Antipenko, Nikolai

On the main line

The site "war literature": militera.lib.ru

Edition: Antipenko NA on the main line. - Moscow: Nauka, 1967. Book online: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russia/antipenko_na/index.html The book is one file: http://militera.lib.ru/memo/0/one/russia/antipenko_na.rar OCR, editing, HTML: Peter Andrianov (assaur@mail.ru) Additional treatment: Andriyanov Peter (assaur@mail.ru)
Antipenko NA on the main line (Memoirs of Deputy Commander of the Front) -M.: Science, 1967.

About the book: the book ... NA Antipenko is clearly useful. In essence, this is the first work of summarizing complex and multifaceted work of the rear of the Red Army in World War II. As the author says, he did not apply for a full description of the rear of the Red Army, and sought only to highlight and summarize scientific and dedicated work of many thousands of tireless workers in the rear of the front, where he worked as the deputy commander of the front on the rear. And he certainly succeeded. - (Marshal Zhukov H. K)

Content
Foreword

On the border The outbreak of war On the outskirts of Moscow The defeat of the Nazis near Moscow The Bryansk front Of Kursk When Belarus From the Vistula to the Oder Rear in the Berlin operation This is the rear Name Index
Notes

FOREWORD
The Great Patriotic War was a stern test of the defense of our socialist motherland. Soviet people and their armed forces under the leadership of Lenin's party during the war demonstrated to the world its power, indomitable will to win, great patriotism and loyalty to proletarian internationalism. The victory of our nation and its armed forces of Nazi Germany cost of great sacrifices. Overcoming extraordinary difficulties of the first period of the war, when the most important economic areas of the country have been temporarily seized by the enemy, the Soviet state has gradually achieved superiority in men and equipment over Nazi Germany, bringing the nationwide struggle to complete the defeat of the enemy. Gigantic work of the Party and the people on the restructuring of the country's economy on a war footing, the mass production of weapons and military equipment, ammunition, fuel, food, clothing and other supplies provided the victory of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Volga region, the Urals, Western Siberia and other eastern areas, where industrial equipment evacuated from the western and south-western [6] regions of the USSR, have been transformed into the largest military arsenals, which provide everything you need for the front of the tense war. Rear workers, factory workers, factories, collective farmers, the Soviet intelligentsia, deeply worrying hanging over Homeland mortal danger, are stretching their physical and spiritual strength, gave the troops of the fronts all you need for ultimate victory over Hitler's army. Soviet hinterland during the last war was an inexhaustible source of strength and might of the Red Army and the Navy. Our soldiers who heroically fought the enemy on all fronts, firmly believed in the stability of the rear, every day felt his help, and the Soviet people, who worked hard and selflessly in the rear, believed in his army to its victory over the enemy. Link between the fighting front and the national economy of the country was the rear of the Red Army. His role in the war is difficult to overestimate. In unusually difficult conditions proceeded logistics work in the first period of the war. Temporary loss of the western and southern regions of sharply reduced military and economic potential of the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the war because of the lack of organization in command and control, and poor performance rear of the Red Army, our troops are often in difficult circumstances. Large stocks, which were before the war in the border counties were destroyed or captured by the enemy. As a result, the Red Army lost huge reserves of fuel, ammunition, weapons, food and clothing. Deliveries of the central warehouse was difficult, since the front-line railways are under the constant influence of intense air strikes. Supply situation fronts complicated by the fact that from the first days of the war began long counter transport. In addition to transport troops and military cargo to the front, from the threatened areas were important evacuation, industrial and economic cargoes into the country. Serious obstacle in organizing support for the troops at the start of the war was the disunity of rear services that did not have a single governing body. Prior to August 1941 rear had a slim organizational structure, which was formed later. At the time, [7] with operational unit rear of the Red Army General Staff, and were in charge of the headquarters of the military districts, they also functioned as a general planning supplies for the army materiel from the economy and determined the amount of material costs for the upcoming operation, and material resources in the hands of the various services who did not obey the general staff. There was, therefore, the gap between the functions of planning, driving and supplies. But the main difficulty was that the general staff were not physically able to do everyday matters logistics troops, being excessively overloaded operational work, could not delve into the diverse and challenging activities logistics, manage day to day. Chiefs of supply attempting to manage supply through commanders, as supposed by the scheme in peacetime, but in war it was almost impossible. That's why it was necessary to relieve acute commanders and general staff of the daily issues of logistic support troops, give them the opportunity to focus its attention on the management of the troops and the organization of their military activity. Comprehensively assess the status and activities of the rear of the army in the first month of the war, the State Defense Committee instructed the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, later a member of the T-bills AI Mikoyan direct control of the armed forces with fuel, food and

clothing. Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of AA Andreev was entrusted leadership of the railway transport. A member of T-bills Voznesensky, deputy chairman of the SNK Kosygin, chairman of the All N. Shvernik also been responsible for organizing the supply of the army. The Central Committee of the party committee was set up assistance to the wounded, which, through the Party, Soviet and trade union organizations in the country took control of the medical evacuation support of sick and wounded. July 28, 1941 T-bills decided to set up an independent body the rear of the Red Army. August 1, 1941 were established General Directorate of the Red Army and the rear of the Rear of the fronts and armies. At the head of the rear of the Red Army was made General AV Hrulev, extremely energetic and experienced organizer. [8] The new structure of the rear of the Red Army fronts and armies was in keeping with the new conditions of war. The newly created controls rear got more rights and opportunities for developing a broad organizational and economic initiatives. Union in the hands of one of planning, managing and organizing logistics troops, submission of all communications chief of logistics and transport allowed more flexibility to solve a complex set of questions on the rear, to use all modes of transport and to bring good order throughout the rear fronts and armies. The new structure of the rear will also radically improve the formulation of medical evacuation cases at the front. Establish closer links military logistical organs with the national economy of the country, which allowed fuller and better use of local resources for the front. Initially, the new structure was introduced only in the center, on the fronts and armies, and in the corps and divisions, the previous rules - there for all the work the rear meet general staff. This led to the fact that the rear of the army chief was forced to give instructions for logistics services, which did not obey him. So in May 1942, and in the compounds was established as deputy commander for logistics, carrying the responsibility for organizing the logistics units and formations. Thus, by this time reached the uniformity of the organizational structure behind. The military situation demanded arrange railway, road and automotive troops. During the operation, revealed a great inconvenience to the management of these troops. Restoration of railway troops conducted two agencies - the People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Railways, which, naturally, had a negative effect on the recovery effort. ICT decision January 2, 1942, and management of all rehabilitation works of obstruction on the railways has been assigned to the People's Commissariat of Communications of the USSR, in a system which was established General Directorate of Military reconstruction. Since that time, all the railway reconstruction troops crossed into submission NKPS, remaining under the operational control of the military councils of the fronts where they worked. Road troops early in the war were also in the system of two commissariats - NGOs and the NKVD. Dual leadership [9] and is adversely affected by the restoration and maintenance of military roads. Therefore, in May 1942, part of the Main Road Highway Administration of the NKVD were subordinated to the newly created General Directorate of Road Traffic Services, the Red Army. Of course, such a significant restructuring of logistics at the start of the war could not have an impact on combat activities and create difficulties in the work of the home front. A natural conclusion: the structure and availability of all organs of the rear of the Armed Forces in peacetime must substantially conform to the requirements of war and the level of combat readiness. At the beginning

of the last war, it was not, and troops often do not have adequate logistical support, that reflected their performance. In modern conditions, the success of military operations, more than ever, depends on the smooth logistical and medical support. Tireless care about the life of military personnel and the timely provision of arms, ammunition, fuel and other supplies is primary responsibility of commanders and superiors at all levels, especially workers behind. The personnel of the rear of the Red Army in the last war showed great ingenuity and efficiency in work, exclusive of labor and combat heroism. Especially important tasks were in the war before the medical service. Rapid evacuation of wounded from the battlefield, timely assistance to skilled care, the maximum number of returned to action after treatment - these indicators measure the success of medical support at the front. Of course, all the other rear services actively helped doctors to solve their difficult and noble goals. Through coherent and fruitful work of rear services during the war 73 percent of the wounded and sick were returned to duty. The success of the home front in the war depends primarily on the skilful, sophisticated logistics organization corresponding to the concept and goals of the operation. Railways, transport should be in such a state that would ensure timely maneuver forces, and the placement of rear units and agencies - timely delivery of material to the troops and non-stop movement of the rear element in the operation. [10] The experience of the last war shows that the troops could not achieve the ultimate goals of offensive operations, if they were not well off in material terms. Thus, our troops could not achieve a proper success in the winter campaign of 1942 in all strategic directions and in the summer-autumn campaign in 1943 in the West direction due to the lack of material support of planned operations. From the management of the home front design requires awareness of the planned operation, the ability to organize the rear in accordance with its nature. The broader the scope of the operation, the more carefully to work out all the practical arrangements for logistical support of troops at each stage of the operation. Given the complexity and amount of work to the rear of the front has to overcome, the commander must be as soon as possible to familiarize his deputy for logistics with the design, timing and the nature of the operation, with a grouping of forces and means of the front, otherwise the rear can not solve the challenges it faces . Thus, the preparation of the Vistula-Oder operation in the autumn of 1944, as mentioned by the author of the book "On the main line," we at least 45 days before the offensive oriented deputy at the rear of Lieutenant-General N. Antipenko in all matters of this operation. We were very clear that the leadership of the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front, without knowledge of the basic aspects of the operational plan will not be able to recover with the upcoming volume of traffic, with the accumulation and proper echelonment ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies. At any restrictions on the admission of persons to develop a plan of operations deputy commander for logistics along with the chief of staff should be fully informed about the plan, timing and nature of the operation. Any belated introduction deputy commander for logistics to plan the upcoming operation will inevitably lead to failure if not, then to serious difficulties in providing the troops. Art of arranging logistics and management is one of the most important aspects of the modern art of war in general.

Proper organization of the rear does not tolerate a pattern and memorized patterns. Each time it requires very specific solutions based on real operational accounting and logistical conditions. [11] During World War II for a number of reasons, primarily because of the limited transport capacity rear, often had to neglect statutes and sometimes even comes close logistics capabilities to the troops, going to a known risk, and it was still justified. Found in the book by Lieutenant-General N. Antipenko several examples of creative and bold advancing the rear, in particular the rear of the Central Front in the Battle of Kursk in 1943 and in the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder operation in January 1945. It accepted standards placement rear units and institutions have come into conflict with the existing concrete operational-strategic and logistical situation. If the organizers of the rear of the front blindly following the formal provisions, the Vistula-Oder offensive, held at an all-time high rates, would not be so well off materially. Work operational rear in the last war was largely dependent on the availability, capacity and carrying capacity of the railways, the value of which in logistic support troops was decisive. Without a well-functioning railway we could not carry out not only the rapid movement of large, relatively frequent during the war, but also uninterrupted supply materials and equipment over long distances. Railway workers, working under the constant influence of the aircraft, and sometimes artillery, showed heroism and rightfully deserved appreciation of the Red Army and the Soviet people. Theaters covers an area of thousands of miles, including areas impassable, especially in the spring, fall and winter. Dirt roads were in these conditions of utmost importance. Military road workers in close collaboration with the Army Corps of Engineers, local communities have successfully coped with their tasks. Without a well-established road to ensure the operational and military logistics could not be on time to pick up the troops the material means to evacuate the wounded and quickly provide them with quality medical care. Good technical equipment Road, continuous improvement of their skills with the use of industrial methods in road and bridge construction will continue to contribute to the high mobility of logistics in general. [12] In modern conditions due to the threat of destruction of large railway communications, continuous motorized and mechanized troops of the military road service will become even more important. The presence of air, pipeline and water resources will not reduce the need for roads. Air transport due to lack of a large number of transport aircraft in the last war did not play a major role in the transport. But there were times when there were no other options to make transportation as airplanes and air transport was playing a crucial role. So it was with the supply of besieged Leningrad, guerrilla groups and forces operating behind enemy lines. Currently, transport aircraft and helicopters will play a more significant role in the movements of both troops and material resources, especially through areas struck nuclear weapons. One of the positive aspects of the experience and the operational structure of the home front in the last war was the integrated use of all transport modes (including even the equestrian and horse). Integrated use of all modes of transport gave a great effect, and in relation to the conditions of this feature in the rear is even more important. On the whole rear of the Red Army successfully coped with the objectives of maintaining troops in the largest strategic operations conducted at a fast pace and in greater depth. Only 1 to June 23, 1944 in preparation of the Belarusian operations forces of the 1st Baltic and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts had drove over 75,000 cars with the troops, equipment and various

supplies. During the operation (from 23 June to 29 August 1944), called the front troops spent 400 thousand tons of ammunition, 300 tons of fuel and 450 tons of food. The same amount of material resources consumed Vistula-Oder operation. Vostochnoprusskoy During operation, the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Fronts spent about 200 thousand tons of ammunition, over 183 tons of fuel and 403 tons of food. To sum up so many fronts troops materiel required titanic rear of the Red Army. The Soviet High Command and the Command of the fronts were well aware of the value of the material factor in the war. So, before you decide to carry out a strategic operation, the General Staff Headquarters and the deep [13] and thoroughly studied the possibilities of financial security fronts. Rear of the Red Army during the war, was closely associated with the national economy of the country, the Soviet people, which is extremely difficult conditions selflessly worked to give the troops everything necessary to win. If the situation permits, and the rear of the troops of the Red Army itself included in the industrial and agricultural production, providing transport assistance to the population, labor, fuel, and raw materials. Suffice it to say that during the war the Red Army moved the vehicle to the economy over 21 million tons of cargo. The liberated Soviet territory, the army restored the coal, oil, petroleum, food, light industry and other industries. By the troops and personnel logistics were built many houses for impoverished farmers occupying settlements. In overseas territories also provide all possible assistance to the peoples liberated from the Nazis by the Red Army, including the German working people. This unique feature of the Soviet troops, brought up in the internationalist spirit, the author vividly demonstrated in the pages of his book. Unfortunately, still published military memoirs very little work reflected the rear of the Red Army, and almost nothing is said about its organizers and employees. In the book, NA Antipenko truthfully shows heroism of the Red Army logistics personnel. Widely reported work of doctors, nurses, working in the field, cooks, drivers, vehicles, road maintenance, military construction, which by their selfless work hasten the victory of our troops over the enemy. Also shown good activity and women warriors who from the very first days of the war went to the front with the men and were ardent patriots of our country. Among the women were experienced pilots, scouts, snipers, communications, men, doctors, nurses, cooks, and other soldierspecialists. During World War II NA Antipenko worked as the deputy commander for logistics Bryansk, Central and 1st Belorussian Front. With rich experience in logistics outstanding operations of World War II on the main strategic direction, he is an authority in this field, ably summarized his theory. Practical experience, theoretical training and the ability to critically analyze allowed NA Antipenko write offers the reader an interesting and useful book on the rear of the front during the war. In his book "On the main line," there are a number of instructive examples relating to the activities of the logistics support management in complex military environment. It tells the story of how senior commanders at all times able to mobilize subordinates to perform tasks in their work, draw on the party and Komsomol organizations. The book described the relationship with the local commanders of Party, government and community organizations, are examples of genuine Soviet patriotism displayed by the troops, shows how the army helped the local people to eliminate the consequences of the war. NA Antipenko work differs from many war memoirs and historical works in an objective and selfcritical exposition. It is of interest to a wide range of Soviet readers, who will find in it many instructive examples for modern conditions. Besides a large popular science, it has educational

value, especially for our young people, eager to learn about the great event in the life of people on the truthful testimony of participants. The book "On the main line," imbued with the spirit of boundless devotion to the Soviet people, the Leninist party. The reader will find it exciting examples of how to take care of the Soviet soldiers at the front, to create favorable conditions for their hard fighting life. The younger generation should be familiar with the combat and labor heroism of the Soviet people of the older generation in the years of the Second World War on the front, behind enemy lines, in the workplace. Youth need to know how faithful sons and daughters of our country fought valiantly with an experienced and vicious enemy, and when he had bravely died. In a future war, if not avoided, will apply the means of mass destruction. Therefore the logistics of all arms is much more complicated. Rear center, rear front, several economic base of the country could be adversely affected, which would create difficult situation for the troops. Modern war immediately turn around on land, at sea, in the air. A large number of states covered by the military-political groups of the two opposing camps, their socio-political nature, and [15], the class nature of pre-defined huge spatial scope of the future world war, its bitter and uncompromising. Modern means trouble-free delivery of nuclear, chemical and other weapons of mass destruction can in the first hours and minutes unleash deadly attacks throughout the interior, including the most remote, beyond the seas and oceans. In modern conditions, the concept of the home front is changing radically. To the front in the same concept of adding new and powerful tools for the troops stationed in the rear, which from the very first minutes of the war will wage an armed struggle against the enemy, inflicting blows and striking means of further attacks. Therefore, the functions of the Soviet Army logistics in today much more complex and wide. Now it is necessary to enforce the troops not only on the external front, but also in the rear. However, in a nuclear war the rich experience of logistics and medical support received during World War II, can be widely used. It is important not to lose this precious grain rational experience that got our nation dearly. We must learn from the lessons of the war all that is valuable and useful in the defense of the country, in the development of the Armed Forces, logistical, medical and other security of the country, to further explore the shortcomings and mistakes that were made in the pre-war years in the defense of the country and in training of the Armed Forces, without which you can not build a successful defense of our country. In a nuclear war against the Soviet people and its armed forces will require enormous pressure of physical and spiritual strength, exceptional organization, endurance and heroism, courage ability to overcome the impact of mass destruction and maintain the will to fight and win. No people in the last war was not as one with the troops in the fight against the enemy, as our heroic Soviet people. The unity of the army and people is essential to the defense of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Valuable experience and traditions of our people to provide the army with everything you need in every way necessary to protect and promote the historical and literature. [16] In the battles of Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Ukraine, Belarus, and other areas where I had the opportunity to lead the fronts, the Soviet people have provided troops to such assistance, which can not recall without emotion and pride for our nation. Indulging in food, rest, despite the danger of death, the Soviet people were standing round the clock for the machines in the factories and repair

shops, working in hospitals, tailoring shops, provide troops with arms, military equipment, material, technical, medical care and other necessities to live and fight. The structure of the material costs in modern combat operations, no doubt, will change due to the huge increase in the technical equipment of troops. One of the unsolved problems of the last war was the lack of motorization rear. Motorization level it must keep pace with the overall level of motorization troops. Operational mobility and troop rears must meet the mobility of troops. The high level of motorization and equipping the troops nuclear missiles require equipment and all parts of the rear vehicle as powerful as field pipelines, heavy transport aircraft, powerful cars. All of these tools reduce the dependence of the rear of the rail - the troops longer be able to do without the transport of rail. However, it would be highly imprudent to give the railways only of secondary importance. In driving up material resources important to the ability to observe all the kinds of transport. It is clear that in the new railway will be a much greater magnitude. This requires a willingness to train well-equipped troops and special units to eliminate the consequences of a nuclear attack on the enemy's rail communications. Especially important to the expansion of the military-political and economic knowledge of the governing military logistical personnel.Successfully manage a complex system of modern logistics is possible only with reference to the totality of military, economic and political factors.Therefore, head of logistics, supply chiefs should have a strong background in operational, political and economic terms, good to know the nature and methods of modern warfare and operations, as well as the latest principles of logistics troops, Froyta head of logistics - a major organizer and director of a complex war economy, a huge group of people, among whom there are thousands of qualified professionals. The combination of its high speed operation, organization, and creativity is achieved as a life experience and a good operational and logistical training in higher military educational institutions. Military and economic leadership training logistics should be significantly increased. It is not about passing the expansion of military-economic outlook, and the acquisition of these frames a deep and abiding knowledge of the war effort. The correct solution to the problem of leadership training rear of the army will ease the task of selecting the organizers of large-scale logistics. As the experience of the war, bringing to the job, even highly skilled military professionals do not always yield good results if these professionals did not have the organizational skills, political sophistication and military-economic knowledge. The task of winning the war with the least loss of personnel and material resources - one of the most important foundations of training command personnel. Yet this aspect in the training and educating of command personnel are not always given due attention. During the war, there were cases where due to poor knowledge of the operational environment, lack of knowledge of the enemy's fire without results produced tens of thousands of tons of ammunition. And how unreasonable and unjustified rearrangements and various troop movements performed during the war! All of this was spent huge amounts of fuel and other expensive equipment, and most importantly - the power of people spend without any benefit ... The problem of economical use of human and material resources in the war was, and always will remain one of the most responsible.

Paying tribute to the heroic feat of the Soviet people and the soldiers of the front and rear of the Soviet troops in the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945., We must not forget that it began a surprise attack on our homeland of prepared and deployed German troops. In modern conditions, sudden thermonuclear missile strikes can cause major destruction of enormous vital centers of the country and cause heavy losses to the population and the armed forces, which can seriously affect the subsequent course of the war. [18] Considering the still not stopping the aggressive designs of the imperialists and revanchist plans resurgent Nazis, we must keep the defense of the country and our armed forces are always in constant combat readiness. In light of the above book NA Antipenko is clearly useful. In essence, this is the first work of summarizing complex and multifaceted work of the rear of the Red Army in World War II. As the author says, he did not apply for a full description of the rear of the Red Army, and sought only to highlight and summarize scientific and dedicated work of many thousands of tireless workers in the rear of the front, where he worked as the deputy commander of the front on the rear. And he certainly succeeded. It remains to wish the author to continue the further generalization of the heroic workers of the rear of the Red Army, bearing in mind the growing demands of an unusually modern reader an objective account of events of the war. [19] MARSHAL H. Z HUKOV

ON THE BORDER
In February 1922, I was appointed political commissar company in the divisional school Kazan third division. Staff and the school were then in Simferopol. In the city of raging hunger, roamed the streets emaciated people, their pale faces were covered with black patina - coal dust from the engine, to the tender which they scrambled to get to the place of bread, and maybe just mud, layered over the weeks and months of life where necessary - at the train station, in a cold barn, under the fence. Across the country were then organized special committees to help the starving - "Pomgol." They did what they could, and other government and community organizations. Everywhere deducted part of their rations to the starving and Soviet soldiers. The New Economic Policy (NEP) was introduced only recently, and only after a few months began to tell its beneficial effect on the economy of the country. Because of its special kind of border is sharper than most of the population, [20] saw the NEP on the other, a dangerous side. Along with the revival of private business has increased the activity of antiSoviet elements, who had hoped for the restoration of capitalism. Took heart enemies of Soviet power and abroad frequent violations of the Soviet border, particularly smuggling, and they kept a close eye on us and use any relaxation of border regime. Maritime boundary in the Crimea at the time was actually open - almost with impunity smugglers landed on the Soviet coast, crossing the sea from the Turkish coast. Not always accompanied them luck, it happened storm overloaded boat overturned, and then died not only goods, but also people. Yet they took risks, knowing the jackpot they roll the owners in case of success. We were

transported drugs, Turkish tobacco, horns and other "oriental sweets", "colonial goods" and every little thing, and our export of gold and jewels, and this had to be stopped. In 1922, the highlight of Narkomvoenmor ordered the Red Army troops specially selected for their transfer to the border troops. Formed in Simferopol separate battalion was made on foot in Evpatoria and took custody of the Coast Perekop shaft through Ak-Mosque, Evpatoria and on to the junction with the frontier of Sevastopol part length of 350 - 400 kilometers. As a part of this battalion arrived at the border and I am. From that time I began my service in the Border Guard. Separate platoon, political commissar of which I was assigned a plot on the right flank - from Perekop shaft to a point about 30 km from Ak-Mosque - a total length of about 100 kilometers. For us, everything was new. Charter border service was not there, and soon we received instruction time on a tissue paper, printed on a typewriter, on her own learning and their personnel composition. The most effective way of learning the art of the border guard were case studies.The main "theory" was to explore ways in which the perpetrators are. Our platoon commander Kurbatov and I reside in the village of Bahcall, personnel were distributed on border posts, to defend one another for 15 - 20 kilometers. Lived mainly in peasant huts, in the most primitive conditions. If the owner of the house refused kuharnichat for the Red Army, they in turn acted as a cook. Items stocked in nearby [21] Tatar villages outfits local authorities. Were frequent food shortages. Border Service was the fact that each border post allocated foot patrols (horses, and even more cars did not exist), whose task was sustained observation sea. Places most convenient for mooring, were taken under constant covert surveillance. Initially frontier troops had their boats, and violators were detained mainly on land, after landing them ashore. It was important not to miss a moment of the landing, so they do not have time to hide in a village, where they had their own people, although in the same villages were almost everywhere and our people, and they have told us in advance of the expected Turkish smugglers. Not do, of course, without the hassles. One was detained large barge laden with four smugglers. They disarmed. The authorities ordered the barge to the goods and the crew under guard to deliver in Evpatoria. Reason to convoy was allocated only two men, apparently in the hope that the barge will follow all the time near the coast. However, the way the guards relaxed their attention, and smugglers seized their weapons. Barge moved away from our shores, and eventually found himself at the Turkish coast. There were many troubles our diplomats until the Turks regained our two guards. Long we then "worked through" this case on teaching young! Political discussions with border guards conducted mainly on issues related to the new economic policy, as well as with the international situation. It was hard work political instructor at the time, being away from the headquarters of the border battalions: all full independence, no "briefings" and seminars. Transport have not been in the platoon, except the wagons, which were transported kaptenarmus products at border posts. A month had to hold each position for at least 12 - 14 reports or interviews, because it had to repeat it for those who were previously in the dress. In addition, it was necessary for various reasons make presentations to the local population - while the party organizations in the field was very small. I do not know, well we do it, but do know that works with all voltages and even overstretch. However, in those years we were young it almost did not feel ...

Concurrently, the border regime, and fewer and fewer of border violations with impunity, but it does not invalidate the work of fascination. [22] On the contrary, the service every day became more interesting: producing more skilled methods of struggle, we learned a lot. She grew up and our political consciousness. When Lenin died, we met shook us the news of his death has united the party collective. Like most of us, I did not have to see and hear Lenin. But, like everyone else, I believed him indefinitely and loved it. He did not seem to us some supernatural being, his name does not lead us into godly awe. We loved Ilyich pure love, which feel to someone, who is not bound by ties of insubordination, and one thing and aspiration. I remember all the sirens and whistles of factories, ships, standing in the roads, boats, locomotives, for 5 minutes heralds the Soviet people parting with their beloved leader. Since that day we have a tradition: Party meetings we always start promptly at 18 hours 50 minutes on Mondays, ie, day, hour and minute of the death of the leader. This tradition, we thought we were great responsibility. We clearly felt an affinity for Lenin and consulted with him passionately arguing among themselves about how to further the building of socialism in our country. Another year passed the Border Service. I liked it. But do not leave me and the idea of continuing the war interrupted agricultural education. Evpatoria ukoma party knew that my desire and when I went to recruit allotment Petrovsky-Razumovsky Academy of Agriculture (now Timiryazevskaya), I was included in the list of the first cut. To get there it was not necessary, the district staff would not let me demobilization. But as a sort of compensation I was still sent to study in Moscow, at the Higher School of Frontier OGPU, which then housed in a godless Lane. From autumn 1925 to March 1927 I went to this school. It was a remarkable military school! Excellent drill was staged, tactical and weapons training. Physical education and sports were also there in honor. Much attention was paid to the history of our party history of the revolutionary movement in Russia and the West, political economy. From the beginning, students with the requisite skills to work independently with a book. We studied the original sources, learning how Marxist and non-Marxist and even anti-Marxist literature, teach yourself to understand what is right, what is not. [23] Before students were such famous figures as Emelyan Yaroslavsky, Felix Cohn. Visited us and A. Martynov. Even before he came to school, we knew that at the II Congress of the Party, he vehemently opposed Lenin. So when we were told about the upcoming meeting with Martynov, we were waiting for her with great excitement. Became clear immediately that, despite his advanced, as we then thought, age, Martynov keep a clear mind and the ability to self-criticism: "In those early years, when we were struggling with a young, aspiring to the revolution Lenin us, despite opposition to the him, hit him extraordinary, iron logic, his boundless faith in the working class. And now we, our mistakes have caused so much trouble to Vladimir Ilyich, deeply regret our past, "- said Martynov. This meeting will forever remain in my memory. I thought about it and then, when a struggle with Trotsky, who hunted Martynov, reproaching his former Menshevism. In the Party cell, where I was secretary, in 1925 read excerpts from the "will of Lenin", as they called the letter to Congress. We passionately discussed the document and concluded that it is necessary to support Stalin and his supporters against the Trotskyites and defend the unity of the party. The debate has been heated, sometimes violent, everyone wanted to share their position sprays and to vote, in accordance with its inner conviction. At the XIV Party Congress, held in an atmosphere of

intense competition for the determination of ways of the Soviet state, Stalin belonged considerable merit in upholding the principles of Lenin. In 1927 I graduated from the High School of the border. Listened, standing in the line of graduates, order, who border on what was going. With excitement we awaited their fate. For some reason, everyone wanted to go to some European border or in the Far East, and the vague anxiety at the thought of covering many of Central Asia. Frankly, I also do not want to climb into the incredible wilderness, which then consisted of those parts, especially since I was a young family man - my son was three years old. And suddenly Central Asia! I was not cheering when I was traveling for the first time this seemed inconceivable country. There just is not uttered passions us "experienced" people: there bandits and tigers and dragons and scorpions with phalanges, giant lizards, and other creatures, especially a lot of horror told about Karakum sand ... Frightened by the fact that it is difficult to adjust to the structure of everyday life of local residents, to the peculiarities of border guards in those conditions. [24] I must say that for more than eight years, I had seen a lot of that, as I was told. But all this is in the nature perceived very differently than in words, do not panic and, perhaps more attracted. Border district headquarters was in Tashkent. On the fifth day of riding on the railway, we arrived in the "City of Bread." - The main thing - do not get into the Karakum - advised me in the train one of the passengers. According to him, the most difficult part - is the border with Afghanistan, in the area which includes the Kara-Kum sands. But exactly what happened, to which I was so troubling: I was given an order to appoint an instructor political work in the border detachment, which was located at the site. And it was probably the best thing that could happen to me, if we consider the whole life until 1941 as a school to prepare for the greatest challenge - the fulfillment of hard long positions of responsibility in a deadly battle with the enemy. Here, in Central Asia, in the sands of abandoned border posts I had a step-by-step learning needs of the troops and each fighter, how they meet, get to know the daily life of units that were under martial law and when the whole country is still living a peaceful life. If, during the war, I more or less skillfully performed the hard work head of logistics, the training of considerable importance in this work, of course, had a service on the Central Asian border. City Kerki Turkmen SSR, where I was stopping over in March 1927, made a painful impression on me. It began with the crossing to the left bank of the Amu Darya. State ferry did not exist. Hunted its private owners skiff. They planted so many passengers that the water almost overlapped board. It was hard to get into the skiff, because the bank was not equipped and we had to jump into the boat skillfully, not to fall into the river, boiling eddies with the deep craters, at least it was hard to get out of the skiff. And how helpless you feel when you are in the middle of the deep river and anxiously watched as Turkmens, knocking out power, wielding a long pole, resisting the flow, - that the sixth, not a paddle, because the only way to fight the mighty rapids of mountain rivers. It was not a good habit - to meet a comrade who had come to help him, and my first impressions were therefore particularly unfavorable. Kerki though called the city, but it was a village, it is true, it is not common, because it agreed trade routes with Afghanistan. A street called customs, here are two series of European-style homes, which

housed the Customs and the Customs officers lived. The remaining buildings were adobe, with flat roofs and high duvalami. The town center market square, where camels and donkeys came buyers and sellers of various oriental handicraft products. On market days was very brisk trade. There were many merchants Turkmen and Afghan. Traded meat, wool, carpets, fruits, and illegally - smuggled goods and drugs. There were plenty of other than fish, although near the Amu Darya flowed, sometimes, it is true, we brought the fish, but at a high price.The name of this fish skaferingus, apparently similar to a small catfish, and it tastes nice, even nicer starlet. Experts say that this fish is found in only two rivers in the world: the Amu Darya river and the Mississippi. In the most crowded, and consequently the most dirty parts market located hairdressers, they replaced the razor Keen piece braids or long steel knife - and they are shaved head and beard, long pre-wet fingers massaging the skin without soap. Thanks to this massage shaving held completely painless, without causing irritation - that I experienced. In Kirk, I stopped in a room of one customs official, in the corner. We slept on the floor, old-timers made it clear that it is best to sleep on a rug spread out - scorpions do not like the smell of wool. Shoes in the morning is not recommended to wear, not flicking it in advance, because scorpions like to climb back to where there is even a faint smell of human sweat. But in the end, I stopped to reckon with the fact that they love and what not like scorpions, and bought a couch. On the other Asian creature - phalanx - I had to learn quickly, and she usually climbs like a bug on the wall to the ceiling and falls out on the bed. Initially, we several times a night lit the kerosene lamp and examined the wall. Then he got bored. Almost all visitors provided themselves with tincture dead scorpion on cottonseed oil or alcohol to lubricate the place bitten by poisonous vermin. How effective this treatment, I did not have to try. Residents there at the time, there were about two thousand, of which about 600 Russian. Among the latter, the majority were former deportees. [26] The city had, one movie theater, one Russian school and several schools in the Turkmen language, a hospital and a military hospital. This village was a district center. It housed okrispolkom and county party committee. More than once, on the instructions of the command, I had to travel to distant villages. A long time there talking with the locals, I have always found the sincere disposition of Turkmen to Russian, especially the military, protecting them from the invasion of gangs. But not only protection from armed attacks developed for Turkmen friendly feelings to the Russian. In the early years of the Soviet Central Asian republics of the value of sanitation and cultural work in disadvantaged areas was especially great, because the population here was almost entirely illiterate and infected with various diseases. Worked came from Soviet Russia, doctors and teachers, as forces involved in this work as officers and their families. Talented and hardworking, but the dark and downtrodden people of Turkmenistan on our eyes unbend back out of the darkness and poverty. For four and a half years of my service in the border guard I rode in the saddle, many hundreds of miles across the sands of the southern Kara-Kum, the mountains of Tajikistan, from which originated the Amu Darya (the upper is called the Besh-Kapa, ie, the "Five sleeves "or" five rivers "), the thick reeds, which subtly weaves Frontier Trail. On leaving the border to patrol had to use horses, subject to recall at each gate. These trips solve several problems at once: first, you can almost consider the context bearing frontier service, and secondly, there is no need to allocate a special outfit to accompany, and thirdly, the hours following

the horse in the watch I had time to hear a lot of stories of our men not only their official matters, but also about his childhood, adolescence, work in the factory, on the farm, even beloved. Arrival commanders of frontier controls on such remote outposts as "Panj", "Hammer", "Parhar" and others, was an event for the border guards. It's been far too often, and people waited for news - radio on the outpost was not, the newspaper brought here with great faults, but when they came, once more packs, you read them it was too little interest. Besides, with the lighting at the outpost was bad: only Lenin room were large shestnadtsatilineynye kerosene lamps, and in the barracks, in the kitchen, the stables and other premises generally burned [27] small vosmilineynye or lantern "The Bat" , or simply oil kagantsy. People living in such conditions, each chief arrived expecting to hear something new. Grief was that of us who went to the border ill-prepared! There was no chance of such a procedure: each riding was once again delved into codes, manuals, get advice from senior political masters but crucial issues of the country. Only after such training could go to the border. Political officer was required, in addition to political discussions, to conduct workshops at the outpost on tactics, on small business, check the knowledge frontier. It gives me great pleasure to conduct practical shooting, because I am fond of shooting. Back in the High Frontier School taught me to love shooting with a rifle and a pistol, on arrival at the border, I went [28] to get involved in the shooting, and was elected chairman of the rifle section of society "Dynamo". One summer as chairman of committee of inspection I had two months to check the firearms training every frontier. Well, I shoot, I myself enough! Although life at the outpost every day was full of many poignant moments - every day the guard looked in the face of mortal danger, and people, of course, thoroughly tired, but they did not cease to be interested in the general political life, and who came from a conversation with a "center" friend gives them a real joy . Efforts have also amateur night, where guards sang, played musical instruments, danced, played chess, checkers. Sometimes these joint entertainment turned into the kind of art show of force - and as the men tried to show his prowess and talents! Well, when you, stranger friend, you can join the fun. And if you "cracker", then for you it is a glory to disperse across the border ... As they say, "for himself," I know how to play the accordion, guitar, mandolin, balalaika, decently played chess, checkers, and it is very simple and easier to establish friendly relations with the soldiers. Musical instruments on each outpost at the time was enough, funds are not spared; missed another people who are able to own tools.Sometimes even had to adjust the distribution of such "craftsmen" on outposts before sending more people to the border (after passing their initial military training.) Annually to replace the older fighters we got young recruits. Before come to the defense of our homeland borders, young soldiers were on a four-month training center drill, political, and special training. At the same time on a definite plan in the four months passed and the identification of talent - singers, dancers, musicians, chess players, athletes, etc. First of platoon, and then in company, battalion, and finally, in the regimental scale initiative arranged the evening, which were recruits - who with their possibilities. As a result, it became clear what we have, and the distribution of people on the outposts taken into account and that side of the case. After all, it is important that at the outpost, somewhere in the desert or in the mountains, the border guards could listen to his guitar or accordion for them to have a good Zapevalov capable of winning over the other singers that they had someone to learn to play chess. [29]

Sometimes in the evenings initiative identified a considerable talents. I remember the initial training conscripts born in 1907. There were more than a thousand. I attended the final evening performances. Host announced that now make young soldier Pushkar Nikita Sidorovich. There was applause - some already knew his voice. He sang high tenor. Accompanied him on the harmonica is not very good, but it does not put a damper on any singer or audience. His repertoire was a lot of Ukrainian songs. Perhaps that night Pushkar first experienced the power of artistic excitement - not to listen to him as he knew people ... The audience stood. And when he sang "Povy, Vitry, to Ukraine," an explosion of delight was indescribable. Yes, it was a real gift. We did not want to send Pushkar somewhere far away and made possible identified him in school junior commanders, which was placed at the headquarters frontier. True, Pushkar has repeatedly had to go along with the school in the Karakum sands for armed struggle against the robber bands, and in the conduct of its military engagements were worthy. When the school on horseback takes a walk through the city, residents took to the streets to listen to the voice of Pushkar. We were soon in the border guard arrived young doctor Maxim Davidovich Rosenblum and his wife Elizabeth Yakovlevna, just graduated from the Leningrad Conservatory piano. Elizabeth Y. immediately drew attention to the voice data Pushkar and took up with him learning of repertoire. Over the three years of service Pushkar learned to sing not only the songs, but also very difficult aria. When the time of discharge from the army, Pushkar came to me to say goodbye. I ask: where are you going? - To their country, to Ukraine, to work on the railroad. Thanking Pushkar for the pleasure which he was delivering the border guards with their singing, just in case I gave him a note to the director of the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow. The note was as follows: "The Director of the Academic Bolshoi Theater, Moscow. Border guard Pushkar NS for three years of service on the border is a great pleasure for people to its outstanding voice. Do not refuse the courtesy to listen to it.Perhaps it is the gift. " So we went from NS Pushkar. [30] Many years have passed since then. It seems that in 1958 I was walking through the streets of Moscow to the place of his service, and suddenly I saw a large poster announcing the celebration of the soloist of the Moscow Philharmonic NS Pushkar on the occasion of the twenty-fifth of his artistic activity. Homage will be held at the House of Scientists. In Moscow and the couple were Rosenblum. We decided together to come to the celebration. Pushkar address presented by the Ministry of Culture, from the collective Philharmonic and other institutions. I got up and asked to speak. It was a surprise to the organizers of the anniversary and the hero of the day. He ran to thank me. Later NS Pushkar told me how dearly he got training. Voice-it was, and the general musical culture and the culture of singing is not enough.For eight years he studied until he graduated from the conservatory, is speaking before the stage. In the days when these lines are written, Nikita Sidorovich continues his artistic activity in the Philharmonic, going on Kamchatka, the Far East, in virgin territory. Communist Pushkar does not forget his former fellow guards, in whose ranks he grew up and got a free pass. Three years of service in the border troops - it was for a fighter not only a school of military skill and courage, but also a solid school of general culture.

Days, months and years. I have an assistant chief frontier for political affairs. But go to the border I had as often as before. Rare departure did without adventure. I remember outpost Boers in the upper Amu Darya. The border runs along the river here, the Soviet shore covered so high and frequent reeds that he seemed impassable. But in the rush was more Border trail width not more than half. Going through it, usually conducted surveillance on foot patrols. A 300 - 400 meters from the shore in the open road was built for horse patrols. Following this road once the commandant neighboring border section P. Kozlov, I suddenly noticed two hundred meters away from us a striped yellow-brown animal, a walking cane along with us in the same direction. Kozlov said, "Tiger!" He forbade us to accelerate the pace of horses and to make any sudden movements, no reason not to give the beast to attack us. We rode at a steady pace over a kilometer. Then the tiger turned into the reeds. [31] Frontier guards "Boers" have told us that this tiger family lives in thickets near the outposts and patrols that often experience anxiety when snarling beast accompanied their movement along the boundary path. At the same outpost was the case when the two meet at night on foot border guards on their way to watch the thick tall reeds (reeds reached height is 12 meters), only 10 - 15 meters struck couple brightly glowing eyes. At the time, went on patrol with a rifle, charged to all five rounds on the trigger guard. Who was walking in front of the guard immediately took aim at the barrel in the direction of two luminous points. The shot was extremely successful, and shot in the forehead with a tiger, resting his head in the ground, his body began to make circular movements. It is easy to force a wounded beast, which within 2 meters around the rolled gigantic height and density of the cane. Only 30 - 40 minutes longer to show signs of animal life. Another incident occurred in the village Parhar, in the immediate vicinity at the foot of the Tien Shan. There's a tiger jumped on croup, but the last sharp blow threw the beast, and the guard who sat on it was thrown out of the saddle for a considerable distance. Tiger did not touch people, and began to pursue the horse. During the service in Central Asia I have not heard of a tiger attack on the person, that is, the maneating tiger. But the pet from getting any of them, and not just local residents approached the border guards to help them in carrying out raids. Sometimes it was possible to catch live terrible beast, luring him into a camouflaged pit. Barca also almost never attack humans, but how long are following in his wake. One day, soon after the night out to the border patrol to the next gate, we noticed behind a pair of glowing "headlights." Experienced comrades immediately identified in habits that this leopard. The distance between us was about 500 meters. - Now we stop, - said one friend, - and the leopard will turn to the side and start moving - and once again he will go for us. Indeed, the few times we stayed, and the "fireflies" swerves. So we rode under the supervision of a leopard miles twenty-five. The most disgusting feeling experienced when driving past the lair of jackals and hyenas. They were howling and screaming could be heard for several kilometers. [32] For all Tajik border trails riding was difficult. Following the east of Saray Komar to the foot of the Tien Shan, often had to hand in the horse's tail, climbing the steep slopes and high almost vertical bank of the Amu Darya. In front of a steep climb, and the rear - loss of 50 - 80 meters above the

river ... Look back or look down is not recommended, even if you have and strong nerves. There were cases when horses with riders falling into the abyss. No less dangerous riding on mountain ledges. Imagine a high steep hill. To go around it, you must ride at least 5 hours on the trail with a width of 30 - 40 centimeters. The biggest nuisance, which can be found in such a journey, it is a counter horseman painfully long had to take the horse back until reach a small area for traveling. Some riders prefer to go with his eyes closed, not to see the bottomless pit. All the same can not be chuck or send it twister or a spur, and an occasion best put freely on the front pommel. Horse, if she does not get in the way, helping himself and the rider. In these places, as nowhere else, understand man's love for a horse, a true friend. We do not limit their activities direct duties, and sometimes had to, for example, legislating hunters, admits poaching, particularly in the hunt for pheasants. I happened to see large herds of wild goats, especially in the Karakum desert. Here, these animals often sneak to human habitation, to drink water. In some outposts located in the Karakum desert, built an extensive pool, lined with brick and cemented, and they were called "House" and served to collect fresh water from precipitation in the winter. These wells and approach sometimes goats, driven by thirst. Shoot them at a time guards considered it a matter unworthy. Among the features of the service to the Central Asian border not to mention the situation of families of commanders, who lived on the border crossings permanently. If a man did not make a big deal after all pass a few hundred miles in the saddle, what is necessary for women? Most of them prefer to sit in a cradle on the side pritorochennoy camel. On the one hand - the cradle with his wife and children, on the other - household goods ... It was a tough ride - 100 - 200 kilometers sway to the beat of a camel gait, and he sometimes even stumbled, and then suddenly bent down, [33] to pluck the dry grass. But most of the women of our military conquer the rigors of life and go hand in hand with their husbands for many years of service on the border. The most difficult issue for the time in the home of the Central Asian border guards unit children. Once the child has reached the age of four or five years, it was impossible to do without the children's society. True, growing among the guards, baby early acquired independence, but it is often greater than the measure of ... Particularly among the issue of school-age children: Russian schools nearby were not. Therefore, the need to create children's orphanage. Such an institution for 60 - 70 persons was first organized by us in Mary. It was assumed that all frontier children over four years will be directed to the Children's Commune (then called by the institution). It would seem that doubts about the wisdom of such an institution could not be. Boarding found a nice room, was fitted for an excellent teaching staff. The content of this institution has been taken by the state on its own account, and only a small part of the costs were covered by a special fund frontier. However, it was not easy to convince some mothers to send a child for 300 - 400 miles to the care of strangers. On the opening day it was decided to hold a congress women officers of the children who had to stay in the Commune. The meeting was held in an atmosphere of high solemnity. Two days spent in Mary the mother, watching how they feel their children. Then came the day of departure of mothers to their frontier. And then I was told that the wife of such and such at night to take their children and took them to the border! It was a big blow to our endeavor, Fortunately, took only two or three children. The remaining well accustomed, and the glory of children's commune boundary group (where I was moved by this time) quickly spread across the Central Asian border.

When will the hot months, we managed to take all the children in the summer, near Moscow. Now the mother "kidnapped" children themselves begged us to take their children to the camp near Moscow. Have we such circumstances, when for many days and nights without sleep and without water fighters chased trespassers on the Kara-Kum desert. Health of fighters require special care. Mary was in a sanatorium for the border guards with a two-week stay. Here taken not sick (such in Border Guard should not be!), [34] and the most distinguished in the service. He created the conditions for the rest, I would say, perfect for that time and in comparison to the daily life of very severe. Resting get crisp white uniform, he was every day - or even every day! - In the shower (which is a luxury for the residents arid desert), eating five times a day, took part in the games and listening, if he wishes, and lectures. Even the cities of Tashkent, Samarkand and Ashkhabad, immersed in green, while still experiencing water shortages. Others towns, away from rivers, especially the frontier in the desert, most of the year suffered from its lack. Dislocation of the frontier is determined mainly existence well, even if the line passes south of the state border between our and Afghan outposts guarded area in the sand here and reached hundreds of kilometers. However, the border line in some places was of symbolic rather than legal, because of boundary markers are not raised, and where they were, they were quickly swept out by the sands. Remember the name of border posts: Jay-Raleigh, Shiram-Kuyu, Osman Uyuk, houses one of the other "in the neighborhood" - their share from 60 to 100 kilometers of arid desert. These wells were the outposts some mystery. How to identify our ancestors, it is here that there is water?After testdrilling wells existed. What is guided by the ancient inhabitants of the desert, starting to rytyo deepest wells in which the water was 300 meters below the surface of the earth? Not surprisingly, many believe, though in the old days were the "visionaries" who has a mysterious gift of feeling buried deep water. Probably the millennial experience taught to notice any signs right now forgotten ... Whatever it was, all the same: finding water here - it is amazing. Hit me and the unit wells. Look in the trunk trehsotmetrovoy and amazing stamina, courage and tenacity of single characters, which a few years every day removed soil leather bag - this leather, for solids, if you make it out of the bucket, could, striking the walls of the well, to cause the collapse of and negate the whole titanic work. It is known that in the tunnel at a depth of 200 - 300 meters there is a lack of oxygen. [35] As a man working, stood a disadvantage? Every rise of land from the well to the surface of the extruded portion of the carbon dioxide and each lowering empty bag brought down some air, more oxygenrich ... But, of course, you had to have a really good health to endure such an ordeal. These wells exist for centuries. Camels accustomed themselves without mahouts and supervision, day in and day out they get their water.On a rope as thick as 5 - 8 inches camel pulling a skin of water, going to the beaten path for many years, of up to 300 meters. Feeling push wineskin, camel, urged on by no one, turns around and goes the other way. For those seconds that the camel turns people to pour water from a wineskin in a huge barrel, installed near the well, or in concrete opening. Day and night at the outpost was accomplished this work, for a lot of water required.Great price for each drop of water in the desert!

We often read and hear now on the radio to the progress in the west of Kara-Kum Canal, whose length is more than 800 kilometers. But in 1929, I was witness to how spontaneously arose this grand canal. It was in the village of Kyzyl-Ayak near which took place shortly before the built-Bassaga Kerki channel length of about 60 kilometers.Head of the channel was at the border village Bassaga where the Amu Darya and turns to the north where the river border with Afghanistan is interrupted, going west on the Karakum sand. Every summer, the entire local population and the nearby army garrison rose against floods. Due to the sharp increase in the level of the Amu Darya water flow in the channel is so large that it always was a threat to the erosion of the right or of the left bank, which could cause great damage to peasant households and cotton fields. Saving the channel then becomes the task of first importance. Tens of thousands of sandbags were laid along the coast, hundreds of peasants carried clock vigil across the road. One day, in 1929 or 1930, the water rose so high that no sandbags could not contain it. Already only centimeters counted in the distance between the mirror and the upper point of water offshore. The disaster seemed inevitable: another moment, and the mass of water will rush defenseless towns, washed away crops, depriving people of shelter and bread. [36] But the water itself has found a different way out. Near the village of Kyzyl-Ayak, breaking through the left bank of the canal, she rushed toward the Karakum sand without causing any damage. Later found that the way in which the excess water has gone, was an old bed of the Amu-Darya, it is in this area, the modern village of Kyzyl-Ayak, several thousand years ago, there was a turn of the mighty Central Asian rivers in the north-west, and it was not to fall the Caspian and the Aral Sea. Who observed the breakthrough of water left bank Bassaga Kerki-channel would have thought that our eyes make a natural wonder: the waters of the Amu Darya again rushed to the side of the Caspian Sea in its ancient bed! The then Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Turkmen SSR Ayta sailed on a boat on the spillway, marking the beginning of the now famous Kara-Kum Canal, going deep into the sand over 15 kilometers - that's all ... But the water itself and further push its way. Often she had to meet on the way large ridge of sand dunes, fixed saxaul thickets, leaning into the ridge, the water rose higher and higher, and then there is a huge lake that disappears once the water broke through the dunes and rushed westward again to meet an obstacle and Reconvene the lake. Only much later intervened human mind and hand in this spontaneous work of water, directing it at the most favorable way to millions of cubic meters of precious water would not go in vain in the thick of the insatiable Karakum sand. From natural phenomena characteristic of the zone of Kara-Kum, I still remember the good "Afghan". So called dust storms looming usually from Afghanistan. Picture approach "Afghans" and its enormous strength, lifting a kilometer up the huge layers of sand, often described in the scientific literature and fiction. I just want to say that many vain people think that the danger be at the mercy of "Afghans" exists only in the desert. Needless to say, in the desert withstand his blows harder, and on the frontier, as well as in any other city, "Afghan" gives a lot of trouble. First established a mysterious calm, the people are vague anxiety. Then southern sky [37] clouded yellowish-brown haze, as it is covered by a huge canopy from below, rising upwards and outwards by the minute. A bright sunny day is quickly replaced by twilight. Yellow dust flies more dense,

penetrating into all the cracks. No matter how you shut your ears, nose, mouth, eyes, no matter what clothes or tried to cover up the body - all to no avail, the dust gets everywhere. First, you can not spit it, then the mouth is dry, and you're barely moving tongue and lips and teeth crunching sand like broken glass. Some housewives pre caulked windows of their apartments, they were sealed with paper, and yet, as will fly "Afghan" on any subject in the house we can show letters or finger paint on a layer of dust has penetrated into the house ... Each border guard and many local residents have safety glasses, tight to the face, they are very much needed at this time, although it is necessary, squeezed his eyes shut, wipe them almost every 20 - 30 minutes. But this attack is never long. Much more excitement and anxiety brought border guards and local residents spills such mighty rivers like the Amu Darya (despite turning it into a new outlet), Vakhsh, Panj and others. This is usually the case in July, when is most rapid melting of snow and ice in the mountains, where the river originates in Central Asia. Overcoming the river at this time and in those days it was a matter of crossing equipment is very risky. To get to the opposite shore, we had to climb up to 4 - 6 kilometers and here take a raft of floats of Polanski. Fast current raft are led to the other shore, pushing it to 4 - 5 kilometers downstream for 1 - 2 minutes. Double border raft made one of the three or four floats, stripped naked, just in case, rifles and clothes in his hands. Cold water burned his feet dangling off the raft. I had to cross so only three times, but it's hard to forget. I also remember the ferry across the mouth of the river Vakhsh in a place where the width greater than half a kilometer. There was a crossing means "skiff." No coincidence that the boat was of such a dreary name. We crossed over to the skiff with the commandant pogranuchastka P. Kozlov. Lowered the boat into the water, we quickly jumped into it, and Kozlov picked up oar. Suddenly, the boat was rapidly coming water. Apart from my cap, pour it was nothing. And I can say without exaggerating, I worked very hard, scooping up water and pouring it over the side. Often think, to us, to his superior, not too often had to expose their nerves such tests, [38] and in fact the soldiers and commanders of the border, carrying the service every day, every hour were in a situation that requires a high physical and emotional stress ... Never later I did not have to go to those places, but I do not think that the service is there to do a lot easier, even today highly developed technology. Represents, in my opinion, special interest and how the guards were supplied with food. Now we hear from the old suppliers, veterans of frontier, which they managed in the 20 - 30's to provide food and fodder large mass scattered over the border people and horses, with a very limited staff of workers, but de these days, although people on border has not increased, states procurers unreasonably inflated. But both are being supplied in the 20's? Where guards received flour, cereals, meat, fats, potatoes, vegetables, hay, grain fodder? In the years of the NEP, supplied merchants or Soviet, or, more often, Afghan nationals. With them on an annual contract, and business executives from the frontier was only required to follow the exact fulfillment of contractual obligations, it was not difficult for stakeholders to renew the contract resourceful merchants usually supplied products of good quality and trouble-free. And the sugar, tobacco, soap and spices were transported to the gates, too, without much trouble, warehouse frontier. In such a system of supply required, of course, very few full-time employees. The financial and economic activity of each pogrankomendatury that led settlements with merchants, produced annually. I must tell you about one episode in connection with such audit.

Once received information that Sarai Komarsky pogrankomendatura, headed by then the old security officer Kalnin, open to abuse in the expenditure of funds to pay for food and feed, and that some of the persons involved in pogrankomendatury dirty dealings with Afghan merchants.Head frontier agreed to hold a deep revision of the economic activities of the commandant's office, which was a committee under my chairmanship, which was introduced and operational worker Nikolaev. On arrival at the Saray Komar, I met [39] with Kalnina as a good friend at his job; to whom I have great respect. Kalnin treated with revision total tranquility and asked me to help him put things in proper order in the household. After several days of detective Nikolaev, keep the rest of the committee members alone, was to prove to me the need to house arrest Kalnin, because without this supposedly impossible to conduct the investigation. I did not have such authority, and Nikolayev special encryption of chief border guard asked. He received permission to house arrest Kalnin. Much to my chagrin, I myself had to give effect to the order of arrest, in connection with what I do, and Kalnin experienced difficult moments ... Only much later, I learned that Nikolayev criminally abused his official position and for purely personal motives, sought isolation Kalnin. Is already in a border guard, I learned that Kalnin was conditionally sentenced to a year in prison for mismanagement. The years passed. The Nazis came to Moscow itself. The troops of the 49th Army, defending Serpukhov, repelled the enemy. In the critical days in November 1941 a small group of enemy tanks crossed the highway between Serpukhov and Tula in the area that housed one of the divisions of the 49th Army. Zakharkin commander ordered me to immediately go to the location of this division, and to clarify the situation on the ground. At night, when he got through snowdrifts up to the cabin, which houses the headquarters of the division, I listened to the report of the Head razvedotdeleniya. Hut covered one kagantsom oil and it was difficult to see the faces of those present. But the voice of the chief razvedotdeleniya seemed very familiar. Listening to him, I often wondered, who is this? In the end, I picked up and learned Kaganets Kalnin. His bearded face and blackened evidence of the difficult conditions of life at the front. We are a friendly hello, but to talk, as we would not have to - not before we were to talk about themselves. It took another 15 years. Arriving on a business trip to Riga, I learned that Kalnin has lived in this city. They gave me his phone number and address. But he was seriously ill, and the doctors are not allowed to visit him in the hospital. To this day I can not forget that infamous role that was played to the Nikolaev Kalnin - this wonderful man. Let's return to service on a Central Asian border. Due to the complete collectivization dramatically escalated the class struggle. [40] Border Service in Central Asia in the late 20's - early 30's has been particularly difficult. Opponents of collectivization in Central Asia with foreign anti-Soviet organizations move to Iran and Afghanistan, transferring there not only his own, but the loot collective and state property. Such "emigration" we inflicted huge economic damage. To stop it, it was not enough to advocate for the villages, often had to engage in an armed struggle with large and small bands, formed in adjacent territories specifically to transfer us to the Bahia family abroad. On one such gang tell more. It was headed by the famous kurbashi Ana Cooley. He became famous for his elusiveness. A lot of times passed his gang Soviet-Afghan border - and each time with impunity, it more than once "killed", but he reappeared. In February of 1932, when I worked as assistant chief frontier in Mary, it was reported that his gang of over 400 well-armed horsemen crossed the border again. The invasion was undertaken in order

to deduce from Khiva sands abroad hundreds bey families gathered there from different parts of the Turkmen SSR. Received a telegram from Moscow, informs that Stalin personally supervised the operation to eliminate the gang and that the chief frontier is personally responsible for the success. It was clear that this time the higher authorities will not forgive us unpunished care Ana Cooley. From Tashkent even demanded, that together with a report on the successful elimination of the gang and he was taken to Cooley Ana - living or dead, otherwise the report will be considered as another duck. M. Orlov, head of border guard, decided to form a fighter squadron consisting of 140 cavalry from selected border guards, including the best students here junior officers of the school with the head of school Kornienko - man tactically well educated, resourceful and determined. It was necessary to distinguish political officer to act as Commissioner fighter squad. I offered to run. Head frontier was glad: "You as my assistant for political affairs do not have to instruct me." We hit the road. Went with me and my "intern", the Red Army conscript VF Shevchenko, later a prominent political worker in the border troops, [41], then work in the political apparatus of our frontier. We had to go across the path of the gang, which was moving in the direction of the Afghan border. According to preliminary calculations, our meeting was to take place in the depths of the Kara-Kum, no closer than 140 - 160 kilometers from the border. It happened. More than 100 kilometers from the city of Mary, our initial point, we saw signs of a recent set of horses and camels. February drizzling rain, and in the damp sand tracks were visible. The band should do at least 800 meters in width. Before. border was about 140 kilometers.Soon advanced patrols reported that the gang down to the ground all the camels in a valley, and the bandits took the hill, best to take the fight. Fog lay thick veil. Occasional gaps can be seen from a hill situated in the valley of the caravan - at least four thousand camels, of which almost everyone was laden, we knew, carpets, values and food. From the enemy country was viewed much better than on our side, so well disguised bandits were able to conduct a more accurate fire. Hurry and send grooms with the horses for the hill, our group went on the offensive. The first fight, which lasted about 4 hours, took place a lot of stress, and we have lost several men killed and wounded. By nightfall, all was quiet. The gang moved on. The next morning, some of our people engaged in tracing and identification of corpses, and the rest went in pursuit. Soon caught up again and again gang tied tight battle lasted until dark. On the third day, repeat the same. And although there were killed Basmachi fair number - after three fights over 300 active rifles of the enemy still had about 400; rifle killed Basmach passed into the hands of one of those who accompanied the band. The fourth and last battle unfolded in the morning in the valley Namaskar, just 12 kilometers from the Afghan border. It was clear that if this fight gang will not be completely destroyed, the remnants of the night it will be on the territory of Afghanistan. To us came to the aid of Kushka Rifles group of men in the 40 cavalry under the command of Chief of the regimental school AA Lucinschi. To exit to the rear of the gang, they made a forced transition on horseback along the border of over 100 kilometers. Soon, we were visited by the commander of the regiment Kushka Sharkov, [42] which is the end of the battle has been closely involved in the liquidation of the remnants of the gang. The

battle began in the morning and lasted until dark. To the surviving bandits are gone at night across the border, all the way out of the valley Namaskar were occupied by our patrols. Early in the morning we found the results of the operation. He headed the gang itself Ana Cooley. His closest aides had a son and a brother. Each fighting bandits found ourselves short of one or the other of their leaders. By the end of surgery, all the leaders of the gang were killed. Of the four thousand camels, which were in the convoy, survived no more than two thousand. We loaded them wounded, women and children, to send them to Kushka for long-distance train. Almost the whole train took us a batted Basmachi good that they wanted to take abroad. Ana gang Cooley was eliminated. Perhaps, from the time of such large gangs in Central Asian border was not there. What were the duties of Commissioner fighter unit in this operation? If the commander had to be there, where it is more convenient to control the course of the battle, the Commissioner in this situation the best way to fulfill its role, being with the men, and sometimes ahead of them. That's where I come in handy, my old passion for small business, which made me once "shot-master" for rifles and pistols! Leaving for the operation, I had his rifle with a telescopic sight of Lyman. Although masked bandits carefully, their turbans were still distinguishable from the crowd, and for shooting with a telescopic sight at a distance of 150 - 200 meters was enough to have a target the size of a matchbox. The soldiers saw during my every shot another turban jumping up and disappeared, perhaps that's why they tried to stay close to me. Often passionate progress of the battle, the guards tried to come together in a melee, but I kept them, seeing that the time for that has not yet come. I never for a moment lost the sense of responsibility for the successful execution of this important task, and it is also guided by my personal actions, not giving up the fight to get excited losing control. Frontier between the command, pogrankomendatur and border posts and local organizations were the most friendly relations. Local residents, urban and rural, with the approval of talking about how to implement the principles of the representatives of Border Lenin's national policy, avoiding any appearance of great-power chauvinism. Friendship with the Turkmen border guards valued and executives. After years of work in Turkmenistan, I was elected into the Kerki District Party Committee, Kerki District Executive Committee, a member of the party at the Mary Three CCC area, was a delegate to All-Turkmen Party Congress. I am proud to wear and appreciation Order of the Red Banner, which I was awarded the Turkmen government for active participation in the political life of the country. In winter 1932/33, I was appointed to the post of Chief Commissioner and the Border radioshkoly Tashkent. This school prepared radio operators and radio technicians for border troops of the European part of the USSR and the whole of Central Asia. The commander County, NM Fast, addressing me, said, "You have to perform the mandate of the Party: the Bolsheviks must master technique. Boldly grasp a new business! " It's not so simple - to command part of a thousand men, and the most difficult to study this matter as radio service. Along with the organization of the educational process had yet to lead the construction of a huge academic buildings, dormitories cadets and two officers of the homes. That was my first and probably the most serious test of organizational maturity. First I had to feel the complexity and responsibility of the commander-man manager. It is one thing - to criticize "outside" the commander for certain problems without bringing formal personal responsibility, and the other - the most responsible for everything: for combat and training, for party political work for

the morale of the side, with the economy and life of the people in advance to think about the approaching winter, the procurement of fuel, the fire events on harvesting vegetables for the coming year, and the spring organize repair of housing, equipment and other things. A good part of the military can not do without farming, and administration of care is also commander. [44] Of course, the commander have assistants on various branches of the work, but how can his troubled heart to respond to the needs and difficulties of everyday life? To be the commander of the - it means to take on the lion's share of responsibility for all of his subordinates, though not always with the confidence that you correctly understand and support in difficult times, "the top". I did not expect that so many clicks will fall on me in the first part of the time management. Before that, for 14 years of service in the army, I had not a single penalty, and for two and a half years of command school, despite the fact that the latter has become a model in a military unit in the area, I managed to get a four reprimands! Reasons for sanctions was plenty. Horse slipped the leash, stepped on the broken wire is energized and then died - head of school accent.Before this incident, I did not know that the horse is killed instantly, even from 50 volt supply voltage. She is a carrier of a large electric charge.Dark night, especially in a strong storm, the horse bounce huge spark, and most of her mane (which I had to watch several times during the night trips to the border). Cadet plucked the apple in the garden of an Uzbek farmer, riding on horseback by his estate, - the head of school reprimanded for poor parenting subordinates ... But many times, we strongly explained how important it is to comply strictly with the right relationship with the local community in general, especially with the farmers, which houses the school radio station, because these stations were more than 100! From the district warehouse were salted fish instead of meat, cooked soup and fish were given to the second course. Several students were upset stomachs - the chief school reprimanded for poor control for kitchens. Paramedic we liked to drink and once got drunk, he was absent for three days, and it was nowhere to be found - the head of school reprimanded for ... Etc. Of course, the head of the school did not remain indifferent to the different offenses, he reacted to them "for administrative and social lines." But it was not enough for the district authorities - he too had to "respond." .. I feel like intruding in unsolicited criticism region. But something to hide? Not once in a while I thought about how important it is to protect the authority of the commander, not only to him but his boss standing over him. [45] Command radioshkoloy years were the school and for myself - and not just in terms of the ability to command a separate part. I had to master the technique, where is can be better than this, to solve this problem! My Deputy Chief of Staff of the school M. Monasevich - a great expert in the field of radio, and he readily agreed to teach me the basics of electrical and radio engineering. For these classes, we took two hours a day. This usually occurs in the morning, from 8 to 10 hours. Persistently engaged, I got six months overview of these disciplines. My other slave - AG Surin - taught me to work on a key in Morse Code. In the office, I had the key, every spare moment I have practiced on it and soon began to take on hearing and pass on the key 50 - 60 characters per minute, which was then considered

