripping level. Consider manual emergency water supply to CT pond. Level alarms in CT pond will sound. Pipe work lagged and ability to drain down during shut down to be considered. AEL/OSL AEL/OSL
AEL/OSL
More flow
BALL VALVE FAILS OPEN ABNORMAL USE PUMPING AGAINST CLOSED VALVES
Excessive water usage and environmental contamination. Extraction license exceeded. Damage to pumps and pipe work
Over flow cut out to run towards surface drain and to lined pond. High-level alarm in CT pond. Flow meter(s) and alarm on both extraction systems. Investigate pump type. Ultimate low level will trigger towns water top up (manual or automatic). Consider option to blend towns water with high level shut off.
AEL/OSL
2 3 4 5
A A A A
More flow (bore hole water) High pressure Low level Composition
1 1 1 1 2
BORE HOLE HOLDING (See no flow above) TANK RUNNING LOW POOR BORE HOLE WATER CONDITION Poor mineral content of water will affect plant and operation
PARTICULATE CARRY Build up of debris on cooling towers and Consider in-line filter(s) water tanks OVER FROM BORE HOLES
Ascot Environmental
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Page 41 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No Flow
SPX/AEL
Global alarm on failure of package. Note plant would need to be failed for Towers to be shut down and cleaned a long period to cause problems on a regular basis (using one off line) Potential Legionella Health & safety. Fouling of system. Note plant would need to be failed for a long period to cause problems Purchasing and storage controls/ management. AEL
NO CHEMICALS
Potential Legionella Health & safety. Fouling of system. Note plant would need to be failed for a long period to cause problems
BLOCKAGE
SPX/AEL
Global alarm on failure of package. Note plant would need to be failed for Towers to be shut down and cleaned a long period to cause problems on a regular basis (using one off line) 5 PIPE RUPTURE Potential Legionella Health & safety. Fouling of system. Local bund protection for spillage. Regular QC checks on CT water. Global alarm on failure of package. SPX/AEL
Towers to be shut down and cleaned Note plant would need to be failed for on a regular basis (using one off line) a long period to cause problems B More flow 1 MEASUREMENT SYSTEM FAILURE OR EXCESSIVE PUMP RUNNING Chemical waste/cost Environmental impact Efficiency of plant would be reduced. Global alarm on failure of package. Regular QC checks on CT water. Water chemistry contractor required. AEL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 42 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Also Flow
INCORRECT Mixing chemicals creates specific health Use specialist chemical contractor with appropriate in-house procedures. CHEMICALS TO TANKS hazards as well as give poor water treatment.
AEL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 43 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
PUMPING FAILURE
Backwash tank overflow to pond without Check if conductivity probe will alarm. processing. Concentration of chemicals Regular QC checks on CT water and organic compounds increases. Concentration of chemicals and organic compounds increases. Check if conductivity probe will alarm or shut valve. Regular QC checks on CT water Check if conductivity probe will alarm. Regular QC checks on CT water Loss of blow down alarm required Control system alarm required Consider High temperature alarm and remedial action.
SPX
SPX
Concentration of chemicals and organic NO BLOW DOWN WATER DUE TO VALVE compounds increases. FAIL CLOSED RO DRAIN/LEAK FAILED Higher demand on make up water OPEN CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE WATER RETURN TOO HOT (>60C) FREEZING AMBIENT CONDITIONS Higher demand on make up water Economic consequence Consent limit exceeded. Possible damage to RO plant.
SPX
Water in line may freeze where exposed Pipe work to be lagged where required to external conditions. Processing unit located within building. Concentration of chemicals and organic compounds increases. Regular QC checks on CT water Regular backwash Consider a filter on bleed line to RO plant.
4 5
A A
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Page 44 of 67 pages
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Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
PUMP FAILURE
Stand by pump (+ 2 x duty) PRV on condenser Check turbine operating period without cooling water and fit rips accordingly. Ensure pump will auto changeover on failure Consider need for direct emergency vent operation on loss of flow/pumping facility. OSL
OSL OSL
WATER LOSS
See previous node (water make-up) Ensure low level in pond doesnt trip all pumps OSL
No (or reduced) water to condenser and PRV on condenser turbine resulting in plant damage Check turbine operating period without cooling water and fit rips accordingly. Valves used for maintenance purposes only, and normally left open.