"satisfactory." I was now able to be more understanding affairs attend classes with students and, therefore, more confident to lead radioshkoloy. It is not usual, we were then the forms and methods of educational work. I will mention some of them. When I was on the border, we are widely used as a way of encouraging letters from the command of parents distinguished guards. I introduced the custom in radioshkole. We wrote not only to parents but also to the factories, mines, farms - from whence came the rookie.Sometimes, our letter gets there in the local press. This was not a dry, standard letters "a blueprint." No, in each such letter reads actual personality traits of students and their behavior, reported specific targets of his studies. Great honor student was awarded such distinctions. Perhaps no more powerful way of moral influence. And for the parents of a soldier these letters many, then they are often framed under glass and posted in a conspicuous place. We received responses from parents, brothers, sisters, CEO's, the collective farm. The correspondence was so extensive that we had to create for the management of this special office correspondence, as they say, on a voluntary basis. At the initiative of the party organization was introduced the custom to gather for a cup of tea at the head of the school, where invited 20 - 25 cadets standouts, led by the commander of the unit. The huge building of the school was completely radios, and each student could hear the loudspeaker, as evidenced by the informal meeting. Usually evening was reduced to a frank exchange of views on the life of the school, the students felt free, and all of us - and command, [46] and the party office - always remember that the most rigorous military discipline should not infringe upon the dignity. Soul of these interviews were usually young secretary of the party bureau VF Shevchenko, who was formerly with me to border guard. One of the bonuses of top students was a visit to Tashkent opera. In those years, the chief school was located on section of "cultural and educational" significant means of which were purchased for the entire year 6 - 8 regular tickets for Saturday and Sunday at the Opera House.About 800 tickets a year are the most established school staff. Cadets greatly appreciated this form of promotion. Many of them for the first time shall be attached in such a way to higher forms of theater. Memorable for all our cadets and officers were coming to the school of the world famous radio operator HSU Teodorovi Ernst Krenkel, party Chelyuskin epic. Krenkel fun telling cadets about the role of radio in the time of the death ship "Chelyuskin" and removal from the ice of Soviet sailors. Cadets listened with bated breath. Then one of them asked Krenkel, "What was the radio system on which you are working, being on the ice?" Ernest Teodrrovich smiled and after a pause said: "Systems NSAIDs." Cadets at the time was on the eve of release and got familiarized with multiple systems stations, but have not heard of such. The room was an awkward silence reigned. Asks uncomfortable - think that the students not literate. Ernst saw people wondering, but did not speak. Finally, one of the teachers radiodelu shyly and softly said that he did not know the system "NSAIDs". Ernest Teodorovici explained: "NSAIDs" - means "on snot," ie, it was not, as he said, the living space, it all consisted of adhesions and nodules. So in the vocabulary of our radio operators have another way of "technical" terms. Do you remember now Ernest Teodorovici with what warmth and love of his students met radioshkoly Tashkent in 1934? Hard, selfless work of a remarkable group of commanders professionals radioshkoly was rewarded with high achievers students - 90% were rated "excellent" and "good." And how much care and attention to the life of his wife officers of cadets! While encouraged to involve women commanders in improving barracks life. Red barracks had to be clean, bright, cozy

hostel where all the beds perfectly primed, [47] are covered with blankets, pillows, not straw and feather, the lockers are carafes of water, and between the beds spread out mats. I know that now it seems to much overkill pampering people, but it is hardly possible to agree with this: in addition to a concern for the comfort of the Red barracks we highly trained people in some of the transitions with large computation, students were taught to endure the heat, as long as possible to dispense no water - accustomed to physical hardship. .. The sweeter rest was well-equipped barracks. Come from different garrisons command representatives are noted in the school strict order. Not without sadness I left the command of the school in 1935, he was appointed Commissioner of the military train crews to Kiev. For more than eight years in Central Asia, I had so much attached to this land, to the locals, to coworkers that the move, even in such a beautiful city as Kiev, could not suppress the sadness of separation from the edge to fall in love. In late 1938, I returned to the border guards. I was transferred to Kharkov for the post of Assistant Chief of Border Guard District, and later was appointed to the post in the same District Administrator border and supply [48], the internal troops of the NKVD. From that time I started my specialization as the organizer of supply. The system was responsible for the supply of troops, arms, munitions, vehicles, fuel, food, clothing, finance, housing allowance. By the time I had completed the Correspondence Department Frunze Military Academy and received the rank of brigade commander. In early 1940, I was assigned to the formation of the District Supply Management Lviv border district while the post of Deputy Chief of the Border Guard. In appointing me to the city convincingly explained the complexity of our relationship with Germany, the great responsibility of border troops in the south-west. In this regard, I was also told that the transfer to the western border of the USSR I have seen as increasing. Did not have to carry this "peaceful" Border Service. Besides, this was a very short period of eventful. With the Deputy Chief of Border Guard District - I. Petrov, I was involved in building a new state border with Romania and choose the most appropriate items for placing outposts. By car and on foot we made our way down the mountain and woodland south of Czernowitz. [49] Our attention was drawn to the highest mountain here Pop-Ivan - about four thousand meters above sea level. It was decided to place on top of this mountain frontier. I myself have climbed this mountain until early May 1941, having decided to see how the guards live there. (Frontier is called "Pop-Ivan.") Uphill, we started at about 8 am, dressed for summer, we came to the gate about 8:00 pm. Approximately half-way we met the patrol, we have brought boots and coats. Soon we entered a period of perpetual snow. The higher we go, the colder it became, stop to rest, we were afraid, afraid of cold, and though slowly but relentlessly went. On the way, we found in one place holder with Russian rifle cartridge, which was knocked out number "- there were Russian soldiers in the First World War. Arriving at the gate, we saw a small house covered with snow. Nearby stood a trigonometric tower. Moving along the border was only possible to ski. From personal experience climbing this mountain and from the stories of border, I learned that the main problem here - is the delivery of food. One-third of his way to deliver on pack horses, and then only on themselves. Trades that locals made one revolution per day, on the back of[50] one person fits 40 - 45 pounds of products. When I read the complaint in Lviv chief outposts "Pop Ivan" that is too

low paid labor porters, to me it seemed unjustified complaint. But now I realized that we have to increase pay by at least half. Once again I had to make a personal acquaintance to the commander with the situation. When we go to the frontier often, I've seen busy traffic on the adjacent side. If six months ago at a border barrier could see one or two German soldiers, in April and May 1941, when I arrived at the gate at Przemysl, as if on cue, jumped at least three dozen German officers who were extremely excited. Signs of increased activity near the German border every day became more and more. And not only on land but also in the air revived their activities. German planes made regular reconnaissance flights, sometimes venturing to our side for a few tens of kilometers of the Pasha antiaircraft and fighter aircraft could only contemplate these brazen antics - they were not allowed to shoot for fear of provocation. It so happened that the next holiday was given to me on 22 June 1941. On the advice of the chief frontier district, I decided not to go and relax in one of the resorts Carpathians. The need for good rest was great - the last four years, in absentia, while studying at the Academy, I used the holiday to perform academic tasks. In the evening ordered the driver DM Grunia submit machine by 6 am. As if nothing had happened to leave care and other commanders. However, given the alarming situation, the chief of Border District established a procedure whereby the weekend duty in the Army headquarters was carrying one of his deputies. On the night of June 22, the headquarters of the district border duty head of the political district YE Maslowski (now Major General retired) - he had to get the first information and report back to Moscow to war. But there is not immediately believe ... [51]

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

At 4 am on June 22, 1941 started firing our territory. At about 5 am on duty at the headquarters of the district to notify the courier and on the phone all the officers. Soon as they get dressed, I heard the roar of planes, then breaks bombs. Sent his family to the basement of the threestory house, and he ran to the district headquarters, is 2 miles from my apartment. On the streets of Lviv were already dead, were audible groans of the wounded. I saw another set of enemy aircraft over the area where my family stayed. As a result of the raid was badly damaged house in which we lived, and my apartment, but, fortunately, had taken refuge in the basement remained intact. Air raids on the Lions lasted almost continuously for several days, though with impunity: Our fighter aircraft suffered heavy casualties in the area on the ground in the first hour of the war, anti-aircraft systems also were soon suppressed. I must say that our air near Lviv were many, but housing for pilots near the airfield was not. [52] Therefore, the flight crews almost daily, and always on a Saturday night, followed by commuter trains to the city for the night, leaving in armored guard. This situation was at hand Nazis, the war in the early morning on Sunday, when all the people, including the military, to rest in peace. At the headquarters of Border JE Maslowski said that in the night of 21 to 22 June 1941 on the site of one of our troops crossed the border of the German soldier and said that at 4 am on the offensive the Germans. Maslowski immediately informed of this in Moscow on duty at the headquarters of the

border troops of the USSR. After some time in Moscow followed Note: Do not succumb to provocations, and the defector morning sent a plane to Kiev. Similar signals have been in other parts of the western border of the Soviet Union. Our country has unsurpassed courage and resourcefulness of staff scouts who collected and reported to the appropriate authorities important information. Unfortunately, the incoming information does not always make the necessary conclusions. Even the warning received four hours before enemy invasion, could go a long way if he had believed. Four hours - term negligible for taking large response, but those hours could be precious, if at that time raised the alarm all the border troops, and troops of the Red Army, is located directly on the border. For those four hours could cause much of the airfields of flight and lift aircraft in the air before they were burned to the ground. The importance of these four hours eloquently some episodes first collision with the enemy of the parts where people were alerted for three to four hours before, or even less. Example - a memorable feat located in Rava-Russian and cover Lions 41 th Infantry Division. Former Chief of Staff of the division Eremin in his memoirs that in the spring of 1941 as soon as the fighting began training division was dispersed and no idea of fighting compounds. Both artillery regiment, anti-tank and anti-aircraft divisions, and other special forces were on the training grounds and fees beyond the boundaries of the division. Given that the German air force nagleli every day, flying at low altitude over Soviet territory, and intelligence reported that the Germans are increasing strength directly at the border, the commander of the 41st Infantry Division, Major General NG Mikushev adopted June 19 self [ 53]decision - to return all personnel from the special collections and sites, and to work on the defensive lines and all parts and units to concentrate on the division camp. - And what about the case and the army? This with their permission? - Asked the Chief of Staff of the division. - This is not going to talk. You know, what is our position - avoided a direct answer general {1} . General Mikushev died a heroic death in the battle for Kiev in 1941, and have remained forever unknown circumstances in which he made his unusually bold for its time decision: whether he did it entirely at your own risk, or agreed with someone their actions. Whatever it was, thanks to his vision and determination he took a number of measures, increase readiness division, and this had important consequences. By the evening of June 21, 1941 the whole division was assembled. Between the division headquarters and chief frontier Major J. D. Small, very energetic and courageous commander in regular contact, the division commander, was well informed about the situation on the border. On Saturday evening, June 21, from a story by EREMINA, General Mikushev called together for a meeting of commanding staff, addressed the audience with the following words: "You and I are at the border divisions, and our job is to protect the public interest here, right on the border. This problem is ... we were not removed now, as in the border area, as you know, has created a rather vague and alarming situation. Among the local population continues to stubbornly hold on rumors of imminent war. You see, as the German aircraft violated the border and fly over our territory. Directly

in front of us to the border only in the last few days have brought a large force of Germans ... We also need to be prepared for the worst ... Chief of Staff of the division remained in the camp until the morning. Commanders too.Nachsostava holidays today reduced to a minimum, all to be better in the camps ... " {2} The outbreak of war did not catch division Mikusheva surprise. Her and units operated by prearranged plan. [54] She defended first in the 50 kilometers wide. Against her were five infantry divisions of the enemy, for it was an important operational areas. The enemy planned by the end of June 22, 1941 to capture the city Rava-Russian, and two days later to take the Lions. But he miscalculated.Soviet soldiers demonstrated unusual courage, stamina, combat effectiveness. Infrequently hand to hand, and each time the Germans could not stand, leaving their wounded, equipment and waste. Only on the sixth day of the division, according to the order, left a line of defense. But she fought without the support of tanks and aircraft, with poorly secured the flanks ... That's what it means not to let yourself be caught off guard in advance to take the initiative and determination to act independently, feeling their responsibility to the people! From this fact begs many important and instructive conclusions, relating not only to military affairs. But above all, it shows that not even two days, and had a few hours in a situation of great importance. Here's another fact: The 99th Infantry Division, which was before the war in Przemysl, was alerted only after an artillery and air bombardment of our territory. But the first blow of Nazi troops took over the border guards 92-unit, and it gave an opportunity to the commander of the 99th Infantry Division, bring it on alert. Yu Strizhkov {3} reports that up to 12 hours of the day June 22, 1941 Line border firmly held down mostly by the border patrol. This allowed the units of the 99th Infantry Division to advance in their assigned defense zone. Began a bloody battle.True, Przemysl was still captured by the Germans by the end of June 22, but as a result of strong and skillful actions of parts of the 99th Infantry Division under the command of Col. I. Dementieva and consolidated border battalions under the command of Lieutenant GS Polivoda and units fortified area by 17 o'clock on June 23 the city was liberated us. The enemy left in the streets over 300 bodies, 12 machine guns, more guns and two tanks. In this fierce battle with the enemy in the rear of the German units broke into Przemysl, hit squad, made up of party activists of the city, 200 people led by Secretary of Party Committee of Przemysl [55] P. B. Orlenko threatened the rear of the enemy and forced him to withdraw across the border river San. Hitler did not command here to reach any significant progress in six days of heavy fighting, and it is easier for us to maneuver on other sectors of the front. Only 28 June 99th Division and the 92nd guards detachment left the city on the orders of a superior command. "Despite the surprise attack of the enemy, the division has not been lost hard and precise control of the command to function properly Good communication with the units" - finishes his tale Yu haircut.

There are other similar cases in the first hours of the war. Looking back on them, you come to the conclusion that Hitler would be costly to his adventure at the very beginning the invasion of the Soviet Union, if this invasion was preceded by a large part of our vigilance. Even neotmobilizovannaya Red Army would not allow the enemy so deeply invade our country. Is it appropriate to each time a nod to the fact that the center did not give timely directives on increasing the combat readiness of the troops? Is only the center was to blame for blunting vigilance troops stationed on the border? Had the center depended on the decision of such a question as abandonment of aircraft in the care of the duty sergeant on the night of June 22, 1941 and leave all pilots to the city for their families? This interpretation, although it is true, quite enough: it does not allow the right conclusions for the future. When the troops are on the border, and even at such a volatile border, is already one requires commanders and units to much. And, as we have seen from these facts, some commanders, acting proactively and skillfully arrested five times, six times superior enemy at the time of war, when every hour was so dear to our country. The situation in the Lviv in the early days of the war there was very tense. The enemy almost around the clock bombing the city, the number of victims among the population was growing by the day. Among the soldiers were, however, few in number, and also the victim of the shots from the corner: Enable the "fifth column" from the local chauvinist groups, as well as the city of the leaked German saboteurs. June 24, 1941, we sent their families by truck in the direction of Kiev without a specific address. Apartment locked and gave mandate wipers keep order, [56], assuring them that will come back soon. We ourselves did believe it. On the same day, by order of the center, we have started to send to the east and empties the entire railway locomotives. I called to Moscow to his immediate superior, General Vurgaft and asked his permission to off-load the wagons of property held as a reserve stock at the district warehouse, subordinate to me. It kept 15,000 pairs of leather boots, the same boots, overcoats, coats and there was there and artillery assets. In response, I was berated and threatened me with execution for "panic." By the end of the day on June 25 followed by a new order from Moscow - immediately evacuate the district warehouse. But it was too late, we did not have a single car: railway workers were highly mobile and had to send to the rear, one after another, probably more than a hundred trains empty. And ... all calls from Moscow became more frequent. Now, I was rudely and sternly reminded that I am personally responsible for the evacuation of the warehouses. The same Vurgaft in my invariable answer that, following an order center, we were left without a car, calmly repeated, "You there on the spot to see where to find funds. You are at the property is a personal responsibility. " At least three times a day I went to the warehouse district, on the outskirts of the city. On three sides of the warehouse was framed by four-and five-story apartment houses, out of their trenches and from attics increasingly shots were fired. Walking on the warehouse unsafe. Could be expected, and any attempts to sabotage groups acquire military equipment. I ordered the warehouse to prepare for the destruction of all the stores. I gave such an order of duty senior officer, but, frankly, could not be reconciled with the ability to carry it out, because they do not want to believe that at the very beginning of the war, we will have to quickly retreat. Meanwhile, the streets of Lviv were east more and more columns of our troops have

withstood heavy fighting was reflected on their gear. And I had to burn as much valuable clothing and shoes! Counsel was not with anyone - no one wanted to take responsibility for a decision. I ordered the warehouse to ship in car leather shoes and summer clothing, take it all on the intersections and give passing troops. Naturally, in this situation of any payroll or receipts, speech could be. [57] Execution of the case was fraught with difficulties and acute feelings. Because of the changing procedure, somewhat delayed passage of troops at intersections formed the "plug." In conditions of continuous enemy air attacks that could cause a lot of trouble. But nothing happened. All that's left after the warehouse, doused with gasoline and burned. Are burned precious winter uniforms. It was horrible sight! But to offer soldiers warm clothes at the time was the heat, it was pointless: and without that they were overloaded with weapons and ammunition. But you can also have all evacuated one or two days before! June 30, our troops have left Lions. It so happened that I was leading a small group of soldiers. They included the chairman of the tribunal prosecutor and district officials of the political and all my staff to manage supply. We moved on vehicles. Lead this group has fallen to my lot: they all knew that I was the brigade commander in rank that I have some military experience - and in that situation everyone wanted to be prepared militarily superior. Regardless of his previous posts were all feeling in our group and the rank and file soldiers, stopping to rest in the forest, carrying duty soldiers in perimeter defense. Almost every hour, our convoy of cars had to stop at the curb or at the forest edges masked by brazen German pilots, free to choose their targets and hunting is not just for small groups, but also for singles. During one of these attacks, my "Chevy" has received several bullet holes. After two or three days before we heard a rumor that the Nazis persecuted everywhere back that Lions again occupied by our troops and go back the regional organization. Jubilation knew no bounds. At the same time I was approached by our prosecutor. He invited me to give a written explanation: who authorized the burning warehouse and distribute forces shoes and clothing without a design? Tone that was asked these questions, let me know what to expect ... Do nothing. He sat down by the tree, I started writing a detailed explanation. Not passed, however, and the hour, I went back to the prosecutor: - Tear, Nicholas, wrote. Nobody needs it, - he said. - German not only keeps the Lions, but is moving eastward. Did well [58] destroyed the warehouse and at least part of the property given away his troops, I just thought, "What did he say to me, when the situation will change again? .." Originally formed the conditions under which your life may be hanging by a thread ... A lot of weapons, ammunition, fuel, food, clothing was left to the enemy in the eyes of our troops, retreating from the fighting and in dire need of the property. But it's hard to blame the warehouse. And what war would have stopped at the very moment when they are without the permission of the property handed over? [59]

ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF MOSCOW

Immediately upon arrival in Kiev, I was summoned to Moscow. A few days earlier by a special plane was called to Moscow and head of the

Lviv Region General V. Khomenko, he was appointed commander of the 30th Army, the move came into heavy fighting at the Smolensk area. In the same army and I was appointed to the post of army quartermaster. In mid-July 1941, I was already in the area of White Smolensk region (south-west of Rzhev). Not so easy was to find the headquarters of the army: the situation was changing almost every hour. Command post, marked on my map in Moscow, has been in the hands of the enemy. I moved him to the highway until I saw several groups of fleeing soldiers in our direction, and among them were many wounded. Stop the car, I asked, "Where is the headquarters of some?" The soldier replied: "Where staff - I do not know, but the Germans out of the fact tubercle, about 300 meters from us." We had to turn back. Army Headquarters I found in swampy grove, [60] called the map "forest Podzaytsevo", just 3 kilometers from the enemy. It is easy to understand why so often then lost control of his troops and staffs often fell into captivity! Only a month or two of the front commander issued the order to streamline deployment of headquarters units and formations in the defense, after which significantly improved the stability of command and control in a very maneuverable defensive battles of the time. But when I arrived in the 30th Army, this order was not there, there was no division of the army authorities in two-tier. Rather, it was a formal division, but all controls are located in the same place. So it was in the 30th Army: second tier controls are on the edge, closer to the enemy, and the army headquarters was located in the woods, about 300 - 500 meters behind the second tier. The commander ordered me to lead all of the services of material support, including artsnabzhenie, road transport, rail transport, etc. This was an unusual combination of duties then, for the scheme, adopted before the war, called the service subject to different bosses from top to bottom. Accordingly, there was no chief of the rear, and were only departments and offices at headquarters, was in charge of organizational and rear questions. Even before the war were felt disadvantages of such a structure, but, as it happens, in peacetime, the force of habit and inertia of long chained initiative people. It took a hard lesson in life, to understand the significance of well-organized, well-managed logistics. In August 1941, have been introduced as deputy army commander for logistics, the deputy commander of the front on the rear and rear chief of the Red Army. With new staff and structure of the home front, the Military Council of the 30th Army made a presentation about my appointment to that position, which I already actually was. But while I was riding in front headquarters with this view, I got to meet Major General V. Vinogradov, is appointed to the position of Chief of Logistics of the 30th Army. At the end of August (or early September, 1941 - I do not remember), I was offered the post of chief of staff of the border troops in Chita or Tbilisi and given day for reflection. From the formal point of this was promotion. But with the actual party? Just yesterday I was among friends in the difficult conditions of the front face to face with the enemy, and now all of a sudden leave thousands of miles away in the rear ... [61] To the Deputy Commissar I came with a report on secondment me in the army. On the report was attached resolution: "To meet the request of Comrade. Antipenko. " With this I came to the head of the rear of the Red Army General A. Khruleva. He received me very kindly. For the first time I had the opportunity to meet the person, on whose shoulders the very beginning of the war was given the important task - providing the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, all kinds

of logistics. In those days, only creating a new body - the General Directorate of the rear of the Red Army, to select personnel workers to the central office, for front and army units. Andrey did not waste time talking questionnaire character. Two or three questions about the latest work was enough to make him a decision. After a few minutes I was served an order on the appointment of Chief of Logistics of the 49th Army Reserve Front (near Moscow). The speed of orientation, sharp wit, lively, restless nature - these traits Khruleva it was impossible not to notice even the first brief meeting with him. In a farewell Andrey said: "Go to the army, do not hesitate grouchy character Zakharkin commander, Ivan G. I have long known. He is much older than you, you first suspect in undignified. But he knows how to appreciate employees. Take in your hands all military facilities. Show a firm hand in restoring order, everything came loose. No owner in the rear. We all have to re-create the control system rear of the Red Army. " After traveling a few hours in the car, Mozhaiskoe highway, I arrived in the 49th Army, whose headquarters was in 20? 30 km west of the railway station New Dugin. Army Commander presented IG Zakharkin and a member of the Military Council of AI Litvinov. My forty years of age he really seemed undignified, he gave me to understand, I met with a chill. Well, I was warned Khruleva! But believing the second part of the recommendation Khruleva, I had no doubt that the work we understand each other. And now it was necessary to immediately take up the case. The army was not long in defense. Soon came the tragic days. Say some more about the current situation there. Located in the rear of the 30th Army, which led heavy fighting, the troops of the 49th Army prepared a new defense line in the 30 - 40 kilometers from the front line. Was established in depth system engineering structures involved[62] troops and military equipment. Divisions, which were part of the 49th Army were well equipped and prepared for action. Especially a lot of work done gunners, they zeroed for each area, spent the interaction with the infantry, posted to firing positions on two combat rounds of ammunition. Again and again checked Commander IG Zakharkin reliable defense system of subordinate forces. Personnel of the army well learned task - fight to the death! - And it was not a phrase for a high spirit of patriotism in every soldier. It seemed that if the enemy break through battle lines stood in front of the 30th Army, he immediately hits a powerful defense of the 49th Army, and further passes. Suddenly the order Betting: 49th Army to withdraw from occupied positions, dive into the cars and move to the Kursk area in which to entrench the turn Kharkov, Kursk, Orel. Many of us have wondered: could ought to throw so well prepared defensive line on the main line? Would not we remove from positions immerse people in cars, and at this time and will be hit by the 30th Army? In this case, the enemy would open for tens of kilometers free way. But it turned out even worse - 30 September and 2 October, the Germans began their general attack on Moscow. Defeating the weak three-month battles of the 30th Army, they were strip ante 49th Army. At the same time they have suffered an air strike on the railway Rokad Rzhev - Vyazma, where focused dozens of trains with military equipment and troops of the 49th Army. Instead Kursk commands and headquarters of the 49th Army had to lead the troops in the region of Kaluga, they were scattered and units.Was soon commissioned and Kaluga. Our troops, retreating to the east, bypassed the city. At that point I was told to Army Commander IG Zakharkin go to Kaluga to personally find out who lit the match factory, she glowed huge flames, and the fire has intensified

panic. Appearing to the Party and the city council, I did not find anyone there. Telephone service continued to operate, but no one answered the call. On adjacent streets and factory already appeared the German soldiers. We had to leave. So I never managed to find out on whose orders was burned match factory in Kaluga. This has created a burning in the army and among the public confidence that the city is bound to surrender to the enemy ... Army headquarters with units of service depart the city Aleksin. By evening, the roads soaked by heavy rain. [63] Transport "in the belly" stuck in the mud. If it is not possible to pull out, then continued on foot. Soon gave up and Aleksin blowing pre railroad bridge across the Oka River, but after about a month on the enemy opened his movement.Doubt - just a completely blew up the bridge? Why his opponent as quickly restored? Began a protracted investigation. Officer-of-layer service VOSO {4} went through a lot of trouble (so delicately put it). Only later, when again our army was busy and we had to Aleksin restore the bridge, now ruined by the Germans, it became clear that no error officer VOSO explosion bridge is not allowed. But the lesson from undermining Alexinsky bridge across the Oka we checked out, we remember when the 49th Army took over the defense of Serpukhov, and stood in line question is when and how to blow up the railway bridge Serpukhov. In mid-October, the enemy had a semicircle of 6-7 kilometers west of Serpukhov. Here we have been curious separation of staff. In the Serpukhov were all the services, subject to the Army chief of logistics. Army Chief of Logistics and his staff were there as well. [64] Since I was a senior commander in the army garrison Serpukhov, the commander of the army appointed me chief of the garrison. From the position I was a part of the City Committee of Defense ("our little T-bills," as we jokingly called it), he was the chairman of the City Party Committee Secretary Gusev.East of Serpukhov in the village Buturlino, ie 15 - 18 kilometers away from the enemy, housed the headquarters of the army - the first transport it. According to the generally accepted model for the second tier would be on the east of the village of Buturlino, ie, away from the front lines.But in this case, the Serpukhov district would divide among divisions. In addition, there is a railway line Moscow - Tula - Eagle and the importance and unique in terms of the highway Moscow - Simferopol. It would be absurd to leave the city to all organs of army rear only for the sake of the scheme, and even in the days when the entire population of Serpukhov, ready to defend their city, to defend Moscow! For Moscow, the mid-October was the most difficult, the most intense. Articles appear in newspapers, calling persistently and courageously defend the capital of our country. To have at least a little, but it is combat-ready military units subordinated to the City Committee of Defense, we have formed a working Serpukhov companies and through daily come from an environment of military detachment of more than 600 people, well-dressed, clad and armed. This our efforts to build, of course, did not stop. In Serpukhov continued to arrive alone and a group of soldiers and officers out of the environment or separated from their units. Was established by the assembly point, where these people have taken and provided with all necessary.For coming out of the environment was very important to simple human attention, not to mention a friendly attitude towards them command and political bodies. Break out of the comrades have created favorable conditions (unfortunately, it was not always). Thanks to the 49th Army was quite significant replenishment men and equipment. The commander was very pleased with it.

Equally important were then headed to the rear, so to speak, "orphan" cars, even with anti-aircraft guns or valuable military equipment, which we take to your party. A squad of workers and soldiers, subordinate City Party Committee, was equipped with anti-aircraft two to three times higher than any rule. One of the most important duties of the army chief of logistics at the time was the evacuation of industrial equipment [65] east. It was impossible to miss a single day of navigation is not Icy Oka. Early frosts threatened freeze-up. Day and night, loaded barges and shipped towards Gorky. What is the only property not to proceed in this direction! In those days came to Serpukhov a deputy commissar of light industry (do not remember his name). His task was to speed up the evacuation of textile enterprises, raw materials, etc. He saw a lot of things from the army chief of logistics, when the situation at the front, so disturbing. And yet he relentlessly pushed on me, sometimes pripugivaya and sometimes pathetically assured me in the most profound respect for me, and promised that "the commissariat and all Moscow will never forget you, your help and thank, once the war is over." Tyloviki 49th Army did everything to save what is possible. But most importantly do our brave soldiers, who did not give Serpukhov to mock and plunder enemy. Recording and distribution of our assets have been a constant activity, but this work is put in front of us at times very strange problems. One came to me a non-military man and asked to take the car from him, brim full of money, folded in bags. How much money is in those bags - he did not know because they do not consider them when setting out some of the State Bank of the city, which at any moment could break the enemy. Frankly, it's "property" I was confused, I did not immediately decided what to do with it. And nachfin army could not offer me anything worthwhile. One bag of money - and lots of it. And then the whole car! Who will take them? What to do with them? And the time for us to mess around with this thing, if around so tense? I gave the man a soldier to accompany and advise as soon as possible to go to Moscow, and if there is no will, then go further to the east. True, our motorists are not averse to change his brand new car ZIS-5 on a worn-out, but they had to refuse the execution of this seductive intent. And went off to the east car full of money ... Meanwhile, the situation at the front all the more acute. In these days of the Serpukhov Vysokinichey to move a column of German troops not be held up by any serious resistance. Our military forces were stretched to the extreme, in defense and commander thought of Serpukhov squad workers held daily military training. He ordered that this squad to meet the enemy. Command squad voluntarily assumed Brigadier Firsov, strong and brave man, in those days, passing [66] I garrison duties Serpukhov, he was temporarily out of work. Under his command squad serpuhovchan not only stopped the German column and routed it, capturing prisoners and trophies - no small event for that time! Firsov soon took command of a division, then the body and ended the war with the rank of lieutenant-general, Hero of the Soviet Union. Success at Serpukhov Vysokinichami inspired workers, who already had willingly perform any tasks to help the Red Army. Muscovites and residents of suburban areas, young and old rose to defend the capital. Construction of defensive positions was then one of the most important and urgent tasks, and that's on all the roads leading to Moscow, there were thousands of installed metal "hedgehogs", were dug dozens of kilometers of anti-tank ditches. In Moscow itself on every main street barricades rose. Essentially almost erased the line between front and rear. Small factories and workshops, workshops for large

companies remaining after the evacuation of machines produced mortars, grenades, collected U-2 aircraft, repairing guns, tanks, vehicles. Produced - in the factories, in the studio and at home - warm clothes for the soldiers who were going to warm things and people. Serpuhovchane, kolomentsy, residents of other communities, included in the defense of the 49th Army, were covered by a desire to help the front. Women voluntarily taking on commitments - make a certain amount of cotton jackets, trousers, warm clothes. We gave them the materials, and kerosene lamps, and especially need support with food and fuel. How useful manufactured Kolomenskoye and Serpukhov workers cans and buckets of stainless alloy (with cotton insulation) for the delivery of hot food and tea soldiers on the cutting edge! Summer during the retreat of our troops lost almost all field kitchens, vacuum flasks and fed long dry. It became even worse when started cold and snow. Besides the defensive front line was difficult to heat the food, as the appearance of German observers tracked down streams of smoke to bring down the place where the food distributed, mortar fire. Later, when the banks of dry alcohol and could reheat food without smoke conditions troop supply hot food have improved significantly. But in the first winter of the war from prolonged lack of hot food frequent gastrointestinal disease at the forefront. [67] In about half of November 1941 in Perkhushkovo, which housed the headquarters of the Western Front, the Military Council of the Front convened a meeting of heads of the rear of armies, to discuss issues related to the material support of soldiers. First place went to the issue of supply of hot food to the forefront. The first member of the Military Council of the Front Bulganin repeatedly stressed that Stalin personally interested in what is being done to improve the food supply of the soldiers on the front line. Following this meeting, we enlisted the help of Serpukhov and Kolomna workers, and literally within a week were produced thousands of buckets with lids, with covers, and a few hundred hand-rail. In these slides the men in camouflage overalls brought hot food directly into the trenches. Often, they were fired at the same enemy. There were times when snipers shot through the bucket. But in general the delivery of hot meals to the forefront was established, and it immediately affected the health of the soldiers. It would seem a trifle? But these "little things" were important. What, for example, the benefit brought Serpukhov women made cloth masks against frostbite! They are especially in need of the cavalry corps Belova, which was the part of the 49th Army, and the sled and carriage driving all parts and connections. Perhaps Serpukhov toiler and now forgotten about this "stuff", for which then went against them many letters of appreciation of our soldiers. Permit me now and again to say a big thank you soldier workers Serpukhov and Kolomna. Population helped us in the equipment of hospitals, to care for the wounded and sick. After all, there were days when the city was coming from the front of a thousand or more wounded. It is not always possible to be at once or in a short time to evacuate them further to the rear, and many medical reasons should have been left in place, providing them with qualified medical assistance and a satisfactory diet and lifestyle.Hospitals and medical battalion divisions were loaded two or three times against the authorized strength, not enough nurses, nurses, cleaners, stokers, and many wounded had to be very bad, if not for the help of local residents. They own a great merit in saving thousands of our Soviet soldiers. Serpukhov City Party Secretary and Chairman of the City Council Gusev Sokolov visited troops on the front line. I accompanied them.Almost all of the last kilometer crawl on their bellies, often resting. We got to the front [68] the trench, which clearly visible figures of German soldiers. I

recommended Gusev talk with the soldiers in the dugout with three reel, but he chose to get behind the reverse slope, where you can gather more people. After the interviews were presented with gifts. Evening approached, the people returned to their places, and we had to go back, but suddenly in the 20 - 30 meters began to explode mines, had to take refuge in the dugout. Mortar raid was repeated several times. When it was dark, city leaders made it safely home. Did not even have to crawl as day. City officials provided under army and divisional medical institutions are any suitable premises, especially schools and hospitals. The difficult task fell on the medical staff who have worked tirelessly for several days in a row. Doctors, clock will not move away from the operating table, swelled legs - were even times when they had to cut shoes. Surgeons often work carried out under air attacks and long-range artillery fire.Sometimes, plaster fell off during the operation on the heads of doctors in open wounds. Is even worse ... Caring for the wounded is one of the major problems of logistics management throughout the war. And in those days the enemy was hanging over Serpukhov on three sides, the city of his motivation was quite probable danger, it is clear that of all the logistics services required to limit voltage effort to ensure, if need be, a complete and rapid evacuation of several thousand injured. I consider it my duty as often as possible to visit the hospital, to find out the needs of the wounded. From conversations with the injured I had to make a strange phenomenon: almost none of them knew no army, no division, or even the part of the department and, as part of which they were when injured. (About any medical records forward area of the question did not exist, primary documentation was got a wounded soldier in an army hospital or sick-bay.) Why is this happening? The fact that the Army received almost daily replenishment of one or twotier, mostly at night. Under cover of darkness, the soldiers disembarked from the train, he immediately put in a car and drove straight to the front. At dawn, they went into action, without having to know the name of even a squad leader. There were thousands. Even today many of them are telling the truth, that fought for Moscow, injuring at Moscow, but where the injured - do not know ... Most of the men complained to the hospital for lack of tobacco and writing paper. Were dissatisfied and absence [69] of photographers - everyone wanted to send his mother a picture: there is a war, you never know what might happen! But were not the only complaint. Many of the wounded appreciated talking about a particular doctor, the nurse, the nurse, the hospital visiting Serpukhov citizens. In one of the hospitals I had to hear the words of gratitude surgeon Khmara. I was surprised to get acquainted with this surgeon, a young girl, for some reason I expected to see an old and experienced physician. And certainly I could not imagine that later Yelena Khmara and I will be forever inseparable. Gives us a lot of trouble the railroad bridge across the Oka River in Serpukhov. In troubled days of October 1941, when the situation on the front seemed low stability, commander told me that I was personally responsible for the timeliness and completeness of its destruction. In this case, the commander reminded me of Aleksin bridge, over which the then continued the investigation. Serpukhov bridge had to be destroyed. The bridge is probably known to many. If the neighboring road bridge was famous at the time of his decrepitude and incredibly crunched when it is passed, the durable and elegant railway bridge was the pride of our engineering. And suddenly this handsome will disfigure and plunged to the bottom of the river ...

Why this task was entrusted to me? Probably because my headquarters located in the city, close to the railway bridge. In determining our deployment was conceived so that, if necessary, of the Rear Army will depart after the first echelon of Army Staff and Chief of Logistics can give the team at the right time to blow up bridges. After all, it was a question about the strategic importance: Hurry to the explosion - the cause enormous damage, late - the enemy will take advantage of the surviving bridge. Several times with major Prokhorenko of military transport service Army, we went to the bridge, check the reliability of the preparations for the explosion. Each beam hung garlands checkers. All poles have been dug meter niche, and they laid the explosives. All this complex circuit was connected by wires, and only had to turn the handle a few degrees to the entire bridge into a shapeless heap of metal. One kilometer away from the bridge in a special shelter was Sergeant with "machine." From the movement of the hand of this depended the fate of Sergeant that our beloved plants. Mostovik visiting engineers, I have seen the face of sergeant that he understands the tragedy of his task. [69] The enemy in the weeks led a methodical bombardment of the bridge long-range guns, and the ice was dotted with numerous holes from shells, fly through the bridge farm, but there were no cases that the shell hit the beam or support. Our troops, to defend the frontiers of the Moscow region, not only saved the bridge from enemy artillery, but also from our destructive preparations. Driving along the bridge in the postwar years, every time I vividly remember that difficult time. In October and November 1941, our troops reflect the incessant attacks of the enemy and at the same time preparing for the decisive battles. Accumulation of ammunition for the coming counterattack was thought at the time the most urgent task. The main way of accumulation of shells was then saving them. Strictly forbidden barrage on insignificant targets. Consumption was planned individually, two or three shots per gun per day - so little shells. You can imagine how annoying it happened gunners to see the goal and not give it on the volley. One day I happened to be in the village, one half of which is occupied by the Germans, and the other our. At the edge of the village stood the regimental battery. Its commander gave me a report and reported on the observed movement of the enemy groups on the opposite end of the street, about 2 kilometers away. I asked why they will lay them on fire? - Unfortunately, I have no right - sorry he reported. - The daily rate we have already used. I promised him an exception to replenish ammunition (even with interest) if it does not miss a favorable moment. After a few well-aimed shots at the apparent purpose of the movement of people to the enemy's, and made a long silence. Our gunners took soul. In the daily delivery of ammunition to the front of warehouses and austerity in spending them for December 5, 1941 the army has gained at least two sets of combat, ie, 160 - 200 rounds per gun. That was enough to break through the German artillery support defense. [71]

THE DEFEAT OF THE NAZIS NEAR MOSCOW

The long-awaited moment came. December 6th, 1941 West Front went to the offensive. 49th Army, while on his left wing, advancing in the direction: Tarusa, Aleksin Kaluga Kondrovo, Yukhnov. Were severe frosts. Layer of snow reached 70 - 90 centimeters. It was hard to tylovikam in the autumn, when it seemed that all the traffic permanently stuck in a quagmire. But do not become easier in the winter. A soldier with a personal and group small arms could somehow move forward in pursuit of the enemy. But what about the major combat equipment, to vehicles? It is not that the army, which had in its offensive zone roads were in better condition than we are advancing in a less favorable zone. Everyone was hard. Everywhere I had to clear the snow, roads on virgin snow. It was at this time, we have learned to build roads and corridors reminiscent of snow for up to 100 - 150 km. [72] For road it was a time of severe tests. Experience has shown that the last thing they had to deal with pre-existing roads, with extremely broken during the autumn mud, they do not meet the requirements for "snowy road." Preferred were open fields, even plowed. They could freely choose the shortest line, it is easier to use road equipment. True, the technology was not enough, and she was so good as now. But even a tractor grader or horse-drawn - a great help in the construction of military roads. Digged typically 3 - 4-meter band with traveling. On both sides of the road stood high walls of snow in 2 - 3 meters.When you go on a road, it seems like almost directly Journeying padded white tunnel. The benefit of such roads was and that, coloring machine in white, we have minimal visibility from the air. The retreating Germans burned and destroyed almost all the villages. There was no road signs, except for the names of villages, written in German. Meanwhile, at a time when the whole area is covered with a thick layer of snow and very little topographic maps on the scale of 1: 25 000 or 1: 50 000, it was important to furnish the necessary signposts at least two directions in the band each division. How could have solved this problem army road builders, headed by experienced, hardworking, very resourceful and engineer Nikolai Tkachev? They opened "field art studio" for the production of road signs. Signs and harvested for the communities that have been in the hands of the enemy. Guided with the largest scale maps, which show the streets, alleys. While there was a struggle for a particular locality, the car, loaded with road signs, is located in close proximity to it, and after 2 - 3 hours after his release already installed signs at all entrances and exits. And the commander and division commanders have repeatedly expressed his admiration for the excellent work of our military Road. The first days of the Moscow counteroffensive winter of 1941 showed just how undervalued the role of logistics command combined arms.Therefore, the Military Council of the Western Front, pointed out that the practice of fighting the advancing armies shows very poor management of the Home Front Military Councils of armies and commanders. Army logistics support management, usually detached from the first echelon of the operational situation and lose all control of rear ... [73] Many commanders in the successful offensive forgot his rear ... to forget that without a well-organized work of the rear most good operation can drown. This indication has played a significant role in strengthening the logistics. Not without extremes: Commander IG Zakharkin and his chief of staff Verholovich still held the rear of the posting of staff of the army and some rear services in the same village as the operational,

intelligence and other divisions of the first echelon. This continued until the directive on the strict observance of the principle of separation of government. Winter offensive continued. Due to snowy roads vehicles more or less smoothly delivered ammunition and food divisions. But how to apply it all in the shelf? It replaced the car came sled. Easy to say - sleigh! To equip troops sleds also had to think about in advance. After all, the military depots were not, there was no special harness. I had to again seek help from the local population and at the same time to establish their own production of the sled. By end-December 49th Army had more than three thousand sleds with harness, was formed by several animal-drawn vehicles and mouth. In January and February 1942, all the mass transport in the rear of the troop lay on horsedrawn carts. However, the more horse-drawn transport, the more you need the horses, and hence feed. What to feed 4,000 horses? We have already begun to feed the surviving remnants of thatched roofs and feed abandoned by evacuees. Soon the whole front came a severe fodder crisis. Far in the rear, in the floodplain of the Oka, were tens of thousands of stacks of hay mown in June 1941. No hay is not taken out, and he was the total loss of the spring floods. We have long heard about this hay and thinking how to take them before the river will flood. But this required the area to throw hundreds senozagotovok sleigh with horses and hundreds of soldiers get senopressovalnye machine, wire or twine ... We have carefully developed a plan senozagotovok and reported it to the Military Council. He immediately and strongly supported the initiative of its tylovikov. During December 1941 and January 1942 was press-fitted and taken to the railway over 5000 tons of excellent hay, and in those days, when the 49th Army remained almost entirely without forage, we began to arrive one by one, the trains with hay . [74] Not only do we avoid this terrible scourge of mass death of the horses, but they were so well off compared to its neighbors, that part of our hay, although we have argued, the chief of the rear of the front took the order and transferred to other armies. In the 50 th Army, our neighbor to the left, horse deaths was greatest, and therefore the head of logistics Surkov army general and chief of staff, Colonel Komlev rear of the army were put on trial by military tribunal. In fairness, it must be said that this disaster had no one to blame tylovikov. Of course, and our horses had to be just as bad as the horses of the 50th Army, had four months before the army commander, General IG Zakharkin not support the initiative of its tylovikov. I must say that we have with Army Commander soon developed a relationship based on mutual trust and respect. As it often happens in war, joint work has moved us into a personal friendship. We even agreed to be inseparable in one army to the end of the war. One case showed how to treat me Commander. In January 1942, during the offensive staff of our army moved to the village of Badgers, east Yukhnov. Here I was with a small group of officers behind. Returning from a division all shivering, I was glad [75] overheated house. Undressed, I hung on the wall cloak coat, PCA, and he sat down at the table and began to talk about the status of the officers in the division. Immediately was Party secretary of the Rear Army I. Pankratov. It was a frosty sunny day. The mistress of the girl were busy at the stove. Suddenly, everything collapsed. I regained consciousness only after I learned from the rubble and smoldering debris. German plane, quietly planning over the country, landed 100-pound bomb right into our house. Seven people were killed, among them the owner of the hut with the girl. My rifle hanging on the wall, was cut in half by shrapnel in my cloak was a hundred holes, and boots, lying on the floor, were riddled. I got off with a light concussion.

At this point, returning from the front line commander. Seeing the dying fragments of my headquarters, and knew that at the time of a direct bomb hit in the house I was, commander wept. When I came to, he said cheerfully, "You and I are destined to work together for a long time!" We all grieve for a long time I. Pankratov, who did not after the bombing. It was an extraordinary man. Party work he began in 1906 as one of the organizers of the strike at the Kazan Railway. Later, he lived for several months in Capri, talking there with Gorky and Lunacharsky. Many years spent in exile in Siberia. In 1941, he was 50 - the age of conscription is not, and Ivan decided to join the militia division. In the military enlistment office denied him in this, taking into account his age and rank. Then he went to another recruitment office, where nothing about her work, presenting a membership card. Then he was enrolled in the militia and a few days later fought at Moscow. When his division that emerged from large losses, reorganized, I. Pankratova, 49, was transferred to the Army for the post of chief communications officer at the rear of the army.People who take this position used to go to the troops with different missions, but, of course, we are not able to "drive" such a respectable person on business trips. Just at this time to create the party organization of the Rear Army, and Pankratov was elected secretary. Soon he won universal respect. Remembering the disaster in the village of Badgers, I thought that Mr. Smith died. And in 1946, came one day to the phone, I heard: "Since you said Pankratov, Mr. Smith ..." I must admit I was taken aback at first: I have to say dead! [76] Recovered, I asked Mr. Smith to come to me immediately . It turns out that when the bomb fell on our house in the village of Badgers, I. Pankratov, badly wounded, fell into the cellar, where it was stored potatoes, and long lay there unconscious. Finally, it has lost a lot of blood extracted from the rubble and taken to a hospital in a neighboring armies, where it then evacuated to Central Asia. He spent eighteen months in a cast. We, his friends at the 49th Army, in a short time a lot of time moving from one area to another, the transition to service in the other compounds, and he could not find us, but we were not looking for it, and, considering killed. By war's end, he was taken to Moscow. He walked a prosthetic leg - one leg was shorter by 8 inches. I. Pankratov, died in 1962. Having mastered the city Yukhnov Ugra and going for our 49th Army went on the defensive. Sometimes in this period of relative calm, fights were fierce. The enemy is not just trying to throw our troops on the eastern bank of the Ugra. For about a month the army headquarters, including the management of the home front, located in the village Kuvshinovo, 3 - 4 kilometers away from the enemy, who was on the opposite bank of the river. The enemy was well aware that this is the headquarters of the army, and kept the village under constant artillery fire. First we went into the slot, then got tired, and we were sitting in their homes and work. Almost time for the spring floods. Nizkovodnye bridges built by army engineering and road parts, is about to be demolished debacle.Worked day and night for two weeks and Bridge construction battalions Road building, erecting high water bridge. Finally, it was told a report about its construction to the Military Council of the army. A few days before the artillery commander General NA Kalinowski put zenith around the bridge cover. We knew that the Germans were carefully observed from the air outside our building. Observed but did not attack. And when the bridge built and solemnly commander cut the ribbon for the passage of road transport, the next day was made a powerful enemy air raid. First was suppressed our

antiaircraft affinity, and then destroyed the bridge. Standing under a tree with the IG in a matter Zakharkin 500 - 600 meters from the bridge, we saw a picture of his death. Not describe the offense, which we felt when we saw it falling into the river. Such a complex and beautiful bridge we built the first time.[77] had taken for the restoration of the same place, using the surviving approaches (Ugra has spread at the time of 6 - 8 kilometers). Finally, a new high water bridge went transports ammunition, fuel, and then the heavy materiel. It was in these days to our army came Mongolian delegation led by S. Luvsanom {5} . This delegation drove on the newly restored bridge towards the combat formations of troops. Fortunately, she was able to leave without loss of areas of heavy artillery fire of the enemy, yet the army commander had to give an explanation to their superiors why he made such a risky trip for visitors. During the winter counteroffensive Army Military Council relentlessly followed for the support of the advancing troops. For the same reason no visits to the troops and the army chief of logistics. One of these trips I long remembered. On the way to the front line, I learned from the commander, the village where I was going (I do not remember her name) is already occupied by our troops, and there you can find the regimental commander. Along with the aide and driver DM Grun we arrived [78] there and actually found in the school regiment commander with a group of officers. But the village was in our hands, only half in the second half there were still Germans. A lively small-arms firing. While I spoke to the commander of the regiment, 15 - 20 yards away stood a group of officers who had deserted to the side, so as not to interfere with the conversation. Suddenly there was a loud bang, everything was shrouded in smoke from exploding mines. The regimental commander asked me to immediately withdraw the corner of the building. There I met a fighter who came from a company, and only had time to ask him how things are going with food and clothing, as my companion fell, badly wounded in the head by shrapnel from a second mine. Then the commander of the regiment said: "I ask you, Comrade General, immediately get out of here. We were not careful, the enemy saw a crowd of people and will not leave us alone. " But it took at least an hour before we were able to get out of the zone of mortar fire. Commissioner rear of the army was AN Rassadin. That's really been a real Commissioner! I did a number of years was the commissar work and knew exactly what the requirements are for this kind of military leaders. AN Rassadin successfully combined the features of party workers, managers, courageous military man and a reliable friend. His outstanding qualities were soon noticed, he was appointed a member of the Military Council of the neighboring army. To replace him arrived I. Fursov, with whom we have worked long, as I soon departed from the 49th Army. But even for a short period of our collaboration I saw in him the same features of the outstanding party official: AN Rassadin was before the war, Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee, JS Fursov, engineer, - Secretary of the Regional Committee of Stalingrad. A sense of respect and gratitude to my frontline commissioners does not leave me to this day. [79]

THE BRYANSK FRONT

The relationship we have developed with the commander of the army is so good that I had in mind was not to change jobs. But here there was a call from Moscow (I was at that time a high gear (HF), the wire was the Chief of Staff of the Red Army rear MP Milovsky. Inquired about my health and well-being, Mikhail Pavlovich began asking how things are

going in Army. Reporting all about it, I felt that's not why he called me, because it was not customary to central authorities appealed to the army, passing front-line management. "How much time do you need to get ready?" - he asked . the unexpected question, I lost my head and did not answer immediately. Milovsky MP continued: "Hrulev ordered you to be ready to leave in 24 hours. Where to go - followed by an additional indication." I just had to say, "Yes, sir." Immediately I reported to the army commander and asked him to intercede for me. because we were going to be parted with and end the war. [80] However, two days later received orders from Moscow to immediately hand over the post of Chief of Logistics of the 49th Army and serve the Bryansk Front, which take office Deputy Commander of the Front for the rear. This happened at the end of June 1942. At parting we IG Zakharkin hugged and kissed. Frontline friendship! Leaving from the Western Front, I took with a lot of experience already gained in an extremely difficult situation. We must give I. Khokhlov - member of the Military Council of the Front for the rear - he was able to awaken in us the energy, initiative, creativity and a love for the business.Man exceptional organizational skills, he was deeply aware of the country's economy and the needs of the population, to work in the army, he moved all the things I learned, being the chairman of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation. Its main distinguishing feature was the knowledge of the "little things" and a remarkable ability to combine these "little things" with national needs and objectives, the ability to make the "war" in the full use of all that is around them to pay less to the government with all kinds of requests. He deserves much of the credit: he re-educate many of the military-economic workers, went to war with the "classical" notions of reliability and security of supply to the army of any property - would be presented to the authorities' request. " Life cruelly denied pink idea that all the benefits, we will be served on a silver platter. For the first time, even there was no one to bid. Had himself to think what and where to take to feed the soldiers, that they might bring to the front is necessary. Khokhlov and showed an example of a professional soldier, how to solve organizational and economic problems, there is at every turn. Coming from a working family, he himself may have to pick up an ax or a scythe, and to prove that anyone who wants to can learn their own. When he learned that I was going to the area of Oka floodplain to establish there mowing, he was willing to go along and asked him to prepare a braid to growth. I sent the hayfield soldiers saw him truly heroic scale oblique, wide grip and clean mowing. To keep up with him, I had to go to a small trick - take twice less grip than a good laugh over Ivan Sergeyevich. Chief of Logistics of the Western Front, V. Vinogradov openly admitted that Igor Khokhlov, a lot to learn in terms of knowledge management, and in the sense of tact in dealing with people. This ability to recognize a superior of a friend - a lovely touch. But it [81] and some lurking danger. Vladislav Petrovich was highly respected by his subordinates and colleagues. But he lacked confidence in his actions lacked the necessary firmness and independence in decision making. Too pressured him authority Igor Khokhlov, which, as it had to some extent a substitute for the rear of the front head. This we have seen, military personnel, and, unwittingly, sometimes avoided his direct superior, appealing directly to a member of the Military Council ... True, it does not suffer from: Ivan Sergeyevich was concerned that the authority of the chief of logistics remained unaffected.

Following the drive to a new duty station, I tried to imagine the circumstances in which it is necessary to solve the problem is not the army, and the front scale. Drove Tula Efremov. Day was drawing towards evening when the driver Grun drew my attention to the barely noticeable black dots in the air: "That the birds, or the aircraft." Less than a minute later, we saw a cloud of smoke over the dace. Until we moved to this town, fascist vultures made several passes, dropping hundreds of bombs. On the main street of the city, we met a few women and children crying. It seemed that the city is dead. Downed telephone poles, thick smoke from burning houses, dead bodies have not yet - traces of the crime committed by the Nazis. [82] 12 kilometers south-east of the headquarters Yelets Bryansk Front. The former commander of this front, General Golikov left to the newly created Voronezh Front. Expect the other team. Chief of the rear of the front I received from General VN Vlasov. We met with him in the cabin filled with cigarette smoke. State of the working room of General Vlasov was like a reflection of his mood. Unshaven face, dirt under the fingernails, tousled hair, crumpled suit - all this made a repulsive. On his desk crawling bugs ... Everything showed that he is going through a deep depression due to failures: the enemy has recently succeeded in penetrating deeply at the junction between the 13th and 40th armies of the Bryansk Front, and despite the fact that the rate of the front gave several tank shells, the enemy here was neither broken nor even pushed. From a brief conversation with VN Vlasov became clear to me: the Bryansk Front dire need everywhere: food, fuel, and ammunition. The main thing - it lacks the motor and horse transport. For this reason, hospitals crammed wounded - evacuation by rail was hampered continuous bombing. I painted a dismal picture Vladimir ... - Can not we drink tea? - I asked. - And why not? - Said Vladimir. - Although this minute. Now we get in the car and go for tea. Indeed, we had to drive about 5 miles before we found in one of the ravines tent with grub. Cup of tea because of spending so much time! - And it feeds the front commander? - I asked. - Had he every cup of tea goes into this ravine? - Yes, we have such a procedure. Told no table near the front headquarters not to keep - sadly explained V. Vlasov. At these words I thought of Ivan Zakharkin, not just to thank me for it by living conditions. Who, if not the chief of logistics to take care of living conditions "brain" of the front, ie, the front headquarters! After all of its employees are registered every minute, minute loss sometimes results in loss of many lives. Of course, the feed head - it is a small matter compared to the provision of the whole front, but if you're [83] can not solve it, then how will you solve the big questions? Again, remember the 49th Army. There dining Army Military Council is well served by the command. The misunderstanding arose only once in connection with the fact that the staff canteen be abused in a write-off of consumption of alcoholic beverages. Looking ahead, talk about one part of the dining room of the second tier of the 1st Belorussian Front. As you know, 100 grams of vodka a day during the war was supposed to all the soldiers and officers from the front edge to the staff of the division. Corps headquarters, and especially the Army Headquarters and the front does not have the right to receive this narkomovskogo "rations". But how could observe this order?Especially in those cases where our troops managed to repel the enemy's stores with hundreds of tons of alcoholic drinks?

After consulting with the commander of the front, I set the order in the dining room to the second tier of the front of the field management has always been enough vodka. Near the water-bottle on the table stood a carafe of vodka. Only the first day of one of the tables had drunk, as they say, "a lord." In the next few days - and so to the end of the war - there were people who abused alcohol. Head of the dining room I have heard many times that the consumption of vodka in the dining room was considerably reduced. Soon came the new commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General Rokossovsky. About him, his 16th Army have written in the newspapers. Rokossovsky name not on the lips, when it was the reflection of the German attack on the Volokolamsk highway, on the transition of our forces on the offensive in this area, and even earlier - the bloodiest battles of Yartsevo. Now I had to meet with him as your commander. Although we saw for the first time, I had the impression that we have many years of know each other. I spoke briefly about themselves, about their service. - We are in a very difficult situation - said Rokossovsky. Looking at the map, he described the situation at the front. 13th Army, now a left-flank our front waged intense battles with the enemy. We had to help her in every way. After listening to my report on the rear of the front, the commander wished me success. [84] - Once again, please take care of the wounded 13th Army - he said goodbye. In Washington, how it was said, was nothing like the order, but I felt a great concern for the 13th Army. On arrival at his headquarters, I asked the Chief of the Medical Control Front General MS Itskina detailed report to me on the situation. According to a report nachsanarma 13th in the country Baranovka accumulated many wounded, and he asked me to help evacuate them. According Itskina, the army has a sufficient number of free hospitals and ambulances, and he can not understand how could form a "plug" in Baranovka. I immediately decided to go with him to Baranovka, is a 70 - 80 km from my headquarters. It is very instructive picture of helplessness and lack of organization ran into our eyes. On a plot of about 20 - 30 kilometers along the front are four hospitals in the 5 - 8 kilometers from one another in the back to the field hospital divisions. According to the scheme as well. But three of the hospital completely inactive, and the fourth, in Baranovka, took more than two thousand wounded. "Took" - it is not even the right word. The wounded were not accepted, and just unloaded on peasant households car drivers who follow an army ammunition depot, the nearest railway station. Was only one road from the troops of an army depot - it went through Baranovka. And as the ambulance evacuation is carried out mainly by reverse empties, drivers of transport vehicles, trying as quickly as possible to deliver ammunition to the front, do not waste time searching for hospitals, nestled in the woods, and were considered more convenient to use the nearest hospital. Besides office picketing was set out very badly, no signposts towards deployed in the rear of the hospitals we have found. And that is done in the hospital for 200 beds when it brought 2,000 wounded, scattering them all over the country? It was impossible to confine private measures of administrative influence. Out of this tragic situation here had to make serious conclusions.In this example, it was necessary to show what is lack of coordination between the various services the rear of the army. For this inconsistency is primarily responsible chief of logistics of the army.

Nachsanarm 13th placed its hospitals to the adopted scheme, unrelated to the overall organization of the rear of the army. He did not take into account the fact that in a stressful combat situation is difficult to get the driver of the transport vehicle to do [85] hook on the road in search of the hospital, also disguised so much that even its hard for people to find it. The situation prompted, that would be best to place hospitals near the road that runs through Baranovka. Let this be a violation of the sanitary circuit device rear, but the wounded would be much better. In this case, the rear of the army headquarters was acting on a pattern, applying a force not to think about the problem, do not take the initiative. Hard lesson learned by us from Baranovskaya tragedy was immediately brought to the attention of the other armies. By the sanitary management front was provided effective assistance of the 13th Army. Front commander approved the measures taken in this regard. Autumn was approaching. We had to think about providing troops for the winter. It was clear that sit idle, waiting for the Center will provide everything you need, it would be a crime. Fall - then had to procure food grains, fodder, potatoes, vegetables, organize feeding cattle coming to us alive, etc. Not once had to consult on these matters with the Secretary of the Oryol regional party NG Ignatov. But besides the Orel region, in the border area of the rear of the front were: Tula, Ryazan, Penza, Tambov. Military Council was reported to plan for the procurement. Commander carefully reviewed our plan and help implement it. - As difficult to distract from the front of the machine, the people, but even worse, if we starve in winter, - said Konstantin Rokossovsky. On the U-2 plane with nachprodotdela I. Makarov I flew Tula, Ryazan, Penza, Tambov region, everywhere reported civilian leaders on the front steps taken everywhere enlisted the support. In coordination with the regional leadership of the military personnel were set of suppliers and transport, storage facilities are defined just harvested. As for the Orel region, here our task was not only to help harvest crops, but also to help the remaining, a depleted local populations in the fall field work. We gave the seed, fuel, vehicles, and, where possible, and tractors. It should be noted that there has always been a proper understanding between military officials and regional leaders, partly occupied by the enemy. For example, one of the members of the Military Council of the Bryansk Front, S. Shabalin, a former pre-war big party worker, [86] and now has become the military and was awarded the rank of general, the incomprehensible arrogance applied to "civilian" leaders of regions and often referred to them "generals without an army," as if they were guilty of the situation. But other leaders of the front were not inclined to follow his example. On the contrary, we have easily folded with provincial and district committees, executive committees and executive committees to frontline areas friendly working relationship. Particularly good relations with management were Orel and Tula regions. Tula Oblast Party Committee Secretary V. Lark Executive Committee and Chairman of NI Chmutov treated with exceptional attention to the needs of the front. They were still fresh in the memory of the days of the heroic defense of Tula. These managers do not need to persuade than to help the front. They organized themselves in Tula repair weapons made mortars, provided all of the best premises for frontline hospitals, found the place where the maintenance base. For its part, the front did everything to help in the reconstruction of the economy, especially coal mines. Rear organs of the front in the home completely restored two flooded mines and established there the coal mining.

About our work with the Secretary of the Oryol regional party NG Ignatov should say more. [87] The commander, treated him with great respect, not just drew my attention to measures to assist affected areas. This long-suffering region was the theater of armed struggle against German fascism, its people have been massive destruction, the economy - destruction. When, in August 1943, the eagle was released, we saw the area is almost entirely in ruins. The share of NG Ignatov fell heavy duty guide all rehabilitation work in the Oryol region: it was necessary to create new industries, hospitals, schools, revive agriculture and the first thing is make sure that people are fed, shod, clothed and can work . We, the military, helped Orlovschine before the war, keeping in touch with the regional committee of the party. Maybe our business close relationship with civil authorities contributed to the fact that in all areas of the workpiece were successful.Worse was the case with the removal of a stock to the railway. Consider whether harvested what's in the outback? The experience of past years shows that there is not exported grain and remained there until the following year, and procurement bodies do not consider it as a real resource. [88] Front Military Council adopted a special resolution on measures to strengthen the work on transportation, especially from deep points.Then to the storage center was pristantsionnym drove different grain and forage almost annual requirement of the front. There was reason to be happy the approach of winter we are not afraid of! Soon it became known that a member of the National Defence Commission Mikoyan convene a meeting in the Kremlin bosses rear edges to discuss readiness for winter in food terms. The party charged the Mikoyan tracking of the Armed Forces of the food, fuel, and for the timely delivery to the front of ammunition, clothing and equipment. In addition, AI Mikoyan, as a member of T-bills was in charge then blanks, imports for the army, foreign and domestic trade, it was administered by the sea and river fleet. The most pressing issue in the first year of the war was to provide the Army with warm clothing and footwear Valen. Winter, as you know, was very fierce, snowy. But thanks to the heroic efforts of the Soviet people and good business organization active army was soundly timely shoes and clothes, and therefore cases of frostbite were rare. In 1942 he came to the fore supply the army with food. For this and said meeting was convened. From newspapers and from the stories of friends I knew Mikoyan - very energetic, demanding person, knows the economy, does not tolerate empty, formal responses, such as "so well", "can not." To attend a meeting with him, I invited the head of the food department of the front II Makarova, who before the war not often met with Anastas Ivanovich at work. Since the Bryansk front did a great job for the procurement of food, and I knew where, what and how much harvested, the upcoming meeting was not very worried. Meeting in the Kremlin continued overnight. Speak first head of logistics Volkhov front. Rising, he began to leaf through my address book to find the data, but temperamental Mikoyan went from one subject to another, and the speaker did not have time to find the right page, and did not remember by heart. Extremely irritated chief of logistics of such ignorance, Mikoyan immediately ordered to release him from his post. Then spoke on the Western Front, Head of Logistics General V. Vinogradov. He has managed all right. It was my turn. I brought charts and diagrams on Whatman paper, clearly showing the state of food supplies. Anastas, who was at the opposite end of the table, walked over to me and sat down. My report actually turned into a lively conversation with him.

And still remains in the memory of the enormous scale of the practical cases that dealt directly with Anastas. It was impossible to imagine any significant government actions to ensure the needs of the army without his active participation. For a short time on the Bryansk front I have developed friendships with the Chief of Staff, General Front Malinin, with artillery commander, General Front VI Kazakov. In creating fellowship, linking executives front a very important role played Rokossovsky. My relationship with him became more cordial than in the early days of dating. Soon after his arrival to the Bryansk front I received the Order of the Red Banner, which has been presented by the Military Council of the Western Front. By the time the Order of the Red Banner for the Army chief of logistics for an extraordinary award, and I am very proud. September 30, 1942 Rokossovsky was appointed commander of the newly formed Don Front. He invited along to a new job generals Malinin, V. Kazakov and me, which I was glad. But Mikoyan's orders not move until it was fully launched successfully blanks. Less than a month and a half, as the new commander of the Bryansk Front, General MA Reuter was ordered to transfer most of the Don front of prepared us food that is in those areas that are immediately adjacent to the Don front. This upset us to the extreme, even though we understand that the best solution at the center was not. The situation in the Bryansk front at the end of 1942 was a tumultuous one: that one, then the other part of the enemy tried to attack.Especially difficult was the situation at the site of the 48th Army, under General PL Romanenko, and just in the army at that time was head of logistics. Assistant Chief of Logistics of the Red Army for Personnel, General Todorov Smelov called me from Moscow and asked me if [90] I am the Divisional Commissioner MK Shlyahtenko, and could take it to work on your front. Still I do not know mate Shlyahtenko! In 1937, when I was in Kiev, he did not believe slanderous denunciation at me and did not let the progress already prepared a document for my arrest. In those days it was an act of extraordinary courage and integrity. Of course, I immediately agreed to his appointment to the post of Chief of Logistics of the 48th Army. First, it is difficult Shlyahtenko had in this position. Throughout his life, by the nature of his work, he saw action on the part of business executives only. And then had to lead a very large and complex Army rear, especially in stressful combat situations. Commander of the 48th PL Romanenko not always able to fairly judge their employees in general and, in particular, failed to see the newly appointed chief of logistics. Army in those days hardly resist the assault of the enemy, and the slightest failure in the front, General explained the poor performance of the rear. So much so, that the commander of the Front Commander has set the issue of bias Shlyahtenko. I remember a conversation front commander, who was at the headquarters of the 48th Army, with me by telegraph apparatus "Bodo". "Where did you get this Shlyahtenko? Did you know that it fails it? I ask you to take decisive action. " Having read the words on the tape, I assured General Reiter that will take action, and that very night he arrived at the rear of the headquarters of the 48th Army. Before leaving his staff, I ordered an immediate download and send in the 48 Army avtobatalon ammunition and another with fuel. I did not recognize Shlyahtenko. His face was ashen, he had not shaved for a couple of nights not sleeping, and I thought that he was indifferent to everything, lost the ability to say something in defense of their distinct and subordinates. "It's hard, very hard," - the only thing that I heard from him. Different ways you can approach this person. The most common method at the time it was removed from office and put another head, and it is to the greatest extent would justify me in the eyes of the

front commander. But it was Shlyahtenko. I knew his whole life. Party member since 1919, persistent communist man of high culture, who enjoyed widespread respect among the Central Asian border and then the Kiev district. I believe that this man is able to be well and quickly learn a new thing for him. Thinking about it and not being happy, I started with, the most cheerful tone recommended Michael Kondratievich [91] immediately shave, then have breakfast with me and rest. He did so, and I would like the clock to act for him. Thanks to the measures taken on the supply of the army has improved markedly. Along the way were considered other organizational matters. And he Shlyahtenko, rest, looked completely different person. Remains unsolved one "detail". The fact that Moscow Shlyahtenko came to me with the signs of the Divisional Commissioner's buttonholes.When injected straps, I asked him to wear epaulettes colonel himself was referring to an agreement with Romanenko of a further submission to the award of his military rank. However, if existing in the 48th Army environment is difficult to count on the favor of the army commander. However, as is often the case at the front, life is literally "turns the brains" of people. The 48th Army not only withstood the superior forces of the enemy, but also caused him great damage. The commander then repeatedly expressed his satisfaction with the Army Chief of Logistics Shlyahtenko myself, without my asking, ensured that Shlyahtenko became "legal" the Colonel. The commander of the Bryansk Front, Colonel-General MA Reiter paid much attention to the work of the home front. Himself in the first months of the war was the chief of the Bryansk Front and rear left that job after the injury. Principal, in his opinion, in the rear, as well as in the work of commanders at all levels should be a constant concern for the fighters, especially for people who are at the forefront. Reuters was fond of at the same time that he was more austere life of a soldier in the imperialist war. When it was winter of 1942/43, to study the life of soldiers and combat readiness of troops in front of the whole team have created several committees, headed by the Chief of Staff, the prosecutor, the chief political directorate, chief of logistics front. I had to examine one of the divisions of the 13th Army. From division to regiment gets on the sleigh, and more - in camouflage overalls walking up to a battalion, and finally, by communication trenches in the company and platoon. With me were my adjutant and commander of the battalion. Speaking attended 15 - 20 soldiers. I asked them to unashamedly tell about life, ensuring that their wishes will be presented at the meeting of the Military Council of the Front. Primarily addressed the issue of clothing, shoes and food. After all, it was winter, cold spells interspersed with thaws, and it is - a scourge to supply the front shoes: in boots or shoes to put on a soldier? [91] to burden its storage in the glove bag an extra pair of shoes, of course, impossible.Not only pounds, 100 grams of additional weight on his shoulders visibly weary grunt. Where is the store extra shoes, which can be useful when you change the weather? Different ways to solve this issue in the divisions and armies. Some issuing Valen entire shoe leather shoes collected at the warehouse division, there repaired and stored until spring. In others, all shoes concentrated on the army warehouse, and it was a better way of saving shoes.But in fact, and in another case, a fighter could not change shoes in the event of a sudden change in the weather. That is why this question was asked by me at a meeting with the soldiers. Came to the conclusion that without the boots stay until the end of winter can not even for a day, and for every occasion is good to have two or three dozen pairs of leather shoes in different sizes in the battalion.

Next, I asked to see ration NC, which by statute must be kept intact in every soldier's knapsack. Alas! No one NC was not. The battalion commander, explained that all the soldering NC stored in a special shelter for the battalion headquarters and issued on hand when needed. Practice has shown, according to the battalion commander, that this method of storing rations NT is more reliable. I checked on the way back to the order of storage of rations, and I could only thank the battalion commander, for his attention to the conservation reserve stock of food. How often bathe and change underwear? - I asked the soldier. Despite the very harsh environment, the commander of the regiment and the regimental doctor provide all personnel cleaning with bed linen regularly once a decade. During the year the war we learned hygiene in any environment. Hot food was served in the trenches, in the words of the soldiers regularly, but not enough spice. Tired of concentrates. "Sausage second front" as they called the soldiers ironically American canned meat, only partly made up for the lack of meat. But all in one voice declared that our Soviet canned meat more tasty. Soldier received approval from the banks dry alcohol, by which it was possible to heat the food in the trench with no risk to unmask himself after such a fire does not smoke. Unfortunately, at the front there was little dry spirit. Outages as cheap tobacco or tobacco were the most burning question, and I had just heard a lot of complaints. But the position of the tobacco industry was still heavy. We had to restore one [93] mahorochnuyu factory ourselves and have prepared a fair amount of leaf tobacco, but still had to wait a while until the front will produce shag their own. Soldiers quite well aware of the situation on other fronts, and international affairs. The capture of many thousands of Paulus at Stalingrad inspired our soldiers. Just a few days after this victory, they had to participate in the attack on Kastornoye, chase the Germans in the Kursk sector, and they understood that, in fact, it was a continuation of the battle of Stalingrad. On return to headquarters front of all survey participants held an extended meeting of the Military Council, which commissioners, made a detailed report. Thus obtained material was the basis for the practical work of all the services front, rear and especially services Political Administration. In January and February 1943, having great difficulties with rail transport. The Kursk sector came one after the other trains with the Don Front. Yeletsky site was packed to the extreme, and, seeing this, the enemy stepped up air attacks on the object. That's where the value of the bypass affected railway built around Yelets before the war. In fact, we did not have a single hour interruption in the pass trains on a roundabout way, the station and the main road had been completely destroyed. Done suddenly appeared in my headquarters, Colonel-General Rokossovsky. On his chest was still a never-seen my Order of Suvorov I degree - the highest military leadership award, as stated in the statute. It took more than five months after his departure from Bryansk to the Don Front. Now appointed commander of the newly created Central Front, he hurried to the area of its operations. Somewhere near Kursk was to accommodate his staff. Two hours of our meeting went like one minute. He had to drive the car in the winter off-road more than 250 kilometers.He left on Ephraim Elec and further Kursk; February 8, 1943 Kursk was cleared of Germans. The release of this city and the troops involved Bryansk Front. We were at the front often visited journalists, writers, and went where they wanted. We are even happy when away from us, but the food and fuel, nothing more is required. [94] But the worst of all was to feel the position of the object of the writer of observation. Almost three days journalist Raisa Azarkh sat in my office. In her arms was a mandate, sufficient authority to give her the right to go

into all the details. I would not say that I enjoyed working, feeling the eyes inquisitive journalist and responding to it rather unexpected and not going to cause problems. And I still do not know how to use R. Azarkh their records in Efremov ... Rampage February snowstorm. Continued to arrive by rail to the area Yelets and Lieven troops and military equipment to the Central (formerly Don) front. Staff indicated his stay in the village of Liberty north of Kursk. Staff arrived here by separate trains for days. Moving to the Kursk direction Front Command has left the Volga all of their road and road machinery, underestimating the role of logistics in the preparation and conduct of operations. For the transportation of personnel and facilities management field 30 trains were given a lot of various equipment was loaded into them, but for road engineering has no place. Costly for the army! Parts unloaded from wagons in Yelets and showers, had to make a hike of 150 - 200 kilometers. Infantry and artillery had to be overcome drifts on the roads, which reached two meters in some places. Especially the plight fell to 70th Army, arrived in the Central Front. It consisted of the border guards. Arriving at the station Elec and showers in February 1943, 70th Army was to follow its course in the district Fatezh continue the line of contact with the enemy. In the blizzard people moved on foot to the waist in the snow. Moreover, they themselves instead of horses, which had almost no army, dragged himself to artillery and other supplies, and it would be difficult to walk the horses in such snowdrifts. If the command of the Don front loading in the Volga taking with him at least towed graders, whatever it gave relief to the troops! Was not without fault in this and the Chief of Logistics of the Don Front, who failed to insist on a proper use of the rolling stock and missed his power ahead of the troops two to three trains with troops and equipment traffic. Subsequently, the rear of the front head, General IG Sovetnikova had a sip because of this a lot of grief. [95]
***

For the first half of World War II, more precisely, for 1942 - 1943 period was characterized by a situation where a considerable space forces stood for hours in defense and fierce fighting took place in some areas. In periods of calm the troops rested, improve their combat skills, strengthen their defensive positions. Medical facilities has been treating the wounded, and authorities rear tidied military equipment, transport, etc. At such times, it was not too much to think about the "repair" of commanders, especially low-level (company, battalion). Directive from the center fronts recommended the establishment of a shortterm opportunity for them to rest. The Bryansk front we solved this problem in different ways. Based on the front and army hospitals were opened two weeks vacation homes. In the rear divisions (at the joints between them) were opened "tea" with rest rooms for 20 - 30 beds. Here, the officer could rest for three - five days and, if necessary to quickly return to his unit. On the front and army military roads open "hotels", where visitors can get to the commander of their certificates good food and rest. The main difficulty was that the missing women cadres to serve as cooks, waiters, cleaners, etc.

A short-lived all these "tea" and "Hotel." But a large part of the officers was able at least for a short time to get away from trench life. Many has been provided or that medical care. But the main thing the person could safely sleep off without artillery and machine-gun "music". [96]

OF KURSK
Unusually early thaw in the Kursk area in 1943. Despite the rain, the roads were in poor condition. Gone soft loam and humus. There was a fierce spring thaw. Only on the Kursk-Orel highway can be reached by car from the front, and the left and right of the highway is difficult to cross even a horse. Worst of all was in the band of the 70th Army, aside from Fatezh Dmitriev-Lgovski, yes, perhaps, and next to it the 65th Army was in no better condition. Tens of thousands of people, horses, many guns and mortars of the 70th and 65th armies were cut off from their supply bases. At the front, had complications from food-troops. Neither of which the onset and continuation of question, although rates did not eliminate the order to attack. I can not remember, 10 or 11 March, I received a telegram from A. Khruleva with orders to arrive by plane to the headquarters of the Central Front. Reported this to the commander of our front, I ordered [97] to prepare the U-2, is in my possession. I was to fly out of the city of Ephraim to the village of Liberty - 1.5 - 2 hours. We took off before dawn, so as not to run into a German fighter, and about 8 landed shlepnuvshis in a puddle. With difficulty overcoming more than a kilometer thick mud, I found the house, which was located Rokossovsky, at which point there was and AV Hrulev. In all likelihood, my view is not a front lot Khruleva confused, asked me first give himself up. I managed to find out what is supposed to release General IG Sovetnikova the post of chief of the Central Front and rear invited to join me in this position. At my appointment the consent of the State Defense Committee. Rokossovsky and AV Hrulev made me guidance. In this case, Andrey gave me 48 hours to see the situation, and then I have to take the reins of the rear completely. Recently published he himself ordered that in such cases the giver and the receiver will have 15 business days to the registration of the act, in this case, he said, was not taken into account. An hour later I was in Kursk, where were located the headquarters of the front and rear of all th supply services. Acquainted with General IG Sovetnikova, I felt sympathy for him. It seemed to me that the decision to remove him from office was the result of unfortunate circumstances beyond the control of it. He said that the problem is not just one bad roads, paralyzing transport: moving into the area of the Kursk, managing logistics, his staff, and a number of senior employees rear were scattered on the road from the Don to the Kursk's chief of staff, General Logistics IM Pockets located on the moment in Yelets where commanded all freight traffic in the direction of Kursk ... In other words, our troops have fought and hammered together rear of the management was not. Perhaps the "wine" Ivan Gerasimovich was his excessive concessions to the second member of the Military Council of the Front for rear Stahurskiy Colonel M., who had a tendency to replace the head of logistics. Immediately, I realized that being in Kursk tyloviki not actually work, because people hardly have time to run to the gap, and came out of them, run back again - the Nazis bombed the Kursk day and night. The staff and services were carrying a lot of sacrifices, but to leave the Kursk could not

because of the total [98] off-road: to accommodate the rear services required not less than 10 - 15 villages and the roads were needed. Giving me the mandate, AV Hrulev announced that I can take with me to the Bryansk front of any employee if it is necessary for the case. To use such a wide permission, I should as soon as possible and get to know the home front workers of the Central Front. At that time the situation occupies an important place food service, and it became clear that the service is necessary to strengthen the new, more energetic and knowledgeable leader. This was the NK Zhizhin, whom I knew well to work on the Bryansk Front. It was necessary to strengthen the management and some other services. In general, the group of workers made a good impression, and with many I had and then go all the way to the end of the war, and what I wanted. The strongest workers were Chief of Staff, General Logistics IM Pockets, Front Head Road Directorate Colonel, later General, GT Donets, Chief Medical Administration Front, AY Barabanov. First of all it was necessary to solve the problem of how to deliver food to the forefront. On the front and some army supplies of food was in plenty, but how to overcome bad roads? They say that the best solution has a relatively simple. I remembered that before the war were served food on the frontier, "Pop-Ivan": one carrier delivered 40 - 50 pounds of food in a backpack on his shoulders. Why not try this method and in a difficult situation of the Central Front?There was, however, a difference in scale. There, it was about fifty people, and here - the tens of thousands ... In the first place it was necessary to take care of the troops of the 70th Army. After a thorough exchange of views, decided to use the relay method, that is, along the front line to organize the transfer of the chain by hand finely bagged goods. For this it was necessary to have tens of thousands of bags and sacks, and where to find them? Appealed to the Kursk women. In the short time they made us the required amount of flexible packaging. In small bags invested three or four-day supply of food for one or several people. Then it all packed in a common bag weighing 15 - 20 pounds and delivered by cars on the highway to those items which are allowed to go to the military situation and the condition of the roads. And then began the baton of horse and foot soldiers along the front line to a distance of 40 kilometers. [99] This method of transportation is particularly careful handling required tobacco, sugar, salt, or it could mix. That's why it took us so many small bags. It took a few days, and the situation has changed decisively. If earlier reports received from the divisions in the columns "bread", "sugar", "tobacco", and others were often zero, but now in these columns began to appear one, then two, three. Food security forces in the daily calculation of each day increased and was reduced to 5 - 7 days. In some areas of the 70th Army shells to artillery positions were delivered as porters. Of course, no way you can fully meet the need, but do not last forever and slush! Air raids continued to Kursk. Brunt of Railway site. Do not have time to finish the restoration paths, the enemy again and again to destroy them. Train traffic through Kursk towards Lgov, Ponyri and to our neighbor to the left in the direction at all times Oboyan stop. Given the effect obtained by detours, laid before the war around Yelets, we again turned to kuryane to build the [100] a temporary bypass line, which is over 7 kilometers around their railway junction. In an unprecedented short time circumvention was done, and further bombing Kursk did not affect the passage of trains on Lgov and Oboyan. In late April 1943 the headquarters moved to the rear of the front Terepsha village, 14 kilometers from the Liberty. Set around the home front, in the neighboring villages.

The rapid advance of the Soviet troops did not allow the fascists to burn the village Terepsha. It has been preserved in all its beauty: clean, sparkling white houses with painted window frames, similar to Ukrainian cozy hut, blossoming gardens and front gardens, willow, which lie on either side of a narrow but fairly deep river Terepshi. Have often surprised the art of our quartermasters in finding a suitable location for headquarters and offices. These quartermaster came, of course, not from the position of the artist to the evaluation of a locality. The main principles that guided them - that, if possible, not remarkable, so to speak, everyday landscape to this area from the air does not stand out, not conspicuous. Therefore, the final decision on the placement of the new district was made only after a staff officer repeatedly scan the area from the air at different altitudes. But in this case the business choice Terepshi and other surrounding villages quite coincide even tasteful landscape painter - so beautiful that area Kursk suburbs. Colonel M. Novikov, deputy chief of my staff had experienced quartermasters who had a keen eye: they are well determined by the needs of communities and homes in them, possible radius dispersal institutions including roads, transport, communications, the number of canteens and most importantly - the zenith of cover. After it came to placing nearly two thousand soldiers, officers, generals and civil servants. They had to move so that a single hour is not lost control of the system of logistics front. And I must pay tribute to our signalers, copes with providing a large and complex logistic mechanism both wire and wireless communication, as they say in the army, "at two positions" - part of staying at the old place, part of moving to a new one. No less complex problem is solved with the redeployment of staff workers power. [101] It should be noted that our voentorgovtsy learned to work so that, everywhere, at any time to "point" with the necessary set of products provided right there, next to the headquarters of the fronts and armies, often - Division. How many times these people have to get bombed, and they remained on their work, although technically a civilian might not expose themselves to such testing. And the location of "points" in a new place PX must have thought quartermaster. Not forgetting, of course, quartermaster during redeployment also to build baths. Near the village was held Terepsha obschefrontovaya surgical conference, attended by more than 500 doctors, as well as the entire group of top medical experts, who arrived from Moscow with the Chief Medical Department EI Smirnov. With special attention and interest the conference presentation E. Smirnov. [102] He scrupulously studied staging medical evacuation cases on various fronts, at all levels and especially in the field hospital. Your observations and experiences he introduced a crowd, and this resulted in the business and creative conference. The main thing in medical support at the front - it is an organization. This idea as clearly stated by NI Pirogov. The same idea was repeated EI Smirnov, illustrating the highlights of her negative and positive examples from our front. The conference was marked by preparations for the upcoming decisive battle with the enemy. Exposure combat readiness and dedication required of soldiers at Kursk. Increasing with each passing day the tension in the army fully be passed to the rear. It was necessary to check all details, time and again to make sure that the huge rear mechanism is working properly. It was important to correctly place the people to communicate to each artist responsibility of his task. Data exploration and analysis of the situation left no doubt that the brewing giant battle of Kursk. In recent weeks I have almost daily to happen at the front commander, the chief of staff. One day (it was

in the middle of May), I went to the command post to report. Approaching the village, I saw a German plane made it two or three passes. When we entered the village, we opened a terrible picture: Rokossovsky house was completely destroyed, and on the ruins lying wounded on duty adjutant. Great was our joy when we saw Rokossovsky coming towards us. He walked into the dining room for breakfast, 100 meters from his house, so alive. He immediately wanted to listen. Reporting to the situation, I paid attention to the commander that the enemy with impunity makes raids on the railway line Kastornoye - Kursk and even at night destroying rolling stock and locomotives. Two months enemy dropped this bomb plot 4000. By the way, it was known that for every shot down German pilot locomotive received the Iron Cross. The commander of the task set before anti-aircraft gunners - discourage German pilots hunting perform nightly raids on our trains. To its credit, gunners, they have successfully completed the task. Was curious practice: steam put into the middle of the train, made up of platforms without any cargo. On some of them mounted anti-aircraft guns and machine guns. If you normally train drivers tried to prevent sparks from steam pipes unmasked, in this [103] If, on the contrary, they have attracted the attention of the enemy. Several times this technique involved the German vultures in the area of effective fire. After a dozen aircraft crashed to the ground, night raids on the train stopped. Continued attacks on bridges in the afternoon line Kastornoye - Kursk. But the railroad, military and civilian, have adapted quickly to cope with the consequences of the attacks. Near each bridge on duty team with a set of restorative materials. After the raid, if the case of damage, the bridge at once restored, and interruptions in the passing of trains did not exceed 3 - 4 hours. Of course, despite all this, the capacity of the railway Kastornoye - Kursk was not enough for us too. In these circumstances, was a great help transport aircraft under the direction of S. Skripko, now Marshal. By air fed the scarcest caliber ammunition, stored blood, blood fluids, etc. Our physicians have used very effectively return flights to evacuate the aircraft: a short time was taken by air more than 21 thousands injured. As far as I know, nowhere in the air ambulance evacuation of this size is not reached throughout the war. With each passing day it becomes more evident that the enemy is preparing two punch of great strength - from the north, from the Eagle, and from the south, from Belgorod. Enemy forces operating from two directions, were to meet in the same town. If successful, the enemy, the environment fell two fronts - the Central and Voronezh. So the Germans were planning to take revenge for Stalingrad! For the task, which they called "Citadel", they were prepared with determination, transferring some of the forces here in the West. Against the Central Front in the Orel were 8 infantry, six armored and motorized divisions of Germany, against the Voronezh front in the Belgorod sector - 5 infantry, 8 armored and motorized divisions. All in all, for the operation "Citadel" Hitler concentrated 50 divisions totaling about 900,000 officers and men, 10,000 guns and mortars, 2,700 tanks and more than 2,000 aircraft. Enemy plans in a timely fashion understood our bet. Central and Voronezh Fronts received considerable reinforcements manpower, tanks, artillery, aircraft, ammunition and fuel. [104] Moreover, the eastern of the two fronts have settled back Steppe Front troops, able to strike in any direction. Creating a powerful strategic groups in the Kursk sector, the Supreme Command did not limit her task defensive end. In the coming summer and autumn campaign was intended to defeat the German Army Group "Center" and "South" and release much of Belarus and Ukraine. In other words, the basis of the strategic plan of the Soviet command were the offensive end. To achieve their rate

decided to use favorable terms of defense, wear down and weaken the enemy and then to counterattack: our troops to defend their pre-prepared lines, should immediately attack. This situation is much more difficult to rear than the "pure" defense or the "pure" offensive. The strategic goal of the operation is determined by the principle of organization and logistics. Studying post-war documents relating to the rear of the Central and Voronezh Fronts of Kursk, I have concluded that the command of the Voronezh Front, rear its head obliged to organize it according to the principle, so to speak, the classic defense, that is, in accordance with military theory in depth capabilities, carry out the rear of stores, hospitals, repair shops, etc., separation is allowed to a depth of 300 - 400 kilometers. The Voronezh Front theory, this requirement has been fully complied with, and it guaranteed a certain stability of the rear in case of deep penetrations of enemy. However, such an arrangement could not provide rear quick transition to the offensive front forces, was inevitable long delay for "pulling rear." And so it happened. Another view is held by the command of the Central Front. It proceeded from the assumption that will be short-lived defensive battle that the enemy quickly exhaust its strength. In accordance with this understanding of the situation of the front head of logistics, who believed in the success of the actions of our troops, the commander suggested plan for the organization of logistics not defensive and offensive option on. Of course, some deviations: the most "heavy" elements of the front rear repair plants, non-transportable evakogospitali, flour, cereal processing plants, etc. - treated away from the front lines. Everything else, especially the mobile field hospitals, ammunition, fuel, food and other physical facilities, [105] focused as possible to the troops, and especially in the Kursk area. Front Military Council approved the study after nagging the plan. But what will happen to our inventory, if the enemy break through defenses and capture the Kursk? This troubling question poses many comrades. However, the front commander firmly adhered to this point of view: no troops to the rear, and the rear for the troops. Rear should provide maximum stability of defense, not to think about a possible retreat. This decision led to a number of major interventions. If before we were laid out on artillery positions a half to two sets of combat rounds, then at Kursk on a number of gauges were laid out on the ground with guns to five fighting sets. This was crucial. Our infantry in moral and political terms was willing fight to the death, but the infantry knows that her dedication and courage lead to success if the artillery, "God of War", unfailingly supports it, that is, when, in addition to high spirit troops are in sufficient quantity of ammunition. Therefore, we have put in the firing position as a significant amount of ammunition. If we had left them on the front half of the stocks based on supply vehicles to the troops during the defensive battle, we would not have time to bring up in a short time, and hunger for ammunition could not affect the stability of the defense as a whole. Have a negative impact on the defensive battle, especially during a counterattack and a counteroffensive, the lack of fuel and food, which is inevitable if we do not put up both in close proximity to the troops. The subsequent course of events confirmed the correctness of the decision of the Central Command of the front. Let us dwell on some aspects of preparation for surgery. Considerable importance for the stability of the defense had help from the local population. In the construction of defensive positions involved residents frontline areas of Kursk, Orel, Voronezh and Kharkov regions. Solely on the Kursk salient employed 105,000 in April, and in June - 300 thousand people. We have already said that the

invaluable help both fronts had Kursk residents in the construction of railway bypass, to restore railways and bridges, often destroyed by the enemy. [106] In record time - 32 days (July - August 1943) - was built by the railroad for 95 kilometers from Stary Oskol to rusty, linking Moscow railway to Donbass. In the construction of this road has participated 25,000 residents. 400 of them in the construction of special honors were awarded orders and medals. In this regard, the construction of a funny story comes to mind. In one of the conversations with the Front Commander, I was asked: "Do you know that in our hinterland, somewhere in Livny, understands the railroad and taken away somewhere rails and sleepers?" I knew nothing about it and with the same question addressed to the chief military communications front AG Chernyakov. Then he also did not know, but the next day reported that indeed the entire road from the highway Kastornoye - Kursk to Libnah, which is over 40 kilometers dismantled and taken away, especially at night. Managed to keep a few cars loaded rails, and the accompanying mandates were on hand for the signature of a member of the Military Council of the Voronezh Front Khrushchev. I had to admit that our vosovtsy missed here, because the property was to ourselves. Note that is, so to say, the competition between tylovikami fronts, armies, divisions often happened ... Kursk Komsomol took patronage over many hospitals. For 1943, they have collected on the field and gave hospitals mattresses 3500, 2233 pillows, 750 blankets, 1,847 beds, 3,447 towels, dishes varying over 20 million units, a large amount of literature and stationery. Was handed the wounded over 20,000 individual parcels and also delivered a lot of milk, cream, eggs, honey and tobacco. In the hospitals of Kursk has 1,300 sandruzhinnits, shift duty at the wounded. 650 massovikov or agitators carried out in hospitals every day reading of newspapers, pamphlets, leaflets, helped the wounded to write letters to relatives or in print. Komsomol members of the forces were given 97 concerts for soldiers. 5275 donors from the local people gave blood needed for the wounded. During battles of Kursk station of blood transfusion was prepared and sent to a hospital a few thousand liters of blood. Industrial enterprise in its front-line areas, despite frequent bombings, did not stop work. They made for the army warm clothing, sledges artillery and notation, the wheels, harnesses, horseshoes, spetsukuporku for projectiles, lights for the trenches, skis, etc. [107] Repaired as guns and tanks. Workers and engineers repair plant resulted in good condition motors 300 tanks and armored vehicles and sent them back to the front. Millions of rubles were collected on a voluntary subscription for the construction of equipment. Ingenuity and a lot of initiative, military and army personnel rear of Kursk. In difficult driving conditions was 65th Army General PI Batov, and employees of the army found themselves out of the situation. Directly to the area of the rear troop of the 65th Army was part of a railway line Lgov - Dmitriev-Lgovski, pereshito Germans on the Western European gauge. There was seized dozens of cars of the same track, but the engine was not. Decided to adapt as draft animals ZIS-5, but for this it was necessary to put in place special rubber bands. They are produced by the army itself. So began working at the site Lgov - Dmitriev-Lgovski peculiar combination. One car ZIS5 led the 5 - 6 cars with load of 10 - 12 tons each. The main difficulty in this is the weakness of the brake system: even small deviations had to take special measures to ensure to keep the train from the crash. For while the army was on the defensive, such road train was brought to both sides of more than 20 thousand tons of cargo. In this great merit rear of the army chief and the head of the army VOSO.Commander of the 65th with his hand to help them, to support their initiative.

The same initiative and ingenuity displayed workers rear 13th Army under the leadership of the army chief of logistics General GA Kurnosova, adapting to their needs narrow-gauge railway, which is over 25 kilometers. With the rail car on the road in the car were transported ammunition and food to the troops. It took a lot of effort from the rear of the front, to provide all necessary came to us two Panzer Army under the command of Lieutenant-General AG Rodina. More information about the needs of tank I got from the Chief of Logistics of the 2nd Panzer Army Surkov - the very Surkov, who in the spring of 1942, near Moscow was brought before the military tribunal for mismanagement. From him I heard a very curious story. Higher authorities replaced his shot demoted to private and sending to the front (while often practiced this measure). Surkov was sent to one of the Army, [108] later proved on the Volga River in the Don front. Deeply affected by unfair accusations, he lost all interest in life and looked for the case to die. But then events took the most amazing way. Before the offensive of the Don front Rokossovsky arrived to the site of one of the armies to personally inspect the item. Front Commander and Commander, carefully camouflaged, approached the hill, where a good view of the terrain toward the enemy. Enemy bullets whizzing around. Imagine the outrage commander, when he noticed the front man walking upright! He immediately ordered him to bring violators of camouflage discipline. Crawling and short dashes messenger approached the soldier and gave him the order. He appeared and announced: - Comrade Commander! As ordered Surkov was ordinary. Rokossovsky, unable to cool anger, asked abruptly: - What is the groundhog? - The same Surkov, who served with you in the Far East in the cavalry in time of peace. It was hard to find in it an old friend: covered in mud, unshaven, in tattered uniforms. And surprise, kindness and appeared on the Commander. While lying next to him in the bush, Surkov told him everything that had happened to him, and was ordered to appear in front headquarters. A few days later Surkov was announced that the Supreme Commander, he restored to the rank of major general. Soon, he was appointed chief of logistics of the 2nd Panzer Army, with which arrived on the Central Front. Then, the army withdrew from our front, and I again lost sight of Surkov. Only much later, I learned that after the war, General Surkov was appointed intendant Carpathian Military District in Lviv. There he was again out of luck: his young son took from a drawer a loaded gun and accidentally shot his father right in the stomach. Only immediate medical attention Surkov saved from death. He is still alive and well. This man was not destined to die from a bullet! Shortly before the start of the defensive battle front commander went to the army, especially in the 13th Army, located on the main line. I accompanied him. Wherever we appeared, he always asked the same questions: Is the number of available ammunition, whether well fed fighter? Circling the battle lines of troops, it seemed that there was no free space where you could put some more rounds of 18 units and parts were then part of the 13th Army, the density of the concentration of troops and artillery was extraordinary. But the place is, of course, was, and continued supply. All be stacked, possibly sheltered in the ground or obvalovyvalos. I was pleased to hear the statement of the commander Pukhov, that it has no additional requirements to the rear. Met with commanders of the 13th Army, commander of the front left to the next 70-Army.

Where he was going, to determine how fit for purpose executives army. I, in particular, was charged closer look at the work of the head of logistics and, if necessary, replace it immediately. Even before I had any doubts about the ability of the general, but still there was a hope that he will master the new scope of work for him.This hope was not realized. Did I mention that the 70th Army was made up of veterans of the border guards, in this regard, I had an idea to transfer here as Chief of Logistics of the former border guard Colonel MK Shlyahtenko of the 48th Army. Many of the guards knew him and treated him well. Front Commander endorsed the proposal and asked me to announce that the 48th Army Commander General PL Romanenko. That evening I had a conversation on HF with PL Romanenko. Alas! I had to listen to a lot of rudeness. I began by reminding him that he was dissatisfied with the work of MK Shlyahtenko just six months ago, and has proposed a Shlyahtenko Colonel General in the hope that the coming general will help me to obtain consent for care of colonel. Romanenko, but almost literally said the following: "I do not need your general, I am quite satisfied with the work of Colonel and would not let go Shlyahtenko, I raised him and I need him in my army. As for the title, I have already taken care of, and you get a few days of submission of the material in his major-general. " I once said that my message is the solution of the front commander and I can not discuss it. Yet, before hanging up, commander swore - in space, of course. [110] Before I had the next day to report to the front commander outlined his conversation with Romanenko, from Moscow rang on HF: high court banned Shlyahtenko pick of the 48th Army. I realized that Romanenko had a call to Moscow and got his. Of course, I was proud and even Shlyahtenko Romanenko, it happens that people are good, but they did not immediately liked each other, but in a combat situation can arise from situations in which produced a real combat friendship, and after that they are each another mountain ... I had to look for another head of logistics for the 70th Army! More than once drawn the attention of my Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel PF Scorpio. He stood out with their will power and the ability to deeply analyze the situation and give the business proposals. I do not doubt that he was in the correct position of the 70th Army. Indeed, even before the big defensive battle he could realign the army rear, and the new commander of IV Galanin was pleased with {6} . Together with the team we have visited 60 front-Army General ID Chernyakhovsky. After hard work [111] , he invited us to dine in the former estate of Prince Barjatinsky. The estate is in the 30 - 40 kilometers south Lgov. It was in the last days of June 1943. The weather was wonderful. I have long heard about the extraordinary beauty of the house, where, after the revolution placed sanatorium. But what I saw with my own eyes, has surpassed all my expectations. Turn left from the main road, we entered the avenue of limes, from which could be seen in the depths of the outlines of the beautiful building. On both sides of the alley orchards stretched for a good mile. The rooms were excellent in layout, the walls are covered with silk fabrics. True, the furniture is left, and our dining table was hastily knocked together out of boards ... The territory of the park was decorated with many caves and islets amid silvery surface of a large pond. One of the island famous for being the prince took Baryatinsky here Shamil. As this magnificent building survived when retreating Nazis here? The clerk told me that the house and its surrounding buildings were completely mined. Up to now there has remained a German officer, who was instructed to enforce the plan of the explosion. But the officer, an architect by

training, could not allow such barbarism and left, cut the wire. Thanks to him, save this landmark. Whether he survived this officer? Returning to the front headquarters, I asked on the way Rokossovsky, and when will the "war"? - Why, damn, do not start ..., - he said. - And we can not rush things. Let start and experience the power of our defense, and then we give them the spirit. MS Malinin on the same question answered the same. Meanwhile, every day the situation became more tense. Bet warned that the enemy may attack starts between 3 and 6 July. Captured on the night of July 5 prisoners showed that the offensive scheduled for the morning. In terms of our defense provided an kontrartpodgotovki by area of concentration shock groupings. These areas were well known. The whole issue was time. Any miscalculation could have dangerous consequences. After receiving information about the impending Nazi attack at dawn, the front commander, could not spend precious time to consult with Moscow. In those critical hours on our front in order to coordinate with other front is the Deputy Supreme Marshal Zhukov. [112] At the time when I had to decide - whether to kontrartpodgotovku both commander agreed: immediately open fire! Powerful artillery strike hit the enemy's, his command and observation posts, artillery positions on. That was the beginning of the historic Battle of Kursk - one of the great battles of the Great Patriotic War. The enemy suffered heavy losses, yet the offensive. German attack yet started in 5 hours 30 minutes, 5 July 1943. By the end of the first day of the enemy succeeded in penetrating our defenses by 2? 3 km in the direction of the station Ponyri, and on very narrow area. On this occasion, MS Malinin said that night, that is the beginning of the end of the Nazi attack on the Kursk, since the first day it was not successful: our troops withstood the onslaught. On the second or third day, some persons from the management front, it seemed that the enemy would still be able to break through our defense and hit the edge of a wedge right in Kursk. Recommendations were: immediately evacuated to the rear away all the property, focusing on the front-line stores, especially food. Questioning the validity of these recommendations, I went personally to the commander. Rokossovsky said: - The Germans failed to achieve a decisive success in the first two days. The less possible now. And if such a misfortune happens, we shall fight in the environment, and I, as commander of the front, stay surrounded with troops. Hearing this, I thought, "Why did the rear of the front must hurry to get away from the army to the east, taking back ammunition, fuel, food?After all, the next day can get task - to deliver the air surrounded by parts of the material means that were taken away from Kursk yesterday! "And immediately reported to the commander of his decision by all possible means of transport to immediately begin the transfer of materiel not east and west, even closer to the troops, who may be cut off from their supply bases, about Fatezh area and west of it. The commander liked this decision. It was carried out at the cost of "total mobilization" of all transportation and human energy. The conclusion from this fact is simple and convincing: the real threat to the troops to be cut off from their supply bases, the more determined it is necessary to concentrate stocks close to the troops. [113] The transfer of stock to the side Fatezh made without compliance with formalities such as extract overhead, obtaining receipts for property surrendered, weighing and Changing over. Not up to it! All employees of the rear understand that every second counts, and no one objected to the "violation of

the rules." A few days later, when our troops inflicted a counterattack, and then counterattacked, property located in Fatezh in us very welcome. Differently valued this experience post-war historians. I once had to review a Ph.D. thesis on the rear in the Battle of Kursk. The author has compiled a wealth of material, and he made a solid scientific work. But when he found correspondence regarding transfer of the Kursk region in Fatezh material resources, mainly food, he first had the picture of a continuous chaos - first of all, because he did not find in the affairs of the parish, statements of expenditure, invoices, receipts, etc. Only penetrating more deeply into the situation in those days, he made another unfaithful output. 5 days of fierce fighting the enemy succeeded in penetrating our defenses to a depth of 10 kilometers, but the width of the breakout area of less than 10 kilometers. This achievement has cost the Germans 42,000 soldiers and officers killed and 800 tanks destroyed. Hitler's attempt to command the defensive in the station Ponyri not successful. The troops of the Central Front, a powerful counter-attack to restore the situation, counterattacked. Thus, the Central Front withstood the onslaught of great power. Worked well, as far as the weather, pilots, and all kinds of troops, carrying out his duty to the country hard. Recalcitrance of our defense was provided in the early days most selfless acts gunners were shot at close range crawling on them "tiger" and "Ferdinand." Trouble-free operation also relied on artillery reliably feed her rear: there was not one hour interruption in the delivery of ammunition to the guns. Difficult the circumstances, our neighbor to the left. Enemy delivered a heavy blow from the south to the troops of the Voronezh Front, sending the main force on the 6th Guards Army Lieutenant General Chistyakov, unreasonably broad line of defense. For four days the Germans have moved here in the 30 - 40 km, which is in essence [114] meant a breakthrough not tactical, and already operational order. Only thanks to the timely aid by the Steppe Front - Reserve Command - managed to straighten a dangerous situation. The reason for such deep penetrations our historians believe misunderstanding the command of the Voronezh front of the enemy's intentions, excessive dispersal of his forces on the front of 164 kilometers, cutting unacceptably broad line of defense for the 6th Guards Army, which was aimed at the main attack of the enemy. I would like to add consideration of the matter in terms of the flow of ammunition to become clearer what the artillery support was in this battle forces of the Central and Voronezh Fronts. By the number of artillery pieces and the weight of combat both fronts were set in more or less the same conditions, the weight of one set of each battle front was about 20,000 tons. On artillery positions of the 13th Army of the Central Front and the 6th Guards Army of the Voronezh Front was laid out four to five ammunition. How many rounds were shot during the defensive battle from 5 to 12 July? In other words, how much fire and metal struck on the head of the enemy? After all of this to a large extent dependent on the stability of our infantry, against which was unprecedented in the entire war armada of tanks and self-propelled guns and operated numerous artillery. The intensity of the fire of our artillery can be seen from these data: for the period from 5 to 12 July 1943 was spent ammunition Central Front 1079 cars, and Voronezh - 417 cars, almost two and a half times. For greater clarity, we present data on the consumption of ammunition from 5 to 12 July 1943 (in thousands):

These data show a difference in the intensity of artillery fire. Hence the conclusion of nonconformity of the Voronezh Front artillery grouping nature of the operational situation. Or rather, the group was due to the wrong artillery operational structure of the defense forces in general. The least reason to believe that not enough ammunition, as the 6th Army had left his enemy ammunition depot, which remained intact and after the expulsion of the Germans from there. 13th Army Central Front spent in the same period of more than four fighting sets. Such a large expense for such a short time was not in a defensive military operations not only in the Great Patriotic War, but in the history of wars. This was possible because the advance was brought to firing positions such quantity of ammunition, which sufficed for preventing attacks of the enemy, and to ensure the counterattack. Delivery of ammunition to fire positions by rail (station area Ponyri) and trucks. For unforgettable pages of stories on the rear of the Central Front Kursk should include the actions of our motorists and road in front of the point of transfer of troops from the defense to the offensive. When it became clear that the enemy had pulled out of the area Lgov effort to stem the tide of our troops on the Eagle, to create favorable conditions for an attack in the direction of L'gov. Front commander decided to throw back a reserve corps of 25,000 troops with artillery and other equipment. He called me and posed the problem: transportation logistics front transfer within 36 hours of the shell is 100 - 120 miles to the west. He added that winning the hour facilitate breakthrough feeble defenses and increase the chances that your body with minimal losses can escape to a distant operating room. Transport for loading case was filed in an hour or two. The difficulty lay in the fact that, apart from the people, it was necessary to carry several hundred artillery horses, which had to additionally equip vehicles; same horse artillery guns were in the trailer at the car, limiting the speed. Thanks to HD headquarters in the rear and a well-proven interoperability and road services automotive front mission commander was not fulfilled for 36 and 24 hours. [116] Breaking the operating room, the case made a heroic chetyrehsotkilometrovy trip to the Dnieper, crossed it and went to the rear Kiev enemy. Front Military Council generously rewarded not only the participants of this breakthrough, but the performers of such an important transport operation. The great battle of Kursk was for the players ordeal forces and organizational abilities. After Moscow and Stalingrad, it was the third strategic counteroffensive, we at the rear, relied so on the experience gained. This experience serves as a major base for the study and the current views of Soviet military theory. Commending the work of its rear edge of Kursk, Marshal Rokossovsky writes: "You have to give credit to the rear of the front ... who succeeded in a short time to organize the transport of goods, used all the means: road, cartage and even water transport " {7} .

***

In the ensuing battle for the Dnieper from us tylovikov, need new efforts in the unexpected relocation of the Central Front.

In September 1943, the troops of our front successfully developed offensive towards Konotop Bakhmach - Nizhyn. Opens up the prospect of liberation of Kiev. My neighbor on the left - the Voronezh Front - some behind, and advanced part of the Central Front, ignoring the dividing line, smashing the enemy and took possession of localities belonging to the neighbor to the left lane. On this ground had been "a misunderstanding": information from TASS reports, we learned that the troops of the Voronezh Front seized a number of settlements that were actually taken command of the Central Front. Soon our front received a new direction - Gomel and Zhlobin, in connection with which the front itself October 20, 1943 it was renamed to Belarusian. I happened to be on the left bank on the day when our troops crossed the river near Loev. Opponent mercilessly bombed approaches to this crossing, but managed to throw a few divisions on the opposite shore. [117] We are again on the Dnieper. It was a gray overcast day late September, was a drizzling rain, and the shots of our artillery was crashing, amplified breaks German bombs. But how happy and anxiety was again after a long absence to see the native river! Looking at the Dnieper, I remembered about his native village, near the Dnieper River in Zaporizhia region. What went through my dear countrymen? Later, I learned that my village was destroyed by the Nazis, of the 300 houses survived 5. Only chimneys sticking among the ruins and ashes. Shot were many villagers who failed to evacuate. He folded his gray head and unruly Mitrofan A. Lesnyak, the Civil War, the Germans shot him for antifascist propaganda. There are a lot of my fellow villagers in the years recorded in the history of the guerrilla war against fascism. But the sorrow and the heroic work of my fellow countrymen, the joys experienced by them after the victory, I hope more to say in another place. On the way back from the Dnieper to the front headquarters we saw fields stagnate bread unharvested potatoes. Part of the grain was cut and lay in the rolls, the rest remained on the vine. There was no one to clean up, the population is low. Cleaning hurt more the fact that the fields and the roads were mined and the Germans, and our partisans. "Can and will die in the snow all that stuff?" - I thought with sadness. I have already said that the Central Front was driven right to the Gomel area. To the rear of the Central Front this maneuver proved to be extremely difficult. During the preceding two months of advance in the direction of Kiev Central Front forces had to focus their bases, depots, repair items on the railway Kursk - Lgov - Konotop - Bakhmach and now had all the front-line and army bases as soon as possible to move to another railway line - Bryansk Unecha - Gomel. Up until then I had never had to face this task. And now she stood up from the acute and urgent. In October - November 1943, still holds a large slush. Rely on the transfer of wartime warehouses, hospitals, repair facilities and other road was almost hopeless and roads were not, and fuel [118] was not enough. The main burden fell on the relocation of rail. Chief military communications front AG Chernyakov, collected applications from all arms and services to the needs of the number of cars for relocation, excitedly reported to me: it takes 7,500 cars! It is almost 200 trains! Where to find them? While capacity rokadnyh railways did not exceed then 12 pairs of trains a day. But to us, but their own transportation, and still had to take continuously coming from the center of the train with weapons, ammunition, fuel!

I understand and fully shared the excitement Chernjakova. After all, the rear of the front had to stay more than a month "on wheels" how he routinely provide combat activities? Yet the task, which seemed insurmountable, well managed our glorious railroad. Overcoming many of the technical difficulties, they greatly accelerated the relocation of the Central Front In the history of the last war in 1943 is described as a turning point in the economic recovery of the Soviet Union. Increased compared with 1942 production of coal, steel, rolled products. Develop the oil industry in the Ural-Volga oil region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Military industry stepped up the pace in the manufacture of aircraft, tanks, guns, mortars and ammunition. But agricultural situation remained extremely tense.Grains were collected less than a third of pre-war. Livestock affected by the war even more. Significant role in ensuring food played Army liberated from the occupation of parts of Ukraine and the North Caucasus. Considerable help all fronts have areas and areas where harvesting were carried out by means of themselves and the front rear, sometimes far from the front lines.Thus, the central front, while the Dnieper, they prepare the meat in the Volga region. In May 1943, the People's Commissariat of the meat and dairy industry of the USSR informed that we planned to leave livestock in the amount of 10 thousand tons in carcass weight of Balashov, Saratov, Penza. It was said that the rail to send cattle to the front Commissariat of the meat and dairy industry can not, as the People's Commissariat does not provide cars. The only way - to organize transhumance mainly by the front itself. Easy to say! 10 thousand tons of meat - that means 70 - 75 000 head of cattle, including the young. More than 500 herds. And the length of driving could be more than a thousand kilometers. We did not have, however, long thought to take or not to take on such a difficult task: the front is in severe need of meat, and all that could store up to the nearest boundary of the front, it was already exhausted. The Military Council has agreed to organize future of driving. Many disturbing thoughts wandered in the head not only me, but also my closest assistants - Front quartermaster general NK Zhizhina and executors planned operations lieutenant Apeksimova. What did not happen? Here the danger of infection, and the lack of food, and the opportunity rastelah death in the way, and the difficulty of the two or three times milking cows, etc., etc. We had to ensure highway haul transport, special gear and equipment for milk collection and processing it. And most importantly, I had to find people - find it on the spot! - Those who perform duties gurtopravov and assistants. An important role in this case fell to the veterinary service of the front led by Gen. N. Speyer: it was supposed to prevent diseases of livestock in transit. In the literature of the time you can find descriptions of driving cattle in Australia and in tsarist Russia, in Siberia. [120] But in either case, it was about 5 - 6 thousand, and we had to overtake more than 70 thousand. We had to immediately begin to address two problems. A team from the front, led by experts, and non-military comrades Sinebylnikovym Koltsov who receive stock in the field and the formation of herds. Another group, led by a major specialist M. Ya Maryasinym consider and identify the route of driving through Saratov, Balashov, Penza, Tambov, Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, and later the Gomel region. Determine the track - it does not mean to hold the line on the map, "and from", as some think, condescending glances at the hard work commissaries. It is necessary to know exactly how favorable the area of driving in epizootic have enough pasture, there will be a stage associated with ease off the bread as available water, whether or bridges crossing numerous rivers, enough veterinary point

on the road, and if not enough , then what must be delivered to the group vetrabotnikov front. In short, the driving of the organizers had provided all the details to their oversight happened woes. Our comrades have identified two routes. Day by day in every 5 - 7 kilometers on both tracks out herds, forming a living conveyor for 120 - 150 goals in each Edge. About 100 days were blank. In August 1943, the movement was more than 400 herds, all of whom moved to the front, and the front was moving further and further to the west. It was a grand business operation, headed by NK Zhizhin. He deserves much of the credit for its success. How to control it? First, permanent lines were used Commissariat of communication: the established settlements were given a telegram to Moscow to the People's Commissar of the meat and dairy industries. Where information is generalized and transferred to the management of the home front of the Red Army, and from there by plane or information on the wire delivered to us on the front. Second, the officer of the front captain Voloshko, livestock specialist by training, by Po-2 overflying routes, counting the number of herds from the air, timed their location, and often landed near them, assisting gurtopravam. The same aircraft delivered newspapers Drover discharged into convolutions. Just stretch together about three thousand people. Among them were officers and soldiers of rear services, but most of [121] were local residents, councils temporarily mobilized for this purpose. Occurred in October 1943. 530 herds safely reached its destination. Livestock held for one day in an average of 15 kilometers. Loss in transit and did not exceed half a percent, and gain at the expense of good content by 10 percent. As expected, in the way there are many young, it had to maintain and ensure the carriage after the herd. Nadaivalis tons of milk each day, which is to surrender to hospitals and clinics, part of it was processed into oil. Meat from the forced slaughter received the next business Commissariat meat and dairy industries. Hides, horns, hooves surrendered to local recyclers. As part attached to the front of the field office number 2 Commissariat meat and dairy industry with the head office Marshak was marching plant that manufactured sausages and other meat products for canteens PX and hospitals. During the driving of cattle the plant processed meat and offal. Chief of Field office and Deputy Maryasin proved proactive and knowledgeable workers. It is no exaggeration when I say that the participants and organizers of this brilliantly executed haul huge [122] did was a mass of cattle working achieve the triumph of the hated enemy. These rear workers deserve to have their feat was widely known for the Soviet people. Thanks go to the staff and the People's Commissariat of meat and dairy industry have offered such a solution of the problem. Shipping cattle usual way, by rail, could hardly be easier and, of no doubt, would have cost more, for water supply, feeding, watering of livestock in transit, and veterinary care would be associated with even greater difficulties. Almost certainly be said that the loss in weight and the number of livestock would also be great. Needless to say, it was necessary to free the railroads, worked with extreme stress, the transportation of live load, able to move under its own power. The experience we have acquired in this unusual operation is very useful at the end of the war. If we take into account that the daily giving meat to the front was an average of 150 tons, the harvesting operation described above, taking into account the achieved gain in the way, up to 70 days provided the front of the meat, with fresh, not canned.

Thus, the problem of supply of meat has been resolved. Much worse was the case with the bread. In October and November 1943, when the armies of the Central Front, ending the battle for the Dnieper River, reached the line station - Kalinkovichi - Mozyr, many of our armies and divisions, bread and cereals were only one or two days. On the front was empty warehouses. Exigencies of the situation is understandable, given that the front, there are 1.5 million consumers had bread for one day, and he had no reserves. No matter how carefully plan the distribution of bakeries across the front, in such circumstances, any regiment or unit could at any time be left without bread ... These difficulties commander repeatedly reported to Headquarters. But then lacked bread in the country! I have said on numerous occasions, when the bread remains in the retracted what happened in Kursk, Orel, Sumy, Chernigov and Gomel regions. Hampered harvesting fighting so often, and there was no one to clean. And in late October - early November were so heavy snowfalls that bread is visible. However, where, after long rains came suddenly cold, sloping bread rolls were pinned down by ice. It seemed that the forces of the front can not procure bread, and there is a hope, a hope to get bread from the depths of the country. [123] While we were thinking what to do, I got a cryptogram - immediately fly to Eagle for a meeting with Mikoyan, who arrived to convene executives recently liberated areas to a meeting on how to establish a normal economic life. I flew on a plane equipped with skis, since the fields were covered with snow. On the way, had once almost tumbled down on the snow-covered field and wait until they disappear walking along the edge of the sky by German fighters. On their way to Eagle, I did not know what caused. In Orel Regional Party Committee introduced AI Mikoyan. He immediately began to inquire about the situation at the front. The conversation was something like this: - Well, what's on the front? - Bad things, there is no bread, Comrade Mikoyan. - Do you want to have bread? - I then came to you to ask for. - I then called you to offer the bread. - Where's the bread? - The bread from you. You go over the bread. - I do not understand you, Comrade Mikoyan. - We give you the front of Orel, Sumy, Chernihiv, Gomel for grain procurement. Do your best to take this bread. - But all the bread went under the snow ... Besides, I'm not sure that a stock will get us bread 1st Byelorussian Front. - Where is the question? - You do well studied in the past, when taken from the Bryansk Front penned almost all our food. Very much it was a shame ... - So, stop in guarantees. Give, comrades, - he said, referring to the secretary - general word that all the grain will get the 1st Belorussian Front? - Give! - Said the voice. - Well, thank you, - I replied. - We will try.

Say something I said ... But I had seen that bread, which we had to harvest! Yes, and Anastas, apparently, did not really believe in the success of the case, giving me a "guarantee." (I'll tell you that he later kept his word and a single pound of bread is not borrowed from the Central Front by force. However, the excessive grain we then refused to do, but that's another). [124] At dawn the next day, I left for the front staff. Morning reported to the Military Council. It appeared last night in Moscow has already received an order to provide us with the four areas for harvesting grain. Rokossovsky and present at the same time, members of the Military Council of the Front KF Telegin and MM Stahurskiy instructed me to prepare a commander of the order and other documents. No exaggeration to say that in its scope and significance of the forthcoming operation was even more difficult than the above-described epic struggle for meat. We have learned well by the time the use of local resources. But the work proceeded in a more normal conditions in the summer and autumn months. Now the favorable time of year has now gone by. Blank area stretching almost a thousand kilometers in depth, and 400 - 500 kilometers wide. In the front zone was not a single highway highway. The railway network has been very weak. Snowfalls and frosts alternate with thaws, the dirt roads were impassable even for cartage. Local authorities, recently restored, has no data, how much grain is left in the field, and they did not know how much and what equipment can be collected. We entered into a struggle for bread in quite unexplored environment. But the delay was not. At harvesting grain was sent to 27,000 soldiers, 2,500 officers, 2,000 cars. Correctly place all of these capabilities - was the first thing. In every region, in every district were identified representatives of the Military Council of the Front. Part of the area was assigned to the armies. Through executive committees, village councils, through authorized individual villages collected agricultural equipment. While in these areas, there are few people, but everyone any able-bodied person was involved in the harvesting and threshing of grain. Where the bread was in the stacks, or even a mop in the rolls, the main task was to bring down him and thrashing. But there was quite a lot of uncut fields where polegshy podmerzshy bread and slightly left under the snow. Much of his crumbling, but still something left for threshing, and in fact we care a kilogram! It took rakes, sickles. Yes, that rakes and sickles. Polegshy grain collected as follows: one soldier with a rake to clean off the snow, the benefit at the time it was still not enough, and the other cut [125] folded ears and sickle. Then the ears were brought in items threshing and winnow the grain transported for drying or storage. Many grains dried on Russian stoves on the bed, or simply on the floor in well-heated huts ... And what were at the time the repository? We were glad to have survived the walls damaged factories, stables and warehouses. Themselves constructed primitive roofs and awnings, if only to protect the grain from rain and snow. Well to the rear of the Political Department of the front led by Gen. SF Galadzhevym. Issue special sheet was cleaning. Field equipment and radio equipment on the machine managed loggers in the field. Planes spread the points thrashing newspaper, dropping them from the air. It was nice to see the daily reports of security forces front bread and grain products is increasing every day numbers from one to two daily tasks to ten, twenty or more. By February 1944, it was

harvested 13.607 million tons of grain. Front half million was provided bread for 160 days in advance, that is, until August 1, 1944. Yes, it was a real battle for bread! And it was a brilliant victory for the triumph of the rear of the front. However, as is usually the case with the victory, she harbored a lot of any surprises, mostly unpleasant: there was a threat of spontaneous combustion of grain, as its humidity reached 25% in some places (at a rate of 12 - 14%). I saw the "vault" - the former stables - a length of 100 meters and a width of 12 - 15 meters, the grain they had rolled in a meter high. Stored in this way quickly warmed bread. We organized a mass perelopachivaniyu grain, but while the work was at one end, grain lit up again in the opposite direction. It was the work of a heavy, monotonous, but badly needed, the only possible in those conditions. Bread was saved. There were, as a result of this operation, and other troubles, such which could not be. At the moment of the greatest labor-voltage I visited a very representative group of the leading lights of persons. It included Attorney Front chairman Tribunal front and head of the special department of the front. I used to see them, but only in the dining room of the 2nd tier, and in itself - the first time. As by the way came led discussion of cases of spontaneous combustion of bread and asked what I had taken, and soon departed, leaving me in the dark, as far as they satisfy my explanation, and in the power of oppressive thought: where you are, [126] friends were at a time when the front had only one daily cottage food! That's when I was in need of good advice and support! But such is the head of logistics Planida: no bread - you are the answer, but a lot of bread was so nervous for him pull ... As if the workers rear less than anyone else sick soul for safety namolochennogo grain! However, on this visit "investigation" ended. By the way, at the end of the war Attorney front we had LI Yachenin, chairman of the tribunal - BI Ievlev and his deputy - NA Venediktov.On their end organs rear felt the constant support and objective approach to people, happened to be in some trouble. By the end of January 1944 the valiant troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts and sailors of the Baltic Fleet drove the enemy from Leningrad. We know what the cost of Leningrad survived 900 days of the siege. First of all, they needed bread. In the liberation of Leningrad from across the country sent trainloads of food. Are not left behind and soldiers of the 1st Belorussian Front: on their behalf and on behalf of workers frontline areas were sent to Leningrad from the stock front 60 000 tons of grain. We, at the front, before the end of logistic preparations was a task - how to process grain into flour and groats. At the disposal of the front and rear of some armies were marching mills and shellers, but they were few divisions. And just not enough. As a driving force was still possible to use the motor vehicle or tractor, but the mill equipment to get to the place it was impossible. Appealed to the VP Zotov - alternate member of the State Defense Committee on food issues. We were not the first to contact him, and there was no occasion when he did not help us. And in this case, the front soon received many sets of equipment for divisional marching mills. Almost every division of the front (and there were at different times from 40 to 60) had now his camp milling unit, capable of recycling 4 - 5 tons of grain a day, and stocks of flour at the front of the rules even exceeded. We harvested tobacco leaf. First sent him to the rear for treatment - but the practice has shown that [127] a return in the form of tobacco is extremely delayed, and did not fully get back to the front that sent. Again appealed for help to Zotov. He said that most mahorochnyh factories destroyed by the Germans and none restore them. "Can not you, Nicholas, take yourself one such factory, so that

all the tobacco, manufactured by it, went to the provision of the 1st Belorussian Front?" - Asked Zotov. Of course, I agreed. Factory was appointed chief officer tylovik, and his order was allocated forces and resources needed for recovery. In less than two months, as a restored us Prilukskaya mahorochnaya factory started to provide front tobacco. Going forward, we will only withdraw out of their officer, and transport and various property allotted to the front of our stores, combined with an Commissariat factory food industry. Bodies rear to the front every opportunity to produce and procure more locally. In 1943, this style of management was typical for the whole of the army. During this year, the whole front was harvested grain, potatoes and vegetables 4,720,078 tonnes - about 10 thousand trains.[128] It is easy to understand how important this work was to reduce the long rail in the country. At the fronts and in many armies tried to organize bigger farms. In 1941, there were about 400, and in 1943 - 6220 with the planting of 300 hectares. Up to a million tons of various agricultural products given these farms. They supplied the milk and milk products to hospitals, for in farms there were with us, on the 1st Belorussian, more than 40 thousand cows. From farms we refused until the end of 1944. Last, the strongest diversified economy (near Lutsk) received by us in 1944 at the disposal of the local authorities of Volyn. Thus, the bodies of the rear of the Red Army, maintaining a constant connection to the national economy, to operationalize the unity of the war effort in the war, not only do they get all they need for the army of the national economy, but also they assisted him with their forces and means. While our troops moving west, I often had to go to the rear to check the status of hospitals, the inspection of railway and highway bridges, restored our troops, to verify the operation of warehouses, etc. All kinds of cases do not have to solve simultaneously the Chief of Logistics for these trips! I remember that I came to a village near the town of Klimovichi Orel. I was approached by the chairman of the village council with the question what to do in a difficult case. The village until 1937 lived beekeeper Klimov. He had an apiary in 30 - 40 hives. He took care of bees he helped his wife and son. In 1937, he moved to the Donbas, where he became a miner. Klimov hut provided one of the women from the village, E. Song, - the mother of five children. Four sons of the woman went to the Red Army and became a pilot. The Red Army was the son Klimova: during the war, he became an artillery officer and was a member of the 1st Belorussian Front. When the Germans occupied the Donbas, Klimov's father, not to work for the enemy, he returned to his village and settled back in his own house, which consisted of two rooms. I've seen this quite a mediocre cabin. Mother of pilots, who lived in it, went out, but his [129]housing has not had, she huddled with her daughter in front of the village council somewhere. And the chairman of the village council, it became known that Klimov received a letter from the son of an artillery. At the same time, received a letter from his son-pilot and EI songs. And he and others are going to soon, taking advantage of the fact that their troops were standing close to Klimovich, to visit their relatives. Asked the pilot even if you can make landing near the village. The question arose: what to do? Evict Klimova to instill in his house mother pilot? It would be unfair to Klimov and sad for his son-line soldier. But you can not leave the family and the pilot in its "temporary" dragged on for months unbearably nasty position!