4 5
No (or reduced) water from condenser and turbine resulting in reduced cooling Debris drawn from CT pond to pumps. No water to condenser and turbine resulting in plant damage
Valves used for flow balancing and maintenance. Strainer arrangement to allow safe (plant protected) removal during operation. OSL
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Page 45 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Less flow
PARTIAL BLOCKAGE
Temperature rises and may damage towers (>52C) Reduced system efficiency and loss of power available for export.
See above Signal to turn off gasification and reduce process flow to regain control and rectify issue. Consider need to trip emergency vent on Hi-Hi temp. EEL/OSL
PUMP FAILURE
Standby pump not available. Temperature rises and may damage towers (>52C) Reduced system efficiency and loss of power available for export.
See above Signal to turn off gasification and reduce process flow to regain control and rectify issue. Consider need to trip emergency vent on Hi-Hi temp. See above Signal to turn off gasification and reduce process flow to regain control and rectify issue. Consider need to trip emergency vent on Hi-Hi temp. EEL/OSL EEL/OSL
Temperature rises and may damage towers (>52C) Reduced system efficiency and loss of power available for export.
4 LOW LEVEL IN CT POND Temperature rises and may damage towers (>52C) Reduced system efficiency and loss of power available for export.
See above Signal to turn off gasification and reduce process flow to regain control and rectify issue. Consider need to trip emergency vent on Hi-Hi temp. Level alarms in CT pond (see above) EEL/OSL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 46 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
More flow
Inefficient operation with possible plant PUMPS OPERATED OUTSIDE OF DUTY DUE damage TO LOW PRESSURE DROP
SPX
2 3
A A
More flow (through towers) Low flow (to ancillaries) Other flow
1 1
INCORRECT SET UP ON Overflow over towers and onto adj area. Correct set-up on commissioning TOWER Higher temperatures Checks after maintenance IMBALANCE OF PRESSURE DROPS ACROSS UNITS Ineffective cooling of lube oil and turbine. Investigate pressure drops over plant items and design accordingly.
1 LEAK INTO CONDENSER Cooling water leaking into the condenser Ensure that CT water is correctly (COOLING TO STEAM) potentially damaging the boiler (circuit) dosed to minimise corrosion. Schedule of testing procedures to be compiled
AEL OSL/AEL
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Page 47 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
FAN FAILURE
Water not cooled effectively. Temperature rises and may damage towers (>52C) Reduced system efficiency and loss of power available for export. CT operation can continue with reduced efficiency if fans are not operating.
Regular maintenance and inspection. Vibration monitoring will prompt fans to trip & alarm and require re-setting. Gearboxes should be overfilled during prolonged down times to prevent moisture ingress. Regular maintenance and inspection. Replace pack. Mesh protection to protect from adjacent trees.
AEL
AEL
Water not cooled effectively. Temperature rises and may damage towers (>52C) Reduced system efficiency and loss of power available for export. CT operation can continue with reduced efficiency if fans are not operating. Water may overflow down side of towers (see above)
High temperature
START UP
Residual hot water accumulated in system will run through to towers and cause damage to pack if >52C
Confirm potential problem (volume estimate from TIBS) Method required for safeguarding pack on re-start.