I told him that, in my opinion, eviction from his home Klimova, certainly not. Left in front of the village council the old woman and her daughter also unacceptable. It is necessary to look for an apartment. Where to look? The village was partly burnt by the Germans. Fortunately for us at this conversation present chief traffic management front, General GT Donets. He took me aside and offered to build for the old woman by the military road builders new log house of four rooms. The motion of course, I was delighted, and the chairman of the village council - even more. Superintendent front were asked to identify EI Pesenko bed with bedding. After 10 days the house was built and fully furnished. It instill a happy mother with her daughter. Road builders also tweaked the house Klimov. Within a few months, we have gone far to the west, we received a local paper, which details the case and was placed EI Pesenko letter to the head of the home front: "I formerly homeless, now offers a great house built to your order. The house worked well, consists of two-bedroom apartments, which a lot of light and comfort. How happy are my children to know about your interest in my old age. Now I will take to my men on their return after the victory over the German fiends. And now I bless my four sons and a daughter in military exploits in defense of our country, of our Soviet people ... " In November 1943, the troops of Belarus (formerly Central) Front, continuing to advance in the north-west, crossed the Berezina River and seized a bridgehead south Zhlobin, in Shapilki. After that, the movement stopped. Front headquarters moved to Gomel. [130] In the band of our front were great rivers - Gums Sozh, Berezina, Dnieper, through which all the bridges, rail and road, were detonated by the enemy. This greatly hampered the work on the Battle of Belarus. However, before proceeding to the Belarusian affairs, I would like to part of the rear of the front to help Orel and Bryansk partisans that our army has worked closely throughout 1943. (Then the Oryol region included the current Bryansk.) At the head of about 43 thousand Oryol Partisans stood regional party secretary Orlovsky AP Matveev. Through it GHQ and implement operational activities. AP Matveev was a frequent visitor here, at the headquarters of the rear of the front. He possessed a rare ability to make a good companion to understand the importance of the issue in which he himself is concerned. He was not verbose, always spoke quietly, somewhat muffled voice, but very convincing, especially after returning from a "small land", which periodically flew to meet personally with the heroes of the guerrillas.Help he needed in everything: weapons, uniforms, food concentrates, tents and medicines. All we can give (and it was almost all that they needed), properly packed and sent to [131] special airfield where our tireless "duck" delivers all the destination. In order to facilitate and speed up all affairs related to ensuring the guerrillas, to meet with Matveev normally invite heads of rear services.

I once asked Matveeva Where shall we look for additional sources of supply for the troops, especially hospitals, meat? Doctors recommend a wounded chicken or rabbit in a pinch. Do we not breed rabbits? Matveev has approved the idea, but advised to find a place for the farm, which would not hear the sound of cannon fire and aircraft. Seeing my surprise, he told me of her own Party practice. In the early 30's we have bred rabbits at factories, military units, gardens, etc. Matveev was at that time secretary of the Party committee at a Moscow factory. Rightly or wrongly, but he was reprimanded for neglect of the rabbit. After that, things changed dramatically: started breeding rabbits "harem" way, ie, in the field, no cells, and they multiply rapidly. All went well, the plant even set an example to others in the work canteen often served rabbit meat. Suddenly began dying. Another day died two or three dozen. The details of this reached the "higher authorities", [132]came to the commission recognized the considerable guilt for what happened Party Secretary, who "complacent and relaxed control." A day or two Matveyev was declared another reprimand, but, alas, the rabbits are still dying. Invited the Commission of the competent veterinarians sent several carcasses for laboratory testing. It was found that all the dead rabbits, the same cause of death: cardiac rupture. Was found and the cause of such massive rabbit myocardial infarction: near the farm was open landing area for local avialyubiteley. At the going down of landing planes flew over the rabbits at a height of several tens of meters and its deafening roar brought in awe of its already very brave animal. After each flight immediately died a few rabbits. - Here are the facts must sometimes provide the Secretary of the Party Committee and director of the factory! - Finished his story, Alexander Pavlovich. He advised me to take account of this experience: - And then at the front and airplanes fly, and shoot a gun, - God forbid, get hurt because of these rabbits ... Many interesting cases and Matveyev said from his experience as People's Commissar for Internal Affairs of Belarus in the late 30's. Original Communist-Leninist man of noble souls, Matveev fought vigorously for the observance of the Leninist norms of party and state life. AP Matveev died prematurely and unexpectedly. His children and grandchildren are proud to pronounce the name of his father and grandfather. Oryol Oryol partisans and the whole party organization will not forget the good name of AP Matveev. [133]

WHEN BELARUS
1944 began a new period of the Great Patriotic War: The 1st Byelorussian Front, along with the 2nd and 3rd Belorussian Front and the 1st Baltic participated in drawing strategic strike, completed the liberation of Belarus and the release of our troops on the Neman and Vistula. In January and February of 1944, our front mastered Mozyr, Kalinkovichi, Rogachev. In early spring the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front was still housed in Gomel. There also is some governing bodies of the Republic of Belarus. Headquarters with all the rear of the front offices stationed in Dobrush, 25 kilometers east of Gomel, in dilapidated buildings Paper Mill.About onesixth of the republic was released before the summer offensive. When it was time to plow, harrowing, sowing, the question was: Who do? What? Where to get the seeds, draft power, fuel?

I remembered that in 1942, about the same was the question of assistance [134], the troops of the Bryansk Front population unoccupied areas of the Oryol region. Front commander Rokossovsky went to the requests Regional Party Secretary NG Ignatov. Assistance was great, despite the fact that we ourselves were not provided. And the command of the Bryansk Front received then, as I believe, quite correctly. In 1944, the 1st Belorussian Front had much greater capabilities than once Bryansk. Having learned from the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Belarusian PK Ponomarenko, what country suffers destitute, the Military Council has instructed me to prepare a draft decision on measures deployed by the national economy of Belarus. This task could be accomplished by "cabinet creativity." Preparation of solutions evolved in the possibility of all departments of the front, in figuring out what people think chiefs of arms and services. At the same time our representatives went to the army to enlist military commanders. In fact the front during the war, to all, and nothing more had not. But the war is a turning point, for three years, providing the army with everything you need, our country has limited their other needs, and now the army is to gradually return home to some of the resources and help her in the healing of wounds. Decision of the Military Council of the Front was entitled "On Measures assistance from the front in the restoration of the national economy of the Republic of Belarus." The further time takes us from the events of the last war, the more interest is perceived by many events and facts of the day. By disturbing documents of the time I carry the Front Military Council resolution of 25 February 1944. "The share of Belarus had the burden since the war began to fall under the yoke of German fascism. Bullying Germans of Belarusians unexampled in history. All that has created the Belarusian people in the 25 years of Soviet power, were destroyed, burned and looted by the German barbarians. " So Front Military Council assessed the situation in that part of the Byelorussian SSR, which was liberated from the Nazis in the spring of 1944. As it turned out, is not exempt if the main part of the BSSR was destroyed even more brutally. Whole areas of the country were razed to the ground. [135] While it is not even talked about the restoration of normal life, and the creation of any acceptable living conditions. The Communist Party and the government of Belarus in 1944 rose immeasurably difficult task - any way to warm, feed the children, so after that, without losing time, begin to build towns and villages on the site of the ruins and ashes. May seem "nemasshtabnymi" compared to the present time the activities identified in the decision of the Military Council. For example: "Select 45 for the spring plowing tractors, fuel supply and the tractor drivers, provide a team of specialists with the necessary tools and spare parts for the repair of agricultural tools, high water build a bridge over the river Sog in Gomel, to create a

construction crew with the release of materials for repair of premises, find and equip the premises a children's orphanages and nurseries, providing them with beds, bedding, blankets, tables, food for the year ahead, based on the total of 2000 children in the villages to build 400 bathhouses, to the Government of Belarus farm with 300 breeding horses and foals in 2200, tested for glanders 10,000 horses from the farms of the republic, to place in front of all the hospitals of local residents, patients with typhus, restore the building and equip 15 hospitals, sent to work in local hospitals, 10 doctors and 25 nurses persons, released 350 tons of kerosene, 200 tons of diesel fuel and 100 tons of grease, restore industrial-utility buildings with a total area of 25,000 square meters, 2,500 cubic meters of timber to pass, pass the national economy of thousands of vehicles, harness, arches, a large number of nails, wood glue, paper, student notebooks, "and so on and the like. And most importantly - more plow and sow. For this were identified hundreds of tons of grain and potatoes from the resources of the front. The decision stated: "Front Military Council requires all army divisions, standing racks, logistics units and institutions, without prejudice to combat activities, to render all possible assistance in the preparation and conduct of the spring planting season. Every tractor, every horse, if the situation permits, to be used for plowing and sowing. Personnel of units should be actively involved in the cultivation of collective and individual gardens, especially the families of Red Army officers and the victims of the German occupiers. The military council commits generals, officers and political agencies to ensure that every large and small [136] part, not being on our front line, joined in this great work: plowing, sowing, repairing farm equipment, farm buildings, some houses belonging to widows, orphans and so forth. " Organizing the implementation of this important decision, I was transported back to the idea of Zaporizhzhya region, to their fellow countrymen. Can you guess where our comrades who liberated that country, something to help the local population, who was in the same incredibly difficult conditions, as Belarusians? The experience of the 1st Belorussian Front showed that at all times to provide such assistance can be - it would wish. Considering the decision of the Military Council of the front document of importance, I refer readers to number 6 "Military History Magazine" for 1964, where it is printed in full. Let the reader ponder

on each line of the document, bearing in mind that it was written more than a year before the war ended. Yet to operations such as Belarus, the Vistula-Oder, Berlin. I am sure that many of his comrades still alive, he was then the leadership of the republic, many generals, officers and soldiers of the 1st Belorussian Front remember well how much initiative, energy, ingenuity invested soldiers and officers in this large nationwide cause. In my memories, of course, I am talking about its front. But what was happening, as I know, and on all other fronts, where the personnel of our troops as soon as possible, participated in the revival of towns and villages and the urban and rural economy, destroyed by the Nazis. Invincible country brought an army!
***

Before we immediately started preparing a summer offensive, which had to deal with many other organizational and economic problems.Important place among them who receive Soviet citizens liberated from Nazi camps. It would seem that the threat of a final military defeat of the Nazis was to get something to think about, just to soften the anger of the Soviet people, but they did not cease to mock our citizens. Almost directly behind the front edge are getting ready to depart, concentrated in the Soviet concentration camps, thousands of women, children and the elderly, sick with typhus. In this regard, the promotion of the band of the 1st Belorussian Front was formed difficult epidemiological situation. The situation was complicated by the fact that all hospitals and other Polesie released [137] areas were destroyed enemy, and the number of reported outbreaks in military typhous rear areas of the 3rd, 48th, 65th, 28th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front was Over 4 thousand. The great mass of patients zavshivevshih, hungry, barefoot and half-naked men rushed towards our troops, waiting for help in everything - in treatment, clothing, food, heating. It was necessary to save them and save the army from epidemic typhus. In April 1944, was cold, unstable, wet weather. The roads are not completely free from snow and ice, the thaw was impassable mud.Populated areas near the front, where they could place wandering the roads of sick people, remained negligible. Local authorities were not able to solve this problem - it fell on the bodies and the home front. Road builders and doctors found in all the ways and intersections checkpoints, which was host to the first survey and inspection of citizens coming from the camps. Some were immediately sent to the hospitals, and others - for special items, where were given clean clothes and disinfect clothes, fed a special diet to dystrophies. Motorists transporting these people to the frontline transport deeper into the rear. Military railroad gave them sanitary and other cars. Clothing and food service supplies to seek additional resources to clothe and feed them. Political Department of the rear of the front with the Party and government bodies of regions and districts have raised awareness among these people. Only through unity and the multidimensional nature of the home front could successfully perform this great and urgent work. Danger typhous epidemic was eliminated.

***

In April 1944, we have undergone great changes. Stavka ordered to take part of the 1st Belorussian Front part of the 2nd Belorussian Front, who were at that time in the direction of Kovel under General PA Kurochkin. From Gomel special train left a large group of senior officials of the front led by Rokossovsky through Ovruch, Korosten at Sarni and on to the train station Manevichi. On the way the train twice been attacked by aircraft. Most got then railroad yards Korosten Sarni; over them almost constantly hung enemy aircraft. [138] The procedure for adoption of the three field armies - 70 th, 47 th and 69 st, 2 nd and 7 th Guards Cavalry Corps, included in the 2nd Byelorussian Front, did not last long - I think about a day. During the war, the expansion or contraction of the front boundaries were frequent and achieved or joining neighboring armies, either passing neighbor flank armies. However, in this case the whole front was abolished, and the 1st Belorussian Front doubles, receiving, besides the above three field armies, and even 6-air. Able to take us army confronts us tylovikami, a considerable task. The number of injuries in this area several times greater than the possibility of the hospitals, and they were packed. Sanitary evacuation has long ceased - railways enemy destroyed, other evakotransportnyh funds was not enough. Catering army was close to zero, especially the bread was bad, but it just could not embarrass us, and the intendant of the front of a stock of bread let us once again taken the armies of stock for 30 days straight. It was also bad with fuel and ammunition - no reserves, and it was an embarrassment for us, too: although the warehouses of the 1st Belorussian Front was both, but the warehouse is 700 - 800 miles from Kovel. I had to make hasty and substantial scale maneuver materiel from the right flank to the left. The day when we formally accepted the Army of the 2nd Byelorussian Front, Rokossovsky asked me to investigate the possibility of transfer to us from the 2nd Byelorussian Front chief surgeon of this Front Professor N. Elanskii. - At least on the ground - the commander said - that we took from them such a large number of wounded. Care providers to his front, I heard a lot about Elanskii. Said of him as a great scientist, a brilliant and experienced surgeon, World Party and the Civil War, fighting in the Halkin-Gol in 1939, the Finnish War in 1940. He often went to the field hospital divisions, the first line of hospitals and trained young surgeons, itself becoming a surgical table for complex operations. I was warned that he is very attached to the collective management of medical personnel of the 2nd Belorussian Front. - Should not be wasting time talking with Elanskii - he will not agree to go to our front, - told me my colleagues-physicians. [139] The sun shone brightly on the building and the courtyard, which housed the headquarters of the front and service units. Cobbled courtyard was already cleaned, sidewalks well dried up. To no one bothered us, I invited Professor Elanskii walk around the yard and started a conversation with him, as they say, from a distance. Our conversation lasted more than an hour. When we made a tour of the paths, onto which the windows of the Headquarters of the front, I noticed that Rokossovsky and others standing near him comrades laugh till you drop. A laugh, apparently, had something. Nikolai

was very high growth. Talked with him, I had to throw back his head to see your pal's face, and the sun is not blinding my eyes, I often put a hand to his forehead - as looks into the distance when looking better scrutinize and Elanskii had to bend at the waist to look me in the face. That is hilarious watching us. But I immediately forgot about the scoffers. I was not up to them. Elanskii stubbornly refused to go to our front-line management. So it is not possible to me to work with him on one front. This we with Andreev often regretted later, a few years after the war, when settled under one roof in a recreation area outside Moscow and stayed so for exactly 15 years. [140] Occupying positions of honor after the war, the chief surgeon of the Armed Forces of the country and director of the surgical clinic of the 1st Moscow Institute of Sechenov, Nicholas did not change his main vocation: he did the most difficult, the most difficult operations, and did not cease to personally train young people and transfer to them a wealth of experience. Another invaluable quality I saw in this man: he was simple and accessible. Was not the case that he refused to someone in a doctor's attention at home or at the cottage. But woe be to the one who started his speech to him not a word about the disease and the assurance that "thank" for help and advice. With difficulty endure insult and having nevertheless help, he then angrily pack off such a patient. Many times I have heard from Elanskii his concern that after the war waning attention to the training of military doctors. Every war requires military doctors qualifications - namely war, that is, those who in time of peace were severe school of military training and discipline. In confirmation of this Nicholas could refer to his own life, his long service in the Army, where he spent almost 50 years, and his selfless service to the Communist Party, of which he was in the most difficult years of the war against fascism. So was Nicholas Elanskii.
***

Was unusual configuration of our leading edge: taking the top of the district Bykhov (BSSR), line it ran along the Dnieper River, east of Zhlobin, then went to the south-west, crossing the Berezina River, then turns back to the south, crossing the Pripyat, on the southern bank of Pripyat left far to the west of Kovel and rounded the last in the east, went again to the south. Considering the band diagram of the front after prirezki us army, located south of Pripyat, the commander drew our attention to the favorable position of the southern wing of our front against the enemy force, which was in Belarus and the Baltics. It has been suggested that with the advent of stable weather, and after amplification of the left flank of the troops and equipment rate probably will decide to hit from that direction in the flank and rear of the Belarusian grouping. Based on this assumption, I thought about the possible organization of the operational plan for the rear. [141] In World War I served as a dividing line Pripyat between two fronts, fought against the Germans and Austrians. But we decided to rate this question in another way: she gave one front the entire pool of Pripyat and its numerous tributaries, forests and swamps. In fact, the entire band of the 1st Belorussian Front was divided into two distinct operating areas: one - to Bobruisk, Baranovichi, Brest, Warsaw, and the other - on Kovel, Chelm, Lublin, Warsaw. This required a pronounced troops

in each direction, and therefore, the same organization of the rear of the front. In fact there were two fronts, united by one command. For a short time in the area of Kovel, one after another came 8th Guards Army Chuikov, 2nd Panzer Army Bogdanov, the 1st Polish Army Berling. It was clear that this creates a powerful strike force. To ensure its front-line stores were opened in areas Sarni and Kivercy; here were pulled vehicles and powerful base hospital front. Requests were also introduced to the center by tens of thousands of tons of ammunition and fuel for the southern flank. In areas Ovruch and Korosten outfitted warehouse and hospital base for the front of his left wing. In short, all of our actions have been directed here to the direction of Kovel. And the front headquarters moved from Homel in Ovruch, where it was easier to manage the onset of the left flank. As it turned out, the rate of Hitler's attack is also expected to Kovel direction but not in the direction of Belarus, and in the south-west, in the direction of the Carpathians. However, in late May 1944 the situation changed dramatically. Rate agreed to deliver strategic attack on four fronts Belarusian direction, and therefore the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front paramount leading value. This wing is increased 28-th Army, one of cavalry, and one tank shell, and at least 20 artillery regiments. In accordance with the directive of the General Staff for 15 - 20 days to the front received an additional 300 - 350 levels, and they all had to be unloaded in Gomel, Zhlobin, Kalinkovichi. Together with the current influx of train arrival was 50 - 60 units per day, while throughput direction Bakhmach - New Belitsa not exceed 36 pairs of trains a day. New railway junction Belitsa crucial. Just in May was completed restoration largest railway [142] Bridge over Sog in Gomel, but through it with great difficulty could miss 12 pairs of trains a day. The Military Council has laid on the rear of the front head of personal responsibility for the passing of trains at a given temperature and for quick unloading them in the designated areas. How could provide reception 50 trains a day? The solution of this problem has resulted in a kind of independent operation of logistics. These days - in early June 1944 - arrived in Gomel Deputy People's Commissar of Communications of the USSR VA Garnyk. When I first met him. It was a typical representative of the old guard rail drivers. Exceptional organizational skills, extensive experience in the driver's position and as the head of the locomotive service promoted him to high office. In Gomel, we formed a makeshift headquarters chief of logistics front, reinforced service representatives that are not in the rear - from the department of acquisition, from the staff of the artillery, the commander of BTMV (armored and mechanized forces) and others. They all knew the "stuffing" of each train. And the gunner and tank commander, and the engineer - each of them wanted to promote their goods as possible to the area of troop, and this meant that the trains have to miss New Belitsky bridge. But after all the trains do not miss! We had to choose the ones that have the least transportable equipment, ie, the most heavy machinery, large-caliber artillery, etc. And that could move under its own power, or in cars to be unloaded for another 20 - 30 - 50 kilometers to Novo Belitsa. In other words, the front unloading stretched for 50 kilometers to the east of Gomel and 50 - 100 kilometers to the west of it. Only in this way could provide reception and unloading of 50 trains per day. But the further away from the areas of concentration are unloaded troops means more gasoline and diesel fuel for their further movement.And troops usually arrive with negligible reserves of fuel. The

duty of the Chief of fuel included extension of mobile fuel depots and lubricants with means filling all of unloading troops, and these points were at least 20. Big task lay in the operation on the service road - she had to provide troops on the roads before the landing points of the main front line.[143] Some trains were on the road for two or three weeks, people in need of sanitation and no longer get a hot meal, and we had to push the point of unloading showers, medical and automotive kontrolnye group and dishes with hot food. The duty to ensure veschevikov lay newcomers baptismal linen and serviceable summer outfit. Car service immediately organized technical inspection and maintenance of machinery of. Representatives of the veterinary service to inspect the front and treatment of horses. Especially great responsibility fell on military transport service, ie, the military railway. Their resourcefulness, energy and sometimes ready to take the risk of missing trains on the most difficult spans a large extent dependent on the success of the operational focus. From what the reader sees that, at first glance, clean rail activity could result in a range of activities of a complex system of logistics. This example from the experience of war once again proves how correct it was the government's decision, which introduced in 1941 a new structure rear of the Red Army. Only thanks to the unity and diversity of the rear can be completed on time treboranie rates of acceptance of the [144] of the front so large masses of troops and equipment intended for the Byelorussian operation. Chief of Logistics has been put into such condition that it is no one should have to bow, he did not have to ask anyone for any financial aid - all essential services he obeyed, and everything depended on his own initiative, organization, and creativity. It is understood the front commander, placing the responsibility for compliance with the above directives rates of transport at his assistant for logistics. As I said, most of the credit for the organization of the transport bodies belonged VOSO front and, in particular, the deputy chief Colonel VOSO embarrassment that our tireless work, resourcefulness, excellent knowledge of the situation, the ability to comply with all of the high command of the People's Commissariat (I mean Deputy Commissar VA Garnyka) To ensure that the trains never stagnated, quickly unloaded and empty timely "thrown out." Not everyone understands what it means timely return empties. By breaking the process, we create a "plug" on the road and dramatically reduces their capacity. How many cars has the same number and hand over a day - this is the immutable law of the railway. No wonder that the railway capacity is calculated not by the number of trains and the number of pairs of trains, in other words, how many trains can skip this section or the whole direction (according to the most narrow places) there and back in one day. But in this operation, we had to violate this principle. Because of the extremely acute situation it was decided in a few days to allow one-way movement of trains - only to the front. Operational echelons were, one by one, and empties, usually had to drive away to free deadlocks and minor railway stations. Was it necessary? Yes, you must. Was it good? Good, but not from all points of view. We immediately felt and the negative consequences of such a measure: thousands of cars, filled the front-line of railroad, were very tempting target for enemy aircraft ... And how much "noise" was the part of the authorities! I had to wait, and we waited a reprimand or in an order to the Red Army for public edification, or "personal telegram." But this time, everything went pretty smoothly. Part of the

empty cars, we sent to the rear tandem trains and large [145] with permission of the center part of the "Reset" on your left - the 1st Ukrainian Front in Kalinkovichi Ovruch, Korosten, Kiev. Considerable assistance rendered us Garnyk who saw in place of the complexity of the situation. As I said, the enemy watched the traffic on our roads. His aircraft continuously patrolled and took pictures, and our anti-aircraft guns roared day and night, driving German observers. Of course, the enemy drew not only empties accumulated on small stations. He tracked down and more valuable compounds, and he managed to put a few heavy air strikes against the New stations Belitsa and Gomel. After one such raid trains temporarily stopped. One day at dawn we were awakened bomb explosions and anti-aircraft guns rumble in close proximity to the edge of the Gomel, which housed our operations group and was equipped with a powerful communications center. Out on the street, along with Garnykom, we saw groups of Nazi bombers, the waves incident on the railway bridge, and then expand the New Belitsa. It seemed that the bridge will be demolished. But our anti-aircraft guns to work together so that the opponent has not made any exact hit. Train traffic stopped only because near the bridge derailed train, which ran for a troop train. We rushed to Garnykom "willis" to the scene. Had to cherish every moment - especially since stopped echelon of enemy aircraft could appear again. We saw a locomotive crashed into three pairs of front wheels and sleepers mound. He went off the rails in an air waves from a powerful bomb exploded. What to do? No lifting equipment was nearby. And then helped savvy old parovoznika Garnyka. Turning to me, he said: - If it were possible to gather more people with logs, I would have tried to solve the problem without mechanisms. For 15 - 20 minutes I managed to collect a hundred soldiers and officers of the refuge in shelters and crevices in anticipation of the next air raid. Victor A. supervised device several levers of the material at hand, summing them under the wheels off the track. He put in three lines of people with logs around the engine: one line stop logs held at the very bottom of the engine, the other - a little higher, and the third - even higher.Garnyk himself framed his mighty shoulders with the front hook. [146] he asked me to command, "One, two, heave!" And a miracle happened: a huge mass of metal was lifted and installed on the rails. At that moment, I thought he Garnyk replaced the more "horsepower"! A few minutes later the engine was driven away from the main road ... Good was this deputy commissar! Reference for concentration of troops was made June 20, 1944 - the last day of our time on transportation. Each of us understands that preparing a grand battle. This was evidenced also by the fact that near Gomel in the auxiliary gearbox front was Deputy Supreme Commander Marshal Zhukov, who, as we know, does not come for nothing, and appears only in an emergency when it is necessary to coordinate fighting fronts in a particular strategic direction. He was present at the last briefing held K Rokossovsky with army commanders of the right flank before the Byelorussian operation. Every day, I reported to the commander on the operational front, transportation, a representative type of troops [147] of my group reported on its line of artillery units arrived, the number of tanks, etc.

At that time, a grand maneuver was accomplished by means of the rear of the front and from the left flank to the right. But more recently, we have focused efforts on the left wing, and now everything had to be "perekantovatsya" to the right and, if possible, hidden from the enemy. About 4 thousand transport vehicles of the 18th Brigade under the command car BN Kugutova loaded ammunition, fuel, engineering and other property, made the transition from the region of Gomel region Sarnia - km 300 - 400. This also moved many hospitals Front, who were previously on the left wing. Train with ammunition and fuel, marching from the center to the left wing of the front, in advance were turned aside Bakhmach, New Belitsa continue on army bases of supply. On the neighboring fronts this direction is the same preparatory work and accumulating supplies. Finally offensive in logistically was provided on the level of requirements and rates front commands. In what quantities are stockpiled before the Belarusian offensive operation conducted by four fronts? By the beginning of the operation security fronts characterized by the following data: From the data table shows that security fronts was generally uniform and generally adequate, except for a shortage of ammunition on the 3rd Belorussian Front and gasoline - on all fronts. [148] It is useful to know that in a time machine to run one tank was only 150 kilometers.Therefore, the four gas stations more than 600 kilometers are not you will pass. And if you take into account the very high incidence of the motor in place, and all sorts of detours and races, the four gas stations do not have enough for more than 400 kilometers (or 200 miles one way). As you know, the actual depth of the operation was to most of the fronts of more than 600 kilometers, due to the difficulty of ensuring that the troops in the fighting fuel was incredibly high. I think the modern reader interested to know what this operation has cost our country in terms of the flow of material resources. Looking ahead, I can mention a figure of total consumption of material resources in the Belorussian operation. Ammunition was expended over 400 thousand tons of fuel - about 300,000 tons of food and fodder - more than 500 tons. If we assume that in the winter-spring period in the battles for the liberation of one-sixth of the BSSR was spent not less than 300 thousand tons of ammunition, fuel and food, the whole operation, which resulted in Belarus was liberated completely, took no less than 1.5 million tonnes of core material and technical means (not counting hundreds of thousands of tons of all kinds of materials used for the restoration of railway and road bridges). How to ensure the advancing troops in an operation? How to plan expenditure of ammunition, fuel, food? Coincided whether actual consumption with planned? Coped with the supplying of a rear? We will try to answer these questions as briefly as possible. I will only speak with the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front. In food supply planning is simple: one daily giving a day - no more, no less. Deviations if they were, it is not to decrease, and in the direction of better food for the soldiers. Even before the onset of the head of the food administration ordered the front to give each soldier in excess of the rations, which consisted of 300 - 400 grams of cooked meat, a piece of fat, sugar, and butter sandwich and other such individual rations were issued 300 thousand. During the operation, as we know, the troops suffered casualties. Counting them always lags behind, or rather statements comes as an afterthought. Fewer people, sometimes even twice or three times,

and higher instances continues to write [149] products on the initial number of personnel. Soldiers in the attack got so unlimited food. Though not always possible to serve hot food to the advanced part. Vodka is the matter was this: she appeared in her usual for a person to get warm while in the trench and to increase appetite, but instead of the usual 100 grams during the onset of each battered, usually more. During the war, more than once raised the question: when to give the soldier vodka, before or after the onset? Some felt that the best way to give the vodka before going off to attack people to have more courage and impulse. But opinions differed on the issue. Most commanders and units came to the conclusion that the vodka before the attack is not always exciting acts, more often - a depressing and even cause drowsiness.Therefore, in most cases, giving vodka and released at the end of the fight, before dinner, but then got it on the vodka man often overweight, and a fighter fast asleep. In general, each commander decided the matter differently. With the food supply troops during the Belorussian operation difficulties, it can be said, was not. In securing of ammunition shortages occur already on the seventh day of the attack due to the transport of non-uniformity, and not because there was not enough road transport (which, by the way, I note lacked throughout the war), but because there were special circumstances bringing up. Where to take out? What route? It is one thing - to take a front-line stores, located at the good roads and well-though primitive, but still mechanically loading (roller conveyors, etc.). Another thing - collect ammo in the woods, in remote places, where before there were artillery positions, and take on the road. Had to find ammunition in the forests of Belarus, and it was no easy task. As we shall see, in the planning of the operation of the Belarusian artillery support was mechanically, for a pattern to earlier operations, excluding special conditions. But in the battle on the Volga and Kursk situation was quite different from the one that exists in Belarus in the summer of 1944. In 1943, while at Kursk in the defense of the Central and Voronezh Fronts strives to provide ammunition for their artillery firing positions.For some calibers were lined up to five sets of combat. And it himself entirely justified, since the artillery [150] had the opportunity for a continuous and devastating fire on the advancing enemy without risking left without ammunition. Do not be at firing positions so a significant amount of ammunition before the battle, the artillery was not able to fulfill its task so because the rear would not provide uninterrupted bringing up shells during the battle. In summer 1944, the situation at the front had the other. Enemy everywhere turned to defense. The density of our guns per kilometer of front has increased two to three times as compared to 1942 1943 years. However, the principle of separation of ammunition and their application rates in the rest position were left the same as in previous years. It was considered necessary to put on the firing positions from two to two and a half sets of fighting, about one unit of fire was contained to the divisional and army supplies and a quarter - in the front yards. Duration artillery barrage planned for at least two hours, during which time expected to be spent ammunition posted in firing positions starting position. In fact, the duration of preparatory bombardment declined almost everywhere, and a large amount of ammunition left unspent. In a way it used to result activism vanguard before the operation by which the refined system of defense and group of enemy forces. But the main reason for such inconsistencies and surprises - a pattern in the planning. For clarity, we present data on planned and actual consumption of ammunition troops of the 65th Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, which was on the main axis (in the fire unit):

Thus, the difference between planned and actual spending reached an average of all calibers for the first day, more than half, and in the next nine days were spent at least 30% of the planned amount of ammunition. [151] By itself, such a solid economy - a fact gratifying. But the savings are not formed in the warehouses, and in firing positions, the troops left after a few hours of the start of the offensive. In the Belarusian artillery positions located mostly away from the roads, in the woods, on sandy and marshy ground. Ammunition were brought here for days, often with the help of artillery units and their trucks and personnel. When the troops went forward, this aid has not been, and ammunition were in places where cars go it was very difficult, these "islands" in the band of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front had about 100. The result is a such a strange situation in which ammunition was faster and easier to apply from warehouses GAC (Main Artillery Directorate) for the 1500 - 2000 miles, rather than collecting them in the starting areas. But ask GAU ammunition had no formal grounds because behind them was listed in more than two sets of combat, and the center holds demanded that we make every effort to collect and export the remaining ammunition. It is indisputable that in the preparation of the Belorussian operation in the starting position on the artillery positions were laid out extra ammo, and then emerged from this great additional difficulties. July 10 (if not mistaken) was convened the first members of the military councils of armies, commanders and chiefs of army logistics artsnabzheniya armies of the left flank of the mill in the village, about 20 kilometers east of Kovel. I presented a paper on "Some Lessons from the experience of material security forces in Bobruisk operation and problems of logistics armies of the left flank." The question of the right of Separation ammunition and the inadmissibility of the formation of small piles of them along the front line was central. Themselves artsnabzhentsy was advisable not to spread in these conditions to firing position just half to two ammunition and halving this rate, the remaining ammunition put at road junctions, where it should be held in even loaded ammunition road transport. Following eight days (July 18, 1944) in advance, the left wing of our front avoided the above-mentioned errors in the design, and there has not been lost, no shell. A search on the right wing ammunition continued not only to the end of the Belorussian operation, but also to the end of the war, and even after the war has found stacks of ammunition abandoned by our troops in the forests of Belarus ... [152] In planning its work came from the rear of the front directives rates about the depth and duration of operations. Directive Bet 1st Byelorussian Front, for example, the depth of the problem was determined by taking the Bobruisk and access to the north-west direction to a depth of 140 kilometers to the duration of the operation 10 - 13 days, then - "depending on the situation." For frontline managers of logistics support of troops in an operation depth of 150 - 200 km did not make any problems. However, such a small depth orientation of rear services objectively resulted in a decrease in the services, limited prospects, reduced willingness to maneuver. At a deeper planning differently constructed the plans and logistics would be less mistakes. Adversely affect planning logistics in 1944 is incomplete and delayed awareness of managers and front-line army rear concerning the concept of operations. Head of logistics is not always invited to operational meetings where refined tasks and practiced interaction. As a result, shallow planning Belorussian operation creates a totally unsatisfactory situation with fuel. It was only enough for 8 10 days of the offensive, at a depth of 200 kilometers, ie, the intended depth of the operation. On the formal side, everything was well, and the head of the rear of the front had no reason to demand from

the higher security, but because of that after 10 - 12 days after the start of the offensive front began to experience true hunger in the fuel. The truth, the whole country at the time felt it a great need. Command understood the situation well, and so we have been deployed prior to the onset of fierce fighting against cost overruns. A significant portion of vehicles has been put on funny, "for conservation." Never use trucks instead of cars. Little importance in motor control, prevention of "dummy" runs, instructing drivers, teaching them to better manage the machine. But the most effective way to save fuel was quickly restore rail front. Empirically, we found that every 100 kilometers of restored railway troops towards reducing fuel consumption per thousand tons. Therefore Front Command did not stint on comprehensive restorative care railway troops. [153] Ensure fronts fuel interfered late return to the rear filler vehicles. We understood this very well, but had to hold the tank to the front, making them as if in a "mobile warehouses on wheels." For this, I once received a reprimand in a telegram to the chief of the Red Army rear AV Khruleva. - I understand you perfectly, Nicholas, you have no other way out there, but I can not respond, I was too tight - said to me by phone Andrey. A delay of a day or two is because we expect the opening of the train at the main railway station. Skipping filling train 100 - 150 kilometers closer to the troops, we saved at least 1,000 1,500 tons of gasoline. Think about it every time: whether to pour gasoline over 300 kilometers from the troops to quickly return the tank, wait a day or two until rebuild railroad and thus reduce the mileage on the tank 100 - 150 kilometers. Usually elected the second option, although it is inevitably followed by "vzdryuchka." During the operation of the Belarusian fuel supply was sometimes so bad that it had to pass armies microdoses - 30 - 40 tons with the needs of 300 - 400 tons. Not the number of vehicles and the amount of fuel was the cause of power failure of ammunition and other military equipment. For the same reason, in some cases, reduced combat activity tanks and artillery pieces. For example, July 27, 1944 a large part of the artillery of the 28th army left behind, because there was no fuel. 3rd Tank Corps 2nd Tank Army could not conduct active operations at Warsaw, as he had no diesel fuel, and the entire Panzer Army actually went on the defensive on the outskirts of Warsaw. July 29, 1944 6th Air Army, which had in its composition, and 1,400 aircraft superior to the enemy in two or three times, and made only 95 sorties, and on July 30 - 232 sorties. From the center took energetic measures to ensure that the resupply of fuel in the front yards. With the permission of the rear of the Red Army Chief of OSG 1st Byelorussian Front, Colonel N. Lozhkin shaped front rail 20 "turntables" 1,000 tons of fuel each. The point of this exercise was that the tank was assigned to train our front, at the head of its GSM service officer standing front, who accompanied the train to Baku and Grozny, there arranged for rapid filling [154] it with fuel, and then on the way by hook or by crook "push" entrusted by train. Bringing it to the front fuel storage, the officer quickly blended fuel and again went to Baku and Grozny. I must say that such "extraordinary" way of self-supply, though not very progressive at the time, played a positive role. Later, we are abandoned "turntables" because, having learned about them, the commanders stations subordinate MCC VOSO on the way from Baku to the front began to redirect these tanks, and our "extraordinary" accompanying officers were powerless to do anything against it done. However, and provision of fuel by the end of 1944, the country was so improved that there is no need in such unusual forms of selfsupply. During the period of the Belarusian offensive, our front spent over 100,000 tones of fuel, or about 170 trains. He could have his equipment technology spend far more offensive and will only be won.

A direct result of insufficient depth of operational planning was inadequate availability of railway troops to the beginning of the offensive, and the unreality of schedule in rehabilitation of railways. As part of the 1st Belorussian Front to June 24, 1944 (the beginning of the onset of the right wing) actually was only one railway brigade, the other is in a formative stage, and the third was working in the rear, beyond the boundaries of the front, on the instructions of the People's Commissariat. Meanwhile other fronts involved in the operation, had two and three brigades. True, the front has received notification of sending him to the south three rail crews, led by the Office of Military reconstruction 20 (UVVR number 20), but the team arrived only at the end of the third week in advance and did not participate in the reconstruction of the most devastated areas of the railway . The reason for such a late maneuver railway troops was, in my opinion, is that these forces throughout the war were under the People's Commissariat of Communications, which was not always aware of the operational and strategic plans of the GHQ. If the railway troops were already chief of logistics of the Red Army (along with road and rail), in terms of logistics strategic operation [155] questions of railway restoration would stand in the first place, and the General Staff would take more effectively in the staffing and timely targeting these troops. (You can not, however, deny that the submission of railway troops NKPS in the first year of the war justified.) As for the planned pace of reconstruction of railways, here we do not explicitly take into account the actual size and nature of the damage.Thus, the 1st Belorussian Front outlined conduct restoration of the railway section Shatsilki - station - Bobruisk rate of 5 miles per day. But what was the fact? Looking at the map, the reader will see that the railway section Shatsilki - Zhlobin stretch of 40 kilometers was in close proximity to the front lines, and from Zhlobin to Bobruisk railway runs in the tactical zone defense, it is in this area of the level of destruction far exceeded all calculations. Was destroyed not only the topsides, but the mound: the enemy izryl its solid niches and shelters for vehicles and people. In this state, the railways are also on many other sites and in other operations, especially where the railway runs parallel to the front line. [156] Plot Shatsilki - station - Bobruisk restored only we train crew at 1 - 2 km a day. The first train came to Bobruisk only July 15, 1944, ie, 21-day offensive, when the troops went ahead by 350 - 400 kilometers. With the arrival of three more railway brigades led by General N. Borisov recovery rates rose sharply, on a good day were 50 - 60 kilometers. But it was only after July 15, the operational depth of the enemy defense discarded. It seems to me relevant clause relating to "average" performance. In one of the works published VOSO MCC, we read that the average recovery rates of the railways in the band of the 1st Belorussian Front in the operation to 32 miles a day, but because it is well known that the average rate of advance of troops in the operation were 16 kilometers per day ... How is this railroad stepped in front of tanks and infantry? And how do we explain the irrefutable fact that the railway behind the advancing troops by 400 miles? The explanation for this discrepancy, we have given above. In its operational depth of the enemy's defense rarely have time, except for the explosion of large bridges, any serious attempt to destroy the railroad. Recovery in this zone are generally reduced to Altering ways for our track. And if we consider at the same time that General Borisov received from the rear of the front of about 200 vehicles for conveying people and building materials along the railway, so that work could be fought on a broad front and in opposite directions, it is not surprising that the "average" rate turned in Charge for the whole operation is quite high.This figure is not an exaggeration, but of course, it is risky to use such a method of "average" performance in planning

restoration work in the future. Must be differentiated assessment of the railways in the tactical zone defense and in-depth it. We have learned this lesson from the Belorussian operation and used it as the war progressed. Also important the right choice of the direction of railways to be restored. The experience of the operation showed that the more profitable is not the shortest and the least ruined direction. If it is possible to bypass heavily damaged areas and even the direction, then in the interest of advancing troops it should be done with determination. [157] In the band of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front shortest and also had two-track direction Kalinkovichi - Luninets - Zhabinka (458 kilometers), but it crosses many tributaries Pripyat with waterlogged floodplains also a huge number of man-made structures are subjected to destruction. On the other, the longer direction - Kalinkovichi - station - Bobruisk - Osipovichi Baranovichi (650 kilometers) - the railway was much less destroyed, also close to the highway it was held, and it is easier for the lateral transport of building materials on a broad front. The Military Council approved a recovery it is this, more favorable, although a longer trend. As a result, the road was restored relatively quickly and at relatively low cost, and the shortest line was restored only two months after the operation. In the Byelorussian operation of great help behind the front had our pilots to destroy the worst enemy - shpalorazrushitel that the enemy had time to disable the 25 kilometers between Zhlobin and Bobruisk. More help tankers that went into a deep behind enemy lines in Osipovichi and prevented him destroy railroads, and moreover, the Germans were forced to leave in Osipovichi large food stores. [158] Construction of the railway bridges at that time was the key to solving all other problems behind. So, for example, on the restoration of the bridge over the Dnieper at Rechitsa use a variety of techniques and worked about two thousand people. The work was done simultaneously with the three points from the center and on both coasts. Of particular importance was at that time the railroad bridge across the Berezina River in the village of Shatsilki. Here, restoration work was carried out in full view of the enemy. Railway workers suffered heavy losses from artillery fire and methods of attacks by enemy aircraft, but did not interrupt their work. And builders are other bridges are not inferior to them in courage. After driving up to one of the restored railway bridges over the Pripyat, I saw him approaching six German vultures. At least 500 people bred at this time on the farms of the bridge: they riveting, cooked, laid sleepers, rails, pulling the wire. Service air defense warning of approaching enemy aircraft for 10 minutes - 15 - could have time to come down from the bridge and go to a shelter, but no one was leaving, the work continued. When I asked one of the soldiers, "Why not go to a shelter?" He said, "I'm tired of walking. If, for each alarm to run in the gap, then the work will not have time. " April 23, 1944 the newspaper "Red Star" wrote: "Selfless work, daring courage and brilliant craftsmanship of the Soviet military railroad played an important role in our fight against the enemy. The problem of communication has always been one of the most important and critical issues of war. The more, the importance of communication, where the needs of the troops immeasurably increased when a successful military operation is possible only if the uninterruptible power

supply front reserves, equipment, ammunition, food, in the grandest scale. And the fact that our military in spite of all the barriers of the railway, in the most difficult conditions provide a solution to this major problem, making them proud of the Red Army and the Soviet people. " I want to say about our great military & Friends - workers, technicians and front-line employees of railways, to vigorously help the troops at all stages of the Byelorussian operation. Among the chief of the railway remember AM Vasil'ev (Kalinin Railway), V. Egorov (Western Railway), NI Krasnobaeva (Gomel Railway), N. Petrova (Kovel railway). Under their guidance, a large army of civil zheleznodorzhnikov selflessly spent trains directly to the location of the fighting [159] troops are often subjected to fierce aerial bombardment and artillery fire. Soviet soldiers and the Soviet people will never forget the outstanding feat of civil patriotic railroad.
***

If when preparing for major traffic burden lay on the railroad, in the course of it, from the first days of the offensive, a crucial role in driving up the road transport played. He had to work with very limited road network. In 1944, in the central part of Belarus density of the road network is 20 kilometers per 100 square kilometers of area, including 3 kilometers of roads and 10 - 15 kilometers of improved ground. In the band of the 1st Belorussian Front road density was two times less - about 6 kilometers underground and 2 km of highways per 100 square kilometers area. On most of the roads were a lot of artificial structures, and required a lot of effort and resources to maintain them in good condition. The road network of our front was about 1500 kilometers in the original position. On each flank was held by a front road. Each army had one or two army road, brought to the troops. Road, the 1st Belorussian Front, which at that time about 25,000 people already have extensive experience in the construction of bridges and roads, and showed great skill in their work. True, in terms mehanovooruzhennost per Roadman not exceeded while two horsepower, while soon after the war it had exceeded 20 - 25 hp. Special care and attention were surrounded bridge construction parts, as they were required particularly high productivity. Two or three bridge-building battalion erected nizkovodny bridge over rivers such as Pripyat, Berezina, Dnieper, in three days. To help Mostovik attached, if necessary, of the ordinary road, the personnel of which quickly obtain the necessary skills. At the head of the troops of the front road was an outstanding organizer, General GT Donets, which I have already mentioned. Very important issue for us was the construction of paved roads. We did not have time necessary materials, [160], we did not have pavers, asphalt pavers. Cherish every bulldozer and grader. There were lots. a length of 30 - 50 kilometers, which cover without them even brick rubble was impossible to pass a flood of vehicles. And where to get them? Used a pile of broken bricks from the destroyed factory buildings, schools, etc. But it was not enough. Donets enterprising general and his deputy to supply Col. PS Sochienkov decided to appeal to the community of believers, so that they were allowed to use the stone from the destroyed churches. And we must pay tribute to these

communities - they passed the military road is often not only rubble, but the surviving walls of ruined churches in order to help the Red Army quickly expel the hated enemy. Road workers were working the front in contact with Army Corps of Engineers. The chief of these troops General AI Proshlyakov always helped road forces all sorts of machinery and materials. In turn, a lot of road troops provided engineering services sections when you construct artificial structures. The duty of military service road lay care and the construction of roads, and properly operated, the maintenance of order on the roads. On the main roads were open nutritional items for passing commands and lone soldiers, items of technical assistance for vehicles, fuel depots, sites with concentrations of packaging to send it to the rear of the empty return, medical centers, showcases Soviet Information Bureau. For officers and generals of every 250 - 300 miles were open roadside hotels. The main concern of road construction on the front - possibly miss more trucks carrying ammunition, fuel, food, troops. As a part of the front in 1944, there were about 70 million vehicles for various purposes. Of these, about 8 thousand, ie 11%, especially troop transport vehicles, the army and the army command. Preparing for a major operation for motorists - is primarily to bring the entire fleet of vehicles in good condition. Machine availability to the top of the Byelorussian operation reached 95%. Each machine could be at least 5000 miles. The volume of work done by road, determined mainly of goods intended to be transported, the state of roads and their length. [161] The right wing of the front we had to bring up every 3 - 4 000 tonnes of cargo, which required 1.5 2000 cars (2-ton for one year back in the day). In summer conditions, daily mileage of the car is 200 miles. When planning transport across the front car park divisions and units not taken into account: it was small, and divert it to the distant flights should not have. Transport vehicles front and army subordinate capacity 9600 there were 5697 tons. At an average rate of advance in the 15 - 16 km and the high voltage power supply of Drivers seamless materiel road could be in the first 12 - 14 days, then, unless the railways, was bound to come a crisis in driving up material resources. We have already said that the railway Kalinkovichi station - Bobruisk was commissioned not on the 12th, and on the 21st day of the offensive, which is not. affected the pace of its development. The actual stretch of ground communications was as follows (referring to the distance from the train station to head the troops) by July 1, that is, a 5 - to 6-day operations - 170 kilometers, July 5 - 300 miles, to 16 - July 17 - 400 - 500 kilometers. Hence it is clear that road transport was not able to supply all the necessary forces, especially at a constant shortage of gasoline and ammunition scattered over a vast forest and marshland BSSR. And yet our road transport troops managed to provide access to a depth of 600 - 650 kilometers. But drivers and maintenance personnel is to get a high price. There were days when motorists are adjusted daily mileage of the cars up to 500 - 600 km. Drivers, mechanics, road workers, service workers POL - all worked with an enormous strain. July 11, 1944 for the troops of the 65th Army was favorable situation: they could go to, that is, with minimal losses, cross the river Orb. But the ammunition in the battle was so small that, if successful, to keep foothold they would have nothing. Therefore, the front commander Gen. Rokossovsky, who was in the position of the 65th Army before allowing the crossing of the river Orb, summoned to the

wire of the front and rear chief asked: can be submitted by the deadline of 500 tons of ammunition? [162] Commander emphasized the critical importance of addressing this issue for the operation of the front. Not wanting to get immediate, and therefore, perhaps, and a rash response, Rokossovsky gave two hours of counting and added: "If this is not possible, so just say so. I'll hold the further advance of troops. " After the commanders of units question posed commander, was brought to the drivers. Drivers of vehicles promised to give all their strength for the success of the offensive. I reported this to Rokossovsky. Drivers Chogub, Home, Schmal, Pescherin, Gladyshev, Ivanov, Lavrukhin, the Ravens of the 57th Automobile Regiment of the 18th Brigade in these days have almost tripled the planned mileage cars. Platoon lieutenant drifter from the 56th Regiment made automobile mileage vehicles per day with ammunition by 400 kilometers. The whole company Lieutenant Hum be run daily on average 430 kilometers. 92 cars of the 57th Regiment for 47 hours were 920 kilometers, and the drivers themselves load and unload the cargo. Drivers worked selflessly and moved ahead of the required amount of ammunition. They have received government awards. This example shows, on the one hand, it is the team with the possibilities of the front rear, on the other - as the rear can flexibly respond to the demands of the command, if the personnel are well aware of the importance of logistics tasks, and head of logistics know the operating environment. Contributed to the success of drivers' working good organization and interaction of the road and traffic control services. Much credit for this belongs to the commander of the 18th Brigade, Colonel automotive BN Kugutovu. Exploit brigade road route Bobruisk - Baranovichi length of 300 km has been divided into three sections. At the head of each plot was the control room officer, in addition, operated mobile officer positions.Every 100 - 120 miles items have been prepared for the big rest stops where you can get food, gas station, medical, and technical assistance. There were tents for the rest of Drivers, hiking baths, hair salons, propaganda station with newspapers and showcases Soviet Information Bureau, as well as tables with writing paper and envelopes. The driver got hot food and hot water at any time, with him, he always had three cottages daily ration.Such care has provided most of the cars of the 18th Brigade run up to 350 kilometers a day. It was not the limit of our capabilities. Do not be a frequent and lengthy delays during loading and unloading, the results of [163] would have been even higher. But for handling mechanisms almost was not, throughout the brunt of the work fell on the shoulders of men. But how long before the talk was about the mechanisms of war, if only to ease labor movers! Published posters with images of various mechanisms, as if it was necessary to persuade someone in the overall benefits of mechanized labor on hand ... When the war started, except roller tables and narrow gauge railways with trolleys for large warehouses, no other mechanization troops arrived. And in the first years after the war, when I've seen of the warehouse in the field, pyatipudovye bags of flour, cereal, sugar, dragged people on the back of the car in a pile or back. During the operation of the Belarusian machine idle totaled 3,254 machine-day. You can not conceal the fact that many commanders and compounds, whose address was delivered the goods, do not rush to dump cars, and try to keep them with you as long as possible and to promote front-line and army vehicles after their non-stop the advancing troops. It would also drastically reduced the turnover of vehicles front and army command. Some interest in the question of the principle of control by road to the front. In magazines and newspapers of war could be seen as a statement in favor of centralized and decentralized methods.

Supporters temporary duty vehicle front to consumers (artsnabzheniyu, engineer troops, hospitals for their transportation to the individual armies, etc.) believed that in this way - by the way the "distribution" - reliable to solve specific problems, and the transport of fewer claims to the front-line management rear. At first glance it seems so. Artsnabzhentsy especially like to see if they are able to "pull" the chief of the rear two or three battalions of motor independently to haul ammunition during the operation. For a while and head of logistics front so relaxed - it is less needlessly stress, and if at times he heard of a commander with the delivery of ammunition that bad, then there could have retorted: "You have asked two avtobatalona, I gave them - so you do not complain to anyone. " Yes, so peaceful. But only at first glance. After all, the military situation inevitably dictates its own: Give ammo! Manage transport as you will, but let's ammo! And in the first place themselves artsnabzhentsy starting to see [164] in his levity, wishing to have a "private" vehicles in addition, it is necessary to monitor the security of ammunition, to care about getting these weapons from central warehouses or to seek within the front, we have yet to take control two or three battalions of transport, to know road conditions, etc. And quite often there are still situations when these "friends" of means of transport is not enough, they should be doubled, that is again directed to the Chief of Logistics, and the latter would be happy to help , but there is nothing, as all distributed to consumers, and he himself was left with a paltry reserve. Suffers as a result the case, there is a risk of delay of the offensive, as it almost happened in the area of the river Orb, if the chief of the rear of the front was not at hand a sufficient supply of transport. My experience tells me different. In any case not to waste transport! Firmly hold it in my hands! And it is less than all, so scrupulously to be held principle of centralized control. If there is no permanent head of logistics provision of transport vehicles, he did not head of logistics and helpless contemplative growing at the front of difficulties. They are only just beginning, and he has signed his impotence. And most of all he will have to listen to complaints from the "consumers", he at the very beginning of the operation courtesy cars "in their full disposal" ... Try it in an operation to remove seconded vehicles! It is almost hopeless. Knowing that he could be taken away, "occupier" arranges to transport attached all the time in a way that it can not "catch". On the track of 300 - 400 kilometers where thousands of cars scurrying, can you catch in the short term handed out vehicles? Such is the sad result, which gives a method of decentralized management of front-line vehicles. There is no doubt that holding in his hands so much weight machines - can be complicated, it requires a lot of attention to the head of the front, hassle, infinitely increases its responsibility for timely submission to the front of everything. This is undoubtedly true. But for that you and head to answer for assignments! During the operation of the Belarusian me daily put on the table a summary of the use of automobile parts of the front, and in this summary was the most important graph, "consists in the provision for 18 hours ..." - these are the machines, which can count on the front commander, at any time . Such a moment may either never come or it will come [165] out of the blue - it often happens in war. How important it is to be able to respond quickly to changing circumstances on the front! Acute situations often evolved in the final stage of the operation, when the onslaught of our already weakened, and the resistance of the enemy is growing, and he tries to arrange us or that trickery. Front commander, in this case quickly make operational decisions on a particular maneuver troops and equipment to and from the head of logistics required to move immediately to the maneuver ammunition, fuel and promotion, hospitals, road capabilities. And it requires a powerful reserve vehicles. Well, if he is!

It is very important to the end "to withstand nature," not to give in to pressure from all sides, when you're a proof that has hit the very moment of crisis operations, and require of thee last hundred cars - "otherwise all will be lost." .. The next day, the situation has worsened, and again at you shake again require. And so every day. In such "extreme" positions is best to consult with the Chief of Logistics Chief of Staff of the front, with the commander and member of the Military Council of the Front. But do not think you can in this way to evade responsibility. This is misleading. Head of logistics is always responsible for everything. His power - the ability to maintain reserves to the end of the operation. The same view is strictly adhered to and the chief motor control of the 1st Belorussian Front, Colonel PS Wiseman. He and his subordinate unit showed tremendous flexibility in the management of complex and large-car economy. Staff for Logistics kept only general direction and control over road transport. The entire organizational work and traffic management by motor control front, and their task motorists decide well. But experience teaches Belorussian operation, in some cases, in accordance with the situation, we must resolutely reject the method of centralized management. In the offensive right flank role was to carry out mechanized cavalry group General IA Pliev. This mobile group intended to return to the operational depth of the enemy defense. In this group were possible separation from their supply bases and even the temporary encirclement by German troops. We had to think about the financial security of Pliev, avoiding, however, the excessive burden it rears. Front Military Council approved a special plan under which places a two car [166] from a reserve battalion front, full-strength most serviceable machines and well-chosen of Drivers. These two battalions were at group Pliev to complete the operation. Moreover, the personnel of the battalions, many of whom were Communists and Komsomol, was directly involved in armed clashes with the Nazis, and showed his best side.
***

In mid-July 1944 created such an incredible stretch of communications that no species of ground transport could serve far the more advanced troops. At this point, I got a call Rokossovsky: - I want to tell you the good news. Stalin promised to help transport aviation. Be prepared to receive and use it. Agreed on everything with the commander of the 16th Air Army, General Rudenko. Call the Chief of Staff, General Logistics Shlyahtenko: - What a joy, Michael Kondratievich! We will have help by air. I do not know how many days passed, [167] until the aircraft will be used, but you will take immediate steps to use them primarily for fuel and most scarce ammunition. The chief of staff smiled happily. I must say that until 1944 we did not use aircraft for vnutrifrontovyh traffic. Of Kursk, as mentioned, transport aircraft Reserve Command under Gen. NS Skripko significantly helped the Central Front supply of ammunition and evacuation of the wounded return empty. But they all organizational work carried out by the central authorities of the home front, from the rear, the front was only required to take loads and driving up to the airport wounded from nearby hospitals. Other experience in the use of transport aircraft we had.

As long as my chief of staff called up artsnabzhentsami and "geseemovtsami" rang from the command post of the 16th Air Army: transport aircraft sat on our airports and wait for further instructions. Where are your goods? Downtime is unacceptable. " The joy of our replacement alarm. I somehow expected for two to three days until the aircraft arrives, and she appeared in a few hours! And it turned out a complete front-to-rear unpreparedness it so mobile use. Near the airfield was not our stocks of fuel and ammunition. Soft container for supplying the air for two years has not been tested, and Chief of Logistics of the 16th Air Army, General Kirillov considered keeping the packaging in their warehouses as a burden and as a favor for his part Superintendent of the front, which, in his opinion, would be to soft container to keep their warehouses. The moment was not the time to understand who was right: I had tylovikam 16th Air Army immediately start preparing the packaging. While checking containers until transported to airfields and is ready to load the appropriate types of fuel and ammunition, aircraft idle. Frankly, I was not happy with this, and was even willing to report to the front commander to refuse from it. By the end of the day was organized by the interaction of transport aircraft with front warehouses and army command, in whose address aviation was to deliver goods. But then revealed yet another difficulty. In order to make planes could fly without additional charge at both ends (the total path length of 1,000 kilometers), they had to take for their own use as much fuel was left [168] little room for payloads. But this will not stop us: too great was the value of every hundred pounds the timely receipt of the advance units of cargo and troops to the front were received by air in the operation of about 600 tons of cargo, mainly fuel. Perhaps the most valuable service to ground troops have yet Po-2 (renamed U-2), which delivered mobile ammunition group General Pliyev serving the Nazis in the rear. Remembering the role of these aircraft in the war, and especially in operations that were carried out behind enemy lines, I wonder: why not erect a pedestal with this Po-2, or a sculptural monument to this tireless worker of the war?

***

As noted above, that the planning of the Belarusian offensive to insufficient depth negatively affected the organization of medical care. A considerable part of the front to the top offensive hospitals remained far behind the lines: do not think it necessary to bring them to the troops, because the problem does not extend beyond the front of Bobruisk and Osipovichi and railroad also was packed with rapid movement. It took a special effort to the essential requirements of medical support in these conditions were fulfilled. During the war, health care providers strive to continually improve their knowledge, summarizing the experience of the previous operations. Surgical conferences were held in each division in the armies and front. Obschefrontovaya surgical conference was held in Ovruch shortly before the Byelorussian operation. It was attended by over 500 physicians, as well as outstanding medical specialists from Moscow. Our permanent curator of the Main Military Medical Directorate was Professor VS Levit, a recognized authority for young surgeons. All were known to his scientific work and skill as a surgeon and teacher, as chief physician of the 5th Moscow city surgical clinic.

His medical practice, he started back as a country doctor. He often spoke of youth, in which conditions have to then work in the village: and operate, and take delivery, and to treat colds, from mental health problems, to be a "specialist" for children, and infectious diseases, to be trouble-free to any patient on the road, [ 169] in a blizzard, in the sultry heat, in a cart, sleigh rides, and even on foot wa dozen kilometers. Usually before a front-line conferences Vladimir Semenovich been in many divisions, watching the work of young surgeons, he became the operating table. His speeches at conferences are strictly businesslike. At the same conference as the primary front-line evacuation center surgeon Professor Igor Zhorov. He always took care of that field doctors penetrated the consciousness of the importance of health maintenance organizations is in the very early stages. He cited examples of infections after injury, while fairly common, it was the fault of poor organization carried the wounded from the battlefield, the weak low-level work of the medical service. After the conference, began training medical care in the Belorussian operation. First of all it was necessary to free the injured from hospitals with long-term treatment: in an army hospital was not to remain any wounded, the period of treatment which would exceed 20 days, they were evacuated to front-line agencies. But at the front to hold them it was impossible, because there had to be back on the bed in case of the large influx of new casualties. Therefore, it was necessary to strengthen the sanitary evacuation trains inland. Throughout the war, there was such a thing: the army command did not want to give their front-line troops wounded to hospitals. This seems odd at first glance. But this was a lot of bases. A significant part of cured and returned to the front of wounded tried to return it to his army, in his division in his regiment, and with this desire could not be ignored. Moreover, the army and division commanders, as they say, its weight in gold valued shelled fighters, is a solid foundation of high combat readiness of all parts. That is why the June 23, 1944, ie, the beginning of the offensive of the right wing of the 1st Belorussian Front, download advanced hospitals wounded remained relatively high - about 2 to 3 thousand people each army, all of which are subject to discharge their part in the coming days. Special attention was paid to preparing low-level medical services - nurses, stretcher-bearer. Usually this link manned by soldiers recovering in hospitals. More than 750 people were trained stretcherbearer and trained elementary method first aid (stop bleeding, overlay [170]tires, harness, etc.) This work is, one might say, it is critical for the rapid healing the wounded. Experience of previous military operations showed that the earlier provided the primary pre-medical and medical care, and then the wounded man, the greater the chance of recovery. This applies especially to the wounded in the chest, abdomen, skull. Found that of the 100 wounded in the abdomen and quality medical care in the first two - four hours after the injury, get well over 90 per cent, but if the assistance is provided in 15 - 20 hours, the deaths reached 90 - 100 percent. That is why the problem of timely removal of the wounded from the battlefield has always been a cornerstone of the practice of the military medical service. Actually, this problem is not purely medical. At least it is not a decision right is the responsibility of the commander of the unit or part.Constant concern about the organization carried the wounded from the battlefield - especially taking care of them in search of land, in a trench cave-ins, or the dugout, in the wreckage of buildings, in the grass - is largely due to better treatment outcomes. The skilful and daring stretcher-bearer, health instructor and platoon stretcherman life depended wounded, as well as their own life, [171]at great risk. So, on the site offensive 109th Infantry Regiment,

37th Infantry Division of the 65th Army for one day out of service 11 nurses, health instructor and platoon commander stretcher-bearer. Compensate for these losses is difficult, and the commander must always be prepared replacement. More attention required supply of advanced and frontline agencies medical supplies, especially bandages, anti-tetanus serum, plaster, drugs and sulfonamides, glucose, and blood banks and krovozameschayuschimi fluids, etc. Before the start of the offensive all health battalions first-echelon divisions and most of the army hospitals were fully deployed and ready to receive and process the wounded. Important disclaimer: If this principle deployment of medical institutions has been fruitful in the Belorussian operation, then six months later, when we were preparing for the Vistula-Oder operation, it was completely unacceptable, as will be discussed below. For receiving the wounded in the band right flank of the front was centered 70 000 hospital beds at a distance of 10 - 12 to 100 kilometers from the front edge. Reserve collapsed hospital is 35 kilometers away. We did not forget also about the left flank, which was about to go on the offensive: they focused more 50,000 hospital beds. We called a special meeting of the heads of all the services of logistics, to whom spoke on Surgeon General Front, AY Barabanov. He spoke of the treatment and evacuation plan in the operation. The medical service is widely relied on the support of the other services of logistics - military transport service, car, road, Quartermaster, etc., and it is beneficial to the fate of the wounded. In general, medical services came to the top of the Byelorussian operation fully trained in medicine, and organizationally. Due to the increased skill of the commanders in the battle management medical losses in separate armies during the advance from June 23 to August 15, 1944 did not exceed 15 - 18 percent. Encouraging was the fact that the regiment [172] health posts 82 - 83 percent of all the wounded were brought not later than four hours after the injury. But still 15 - 20 percent carried the wounded from the battlefield out of time, and this is evidence of serious shortcomings in the lower levels of medical support. Noteworthy data describing a way to deliver the wounded from the battlefield to the battalion and regimental aid stations (in percentages): The rest came from the field without special attendants, most of the group, helping each other. Characteristically, the main methods of delivery of the wounded to the battalion aid stations are stretchers, cape, scrapers, as well as on foot. No mechanization in the lower levels of the evacuation was not applied. Already at that time doctors have repeatedly raised the issue of the construction of a nizkosidyaschego armored personnel carriers, the ability to take the wounded to the ground right into special legs, so as to protect against re-injury, but in the last war, this technical problem has remained unresolved. In echelon battalion - the regiment of the primary means of evacuation was health wagon. For modern vysokomotorizovannoy army wagon looks anachronistic, in its place comes a mobile and, presumably, more comfortable vehicle. The whole complex of organizational and preventive measures given the relatively high rate of return healed the wounded to duty. Thus, in the Stalingrad operation was returned to the system 32.3 percent, in the Battle of Kursk - 45 percent, in the Belorussian operation - 50 percent. [173] These statistics cover only the army, army and front-line health facilities, no central. More than 20 - 25 percent of the wounded healed and returned to the system beyond the borders of the front.

***

Very complex and cumbersome task for the rear was providing veterinary offensive. Considering the three cavalry corps in the front, there were 145 thousand horses. By the beginning of the offensive part of the whole horse had a good nutritional state, was completely reforged, all infectious diseases are minimized. Improvement of the horse population has greatly contributed to "war horse review", conducted in May - June 1944, and by participating in this great campaign of political organs, party and Komsomol organizations, and officers and soldiers parade gave good results. In veterinary software, as well as in the medical, business was crucial. It was brilliantly performed by the outstanding specialist in the field of the front head of the Veterinary Service of Professor [174] and General N. Speyer. The whole network of front and army veterinary institutions were as close to the places of greatest congestion of horse. Well was placed evacuation of the wounded horses. The loss of the horse in the attack were minor, but the mechanized cavalry group Pliev they were sensitive, as this group has come under fierce attack from the air and lost 7,300 killed and wounded horses. On the left flank under unremitting surveillance of veterinary workers were two cavalry corps. Great efforts from the Veterinary Service of the front demanded inspection and sorting of 11 thousand horses, captured from the enemy in Bobruisk. As mentioned, the veterinary service of the front also conducted extensive anti-voepizooticheskie events in the Belorussian economy while contributing to the welfare of the horse and that of the front. Finally, veterinarians front and army were responsible for the quality of the meat, enters the allowance; still for each army followed the herds, a total of tens of thousands of cattle. The general picture of the various activities of the rear would be incomplete if we were not told about the trophy bodies involved in the beginning of the war in the collection and evacuation of [175] to the rear padded on the battlefields of equipment, spent cartridges and special sealing. As the expanded scope of the armed struggle, especially after the Battle of Stalingrad, the role of the trophy has multiplied. For 1943 were shipped from the front base of the plants and 112,650 cars and 21,114 scrap cars weapons. A serious drawback trophy service at the time was the lack of information about the operational plans of the command, so that the members of this service is often a long delay appears in the captured objects, that is, when a significant part of the property was pillaged and, at best, used unregistered. Technical equipment of the trophy in this period of the war remained extremely low. Especially scarce evacuation vehicles for export trophies. The vast space between the meridian Eagle - Kursk and Dnieper trophy authorities continued to collect and send to the rear of a damaged military equipment and various scrap metal. Inspired by the work of this important state, our "trofeyschiki" is not ready for the beginning of the Belorussian operation, and I as the head of logistics had to get over it by the suggestion of the Military Council of the Front. And it was for that! According to past experience, we knew that the enemy was in retreat nothing "decent" does not leave us, disabling, drenched with gasoline and set on fire vehicles, artillery and tanks hold anyone except representatives trophy service. The situation is different in the Belorussian operation. Apparently, the enemy did not expect that our troops will come to him so quickly to the rear and seize large stores of food and a variety of other assets. It happened this way: in Osipovichi our forward units were captured in full fitness thousand tons of flour, cereal, sugar, millions of cans of condensed milk, canned food. Since the trophy protection service in warehouses not exposed, and

all the doors were opened, any military unit, passing by, found it necessary to replenish their stocks. With a long delay could bring order to take into account the rest of the property. When assuming the offensive forces of the left wing, our bodies come to the trophy case quite differently: not only take into account the presence of intelligence by the enemy military depots, and read, at least in general terms, with the economy of the area, where they were to enter the Soviet troops, including centers such as Chelm, Lublin, Biala Podlaska, Siedlce, Mendzyzhets etc. Executives trophy service Front (General Zhmakin Colonel Kowalczyk) [176] in advance formed several "task forces", which included experts - engineers different fields and energetic officers led military commands, machine and enough fuel. These groups with mandates from the rear of the front head moved before the transition to the offensive (17 July 1944), the location of the first-echelon divisions to follow along with them to the specified object. Such tactics will fully justified. Just a few hours after taking of a large settlement service officers captured were at munitions storage sites of the enemy, as well as all major enterprises; soldiers everywhere exhibited positions allocated commanders, and the premises were closed, superimposed on the door seal. A day or two set about a detailed accounting of all seized. True, it could not go without incident. There were cases when exposed captured bodies were taken hourly passing military units to "refuel" extremely seductive products that, in their opinion, no accident that had been taken under protection, just making sure the groundlessness of their hopes, they themselves have restored order. Particularly well and deliberately approached the captured trophies cavalry corps of General Vladimir Kryukov. Deputy for logistics in this case was Col. GA Tolokolnikov. 2nd Cavalry Corps through skilful and decisive action quickly moved to the operational depth of the enemy and captured along with other troops saddle letsom. There were warehouses with large stocks of food and feed grains and other property. Case took custody all the property and, of course, first of all to ensure their troops of the rules, setting off a plan to use. Already it was extremely good: could fly and take no credit! But Colonel Tolokolnikov was even more generous: he called me and offered "exchange transaction". "I offer you the oats, and you give me a few tons of sugar and meat, as in the case of these products is not enough." I had to go for it. (Such "exchange transactions" between the armies subsequently practiced repeatedly, as trophies in different directions were different.) Among the trophies were cavalry horses sample captured from the Germans. The Nazis had their "own" - captured in 1939 in Poland, stud farms, which had heard the cavalry. In the ranks of our riders somehow spontaneously emerged appeal: "Horses have to grow a body!" This meant that instead of undersized Kyrgyz horses must type [177] appear more tall, beautiful horse. This appeal has swept a broad wave of cavalry, and the response to it was to grow beyond the permissible. Corps commander had to restore order in his "household." Soon, all captured from the Germans studs were given the Poles. The horses were in the capable hands of the Poles, unsurpassed riders for centuries been famous for its extraordinary art thoroughbred horse breeding.
***

The experience gained in the rear of the Belarusian authorities operation was carefully analyzed. In particular, they made serious conclusions about the lack of preparedness of some service to the rear of the new conditions on foreign territory. The main disadvantage is the smattering of basic

economics of neighboring countries, monetary relations, about the use of industrial and food resources. Apparently, this is due to the fact that our senior military personnel in peacetime studied neighboring states on textbooks, not different enough depth and accuracy, focusing not on the economy, and the natural features of theaters of war. [178] This significant gap in our military and economic preparations peacetime we feel even more acute in the final stage of the war. Later, during the years of my teaching at the Academy, I strongly impressed on the audience the importance of this issue. But, of course, not only in the listeners. The territory of the rear of our front in the Belorussian operation reached 200 thousand square kilometers in the rest position, and about 500,000 square kilometers by the end of the operation. This is more than the territory of major West European states. This area should be managed to maintain her proper order according to the requirements of war. The highest authority in the war area was Front Military Council, in which is usually a separate senior civilian leaders. The rear of the front almost to solve specific problems for the protection and defense communications, supply depots, and hospital databases, repair stations, etc. Large groups of enemy assault at this time in our rear is not abandoned. But he were sent to us in the near vicinity of the Soviet rear youths forcibly abducted to Germany, intimidated, corrupted, and then trained in special schools saboteurs. Of 15 - 16 year old boys dropped by parachute with explosives, with poisons to poison wells, with the means to damage vehicles (in particular, those boys were given small metal hedgehogs to scatter them on the way to pierce ramps cars). Enemy used Ukrainian kulak-nationalist gang (Bandera, bulbovtsev etc.). These gangs destroyed communications lines, scattered along the roads of mines by armed raids on lying to us local people were killed in road single track of our commanders. To combat gangs and saboteurs involved us in the first place the NKVD, one division of which was attached to the front. However, some of these troops would be difficult to cover the rear and military units, institutions and the headquarters of the sabotage of hostile elements.Therefore, the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front adopted a special resolution on the order of a solid hover in the front and rear areas of the army. The responsibility for this was assigned to the rear of the front head. [179] First time in the war rose so sharply that question. It is true that the fall of 1941 near Moscow as there was a special rear guard troops of the NKVD and fighter units of civil defense, but there the situation was quite different. Now it was necessary to secure a large territory. Not only the troops of the NKVD - the whole system of logistics, all the local authorities, the entire population participated in the task. Attribution to head of logistics for restoring order in the rear of the front was quite natural, but the earlier theory and practice of such a function is not provided. But before the war, and most have not provided as Head of Logistics ... Front and rear of the head chief of logistics in the Belarusian army operations given the right areas that housed connections and units, their powers and means to organize the urban and rural nonstandard military commandant. The whole strip from the leading edge to the rear of the border was covered with a network of commandant. From the local government and Party-Komsomol volunteer groups have been established to assist 10 - 15 people. In all settlements established system "desyatidvorok" led by the commissioners. It is

the responsibility of all these commandants, groups and "desyatidvorok" included strict adherence to the rules and the regime established in the front line. Measures taken by the NKVD and road traffic control service front, produced results: attempts to sabotage and terrorist attacks of the enemy were not successful. As for the boys, saboteurs, threw the enemy in our rear, although these Soviet children for two or three years have been processed in special German schools, they are one and all were themselves in our commander's office and village councils. Experience in the rear of the Byelorussian operation is also very useful to us in the future. July 18, 1944 took the offensive left wing front by six field armies (including the 1st Polish Army), one tank army, two cavalry corps and air force. Mentioned forces were equal independent front. Rear, providing the offensive right wing, not for a moment forget about the left wing, which is only waiting for a favorable moment to go on the offensive. As soon as this moment was coming, we had almost from the apothecary to weigh up how much ammunition or fuel forward on the right wing, and how much to the left. [180] Five days before the offensive was decided that all the trains with fuel and ammunition from the central supply bases directed not toward Gomel, and towards Kovel, in Kiev, and as soon as it cleared the highway Kovel - Brest, immediately begin to feed the right wing on the highway from Kovel. For this it was necessary to make a major maneuver by road traffic troops frontline hospitals right, avoiding pool Pripyat. At the same time it was necessary to make an artillery maneuver as to the right to the left, which required a lot of trains and hundreds of additional cars. Not perform such transportation, would disrupt the attack. A month earlier, the rapid flow of trains moving at the Gomel area, now only train hard situation created because everybody rushed to the other side - to Sarni, Kovel.
***

Our front was in constant contact with the guerrilla movement. The head of the partisan movement in Belarus (later head of the Central Staff of the guerrilla forces) PK Ponomarenko (the then First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belarus) was a frequent visitor at the headquarters of the 1st Belorussian Front. Of course, no discussion of coordinated action not without solutions regular issues of logistics and medical support of the guerrillas. Daily coordination of activities with the operational staff of the guerrilla group led by General Dikan, with him, and then interacted chiefs of the front of our home front. Supplying the guerrillas with the "Great Land" and reverse the evacuation of people and equipment can be carried out only by air.Therefore, to create databases on special ground. At these airports open branch warehouses with arms, ammunition, fuel, medical supplies. In the same department opened hospitals to receive the wounded and sick. First base, from steel to transfer loads to the guerrillas, was organized October 20, 1943 near the village of Ivanovo, which is 4 km west of the city Klintsy. Then, as we move to the West, opened more and more airports, and next to them a supply base. Required a lot of trouble packing of goods to be transported by air (landing on the ground or by dropping). [181] to drop cargo from the air were given the task force partisan 345 cargo parachutes. During the preparation and conduct of the operation of the Belarusian Air Force front produced 369 sorties in the location of guerrilla, bringing back 166 tons of cargo and 37 people managers and radio operators. The return flight was taken 305 sick and wounded. In addition, the children were

taken out guerrillas who threatened revenge Nazis. Soviet pilots to make flights in all weather conditions, often under heavy enemy ground fire and pursued "Messerschmidt". A lot of these characters, pilots have not returned to their airfields. In the account documents guerrilla movement marked the names of outstanding airmen of the 16th Air Army of the 1st Belorussian Front, who showed heroism in the performance of tasks to ensure the guerrillas. This fellow Lakhtin, Wolves, Semenov, peas, Kurguzov, Goncharov, Utkin. In those documents, we read: "The commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Rokossovsky so, members of the Military Council of vols. Bulganin and Telegin well understood and appreciated the value of the partisan movement, giving him aid, arms, munitions, diversionary, vehicles for transporting cargo to airfields, etc. " "We also note - it adds in the report - and responsive to the needs of the Bolshevik partisans of the Chief of General Staff of the Front Malinin front and rear chief General NA Antipenko who always receives applications directly to ensure the needs of guerrillas and reliably satisfy them. All possible assistance to the guerrillas provided Shlyahtenko General, General Boiko, General Shabanin, General Zhizhin, Dutov Colonel, Colonel Wiseman, Colonel Vakh. " Some say the military (and historians write so) that, with our troops on the line of the Vistula over Belorussian operation. Technically, maybe it's true. While visiting the headquarters of the front, I watched as some departments were concerned about drawing correlations for the award after the operation is over! For whom is over, and for whom there is no ... To the rear of the front efforts on carrying reached its zenith. With the restoration of the railways, we are far behind, blown up bridges over the numerous tributaries of Pripyat were built, [182] vehicles worked on the "shoulder" 400 - 500 miles each way, the fuel was not enough, many of the vital elements of the rear of the distant past, they should be was immediately moved forward ... Requirements to the rear at this point increase sharply, and although the operation is complete. In this connection, the question arises: what is considered the end of the operation? This is not an idle question. A correct understanding of it will plan the logistics offensive throughout its entire depth. After the war, at the Academy of the General Staff, I went to three different, but equally authoritative comrades with the same question: what is the final stage of the operation? Received three different answers, of which one was correct, but incomplete. One said that the completion of the operation means moving troops to a given line, the other - it is not only access to a given threshold, but also the firm holding Accomplishments and the third answer was more complete: the end of the operation

must be considered not only the yield of the troops to the specified line and retention, but also to create favorable conditions for the preparation of subsequent offensive. Consider these statements. Each of these places on the rear of the different responsibilities. Experience most of the offensive operations of the Red Army shows that the expenditure of material resources, as well as human losses there is a certain pattern: a higher level of losses - for the breakthrough, a sharp decline in the occurrence and growth - at the end of the operation.It should be noted that the higher the rate of advance, the less consumption of material resources and the fewer casualties. As for the end of the operation, the plan for this most difficult period - we are dealing with many unknowns, and the consumption of material resources is in direct proportion to the newly created situation, as well as those tasks, which makes the front commander, the troops at the final stage of the operation.If we consider the most accurate definition of "the final stage of the operation" output to the specified line and to create favorable conditions for further offensive operations, then from the rear of the front as required to calculate the forces and means to be had in the most difficult, the most crucial moment. Otherwise, we may be at risk of losing the achievements and incur unnecessarily high casualties. Considerable contribution to the Byelorussian operation of military personnel have made trade at the front - military trade. [183] They were engaged in the sale of goods produced from bases center, and cared about the establishment of local production. In 1943 in our voentorgovskoy network began to develop their handicrafts. Produced consumer goods - combs, combs, cigarette lighters, cutlery, etc. In 1944, the company set PX fronts for the army 60,000 pairs swab, about 1.5 million stars, logos, buttons, about 2 million, 0.5 million cans shoe polish, 600,000 boxes of tooth powder. These enterprises PX widely used labor disabled veterans, who have been recruited to work directly in the hospitals for convalescents. Offered their services, and many local residents. With staffs of, and sometimes parts of the stalls were PX (though not always functioned regularly) in the battalions, companies, battalions, divisions, battery-operated hawkers - soldiers and sergeants, who walked the dugouts and trenches, selling consumer goods. The most interesting form of trade at the front was a system of individual and collective "packages." "Making" - a collection of popular goods packed in bags with a list of contents and marked price. To speed up and simplify the calculations in combat, forming collective "send" on the department, platoon and company. [184] Hawker received money for them with one or two people, who then themselves were calculated with the rest. Voentorg 1st Belorussian Front in 1944, sold 809,000 "parcels", and on all fronts were sold in the same year, more than 5 million. Thanks to this fighter and at the front was interested in obtaining timely and complete due to him, though, and a small salary, knowing in advance that it would advisable to spend. This, by the way, and at the front kept the real cost of the Soviet ruble. PX system gradually took over the maintenance of all the mess in the management of the front, in the headquarters of the army and in some places in the division headquarters. Officer due to Voentorg ration passed, and the last had the opportunity to strengthen it by products harvested yourself. Personnel of these messes sometimes hit their extraordinary efficiency in moving the headquarters. Do not have time used to come to a new place - and during the offensive staffs often alternated its location - a report that dining PX already turned around and let the hot lunches.Quartermaster, going on reconnaissance to choose a suitable area for the new cantonment,

they took with them, and military trade representative, who immediately set about the hardware platforms for the dining room. With a great sense of gratitude should mention the military trade workers during the last war. Led PX 1st Belorussian Front was a very energetic and enterprising officer NV Kashirin - now Major General, who works in the system Glavvoenstroya Ministry of Defence.
***

In a complex and difficult work to guide the preparation of a front-line rear Byelorussian operation of great help in the rear head of the Military Council of the Front. I have sometimes been criticized for the fact that I do not always defer to his leadership. Adhering to the principle of unity of command in the management of severe rear, I was sure that I must take full responsibility for their work and sometimes take risks in some major event, fully aware the brunt of the consequences if the risk can not be justified. But once you take the responsibility, then the law must not be reduced. Full responsibility and full rights - are inseparable. But it is hard work if there is strong support from the chief. War does not tolerate "and honey" and "shiver" leadership subordinates. Sharpness, dynamic environment require [185] head firmness, determination, speed of response, not allowed to take the time for approval and discussion. Sometimes it seemed that I did not have enough space for the initiative, that too much time is spent on redundant reports. Perhaps some restlessness in the nature and rapidity of action created some chiefs opinion of me as a person, not accommodating. But I was never rude to subordinates and did not tolerate abuse of them. No need to give up with a serious comment from the chief, if such a comment is made and not in proper form, because the authorities is of the same matter, and the nerves, just like you - sometimes they will have setbacks. But ignore these failures, you should not, sometimes it is useful to draw attention to their superior companion inadmissibility. If he is a wise man, do not be offended. Based on these principles, I was building my relationship with people. The main thing - trust! Without trust, you are not an employee, but an official ... Confidence inspires initiative, creativity, daring to risk.During the war, we felt the positive impact of trust, integrity and completeness of human responsibility for their work. With the support of the commander and the military council, I renewed energy provided leadership in the Byelorussian Operation Homefront. The rear of our front had significant help young Polish republic, and every kind of assistance needed: vehicles, fuel, and certain types of products, and other things. We had to provide clothing and food for hundreds of orphans whose parents were killed by the Nazis. At the request of Bierut and Osobka Moravian for those children identified front flour, cereals, sugar, condensed milk, bedding, based on the annual requirement. On the personal instructions of Stalin 1st Belorussian Front isolated from its fleet of 500 trucks and hundreds of tons of fuel available to the Polish government. By this time it was not easy for us. Thousands of workers collective rear of the 1st Belorussian Front showed heroism and dedication to provide the greatest battle for the liberation of the Republic of Belarus from Nazi barbarians. More than 11,000 soldiers, officers and generals of the departments and services of the home front were honored for their heroic work. [186]

FROM THE VISTULA TO THE ODER

With the Soviet armed forces on the territory of neighboring states began a new stage in the fronts, including in the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front. Poland has been more than five years occupied by the Nazis. They did not recognize any, even the most brutal military law in the supply of agricultural products, they are just robbing, killing the slightest resistance. At the same time, the Nazi propaganda inspired the Polish population that the army is coming from the East 'Bolshevik looters. " Getting on the ground prepared for the 20 years of anti-Soviet propaganda in Poland Pilsudski and Rydz-Smigly this slander were unsuccessful. In this situation, each Soviet soldier required a deep understanding of their responsibilities, understanding the liberating mission of the Red Army. Especially great are the requirements for the officers and soldiers behind. After all, it was clear in advance that we, the workers of the home front, the more likely it is necessary [187] to enter into business relations with the Polish people, especially the peasants, for the procurement of food and feed. How many rear units and institutions as hospitals have to put in the Polish cities and villages and everywhere at the same time should take care to avoid violating the customs and way of life of the Polish population ... The easiest way to be attributed all adversity from war, but good relations they can be weakened. It must be said that the Soviet soldiers as brothers belonged to the Polish people. I remember, in July 1944, we settled in a large border of the Polish countryside. Commandant took the headquarters chief of logistics of the front house of a peasant, who had a wife and sick daughter 20 years. Our first conversation with the owner of the house was of somewhat nervous, tense. To my questions he answered discreetly, avoided talking about the situation in his household. Animated host only when we were talking about the disease daughters too many years it is suffering some illness, he spent a lot of money for treatment, but to no avail. Just at this time, we went to Surgeon General Front, AY Drums and chief surgeon of the front Professor V. Popov. Decided, on an exceptional basis, to place the girl in one of the women's section of the front hospital warned her father that cure it, we can not, as the disease is chronic, but we will survey the most thorough, accurate diagnosis and relieve her suffering as possible. The girl was hospitalized. This made a stunning impression on the inhabitants of the village, and the good news of us to become a part of the neighborhood. However, the next morning the adjutant reported to me that the owner came to complain about the soldiers carrying security staff.My heart skipped a beat: are violated to punish anyone? I ask the owner to come to me immediately. It turned out that he had brought the soldiers huge jug of milk to treat them, and the men flatly refused too literally fulfilling our guidance. The owner was offended. I explained to the soldiers that accept such gifts is not prohibited. On the third evening, the owner came to me and asked permission to speak candidly. It turns out that he was under the influence of Nazi propaganda hid their pigs somewhere in the field, in a deep pit. Now he decided to bring them back and ask whether there will be with them then?The owner said that people like him, in the village a lot, they are afraid of bringing home the cattle from various hiding places. [188] The next morning, drove into the yard a large cart with four pigs. All other farmers of the village did the same ...

The first task was to find the rear of the front right solution of the food problem. Our stocks of grain, cereals, potatoes, vegetables, remained in the rear and take them out was not easy, because not yet been restored railway bridges across the Bug. Provide our military and industrial centers of the workers had in a country where not only economic, but also the entire civil life was catastrophically disorganized, and the population, met us as liberators, still have not got rid of the mistrust of the grafted anti-Soviet propaganda.Polish leftwing political parties that were in Hitler's underground, just beginning his legal activity. Great influence on the peasants had while Catholic clergy (whose credibility has increased and because it was persecuted by the occupiers) and popular figures in the country of procurement and distribution of rural cooperatives. It is these forces and we had to fall back on. The Government of Poland, represented by the Chairman of Regional happy Narodowa Boleslaw Bierut and the chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation Edward Boleslav Osobka Moravian in August 1944, has taken a number of important laws on compulsory military supplies to the government. Among them will name two important decrees: 1) the "Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of mandatory military supplies of grains and potatoes for the state" 2) "Decree of the Polish Committee of National Liberation of mandatory military supplies of meat, milk and hay for the state." These were documents of great economic and political significance. Because they also apply to the provisioning of operating with polskgsh army of the Soviet troops, the bodies of the rear and the Political Department of the 1st Belorussian Front took part in explaining farmers adopted by the Polish government laws and to help local loggers vehicles, containers, etc. At the direction of the Military Council, I traveled all the provinces and districts much of the Right Bank of Poland and everywhere had official meetings with representatives of the Committee of National Liberation, [189] with the local authorities (which are often made up of members of the prewar so-called Peasants' Party, or different shades of liberals and socialists) with the cooperative Polish public and religious communities. These meetings are almost always complete a full understanding of the conditions, the amount and timing of supply us food and feed. I particularly remember a meeting in the town of Biala Podlaska, attended by over 150 representatives of the Polish community. Speakers at the meeting called for early and steadily carry out the task of the government to supply the Polish and Soviet armies. Bread and other products with thousands of tons of steel come to collection points. Decree oblige farmers to deliver all their own transport, but we refused to vehicles, if requested of this. However, this is often not the case: the peasants grouped in columns and is denoted by a red flag waving triumphantly followed by drop-off point. December 15, 1944 in order to the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, the front commander Marshal Zhukov announced thank the large group of generals and officers for the full completion of the pieces of food, which should be good until the next harvest. [190] "The successful implementation of the plan set pieces described in the order - to provide great organizational activities of the front, a broad popular and political work in the communes and communities, conducted by political organs of fronts and armies, close contact representatives of the Front Command and the Army with the Polish Committee of National

Liberation in central and local levels, strong organizational and financial assistance provided by the front and the armies of the local authorities and the Polish cooperation in the conduct of blanks. " All of the home front began at this stage of the victorious war to generalize the experience gained in the summer offensive. This work has resulted in a major research and development activity. We had something to summarize: in 40 days of the offensive, during which the troops passed 600 - 650 miles, rear done unprecedented work. We were even more severe test, and we know that the fuller and more we comprehend the previous experience, the better it will provide a new operation. First in the division, then the armies, and finally, in the front held fees, meetings, conferences, almost all of the home front. For medical, veterinary, automotive and road services were shown dozens of various inventions and innovations made hundreds, mostly realized during the offensive. At that time was, for example, high-frequency hardening novelty crankshafts for trucks, in one of the mobile repair plant front thanks to the initiative and persistence of military engineer Solomonyan and personal involvement Moscow professor Halperin was mounted high-frequency setting, which gave high effect. Demonstrated as a truck ZIS-5, in which the driver Nesterov was 300 thousand kilometers from his farm to the Vistula. Front manufactured by means of a large number of its parts: pistons, rings, liners rear axle intermediate shaft for the GAZ-AA, etc. Experience summer offensive operations in 1944 has been analyzed and summarized in a detailed report written specially selected employees of rear services. These reports are invaluable and still fund the archives of the Ministry of Defence. From September to December 1944 was carried out, so [191] a comprehensive theoretical and practical training of logistics for the upcoming grand battles. Important role in the synthesis and dissemination of experience playing "Newsletter" published by the Rear Front. (Although the front was in the territory of Poland, but we continue to use the services of printing the Communist Party of Belarus, which until the end of the war printed our "Newsletter".) Had the difficult task at a time to share our financial services. We first entered the overseas territory where the economic system and the financial system were very different from ours. Not yet been found ways and forms to determine zloty in new conditions must be established and payment for the supplies for the Red Army, and finally, I had to find the best procedure for issuing military salary at the same time operating systems banknotes - Soviet and Polish. A number of other issues arose in front of us in the field of monetary circulation in the first months of the entry into Poland, and they were keen political. Their solution is, of course, the Soviet government and the government of a democratic Poland, but our front-line financiers was asked to provide full assistance to Polish colleagues. [192] At the direction of Bulganin and I have begun this finance director Front Colonel VN Dutov, and we had to work hard to make proposals on all these issues. The vast experience and broad erudition VN Dutova who knew the basis of the state financial policy of the USSR and the forms of international financial relations, had many benefits in the initial forging Polish Finance. With unprecedented severity faced the Soviet military command the task of helping the people affected by the Nazi terror.

According to statistics, the loss in killed, wounded and missing in the last war are estimated (approximately) for the U.S. population - 0.2% for England - 1, 6 for Germany, for the USSR - 10%. As for Poland, the Nazis destroyed here over 6 million Polish citizens, or 25% of the total population. Hatred for the invaders fighting for the independence of the Polish people was manifested not only in the physical destruction of the population, but also in the mass destruction of the industrial and cultural centers of the country. During the years of occupation in Poland was destroyed 10200 (64%), industrial plants, hospitals in 2677, 6000, schools, museums and theaters in 3337, 300 thousand buildings in cities and over 450 million homes in the villages. Many cities in Poland is a pile of rubble and pepelischd. In this torn and devastated country, our troops entered in 1944. In the first days and months after the liberation of Poland by the Soviet Red Army and the government to help it any way they could: by car, fuel, scarce foodstuffs, medicines, medical care, etc. At the request of the Polish Committee of National Liberation Soviet Government fully supported nearly three hundred thousand Polish army weapons, military equipment, uniforms, military specialists, etc. While a strong basis for brotherly relations with the Polish people entrenched in the coming years. Upon leaving our troops in the Vistula River in August 1944, began a systematic comprehensive training to rear new offensive. In the official literature and various textbooks often use the term "preparatory period of the operation". [193] The length of his usually determined for the front 25 - 30 days for the army - 10 - 15 days. Thus, the beginning of the preparatory period, the Belarusian offensive is for the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front May 31, 1944 (the offensive began on 24 June). The beginning of the preparatory period of the Vistula-Oder operation is usually November 28, 1944 (the offensive began Jan. 14, 1945). And in fact, in both cases refers to the date of receipt of the operational guidelines on the preparation of Bids offensive. Even if we exclude the initial offensive of the war, because they are different from operations in the future and because they lack many factors specific to the long war, when it provided for the front rear of the dates you have to a certain extent an estimate. The most characteristic operations of the Great Patriotic War was the mass destruction of terrestrial communications. The difficulty of recovery depended on their number and length of [194] in the offensive zone of artificial structures, destroyed the retreating enemy. It is difficult wartime home front during the offensive, but it is even more difficult - when it is completed. Troops reached the Vistula, and behind were destroyed all the bridges and overpasses. At a time when the front moved to the Vistula road troops, led by the tireless and enterprising general GT Donets built bridges across the Dnieper, Pripyat, Sozh, Berezina, Western Bug and many small bridges over their tributaries. Until January our road builders built within the front of the bridge with a total length 562 11 231 meter, reinforced and repaired 626 bridges of 9764 linear meters in length, built on the roads 185 kilometers wood coatings profiled 1278 miles of dirt roads, 1,026 kilometers of panels arranged for snegozaschity, brought and scattered 62,000 cubic yards of sand on the [195] areas of black ice, procured 610,000 cubic meters of stone and other aggregates for the construction of bridges. Before the end of this work it was impossible to launch an offensive, rather, it was impossible to prepare the front to launch an offensive. Did you perform such a volume of work during the period, which we usually call the "preparatory period of the operation?"

One of the most important tasks of road service in the preparation of the Vistula-Oder operation was the construction of bridges over the Vistula. Belarusian operation completed our troops capture the bridgeheads on the left bank of the Vistula Magnushevsky and Pulavskogo. The first was the length along the front edge of 45 kilometers and a depth of 18 kilometers, the second - on the front edge of 30 kilometers and a depth of 10 kilometers. Concentration of troops on both bridgeheads was so great that it was necessary to have a large number of crossings to ensure[196] pass ponderous machinery, motor vehicles, and maneuver forces. Joint efforts of engineering and road and bridge parts of the front before the surgery was built 13 bridges over the Vistula, including a load of 60 tons - 6 bridges, a load of 30 tons - 5 bridges and a load of 16 tons - 2 bridge. The length of each bridge was on average 1000 meters long, not counting approaches. Some bridges and roads laid to them, were of great importance as a tool for efficient masking. Thus, in the report Chief of Logistics of the 8th Guards Army General PN Pahaznikova we read: "The army had three roads to the bridgehead, the two of them were forest immediately adjacent to the Vistula and disguise themselves well these roads, and the third way was open. Exit troops at the bridgehead, and supply of material resources was carried on the first two roads, and the reverse was empty on the third road, creating visibility pulling troops from the front to the rear. " Road troops served as civilians and going separate military commands, road builders had to put them in passing an empty transport. In just three months before the operation was moved to the front of our roads up to 2 million people. Roads were organized nutritious, filling, medical centers, create policies and educational showcase, urging all to work for the final victory over fascism. Along with the operation of the existing road network road our troops were prepared for the construction of additional bridges over the Vistula in Warsaw, Deblin, where still we have not had the bridgehead and the enemy took all the opposite shore. These objects in advance to bring up trusses, beams on the block, frame supports and other elements of bridge structures. Front commander, Marshal Zhukov took the time to personally visit the construction Vistula bridges. In addition to the Vistula, in the band coming offensive proceeded such big rivers as Bzura (with inflow RAW), Warta, Odra. The floodplains of these rivers are wide, sometimes as high as 5 - 6 miles. Vistula is a very complex water regime: spring water rise up to 5 - 6 meters, the river spreads to 6 kilometers. Sandy bottom of the Vistula, mobile, unfavorable for the construction of bridges. Autumn begins drifting ice in the area since the end of November and lasts until spring. [197]These conditions present challenges to maintain bridges in every season except summer. In parts of the front road there were 24 thousand people, 344 cars, 287 tractors, 6100 horses. 2930 vehicles, 36 diesel hammers, 15 log frames. Technological level of road was part of the time is relatively high, but it is not posted scope of the work, and only thanks to the high level of organization, hard work and courage of the personnel chiefs and great experience our glorious road builders with honor the tasks set command.

Even more difficult problems confronted by military railwaymen. If the builders of roads could as a temporary measure to build nizkovodnye collapsible bridges and ensure passage of troops and military equipment, keeping up with the pace of troops, were presented to the railway bridge at the time of the war, almost the same requirements as in peacetime. True, refurbished or newly built to bypass railway bridges commonly called temporary, but their "time" has been designed for 10 - 15 years. In other words, to pass on the 18 - 20 pairs of trains per day, needed reliable bridges. The degree of destruction of railway bridges usually was so great that in rare cases could even partially destroyed farms and use props, but more often just had to build them again, on the bypass, along the broken bridge. This speeds up the commissioning railway directions, but required additional effort from the builders of railway. As soon as we entered the territory of Poland, to the command of the front was a question: whether to alter the Polish railways in the Union, that is adopted in the Soviet Union gauge (1524 mm) or leave them on the Western track (1435 mm). Of course, it would be wrong to alter the roads of Poland to the Federal rut, because then we would eliminate the use of cars, platforms and tanks Western track and access our entire Soviet rolling stock at a time when the growing needs of the Soviet economy demanded of all rail effort.But the further withdrawal of the Soviet troops in the west, the longer becomes the serving of highways, [198] and if we were to alter their union track, it comes off like, on our national economic needs of not only the increasing number of cars and locomotives, but also railwaymen. At the same time, would be left without a job Polish railways. This conclusion came the command of the 1st Belorussian Front, after we calculated rolling left the enemy in the Right Bank Poland. 2966 there were only serviceable cars and the same faulty, 20 and 148 serviceable locomotives Western faulty gauge. This stock has been, if possible, be used for internal communications Right Bank of Poland. We even tried to double-track direction from Chelm to Deblin (about 180 kilometers) to operate one way to track the Union, the other - on the WestEuropean and at the site equipped with a transit point for acceptance of goods from one track to another. At the station, and smart enough to Helm organization fuel drain by gravity, using the difference in the level flyovers, and also poured fuel from six Soviet tanks in the same number of captured or Polish, but this operation is required at least 12 hours, and the front was to receive from the direction of Kovel - Hill - Deblin daily 20 - 25 of supply trains, or more than 1,000 cars. To tranship the cargo of such number of cars from one track to another, needed a completely different base, required a lot of lifting equipment and pumping facilities, which the front had. Experience in this area convinced us that the terminal station, which would provide the needs of the large front, is a task of national importance, and its solution to any one edge can not accomplish. Therefore, refuse to Pereshivko union at least one track, the most powerful railway lines was impossible. In the offensive zone the front, there were two main railway lines. The first (northern) - Brest, Warsaw and Poznan further, Frankfurt-on-Oder, the second (south) - Kovel, Lublin, Lodz Deblin continue, Kalish. Both directions of the Vistula were pereshito us on union track, and the wisdom of this was no doubt, but what about the rail, going west from the Vistula? For purely economic reasons, given the opportunity to capture a large number of captured vehicles, they should be left to the Western track. But in this case required the powerful storage terminal capable of[199] daily process to 2000 cars (1000 cars in each direction). This possibility, we, unfortunately, did not.

It is permissible to ask: was it possible to organize a time base with a transshipment capacity of 1000 cars per day in each direction? Yes, I can. But this must have thought at least half a year before, when our troops have not yet started their border. Then it would be good time to pull to the boundary (as the liberation of our territory) the necessary means of mechanization. This, of course, to build a storage terminal capacity usefully close to our border, but not from the Vistula river, the left bank of which was the enemy. I do not know, maybe an abstract question and now anyone interested, but at the time, at least I as head of logistics, it does not even arise.We presumed that provide combat activity of the front can double-track major highway Warsaw - Poznan - Frankfurt-on-Oder, if allied to alter track. Front Command did not feel able to put the success of the upcoming offensive in reliance on captured vehicles, which has not yet been captured, and the work of a storage terminal, which is not organized. Therefore Front Military Council, introduced the National Defence Commission of its proposal: the north (main) railway line to restore the union track, and the south - in Western Europe. Come to us at the time a day with various military equipment around 50 trains, of which expected to handle up to 15 gauge for Western Europe, and the rest to pass without delay union rut. An important theme in the rationale of the plan was the nature of the operation - its strategic value and high rates of occurrence. Rely on road transport in such a large volume of traffic, and even on the stretched lines of communication would be clearly unreasonable. However, the National Defence Commission decision of 7 October 1944 rejected the proposal and ordered us to prepare for the operation of the railways in the west of the Vistula Western tracks. Self-righteous, Front Military Council again raised the issue with the T-bills, ensuring that were allowed to alter the main line track on the union. Again, the answer came in the decision of 21 November 1944, commits to conduct restoration of railway [200] and the construction of bridges only Western European gauge. We had no choice but to take to the execution of center. It is interesting to note that such an important authority as central office of the Red Army military communications, fully shares the opinion of the Military Council of the 1st Belorussian Front. Here he writes about this General IV Kovalev: "In those years I was head VOSO MCC Transport Committee and a member of the State Committee of Defense. The transport committee was composed of the People's Commissar of Railways LM Kaganovich, secretary of the Central Committee and vice-chairman of the transport committee, AA Andreev, a member of the T-bills, Anastas Mikoyan, head of logistics of the Red Army General AV Hrulev. Chairman of this committee was Stalin. Transport committee was formed at the initiative of Stalin in order to coordinate all the transportation systems of the country and make proposals. State Defense Committee on the major transport problems. Altering the question of railways on a particular track in connection with the release of the Red Army to the Western frontier had for the time paramount. USSR People's Commissariat of the opinion that the extension of the west rail gauge Union will strengthen the

intensity of transport within the country, particularly in relation to unfolded to reconstruction of the economy. The maximum turnover of Soviet rolling stock was at that time the problem number one. In its own People's Commissariat was right. But this did not meet the needs of the front, in front of which was a difficult task for the final defeat of Nazi army. It was clear that without Altering least one lane in each direction of the front to ensure the union track extremely increased amount of operational and resupply at the final stage of the war was impossible, and I played for a Pereshivko. But in October - November 1944, it had no success. Only later, when the situation has escalated to the extreme, the fronts have been instructed to by union Altering track in the same direction. Unfortunately, the late decision had a lot of negative consequences " {8} . So, the front-line management of military reconstruction number 20, which was headed by the famous builder of the Hero of Socialist Labor, General Nikolai Borisov, [201] received from the Military Council of the Front task of comprehensive development of railway capacity, suitable to the Vistula from the East, and at the same time prepare for the restoration of railway bridges and paths of the Vistula and on the west by the width of the West European gauge. In front of the railway troops were then 26,255 soldiers, NCOs and officers, summarized in four teams. Led teams were such outstanding specialists and organizers, as Major-General of Technical Troops VP Tissone (1st Guards Brigade train), Major-General of Technical Troops TK Yatsyna (5th Red Banner Brigade train), General Major technical troops VI Slingshot (29th Railway Brigade), Col. DG Vasil'ev (third railway brigade). In addition, at the front were two mostopoezda ( 13 Commander train colonel IL Moskalev about excellence that we have say, and number 7 - the commander of the train engineer major Artemenko). At that time, and train troops and special units NKPS were technically well equipped and financially secure, they had a wealth of experience in new construction and restoration. Suffice it to say that it was these troops was restored in 1943 nizkovodny railway bridge across the Dnieper River in Kiev in record time - in just 8 days. Only from September to December 1944, they were restored in 2803 kilometers, 10,770 kilometers of lines, built 24 large and small bridges. But not only this, the then our railway troops. Great calamity for the front rail was the lack of fuel for steam locomotives. It had to prepare themselves. And rail and road troops in a short time have prepared for Kovel and Brest-Litovsk railways 542,000 cubic meters of wood. Wood heating - no coal, but we were glad it, though trains were moving, not standing still. In rebuilding the railways and bridges has had considerable help us Polish population. Some days to go to work more than 10 thousand Polish citizens with their instruments and draft power, following high level of organization and discipline. Front Military Council and head of logistics front to lend his full support military railwaymen, regardless sometimes with some formal limitations associated with their position, "seconded." They additionally allotted clothing, food, double [202] portion of vodka, vehicles, fuel, etc. In addition, to

help train troops have been allocated by the engineer troops of the front 3500, 2 tug boats, 40 floats carrying capacity of 10 - 15 tons each number of other devices. Front Military Council approved a recovery plan for the North West European gauge (major) trend Warsaw, Lovich, Kutno, Poznan, which is over 300 kilometers and south - Deblin, Radom, SkarzyskoKamenka Tomaszw, Lodz, Zduska Will, caliche, which is over 400 kilometers. Pace of recovery railways planned 10 kilometers a day, and with little damage - 25 kilometers per day. Then it was decided to build two storage terminal, one in Warsaw and the other in the Deblin with transshipment capacity of 400 - 500 cars per day each. Start of construction bases determines the moment of liberation from the enemy opposite bank of the Vistula. On the restoration of the main line was planned to allocate two-thirds of the forces and the southern direction - one-third. Until we liberate their territory, front-line railroads of the Governing Body through the Soviet military communications civil administration. In Poland administration of the railways from 12 October 1944 took in charge, Department of Transport and Communications of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, and railway maintenance was entrusted to the Polish railway workers. The rail network east of the Vistula was divided into sectors, and the last - the performance department. At the Department of Communications PCNL was authorized MCC Boso USSR People's Commissariat General Pavel Rumyantsev authorized MCC VOSO were each directorate. In the 50kilometer front line held and serviced train railways operational military regiments. Such a management system fully justified. On the front rail available at the time of column 322 locomotive. Locomotive drivers and train crews, who worked in the towers, driven by high patriotic duty, conducted a train just in front of the enemy, who was on the opposite bank of the Vistula. There were 72 cases shelling enemy trains passing in the section Deblin - Warsaw, with civilian and military railwaymen who accompanied the train, lost in killed 42 people and wounded 57 people. Damaged rails were 308, 268 spans of wire communication, 18 switches, two locomotives, 20 cars. [203] Despite the sacrifices brave railroad never threw their posts. They have learned to use in hazardous areas some stratagem: forward skipped without much respect for camouflage discipline separately reaching locomotives, and behind them came after the whole train in strict compliance with camouflage. In this case, however, the big risk are single engine, distracting the attention of the enemy, but it was a difficult and hit the target. As were increased rail and road communications, during August, September and October, and the rear part of the institution moved into the area between the Bug and the Vistula. All we have at the time on the 1st Belorussian Front, there were up to 490 rear units and institutions of the front of subordination, including parts of the protection and maintenance - 16 artillery institutions - 19, health - 226, veterinary - 22, quartermaster - 29 Services Fuel Supply - 12 military posts - 58, repair of armored vehicles - 17, military institutions and chemical supply - 6, motor units and establishments - 21, Road - 34, institutions of military engineering supplies - 5 connection - 2, Service POW - 10 points - about 20.Each army has been to hundreds of its parts and logistics facilities. And all in the 1 st Belorussian Front (no divisions) their values over 1500. Pulling left far behind the rear occurred before November 1944. Did not yet have a concrete plan coming offensive, there are some general outline, which no one but the very narrow range, not yet introduced. Planning of the Vistula-Oder operation (the name she received later) began in essence with November 1944, with a new front commander Marshal Zhukov.

Almost three years have commanded our front Rokossovsky. Changed the name of the front (Bryansk, Don, Central, Belorussian, 1st Byelorussian), but the management, key personnel of the front and even some of the army remained the same. Chief of Staff of the front was Mikhail Malinin, artillery commander - Vladimir Kazakov, commander of the armored troops - GN Eagle, Commander of the Air Force - Rudenko, chief engineer troops - AI Proshlyakov, [ 204], head of logistics - NA Antipenko, Chief Political Administration - SF Galadzhev. The whole team was led by the same composition of the Military Council of the Front - Rokossovsky and KF Telegin. People worked together, learned to understand each other perfectly. Rokossovsky loved and his direct reports, and the soldiers and officers of the parts. Have often heard the question: what was the reason for the general good attitude to Rokossovsky? I do not pretend to be an impartial biographer and openly admitted that he is tied to this person, with whom I was almost three years working together at the front and that his personal charm, always smooth and courteous treatment, always ready to help in difficult times was able cause each slave desire to better obey his orders, and in no way bring their commander. Rokossovsky, like most of the major military leaders, their work is based on the principle of trust to his aides. The trust that was not blind: it becomes complete only when Konstantin personally and not just convinced that he's told the truth, that everything has been done to solve the problem, making sure that he saw in you a good comrade, his friend. That's why the leadership of the front was so united and soldered together, each of us truly valued authority of their commander. Rokossovsky at the front were not afraid, he was loved. And that's why it was taken as an indication the order, which can not fulfill. Organizing the execution of orders Rokossovskogo I least recourse in dealing with subordinates to the formula "the commander ordered."There was no need. It was enough to say that the team hopes the initiative and high level of organization tylovikov. This was the style of the work and the commander, and his closest aides. Seeing Rokossovsky the 2nd Byelorussian Front, whose team was appointed to coincide with the Day of artillery - November 19, 1944, we celebrated the first day. The city was going to sluggish Podlaska entire management team of staff and offices of the 1st Belorussian Front. The same day, a rumor that with Rokossovsky translation to the front and all his deputies. But to come to us at the front Zhukov announced that Stalin banned what else transfers and all should remain in place. [205] Frankly, many of us were sad. I was worried about whether the new commander also attentive to the work of the rear? Will it address the special difficulties for the rear? After the rear - it is field in which you can always "burn" if you do not have the support from the team. On Zhukov besides, spoken of as a man with a severe and sharp temper ... Well preserved in the memory of a farewell dialogue between the two marshals, to climb the soapbox Day artillery. They remembered his early years, when both fought in the Civil War, his meetings in exercises, competitions (because they both - dashing cavalry!) After the civil war, etc. All present officers and generals watched with admiration his outstanding marshals. "Birthdays", ie, our brave artillery, which was in honor of a celebration, went to their armies and corps in a good mood and thanked the organizers of the holiday. The next day I first reported the new commander of the status of the home front. I must say that I have experienced quite a relief when I saw how deeply and thoroughly interested in Marshal Zhukov questions behind. In the first place, he asked powered soldiers on the front line and then

recommend carefully to find out all of the claims relating to the supply of food and clothing. Particular attention was also given to them communications front, because, as he said, "we have a lot of rapid movement." The objectives of the test and the mass survey of hospitals had to go in and find out well-being and morale of the wounded soldiers. In conclusion, the conversation I was asked to prepare for a trip to Moscow, where the marshal went to the report Chief. November 27, 1944 a special train, we arrived in Moscow. On the way, the commander conversed with his party on all sorts of topics. Time and again raised issues of logistics, and I was pleased to hear how strongly Zhukov emphasized the importance of logistics in the operation. In Moscow, daily, or even twice a day, Marshall introduced me to new details of the plan, set goals and listen to my reports. In particular, he informed me of the impending arrival of the 1st Belorussian Front four field armies, the expected group of our troops and that the preparations for the attack should be completed no later than 10 January 1945. [206] It is easy to understand how important it was to the head of logistics for the 45 days prior to the visualize the main features of the upcoming surgery! But he could not because of this commander with greater confidence and advance to set specific objectives rear. In the days spent in Moscow, I had to report twice the rear of the Red Army chief Gen. AV Khruleva front of the needs for the proposed operation in detail to find out the chief marshal of artillery GAU ND Yakovlev plan and schedule for filing the front ammunition with MCC chief VOSO Red Army Gen. IV Kovalev we refined the Schedule of the front operational and supply trains. By the way, the schedule was very tight: in fact for some 30 - 40 days were to come to the front four field armies more than 500 trains, 100 trains with new military equipment procurement and 800 trains. In addition, vnutrifrontovye rail is at least 15 - 20 trains a day. All these talks, I reported to Marshal Zhukov before leaving Moscow. Faced a huge organizational work, to "digest" a lot of trains. At first glance it may seem that this is purely a railway problem. But this is not the case. We return once more to the experience of the Byelorussian operation. Operational trains arrive then at the border of the front 50 - 60 per day. To receive them, quickly unloaded and immediately return empty, it was necessary to provide a broad front landing - at least 15 - 20 railway stations. For the theater of it was easy, but we could not unload the army, where we want, it was necessary to fulfill the requirement of Staff of the Front: unload the army away from the area where they will be used in reality, that is, to observe the basic requirements of operational camouflage.For this road our troops were to provide access to the station and access to unload the main highway, and this maneuver increased fuel consumption, therefore, the service supply of fuel was put forward their stores (branches) to areas of discharge. Medical and food services also had to push their points per station unloading. In short, the adoption of such a powerful stream of trains is in the Belorussian operation for the rear of the front as a whole complex task, which was to do now in an even larger scale. [208] As the head of the rear of the front had advance knowledge of what and where to file, the task was doable. I repeat, head of logistics was oriented Front Commander in full all of the tasks of the forthcoming offensive. Do encounter a certain contradiction between the required compliance and operational camouflage capabilities rear. It was not difficult to unload an army of 100 - 150 km from the assembly area, bearing in mind the people and mobile machinery, at the right time, these people and technology in the short term will be advanced to the desired area. But what about the tens of thousands of tons of ammunition, food, fodder, fuel, going to the same army? Surely this property for concealment must

first upload in one area, and then after 10 - 15 days to ship back into the cars and serve closer to the front? There was a question about the two base areas each newly arriving Army: one time (10 - 20 days), the other, as it were permanent. In this regard, the front command Dec. 5, 1944, that is 45 - 50 days before the offensive, was reported by the "Plan-based armies of the 1st Belorussian Front." Of course, it was arhisekretnoe event because, knowing the plan-based armies, the enemy could unravel scheduled for an offensive grouping. After approval of the plan of logistic front had firmly break his head over so that all heavy cargo coming from the center, with no congestion in the areas were constant deployment of armies and troops unloaded themselves in areas of temporary bases. This eliminates unnecessary transshipment operations. To ensure the rapid movement, it was decided to build a railway bypass around Prague (right-bank part of Warsaw), Lublin, and Malkin Deblin Grna. Workarounds - this is a great thing! Prague hosts Deblin been under continuous artillery fire, and we had to provide trains pass by them - in fact it was a maneuver from one flank to the other. For the same purpose troops of the front was built a new railway connecting thread between the stations of Minsk Mazowiecki and Pilyava length of 35 kilometers, through which transfer trains from Warsaw to Lublin area and back was easier. I remember the joy with which Marshal Zhukov took the news, he immediately gave a number of instructions on the front of the chief of staff for additional activities on operational camouflage and maneuver. [209] Importance to the rear of the front in the Vistula-Oder operation operative game was conducted by a team a month before the attack. It was a game of cards, it was attended by all commanders, commanders of the army artillery, chief of the troops of the front. Also participated and head of logistics front. As it later became clear that is playing essentially the true version of the forthcoming operation. While the rear of the front had already had more or less completed the organization in relation to the operational plan, the game has made it possible to find out the weaknesses of this organization and then make the necessary changes. This fact is more proof that Marshal Zhukov attached great importance to advance and possibly a full head of logistics orientation, not only in the mind of the operation, but in particular its planning. How was organized in front of the rear of the Vistula-Oder operation? What principles were laid in the foundation of his organization? We did not think it possible to adhere to a template. We had to start from the concrete of the situation. However, it was necessary to detail the experience of all previous operations, and especially the summer offensive of 1944. A distinctive feature of the plan the operation was a significant depth of it. And for multiple occurrences of the front commander, and the nature of operations carried out on the game card has been known that the offensive output provides troops west of Poznan, ie, to a depth of 350 kilometers. This is not the 150 kilometers, as in Bobruisk operation! Clearly loomed perspective (on reaching this milestone) continue non-stop promotion of our troops on the Oder, that is, to a total depth of 600 kilometers. Air offensive planned an average of 20 kilometers a day (actually it was 32 kilometers). Takes into account the overall favorable operational-strategic situation, by which the enemy could not conduct major offensive operations.Such a serious water barrier as the Vistula, which took place along the front, excluded the possibility of any significant and unexpected attacks by the enemy to thwart the impending attack. Take into account the absolute superiority of our forces over the

enemy and our complete air supremacy, powerful groups of our troops on the right and left flanks of the front providing security. Everywhere reigned deep confidence in [210]the operation being prepared - the confidence emanating from the accounts of all these factors and of the indomitable desire to speed up the whole staff of the victorious end of the war. Experience in the operation to defeat fascist forces in Belarus showed that, if the rear of the home position for the attack is not in a compressed spring, closer to the troops, the logistical and medical support in the rapidly developing offensive becomes very difficult, and in all the work of the rear soon arise moments of crisis. Conversely, a strong approximation of vital elements of logistics to the troops at the time of their transition to the offensive guarantee uptime even in the rear stretched and unreduced communications. With these lessons and the nature of existing operational-strategic situation, and we had proposed to the Military Council of the Front "Plan of the organization of logistics and material support of the offensive," provides: 1. Resolute approach of all the most important institutions of logistics and inventory to the troops. More than 70 percent of them were located in the area of 10 to 60 kilometers from the front line. Closest approach was scheduled for frontline hospital databases: near Garwolin - to 35,000 beds in Pulawy to 20,000 beds (two points in 15 - 30 kilometers from the front line), as well as front-line fuel depots - one in Rembertuv, the other - in a place to put (both in the 10 - 15 kilometers from the front line). 2. Almost complete exemption from military rears its functions in the initial position and take over these functions frontline managers. Army thanks to the rear to move without pause after the advancing troops, providing them with the first stages of the operation. Even divisional medical battalion of some divisions were folded and joined the work only by the end of the first day of the battle. 3. Bringing in the front border of the material means of what is required on the entire operation. Count on the number of missing supply of ammunition, fuel from the center in the rapid onset of a mistake. By the beginning of the offensive front had ammunition to four sets of combat - about 160,000 tons of all kinds of fuel - about 60,000 tons of food for 30 - 50 days, or 200 tons. Such maintenance is good for the time, but the motor and diesel fuel [211] is still not enough, as the depth of the operation was even more than expected, to the same forces had to make an unexpected big realignment in the north.

4. Restoring both directions on the Western European railway track and the simultaneous construction of terminal stations in Warsaw and Deblin. The reinstatement of the railway bridge in Warsaw called for up to 18 days and Deblin - for 20 days. 5. Conversion of all roads to the start of the offensive on the front-line service road parts. The army of the same road is released to follow the advancing units. In addition to the above, the plan contained a detailed development of various activities (dislocation parts logistics, how to move them during the offensive, the organization of reception of prisoners of war, the protection and defense of the home front). Front Military Council approved a plan called, but the administrative order was signed by the commander of much later and under special circumstances (which will be discussed below). We can not say about the difficulties of organization of the military on the home front and Magnushevsky Pulavskom bridgeheads. With their small size on the ground, with 23 divisions and 5,348 artillery pieces, the second - 16 divisions and 3324 barrel (in both cases without anti-aircraft guns and mortars Guards). The breakthrough sectors maximum density reached 282 artillery barrel per kilometer front. 8th Guards Army had offensive zone about 7 kilometers wide, which at a depth of 5 kilometers was located 75 - 80 artillery regiments, that is, the square kilometer are 2.5 - 3 artillery regiments. It would seem that there is no room for ammunition, fuel, kitchens, health centers: circling bridgeheads everywhere I saw endless rows disguised techniques and a dense network of trenches with manpower. And yet there was a place for the rear. Divisional and regimental logistics units (units) were located at a distance of 3 - 6 kilometers from the front line. Ammunition posted in the artillery positions were covered in pits and diked, medical facilities located in the stone buildings and reverse slopes of the heights. Even the rear part of the army institutions found a place on the west bank of the Vistula River near the crossing. [212] High camouflage discipline, established the headquarters of the front for all troops to fully respect and rear parts, and institutions. Of course, no storage space was not there. All stored outdoors in piles, in bags, in containers, mainly in ground cavities and trenches, possibly disguised top. Here and there could keep stocks in closed rooms, but this was the exception. Only a very small portion of the material contained in the vehicles. Even the regiment in the defense held their reserves in the ground (in the crevices, ravines and so on). Now have other means of combat and transport capacity increased immeasurably. But then what? Let us imagine for a moment that we have loaded on trucks in January 1945, the minimum of material and equipment that is supposed to contain in each army before the offensive. To such an army, as, say, the 8th Guards, this would sink at least 4 tons, and for what it would take (in the twoton basis) 2000 transport vehicles, and they were all in the Army 323, that is 700 tons and the rest of the property would inevitably spread to the ground {9} .

From this point of view have to pay some attention to the published magazine 3 "October" of 1964 memoir Marshal Chuikov, where in the bad light of the work presented rear edge, and along with the decision of the Military Council of the Front, approving plan for the organization of logistics in the Vistula-Oder operation. Error, according to Chuikov, consisted in the fact that much of the military supplies stored in the ground, and he is considered unacceptable. Given the above, we refuse to understand Chuikov, when he writes that the plans of the front, "the army, receiving ammunition, fuel and food for the entire operation, would be forced to keep them on the ground, in the open, not in transport" (p. 132).Yes, indeed, much of the inventory is kept on the ground, in the open (in ditches, ravines, diked land, well-camouflaged), as it happens in war. The reader is more or less knows war, approval Chuikov only cause confusion: how could such a seasoned warrior write these lines? On January 1, 1945 in army warehouses 8th Guards Army Numbers: ammunition - 0.5 to 1 unit of fire [203] (or 2,000 tons) of fuel - 1.6 - 1.7 refueling (or 900 tonnes), food and feed - for 12 - 15 days (or 4,000 tons) {10} . A whole army in army warehouses to store more than 7,000 tonnes of essential material resources, and it has never been recognized excessive. Conversely, all the army sought to raise their reserves before the onset. The Army had its road transport is not to keep it loaded ammunition and other things, and not as much she had had to simultaneously lift all loads; your transport she needed to serve in the attack from its warehouses in military materiel in accordance with the actual need of troops. And when the army did not have enough funds in the case turned on the front transport. This is an open order. Chuikov says further that the plan for the organization of logistics in the Vistula-Oder operation, which was adopted by the Military Council of the front, already his, Chuikov's point of view was unacceptable. As you know, the plan is part of the whole plan of operation and therefore a document secrecy, he was brought before the armies only in respect of the tasks assigned to this army. Therefore Chuikov on their official position could not have known the organization of logistics front. To be fair, I note that Chuikov as commander in 1944 - 1945's well known the rear of his army, and it does him credit. I can not forget this fact. Shortly before the start of the offensive, doing the job of the front commander, I arrived at Magnushevsky springboard to Chuikov, after inspecting the rear of the 8th Guards Army, accompanied by generals AY Barabanov, GT Donets and NK Zhizhina.Assessing the state of the rear of his army, Chuikov said that he does not have any claims to the rear of the front. And after 20 years, suddenly everything has changed ... Not understand the desire Chuikov hindsight to question the dedication, hard, I would say, heroic work of many thousands of soldiers, officers and generals of the rear of the front, that his efforts ensured the victorious advance of the Vistula River to the west. It is not clear, and his desire to sneer at the term "compressed spring". Front Command, as already mentioned, was of the view that the closer to the beginning of the offensive, [214] the more determined it is necessary to strive for the maximum concentration in the immediate vicinity of the army vehicles, inventory, medical, repair organs, restorative materials. "Compressed spring" - this is a figure of speech for a specific principle of concentration, followed by rapid deployment - the principle, which is one of the foundations of the theory of operational art. Only because of this construction in the rear starting position, we were able to put forward following the rapidly advancing troops branch warehouses with ammunition and fuel, a group of hospitals, rehabilitation facilities. "Spring" continuously decompresses towards outgoing troops.