SPX TIBS
Ascot Environmental
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Page 48 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
1 1
A A B C
Note Steam-to-turbine is protected by the condenser dump line. The turbine is treated as a black box with no detailed analysis. Check operation of turbine trip system link to by-pass valve and the resulting effect on pressure. No Flow (steam) Low flow (steam) More flow (steam) 1 1 1 BYPASS VALVE FAILS Over pressure and damage TO OPEN STREAM 3 OPERATION If valve cannot cope with low pressure range, then oscillation may occur OVERLOAD OF GAS PRODUCTION Excessive pressure and temperature generated in condenser. Hot water to CTs and reduced turbine efficiency. PRVs on boilers. Turn down range of valve to be checked Correct operational loading TIBS AEL TIBS/ OSL
High temperature
1 WATER SPRAY FAILURE Lack of water spray can allow steam at Automatic protection required to up to 410C. Condenser can run at higher protect the condenser. temperature for a short period, but will eventually be damaged. 1 1 LOSS OF COOLING Potential damage to condenser. WATER TO CONDENSER PRV on condenser (See cooling water above)
TIBS/ OSL
A B
Turbine will trip economic consequence Leave gasifier operating on low LOST PRESSURE pressure. CONTROL BECAUSE DUMP VALVE IS OPEN Erosion and deposition on turbine blades See boiler nodes CARRY OVER OF SOLIDS IN THE BOILER Turbine has integral separator to clean (SEE BOILER NODES) steam.
OSL
Composition
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Page 49 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
WATER SUPPLY LOST Deaerator level drops but this will be over a long period of time (approx 4-5 days). PUMP FAILURE 0.5 m3/hr loss of water. Up to 8 hrs
RO plant and softener by-passed Consider stand-by water source and/ or contract supplier. Use water tank as by-pass/ stand-by with main feed direct from RO plant Spare pump required Independent level alarm. Take overflow to RO reject sump for recycling to bore hole store tank
Level
Composition
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Page 50 of 67 pages
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Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
PUMP FAILURE
PRV on condenser Check detailed condensers Consider trip to emergency vent requirement on high level in condenser. Standby pump available OSL
PRV on condenser Check detailed condensers Consider trip to emergency vent requirement on high level in condenser. OSL
B 2 A
1 3 WAY CONTROL VALVE Pump cavitating and pump failure FAILS 1 ABNORMAL OPERATION Poor operation!
OSL
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Page 51 of 67 pages
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Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
PUMP FAILURE
Low level in boilers leading to emergency 2 duty and one stand-by pumps with vent opening auto changeover. Pump alarms, and reduce gasification rate (consider auto switch to reduced gasification). Low level alarm Flow alarm
NO WATER
Low-level alarm in deaerator. Consider supervisory override key to prevent all pumps being shut down. Level control monitored on deaerator. TIBS
3 4
Low level in boilers leading to emergency Flow alarm & procedures vent opening Low level in boilers leading to emergency Flow alarm & procedures vent opening. Note - only excessive flow is diverted. High pressure pumping against dead head resulting in seal damage Consider method to protect pump. TIBS
B 2 A
1 See high level in boiler node 1 BOILER FEED PUMP VALVES CLOSED
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Page 52 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
1 2
No deaerator heating resulting in higher Back up supply from high pressure chemical usage. Economic consequence steam header. No deaerator heating resulting in higher Back up supply from high pressure chemical usage. Economic consequence steam header. Pressure in deaerator increases. PRV on deaerator. Consider CV to suitable higher standard. TIBS
B 2 A
1 LOSS OF WATER TO DE- Control valve damaged. Unlikely to SUPER HEATER damage deaerator
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Page 53 of 67 pages
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Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Low flow
UP-STREAM PROCESS Drop in flow and temperature and flow ISSUES may cause condensing acidic deposits. This is considered unlikely, as there are wide ranging design parameters for the unit.
Bag house construction coated and insulated to protect against corrosion. Hopper trace heaters will warm hoppers.
Reverse flow
DAMPER AND ID FAN FAILURE DURING EMERGENCY VENT OPERATION SEE BOILER & ECONOMISER NODE EXCESSIVE TRACE HEATING
No consequence other than minor risk of back flow of dust and cooling of unit.
High temperature
1 2
Bag will be destroyed and possible risk of See boiler & economiser node fire. Health & safety issue. Check if bags are combustible Possible fire or adverse reaction in base Check impact of trace heating on of hoppers possible combustible material in hopper base and safeguard as required. Condensation causes clogging of bags 4hrs required to warm upstream to operating temperature, which will be adequate to warm bag house. Hopper trace heaters will warm hoppers. Start up on diesel oil. Experience shows that this is not an issue
EEL EEL
Low temperature
START UP.