Any talk of an overload or underload army rear while it was not conducted: close to army warehouses stood front, from the material means are often fed directly to the division, passing army link. This is also one of the strengths of the organization on a "compressed spring". Why railway line Warsaw - Poznan was mostly recognized as Deblin - Lodz - a minor? This, according to Chuikov error lies Front Command. But the error was not here. Warsaw railway line - double track, and Demblinskoe - single track. The capacity of their incomparable. The main thing is that the northern, ie Warsaw, direction - the shortest between the Vistula and the Oder, coming to Warsaw and then to Frankfurt an der Oder. It coincides with the axis of advance of the main forces of the front. Match that was not directly from the Vistula, where the offensive began, but after kakih-nibud 80 - 100 miles in front of the Vistula all forces advancing from Magnushevsky springboard, "saddled" is a double-track line. It seems clear that this was the main railway line and, therefore, for its restoration were left two-thirds of the forces that were at our disposal. As for the road south, Demblinskogo direction, then here were thrown quite sufficient for its recovery capabilities, and there was no need to increase it, even if we had to this reserve. That is why we have used the southern direction so effectively that it was restored very quickly - even faster than might have been hoped. The choice of the railway lines to restore was always the prerogative of the Military Council of the Front. [215] Of course, the chief of the rear of the front with the chief and the head VOSO railway troops advance themselves thoroughly studied road network throughout the depth of the forthcoming operation, not just consulted with the Chief of Staff of the Front and only then reported to the Military Council is sufficient to develop and validate recovery plan with the appropriate balance of power. This was the case, and in the planning of the Vistula-Oder operation. Chuikov questioned Demblinskogo and construction of the railway bridge. In his view, the restoration of the bridge should start immediately after taking our troops Deblin, ie in July - August 1944, and that it began to recover only after January 15, 1945, is an indicator of someone's "military illiteracy" . Leave aside the debate about literacy. We recall only that the railroad bridge in question, passed not through Deblin, and the Vistula River near Deblin and the opposite side of the bridge was in the hands of the enemy until 15 January 1945. Neither of which recovery was not out of the question. All this is so strange that may seem like an afterthought Chuikov wants to question the competence and command of the front and give the impression that the success of the Vistula-Oder, and then the Berlin operation would be unlikely, if not visionary commander of the 8th Guards Army . Of course, highly regarded in their field workers are not free from errors. Could be mistaken for something and the commander of the 1st Byelorussian Front. However, the "method of criticism" used Chuikov, does not reveal the actual error, and imposes imaginary. We return to the other issues of the Vistula-Oder operation. After the survey was conducted massive living conditions of soldiers, Front Military Council decided to hold a conference of representatives obschefrontovuyu mouth front end. The survey involved more than 100 validation committees surveyed 9,800 men. The reason for holding this event will, in particular, the fact that because of the lack of meat Front Military Council temporarily introduced in place of two vegetarian one day a week to allow for the issuance of additional solder these days 100 grams of bread, potatoes, 200 grams, 100 grams of cereals, sugar 10 grams, 20 grams of fat. [216] Although the calorie ration was

maintained at 3800 - 3900 calories (at a rate of 3547), but could be a problem - the monotony of food or poor quality food preparation. Naturally, the best thing to listen to themselves fighters. A general report on the results of a survey made by the quartermaster Front, NK Zhizhin. He spoke quite critically on the detected deficiencies. Chaired the conference of the Military Council of General K. Telegin called all openly talk about the needs of the soldiers. Speaking at least 20 elders mouth, and some members of the service of food and clothing supplies. Overall, the picture revealed quite gratifying. I remember an episode in this conference. He played top sergeant Karpenko. He is 10 minutes with great enthusiasm praising life at the forefront: the soldiers washed regularly every 10 days with bed linen, hot food take two or even three times a day, all is well with tobacco, letters and newspapers received regularly; tray PX often appears on the front line, and so we are finished, the foreman went to his place. General Telegin stopped him and asked, "What do they say about men extension vegetarian day?" Sergeant, recollecting himself, he returned to the podium and began to apologize, it did not say "most important": - The fighters are very loved vegetarian second day, - he said, - and, as one, say that if that day is issued and a good piece of meat, the better and want nothing ... Can you imagine the laughter, laugh uncontrollably when 500 people? During November and December 1944 to the front received about 8000 wagons of ammunition, of which about 3500 has been posted to firing positions on the bridgeheads. During the same time the fuel tank wagons received 6000 (10-ton basis). That's a lot, but gasoline still was not enough. However, the front could not take more, and if he was allowed out of the center - not enough tanks. Maximum front could take over their warehouses about 40 thousand tons (not including tank cars). The need for fuel is calculated, based on the presence at the front of about 2500 existing aircraft, tanks and four thousand [217] self-propelled guns, 70,000 vehicles and three thousand tractors ... As before, observe the strictest regime of economy in the expenditure of fuel to as much as possible to save it to the beginning of the offensive. Of the total amount of fuel in existence in the army was about 50 percent, in army warehouses - 16 and the front-line stores - 34 percent (from the last of more than half was for aviation). Taking into account the bad experience of the Belarusian transport aircraft operations, this time we have concentrated near the airfield and poured fuel 4200 iron barrels and airborne fuel tanks in case of transfer to the air. Food and feed front consumed about 5,000 tons daily, including breads - 1150 tonnes of cereals 220 tons of meat - 220 tons, fat - 62 tonnes of sugar - 44 tons of vegetables and potatoes - about 1,500 tons of grain and hay - about 1,600 tons. As mentioned, the front had a difficult time with the meat, therefore, was temporarily put vegetarian second day. In terms of livestock vegetarian one day let's save a thousand head of cattle, and for the two months were saved in this way almost 8 thousand. The medical service is also, of course, preparing for the attack. Of the 123 thousand hospital beds, available at the front and in the armies was zyanyato wounded and sick, only 38 thousand. All the others were as close to the troops, and the non-deployed medical facilities, ready to follow the troops, it was left to the 44 000 beds.

Accordingly, the choices of possible health loss medical service of the front and the army paid close attention to blood banking and blood fluids. Experience has shown that approximately 15 percent of all patients in need of blood transfusions. The average dose per transfusion - 330 cubic centimeters. Additionally the same wounded had to pour 500 cubic centimeters of blood fluids, as well as a single dose (10 cubic centimeters) antishock fluid. Based on these rules, the first days of the offensive battles we had to spend about 2,500 gallons of blood, and more than 6000 liters of blood fluids. To obtain the necessary amount of blood at the front and in the armies were deployed and set up blood bank blood transfusion. On January 8, 1945, we were registered 26,000 donors, [218] including more than 9000 health professionals, 7600, other military personnel, about 9,000 civilians. Day by day the number of harvested blood at the front increased and has been brought up to 130,000 doses. I note the widespread desire of the Polish population to give his blood to Soviet soldiers. That did not happen during the Nazi occupation - then the Poles brought under escort to the blood bank. Was harvested as tetanus toxoid - 35,000 doses. Since the operation was carried out in the winter time, the medical service took care of the quilt, sleeping bags and other warm things for the wounded. At all levels of medical staff conducted more training work, studied 8,277 nurses and stretcherbearer. Based on lessons learned, medical support Byelorussian operation during August November 1944 was published 82 research papers. Before the operation was conducted obschefrontovaya and army surgeons conference, which was attended by over a thousand doctors. Among the many issues raised at those conferences, issues, considerable attention was paid to the treatment of walking wounded who were not evacuated beyond the front and quickly returned to duty. A large contribution to this cause has made Professor VV Gorinevskaya, which initiated in all fronts were created hospitals walking wounded (GLR). Statistics show that more than half of the wounded - it's walking wounded, return them to the system in a short time was dependent on the general statement of medical business in the GLR. There were cases when the man with the oversight of doctors with minor injuries become unusable due to a system of contractions, ie, immobility or limitation of movement of the limbs. This issue was addressed in the published book under LA Kunicheva "Exercise therapy for mild gunshot injury" under the editorship of Professor Igor Zhorov with a foreword by Chief Glavmedupra E. Smirnov. At the front of the conference has been carefully analyzed the causes contractures. It was later published a brochure, "The mechanism of trauma and the prevention of contractures in the front area." Military surgeons very approvingly spoke of antishock fluid made prescription Surgeon our front Major General V. Popov. This fluid, in particular, was very useful in the fight against traumatic shock. Sanitary-epidemiological status of the 1st Belorussian Front on the eve of the Vistula-Oder operation was completely successful. [219]Special attention was given to troops deployed in the bridgeheads: there is often replaced by underwear, outerwear dizenfitsirovalas been strengthened control over the regular delivery of hot trenches food and tea. Front had relatively powerful tools for medical evacuation - 449 sanitation vehicles, 963 sanitation vehicles, 15 railway sanitary letuchek, 20 military hospital trains, 52 ambulances. In the 8th Guards and 69th Armies were also one company of sled dogs (400 dogs in the company), (4 - 5 pairs of dogs pulling a cart with two wounded soldiers). In the general medical service under Gen. AY Barabanov was well prepared for the coming offensive.

Successfully conducted and veterinary software led by the Chief Veterinary General NM Speyer. Horse composition (it still had 145,000 head) was in a good body. By this time it became clear that we can even pass in the national economy of the USSR in 1200 the tribal heads and improved breeds of horses, sires and brood composition. Antiaircraft cover objects in the rear is at a high level. Cover means were 540 medium-caliber antiaircraft guns, 811 small caliber guns, 895 anti-aircraft guns, 209 anti-aircraft searchlights. In addition, the rear covered 326 aircraft fighter aircraft. During the period of intense operational traffic of railroads Front fighters circled continuously from dawn to dark. Although it is very difficult, but some trains with fuel accompanied by fighters until their arrival at the place. Incidentally, I note that due to the good air cover and skillful maneuvering our vosovtsev tankers trains 1st Belorussian Front had lost by enemy aircraft during transport over the last two years of the war, only one half of the railway tank of fuel. Safety and Defense Logistics attached great importance, as the political situation in the rear of our front-line creates a rather complicated. Reactionary nationalist elements in Poland, fueled by immigrants from London, tried to sharpen the relationship between the Red Army and the Polish population. Since this could not be ignored. We should have the ability to detect and anticipate in our rear stray enemy groups, remnants of the defeated army, able to attack people and stores. [220] To reflect the possible sabotage in all rear parts to create permanent duty unit. Order of the Chief of Logistics of the front in all more or less large settlements appointed military commandant. Personal responsibility has been established in rural and township chiefs for keeping order, certain military commanders. Despite these measures, the enemy was possible to disrupt the work and sometimes cause us damage in people and technology. The depth of the rear area of the front in the home position reached more than 500 kilometers from the front edge. Of communication devices to control all of our complex logistical management was enough. So as not to attract the attention of enemy intelligence, the front commander forbade the generals often appear on bridgeheads. However, in about 10 - 12 days before the onset of instruction followed executives personally check the rear of the armies and connections were on the bridgeheads. Together with the chief of logistics of the 33rd Army Guard Col. A. Pletnev and Chief of Logistics of the 69th Army, Colonel P. Likhachev we visited the location and condition of the institutions at the rear Pulavskom bridgehead. This bridgehead was so insignificant that it rears were jammed to capacity. On Magnushevsky bridgehead together with the heads of the rear of the 5th Shock Army General NV Serdenko and 8th Guards Army, General PN Pahaznikovym I inspected the rear of the army. As a result of the inspection met the Army Commander of the 8th Guards Army, General Chuikov (this is mentioned) and Army Commander of the 5th Shock Army, General NE Berzarina. He and other expressed complete [221]satisfaction with their institutions and rear stocks {11} . On Magnushevsky bridgehead important task has been entrusted to the 6th Artillery Corps breakthrough RGC (Reserve Command). Chief of Logistics of the corps Guard Lieutenant VA Gurko informed me about the many outstanding issues. Housing was a major artillery units, equipped with the latest technology and first-rate. One such housing provides breakthrough two field armies - the 5th Shock and 8th Guards. He had to help a lot, and it was hard to deny something, listening to a convincing report seasoned warrior Gurko. We detailed the issues of the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps,

with the head of the corps rear Colonel KP Bugrov and Chief of Logistics of the 4th Artillery breakthrough Guard Colonel AK Tulchinsky. Marshal Zhukov was the last time before the onset of listened to my report on the security forces and said only: - So, starting tomorrow. I thought, "Tomorrow at dawn battle begins. Will throw the enemy 53,000 tons of ammunition that we worked so hard to have delivered to staging areas ... So will the head of logistics front can not be there at this hour where success is decided in advance and the fate of the entire offensive? " [222] Requested Zhukov allow me to attend his observation post on the day of the breakout. He replied: "I am commander of the front and rear of you, and each of us has to be in place at this critical moment." I said nothing, and thought to myself that my desire not wrong: it is inexcusable to me not to see the whole panorama of the breakthrough, which, if I may say so, is the result of long work well and the rear. Instructed his adjutant Major MG Sviridov get in touch with his friends - adjutant marshal and see exactly hour out to the observation to settle down after. The fact that the NP was at the river, in the 5 th Shock Army on Magnushevsky bridgehead 500 meters from the enemy. To get there, you had to drive through a complex maze of military orders, and without an experienced guide, very knowledgeable about the road and the password to get there it was impossible. Promptly at 2:00 am in the thick darkness we Sviridov aide and chauffeur drove up in Grun "willis" to the house of the commander, where his car was standing, and the officer's car conductor. Riding in the dark on an unfamiliar road with headlights extinguished, keeping up with the instruction, it was difficult. Driving across the bridge over the Vistula, we have seen continuous breaks flak that prevented enemy aircraft to fly with impunity. It seemed like we were on the road forever. However, it took only an hour and a half, and we arrived. I went to the shelter of the army commander Gen. NE Berzarina; dugout front commander was nearby, at 100 - 150 meters. By observation tower were lines of communication from both dugouts. Sitting in the dugout Berzarina general, I was able to follow the process of command and control in these most tense moments before the attack. Berzarin enjoyed great connections, he could speak to all corps commanders together or each separately. Several times he looked at his watch, and compares it with the clock of the front commander. Corps commanders, in turn, compared their clocks with the clock commander. Finally, Nicholas Erastovich last spoke to the corps commander and invited me to the tower. Promptly at 8:00 am January 14, 1945 was opened heavy fire of artillery. Long-range guns fired over the heads of his troops, and the flash of their shots did not cover our tower. But when they opened fire "Katyusha", who stood next to us, it was as bright as day. Commander, he saw me, he asked, [223] - What do you get here? I replied: - Brought to sign a plan of material security, the offensive - the same operation, which have already begun. However, according to the plan, the rear of the long running, and it has already been approved by you, but still need your signature, at least for stories. The commander smiled silently. I stayed on the tower. According to the plan of artillery preparation we had to conduct intensive fire for at least an hour. But it took no more than 25 minutes, the front commander ordered that artillery fire and dispatching troops to the attack. It was later revealed that this was a reasonable order, for further

shooting came to an empty space: Hitler's forces did not survive the fire and began to retreat everywhere. Thus, out of the planned 53 thousand tons of ammunition were shot no more than half. Formed a savings of about 30 000 tons of ammunition, and it was of paramount importance for the struggle against the enemy in the final stage of the operation. Returning to the dugout, Marshal Zhukov signed the papers, in particular, two statements: the service of fuel and food. Home Front Command preparing for offensive operations in strict accordance to the plan, expressed mainly graphically, and not in the form of a large compendium. For military security be strictly prohibited compilations, in any way reveal the concept of operations. Before each service were specific targets and time frames for implementation. The rear of the front organization was displayed graphically on a map of scale 1: 200 000 and 1 500 000. Only five days before the attack, that is, January 9, 1945, an order was issued by the Commander of the rear of the front, where they are the most important organizational measures (basing, boundary lines, roads, etc.), and a special task to basic services; it was like a compressed work plan logistics for the preparatory phase and in the next few days of the offensive. Two days before the start of his staff developed a separate plan for the rear moving rear units and agencies during the operation. After the war, in the walls of the military academy I had often heard the opinion of commanders who have not participated in the war, which, as is not found in the archives of the "Plan the organization of logistics and material support of the Vistula-Oder operation", [224] it means that the rear was working without a plan. This opinion can be attributed only due to ignorance of the conditions in which the war was fought. In peace time, producing a uniform methodology, we attach too much importance to all kinds of documentation on games and exercises - and it is quite right: life would amend certain particular, and the foundations of education should contribute to a certain way of thinking ... The fighting troops of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder operation consisted essentially of three steps: first phase (from 14 to 17 January 1945) - Breakthrough Vistula defensive line and defeat the German Warsaw-Radom group; the second phase (from January 18 to January 24, 1945) - a breakthrough development and access to the Poznanski defensive line; third phase (from January 25 to February 3, 1945) - Breakthrough German border fortified areas and access to the Oder. Plan of operation provided for movement of troops in the first eight days to a depth of 120 - 150 kilometers at an average daily rate of 15 - 16 kilometers. But already in the first four days of field armies had advanced 100 kilometers, that is, the average daily rate of advance was 25 kilometers. Over the next seven days, troops moved forward another 230 kilometers, the average rate has already reached 33 miles. In other words, on the sixth day the army reached the line, the achievement of which was planned only for twelfth day operations. During the operation, the pace of the two times higher than previously planned. Panzer Army some days moved to 70 - 80 km. Pursuit of the enemy was conducted columns. That was not a retreat, and escape the Nazis. In order not to break away from the enemy, our troops to make maximum use of all kinds of trophy transport: cars, motorcycles, bicycles, carts, etc. Almost all the infantry moved on pursuing some form of transport.

All of it was excellent! High rates of occurrence primarily kept thousands of lives of our soldiers. Triumph at the expense of the small blood - this is the first commandment for the warlords. Our military commanders met her. In addition, high rates of occurrence are usually given a huge saving of material resources, and it is easy to prove the arithmetic, if you calculate the price that we got out every mile conquered territory. Hastily retreating enemy does not have time to destroy roads, bridges and other important objects, [225] and it makes it easier to recover - do not remove it, of course, only makes it easier, because almost all the bridges of strategic importance, and the enemy had time to break in this battle. Finally, the high rate of occurrence give a lot of trophies, even partially given in disrepair. What could be wrong with high rates? On this I will answer with a singular point of view, "tylovika": rear becomes harder to provide far detached troops. Fuel consumption increases immeasurably, and it can only be cast by road, as the first, and often considerable time railways inactive. And where to get as much liquid items? And besides, the road ... After all, winter, ice, blizzard! We will see how important was the fact that our front saved about 30,000 tons of ammunition on Vistula bridgeheads. Let us assume for a moment that all the ammunition would be executed as envisaged plan artillery preparation. The task of the rear would have remained only then remove from the initial position of spent cartridges. Do not argue, the task is important, but directly related to the success of the offensive at the moment it would not have. Now it was on managing savings ammunition left on the bridgeheads. Of course, it was not that collect hundreds of piles of shells scattered on the Belarusian forests, sand and swamps. But the bridgeheads soil was sandy, too, was the complete lack of roads.Collect and take a lot of ammo - is not easy. But it's good that they are saved, it is good that they are in stock, and we will demand less of our country. Ultimately, high rates of advance for operational rear create a positive work environment, rather than the slow rate, while demand in the climactic moments of exceptional intensity. Looking at the map of Poland and East Germany, you would think that offensive from the Vistula to the Oder not encounter any serious difficulties in terms of movement parts: a network of roads here are pretty thick, most of which is paved. Indeed, in the offensive were two cross-frontal military roads, in addition, each army had one, at least two army military roads (AWAD). As you know, the winter in these parts is soft and looks more like a Russian autumn. But in January 1945, a violent storm, [226] often replaced drizzling rain. Bare ice covered the roads, road transport and travel became extremely difficult. There were times when all stood still on the road ... But those were just moments. General Donets and road builders did not panic. They prepared for the vagaries of the local winter are procured large quantities of sand and scattered it on the road. Polish population at the call of the Soviet command voluntarily sent the thousands of carts on the road with sand and people. Hundreds of miles of roadside billboards mounted on the heels of the advancing troops to secure free passage road transport of ammunition and fuel. More than once I have heard from the soldiers and officers of the road service of their chief Gen. Donets words of sincere admiration. It really is an extraordinary man, a simple, fun, kind, determined, talented organizer who enjoyed widespread respect. No matter how difficult the situation was, George Tikhonovich never lose heart, probably another reason that has always believed in his people. By education he was not an expert, road maintenance, but loved and brilliantly mastered the job, to which he remained for 20 years. His deputy on the 1st Belorussian Front was a great specialist in road and bridge construction, sent from Moscow engineer GA hunger. Its distinguishing feature was the unshakable will to fulfill its

assigned task. He was one of those non-military experts, who came to the army, care less about respecting subordination, which is considered one of the important features of military service; Golodova always eager as quickly as possible, to quickly resolve his concerns at work, and he was, as they say , right through, any boss that they depended on the answer. Sometimes it is brought on by a well-deserved blame, but then he explained with mock innocence that man he was "civil" and had not yet mastered the army etiquette way disarming even the most hardened campaigners. He succeeded because of the importance and validity of actions in which he insisted was beyond doubt. In the operation in difficulties for the rear aggravated delayed addressing the issue of Altering the main railway lines to the allied track. Restoration of the railways and the construction of bridges over the Vistula began immediately after the expulsion of the enemy from the left bank of the Vistula. The work was carried wide front, day and night, using a rather different means of mechanization, [227] so that recovery rates have been very high. Also facilitates the work and the fact that the roads remained in Western tracks. Simultaneously built and storage terminal at the station Warsaw-West and in Deblin. Spent a lot of materials, labor and transport, to build the plant in Warsaw West more than 30 kilometers of parallel paths, and about a kilometer high platforms and shelters for temporary storage of the goods to be trans. We sought the best way to implement the decision of the National Defence on the use of Western European vehicles. January 29, 1945 was completed at the same time restoring the 300-kilometer journey from Warsaw to Poznan and Warsaw construction of the railway bridge. It would be possible to start cargo handling and shipping them to the knowledge, the benefit of a Union train tracks accumulated by that time on the outskirts of Warsaw, hundreds. Advancing troops by this time were far Poznan, approaching the Oder. The distance between them and the army bases railroad reached 500 kilometers. Surmount even three - five trains a day and submit them as close as possible to the troops was at the time invaluable. It was not only the filing of ammunition and fuel, broke away from the troops of heavy tanks, large-caliber artillery, metal runways, heavy engineering equipment.Is all this shalt deliver on the car? Only by rail could throw it all. I am not undermining the role of transport in the Vistula-Oder operation. But in those days could only save the railroad. And then came the big day when we test after Warsaw Bridge and all the way to Poznan announced that from January 29, 1945 is effective main railway line. But on this day had directed the center to immediately Altering all of this trend on the Federal rut ... No joke - alter re 300km double-track railway! Alter the newly reconstituted Warsaw railway bridge! Again alter huge knot Warsaw West and put a cross on the superhuman efforts that were spent on the construction and equipment storage terminal here! The reader will understand our feelings. But nothing can be done - I had to return the railway troops and require them to new, literally titanic efforts. [228] I had to explain to people the reasons for such a situation, that they are not formally, but with the soul took up the case. After all, our soldiers used consciously refers to obtaining a job. He knew the value of the work already undertaken. And then suddenly changing everything! "The speed and pace" - only this and confirmed him every minute; itself haste in Pereshivko not promise good. But there have arisen new obstacles. Western European railways are often not spike

as in the USSR, and the wood screw mounting rails to the sleepers. Due to the fact that the broadening along the way in a hurry and with a shortage of instruments in some areas not tighten the screws, and scored a pair of crutches, which drastically reduced the strength of the safety. Moreover, a number of hauls were not wood, and steel sleepers with welded them mounts, which further complicated the job. By Altering such sites, our troops were not fully prepared, and there were large deviations from the approved specifications. All this taken together led to the fact that in some places the train derailment, formed the "plug." Storm of indignation broke out at the rear of the front of the head chief, chief VOSO front and especially to the chief military reconstruction General N. Borisov. On airplanes, in cars arrived at the scene of investigative bodies, while investigating something on the spot there was nothing left: within two days the problem is fixed, and the movement of trains was no longer on the schedule. Some of the executives received a reprimand instead of rewards. But not in this case. The main thing - go train! That was in mid-February, when our troops more than 10 days were intense battles on the Oder. The enemy offered fierce resistance to this line, not only was the looming threat of newly emerging Pomeranian enemy hanging over our right flank. The situation was complicated by the fact that during the offensive from day to day to increase the gap between the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front and the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front, rotated at stake in the north and north-west. By the end of the operation, the gap was more than 200 kilometers. In this "empty space" walked away with a group of the enemy. Front Command had to take urgent operational measures to ensure their right flank and rear. Need of ammunition and fuel, it goes without saying all felt sharper and sharper. I had to drive tens of thousands of tons of supplies. [229]Hoping to transport them by road, even through the mobilization of all the machines in the armies, divisions, including arttyagachi, there was no reason. Because the distance from the front-line supply bases to the troops was a one-way 550 - 650 miles, and the car was on the way, given the blizzard and ice, 10 - 12 days round trip. As before, only by rail could be the greatest effect to transfer 25 - 30 thousand tons of ordnance left the bridgeheads. And then we helped Southern Railway, ie demblinskoe direction. Here success reducing exceeded our expectations: Demblinsky bridge instead of the planned 18 days was restored to 8 days - 23 January 1945 it was opened to train traffic. Alas, the war rarely happens that joy does not clouded: Railway intelligence had reported that the road from Lodz to Deblin damaged slightly, but the enemy had almost completely cut lines wired station and destroy communications centers. However, adverse circumstances in the war often compensated for anything: we know that if the path toward Kalisz abundant with man-made structures that are almost universally destroyed by the enemy, the way to Bydgosh, Shneydemyul, Landsberg, Kustrin better preserved, and even though it is twice longer than the first, but the traffic here can be opened earlier. It was also found that our troops captured in good condition 15,000 wagons and 380 locomotives. Do not use such a favorable environment, and sit back, waiting for the opening of traffic on the main line of a big mistake, which could result in the loss of many human lives. It was decided to train the 5th Brigade, Colonel Yatsyna immediately turn Kutno Vlatslavek, Torun, Bydgosh, Kustrin. Although the length of this line reached 1000 kilometers, that is was almost twice the shortest, but it had the advantage of it to open the movement for 10 - 15 days before the Warsaw,

and most importantly - it came out on the right wing of the front, where the situation exacerbated by the day. As loomed favorable situation on the southern railway lines, we have matured the idea of using it for the movement direction of the surviving savings munitions Western tracks. But for this it was necessary to take a completely unusual decision: to carry ammunition bridgeheads not toward the troops, [230] and in the opposite direction - the Vistula River, on its right bank to the railway Deblin Warsaw, which continued to arrive on the train tracks of the Union. At the same time it was necessary to alter the line in the Western European gauge, so that ammunition exported from the bases, you can overload the trucks right in the trophy cars. "How so? - Asked us to doubt the wisdom of such a maneuver. - Is not it better if those 200 cars, which are occupied export munitions bases, to send troops to at least give them a little help? Not yet known - told us - when they come to the trophy cars to the front. And with the help of machines, we can even plug the hole. " Yes, it would be really darned holes, rather than a capital solution to the issue. Reaching small success today, we would have lost perspective and opportunity tomorrow to find a fundamental solution of the problem. I was once again in the face repeatedly arisen in the course of the war situation: where best to direct negligible reserves of fuel, vehicles and other things? Give them some one army, even housing, motor parts, or help these reserves railway troops to a few days before opening the trains? Many dilemmas are always risky, especially in a war where the outcome depends not only on you but also on the enemy. So it was in this case. Supporters of the planned maneuver was not so much. However, we have chosen this particular, rail option ammunition feed from the Vistula to the Oder at Western track without giving up completely and part of the transport of goods by road. Steel shipping and send by Demblinskomu bridge to 8 - 10 trains a day with ammunition and fuel. At the same time picking up on the way and loaded on to the platform peeled heavy equipment. Every day, up to 10 trains took to the west of the Vistula - 30 - 40 cars on each train. Time and again we requested on the radio, in whose address to send trains to what station? Our answer was invariably: send to the west, in the direction of Landsberg and Kustrin. After all, the situation was changing every day, and it was hard to tell how it will develop by the time when it's one or the other train. I remind then increasingly threatened with attack on our right flank of the Pomeranian grouping. Therefore, it was difficult to predict on which station will have to unload that we sent, it was important that the goods were not as relentlessly moved west, the Oder. But how to pass the train is not operating line communications? It is necessary to report the release of the next station the train to avoid a collision with the counter. Also missing railway employees at many stations was not even scapegoats. The Nazis knew how hostile they Polish railway workers, and they are many of them killed or imprisoned in concentration camps, the rest went to the anti-Nazi underground, or simply went to the villages. Thus, the military posts were put in an absolutely incredible conditions under which it was necessary to find a way to control the flow by Western track in the most acute phase of the operation, as the main line at a time yet to alter. Should be commended Chief VOSO Front General AG Chernyakov. He managed to mobilize their employees, to awaken in them creativity. It was in these days came to us at the front for training a large group of students of the Military Transport Academy. All of them together with the officers VOSO front stood on watch: one chief of station, the assistant station, telegraph, and other specialists

switchmen traffic services, while others were train crews, became the locomotive drivers, firemen, etc. For communication to the disposal of the Chief VOSO allocated cars, Po-2, as well as a large number of radio stations. VOSO officer followed the car to the twin highway, ahead of the train to avoid oncoming traffic. And so from station to station. Other officers on aircraft overflew this time their assigned section of the railway, and applied to the position of the tablet train. It is true that aircraft observations are often hindered thick fog and drizzling rain, limiting visibility and even the possibility of departure ... With radio stations installed on the key points, the chief military communications front received twice daily information on train position.In management VOSO Front was established special "transportation department" for Western track led by qualified railwayman Colonel TK Dragomoshenko. As a result, each day we knew the number of trains passed through Demblinsky bridge to the west and how much is on a particular section of road. 3 - 5 February this track had more than 100 trains with ammunition, fuel, heavy military equipment, in any [232] one train had not come to the place of unloading. They all thought that the trains are moving very slowly - and they really moved slowly, held up by endless difficulties. It is not enough fuel and water for steam locomotives, a number of areas were possible only a very limited speed. The most difficult issue in rail transport was the delivery of fuel to the troops. To the eastern bank of the Vistula fuel reported in trains union track, and there were many, but how to apply now? And then do the army showed a commendable initiative. They announced that they can get on the Vistula fuel as much as trains will be able to form a liquid through captured tanks, which were many. Almost all of these tanks have been busy fuel oil. However, our "goryuchnikov" is not confused. They quickly washed such tanks and incorporate them in their train-turntables. Above I talked about the experience of the organization of railway turntables rear front. Now the right to form their own selfleveling spinner gave armies. The fact that the front could not be as fast as an army tank to identify the secondary branches and dead ends, [233] as the army conducted a broad exploration of the newly conquered territories, and finding cars and locomotives, immediately formed a small train. Control of military communications front assign them obschefrontovoy and comprises timetable. Army take care of that in the army turntables were two or three cars with fuel and water tank to the engine, the car with the accompanying team. Supply of fuel and water planned for both ends, that is, about 1000 - 1200 miles. By the end of January 1945, there were 18 in the armies of turntables with a total capacity 3150 tons. Especially great initiative and ingenuity displayed Chief of Logistics of the 1st Guards Tank Army General VF Konkov. He had not one, but several liquid turntables, and it soon became clear that he took from the Vistula so much fuel that we had a little "adjust" this stock to other armies. True, the commander of the 1st Guards Tank ME Katukov and his chief of logistics VF Konkov murmured against the violation of the principle chief of logistics front "material interest", but we had no other choice. After tankers like the cavalry, due to its high mobility reaped first "trophy harvest," and sometimes battered infantry only remnants. Therefore is necessary to regulate [234] distribution of captured wagons and locomotives between armies. But to return to the train, which departed from the Vistula with the ammunition. They were waiting at the front with the greatest impatience. "Where is your train of ammunition?" - This question always met head of logistics at the headquarters of the front. Artillery commander, General Vladimir Kazakov even said to Marshal Zhukov, that threatened disruption of the lack of artillery ammunition, and hinted that the blame will be head of logistics front: he was immersed in all the ammunition

wagons, and where these cars? And in the most critical time (5 - 6 February), when the situation in front of the headquarters ran high, the troops began to arrive one by one, the long-awaited train with ammunition, heavy materiel, and so not a thousand tons and 20 thousand tons of ammunition a few days to get the right wing of the front just to the days when our troops reflect, and then smashed Pomeranian grouping. From January 23 to February 10, when still dormant alter north of the road, the 1st Belorussian Front were on the southern route of about 170 trains with the most important goods, which accounted for at least 50 tons. Was it possible to solve this problem by road? Now, perhaps, narrated looks like an insignificant episode, and then all the attention was focused on the front command for this "episode." If the disorder, with poor communication and management techniques primitive railway southbound played a crucial role in providing troops materiel, how great would help the front, if it was promptly altered to track the main union, the Warsaw-Poznan destination! According to it, the train could go to areas of attacking troops, not 12 - 15, 1 - 3 February, and the timely submission of the full materiel troops have entered the Oder, could create a different, more favorable to our troops operating environment. Unfortunately, this has not happened. Provision of ammunition and fuel to the time they enter the Oder was 0.3 - 0.5 and 0.5 ammo refills. It was only enough for combat to seize and hold a bridgehead on the Oder. Meanwhile, increased counterattacks on the beachhead Kyustrinskom, beating we suffered heavy losses. [235]say that in this situation it was necessary to go nonstop to Berlin to take it 10 - 12 February - at least frivolity. Yet now, after more than 20 years, trying to assert (magazine October, 4 of 1964, memories Chuikov "The End of the Third Reich"), that the front commander, made the mistake of not moving his troops on the move right of Berlin. But how could not ignore the threat from the north and the state of the rear? "We had to take the risk." But the art of war consists in the fact that to be able to distinguish between intelligent risk of adventures. In this case, everyone knows that the situation is far from the rear favored immediate movement of our troops in Berlin. Even less meet this operational-strategic situation in the delay output of the 2nd Belorussian Front to the Oder and the slow pace of the west of the 1st Ukrainian Front. The movement of the 1st Belorussian Front the Oder to the unsecured flanks could only lead to the compromise of a grandiose Soviet offensive in January 1945. According to the same memoirist Berliners to February 1945, allegedly mentally quite ripe for overthrow Hitler - but would have been given a boost from the outside. But it is doubtful whether such arguments are unfounded. The tenacity with which the Germans fought to the last hours of the war is well known. In the battle for Berlin, our two armies - the 8th Guards and 5th Shock - have lost 25 percent of personnel. About the same tenacity evidenced several days fighting encircled garrison in Pozna Schneidemiihl etc. From wholesale and premature onset of the 1st Belorussian Front to Berlin we kept the vision and foresight of Supreme Commander, on the one hand, and a real understanding of the situation the command of the front - on the other. The reader should not shape the opinion that in the Vistula-Oder operation in road transport had the relatively small load. On the contrary, the intensity of road transport in the operation had reached its highest point. If during the first 15 days of January 1945, when preparing for an operation, front and army trucks have transported 165,900 tons, over the second half of January was transported 320,101 tons of cargo. [236]

Showed no significant difference between the planned and the actual rate of car use. Instead of the planned 200 miles daily mileage was only 140 kilometers, that is 30 per cent less, the length of ground communications provided for 300 miles, and was 600 kilometers. On some days, mileage vehicles did not exceed 100 kilometers due to heavy traffic conditions. Duration of one car in the period of maximum separation of forces from their supply bases was 10 - 12 days. In this situation, the front and army road transport could take out of the area of the Vistula is not more than 1 thousand tons of ammunition, and not every day. Therefore Front Military Council decided to transport ammunition to attract 500 cars, tractors of artillery units and parts of the front and reserve of the Supreme Command. In other words, a number of guns had been left in the field.This decision was prompted by an emergency situation, there was no alternative. In addition to ammunition, also immediately took to push forward into areas of Radom and Lodz, large groups of front-line hospitals. For this purpose it has been allocated 750 cars. Fast pace of the required frequent moving field management front, and each time was required for this purpose, at least 400 cars. More than 300 vehicles were employed in transporting food trophy. Finally, it was necessary to systematically assist road rail recovery units. It was especially difficult with the supplying of fuel. Total capacity of the front car park liquid was 5574 tons. It is a lot, but the trouble is that each car sent for fuel in the area of the Vistula, spending up to eight gas stations, that is, nearly a quarter of the transported gas. Slightly less than 1 million tones were transported by road to the January 14, 1945 until the end of February 1945. Each car carried two tons of supplies on average per day, and it was good for that time. Giving priority to delivery of ammunition, the Military Council has decided to award the driver structure for each tonne-kilometer ammunition carried above the norm. Some drivers receive monthly bonuses of up to 500 rubles. As in the Belorussian operation, particularly distinguished 18th car brigade, commanded by Colonel BN Kugutov. [237] At the head of the troops of the front car was very experienced organizer and head of automotive management specialist Colonel (later General) PS Wiseman. Together with the head of road front forces Gen. GT Donets it is well organized road transport, breaking a lot of trouble free. In this operation, motor vehicles used by the armies of the front and usually centrally - car parts and units were attached to no one. But the road to manage the stretched lines of communication proved to be very difficult, despite the widespread use of radio, telephones, motorcycles, cars and planes connected. Experience has shown that in such a situation should not create a bulky motor columns, otherwise avoid long delays during loading and unloading, as well as traffic jams along the line, if forced to stop at least one car. It is best to send in flight at the same time three - five cars, the speed increases run time by 75 percent. Platoon and company commander the more columns gave a smaller effect. Overload the front of cars on the army and the army in divisions in the attack was not applied: treasuring every moment we deliver the goods directly to the location of front-line troops machines. Many cabinet makers and today is considered the most harmonious, it can be said, the ideal scheme of two-three times the congestion in the links of the front - army - division. But in practice it has not been used. And who overload? The driver is often served as a porter, he overworking, enough sleep, and we were surprised once a relatively small number of accidents on the road caused by the driver. We have learned to give importance to the use of reverse empty. Service artillery supply, road and captured troops required to be quick in the rear hauling containers, sleeves, trophy

property. Following the road, you can read everywhere pointer where and what cargo was prepared for the return flight, and the distance to this point. All drivers was well known short but persuasive appeal: "Instead of each sleeve, sent to the rear, one shell to the front!" Very serious question was sent to the rear with spetsukuporki. Indeed, on every front came millions boxes of ammunition a year. In the manufacture of these boxes countries spent millions of cubic meters of wood. Return yashdkov the rear becomes a problem of national importance. Drivers, aiming their return flight, received awards. [238] Unusually large amount of work has captured the service. During the Vistula-Oder operation was captured in 1119 tanks and self-propelled guns, 4,265 guns of various calibers, 2401 mortar, 18,327 machine guns, 757 aircraft, 17,494 vehicle {12} . Most were not cars, and scrap metal, but to use it had to be removed, and then promptly sent to steel mills every trophy unit. To expedite this work, the front commander, offered to provide every division one company with vehicles and tractors. But then a new problem - the lack of skilled personnel for the demolition work. To these works trofeyschiki military were not prepared, civilian agencies are also slowly incorporated into this. As a result, the main burden of work fell on the bodies of the front and rear of the armies, and so it remained until late in the war. What was the loss of life during the Vistula-Oder operation? How justified is our forecast of a favorable impact of high rates of occurrence of the number of losses? From previous experience, we expected to lose about 12 percent of the wounded, and in fact from 14 January to 5 February, they turned out 6 percent, half the time. [239] The high rate of advance significantly cut our losses. As for the dynamics of these losses, it is repeated pattern before all our other offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War: the greatest number of casualties attacking side is prepared for the breakout of defense, as well as at the final stage of the operation, when the troops reached the specified boundary, and the enemy has strengthened resistance. As expected, the greatest losses army battle groups of the front (5th Shock, 8th Guards, 1st and 2nd Guards Tank). Smallest losses were 3rd Shock Army (3 percent) and the 1st Polish Army (2.6 percent). If at the beginning of the war the average daily medical losses for the armies advancing on the main line, was 1 - 2 per cent, in the operation, they averaged 0.4 percent. Maneuver skillfully organized medical institutions during the offensive in drastically reducing road sanitary evacuation and provide treatment for the majority of the wounded on the ground until they are completely recovered. Over 50 percent of the wounded were returned to service after treatment within the front. Vistula-Oder operation was significantly different from the others and capable of bearing the wounded from the battlefield. [240] quickly exhaust the enemy could not have re-exposure to the fire of the wounded man, he could not put out of stretcher-bearer, so about 80 percent of all the wounded were taken to the battlefield on stretchers or reached by foot. Thanks to the experience and dedication of low-level medical service for over 80 percent of all the wounded were taken to the regimental aid stations during the first three hours after the injury, and this in itself greatly facilitates the return of man to life. Promptly found wounded on the battlefield, lying in a ditch or snow-covered, immediately gave him first aid dovrachebiuyu, gently bring the victim to the point of care - in this noble hazardous labor nurses, often sacrificing his own life to save a wounded comrade. Vistula-Oder operation showed increased skill organizers of medical support in the divisions, armies at the front. Nachsanarmov names and prominent leaders of the front-tier health service - Generals

AY Barabanov, R. Plyakin, VI Popov, B. Ibragimov, professors I. Zhorov, MF Ryabov, E. M. Kaplun, GA Znamensky and others - forever in the history of the great liberation struggle of the Soviet people against fascism. Vistula-Oder operation completed an unprecedented scale operational maneuver in the north. As already noted, the gap between the left flank of the 2nd Belorussian Front and the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front exceeded by the end of January 200 kilometers. And from January 22, the enemy began to strengthen its group in Pomerania, to strike a strong counterattack on the open flank of the 1st Belorussian Front.Anticipating this, the team turned to the north of the front four field armies, two tank armies and cavalry corps. Essentially formed as a new front facing north and occupied a strip of about 300 kilometers. From the rear needed new efforts to promptly replenish inventories, and to take other steps to ensure that these right-flank armies. The entire network of military roads in the direction Arnsvalde Piritts served by road and parts of the front. More than 2 million vehicles, separated from front-line reserve, taken on the right wing for the first five days of 7000 tons of ammunition, but only until the end of the operation - more than 20 thousand tons. Part of trains with ammunition and fuel that came from Warsaw and Deblin, was diverted to the right wing of the army, to accelerate the recovery of the railway in the band of the 47th and 61st Armies, here were moved further reduction of the railway, [242] taken from the southern sector of the front. In areas Wgrowiec and Landsberg in the short term have been deployed on the front-line hospitals, 15,000 beds. On the scale and timing of the maneuver described rear parts and material resources is one of the most interesting and instructive examples of the rear of the front in the last war. During the war, it was considered necessary to establish, on every front, a subordinate chief of logistics inspection of 10 - 12 people. The main objectives of this inspection was to ensure to check the performance of the most important decisions of the Military Council and the rear of the front head on logistics troops. In some cases, had to assign inspectors to check the information about the major shortcomings in the services of the front or rear of material shortage. Led the inspection of experienced lawyers. The first chief of such an inspection on our front was Colonel Sviridov, a former deputy prosecutor of the front. He was particularly respected for caution, for a thoughtful approach to every issue and every person, and he never offered a hasty conclusions, particularly in cases when the fate of the people. It happened that one of the tank corps halted offensive somewhere on the outskirts of Kstrin allegedly due to lack of fuel in the tanks.Front Commander made me remark. He ordered to organize a thorough check on the spot and punish the perpetrators of Inadequate housing diesel. The commander of the armored corps, on the grounds in front of the commander, the blame for the delay in the onset shouldered rear. So many times I listened to like that! Colonel Sviridov personally headed the commission for verification. He safely reached the body (although the decor was very unclear, and as a precaution the Commission has followed on two machines), and measured the fuel in most tanks. It was found that a single tank without fuel was found, each had at least polbaka, ie 200 - 300 liters. Hence, the reason for stopping the offensive was something else. Sviridov was Act, signed as a representative body, and went back. On his way he saw a column [243] tank with diesel fuel, sent me into the case before his departure. On the way back to the forest road car Sviridov somewhat behind the front going, losing sight of it. On one of the forks in the road was a sign reading "mined" and an arrow pointing to a

detour. Turning on the bypass road, the car in a few minutes was ambushed by the Germans, who shot all who were in it. Fearing that he heard the shots, could arrive any our unit, the Germans fled, not away from them even documents. The new chief of inspection the rear of the front Colonel Mariupol, also a lawyer by training and by profession, had the same valuable qualities as its predecessor. Inspection is always concerned with the important issues, and I did not admit that it was turned into an appendage of the investigating authorities. Life has advanced a lot of problems, and for this purpose it was important to have an inspection of skilled workers of different specialties. Through the help of our inspectors, we avoided, in particular, errors in the evaluation of individual employees. In the course of the Vistula-Oder operation, the 1st Belorussian Front repeatedly awarded highest honor - Kremlin volleys and orders of the Supreme Commander for the release of the major cities in Poland. Such orders and volleys noted the capture of Warsaw, Lodz, Gniezno, Poznan and other cities. The order is usually listed the names of the commanders of the fronts and armies, their chiefs of staff and some of the chiefs of the combat arms of the front. But as a complete surprise was the fact that the order in the January 1945 on the occasion of the capture of Gniezno, said that the city was freed generals-such forces, including troops of General NA Antipenko. I read and think, not a dream is it? I called the chief of staff of the front Malinin - not a mistake? No, he said, not a bug, let them know that the rear of the fighting. Of course, I was happy not only such order; huge group of workers on the rear right to accept praise for his account. Unfortunately, that was the only time during the war. Thus ended one of the most outstanding offensive operations of the Great Patriotic War. With good reason the operation Historians refer to the number of classical. [245] It really contains all the features of modern warfare. After the war, about nine years I taught at the Academy of the General Staff, and each time the lectures on the art of war in front of me opened the picture is of the Vistula-Oder operation: a methodology for planning, decision-making, the form of operational maneuver, etc. Of course, we have been amended annually with the new weapons, but remained important: swiftness, high dynamism, determination and courage in achieving this goal. Generalship of quality, then displayed front and army commanders, are the basis of education of young people in the military today. Each team, of course, has its own working style, his method, peculiar to him alone thinking and evaluation events. Commander of the 1st Belorussian Front, Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov nemnogorechiv, unnecessary word, unrelated to the matter, he did not say. Brevity and conciseness of language, a purely military language polished, extremely clear and precise statement of the problems, the ability to correctly assess the ability and willingness to subordinate things done - these are the features which I caught in the nature Zhukova while working with him.Externally it is rather dry, but when the situation allows weakened somewhat constant tension of mind and will, it is simple and open, and loved to joke. Deep internal and external discipline, smartness, high demands, straightness and integrity in the views and in relationships with people, and an iron will make up for the inability of somebody else in the mood and opinions - those aspects of his personality that make me a deep respect for Zhukov. Not to mention his outstanding leadership talent. I like Zhukov, Deputy for Logistics particularly expensive was that he really imagined the battle as a whole, individual stages, was able to calculate the actions of each of the parts of the vast and sophisticated military machine. I think I will not be accused of "departmental approach" if the best

qualities of the commander Zhukov-I will take it to the attention of the front rear uptime, without which it can not fulfill its task, none of the existing labor forces. [246]

THE REAR OF THE BERLIN OPERATION

Preparing Berlin offensive took place in very unusual circumstances. The Battle of Kursk, the liberation of Belarus, the Vistula-Oder operation began after a long, measure several months pause, during which the rear end time to restoration of communications, to move closer to his troops units and agencies to evacuate the wounded and damaged military equipment, to save material resources. We even had time to summarize the experience of the previous theory, operation, conduct numerous conferences and professional fees. Not happened with the preparation of the Berlin operation. In essence, there was no pause - neither troops nor to the rear. A military operation to reach its goal, the transition to another. Armies perform rapid maneuvers in the rear of the other armies to enter new operational directions. This required from the rear is extremely fast and flexible maneuvering financially and the transport of funds. [247] Let me remind you that the Nazis concentrated in Pomerania 16 infantry, 4 tank, three motorized divisions, 17 brigades, combat groups and individual parts to strike a powerful blow to the flank of the 1st Byelorussian Front. German commanders on the map edge of this blow was directed to the City Circus, located 100 kilometers to the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front. (I particularly remember this point, because there was located at the time the headquarters of the rear of the front). To reflect this diversion on the right flank of the 1st Belorussian Front from among its troops was formed essentially a new front, facing north. There were four field armies, two tank and cavalry corps. Should make clear that if the first days of the Vistula-Oder operation was restored railroad from Deblin with continuation to the north and further to the west, it is hard to imagine how we could provide the renewed front in the direction of the Pomeranian. It is for this move from the south to the north-west came at the most critical moment of the train with ammunition and fuel. It should be borne in mind, and one more important thing: if Zhukov did not cut the artillery preparation on the Vistula and not saved it about 30 thousand tons of ammunition, even if wellfunctioning communications we would have nothing to haul. Troops, reflecting enemy counterattack from Pomerania, and then, and defeat this group, spent on this so-called private military operation two rounds of ammunition, or more than 25,000 tons, which could be used directly for the Berlin operation, greatly facilitating its preparation. By the end of March 1945 ended with the defeat of the enemy Pomeranian, and the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front took the starting positions for the attack on Berlin. Of time before it starts remained negligible - two weeks. Only due to the extremely energetic and timely assistance from central authorities rear we have a relatively good idea to provide all the necessary forces in such a short period of time. Before talking about the volume of measures ensuring the Berlin operation, I have to acquaint the reader with the situation prevailing in March 1945. By that time it is fully straightened trains on the Union track from Moscow to Frankfurt an der Oder. It would seem to rejoice: Marshal of Artillery ND Yakovlev (Chief of Ordnance Department) increased shipments of ammunition against our front, the People's Commissariat of Communications opened, [248] is said to have the green light to a train going to the 1st Belorussian Front , head of the fuels and lubricants Commissariat of Defense General MI Kormilitsyn the same energy for the train Trains leave us aviation fuel, gasoline, diesel fuel. Chief of

Logistics of the Red Army AV Hrulev and deputy Vladimir Vinogradov, VE Belokoskov daily or even several times a day on the phone inquired about the situation at the front. But suddenly there was a serious concern: that a rapid snowmelt. Came to light in its upper Vistula, and pulled the threat of destruction of railway bridges in Deblin and Warsaw. Anxiety was the time! Rail and road bridges in the band of the 1st Ukrainian Front had already been fully or partially demolished ice, the whole armada of debris, ice-bound, moved downstream, threatening bridges of the 1st Belorussian Front. These bridges have been restored to the temporary supports, which, of course, could not resist this onslaught of ice. It was necessary to save the bridge, otherwise the whole front would have been cut off for 10 - 15 days from the central supply bases. The Military Council took into account the seriousness of the situation. I was instructed to go along with the head of the military posts of the front and the head of the railway troops in the Warsaw area and take drastic measures to save the bridge. Before you go to the Vistula, I asked AV Khruleva send plane to Warsaw scientists specialists Mostovik. Arriving in Warsaw, I met them.Held a short consultation of scientists and experts on the Vistula River, right at the Warsaw bridge. Wide and seemed calm river harbored enormous destructive power. A few days remain until the opening of the ice in the area. A higher Deblin already started drifting ice. It was important to save the first Demblinsky rail bridge is above the stream, in which case she would be less threatening and the Warsaw bridge. Salvation bridges resulted in a vast operation. Unprecedented heroism railway troops and special units NKPS. Near the bridge was Demblinskogo while mostopoezd number 13, his head was then colonel IL Moskalev, he discovered a rare resource in establishing a ice corridors to pass through the shattered ice bridge spans, in other words, to fight ice with through the ice. This ingenious invention has been very useful. For crushing impending "iceberg" we called for air support and field engineers. Aircraft made a continuous bombardment of huge ice still on the distant approaches. Heavy bridge farm, stripped of their seats in the band of the 1st Ukrainian Front, somewhere in the upper reaches of the river and threaten our bridges, under the influence of bombs and land mines sapper turned into wood chips and easy passage into the holes between the supports. Standing on the bridge, it could be seen as a long corridor ice several kilometers and a width of 50 meters upstream and up to 20 - 30 meters directly at the bridge Buzz rushed mass of crushed ice. A very original way saved Warsaw railway bridge. From various points he was tied to both sides of the cables, 4 - 5 "thread" in each direction. Placed on top of the bridge about 100 platforms loaded with cobblestones, to increase the stability of the supports, and reduce the probability of rupture of the bridge deck. In the most critical moment of the ice so advanced on this bridge that formed the deflection at the center of it - a sort of half-arches, concave in the direction of flow. Train, standing on the bridge with stones, stretched and seemed about to burst. Remarkably, this is a position close to the accident did not cause nervousness, did not cause any rash actions or despair - Aviation and sappers systematically continued its work. Lasted for more than three days, this struggle with the elements. Bridges have been saved. Especially distinguished officers and men of the 20th Battalion of the bridge under the command of Major B. Zheltikova of 1st Guards Brigade of the railway, which received the name of the then Warsaw. These fearless men climbed the ice floes in the bridge, pushing their poles in the transit

passes. Sometimes chunks of ice piled up, reached the height of the bridge deck, and not everyone is able to stay on this mobile is alive and roaring mass of ice - some Mostovik disrupted the water. However, grabbing a rope thrown to them, they immediately climbed on the ice and again entered the fray. Worse things have developed from a neighbor on the right - on the 2nd Belorussian Front. The only railway bridge in his band across the Vistula, at Torun, could not resist the onslaught of ice and was demolished. Almost half a month we had to pass through Warsaw Bridge train going to the 2nd Byelorussian Front, while Torun bridge was not rebuilt again. [250] Front Military Council praised the merits of railway bridges in the rescue. The first member of the Military Council of the Front handed Major B. Zheltikova Order of the Red Banner and heartily thanked the personnel of the battalion, which was all received awards. Order of the Red Banner was awarded colonel IL Moskalev. As long as the heroic job to save the Vistula bridges between Warsaw and Brest have a lot of levels for each day was coming in this direction 25 - 30 trains, and they all lined up, the benefit of enemy aircraft, although it has been active on the front lines already did not appear in the rear. Accumulated train we passed one another in the Warsaw bridge with possible speed, and some of them went to the area under the Deblin congestion on the Western European track, so the southern area and was used to the limit. It is not difficult to understand how great was the value of the saved bridges over the Vistula for preparing the Berlin operation. By the beginning of the offensive on Berlin had a lot of preparatory work as road builders front. The Oder was built 25 road bridges with total length of 15,017 linear feet. For these bridges during the preparation and conduct of the Berlin operation to proceed in both directions [251]1,671,188 vehicles, 400,000 vehicles and about 600 thousand people on foot (mostly Soviet and Polish immigrants). We have already talked about the heroism of our glorious and Mostovik Road. It is impossible here not recall such a feat, as the construction of a wooden bridge srednevodnogo length of 1,600 linear meters with a five-meter carriageway across the Oder near the town virgin. During offensive operations from the Vistula to the Oder troops of the 5th Shock Army crossed the Oder and seized a small bridgehead north Kustrin. The value of this base was great to consolidate progress made and to prepare further attacks on Berlin. Therefore, the enemy attacked continuously of the bridgehead, trying to throw them into the river. To hold the position where it was necessary to immediately transfer the self-propelled artillery and tanks. Front Command ordered the chief of the troops of the front road GT Donets organize the construction of a road bridge across the Oder to Kyustrinskomu bridgehead. For this task was entrusted to the military road management 3 (TAL-3) reinforced by a regiment of engineering troops and 95-m bridge-building battalion of reserve front. Total construction management was entrusted to the engineer Colonel DA Rudenko. Since the construction area was strongly influenced by artillery and mortar fire, as well as frequent air raids, had to build the night of the elements of the bridge structure, harvested during the day in the surrounding forests. Despite this, the road and bridge division suffered heavy losses. During the day, the bridge is not just damaged by enemy aircraft in a particular passage, copra with diesel hammers mounted on pontoons, often drowning splinter min. Still, the bridge was built in seven days.

This week bridge builders lost killed 163 people drowned - 38 people and wounded - 186 people. Heavy price to get this bridge, but it allowed to transfer to the bridgehead fighting equipment, hold, and then expand the bridgehead. The enemy aircraft strongly opposed the restoration Kyustrinskih bridges over the Oder. On the night of April 18, when the work was completed on a railway bridge over the Oder and Warta, the enemy inflicted on them a severe blow from the air and destroyed the two bridges.Part of the 29th Brigade and the railway mostopoezd IL Moskaleva selflessly under continuous bombardment, bringing losses over [252] began to restore the two bridges by doing the job in just one week to April 25. As a result, when our troops rushed to Berlin, along with them, and the first train arrived at the station in Berlin-Lichtenberg with heavy artillery. That was in 18 hours April 25, 1945. What to say! Event is important. With great joy, we report to the Military Council of the front. The text of the report cite verbatim: "Heaven - the Military Council. Report: today 25 April at 18.00 area Kustrin - Berlin opened to traffic train to Berlin-Lichtenberg. Antipenko, Chernyak, Boris. " In this report imposed resolution: "Well done. Beetles. Telegin. 4.26 ". Further reduction of the Berlin railway junction complex [253] and a large number of bridges over the Elbe River Spree and is also one of the glorious pages in the history of the heroic railway troops. They have done their duty to their country.
***

Now we continue the story of the Berlin logistical support operations. The main difficulty was the delivery of ammunition. Front had at that time about 14,000 artillery pieces and mortars of different calibers.Weight of a combat kit exceeded 43,000 tons. The density of artillery on the main axis is 272 kilometer trunk at the front, and in some areas - even 286 trunks (5th Shock Army). [254] Sea of fire was to attack the opponent's head. One infantry regiment supported by five artillery regiments. Only on the first day of the operation was planned to spend 1,147,659 and mortar shells, 49,940 rockets and this is 2382 car of ammunition. One kilometer of the front in the direction of the main attack had 358 tons of ammunition. Some military historians believe that the beginning of the offensive on Berlin 1st Belorussian Front had sufficient funds, but this is true only for fuel and food. Ammunition it was only 2 - 2.5 ammunition, of which the first day of the plan expected to spend about 1.5 ammunition. But what we take Berlin if we would have spent the first day of such a large quantity of ammunition? I recall my conversation with the Chief of Staff of the Front, General Malinin. He said: "We all have a case in the history of World War II, when, due to special circumstances, we have to start with partial onset stocks, hoping for delivery of ammunition during the operation." And so it was. It should be noted at the same time a very important detail that is often overlooked. Duration of artillery preparation for the first day of the attack on Berlin was defined within an hour. However, the front commander, who was at an observation post in the location of the 8th Guards Army, reduced artillery preparation, just as he did on the Vistula bridgehead to 30 minutes and moved forward troops that have been successfully attack. (However, to master the Seelow Heights on the first day of the attack failed, but this can not be attributed to incomplete artillery barrage).Received by a particular view of the conditions saving ammunition was of great importance for the

subsequent days of the operation and the storming of Berlin. Although the approach of trains and on, but delivered ammunition could not meet the needs of troops in these days, as the enemy resisted at every turn, and every new day of our army offensive began with artillery barrage at a rate of 0.25 to 0.5 of ammunition. This is where the handy savings from the first day of the offensive on Berlin, the more that Hitler's artillery was not completely suppressed and kept pretty intense fire back. At the end of the operation of ammunition accumulated quite a lot, and no wonder our troops celebrate the victory over fascism salvoes almost without any regard to manufactured shells. Launched a powerful artillery preparation. [255] The whole front line was illuminated with bright flashes, the guns and mortars blended into incessant hum. It is difficult to convey in words majestic picture of the ensuing battle! Wishing to strengthen the psychological effect on the enemy and blind him, and also to facilitate the orientation of our infantry movements in the night, the commander drew 143 powerful spotlights. They were located at the front of 150 - 200 meters away from each other and from 300 500 meters from the front edge. Searchlights were included with the end of the artillery fire. Thick fog has weakened the effectiveness of lights, which could give blinding rays at a much greater depth. However, even under adverse weather conditions spotlight, as shown by some of the prisoners, stunned the Nazis. At dawn on the battlefield appeared bombers, dropped hundreds of tons of bombs. A huge cloud of smoke and dust. The enemy was silenced in the first two or three hours had no serious opposition to our infantry and tanks. But then, after recovering from the shock, the Nazis began to fight with unprecedented ferocity. Along with efforts to ensure Pomeranian operations and training before the Berlin operation of logistic faced the task of economic development of the territory east of the Oder. First of all it was necessary to save the cattle left without any supervision. Everywhere one could hear the roar of the hungry cattle, cows were nedoennymi. And who could feed, water and milk them? German landlords and rich peasants, workers fled the war economy, and most settlements the SS forcibly drove west all the peasants and farm laborers. Our Polish friends were not ready to move in and development of the restitution of the land. We decided to ask the Soviet women, rescued from Nazi captivity. They had to collect, explain the situation, to persuade them to stay home with the departure, for each day missed threatened loss of thousands of head of cattle. But it was impossible for a long time in a foreign country to detain the Soviet people, longing for home, on the house. At first we had no idea how great we now face an unexpected challenge. Thought dispense their regular units. But in the next calculation[257] showed that the abandoned animals so much that more extensive measures. First, it was necessary to collect the cattle roaming the fields in herds that it was easier for him to look after, feed, milking. Was needed immediate veterinary care, as there are many sick cattle with any kind of inflammation due to irregular milking, veterinary and armies of the Front barely managed to show up to the challenges of Chiefs herds.Everywhere there were warning signs of lack of feed. A huge number of bulky feed, succulent forage and concentrates required for the whole of this mass of cattle. These diets have been found, to consider and to drive to certain areas. So, needed transportation - rail, road, horse-drawn.Needed to fuel, needed people needed organization! Had to choose the most favorable areas for concentration and prolonged detention of cattle given feed and water in the epizootic welfare, economic facilities maintenance, etc.

Edge individual in connection with the upcoming transition to a long distance in order to be able to capitalize on the most beautiful river floodplains Oder and Warta. About transportation of livestock to these places by train was out of the question. Rail transport is not enough for military transportation.Actually represent only one way - to block. But it is easy to say haul! Although we were behind the experience of driving the cattle from the Volga to the Dnieper, but it was the Russian cattle, used to walk every day for 15 - 20 miles, and here - is another matter. As you know, in the West cattle is penning. All year round it is in the pen, and only gradually makes "promenade" - 100 - 200 meters per day on a small patch. This animal is not suited for longterm transitions no hoof, no muscles. Consulted with experts. Veterinary workers have recognized the possible and desirable transition livestock areas rich foods, but subject to the advance of physical exercise and a careful examination of livestock haul routes. We had to develop a special training program, which provides a course of various rubbing, massage, stripping and trimming hooves, and then coating them with a layer of resin. As for the driving of the routes, the study of them was quite difficult, it was necessary to provide points of watering, feeding, treatment, presence of certain infections, etc. One cow transferred from area to area for 40 - 50 kilometers - and the case is difficult. And then hundreds of herds! [258] Polish authorities were very helpful in selecting areas by providing grazing in floodplains, and our military and food agencies brought there from their meager resources of more than 3,000 tons of concentrate feed. With exceptional care and thrift treated Soviet people (immigrants) to this orphan animals. They took calves from cows rastelivshihsya the road, fed to them, carried on vehicles and prevented mortality. The cost of enormous efforts by the military authorities and the public surround the whole mass of cattle was saved from certain death. Rescued animals so the last thing needed was the army, for the Soviet troops got everything you need to power through public blanks.Rescuing animals, we thought about the people liberated from concentration camps to disadvantaged populations surrounding areas. In particular, due to this we were able to perform an indication of the Soviet government on the allocation of 5,000 dairy cows at the disposal of the Berlin authorities to provide milk to children 13 years of age at the rate of 200 grams of milk per day per person. We had to spend the spring sowing in the lands east of the Oder. After Hitler's forces withdrew from there in March - April 1945, having stolen the local population. And the spring in those parts comes early. It was impossible to leave tens of thousands of hectares of fallow! Had hastily set up their makeshift "farms", equip them with transportation, fuel, and then allocate the seed, fertilizer, etc. We felt that perhaps we do not have to collect the harvest, but it is important that the land of freaks. In such circumstances, had to expand the functions of the blanks uprodsnaba front, turning it from an organ procurement in manufacturing.Several were later created a whole farm management front, led by Colonel Vladimir Begutovym, and while that led all of these cases there was a chief of department blanks Colonel Apeksimov who purchased at that time a great experience for the procurement and processing of agricultural products. The direct management of this body carried out the general NK Zhizhin and Colonel VF Tkachev. Through participation in this important work of the rear of the army, as well as commanders and units, [259] even before the Berlin operation, and during it was planted 300,000 hectares of land all sorts of spring crops, it is not less than 40 million

tons of grain. (The land returned after the war the Polish People's Republic, but since the resettlement of Poles in them could not go fast, then, in agreement with the Polish government, the harvest had to clean our group of troops.) After the Berlin operation was organized in flood mowing the Oder and Warta. In order not to lose precious time for hay, it was necessary to take care of the inventory, the senopressovalnyh machines for wire, etc. This has been successfully accomplished professionals rear armies, corps and divisions. Especially worked hard rear chief cavalry corps: 7th - General V. Kazan, 2nd - Lt. Col. Ivanov, their cases were the main consumers of harvested hay. There were harvested and pressed more than 100 tons of hay. In the same location had a lot of idle industrial plants. Among them, we were interested primarily mills, bakeries, pasta factories, etc., but at the same time we have used every opportunity to organize the work of textile and tanneries - because the front needed uniforms, shoes, equipment. The owners of these companies, almost all fled, but workers Germans where they were, were ready to get to work, would be given electricity. Where not enough local workers, it was decided to raise to be the repatriation of Soviet citizens. But above all it was necessary to reserve fuel for power plants - coal and fuel oil. In each city, and some companies have had their power sources, and not only front-line management of the home front, but the rear of the army tried to organize economic life in that housed their troops. Especially wide initiative launched Chief of Logistics of the 5th Shock Army, General NV Serdenko, quartermaster 3rd Shock Army Colonel SP Kudryavtsev, head of logistics of the 61st Army General A. Vavilov, head of logistics 2 Guards Panzer Army PS Antonov. Everywhere there were reports of the manufacturing of the soldier's clothes, summer clothing, cavalry equipment, pots, spoons, cups, etc. Increased demand for raw materials: in one place it was not, and in other places in the accumulated surplus. There was a need to create a special department for the management of industrial production. It was headed by the talented engineer, and [260] Cherry organizer with his closest aides and Sukonnovym Svetlitskaya. They even tried to make the planning principle in the work of industrial enterprises, organizing subcontractors and ensuring the supply of raw materials. Thus, in the rear of the front leading position occupied new departments - agricultural and industrial. Although these departments in general quickly became active, but in those days, I do not just have the idea that the solution of major problems should be prepared, still on its territory, yet there had to prepare the staff for the job. Perhaps the reader bored even a summary of those seemed to be quite non-military tasks that had to deal with the rear of the Berlin operation. But this is only a small part of problems that are solved rear. Due to the end of the war there were other issues. Speaking of the Berlin operation, we mean not only the taking of Berlin itself, but also the defeat of the German forces. In this regard, it should be said about some of the common indicators of the operations related to all three fronts - the 1st, 2nd Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian. Despite the limited depth of the operation (150 - 200 km), in a relatively short time of the Conference, it is still costly to the Soviet people.More than 300,000 dead and wounded we lost in this final showdown with doomed enemy. Spent a huge amount of war material - about 200 thousand tons of ammunition, 150 tons of fuel, more than 300,000 tons of food and feed.Together with the property (engineering, clothing, etc.), all this is not less than 800 thousand tons, or 1300 trains. We are no longer talking about a huge

amount of rehabilitation and construction materials imported from the Soviet Union to build bridges across the Oder, Warta, Spree and for the construction of other facilities in Germany. The fronts have lost over 21 thousand horses. It is very important to note that the troops of the 1st Belorussian Front, as well as all the Red Army ended the war with a high level of material well and good condition of equipment and vehicles. In victory over fascism, we have the power to securely hold the results of victory in any circumstances. It is no accident, and after the war, when our war wounds have not been healed, even the most aggressive imperialist our enemies do not dare to go beyond the "cold war". [261] After the defeat of fascism, our troops and especially their rear facing dire consequences left by the war on German soil. Exceptional threat to troops and the population represents a possible outbreak in Berlin. Weather was hot, and everywhere - in every house, the basement, the attic - lay dead. Front commander, he demanded Chief of Logistics and Chief Medical Administration Front, AY Barabanov decisive action. Soon, all the bodies were removed, except for those that remained under the rubble of the big houses. But before the health management were other challenges that could only be removed with a large expenditure of labor: many broken and contaminated water bodies and sources, mass disease among liberated from the concentration camps of the Soviet and foreign citizens, spoiled food in warehouses, stores, etc. etc. And all of this had to do, at the same time to perform the first duty of the military health services treatment of wounded in the fighting. The fight was fierce for Berlin. The Germans were firing from everywhere: from rooftops, balconies, from basements, behind every corner.As already mentioned, the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Army had lost a quarter of its members, while others had fewer losses, but still there are at 2 - 3000 wounded. However, we completely stopped sanitary evacuation home, ensuring that all the wounded were finally cured in front and army hospitals, and in the Soviet Union left the healthy. As a result of the Berlin operation was captured many trophies: Of course, most all of the above weapons is a pile of metal, but the metal was very necessary, especially at the time. [262] Once gone from Germany, the 2nd Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Front, the collection, sorting and sending to the steel mills of the property fell on the trophy with the 1st Belorussian Front (later the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany). Cause a lot of scrap metal for shipment status, a ride to the railway lines - all this, if you think about it, is an independent operation, not less complex than, say, the driving of cattle or harvest winter. Still, for the front of the trophy this work was not the main one. Much attention was paid to the destruction of military facilities on the basis of decisions of the Crimea, and later - Potsdam. Destruction program of military-industrial potential of Germany combined with a program of compensation Germany damage to the people of Europe. Large amount of work required to establish a new trophy positions - deputy chief of logistics for the trophy front office. To this position he was appointed quartermaster Front, NK Zhizhin, have repeatedly shown their ability to solve major economic problems. Many efforts we have delivered prisoners of war, which only from April 16 to May 9, 1945, was taken by the 1st Belorussian Front 250,534 people. At the front, there was a special department, which had in its composition 10 collection points POWs (SPV). This department is subordinate to the Military Council of the front and the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Headed it had a great experience in this business, Colonel

Mamekov. As for the war, the treatment of prisoners of war on our part was humane. Captured Germans were in a better position than they are at large fellow, residents of Berlin and other major German cities, which even before the collapse of the Nazi regime dragged semi-starvation, and after fighting in Berlin and at all hungry. The Soviet command strictly monitored to ensure that prisoners are in a warm, clean and prepared food of the rules. Moreover, we are, as far as possible, with the desire of the prisoners were considered to work during their time in captivity on a particular profession. [263]
***

As our troops advanced to the Elbe, more and more, thousands of Soviet citizens and citizens of other countries in droves to the east, leaving the camps and on the hosts. Immigrants took to special collection points, where they were medico-sanitary inspection and treatment, some had to be hospitalized immediately, other re-clothed and shod, and most importantly - had all at once to feed and provide overnight. Military advice Army and the Military Council of the Front every day increased their requirements for bodies behind. The fact is that in the months of May and June 1945 the average daily flow of repatriated in our zone was, according to the head of the repatriation of General Skrynnik 36,000 people. By the end of June to save up to 1 million, not including drafted into the Red Army, the army command directly. Among the returnees was carried enormous political work which led the first member of the Military Council of the Front General K. Telegin and political governance front, led by General SF Galadzhevym. One million people! It was necessary to accommodate, feed, heal, clothe, shoes. And over all these tasks there was one, the most difficult and urgent - as a better and more to send a million people in the country? Began to count, count, but good output could not find: there was no cars, no roads with sufficient capacity. If you put in train by 1500, it would require 700 trains. But because each immigrant had personal things, and we could not let people lose their modest belongings. Almost on the train could not put more than a thousand people with things, therefore, we would need one thousand trains. In those days, we used to send to the east two or three trains of returnees a day ... Almost half a year would have some wait their turn.Cheerless prospect! Moreover, according to the information available at that time, the number of returnees could increase to 3 million people. After repeated negotiations member of the Military Council of the Front with Moscow decided to send most of the immigrants to the USSR on foot. People understood that [264] there is no alternative, but everyone wanted to get into the group, to be transported by rail. Because children under the age of 14 have firmly decided not to send the foot, it is often seen cases of fictitious adoption (adoption) of the children of women who refused to walk. It turned out that many women get their shoes after his release, shod in high-heeled shoes, and they can not go far. Rose one more question about the allocation of tens of thousands of pairs of women's low-heeled shoes for walking on foot .... In general, the accepted version then marching to the Soviet Union dispatched 650 thousand people. Was scheduled five runs with a total length (including the territory of Poland) is a thousand miles each. Slopes were divided into points of transit, where were built outdoor oven for baking every 8 -

10 tons of bread, established centers for hot food, which was issued after every three days. At these points of transit and issued rations for three days. There were also camping showers and medical facilities. People were grouped into the column by 5000 people each. Columns enter the track one by one in a day. Before the release gives an official farewell. There were many dramatic scenes. In Germany, often drove the whole family - husband, wife, child or several children. Furthermore, among these "Eastern workers" arose in a foreign land new families with children. Wife saw off on the long journey from their husbands, while they themselves stayed with small children to follow in the train of the USSR, and many of them were willing to go along with their husbands on foot, but we could not let that happen. Again the tears again care ... Military workers urged mothers and children, it is a temporary separation, that there is no alternative. For the selection of routes for the order to answer them military road builders. Car front office has allocated 2,000 vehicles for the transport of food on the routes and to accompany each of the columns of returnees. Service fuel pushed throughout his filling station. Personal items were sent to the machine accompanied by officers themselves repatriated to the Soviet-Polish border, where these things fit into a strictly defined order. Food service at the front points of transit sent 20 tons of flour, six thousand tones of cereals, 2,500 tons of meat, 1,500 tonnes of fat, 1,600 tons of salt, 1,300 tons of sugar, 50 tons of potatoes, etc. Given that the road great importance was dry rations, front awarded 12 million cans of food - had us on all fronts and armies warehouses remove all canned goods to the last cell. [265] Marshal Zhukov personally considered transition plan repatriated and gave mandate strict compliance order on the solid lines. Special attention was paid to the inadmissibility of any complications in relations with the Polish population - it was summer, the path of many gardens, orchards, ponds, categorically prohibits unauthorized go anywhere. Among the liberated us from German captivity were citizens of other countries, including the Americans, the British, the French. The fate of the German prisoner of war had been in the military from the allied armies of the world to take care not only our military commanders, and central government bodies. Citizens of the USA, Britain and France clothed, shod, fed and taken to the port of Odessa, where they march to their homeland. By the way, are not always the same answer we are allies. They often send us repatriated one-day supply of food, and by agreement was supposed to provide them for three days. Soon followed by other unfriendly actions by the Allies, but they are not the place to talk. I very briefly described the work of the Soviet military command and, in particular, the front and rear of the armies of the repatriation of liberated from Nazi captivity people. In essence it is a topic for the description and historical research. But a lot of even discussed here occurred after the war.
***

The war is not over, but it was nearing its end, and I had to think, as they say, about the future. In one of the last days of April 1945, I reported to the front of the Military Council of his intention to convene on April 30 Noyenhagene (7 kilometers south-west of Alt-Landsberg) obschefrontovoe chiefs meeting logistics army, head of the rear of the front, the governing party and political workers to the rear of the front discuss problems related to the upcoming transition to a peacetime footing

troops. Command has approved our proposal, and General Telegin ordered that at the meeting were invited to the second members of the military councils of armies. I take the surviving records to reproduce [266] some parts of my report, and from the statements of individual participants, for these materials to some extent characterize the current situation then. The very agenda of the meeting pointed to the fact that the end of war promises to workers rear prospects rest on our laurels. The issues of discussion the following issues: the organization of the front and rear of the army after the war, the collection of trophy assets, the maintenance of order in Berlin, on the repatriation of Soviet citizens, for the admission of prisoners of war after the German surrender. What and how we made the decision later to these problems, the reader is already aware of the previous story. At that meeting has not raised the issue of resignation from the army older - just awkward to put it, because war is not over, although Front Military Council foresaw the complexity of the task and demanded from the rear of the preparatory work. But as long as it was necessary to discuss the issues that directly resulted from the situation. - Comrades Nearing the end of the war. Our meeting today, apparently, the last meeting in wartime. Thus began my report. Frankly, I myself do not really believe that it will be so. After four years, every day and every hour, all thoughts were only about war, but about the situation on the front, only military equipment, the people, the roads, the transport! And now it was necessary to convince military friends and associates that from us, tylovikov depends largely on providing a relaxing holiday of our soldiers-winners, to provide them with an environment that they feel the charm of a peaceful life. Just think: four years to live in the trenches, dugouts, to sleep on the wet ground, his clothes, wash, somehow, to live in constant physical and nervous tension, to be affected by small-arms, artillery, aircraft fire, to hear the groans, seeing those killed or maimed comrades, dismiss the idea that you might face the same fate - and suddenly it's all behind now: you can calmly undress, undressed, lay down in a clean bed and dream about the future ... This was "the bliss of tomorrow" and had to think about senior commanders, first of all, we, the leaders of Logistics and its services. It was necessary to find and provide the Soviet soldiers barracks, bed, or even bunk with clean bedding, allow the well to wash, change clothes, put on clean clothing, sew white undercollar, polish shoes, shave and look at yourself in the mirror. [267 ] On the basis of the already adopted Front Military Council decisions we had to tidy up the rear, collect stretching for hundreds of kilometers rear institutions, equipment and supplies, to release the army of unnecessary assets, organize repair of uniforms and equipment, to establish manufacturing of clothes and shoes, as well as the rest of the property for enterprises in Germany. Our task now would also minimize government spending on the military overseas. Marshal Zhukov ordered the plan work with a view to the rear is not less than a year at the appropriate troop front. We had to learn it well to local conditions, available resources, to organize the spring sowing, harvesting and then to the land which the troops planted the front (and they with winter crop, there were 350,000 hectares) in order to have enough bread for at least a year , it was very important not to miss the time for planting in the area of potatoes, cabbage, cucumbers, tomatoes, and to ensure that our men for a year, and vegetables.

The meat that we can solve the problem, we thought only developing pig. Our front-line economy were 66,000 pigs had to preserve breeding stock and take care of the herd growth by organizing this large pig farms, using the services of the local population. If we are good host and we will be surplus, we will take them to the Soviet Union. These and many other questions I tabled a crowd. Addressed the meeting of more than 20 generals and officers, and each of them brings a grain of his own experience.
***

May 2 fell Berlin. With great excitement gave each of us an order of the Supreme Commander: "... The 1st Belorussian Front, with the assistance of the 1st Ukrainian Front after heavy street fighting, completed the rout of the Berlin of the German troops and today, May 2, complete control of the German capital, the city of Berlin - the center of German imperialism and a hotbed of German aggression. " On May 8, 1945, was scheduled to sign a Karlhorst, a suburb of Berlin, an act of complete and unconditional The surrender of Nazi Germany. The ceremony of signing the instrument of surrender took place on the night of May 9, 1945. I had to manage the organizational and economic support of the ceremony. May 8 Karlhorst representatives arrived in all the Union armies. The Soviet High Command was represented by Marshal Zhukov, British High Command - Air Chief Marshal A. Tedder, the armed forces of the United States of America - Strategic Commander U.S. Air Force Gen. C. Spaatz, the French armed forces - Chief of the French Army, General J. Delatr de Tassigny. In Karlhorst have been delivered and the representatives of the defeated German forces - Field Marshal Keitel, Admiral Friedeburg and Colonel-General Stumpf. German representatives placed in a small mansion near the former military engineering school in Karlhorst, where it was scheduled to sign the instrument of surrender and a banquet for the occasion. Early in the morning on May 8 we have taken steps to ensure that the table for the German representatives in the space they mansion was set properly. Instructing waitresses dining PX EP Mihetko and ED do Pavlova laying the table for Keitel and his party, I was summoned by the chief military trade front NV Kashirina his deputy A. Morgunova and chefs in . M. Pavlova, to listen to them on the preparations the dinner, which was to begin after the signing of the surrender, about 15 hours on May 8. Even before the chef Pavlov suggested they developed the dinner menu. First we had to deal with "supply" of this kind. Everyone, of course, well aware of what was the moral emotions and people in financial difficulties due to the war. It would seem not to banquets at a time ... But it was completed an unprecedented scale war! For the first time brought together representatives of the victorious powers on such a solemn occasion. We had to take the good people. Pavlov proposed menu has been agreed with the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and approved by Vasiliev Marshal Zhukov.

Range of products needed so varied that I had to seek assistance from the food industry of the USSR Minister VP Zotov. [269] After a few hours, and all the missing food and drinks were flown to Berlin. Voentorg Front also highlighted some of the stocks. It was necessary to attract and workers canteen 1st-tier front, chief of administrative division of the headquarters of the front LS Chernoryzh and Chief PX at the headquarters of the front YE Malinowski took an active part in preparing the meal, so mainly in the organization courtroom where the alleged acceptance of surrender. This hall can accommodate 300 people - 400. Tables were set up with a "P" when signing the Act and the letter "W" - during the dinner. For German representatives was set right at the entrance of a small table. While there was a conference room equipment, I was invited to assess the cooking art Pavlova. About the man I want to say more. I first met him in 1943 at Kursk in a hospital front. After inspection of hospital wards and polling claims wounded we saw the food unit, and there I saw Pavlova. Wounded unanimously praised the quality of hospital food and thank the chef. Paul is on the exterior of a classic type of Russian cook. His imposing figure, broad face, gray-blue eyes, a nice smile, extraordinary kindness of the entire appearance, professional way to indulge in the detailed description of the feed meal - everything was in it attractive. [270] Later, when we moved forward and the hospital, where he worked, remained outside the borders of the front, Pavlov was appointed chef generals dining 2nd-tier field management front. From that time until the end of the war, I have often heard rave reviews of the extraordinary skill of the chef. Currently works as the head of production Pavlov restaurant Kharkov station. As an eminent specialist, he was awarded the title of Master Chef of the national category, which witnessed a diploma and signed by Anastas Mikoyan. Knowing Pavlova, we could not doubt that the training is a formal dinner "at the highest level." But suddenly developed complications. By 15 o'clock, May 8 dinner was prepared and signed the instrument of surrender was postponed.It was already evening, and the team to convene people in the courtroom did not come. The few times I spoke to Marshal Zhukov, expressing his concern for the quality of lunch. But not his wire depended on what were the causes of high diplomatic order: Moscow, Washington, London, could not agree on a procedure for the adoption of surrender ... Cooks did not care about those negotiations, their troubled one - as would not lose face and show eminent Europeans in all the splendor of Russian cooking art. A couple of times I went to the house Keitel. He sat at a table covered with a more modest. Behind him and other German representatives were British officers. Keitel behaved with independent views, to the food barely touched. He would at any moment to be called to the meeting room, and there, before the whole world, to sign a document that forever pilloried the German militarists, - the act of unconditional surrender. Op sat pompous, stretching his neck, with the monocle. Finally, the long-awaited hour. At the table, the official representatives of the victorious powers in the center sat focused, stern Zhukov. Infinitely clicked the shutter and video cameras. Reporters and cameramen were busy, fast walking in the huge hall, trying to climb higher, to better capture the event. The ceremony was opened by Marshal Zhukov, he welcomed the generals, diplomats, and all the guests. He then commanded to enter the hall of representatives of the Nazi high command. Paintings gesture Field Marshal Keitel, welcomed the audience with a rod. [271] After the verification of credentials was presented to representatives of the German act of unconditional surrender. Started the procedure of signing each instance.

Keitel at that moment I could not see - he was obscured crowd of reporters and cameramen. But that was over the procedure of signing the instrument of surrender, Marshal Zhukov ordered to divert German generals. Soviet people and still be proud of the fact that, by embodying Soviet arms, indomitable will of the Soviet people, led throughout the ceremony was Marshal Georgy Zhukov. After the signing of the surrender (this was about 0.45 Moscow time on May 9, 1945), while there was a preparation for dinner (lunch at 2 o'clock in the morning) around Zhukov tight circle gathered Soviet generals and journalists, congratulating each other end of the war. Among those present were many comrades who have passed the way from Moscow to Berlin. Turning to his comrades-in-arms, Zhukov speech, remaining to this day in my memory: "The party and the government in the hour of mortal danger looming over the homeland, have entrusted us defense of our motherland in Moscow in 1941, and the trust of our gallant troops acquitted, the city was not put to shame the enemy. Crack Hitler's troops were defeated on the outskirts of the capital. Now, in 1945, we were once again the trust and a great honor to complete the defeat of the hated enemy in his own lair. And that trust is even more brilliantly met our glorious soldiers hoisted the banner of victory over the Reichstag. " In the 2nd hour of the night, all participants were invited to the ceremony to the table. Chief consultant on the ceremonial was the same Vassiliev, who recommended to seat guests, so that next to every Soviet general sat a Frenchman, an Englishman and an American. This order was observed at all tables. I sat at a table near the main entrance, where it was easier to me to observe the entire room and the work of the staff. Chief steward of Nutrition NV Kashirin was not far from me, and it was easy to catch my sign, calling on the table to bring the missing dishes and bottles. The banquet opened Marshal Zhukov brief but expressive toast for victory over the Soviet soldiers, for the soldiers of the Union of us, to the health of all present. Then, the same short toasts uttered Tedder, Delatr de Tassigny, Spaatz, a member of the Military Council of the Front KF Telegin, [272] generals Sokolovsky, NE Berzarin, S. Bogdanov, VI Chuikov, etc. Frankly, all of us, including our guests, very hungry. No one was disappointed by the brevity of toast. And there was no need for them. The situation from the very beginning there was a very friendly, everyone was trying to say to each other nice, using a poor fund of foreign words.Although I got a perfect score on the English language in the final examination at the Military Academy. Frunze in 1940, but knew little spoken language, but also a lot and forgotten. Still, I was able to maintain an elementary conversation at the table at some conventional, but still understandable Englishman language. The whole conversation was brought together to praise from guests for dinner. Guests overturned glass after glass with "Russian bitter": even the great Armenian brandy had no such demand as "Special Moscow." Although it was early morning, but the soup daily taken guests with great pleasure, which gave special joy to the chef. Another great success Ukrainian turkey with cream and cake with Ural fish. I sat opposite the American general said my influence and resources to fill before the break up, he asked me to provide him the departure of a bottle of vodka and caviar

sandwiches. Of course, not only he, but also other foreign generals have such a "one for the road on the way." The banquet ended with songs and, of course, the daring Russian dance. For the second time I had a chance to see the war as dancing Marshal Zhukov. The first time was November 19, 1944 in Biala Podlaska on the occasion of the artillery. He and General Radzievskii then showed a fair ability - the cavalry! At this time paired with Zhukov was Delatr de Tassigny. Both of them tried to outdo each other with complicated shapes ... It was about 6:00 in the morning. It was time to depart for home. We parted as real fighting friends. It was hard to conceive that the friendship sealed in blood, will soon be overshadowed by the long period of "cold war." If all of the veterans who fought against fascism, do not forget hard lessons of the last war, mankind could live and work safer, more confident about the future. [373]
***

Peaceful life began for us away from home. Soldiers do not raise the alarm, they were allowed to sleep longer, gave more so-called personal time. In the evening of the barracks heard the song, the music. Gunners nadraivayut material part, put blankets on the newly cooled guns. Tankers cleaning, brush and even embellish the material part.Cavalrymen tidy outfit, polish the bit, stirrups, repairing saddles and most are busy around their horses. Everyone has their own work and personal care. Many people who have a family is gone, no more blood, even the village burned to the ground and the plant was evacuated to the east, overcome difficult thoughts: where to go after the military? What to do next? As the war, all these issues arose sharply for a moment to once again fade away - maybe tomorrow I'll do anything I will not think ... Now thoughts are haunting. Soon begin muster-out of older people will ask questions to which you want to go? Commanders at all levels, from platoon leader to general, had to help his staff as much as possible to solve their life questions. Even before the war, the Army began to receive a job offer. People are needed everywhere. The country is a broad front was a campaign against the devastation against countless disasters brought by the war. Choose any area, any industry, any farm! Of course, in each case, the decision to take it easy, and it turned out not always successful. But on the whole issue of employment to demobilized presents no difficulties. For us, tylovikov, firing thousands of soldiers serving at home, meant a new concern: many clothing and footwear have become worthless.We had to re-wear, shoes of every person to be left in good health and good spirits. Without burdening the country requests and the requests we have made on the site to 400 thousand sets of new clothing, new shoes, no less than 1 million pairs of clean underwear. By the decision of the National Defence Commission dismisses each well on duty, we had to give a gift. In essence, it was all because the front was not bad on duty.Consequently, our front was to prepare thousands of gifts as possible while taking into account the personal needs of laid-off, the composition of their families, etc. [274] Front Military Council singled out from among the spoils of war in the gift fund radios, cameras, bicycles, sewing machines, and ordered to give each laid off one set of clothing - men, women or children. For a fee, anyone can purchase any available six meters of fabric in stock.

Seems to have remained a technical issue - give gifts to give 300 - 400 thousand new suitcases and duffel bags. But when it came to about traffic, again there was a set of intractable problems. The train could not put more than a thousand demobilized. Where to get in a short period 400 - 500 trains? The reader, in all probability, have not forgotten that required immigrants to carry one thousand trains. And because all the traffic was layered on one another! It was clear that the railway send all demobilized was impossible. Offered to send them on foot, and for things to allocate road and cartage.But can you add walking to the Urals, Siberia, the Far East? Started calculating alternative transport. Head of road management Front, PS Wiseman estimates that for the transport of the demobilized to Brest for two months will require 5,000 vehicles and 42,000 tons of fuel. Marshal Zhukov, but demanded that the dismissal was carried out within one month instead of two. First, the soldiers themselves were torn home, secondly, the country urgently needed working hands approaching harvest ... So, we had to come up with something else. By this time it became clear that our army is obliged to send to the USSR, and denote the number of horses combatant 50,000 animals, of course, their own. What if these horses and carts to send? Front membership is comprised of 59,000 vehicles and 30 thousand of them could be easily abandoned. If each wagon accommodate 4 - 5 people, it is much easier solution. Thus was born the version of the combined method of sending demobilized, approved by the Military Council of the front. Each army has decided it differently. Only the "foot option" completely dropped. Military railroad made sure to train for demobilized were well washed, disinfected, provided beds and equipment. Food service has equipped the entire journey kitchen fire and bakeries. Financial Services has made [275] calculations with fire and lump sum remuneration, salary for two months and in the field of money. Was exchanged for the local currency Soviet money, so that the soldiers could buy in stores PX desired him the goods. Financiers have done all this work without bureaucracy, avoiding long lines at the Treasury tables. In general, all of the home front did their best to make victorious warrior went home in a good mood. In Brest, happily greeted their population. And then the military tyloviki taken care of in advance, to help local authorities as well as possible to the defenders of the homeland - some civil authorities could then deal with the device such a meeting. Went to the front, soldiers, sergeants, petty officers. "And you, comrade Grun, when intending to leave for home?" - I asked my driver. "Oh, will serve with you as you can be! 'Remains Dmitry Maksimovich Grun serve" as you can be. " Frankly, I could not imagine how I could part with this man. How much time with him, we got in trouble on the front, especially in the first days of the war, how many times were there, watching from above flying black "cigar" with enemy aircraft! [276] Grun '22 sat behind the wheel of my company car, and can not remember a single accident, even a small failure. Case, frankly speaking, is not often in life, however, he was, perhaps, because the feature Grunya - absolute tranquility, silence and focused attention in any situation. In all the years away there was no case to Grun turned his head to me or to another passenger in conversation with him. God forbid! He always looked straight ahead at the road. In long conversations but he also joined, usually limited to monosyllabic "yes" or "no." Something that he worried, I knew immediately without words at this moment it is something whistled softly to himself. Sitting next to him adjutant M. Sviridov was also in the way malorazgovorchiv. He turned to me only when doubted the correctness of the route. After the war, we parted on his demobilization. He became adjutant

accidentally receiving such assignment after being seriously wounded when he could be if he wanted to, to leave the Army. In 1964 Grunia turned 50. He continues his former job at the Military Academy. His name has been on the Leaderboards. It was hard to part with such a person. At every meeting with him, it gives me great pleasure to shake his hand, look him in the open, still face beaming with kindness. For more than 20 years after the war, a new generation. Fewer and fewer and fewer friends who fought the Nazis. During the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the Victory in the enterprises, collective farms, state farms, institutions meetings were held, war veterans were awarded medals and souvenirs. But it is good to remember these people are not in one, four, five, five years, and every year - not every live to see the next five years.
***

Our economy has lost so much in the war, that there was no question about that Germany could recover all the lost, especially in the post-war state of its economy. Nazis destroyed 1,710 Soviet cities and more than 70,000 villages, 32,000 industrial enterprises, 98,000 farms, 1,876 farms. They blew 65,000 kilometers of railways, spoiled and taken 16,000 locomotives, 428,000 wagons, etc. In general, the material loss of the Soviet Union was about 2 trillion 600 billion rubles. [277] It is unlikely that the entire industry of Germany, East and West, had It was dismantled and taken to the last bolt, would be sufficient compensation for such losses. It is clear to everyone. As we move our troops to the west we met more often large military-industrial properties built for the needs of Nazi Germany's aggressive war: gunpowder, aircraft, tank factories, etc. In accordance with the Crimea decisions they had to be destroyed immediately: remove and blow up.This work is also carried out of the front and rear bodies of armies on the instructions of the Soviet government headed by commissioners of the National Defence MZ Saburov and P. Zernov. It was a very complicated and difficult job. She required a well thought out technology and highly skilled performers. I must say that in some cases, the German engineers and workers have given us active support. I remember a gunpowder factory in Bromberg. It was a whole city with a vast network of underground utilities. Even more striking picture opened in Mezeritsskogo abroad, where several kilometers underground stretch workshop aircraft factories, supplying aircraft - fighters and bombers. This was what is called military potential of Hitler's Germany, and similar items to be destroyed. Again, it was difficult to solve these problems at a time when there was a war. Before bodies rear was acutely raised questions related to ensuring the victorious end of the war. The road was every car, every employee rear, every minute of the time. We certainly could not fully carry out all work related to the destruction of large military-industrial sites of Nazi Germany, but did everything to make the maximum possible. This is in the interest of the homeland, which we were so indebted to!

***

It was clear that the resources available to us do not have enough meat. Rely on the supply of livestock or meat from the Soviet Union would be wrong. Meanwhile, the front (along with returnees) consumed 450 tons of meat every day, or about 1,500 head of cattle. We have already said that all military units and formations [278] , it was recommended to ease the situation, to acquire part-time farms, mostly for breeding pigs. But why not help to solve the problem is the meat and by the fish? After all, the Baltic Sea coast for 300 kilometers adjacent to the territories occupied by our troops, and, in addition, everywhere there were many inland waters. During June 1945 the matter thoroughly investigated. Each army, each province and district governor given the task - consider preserved fishing cooperative, save and Potential fish catches, and find out what help is needed from the front to immediately deploy commercial fishing. July 11, 1945 troops of the Military Council issued a decree "On the organization of fishing on the Baltic Sea." In 1945 he had to catch 21,000 tons of fish, which replaced the 14 000 tonnes of meat, or about 100 thousand head of cattle. According uprodsnaba Group of Forces in the former fisheries was considered 103 motor boats, sailboats - 21-166 motor boats, sailboats - 12, rowing boats - 132, seines and nets - 2355. A lot of fishing gear was found on the front and army warehouses. Risen a lot of organizational and economic questions: where to get the containers, cans? We had to bring in the canneries large amounts of salt, oil, pepper, bay leaf. Needed wagons refrigerators. They began to search among soldiers and repatriated people who have experience in the fishing business. Was established incentive pay system for successful fishing, especially palpable for German fishermen: they were given a fair amount of in-kind products. Germans set to work together, but from our side it took a big help vehicles, fuel, etc. It was especially important to complete the already started clearing coastal waters - until it was done, the fishermen did not want to go to sea. Fishing was a completely new thing for all of us, because during the war we had not met before. But the need to learn everything. And learned to fish. Army and individual housing denounced the catch of 500 - 700 tons of fish per decade. Fighters willing to take fresh fish instead of meat. Thus was solved this problem.
***

A few words on the participation of employees in the preparation of the rear of the front Potsdam Conference. We started with podyskivaniya place for the conference. A group of officers, among whom was the chief representative of the rear of the front Colonel GD Kosoglyad (head quarters and operations manager of the front), has traveled in two cars around Berlin. Their choice fell on Babelsberg, near Potsdam. It's a beautiful summer residence area, all in the green, where she lived the biggest Berlin bourgeoisie. Homeowners fled to the west, leaving the workers. I was next to a beautiful park of Sanssouci Palace with former German Crown Prince. Zhukov approved this decision, after which Stalin also spoke on this option: in a communication dated 18 June 1945 addressed to Churchill, Stalin recommended location for the conference

Babelsberg. Each delegation will have an allied private rooms, and the joint meeting of the international conference scheduled to perform at the palace of the Hohenzollern. As long as the diplomatic correspondence, we began construction and repair work. Their volume was significant. In Babelsberg before the arrival of Soviet troops all underground utilities have been blown up, water, sewerage and electricity networks destroyed. We had to re-repair of 6 - 8 holiday houses in Babelsberg for each delegation and bring some access roads to them. There were built six kilometers of new roads, well paved, and restored 15 miles past. Particularly complex was renovated palace of the Crown Prince. For many years he has not been repaired, and the interior decoration of his dilapidated. It had 36 rooms, including 22 on the ground floor. Each delegation should be given a separate entrance, a common entrance intended for correspondents and staff. Conference room, where they were held joint meetings, also had four separate entrances.In addition, next to the hall for each delegation was prepared for one common room and several study rooms. So on "White Room" - for the Soviet delegation, "Blue Room" - for the American delegation "Pink Room" - for the British delegation. The palace has been completely renovated (Outside his window did not have to close the black-out curtains, as they were covered thickly overgrown greenery). Conference room is in past years had been redecorated inside an oak, and now require only a thorough cleaning of the walls. The U.S. and Britain monitored the repair work vosstanovitelnyh, presenting sometimes very demanding. At their request had walls in the halls and bedrooms decorate colored natural silk. The floors were covered with a everywhere expensive carpets. It seemed to me that Stalin should furnish the mansion no less luxurious, and something in that direction has already been done. But the representative of Moscow, General N. Vlasic explained that the finish will be more modest than the appearance, the better. Instead of expensive beds and furniture brought from somewhere, were delivered just a bed and sofas simple, austere desk and a chair for him. Office, a bedroom, a reception was re-painted in dark colors, all rugs from the room cleaned and replaced the tracks. For a conference room round table diameter of 6.8 meters has been made in a Moscow furniture factory "Lux". Around him placing two rows of seats: first row - for the heads and members of the delegation, the second - for their assistants and consultants. For repair work on the premises and to repair damaged underground communications were brought by German engineers, technicians and workers (for which the head of logistics, front allocated rations 1200). Take the good road builders and engineers Donets General General Proshlyakova, with extraordinary rapidity, they paved and asphalted all the entrances and exits, laid in such a way that everywhere was possible oncoming traffic. (Management services of particular importance was attached!) To build two new bridges across the lake in Potsdam and two bridges repaired. Great work has been done on the improvement and rehabilitation of the territories adjoining the park Sanssouci, brought and planted more than 1,500 tui, silver fir and other trees, made a 50-beds and planted a lot of flowers. For the sake of security of all the surrounding area was divided into three rings - the outer, middle and inner. Protection of two rings carried the Soviet people, the inner ring was delimited into three sectors, each of which was guarded by the relevant people power. Meals and other services by appointment secures each delegation its forces and resources (at the Yalta Conference was different, there are all the costs of care and carried the Soviet Union), only buffet in the conference hall was common, due to the Soviet Union.

Now this work, will cause a lot of trouble tylovikam seem quite unimportant. But tell her I have to [281] in this book on the rear of the front, for this example once again confirms the truth that there is no such provision, and there is no event that is at least for a short period of time would remove from the head of logistics burden of care, and that Very often, these provisions and events such as the burden is getting heavier. So in this case. Of course, to cope with the work described above - is not that serve half million troops. But in Babelsberg not pass an hour, not to create a tense and nervous situation. As a representative of permanent delegation at the Office of the Chief of Staff, I highlighted the rear of the front of General MK Shlyahtenko. Direct supervisor of construction works was Colonel GD Kosoglyad and household devices occupy the chief of the economic division of the headquarters of the front LS Chernoryzh. Following the conference, many of the actual perpetrators involved in the preparation and maintenance of the conference were government awards. Deserve special praise and Kosoglyad Chernoryzh.
***

Every year war fierce anger and hatred of the enemy grew in the hearts of Soviet citizens. As our troops were approaching the age-old German lands, in the soul of many of us infancy anxiety, if we can harness the massive anger?Prevail if the forces of humanity and reason over the natural desire for revenge? But the Communist Party has kept his people, his army of alien to us of the massacre. The party has kept its army from the danger of decomposition than always ends revel in their glory winners, giving the looting and violence towns and villages conquered country. Not the Germans were waiting. Nearer to Berlin, we saw the Germans, plowing the land, to plant potatoes. But they were alone, and they were treated with individual plots of land. The greater part of the lands between the Oder and Berlin, and even west of Berlin remained untreated. Not to care about the future at that time was to the Germans! Many of them saw themselves condemned and feared that they would have to pay for all of their actions by themselves or their friends and compatriots. But we treated it differently. Whatever our feelings, we were clear that "Hitlers come and go, but the German people remain". [281] No matter how strong while apathy and depression in the wider circles of the Germans, there was no delay in mobilizing the population for the spring sowing. Nearing the end of the war - will rise tomorrow, the problem of peace. In those days the team arrived in Berlin, Walter Ulbricht, who took over the leadership of the democratically-minded part of the population. Walter Ulbricht immediately immersed himself in the restoration of the country's economy, the establishment of a new life. Finding out the situation, he turned for help to the Soviet command. Front Military Council expressed its readiness to provide any assistance. Conductor of this kind of solutions of the Military Council were bodies behind. Much depended on the speed and organization of the entire system of logistics, from its willingness to engage in new economic affairs. We have already mentioned that in preparation for the Berlin operation, while still on the east bank of the Oder, the troops on our front launched work on the spring sowing, to May 5, 1945 the area of land planted with troops reached 350 thousand hectares. Now I had to continue this work.

In the eastern part of Germany, there were convenient land 6.7 million hectares, of which 1.4 million were planted with wheat and rye in the autumn of 1944. (For Germany - is an unusual event, there is always dominated by winter crop, but the war made its amendments). About 5 million hectares have been sown in the spring. Many estates left without owners, part of the estates took over the peasants, and appointed their managers, and the rest remained unsupervised. We had to stop the squandering of orphan estates mobilize surviving inventory, arrange for repairs, suspend the withdrawal of horses, and most importantly - to help seed, potatoes, tractors, fuel, transport. In all of this was provided by the German population significant assistance from our command. Thousands of tons of potatoes, millet, peas and other crops that are not yet too late to plant and sow, were given to the Germans, and they helped us with tractors, engines and fuel. In the end, the entire area was planted. Working in the field, the Germans woke up from lethargy and proved, as before, stewards and workers. However, the most complex and difficult food challenges facing the rear of the front, was the supply of Berlin. In a city used to be about 5 million people, to our parish remained almost 2 million, and the rest scattered throughout Germany. Berlin - industrial center with one of the largest sections of the working class. It has long been working in Berlin lived from hand to mouth, and at the end of war, hundreds of thousands of them were starving. [283] Bourgeoisie fled, were hard workers, and they took care of the Soviet government even before the German surrender. From the first day of arrival in Berlin Front Military Council pending decisions of the National Defence on the subject introduced temporary regulations providing the population of Berlin. 8 of his book Zur Geschichte der neusten Zeit, published in 1955, Walter Ulbricht says: "At that time the German people could not stand firmly on its feet without outside help. The population of the German Democratic Republic will never forget the selfless work of peaceful Soviet commanders and officers, and more recently fought against Nazi troops, now they have started with an unprecedented energy to helping the Germans, urging their determination and dedication to get to work. It was a worthy end of the liberating mission of the Soviet troops. " May 9, 1945 in Berlin, profit Vice Chairman of People's Commissars of the USSR AI Mikoyan and Chief of Logistics of the Red Army General AV Hrulev. They brought the decision of the Soviet Government on the organization to the population of Berlin. In accordance with the rules of the persons engaged in heavy physical work, and working in hazardous occupations issued by day 600 grams of bread, 80 grams of cereal and pasta, 100 grams of meat, 30 grams of fat, 25 grams of sugar, the workers received 500 grams of bread , 60 grams of pasta and cereals, 65 grams of meat, 15 grams of fat and 20 grams of sugar. Rest of the population received 300 grams of bread, 30 grams of pasta and cereals, 20 grams of meat, 7 grams of fat and 15 grams of sugar. In addition, each resident received 400 - 500 grams of potatoes a day and 400 grams of salt per month. Finally, on the cards were given coffee and tea. For scientists, engineers, doctors, workers of culture and art, as well as for managers of urban and regional self-government, heavy

industry and transport were set the same standards as for the workers employed in physically demanding and dangerous jobs. Other technicians in Berlin, as well as entrepreneurs, teachers, and church leaders, received food under the same standards as regular working enterprises. For patients being treated in hospitals, special rules were introduced. In addition, Mikoyan ordered all the children of Berlin up to 13 years of age every issue but 200 grams of milk. Initially, we hoped to provide power more than 2 [284] million recorded inhabitants of Berlin, and, based on this number, printed ration cards. However, it soon changed. Having heard that the Soviet military command no reprisals against Germans not uchinyaet and even, on the contrary, intended to feed the inhabitants of Berlin from all over Germany to the capital flowed long lines of men, women and children - who on what he could: by bicycle, motorcycle, polurazbityh cars, carts, hand carts harnessed to dogs or just walking. I had to print additional ration cards, bringing the number to 4 million. To feed the population of Berlin was harvested from the resources of the 1st and 2nd Byelorussian and 1st Ukrainian Front for five months need 105 000 Tony grain, 18,000 tons of meat, 4,500 tonnes of fat, 6,000 tons of sugar, 50,000 tons of potatoes the monthly demand, 4000 tons of salt and 350 tons of coffee. All the work on delivery of food to Berlin, on the organization of the distribution network, in order to ensure the issuance of food Berliners Mikoyan lies with the rear of the front, the rear of the front head announcing that he is personally responsible for the accurate and timely fulfillment of the government's decision. That's really no way I thought of, say, six months ago, I would have to feed the Germans! While we were busy with the importation of food, in Berlin there were a lot of provocative rumors. Even whispered that, say, the Germans will collect food items from there to perehvatat all. What surprise people when the appointed day and time (May 15 at 8 am) Open all stalls and began issuing food! Not long before, Mikoyan, viewing text ration card, he asked me: - And what are you going to give coffee to the Germans? - Surrogate, - I answered. - Why is not natural? I replied that organic coffee in the warehouses of the front is not very long ago and I myself did not drink it. Mikoyan said: - In stock you do not, and in the Soviet state is. Take the trouble to each card in the "coffee", add the word "natural" ... I had to print additional word "natural" in the 4 million cards. [285] While we have made this amendment, an alternate member of the ICT on food issues VP Zotov sent from Moscow to Berlin train and natural coffee, the People's Commissariat of Communications has provided this tier "green light." As always, Zotov helped us in difficult times. When they began to produce products, the Germans were surprised: all but the ruling elite and the rich, long, and seemed to have forgotten all the smell and taste of real coffee, and they could not believe that Russian now suddenly it will, but we were given on the cards is a natural Coffee, though a month or even two months in advance to pack not to share, and deliver it to the customer completely.

On the first day of issue of food Mikoyan and Marshal Zhukov personally visited a number of grocery stores. Everywhere they found the proper order and not just listen to the Germans sincere gratitude to the Soviet people for the help. According to the decision of the Military Council of the Front of Berlin city authorities were given 1,000 trucks and 100 cars, 1,000 tons of fuel and lubricants, 5000 head of dairy cows to provide milk for children and the sick. At the rear of bodies has been tasked with the military commandant of the city, Colonel General Berzarina facilitate the rapid establishment of normal life in the city, an outdoor theater, cinema, cafes, restore lighting, telephony, increased health surveillance, launching industry, shipping coal, etc . I have before me a report Chief of Logistics of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany, a member of the National Defence Commission of AI Mikoyan of 21 June 1945 on the supply of food to the population of Berlin and of the organization of normal utilities and urban transport, medical and cultural institutions. The report stated: "As of June issued the required amount of food stamps. Chain stores enough, no queues. Children are regularly given milk. Food is given without interruption. Conducted extensive sanitary and epidemiological logical intelligence, eliminated pockets of infection. In the city, collected and buried more than two thousand dead animals. Examined waterworks, forbidden to use the clogged sources. Organized medical monitoring for refrigeration and canning and sausage factories. [286] started to work: 92 hospitals, four children's hospitals, nursing homes 10, 146 pharmacies, dispensaries 9, four dispensaries, clinics 13, three children's consultation, ambulance stations 6. The total number of hospital beds 31,780. Doctors working in hospitals, 654, Private Practice - 801. Create Main Health Office in Berlin and regional authorities. Capacity of existing power plants increased to 98,000 kW. Connected to the mains: 33,000 houses, water and sewage plants 51, 4 baths, laundries, 7, 480 hairdressers, bakeries 1084. Restored and includes over three thousand lights street lighting. Put into operation 15 water stations with a daily capacity of 510,000 cubic meters, restored the main water line. Connected to the water supply of buildings 85000 and all running utilities. Put into operation 35 pumping stations.

Commissioned in 39.2 kilometers of subway lines, 52 stations opened, running 16 trains consisting of 62 wagons. Put into operation eight tram lines with a total length 65.4 km, runs 122 train. Permission for use 7 lines Omnibus posts 91 kilometer long, running 46 omnibuses. Put into operation five gas plants with a total daily capacity of 157,000 cubic meters. Put into operation six baths, renovated five baths. Put into operation 10 laundries. For the transportation of coal from Silesia formed 18 railway turntables. Briquetted coal from Mncheberg driving up the 25 decks, 850 tons each. Opening of shops and restaurants yet received little development. Open and operating theaters: "Western theater", where we have a ballet group "Renaissance" - a theater (comedy), Symphony Orchestra, in the next few days will work opera and drama theaters. Open and operate 45 Varietes, 127 cinemas, the attendance of which from 80 to 100 thousand a year. " And so on ... You read it and could not help remembering what the fate of Hitler was preparing for our capital, Moscow, if he could take her. At a meeting at the headquarters of Army Group "Center" in 1941, Hitler said: "The city should be surrounded by so that not a single Russian soldier, not a single resident - whether man, woman or child could not leave it. Any attempt to suppress the output force. Make the necessary [287] preparations to Moscow and its surroundings with huge buildings were flooded. Where is Moscow today, should have a great sea that forever hide from the civilized world capital of the Russian people ... " The same fate was preparing for Leningrad. "For all other cities, - said Hitler - should operate normally, that in front of their employment, they have to be reduced to ruins

by artillery fire and air strikes. Unacceptable risk the life of a German soldier to rescue the Russian cities of Fire " {13} . One of Hitler's loyal dogs, Field Marshal Reichenau, issued an order in 1941, which stated: "Purchasing power of local residents and war is unnecessary humanity" ... Now, 20 years after the victory over Nazi Germany, we can say with great satisfaction to say that the seeds of humanity were left by the Soviet people in the fertile soil. In the face of workers' German Democratic Republic, the Soviet Union has found staunch allies. Consistently implementing democratic reforms, confiscating the Prussian Junker estates and property of war criminals, the working class and the peasantry in East Germany began building a new life. East Germany is among the top ten most developed countries of the world and now produces many industrial products, how it was made before the war in Germany. The German Democratic Republic is a reliable outpost of socialism in Western Europe. She is pursuing a peaceful foreign policy and has a strong deterrent effect on the revanchist policies Bonn bosses. The first-ever German socialist state firmly and confidently striding into the future. Fighting allies of the Soviet Army is the national People's Army of the GDR. The state line our relations with the GDR stitched treaties of friendship and mutual assistance in all directions. In 1945, and still the basis of our friendship is mutual respect for sovereignty and national characteristics. The blood shed profusely by the Soviet people in the struggle against fascism, calls us to fraternal solidarity in the struggle for peace in the world. [288]

THIS IS THE REAR (SOME RESULTS)

I just wanted to tell you about the basic functions of logistics and brought a few cases encountered in the work. Real manifold problems were so great, the conditions to each of them are so complicated and specific that even a dry protocol definition would require too much space. However, I hope that the reader will get some idea of the home front. What is the rear of the front? This is a great group of people to resolve a complex and varied tasks to ensure combat activities. This is a huge area, sometimes in the hundreds of thousands of square kilometers, which is equal to the area of France or Germany, and not just territory, but the whole economy, natural resources, production and labor, are on it. This communication rail, water, road, air, complementary means of transport used in accordance with the geographical features of the theater [289] war, weather conditions and the requirements of the combat situation. This set of formations, units, agencies, various special technical and other departments, summarized in a single system. The whole system has lived and worked only in their organic unity, cooperation and mutual assistance.

When all units of the rear, to the company, inclusive, and all the people that provide troops to the material, technical, medical, veterinary, transport and other respects, this team will be at least onefifth of the total number of troops: the 1st Belorussian Front in the rear there were at least 250,000 people. Certainly it is a lot. The perennial problem of all wars - to reduce the rear ... How many times in the last war, with frequent sieve were walking in the rear of various commissions in the search for "units" that could be cut in the rear states institutions in search of healthy, suitable for the system of people in search of weapons, more needed at the front. But the results of these searches have always been miserable, and not because someone they resisted. So is the nature of modern war and modern army, which rears tend to swell: every new weapon, a new branch of the armed forces requires more extensive and complex system maintenance and service. In Moscow, at the parade in front of you is mass on wheels or tracks, known as self-propelled or rocket. A Have you ever thought about how to feed this colossus ammunition, fuel and the most sensitive types of oils? Which roads and bridges as any additional cars and people want to make this technique flawlessly acted? All this is the rear of the front. Now the rear largely mechanized, but it is people, people and people. Without them it is impossible to do, even in this age of computer technology and cybernetics. As already mentioned, in the rear of the 1st Belorussian Front had about 1,500 units and agencies (not including divisional and regimental units). Each of them had to specify a location within the overall system operational deployment of troops, to ensure the means of communication, to timely deliver to him the problem and ensure that no one agency was not unmanageable. 20 generals, 33,000 officers, thousands of primary Party organizations, to 20 thousand Communists were [289] in the system of the rear of the front. These people have learned in school brutal war to overcome difficulties, to find a way out of a seemingly hopeless situation, and there is the rear of the front.
***

No matter how great is the rear area of the front, but it has its limits - the front, which coincides with the location of the forward units, side and rear. Boundary lines were established in order to know exactly command of the territory in which he granted the right to have the troops to use communications, echelon inventories and institutions produce billets food use for their needs industries, bases, warehouses, raw materials, involve the local population to certain works. This establishes the responsibility for maintaining order fronts for their assigned territory for safety communications for the protection and defense of the home front as a whole. In defense, the size of the territory usually happens twice deeper, and before they advance dramatically reduced. But so happened that in the course of deep offensive front line moves forward, and the transfer of the rear boundary line is delayed, then the area to be keeping the rear of the front, reaches thousands of kilometers in depth. And who was to blame in the fact that the transfer of the rear boundary of late? Then anything can happen. In one case, the front head of logistics itself is not interested in reducing the area because there are still far behind its inventory and logistic facilities, and that they "pull" is closer to the troops, it is necessary to retain the right of railway management, giving the territory to the Centre ,

head of the rear of the front was deprived of that right and fell into a direct function of the Centre in the front carriage of the resources and institutions. Of course, excessive stretching of the rear is extremely difficult to manage. It happens so that the head of the rear of the front was interested in the fact that as soon as possible to give the center over the territory, but the latter is in no hurry with this, as was not yet ready to take on the responsibility for maintaining order in the area, with the success of the railways, for the state of roads, etc. Often on this occasion was started lively and even nervous correspondence between the front and center. [291] But in itself the definition surround the dividing lines for the front and the army is very important - it is one way to control the system rear. In the designated boundaries of the Military Council of the Front have the highest authority, and acted on behalf of the Soviet government. Which is typical for all of the rear of the front during the war? In my opinion, it is his diversity and unity. It is this combination allowed by tylovikam solve problems quickly and to the end, freeing the commander of the large and small logistical issues. That's the point of adjustment made in August 1941 and fully justified the experience of war. However, there are comrades who believe that if war broke out in another way, it would have been good enough, and the pre-war structure of the rear. But this is misleading. Under present conditions, when so complicated command and control, and life itself has put forward the need for a single centralized system of logistic support of all kinds and types of troops. Before World War II Home Front direct supervision performed general staff. At the Joint Chiefs of Staff personally responsible for the organization and operation of logistics, which in the headquarters had special departments (offices) rear. Supply troops materiel, medical and veterinary chiefs were in charge of providing arms and services, subject to no headquarters and command directly. General staff responsible for organizing logistics, planning, material support, the transport of the organization, but directly responsible for the supply and maintenance of the troops did not carry, because these services are not subject to them. The experience of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939 - 1940 years. showed how often broken rear control because the Chiefs could not give this matter due consideration. Consequently, in some armies were then appointed deputy chief of staff for logistics, and in the 8th Army - Assistant Commander for Logistics. Unfortunately, this fleeting, but a very important experience was regarded then as a special case, and we are in the Great Patriotic War with fragmented system logistics. The term "logistics" was not before the war. Usually expressed as: "the organization of logistics and logistics operations." Although long term, but is not exhaustive. [292] Born in the beginning of the war, the system of logistics troops characterized in that it combines in a single governing body, the functions of the transport of supplies and functions. Break these two functions - it means to break the unity of the home front, sharply weakened. The versatility of the rear shows a simple list of services and areas in which the chief was in charge of the rear of the front during World War II: Rear headquarters. Politotdel rear.

Railways, recovery and maintenance. Roads, their construction, rehabilitation and maintenance. Automotive Service. Purchasing fuel. duffel supply. housing allowance. Medical Service. Veterinary Service. Financial Services. Rations. State Bank. Trophy service. Ivestock (after the war). Industry Division (after the war). Personnel Department. Voentorg. In addition to the above, the Chief of Logistics responsible for transport by all modes of transport ammunition, engineering equipment and everything else needed the troops during the war, to evacuate all unnecessary, which was in the army. From the list that was in charge of head of logistics not only basic kinds of supplies, but also all the means to deliver them to the troops. In this it is a complete system. Front commander had every reason to demand that his deputy for logistics flexible and timely resolution of issues, because in the hands of the chief of logistics for the front was all necessary. It is not general staff, and the head of logistics is the organizer. He organized the rear as it was the most profitable in every sense: Given the nature of the operation, reliability, protection and defense of the home front, the most convenience location rear agencies and organizations bringing up. In the last war chief of logistics for the first time made in full personal liability for the work of the Military Council of the rear from the beginning to the end of the operation. [293] What does it mean to organize the rear to the front? There can not be an abstract, whatever the organization behind. It should match the operational objectives of the front. From the foregoing description of the reader knows that if the troops are defensive task, and the rear must have an organization appropriate defense. As in any defense, there may be temporary setbacks, forced to waste or a deliberate concession to the enemy of the territory, a wide maneuvering troops and military equipment, a counterattack, etc. It would be very unwise to put at risk large numbers of enemy logistical facilities and inventory. Particularly unacceptable congestion wounded close to the front. Therefore, in the defense of the rear deep esheloniruetsya. From the depth is much easier to maneuver supplying of material resources, it is easier to provide regrouping. It is quite another to attack. Knowing the idea of command and general plan of offensive operations chief of logistics front accordingly organizes rear. It is a mistake to refer to the rear far the most important institutions and stocks before the offensive. Conversely, the more profound and rapid nature of the operation was in

the last war, the more reason to go for a decisive approach to forces of everything. Of course, within reason, is not a pattern. In the Vistula-Oder operation we decided on an unusual approach to the front of not only military, but also the front-line agencies and resources, and it is quite consistent with the operationalstrategic situation at the front. In another situation, we certainly would have done differently. Therefore, arrange the rear to the front - it means to make a rear organizational operational order that corresponds to the nature of the military operation. Development of communications, accommodation establishments rear, stock, the availability of vehicles - all to the greatest extent should provide fighting troops. The same idea can be expressed in other words, the rear should be well organized for the forthcoming operation, to retain as long as possible their stability and mobility, without undergoing major upheavals and reorganizations under certain partial changes on the front. There are many cases where even a slight imbalance in the rear of a detrimental effect on the troops at the front. When burned match factory in Kaluga, in October 1941, each soldier to defend the city, knew [294] that the Kaluga deliberately decided to give the enemy, and therefore there is no need to fight for it ... In order to organize the rear, his boss and his staff have to the fullest extent possible, and most importantly know in advance the concept of operations and plan for it. What is called the operative orientation superiors is paramount to the rear. Considerable harm in the last war was somewhere late, late orientation chief of logistics operations in the conception, planning it. If any arm of the commander or the chief of the service needed a few days to regroup forces and means, the rear of the front head had more time to bring the system in line with the rear of operation. Staff officer drew an arrow in one direction or another, and the troops moved their funds. A rear "arrow" is not controlled. He needs railways and roads, we need all kinds of transport to move tens of thousands of tons of goods, need careful organization. And, of course, takes time. That is why I emphasize again invaluable to the fact that the front commander Zhukov long before the Vistula-Oder operation acquainted me with a plan of its implementation. It is no exaggeration to say that even at this early stage, as the development plan, and the more the operation plan, the chief of the rear of the front should make it no less involved than the chief of staff of the front. The proper functioning of logistics involves both an indispensable condition - good communication between headquarters and the Chief of Logistics and general staff. Organize the rear - so anticipate. The depth and accuracy of prediction depends on the overall military theory and economic training leading generals and officers from the rear, on their ability to learn from past experience and the ability to objectively assess the intentions of the enemy, not only to our leading edge, but many hundreds of kilometers ahead, that is, in operational and strategic depth. Organization of the rear to the front is associated with a complex, not always identifiable phenomena. Much depends on the opponent. Organization of the rear to the front - this is not a drawing, re-applied on a clean sheet of paper. An organization does not arise only on the basis of design and operational solutions, and she, as well as very efficient solution, but even [295] largely depends on the nature of the theater of war, previous operations, the state of the troops and the home front. In other words, the range of activities carried

out at the completion of a previous operation, has a direct impact on the scope and timing of the new operation. Dependence and continuity between two successive operations - one of the characteristic features in the operational rear. In any case, it was in the last war. Organizers of the rear at once, of course, learned to analyze the situation and make a decision not memorized the scheme, and on the basis of specific conditions, often going beyond the formal provisions. Unconventional decision requires superiors not only greater expenditure of mental energy, but more courage, a willingness to take risks, to take on responsibility. But that is what war is. There is no undue risk will be smaller than the head of logistics work in concert with the general staff. A classic example of coordinated work of staff and the staff of the rear of the front, a deep understanding of the role of the commander of the logistics in the war and for its concern for timely operational orientation chief of logistics, I think the Vistula-Oder operation. A well-designed organization determines the successful solution of this problem, as the protection and defense of the home front. Already the group of institutions is an important aspect of the rear of the problem. Increasing the combat readiness of personnel, clear and vigilant performance of garrison duty, a right relationship with the troops of the Ministry of Interior to protect the home front, the involvement of local authorities and the population for the same purpose, and most importantly - a reliable air defense cover for the rear - all work together to provide the operational stability of the rear. However, officially regulates the rights and duties of the chief of logistics in an area for which he was responsible, was not working groping, and the end of the war, the question has not received sufficient clarity. We think that in the protection and defense of the rear head of logistics must be endowed with more power and he needs to have for this purpose in its jurisdiction sufficient forces and means. Properly plan for the possible material costs in the upcoming military operation - one of the main challenges head of logistics, the staff and the heads of all the services At the heart of such planning are well-known factors: the presence of the forces and means at the front, the length, depth and pace of the operation, the nature of the theater of operations, time of year and weather conditions, the experience of the previous [296] operations. Each of these factors has in a particular greater or lesser impact. The experience of the last war taught more carefully planning the logistics for the first phase of the offensive. However, it is equally important to provide for the totality of conditions that may occur in the final stage of the most difficult operations, which often depends on its successful completion. Most of the offensive operations of the last war ended with no fading, no reduction of military activity, but, on the contrary, increase it over a period of persecution, because the enemy has time to bring up reserves and aims to break away from our troops back. Only after the enemy convinced of the futility of their efforts, comes the real operational pause. For the planning of logistic extremely important to have a correct understanding of the concept of "operative" in order to better define the needs of material and tools, and the order to maneuver reserves. With regard to the operation, then define it very simply: Artillery training is generally well ushers in "D" and "H" (the day and hour of the scheduled time). And the end of the operation? Opinions are divided. The main force of the front reached the predetermined threshold - then solved the basic problem posed by a higher authority, and it can be considered the end of the operation. From this point of

view, the end of the Vistula-Oder operation for the 1st Belorussian Front can be considered Feb. 3, 1945, and then the duration of the offensive will be calculated at 20 days. But you can hear a different answer: the end of the operation means getting out of the main forces on the end line and securing them on this line. And in order to gain a foothold in a given turn, requires time, more human casualties and material costs. Finally, there is, in our view, the most correct definition of the end of the operation: the output forces on a given line, fixing them on this line and the creation of favorable conditions for the preparation of a subsequent operation. With this understanding of the issue late Vistula-Oder operation for the 1st Belorussian Front will start in March 1945, for only then the front in bloody battles to build on the results of the attack and created the conditions for the preparation of the Berlin operation. If during the first 20 days of the onset of the front and the release of his [297] on the Oder was expended 250,000 tons of material resources, over the next 20 - 30 days were spent another 250 thousand tons, and all, therefore, the Vistula-Oder operation required 500,000 tons of ammunition, fuel, food and other supplies. Our opinion will be more convincing if we analyze the loss of life. After reaching the Oder their number compared to the first 20 days has increased by two and a half times. Such is the character, this is the behavior of costs, natural, perhaps, for the Red Army. This is one of the most important lessons of the war. Thus the rear can not plan their work, based on such a formal moment achievement given the troops overseas. He must be ready to provide troops to critical - sometimes the most critical - moments that occur frequently immediately without any pauses after, let's say, the ultimate objective of the operation is achieved. This implies the importance of the issue of reserves - reserves of ammunition, fuel, medical capabilities, and most importantly - transport. Head of logistics without reserves - not head of logistics, it is helpless contemplative growing tragedy. Therefore, he must gather his courage, self-control, the will to hold in their hands the reserves until it is of absolute necessity to introduce them into the work, so as not to lose reserves prematurely, giving endless demands, requests and even threats from all sides. Caring for reasonable use of melting every day resource for their constant replenishment, the reserves - the general law of war, it is absolutely mandatory for the head of logistics. We are talking about the financial costs in the operations of the war. But some one may look to the future, to consider the same issue in the light of the ongoing technological revolution, without going into what appears to be another in a too vague outlines. Increase or decrease the material costs associated with the direct support of combat operations? I would say this: since the armed forces on both sides will keep such basic features as the mass and high technical equipment, the amount of material costs for a specific combat operation significantly ahead of the last war. Change in the structure of these costs: nearly completely eliminated (in the scale of the front) this kind of [298]supply, as fodder, who was previously around 40% of the total; repeatedly increase consumption of all types of fuel, the weight of which can pass for 50% of total funds spent . As for food, the consumption of it will match the number of consumers plus possible, sometimes significant loss product from new weapons. Naturally there will be necessary to significantly improve the methods of delivery of military goods, especially fuel. These powerful tools as field collapsible pipelines, heavy benzotsisterny, helicopters

will provide the delivery of fuel as soon as possible to rocket launchers, to the plane, to the tank and the car. Along the way, I want to emphasize the continuing urgency of this issue, as saving fuel. Unlikely to diminish the significance of this problem compared to the conditions of the war. The more vehicles will be involved in the war, so scrupulously adhered to fuel savings. If the Vistula-Oder offensive, which had a depth of 600 kilometers, has cost the 1st Belorussian Front of half a million tons of basic material resources (and the 1st Ukrainian Front, in the same), then the modern military equipment and automotive rear in a similar situation consumption far exceeds a figure. What is the impact on the consumption of material resources have a certain rate of advance? It is known that the operation of the last period of World War II are characterized by a high rate. This places high demands to the rear.However, experience has shown that the higher the rate of advance, the lower the losses incurred by coming not only in personnel, but also in material resources. If we compare the consumption of ammunition and fuel to each line kilometers, captured from the enemy forces of the 1st Belorussian Front in the Vistula-Oder and Berlin operations (the latter is characterized by a slow pace), the following picture (in tons): [299] The difference is huge! True, the Berlin operation - unusual operation: here the enemy fought with fanatical persistence of each quarter, a street, a house, and even the floor stairwell. But we have expressed the idea of the superiority of the high rate of occurrence of slow convincingly illustrated by the data. High rates of advance do not give the enemy no chance to make much damage man-made structures on roads and water barriers, and we got more of the territories and communications. The high pace of the rear feels particularly strongly. He also feels that the rapid movement of troops requires personnel rear exceptional organization, mobilization, limiting stress physical and moral strength, resourceful to find ways to ensure the faster the parts. Offensive task involves grouping the corresponding rear agencies, the establishment of reserves and maneuver them. The higher rate of planned offensive, the more determined to be made closer to the principle of the troops in the initial position of rear agencies supply bases for separation of forces from bases will grow with great rapidity under the force of the initial impact. For the same reasons it is advisable to remove the initial position of armies most of the features on Logistics, transferring it to the frontline managers. The Army will keep the rear in this case, the resources for the needs of the advancing troops. Thus, high rates of offensive require very sophisticated logistics organizations in all stages of the operation.
***

What is important in the rear? In military schools, academies for various exercises and games, you can often hear the answer: the main thing - ammunition, fuel, and without them it is impossible to fight, but the rest is not so important! I do not support these allegations and categorical oppositions. At one stage the success decide ammunition, on the other - the fuel - the third transport. But always, at all stages in the first place must be powered soldier.