UP-STREAM PROCESS See above ISSUES COMMISSIONING Refractory linings not sufficiently cured in Consider method of curing refractory ducts. lining. EEL/ OSL EEL
ID FAN SUCKING Possible damage to bag house structure Consider protection if required. AGAINST CLOSED DUCT
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Page 54 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Safeguards Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
SCREW FAILURE
Silo can hold several tonnes of material Level switch in hopper set to point to representing several hours of production. allow time for action. Motor trip alarm Silo can hold several tonnes of material Level switch in hopper set to point to representing several hours of production allow time for action. Consider recirc hopper trace heating Motor trip alarm Inspection panel required and possible access for cleaning to be considered
EEL
BLOCKAGE
Silo can hold several tonnes of material Level switch in hopper set to point to representing several hours of production allow time for action. Motor trip alarm Dangerous materials (e.g. asbestos) accumulating in ash. Health and safety risk Site permit covers material that can and cannot be accepted. Supplier controls and QC. Consider protection and warnings against personnel contact with hot residues. Care to be taken to avoid water around bagging area (store bags dry) Ensure discharge system and bags can withstand max temperature and dust containment. Consider alternative methods of collection (e.g. pneumatic conveying & tanker)
Also Flow
AEL
High temperature
HOT SOLIDS Temperature of solids will be less than DISCHARGED TO BAGS flue gas temp (<150). Flow rate is low.
AEL/EEL
AEL AEL/EEL
AEL
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Site
Page 55 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Safeguards Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
High level
Consider alternative methods of collection (e.g. pneumatic conveying & tanker) Level switch in discharge hopper.
AEL
Discharge hopper is full, and unable to recirculate resulting in increase in virgin chemical usage.
EEL
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Page 56 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
1 COMPRESSOR FAILURE Unable to clear bag filters. Ultimately system will need to be shut down (after several hrs) 2 BAGS BLINDED (See above)
More flow
FREQUENT PULSING Excessive wear on bag. Economic DUE TO WRONG SET UP consequence.
Timer is main control for pulsing with Dp backup Note pulsing will be audible to operators
EEL
DP MEASUREMENT FAILURE
Timer is main control for pulsing with Dp backup Note pulsing will be audible to operators
EEL
BAG CHANGEOVER
Contractor to use PPE and cleaning Release of excessive dust during bag changeover (approx 500 off). May cause equipment health & safety issue Safe (dust reduced) method of changing bags required Air condition from compressor to be at appropriate standard.
Composition
AIR HOLDS TOO MUCH Bag blinding due to condensation. MOISTURE Possible increase in plant corrosion
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Page 57 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
1 2 3
See gasifier node See gasifier node Considered highly unlikely (stack diameter 0.8m) Ensure material protection coating can withstand maximum temperatures Bag house inlet trip limits set accordingly EEL EEL AEL AEL/EEL
High temperature
3 4
A A
Level No Inspection
1 1
RAIN ACCUMULATED IN May occur during shut down periods STACK PROCESS DEVIATIONS Permit levels exceeded. Environmental RESULT IN ADVERSE consequences EMISSIONS
Accessible drain to be fitted in base of stack. Regular independent measurements made on discharge Sample points to measure discharge materials to be included with suitable access and compliant pipe design. Ensure construction materials are adequate.
Corrosion
EEL
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Page 58 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Depending where in the process cycle TOTAL LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER & this occurred. GENERATOR All drives, fans etc would stop. Gas released from PGC & SCC. Pressure would increase in the boiler/condenser system. Internal and external lighting would be lost.
PRVs on boiler/condenser Emergency lighting in critical locations Consider safe location of manual emergency venting operation (e.g. outside of building) Consider emergency ventilation/ extraction for building Office ventilation to external wall
PGC doors will remain closed due to loss Control room to have emergency lighting and emergency hard wired of hydraulic power. stop for vent. Fire hoses will not work. PLC will action a delayed vent opening to allow for generator starting time. This will require vent solenoid to have emergency back up power. Develop start strategy after power failure. Consider reduced flow signal to EEL control Consider hydraulic design to maximise availability on power failure Fire fighting strategy to be developed taking into account potential power loss scenarios. Consider making the SCC burners and fans a priority on start up.
EEL/ OSL
EEL/OSL
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Page 59 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
NO WATER
No ash wetting. Release of dust to atmosphere. Operators may notice lack of water. No ash wetting. Release of dust to atmosphere. Operators may notice lack of water.
Low level alarm Water make up to receiving sump through ball valve. Two pumps (one per line) with manual cross over if required. Trip alarm on motor failure Option to use submerged system would negate use of spray (see below). Design of spray to take into account water quality. AEL/EEL EEL
PUMP FAILURE
ASH SPRAY BLOCKED No ash wetting. Release of dust to atmosphere. Operators may notice lack of water.
No ash wetting. Release of dust to atmosphere Operators may notice lack of water. No ash wetting. Release of dust to atmosphere. Operators may notice lack of water.
Design of ball valve to take into account water quality. Consider dual ball valves Valves only used for maintenance purposes, and should remain open.
6 Consider detail design on a manual operation or auto pumping on conveyor start depending on spray or soak regime etc requiring a signal from conveyor to start pump. Include for one pump per line. B More flow 1 BALL VALVE FAILURE (ASH CONVEYORS) Conveyor pit would flood over into surrounding area. Water waste and cleaning operation economic consequence. Risk of contaminated water entering boiler drain pits. Floor drain to ash pit. Curb designs around pits/gasifiers etc. Regular maintenance on ball valves.
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Page 60 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Floor drain to ash pit. CONVEYOR TRIP FOR Water sprayed into conveyor pit when PUMP FAILS ON ash is not being discharged. Water may Curb designs around pits/gasifiers etc build up and flood but at a slower rate Regular maintenance on ball valves than for ball valve failure BALL VALVE FAILURE (COLLECTION SUMP) HOT BLOW DOWN WATER CHEMICALS IN ASH Sump would over flow Damage to pumps Cannot be used by end user Change ball valve for solenoid valve and level control. Alarm in flash tank see boiler node Check with end user.
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 61 of 67 pages
DATE: 29th Oct 2007 DATE: Action By
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
No flow
PUMP FAILURE
Water overflows from underground tank and flood floor near gasifiers. Water may back up to boiler RO reject sump and contaminate bore hole water
Duty standby pumps Consider using a discreet tank to protect bore hole water. Level alarms Provide strainers on sump overflow outlet and access to underground tank for ash removal. AEL/OSL AEL/OSL
Water overflows from tank and flood floor Ensure tanker distribution contract is adequate. near gasifiers. Risk of contaminated water in ash making not suitable for sale Water may back up to boiler RO reject sump and contaminate bore hole water Level alarms Provide branch and connection for retrofit of return to ash wetting sump. Instrumentation at ground level to avoid need for tank top access or use scissor lift access Consider trace heating Maintain a level of water in tank
AEL
OSL/AEL OSL/AEL
3 2 A High temperature 1
Water pipe runs external to building and is a batch process. Underground tank is plastic and may be damaged.
OSL/AEL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 62 of 67 pages
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 v2 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
MATERIAL STRADDLED Safety implication for operator access to Door designed to minimise possibility move material ACROSS PRIMARY Waste material type is generally a fine CHAMBER DOOR constituency not liable to get trapped. Walkway between chambers will allow edges to be swept clean if required. Note Trapping points to be suitably guarded to prevent injury from moving parts etc. Interlock on doors will prevent door movement when operator(s) is close to the plant. Waste delivery is not permitted during primary loading and v.v. EEL
EEL
Ensure operator training covers risk of damage There will be sufficient time to load the chamber i.e. no undue pressure for the loading operator to rush Interlock temperature setting will prevent access to chamber when temperature is too high. Chambers should only be loaded just prior to intended operation.
EEL
AEL AEL
Mixed chemicals
Reaction may generate poisonous INCORRECT CHEMICALS SUPPLIED gas/vapour FOR DOSING SYSTEM
Ascot Environmental
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Page 63 of 67 pages
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 v2 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
A B
1 1
BURNERS POSITIONED Poor burner monitoring and reduced TOO HIGH operator control capability.
EEL AEL
Poor secondary chamber inspection and Confined space procedure to be CONFINED SPACE AROUND AND BETWEEN personnel risk from working in confined developed spaces SECONDARY CHAMBERS Hatch to have clear warning signs. Fastening with bolts as opposed to wing nuts). Bag house inspection and maintenance must only be carried during stream shut down. Hatch to have clear warning signs. Fastening with bolts (as opposed to wing nuts)..
Hot gas released when opening secondary chamber door (for inspection) Hot gas released when opening bag house reaction tower (for inspection)
1 BURNER IN OPERATION Operator/engineer injured by release of hot gas. WHEN HATCH IS OPENED 1 PLANT IN OPERATION Operator/engineer injured by release of hot gas. WHEN BAG HOUSE REACTION TOWER INSPECTION IS CARRIED OUT
EEL
AEL
EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 64 of 67 pages
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 v2 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
The design of the ash discharge is Ash left in the primary chamber will currently being designed. reduce the efficiency of the burner and cause potential unwanted residue to build The effectiveness of the system will be up. considered when the design is published Interlock temperature setting will prevent access to chamber when temperature is too high Flexible ash discharge to skip Manual redistribution in skip if required Consider collection pit.
EEL AEL/EEL
PRIMARY CHAMBER Ash too hot and potentially unsafe. OPENED TOO EARLY IN THE CYCLE ASH FORMS A CONE IN Uneconomic use of skips etc. THE SKIP
EEL
Ascot Environmental
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Page 65 of 67 pages
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 v2 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Method of removal to be considered (power lift etc) Weight of fan unit to be checked. Gate valve access is via rear platform and removal will be with the use of site plant from front of chamber. Boom access to be checked Consider A Frame lifting device on platforms for removal of gate valve. This will require easy/safe removal of handrail.
AEL AEL/EEL
Procedure - Doors must be open before burner and or thermocouple unit is removed.
AEL/EEL
3 UNABLE TO REMOVE OF Unable to maintain/clean/replace nozzles Access is via working platform. QUENCH NOZZLES 4 UNABLE TO REMOVE OF Unable to maintain/replace door limit DOOR LIMIT SWITCHES switches 5 Unable to maintain air distributors UNABLE TO ACCESS/REMOVE AIR DISTRIBUTORS SECONDARY CHAMBER Unable to maintain secondary burners BURNERS LOCATED TOO HIGH WITH POOR ACCESSIBILITY RECIRCULATION FANS Unable to maintain recirc fans DE-NOX LANCES Unable to maintain de-nox lances Access is via working platform. Access is from front of unit.
EEL AEL
7 8
EEL EEL
Ascot Environmental
Site
Page 66 of 67 pages
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 v2 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
SECONDARY CHAMBER Unable to maintain secondary chamber INSTRUMENTATION instruments Note detail design of platforms to be considered during installation. CONDENSER RELIEF VALVES Unable to maintain condenser relief valves
AEL EEL/AEL
10
11 Condenser access and maintainability to be reviewed at a later date when information is available 12 13 DE-AERATOR BAG HOUSE BAG CHANGING Unable to maintain de-aerator Unable to remove/clean/replace bags etc. Access platforms for instrumentation etc to be reviewed Bags & frames lifted manually out of the chamber, and lowered to the ground with either a sling or site vehicle.
Ascot Environmental
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Page 67 of 67 pages
Data sheet Ref: 1188_ 93610 v2 Check Sheet Ref 1188_93611 Consequence
Operator Injured/discomfort
HOT SURFACES
Burn injury
Design of Primary chambers prevents surface from getting higher than 80C max. Warning signs for hot surfaces The secondary chamber is not accessible during operation. Burner units & thermocouples will require maintenance access. AEL/EEL AEL AEL/EEL AEL AEL AEL
3 Risk assessment for general PPE to be carried out (eye, hearing, footwear, dust, etc, noting special circumstances such as sampling operations etc.) 4 DUST INHALATION Bag house operations Face mask required