It may sound harsh, but the voice of the stomach - a strong voice. "Fed five more soldiers hungry" used to say, Marshal Zhukov. Failure to understand this very expensive to us at the beginning of the war. Thought, will be a month or two, runs [300] Nazis and start living normally, but now you can starve or stay dry. But it turned out not so. Regardless of whether we are retreating or advancing, standing there on vacation, a soldier to feed daily two to three times a day, so even posytnee and tastiest. Our people all gave the Army to soldiers at the front was full. Rear bodies were conductors of the popular will. They have learned to do a lot themselves to time and it is better to feed the soldiers. The primary function of the rear - to feed, drink, dress, shoes and warm fighter. Err those of military comrades who look at this thing as a minor. Just think, the problem! Cook the soup, porridge - and, although the case cook (by the way is a very important profession in the front!) Bake two or three loaves of bread - also is not particularly tricky. But one 1st Belorussian Front had seconded with more than 2 million consumers.They had to give half a hot meal and at least two times a day - hot tea, bake daily about a thousand tons of bread. In urban areas, where you will find on every corner dining room, coffee shop, restaurant, everywhere supplied with gas, hot water and no enemy planes do not hang over your head, do not break the shells, and it is difficult to ensure that all people and all the time to feed. At the front, as often happens - everywhere bare field, at best, a shrub, not enough fuel, ruined mills and bakeries, the water is bad, to the same opponent keenly hunting down any stream of smoke on our side to come down on this place with fire. In such circumstances, it is necessary to feed the people. We must prepare ourselves to grind grain and flour, timely razvezti the armies, divisions, on the shelves and their companies, bread, meat, fats, sugar, salt, spices, and the 100 grams of vodka. Even a small interruption in the food supply of troops could lead to serious consequences. Of course, you can find a way out of a difficult situation by presenting an application to the higher court. And taught us so much before the war. Tons of paper scribbled we once, training in the ability to write applications. I remember how hard we were taught that the "art" in the Military Academy. Frunze, I graduated before the war. But the war, and it all turned out differently. Not all were able to move quickly, many tyloviki continued coasting all ask so ask the center ... But nothing to do: not getting ask, had to find the necessary on-site. And for this it was necessary to implement such organizational and economic measures, which before the war [301] while in the universities did not say anything, and now some people forget. But it would be wrong to conclude that, independently solving many problems at the front, we have little need of assistance center, and treated in the home. Unfortunately, it was impossible to do alone, and their local resources. We had to ask the center one thing, then another, and so preserves, sugar, tobacco, all kinds of spices in general could only rarely get there. There were times when the Front had just one daily cottage food. And special thanks deserve outstanding leaders of military food service of the Red Army during World War II generals D. Pavlov and V. Belousov. Without them, we need not bother, but when the front looking for help out we were not. DV Pavlov was appointed chief of the Red Army from uprodsnaba post of Commissar Trade. The rich experience of his pre-war work was very useful during the war. Employee a large scale, well knowing the ins and outs of food supply and available resources of the country as a whole and individual areas, he found the solution in a difficult position when it was on the needs of the front. Prior to joining uprodsnab Pavlov had a titanic job of organizing the food supply of besieged Leningrad.

But it was that and uprodsnab are powerless to meet the needs of the front. Then we applied directly to the alternate member of the State Defense Committee VP Zotov, in charge of all food resources of the country. Zotov, who knew that nothing for him we would not have to handle, always trying to help the front. We applied, for example, with a request to give us a millstone for hiking mills. Now it seems a trifle. And in those years only by Zotov we got these millstones and set up the production of flour directly into divisions, processing up to 10 tons of grain each mill in the day, and provided a meal on the front 25 - 30 days ahead. Together with Mikoyan VP Zotov throughout the war, we can say hourly, followed food supply of the Red Army. And in fact, that our army, even in the most difficult time in general received adequate food, great merit belongs to him personally. And how was wearing boots on our army during the war? With deep gratitude to our people say that the front was dressed and shod. Even had to wonder [302] sometimes, from which a sample so many shoes, especially boots, cotton-padded jackets, coats, hats? Because we lost so much during the withdrawal of the summer of 1941! Yet the harsh winter that year, troops met quite prepared. Our multi-million army for four years of war, four times was dressed in winter and four in summer uniforms. Older veterans, read these lines, confirm that freezing at the front were observed only in a few cases, most often freezes in the nose, cheeks and fingers carriage driving or cavalry, long staying in the wind. Much energy and resources, our country gave to the soldiers went to the winter boots in cotton clothing, a warm hat, and in the summer - in shoes, in a light outfit. But that all clothing and equipment came to a fighter, had to work - and work well - Intendant of the Red Army front, army, division, regimental quartermaster. Imagine quickly come spring. All forces are switching to summer uniform. Millions of pairs of boots, coats, cotton trousers, jackets need to collect, dry, repair, protect from moths, sanitized and ready for next winter. And all this in the field, where there is no storage space, no dryers equipped, no repair shops, everything is done by the army! Especially it is difficult during the thaw, suddenly coming of winter in the middle and southern regions. At this time, always hung over the fighter threat of frostbite feet - because early thaw replaced harsh winds and frost ... Throughout the war with great difficulty managed to establish a transition from one mode to the other shoes during cold snap or warming. What is the link, in the regiment, division or army, to keep a second set of shoes? Because it is associated with the storage of "weighting" rears, elongation of columns when you move, and most importantly, there is a risk of loss of property in a rapidly changing tactical situation. Caring regimental commanders, sophisticated front-line experience, prefer always to have at least a small shelf in the supply of socalled "duty shoes," and they were right - a reserve soldier rescued at every change of weather. We, the heads of the front rear, always felt the support from the chief of the Red Army General upraveschsnaba N. Karpinski and Deputy General FG Tarmosina. Even before our requests, they always made sure that there is enough provided the army at the summer and winter clothing, shoes, all kinds of equipment. [303] Along with the name of such an outstanding organizer Quartermaster Corps, which was the chief quartermaster, Colonel-General P. and . Drachev, names and Karpinski Tarmosina worthy entered the history of labor feats that provided heroic victory of the Red Army. All clothing and equipment at the front was produced domestically. From the United States leather shoes and other belongings were of poor quality. There was an uncomfortable shoe boots (low rise), the sole quickly burst, so our warrior willingly put their shoes repaired than new overseas.

A prominent role in ensuring the victory of the Red Army in the last war and, in particular, in support of troops of the 1st Belorussian Front met Head of Fuel Supply Lieutenant General MI Kormilitsyn, Head of Administration of the Red Army road Lieutenant General ZI Kondratyev, Head of Road Management Lt. Gen. IP Tyagunov. It is difficult to overestimate the role of proper and timely organization of military transportation work VOSO Central Office, headed by Lt. Gen. IV Kovalev. I call these names not only in order to take advantage and bring them thanks. That would be too little. I am sure that a talented and tireless work, their experiences deserve a special study and media coverage. Military medical services in the last war with honor stood the ordeal. But in this industry, we had a military operation in the war a lot to learn. Our military doctors, professors, nurses, health trainers, nurses, ignoring the danger and many hardships, always wanted to be where they were needed. By plane, by car, on a cart, on foot health professionals traveled to the front line to help the wounded Soviet soldiers. To the noble work of physicians into a well-run health service, it must be surrounded by the care and support of the other rear services.Medical services alone can not successfully to the end to achieve a complete cure is possible sick and wounded. [304] This requires a good house (or tent), light, heat, food, clothing, transportation, and in the war years there was a general atmosphere of caring for the wounded. That's why they were profoundly mistaken comrades of the medical service, which even in the most difficult time offered to bring it out the rear. It seemed to them that they will then be "more independence". When they asked me during the war that I think about it, I always say with all sincerity, that the very formulation of the matter is criminal, because the issue here is not about the "esprit de corps" and the joint efforts of all the services the rear to save millions of lives . Even in peacetime, such a question should be considered harmful, mindful of the potential implications of the new weapon. Finding medical service system in the rear increases the responsibility of all employees at the rear to create the most favorable conditions in the work of physicians at the front. In the successful treatment of the wounded at the front were decisive health maintenance organizations. It is particularly intolerant pattern. The point is not just to have more staff, a lot of hospitals - even more important to find the correct application of all this, that is, one that would provide the earliest possible provision of adequate medical care, would reduce many steps-ties evacuation, ensure the availability of permanent reserves for the additional deployment of medical institutions in the operation and especially its final stage. Our doctors have learned a great noble motto: "Do not go to the hospital wounded, and the hospital to the wounded." Reserve hospitals all the time moved forward and deployed where accumulated injuries. In any situation, in any means of destruction medicine pursues the troops. This rule is confirmed by the experience of war. Literally, grain, every day, with each front selects all new and progressive in the medical service. Greater organizational role was played here by central medical authority of the Red Army. Its director E. Smirnov, one major organizational abilities, strong will and perseverance in his frequent appeals and letters to health care providers all fronts popularized notable forms and methods of treatment. He knew everything of value in all parts of the medical service, especially the field hospital and hospitals first line, where he frequently traveled. [305] It is widely supported initiative of

his closest aides - professors, so the fronts were used specialized medical institutions: hospitals walking wounded , cranial, thoracic, abdominal, etc. On our front, as well as on others, grew experienced thousands of young doctors, one week on the war in terms of gaining experience is often equal to the physician, the time of peace. EI Smirnov belongs to attract considerable merit in the Red Army during the difficult years of the war such luminaries of medicine as NNBurdenko, VI Shamov, SS Girgolav, N. Elanskii, VS Leviticus, PA Kupriyanov Vovsi, A. Wisniewski, MN Akhutin, JS Zhorov, VI Popov, SI Banaytis, D. Entin, VI Voyachek. Great progress in the war received research work among physicians front. Virtually every front-line army or conference of surgeons, physicians, dentists, neurologists, epidemiologists are known step in the synthesis of scientific expertise, develop common views on the most pressing issues. Even then engendered valuable ideas at the basis of monographs published after the war. Even during the war, out of print books, brings a lot of new in the various issues related to medicine. Sanitary evacuation - one of the most important sites in the system of medical service, I would not say that we are fully "Rule to solve this problem in the last war. It is no secret that in the lower levels of medical services often used barbaric method of drawing (delivery on "scraper") wounded to the nearest health clinic. The experience of the last war requires us to aggressively seek out the best ways to evacuate the wounded, especially off the field. The greatest merit of the Soviet health service, in particular the medical 1st Belorussian Front, was the fact that in all the years of war, our troops were not aware of any serious epidemics. A provocative moments were many: there were also spotted fever and tularemia, and dysentery.But each time the efforts of physicians, with the support of the entire system of logistics outbreaks of infectious disease could quickly locate and eliminate.
***

Speaking about the main thing in the rear to the front, is often placed on top of communication and transportation. This, of course, makes sense. In the end, only the front is strong, [306] when he is able to maneuver equipment, manpower, material resources. And for that we need roads, we need transportation. Four years of war - four years of continuous maneuver not only a division, corps, but whole armies and even fronts. In these unprecedented scale transport decisive role was played by rail. About 20 million cars of various military cargoes were transported during the war.In all kinds of military transport the share of rail transport has dropped 70%. Railways of the Soviet Union, especially frontline, worked with threshold voltages. Transport of the USSR People's Commissariat, chief roads, the personnel of the army of millions of railway jobs with honor the party and government during the war, and we are pleased to have had such a wonderful family member, as a railway USSR army, which was called the younger brother of the Red Army. Road transport in the last war complement the work of the railways, sometimes acting in parallel with them. Of course, it was a lot of work: during the war, the Red Army motor carried more than 100 million tons of cargo, their total mileage totaled 2.564 billion kilometers. Yet it only complements the work of the railways. As the experience of the last war, the front could do it in the designated boundaries of only one road no more than 10 - 15 days, after which they necessarily would take effect front rail. If this does not happen, inevitably a crisis. Modern, post-war road transport is technically much more perfect, and it

is, of course, may be more important in the front carriage. But I think that in the future only the railways will be able to carry millions of tons of cargo over long distances in a short time. I recall that operations such as Belarus, the Vistula-Oder, Berlin, demanded a million tons of material means each. A whole war has destroyed more than 10 million tons of ammunition, 13.4 million tons of fuel and 40 million tons of food, and about 12 - 15 million tons of various other assets. The whole mass of cargo was transported to the army on the railways for many thousands of kilometers. Water transport during the war was brought to the front needs 22 million tonnes of cargo, representing 9.5% of the total military transportation. [307] Substantial assistance provided to us during the war, military transport aircraft, which was brought by 1.5 million people and 120 thousand tons of military cargo. We recognize and cartage. There were many situations where a horse or donkey to help us in the days of bad roads or in the mountains. All modes of transport and roads at the front gave the greatest effect only if the integrated use. Some people are inclined to give the principle of integrated use of vehicles for the novelty of recent years. This is misleading. It is in the experience of the Great Patriotic War to be found the most striking examples of the integrated use of transport. Perhaps it was one of the most prominent features in the rear. When they say that the rear should work like clockwork, then we have in mind is the skillful use of all modes of transport and communications, and skillful organization of the transport of the evacuation. Rear bodies during the war with some, I would say, artistic ability to use every opportunity to "ride" even tens of kilometers of railways survivors, organizing everywhere transhipment device. Only the 1st Belorussian Front during the Vistula-Oder operation was organized more than 10 front and army terminal stations. In some cases, goods wagons rolled over with one track in cars other gauge, in others there was transshipment from cars to trucks and vice versa. From the above it can be concluded that the role of the opposition and the fetishization of a mode of transport in the war - undertaking useless and even harmful. In war, all forms of transport are good if they use reasonable under the circumstances. There is no doubt that, wherever practicable, it is necessary to maximum use railway transport for the benefit of the troops. But this does not mean that now, after the war of 1941 - 1945., Maintain dependence troops from railway communications, "attachment" of troops to the railway line. With the advent of large-tonnage road and air transport capabilities have increased significantly combat support forces to a greater depth, regardless of the railways. Especially important the field of pipelines to deliver fuel to the troops. Thanks to the improvement of the process of assembly and disassembly of pipes almost solved the problem of continuous fuel supply troops at any rate of movement. [308] Also becoming an important transport aircraft, especially helicopters that can lift and move the air large bridge structures, and place them in a new area. In areas with high levels of radiation useful work helicopters laying communications overestimated. At the front, can be invaluable, and pack animals, deer and dog sleds and even porters - it all depends on the specific situation. Consequently, it is not that, what kind of transportation to prefer on the front, and to make the best use of all available modes of transport - either individually or comprehensively.

Integrated use of all modes of transport is one of the cornerstones in the rear to the front. From this largely depends so-called survival rear.Timely switch from one mode to another, use existing diversion or advance their equip - all increase survivability rear. The war showed the great importance of rail circuits around important nodes and administrative and political centers. Even in peacetime, in terms of national economic interests such detours provided a sufficiently large radius are of great practical importance. Construction of road and rail detours now paid much attention, but more must be done than has been done. When it comes to the usefulness of the surviving troops (isolated) of railroad, involuntarily arises the idea of a steam locomotive. It's about the locomotives, not locomotives and electric locomotives. This "primitive" tax, like a chimney, it may be the only applicable where the energy basis will only wood or other available fuels. Rush to send locomotives to scrap should not be. Integrated operation of all types of transport and communications systems and ensures the unity of the home front. Thanks to this unity easily solved and the second side of the problem - an integrated restoration of disturbed communication. In the last war often practiced bring together in one area or in one of railway, road, engineering troops and the local population. Now, such a union is an absolute necessity. Head of logistics should be able to [309] to carry out any maneuver available forces and means. This would facilitate training of personnel recovery units on a wider profile of specialization, to be able to observe the principle of interchangeability. Survivability and mobility of logistics - the concepts are not separable from one another. Lack of mobility of the rear in the last war essentially limited combat activities. There was a shortage of transport, machinery, motors. The problem of mechanization and motorization of the rear was always up to date. Directly dependent on this factor was and his organization: limited transport capacity forced to go to the rear of excessive proximity institutions with unacceptably short distances from the troops. The more motorized rear, the more determined the principle of dispersal may be all the elements. The war experience has shown that the rear provide the troops the better, the less there was a gap between the level of motorization of troops and logistics. There is no doubt that the motorization and mechanization of modern logistics should not lag behind the general level of motorization of the Soviet Army.
***

We mentioned the trophy of the home front. At the beginning of the war there were so-called evakoorgany, whose task is mainly evacuated from the front line to the rear, both military and economic projects. These were frail bodies, and they could not cope with the collection of captured weapons and equipment on the battlefield.Meanwhile, such property is gaining more and more. March 23, 1942 GKO decree established a system of captured bodies. The primary task of these bodies was to collect scrap metal. We have already given some specific information on the number sent to the rear of the country by the metal front. It is interesting to know the reader that for the whole period of the war the Red Army captured bodies sent to steel plants in the country of 6 million tons, including 165,000 tons of ferrous metal.

But not only the metal collected these organs. During the war years they have taken into account and transferred to the supply of troops 3.5 million tons of various food (by the way, the trophy unaccounted food was, perhaps, not less, but it is entirely gone soldiers, and we do not regret it.) Before entering the adjacent territories captured bodies front also performs general tasks. They took custody plants, factories and other important business approach to the liberated areas of local government and economic authorities. No less important to cleaning stations, roads, fields of explosive substances for this purpose as part of the trophy created its engineering units. At first, the service was bad trophy staffed and mechanisms, has not yet developed its "tactics", uncertain approach to solving the growing day by day tasks. Trophy and units are often cut off from combat units, were late with the release of a captured object, so that took away a lot, port, or, at best, to spend unregistered. Soon, these bodies have an own intelligence, coming in the first division and regimental levels and takes as protected conquest immediately after the passage of troops. Increased and their technical equipment. With the release of the foreign territory to fundamentally change the problem of captured bodies. Of course, they were the responsibility of collecting a damaged military equipment and send it to the rear of the country, and the amount of work by the end of the war has been steadily increasing. But before authorities captured stood still and the task of destroying the military-economic potential of the enemy on his own territory. Front captured bodies successfully managed Zhmakin then Kowalczyk, and at the end of the war my deputy for trophy service general NK Zhizhin. The war experience has demonstrated that the captured bodies should be staffed with highly qualified engineers and technicians a variety of specialties. The level of economic management training of the service should be much higher than what was in the last war.
***

Under the authority of the home front was a seemingly purely peaceful service as financial. She reports to Chief of the rear of the front, which was a complete manager of credits front. Although during the war, the role of money is usually reduced, but we did not stop to consider military expenditure in terms of money. [311] Financial agencies should have in any situation promptly and completely to give people money owed to them. Some readers will say, what the front money? After all, at the front get free food, clothing, and what the money will buy? The fact of the matter is that at the front, we tried to give the opportunity to spend the money wisely, especially the enlisted men, for which the goods were selected for special range and carefully brought up to the front line trenches. We have already talked about the system of military trade field at the front. It was a fairly extensive sales network Commissariat Trade.Voentorg at the front selling such a hot commodity that intendancy not. Could supply the troops: candy, cookies, cigarettes, cigarette holders, cigarette cases, stationery, knitted goods, perfume, soap, razors, notebooks, pocket knives, etc. Only for 1944 turnover amounted field PX 1.758 billion rubles, and this is mainly due to the sales forces.

Thus commodity software ruble at the front there. Of financial services at the front to a large extent depended on the maintenance of economic stability and value of the ruble. Financiers met with with a lot of specific difficulties arising from changes in the front of the situation: the constant fluctuations in the number of people in the composition, diversity in salaries and incentive system, the salary and allowances etc, etc. During the fighting, some of the people retiring at all and the other fell into the hospitals. Constantly arrive all fresh and new recruitment. Behind all this had to follow. In the army, the person receives no pay and pay, this includes the salary of the post, all kinds of allowances - for military rank, etc. all put together and is called pay. In some parts of the people receive just wages, in others - plus to more money and field. There Guard salaries in Guards units and formations, but also within them were the guards salary increase: the mortar parts in istrebitelyyu-tank artillery units and divisions, other salaries were in shock armies, a paratrooper. Difficult enough differentiation observed in armor, depending on the type of tank, from cartwright, from class driving tanks, etc. [312] The increased salaries were given to snipers, machine gunners, the personnel of the anti-tank guns. Payroll in the pay - is a complex labyrinth in which no one could understand. In addition to permanent additions to salary, were given one-time premium for a downed plane, a destroyed tank, for the sinking ship for the return artillery special sealing. There were deductions complicates calculations for monetary allowances: for the loss of military property by negligence, the retention of the content that is sent to their certificates family deductions for "arrest while on duty," Hold for a subscription to the loan (in 1943, abolished in the lower levels including division). Consequently, on the front is broad-based incentives. Of course, it's not that the production in time of peace, yet the soldier or guardsman drummer was pleased to realize that it is not only in the army, covered with military glory, but gets Guards salary, not to mention some of the external distinguishing signs. I would say a combination of moral and material incentives factors at the front was very successful. The most important task of financial services at the front was to provide families of Soviet soldiers. As you know, during the war, soldiers had the right to issue certificates to their families to receive them in the community some of the salary. It had a great moral and economic importance. Soldier at the front was quiet for the provision of their families, wherever it may be, especially since military conscription helped the families of soldiers who were with them were registered on the basis of certificates, wood, kerosene, food. The financial and economic outcome is reinforced by the fact that there is no need to bring in front of large masses of currency and not inundate these signs near the front, where the already money market was very unstable. Financial authorities scrutinized sending certificates and they facilitated communication each soldier with his family. Thanks to the sustained efforts of financiers often able to find families who were abandoned after being evacuated to the far corners of our country. Moral and political significance of this work was extremely high. Central Committee of the Party during the war time and again emphasized that the care of the families of soldiers means taking care of themselves warriors, their high moral-political and martial status. [313] Financial service front, fighting for the maximum deflation during the war, to introduce a system of non-cash payments in the relationship with suppliers, which also contributed to improvement of the

country's finances. Lending to suppliers, the financial authorities of the front at the same time control the timeliness and quality of the delivered property. Generally speaking, the supply to the front carefully implemented, despite the lack of materials and skilled labor necessary packaging to transportation difficulties. But there have been cases where some unscrupulous suppliers sent the front non-conforming products, and the money sought by the highest list price scale - at the front, they say, anything goes. Protests by the financial authorities Quartermaster Directorate front only in 1944 was forced to refuse to pay a number of bills due to faulty products delivered. Especially all sorts of lawsuits was with the railways and shipping companies due to shortage or damage of goods in transit. Each military unit is at least four times a year, subject to financial audits and this helped to strengthen financial discipline in the army. In the war of 1914 and in previous wars financial audit carried out only at the end of the war, so there flourished embezzlement at every step: Try to find out after the war, where, what, at what price purchased. For abuse was boundless, and businessmen cashing in on the war, millions of capital, and treasury and stealing soldiers. In the Red Army not noticed. A significant preventive role in this was played by the military-financial services. Entirely new problem faced the front of the financiers with access to our troops on foreign territory. Here and the establishment of the ruble in relation to the Polish zloty, the German mark, the Austrian schilling, CSK, and others, and settlements with private providers, and remittances for foreign exchange, and storage of captured money, securities, jewelry. Was especially acute issue of combating counterfeit money, which the Germans flooded the local markets. All these problems were faced with rear organs, especially in the financial department. It took hard work and thoughtful financial and banking employees front to deal with core set of associated tasks, far beyond, beyond formal positions. Life inevitably require bold decisions, [314] and our financiers have shown their maturity. At the head of the financial services front was very experienced financier Colonel VN Dutov (now Colonel-General, Head of the Central Financial Directorate of the Soviet Army). He is very flexible, did not suffer pettiness inherent in many of his colleagues, and boldly went to finance measures aimed at improving combat readiness and combat effectiveness, even if those events and did not fit into the framework of regulations. His worthy colleague at the front was no less energetic and knowledgeable banking chief field offices of the State Bank IA Lopasov. He has worked hard to preserve banks, savings banks, securities and valuables. The entire team of financiers front to troop level including demonstrated its high fidelity and honesty in their work.
***

The reader is clear that such a large number of subordinate chief of logistics services and front such a variety of challenges facing the home front during the war, called for particularly precise work of staff of logistics - the directing and coordinating authority. Good working staff is not just going in-depth information and analyzes the data for the report the chief. Shaposhnikov called the General Staff of the "brain" of the army. This is to some extent true for every military headquarters, and not only to the General Staff. However, in the lower echelons,

especially during the war years, the staffs were overwhelmed operational tasks, but they did not cease to be the "brain" of a military court. So it was on our front. Headquarters rear edge well coordinated work of all services behind. What was this coordination? Will try very briefly to answer this question by pointing to specific examples. Chiefs of the rear, before you put the rear or to the Chief Military Council of the Front or that fundamental question fully "linked the" proposals with all the other services. Only then can we count on continued success. Headquarters and engaged in "lapping" and linking these issues. For example, the Surgeon General of the front sees fit [315] a group of hospitals in the 10 - 15 thousand beds to put in a certain area. Looking at the map, the Chief of Staff did not see anything that would cause doubt on the wisdom of such an intention. And how it looks from the point of view of other logistics services - road, rail, automotive, housing, etc.? How to view this area from the air, which are natural cover on it for the people, technology, etc.? And maybe in the area appropriate to place other objects in the rear? There is a range of issues, without which learning can not take the final decision. Rear headquarters in-depth, I would say the research to have an opinion about the proposal or that the Chief of the front. Or the issue of the movement of logistic facilities in the new district. If a few hundred institutions on their own initiative, in the home moved into the area when someone wants, it would create an incredible chaos and disorganization. To avoid this, the headquarters of the rear skillfully maneuvering controls the entire grand avalanche, making sure that the relocation was of operational-literate character, situation at the front line with the requirements and the troops. Troops should always feel free operation rear. Haste in the rear and move them from the forces behind an equally disastrous. Catching the pulse of the combat situation at the front - this is one of the most important tasks of staff behind. And not only has to pick up the headquarters, but also in a timely manner all of this pulse of the home front, that they lived in one breath, common understanding of the situation and the constant desire to always be ready to help the troops.This is one side of the coordination of the staff behind. Try to imagine the process of moving hundreds of front rear institutions to a new area: thousands of people - soldiers, sergeants, officers, civilian structure with all kinds of property, supplies, books, a personal business, typewriters, kitchen, dining room, and so on - all in sequence, usually in the dark, is loaded into the machine, and people do not know where they were taken. And when the dawn they should already be in place. Each wheel again for a huge mechanism, turning it as if not stopped, it just continues to operate on the new position, in the right measure, at the right pace, doing useful things. Such movements in the course of the Vistula-Oder operation was at least 10, though in the most difficult circumstances - in the rain, in the snow, the ice, on country and forest roads ... [316] Who is invisible "ruler" of the whole process? Rear headquarters. Through the Chief of Logistics Staff organizes the entire system, to manage it, with all kinds and branches of service. Rear headquarters - this body of material costs in the planning of combat operations. Well-trained staff, having behind him the experience of war, could in a short time, like a modern computer, to say how many and what kind of material resources to the front at a given number of people and equipment, with the intended depth and pace of the operation. We tried during the war to minimize paper flow, to teach people to make it work, trusting each other. Rarely has the required receipts for orders. Most critical tasks often given orally, and only

singer to put them in their "workbook", which was the main form of documentation staff at the front. Of equal importance was the topographical map of a certain scale. Look, used to map the scale of 1: 200 000, on which a front and rear setting, and all appears to you as a living, for a [317] each circle, a square, a rectangle, for each line and the dotted line you are hiding familiar institutions rear scattered throughout inventories, vehicles, and a dense network of communications. Headquarters is closely monitoring the situation and all its dynamics at the leading edge and the rear reflects the changes taking place on the map. Nicely now remember well put together, well functioning team headquarters rear front. It was headed by General MK Shlyahtenko man extraordinary erudition and with great tact. About him we said. Determination was not its main feature, he had a gentle nature, and had a penchant for some reflection on the fact that the more impulsive person at once would have seemed obvious. But the ability for deep thinking about it was indispensable and efficient start, determination, commitment, embodied the Deputy Chief of Staff, Colonel Mikhail Novikov (now a lieutenant general, one of the prominent military commanders of our). Shlyahtenko and is a good blend.Novikov in charge of all organizational matters, and amassed in his department as a group of talented officers (IV Druzhinin, Izotov, DN Shpagin, Sergeev, I. Moladnitsky, MS Pokumeyko, TN Kalinchuk, A. E. Pustovoitenko, Koval, Zhukov, LA Baking, Lane, JA Boruhson, etc.), [318] which is quickly and expertly developed an important assumption in organizing logistics for all phases of operation. In the rear headquarters were accounting and planning department, led by Colonel N. Vakh and his deputy, and the department Lutsyk return spetsukuporki under Colonel LS Zarudenko. The latter should be noted that due to extremely hard, even cantankerous, brought on dissatisfaction of many efforts to return the country to the rear and container spetsukuporki our front savings for the state tens of millions of rubles and saved from felling forced many thousands of hectares of precious wood species.
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One important issue here, as elsewhere, was the selection of workers. As in the army during the war, and we have an absolute majority of the workers were not the rear, as they say, a professional soldier. In management front and army dominated by the scale generals and staff officers, and the majority of logistics professionals (doctors, engineers, road workers, motorists, railroad service professionals fuel, food and clothing workers services, etc.) composed of former civilian employees. It is quite natural for the war. I would like to emphasize a very important positive side of this phenomenon. The arrival of civilian experts will contribute to the work behind. These people have a life-giving spirit into style in character, in the very essence of the work. True, they felt at first too "civil", could not immediately acquire the necessary appearance, and it embarrassed them. But it is nothing. Home Other: Experience in the economy, brought them to the army, largely made of old military business executives strongly regroup, to find other ways and methods of management, from the first, built by following the instructions on the formal peace time, the "art" and get ready to distribute Standards. There has been a very important, useful, merging experience - war and peace. Indeed, the former deputy of USSR People's Commissar of Food ID Kravchenko becomes Commissioner uprodsnaba front, he was not only a party-political worker, immediately became the soul of the team, but also knew the ins and outs of food on a large scale, making it experience and

tips acquired [319] particularly valuable in the food supply of the front. Another example: I. Makarov, before the war, the State Planning Commission employee, engaged in the food supply during the war was an excellent chief prodotdela front. In 1942, not every professional soldier handyman can quickly understand the essence of the created then difficult food situation in the country, and for all that Makarova was familiar, he quickly oriented in the atmosphere. It is no accident, as I said earlier, the People's Commissar of Trade RSFSR DV Pavlov took over the food service in the Red Army during the war. The arrival of the army of highly skilled workers has been a real help military and economic institutions of the Red Army during the most difficult period of the war. Similar examples could be cited. The very nature of the home front, in essence, similar peaceful civilian work. Therefore not observed any major hitches in the development of these experts their new responsibilities in the army. They do not take long to become worthy leaders in their fields of work. These observations also fail me to think about the shortcomings in the academic training of military personnel surround workers in peacetime. [320] Dogmatism, learning the rules and forms, poor knowledge of the foundations of national economic life, on the job, and the main factor of the underestimation of the creative initiatives of management - all it showed up in the first months of the war, our military personnel. Equally, it is also applied to the rear leading cadres, including the chiefs themselves rear connections and associations. The narrowness of economic knowledge, one-sided approach to the search for resources, poor orientation in the structure of the economy, not proactive, and sometimes halfhearted solution of major economic problems in the war - all of these shortcomings, we voennohozyaystvennye leaders and organizers, badly suffered. Required to pass a very hard school of life at the front, to endure a lot of setbacks and hardships, until, finally, gain experience, have stabilized and worked tylovikov shots and set the correct attitude towards them from the combined arms commanders. War was for many of us the real academy. The more difficult task was to find just the rear of the existing system of people who can perform a particular leadership role. Until the spring of 1944 as Personnel Manager of Logistics Central, then the 1st Belorussian Front was Colonel AG Naidenko, who knew his business. But he fell ill and had to be assigned. There was a question about the new head of personnel. Asked the AV Khruleva. Soon after, he called me a staff assistant general Todorov boldly and said, "We can recommend you a very suitable candidate for the post of Chief of Staff of Logistics front Kuryleva Anatoly Konstantinovich, he has experience, good, sensitive person, you can send it. " I said that I agree, and asked him to send Kuryleva. A few days later Kurylev already managed by the personnel department of Logistics of the 1st Belorussian Front. He made us all very impressed. Earlier, before the Second World War, he was at the Komsomol. Cheerful "Komsomol look" kept at it and by the time of our meeting with him in 1944. Do not just have to talk to him about the general problems of human resources staff at the front. Kurylev, as if setting out its program of work, formulated it as follows: "It is right to place shots - it's a great thing. One must know its mandated task. [321] Find the right time nominee, to take responsibility for the officer, who rekomenduesh for a particular job, carefully monitor its growth, to ensure that it does not "soured" on one post open his way to new feats, new daring, provide time for

promotion to the next rank, show maximum attention to those who have "things do not exactly succeed," and to help find the cause of failure - that the work of the personnel department. " He convened a meeting of workers obschefrontovoe frame rear and rear heads of the political agencies before the Berlin operation in March 1945. Fundamental questions are then: - To ensure the final defeat of the enemy; - Improving the practice of rewarding personnel; - Training of personnel files of officers in connection with the forthcoming dismissal of many of them after the war. Meeting was chaired by the deputy chief of logistics on the political front of the colonel DI mules. He spoke of tylovikah as people whose supreme duty is to the soldiers and officers who are at the forefront, always felt the care of their basic needs (food, clothing, medication, heat, etc.). Those who do not remember always about this, can not work well in the bodies behind. Thousands and thousands of brave men immediately after injury [322] were in hospitals and have not been submitted for the award. Mules urged all employees to the rear identification. Speakers at the meeting led the facts when they themselves had to meet the officers who returned from the hospital after the fifth or sixth injured and without a single award. These facts indicated trouble in practice award. After the meeting, all the hospitals surveyed and interviewed the wounded, to report every person in his army, division and unit. I can not say that it helped eliminate injustice. Perhaps even now live in different parts of the country comrades who did not receive awards, they were worthy. Lt. Col. Nikolayenko said at the meeting: "Being in the 5th Shock Army and the 47th Army, and I listened to the complaints of some commanders of divisions and regiments to delay the award of materials and ideas to the next rank on tylovikov like it's second-class people. Presentation of the awards, and military ranks of combatant commanders are issued for 5 - 10 days, and at tylovikov pickled and even disappear. This much we blame, the cadres. " These words of the representative of the personnel department obschefrontovogo were perfectly justified. Now AK Kurylev - PhD, Professor, Head of the Moscow State University.
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The mass character of modern armies is not only in the number of multi-million dollar, but also in their composition. In the last war was attended by millions of women - military and civilian. Women replaced men in many areas, not only in the various support services, and sometimes even in the immediate armed struggle against the enemy.

Multilateral women's participation in the war was now an accomplished fact. There is a service at the front, where women are the majority.Of medical and paramedical staff of the 1st Belorussian Front 65% were women. Among food service workers on the same front, 75% were women. Where a woman is on a par with men, not always a man can change a woman. Many [323] sections of the military working women showed heroism. They walked to the rear of the enemy, performing daring to brave combat missions, carried the wounded soldiers from the debris and fires, carrying not only wounded, but his weapon, becoming a victim often fascist sniper bullets. Published dozens of books and produced many films about the heroism of the Soviet women during the war. Pilots, snipers, signaller, doctors, nurses, nurse, traffic controller on the roads, cooks, typists, shop in shops and PX toiler various other specialties at the front - all of which are sung by our publicists, their images depicted in verse, film frames, paintings and sculptures . But few have thought about the fact that the woman at the front requires special attention, which her life is a lot that is not provided by military regulations, designed for men, the common soldiers' habits. Women need special clothing, shoes, special medical supervision, their living conditions. Not all know and do not even think about the particular difficulties faced by women in the frontline setting. It would be unfair to say that the women did not think during the war. Especially a lot of thinking about where you can put a woman instead of a man. There was even such a commission at the beginning of the war, which looked virtually every male "regular unit" for replacement of men by women. Chief of Logistics of the Red Army Andrey Hrulev, approach to all issues on a large scale, so did against women who were in the army: he introduced the post of assistant chief quartermaster of the Red Army on women's clothing and asked for the job, AK Aspen - the director of one of the largest garment factory in Moscow, which was both, so to speak, the female consultant and for other services of the army. For women, more or less invented the right clothes at the front and even beautiful boots. Unfortunately, we did not have all of this in sufficient quantities, and often give women prihodrglos cotton trousers, men's warm underwear and tarpaulin boots. Only at the end of the war women on the front and began to dress shoe is not only good quality, but also beautiful. But this is the end of the war. On the 1st Belorussian Front in 1943 came to a consultant gynecologist Professor EM Kaplun, a former director of gynecological clinic named Ott in Leningrad. [324] Prior to his arrival, a special martial gynecological service at the front did not exist. There was not a specialist gynecologist. Meanwhile, the need to provide medical care to the wounded and gynecological ill women was high. Organized front short training courses for gynecologists, after which he was appointed by a gynecologist in the division. EM Kaplun did a great organizational and research work, and in fact re-established military field gynecology at the front. Despite his failing health, he tried himself to be in every army in every division, and made great efforts to ensure that, wherever there are women who have been established for them adequate living conditions. He lectured to women in hospitals, field hospital, in bathing and laundry detachments, canteens, etc. At first I did not know this.

Once nachmedupra Front, Drums asked me to listen to the report of the front gynecologist, who returned recently from a great trip to the armies and divisions. I'm surprised shrugged, but agreed to listen. Kaplun professor told me about a number of serious problems that occurred with the women at the front. Every case is different from another of his personality, the power of his drama and impact. But all had a lot in common: lack of attention from supervisors to basic needs, due to the physiological characteristics of women, lack of access to advice and expert clinical care in case of illness, the almost complete neglect of women's everyday needs - there was no proper clothes, but it was special and essential medicines etc. Professor Kaplun pathetically exclaimed: "Do the chiefs, men, that a woman - a man!? Do they think about the basic needs of women, when a military convoy was stopped at a small camp in the way? Do they know that the woman in the company in the battalion, the regiment is constantly on the mind of men, suffering from huge inconvenience? Is it normal to a situation where at the front and in the armies of no special women's hospital, and if such hospitals, and in some places are open, then it is done arbitrarily order? " And how difficult was the situation of a pregnant woman at the front! Though there was an order to be sent to the rear of the binding of all pregnant women, but it is a general order, and life went on. Not every woman is able to find refuge in the rear, for many there is not a parent, [325] no relatives or housing, but also, the moral side also played a significant role ... Many were formed at the front of a good family, and not everyone was willing to his wife parturient somewhere away from it, and not every woman is to agree. Therefore, it was necessary to create the conditions for successful birth right there on the front. And after that there was a question about the "gear" newborns. Who had to deal with all these questions? Spilling of local importance. This I reported to the commander of the front. I was instructed to issue a special administrative order. The author of the order was the professor Kaplun. He invested in his whole soul. It is no exaggeration to say that after the publication of this order, the turning point in the life of women. Many hospitals were open women's section. Increased health education among women. Made regular medical checkups. The quality of women's clothing and footwear. At the front was opened 11 women's hospital with 20 beds and, in addition, two female hospital with 200 beds each. Were created, however, by the end of the war, conditions for mothers and newborns. Head PX front NV Kashirin sought an opportunity to make a significant number of sets of "dowry" for babies, which is given to new mothers. On the life of women, especially in the company, battalion, regiment, albeit belatedly, was given the most serious attention of commanders at all levels. Let not the reader think that I exaggerated. I wanted to show at least a little, the back side of the beautiful, shining medals, not to think that the way women on the front was covered with flowers only fame and universal admiration. Useful to know the dark side - not only history, but also for the future. Professor Kaplun owns considerable merit in theoretical generalization martial gynecology. Under his leadership, were written 22 scientific works on the front, and he had three special obschefrontovye scientific conferences. He was a recognized authority in his field, and enjoyed great respect from his colleagues. Serious illness has not given live up to this beautiful man. We must pay tribute to his wife EA Kaplun, gone with her husband to the front and showed himself a tireless toiler on duty doctor-intern gynecological department frontline evacuation hospital. She

passed all the hard way front life, helping her husband in his medical work. [326] It continues to this day in the same hospital name Ott, from the front, and went up to where the last days of his life he worked EM Kaplun.
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Rear of the Red Army during the war, was closely linked to the economy. He not only received from the national economy all necessary, reasonable using the received, but also provide assistance to the national economy and their own means. Rear bodies, military units and vacant land seeded themselves, raise livestock, produces essential, that line in the rear of the military must fully cultivated and in peacetime. The territory occupied by all kinds of polygons, airfields, training fields, shooting ranges, tank ranges, is, in all probability, the area of a solid European state. Creating her farms on the principle of material interest of military units and greatly facilitate care of the state of the food supply the army, and also serve as a good example in the education initiatives of the military business executives. The jurisdiction of the chief of logistics are huge and varied wealth. Dispose of these funds should be at the front of one chief, whom they are entrusted. Polyarchy is fraught with grave consequences. Strict management of undivided rear provides the most appropriate use of material resources and contributes to the well-coordinated work of the system. However, the critical importance and usefulness, even in front of the situation, have extensive prior consultation and collective development of the most important activities for the rear. The very nature of the issues dealt with head of logistics, is that they do not solve the "one stroke". Subordinated to the Chief of Logistics 15, and sometimes more in all possible directions. Among them is a completely different profession.But they are organically linked the most important - are all needed to ensure victory over the enemy, and because all depend on each other. There can be no head of logistics, which would be equally well-versed in all matters. But of one thing he has to stand at the height - to lead people in the arts, the ability to direct their activities. And this is not achieved [321] administration, no arm-twisting, and certainly not by ignoring the knowledge of experts. It is always useful to consult with smart people, listen to their views and suggestions, even if they were in conflict with your preliminary intentions. Coordination of specialists, focused, well thought-out organization of logistics, based on the account specific aspects of each service, require that all services constantly felt in the work of a single rhythm, clearly and coherently interact. For example, the Medical Director can not know the prospects of road and rail construction, and the road is also important to know the heads of the organization of medical care, to know how it contributes to the road network. GSM service chief must know the needs of aviation and automotive service. Chief trophy service does not fulfill his duties, will not know if the next task forces to accurately target their forces and equipment to the appropriate objects in the rear of the enemy. In short, all of the home front must understand the Druze and other base its work on the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance. Before making a final decision, the chief of logistics is very useful preliminary discussion with the head of the project. Deal only benefit from this, and the principle of unity of command is not violated. One may ask - what group of experts should include head of logistics?

We are not a mistake to say that the main feature, the main feature, perhaps a specialty of such people can be expressed by the term "organizer" or "military organizer". Lenin repeatedly emphasized the importance of organizational activities. He even called this activity a separate specialty, bordering on art. They say that there are no schools that would prepare the organizers, the organizers revealed by life itself, as it were, naturally. From this we can agree only in part. Such an act of "identification" usually are a lot of victims - a change of a few people, until, finally, will be the one who best suits the job. Many examples can be traced hard and thorny path of generals and officers stood the ordeal of war in the military-logistical work. It is very important, choosing the right people for a particular job, to identify among them the organizers. But even more important - the ability to prepare an organizer. [328] Did the system of training military and logistical managerial personnel in peace time the work with which we met during the war?Absolutely not. Pre-war structure of the rear did not provide for such category leaders. Senior officials were preparing a large-scale logistics mainly as staff officers to the military and logistical "bias." Since the structure of the pre-war home front was divided, then the leadership training of the home front had no focus, which demanded war. Organizers of the rear should be selected and trained, to give them the minimum of knowledge and expertise that would allow them to professionally manage people, to instill in them the skills necessary to coordinate the efforts of various specialists. The higher the link in the rear, so versatile to be prepared by the organizer. Chief of Logistics of the front (army) should be a competent operational commander, able to understand the complex operational-strategic and political situation, the military erudite economist, determined and resolute organizer. Improve the teaching of economic knowledge should be given special attention. Even at the Academy of the General Staff, I graduated after the war, the military-economic training of students and faculty could be more fundamental. Good ekonomzhcheskaya military training is particularly necessary for those who will work in the bodies behind. Where to draw the energy of the soldiers of the Red Army, including the employees of the rear, ready to give up their power, and even lives for their country, for his people? Love of country, the great Soviet patriotism - is the force that controls millions of hearts, inspiring to work, to exploit to the full self-sacrifice! Love for the people who sent you to defend the homeland, their confidence and gave you their fate in the hour of mortal danger.Boundless faith in the party, headed the sacred struggle with the treacherous enemy, the party, which under the leadership of Lenin led people to storm the autocracy and capitalism during the revolution, and during the war with the same decisiveness stood at the forefront of the armed struggle of the Soviet people against fascism. [ 329]
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Front and rear in one. The whole country has risen to defend their land. This force, in the origins of the power of the Red Army.

The bodies were worthy rear conductors will of the people in such an important area as the constant care about the life of a soldier, providing the army with all the material means, the maintenance of constant combat readiness of troops. Great responsibility fell to the Communists, the party sent to work for the rear. Make these organs maximum performance, responsive to the needs of the Soviet soldiers, ready to perform any task command - that was the task of the Communists and the whole system of party-political education of workers behind. Particularly important and noble task of the Communists was to the rear care for the wounded. At the time, Mikhail Kalinin said: "The wounded need your kind words, to participate, and this is where you show sincerity. Good attitude wounded soldier always remember and talk about it in a thousand places. As a result, the word spoken slowly, would spread far " {14} . The staff of the home front during the war, was brought up in the spirit of irreconcilability to wasteful, uneconomical expenditure of material resources. Logistics workers understand their responsibility for the fruits of labor of the Soviet people, a heritage of the whole of our society. They gave all the power, building the bridges, roads, repair of equipment, ensuring timely delivery to the front of all necessary, evacuation to the rear of various assets, preparation of food, the field work. The party called on the personnel of the rear to increase productivity, to the manifestation of creativity, to the fulfillment of high military duty. Mobilizing enormous significance was the "Appeal Front Military Council to employees rear" before the Berlin operation. The Military Council demanded that all of us wide clarification policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet government in relation to the German people - fierce hatred of armed enemies and deceived humanity to the German population, the care of the German children. The appeal of the Military Council said: "The heroes in this great battle is not only those who directly destroy the enemy in battle, but also those who, despite all the difficulties, always keeping up with a ride [330] to the battlefield all you need to defeat the enemy and rapid progress. " This call Front Military Council has found an echo in the heart of every soldier, sergeant, officer and general logistics. No less important was the holding of the general party-political work among the local population of the front line, directly involved in organizing the recovery of the local economy and to use it for the needs of the Red Army, the maintenance of proper relations with the local population - not a simple task in foreign territories. During the war, was well placed visual propaganda. On posters, slogans, signs on the roads would be to compile a whole chronicle of the war. It was one of the strongest forms of political work in the rear of the front. It is not my task to give a detailed description of all forms and methods of party-political work in the rear of the front. This is the subject of independent research. I will say the main thing: to the

particular merits of large groups of communists rear I carry the spirit of unity, solidarity, co-mutual, deep mutual respect and trust, which have prevailed throughout. Political Department of the rear in no small part contributed to the establishment and maintenance of healthy friendly atmosphere in relations between people. The rear of the front head of the political Colonel DI mule, has extensive experience in civil party work conditions before the war, in many ways helped to guide the head of logistics complex. I somehow "lucky" to commissioners and deputy for political affairs. Sometimes my colleagues even asked what accounts for this enviable community? I do not know what to say. Can be, and in fact I was just lucky. I already mentioned the Commissioner rear 49th Army AN Rassadin. At the same He was replaced by JS Fursov. Both of them were big party workers before the war Rassadin - Secretary of the Baku City Party Committee, Fursov - Secretary of the Stalingrad Regional Party. Commissioner rear Bryansk front in 1942 was M. Smirnov, a member of the Communist Party since 1915, voluntarily joined the Moscow People's Militia.Immediately after the war, my deputy for political affairs in Glavvoenstroe was Dengin SA - formerly Secretary of the Smolensk Regional Party.They all had great political experience, knew the country's economy, especially the area, and their knowledge and experience were a precious asset to the Armed Forces during the war, and especially [331] to the rear of the system, where, in fact, there is much akin to the complex and multifaceted work Head area, district or region. Prewar party leaders, becoming party leader in the system of the army and the rear of the front, quickly "grow into" the new conditions. Of course, each of them had their own special qualities. But overall they had the ability to create an atmosphere of principle, efficiency and camaraderie. In establishing good business relationships with friendly commissioners may some role played by the fact that I myself spent 16 years in the party-political work in the army. United and coordinated work of Chief Commissioner, the unity of views on all the fundamental issues always create confidence in the basis for a bold initiative. You always feel elbow comrade who will support you in difficult times. With special affection and deep respect I have to say about the chief political management front Gen. SF Galadzheve. Political Department of the front under his leadership, has had a steady and tangible support the rear of the front everywhere: in the selection of people in the organization of political work in period pieces, to maintain order in the rear of the front, in their various events at the rear ("Review of military equipment", " Review of the horse "," Conference of experts "," visual propaganda for military roads "), to provide leisure drivers, repairmen, builders, etc. The issues involved in the rear of our front member of the Military Council of General K. Telegin. He attached great importance to the planning of the home front, especially in operations such as the Battle of Kursk, the Vistula-Oder and Berlin. He is almost always present at the meetings with the heads of the chief of logistics services, the development of the main issues of logistics, participated in the conference obschefrontovoy summarizing the experience of war, discuss the formulation of treatment and evacuation of the case, the quality of food the soldiers on the front line. Sometimes I thought that Telegin even "unduly" interested in us, without having to delve into some of the details; chiefs painfully react to such intervention, seeing in it the distrust of himself and a violation of the principle of unity of command. But it could be in the end result of a purely subjective sensibility ... It is undisputed that Telegin always, even if there were other important things to find

time to talk with the workers[332] and in the rear of his desire to help them except sometimes with formal framework. Most felt Telegina help in the organization of political work in the rear. From political agencies politapparata, party organizations Logistics system requires a deep understanding of the challenges faced by their services, parts, units. The governing system of logistics chiefs always have to take care that the political officers were targeted in the situation and work purposefully. For attention to the work of the Communist Party of military logistics in the war proved, in particular, the introduction at the front and in the armies of office of members of the military advice on the home front. These duties usually performed by large party workers, drafted into the army during the war. Not once occurred to me that many of them were, would be worthy candidates for leadership positions in the rear, if they had the military and academic education. The experience of the last war has shown that it would be appropriate to introduce into the Military Council (in peacetime - Military Council District) Chief of Logistics of the front (army). This greatly facilitate his work and increase credibility.
***

It is impossible to adequately describe the work is complete the rear, without telling the person who headed the rear of the Red Army during the Great Patriotic War - general AV Khruleva, his multifaceted, comprehensive and, I would say, titanic work. The reader is already familiar with how complex and difficult a job the front rear. How then was the grand scale of the Chief of Logistics of the Armed Forces of the country! Khruleva knew only by the Armed Forces. It was closely associated with the whole of the economy with the State Planning Commission, with the leading Commissariat. It was a great soldier and statesman. His biography, as in a mirror, reflects the way many of the older generation, who gave his entire life revolution. Coming from a peasant village of Bolshaya Aleksandrovka, now Leningrad region, it becomes a personnel Petrograd proletariat - fitter Porokhovsky plant. A soldier of the First World War, he took part in the February and October revolutions. [333] From the beginning of the socialist revolution he joined the Red Guard, and then the Red Army. Became a member of the Communist Party in March 1918. During the Civil War, he was commissioner of the 11th Cavalry Division as part of the 1st Cavalry Army. Hrulev was a delegate to X, XIV and XV of party congresses, XIV and XV Party conferences, was a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the second convocation. From the beginning of World War II led Hrulev tricky business logistics of the Armed Forces. As Deputy People's Commissar of Defense for Logistics, Hrulev essentially re-created the system of logistic support of the army. That he belongs to the great merit in the birth of the idea to create the rear of the Armed Forces as a system of supply and material support of the warring armies. Basic, perhaps, the defining feature of the military leader was his ability to affect those most important and crucial areas in the economic life of the country, which depended on the state of the entire economy of the Soviet Union and the stability of the rear of the Armed Forces. When in the course of the war it became clear that a further rise of industry and the success of combat operations in the front is impossible, if not achieved clarity and reliability in rail transport, Khruleva was given in combination and the duty of National Commissioner of Railways.

To ensure the steel industry with raw materials, logistics chief of the Red Army was responsible for managing the collection of scrap metal and shipping it to the steel mills. AV Hrulev demanded active participation in the conduct of the troops of the spring and autumn sowing, the harvest, especially in the front line, helped commissariats and agencies that process agricultural products. He is close to his heart took tremendous work to restore the coalfields, produced during the war and after it in the Tula region, the Donbas, in Dombrowski's district (Poland), to increase oil production in Baku, Grozny, Drohobych, and then in Ploiesti (Romania ). He was a property extraordinary scope in any case where the required support from the rear of the Armed Forces - whether hlebouborochnaya campaign supply beet sugar factories, the establishment of tobacco production, recovery of textile industry, the management of the coal basin, gasoline production, etc. [ 334] He went to the front, where it was very difficult. On his arrival at the Kursk Bulge in 1943, I said. He is very fond of ne slow, extra words, always demanded speed operation. Chief Minister to accept the rear of the Central Front in March 1943, he gave me 48 hours, but less than two hours later, as he called and asked me how long I'm going to take the case, and another two hours later ordered me to join the position and take full responsibility for the work. .. So he "set in motion the car," and then every two to three hours I reported to him about the situation. He could sometimes make much noise - that much noise, but not to offend his subordinate, not to curse. He valued each human dignity. Was very sociable, curious, reached "to the root" in any their situation. Great attention to the slave - one of the characteristics and strengths Khruleva. He often worried about the life, the health of a commander.Especially he showed a lot of care for the families of commanders who find themselves in a difficult position. Location just took this man so much power? How could he withstand the constant onslaught from different sides - the military councils of the fronts, commissars, the General Staff, the national and provincial governing bodies, directors, defense plants and more! A report of Stalin? Many times I have heard from Khruleva how difficult it had happened during these presentations. It's one thing to report to Stalin alone - then everything went well: Stalin detail delved into the details of the issue and calmly gave instructions. The situation was different when the office of the "Supreme" were some members of the State Defense Committee, as well as one or the other, the front commander or the commander of a native troops (artillery, tank, aviator). All of them expressed their claims to the rear - everywhere something was missing. Others were not averse to take off and take a personal account Khruleva blame for problems at the front or in the defense industry. But this was not Hrulev to take positions. He knew his job and knew the state of the economy, and no matter ne could catch him unawares.He could with all boldness, directness and sharpness even parry attacks. In most cases, Stalin took the side Khruleva and supported him. "But one day - told me Hrulev calling Stalin asked about the state of the supply of a front. I just opened my mouth to ask for permission to give a substantive response as Stalin snapped [335] me and hung up. It is not difficult to understand my mood after that, "- said Hrulev. Yet Stalin, according Khruleva, respected him for his intransigence, for courage, for their inability to make up to the authorities, even to the most "supreme."

After the war, I do not just have to see Andrei Vasilevich at home, in the circle of his family. He always did a lot of people, especially on weekends. Extended family as the patriarch seated it at the table, and friendly laughter of friends, relatives, children of all ages answered witty and funny remarks the host and hostess Esther Samson. Andrei Vasilievich loved by all who knew what he was carrying a heavy load on his shoulders during the war. Disliked him unable to see what the price of the our people every kilogram of bread, every coat, every ton of fuel each car, etc. The refusal of food, in uniform, in the supply of a load is seen by them in ignorance as stinginess and miserliness even . Andrey Hrulev burned at work. He never gave the case half. Or does not take, or if you took on something, then reduce it to the end. His work certainly deserved to, he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and Hero of Socialist Labor. To this day, I wonder why it happened that he and other prominent organizers of the rear did not get such an award. But what was the war! What superhuman effort she demanded from employees of Logistics and most of Khruleva! Last and highest honors AV Hrulev as an outstanding military leader honored after death he was buried in the Kremlin wall next to the Lenin Mausoleum, the covenants which he lived and worked Hrulev.
***

Central office of the rear of experienced and respected leaders. We had a wonderful Khruleva deputies and assistants. General VE Belokoskov was one of the deputy chief of the rear of the Red Army, who was loved, loved it all, they had to at least time to contact him. He was in charge of road construction and road management. Always calm, thoughtful, he does not hang up any questions, do not hide behind the head, [337] took over when he could, the lion's share of responsibility for the decision. General V. Vinogradov, also deputy head of the rear of the Red Army was in charge of the general problems of the home front, as well as directly involved in organizing the evacuation of wounded troops and supply fuel. At the front of the most difficult periods of offensive operations we always felt his care. Was in charge of the food supply, Deputy Chief of Logistics General PA Yermolin, sensitive to our needs people. However, to satisfy all the needs of the front in different types of food, we have successfully negotiated with the chief uprodsnaba D. Pavlov and Ermolina accessed only in the most extreme cases. Commissioner rear was VA Bayukov, then it was replaced by J. S. Kolesov, who remained deputy chief of logistics on the political part of the war. Characteristic not only of the supreme body of the rear, but also the personality of General Khruleva would be incomplete if we were not told about the logistics chief of staff of the Armed Forces Gen. MP Milovskaya. He was the soul of the whole central office behind. Khruleva was inherent expansiveness, sometimes a hurry in making a decision, sometimes it just does not want to reckon with the order if recognized them obsolete. Too rough edges smoothed nature Khruleva calm, balanced mind Milovskaya. Sometimes I've been out with the Chief of Staff with a notebook in hand patiently listens to instructions Khruleva, recording his every thought. From the side it was evident that some indications of Andrei Vasilyevich inspired by emotions,

uncontrollable desire to improve one stroke confusing and difficult thing, perhaps an hour or two it would be followed by other instructions on the same subject. The chief of staff is taken into account. He quietly, with dignity, says: "All right. It will be done, "and then reported Khruleva draft order or directive with such amendments and clarifications that could not disagree Hrulev himself. Complex way of life was Michael P. Milovsky. He is a native of the village parish Nikulino Filippovskaya Pokrovsky County Ivanovo region.From the first days of the October Revolution, he was forced to participate in commissions for the nationalization of industry, as well as the distribution of the landed estates of the working peasantry. In 1918, he was fortunate to attend a conference of young communists in Moscow, where the bright speech [338] was Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.Milovsky talked about this significant event in his life: "At first, Lenin reproached us is that we think only about the war and how young people seek only to fight the counter-revolution. And now need to start thinking of other things, to restore damaged during World War II economy. It is necessary to acquire the knowledge to manage all sectors of the economy, we should be the masters of their own country. And for this we need to learn, learn and learn. It is necessary to acquire all the knowledge that mankind has accumulated - so said Lenin ... " Second time lucky Milovskaya see Lenin and hear his speech August 1, 1919 at the Conference of the Red Army Khodynsky camp in Moscow. Vladimir Lenin called the Red Army, sent to the front, staunchly defend Soviet power, make every effort to defeat the counter-revolution.Among the students, go to the front, and was Milovsky. "For 46 years of service in the Soviet Army, I look at myself as a servant of the Soviet people, charged with weapons to defend the gains of the October Revolution" - so said Milovsky their long journey, and it was half a century flawless and selfless Service. Even before the Second World War against Fascism, he graduated from the Academy of the General Staff and has extensive military and theoretical knowledge. Devoting himself to the education of young military personnel, he worked first at the Frunze Academy, and then at the Academy of the rear of the Red Army. It exceptionally well combined as military commander during the Civil War (for which he received two serious wounds), and organizer of a practitioner in the academic and scientific research institution of higher education. He was already a well-trained staff officers, when in 1941 he had to lead the rear headquarters of the Red Army. The choice was Khruleva could not be more successful: with the advent of the rear headquarters Milovskaya turned into a cultural, balanced, rhythmically working center, where each of us, peripheral workers could get operational orientation, interesting lessons learned, and tips. Often Milovskaya and most had to travel to the front during the preparation of large-scale operations. Perhaps, it is difficult to say where the more time spent in the last war Milovsky - at the front or in Moscow. When was released Dabrowski Coal Basin, the government entrusted Milovskaya honorable duty of [339] to lead the restoration of flooded and destroyed the mines. This role is with honor, not for nothing after 20 years Polish miners honored him with an honorary miner Dombrowski pool. Exceptionally great merit Mikhail Pavlovich the talent the rear of the Soviet Army. Many students of the Academy, serving in the Soviet Army or have gone to the reserve, are graduates of its completion, signed Milovskaya as head of the Academy. MP Milovsky has made a major contribution to the theory of Soviet military art on the home front. His death June 23, 1966 was a great loss.

***

A few lines at the end. Experience the rear to the front of the Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945 and it is still the basis for the development of the theory of Soviet military art in this area. It is extremely important to thoroughly and objectively examine the experience. Much has been done in this direction, but the main work is still ahead. It would be wrong to think of it so that if every service (or branch) rear summarized its experience, and this can be limited. Undoubtedly, and such work is important. But we have in mind the theoretical generalization of a set of questions logistics troops in the war in terms of interaction and interdependence of all rear services, organizational unity of the rear. This is precisely the essence and novelty solutions problem posed by the war. A theoretical analysis of the problem logistics in World War II shows that in the art of war has its "tactics", its "strategy", there are a number of its laws that preserve a certain significance in the present time. Undoubtedly, the work in this area no end. The generated current single military-historical center of economy and military matters, in particular logistics of the army have to find the right place. Deeply wrong those comrades who believe that the study of the experience of the last war has only historical interest, is something addressed in the past and focused on what is not acceptable in this age of the atom, missile technology and cybernetics. [340] Studying the experience of the past, it would be wrong to rely on stereotypical repetition of the practice of past years. But this does not detract from the value and importance of such a study. The experience of combat activity of the front, where I worked most of the war, is great value, if only because his way passed on the important strategic direction - from Moscow to Berlin. I am far from canonize this experience. Every front, every army in any direction made many of his very valuable in military science, and it would be inexcusable to give up the very thorough analysis and synthesis of all this vast material, especially when it comes to the rear, as this area is the most poorly covered in the public literature. It is time to show our contemporaries multifaceted work of the rear in the last war. This can be useful in the future. The structure of the home front, the war born, survived the ordeal. It has proven its compliance nature of the war machine of the period. The most important and most valuable feature of the new structure was to rear its unity. Came together key functions - planning and organization, logistics and transport. In the future, this principle, we believe, will not only retain its value, and will become even more rich content. Modern conditions dictate the need for even more insistently for greater centralization in the manual on the rear of the front. Tested during the war rear structure we must continuously improve in line with fundamental shifts taking place in the field of military technology - this is the incontrovertible lesson of the war. Employees of the rear along with the entire Soviet Army performed their sacred duty to the country. They always felt responsible to the soldier, took care of his health and spirits. Callousness, heartlessness, formalism in the work of the rear resolutely eradicated. Homeland rewarded soldiers, officers and generals of the rear for their dedicated work. "Logistics" ... Compared with the combat activities gunners, pilots, tank, guerrillas - as prosaic sounds! Rear - this is not the art of war, in honor of which, as in the day tank, artillery Day Salute Moscow. Some books on the work of the home front in the last war, and called the "Invisible service."

However, Marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan X. Baghramyan said: "Rear - is half the battle, and even a little more than half". [341] What happens? Discreet service, and at least half of the win? Re-read the memoirs of some military commanders about the war, and with great difficulty (often between the lines) notice how casually dropped by the phrase as workers rear also took some part in the battles that brought fame to the author of the memoirs. Often in such memoirs arranged "dressing down" storekeeper kaptenarmusam, cooks, and this sort of an equal sign between them called a general concept - rear. The word "tylovik" during the war sounded in the mouths of some of the military as a swear word. Among them were such ignorant people (sometimes takes a high position in the army), which, besides shouting, did not know of other forms of treatment of workers rear (by the way, such ignorance does not prevent such people now speak pompous phrases about the exclusive role of logistics in the war) . When commanders who loved commit "defeat" tylovikam, [342] themselves became head of logistics, they immediately found the helplessness and lack of minimal organizational abilities. Yes, the rear - this is a tough cookie. Not everyone is to get to the core. But everyone feels entitled to judge and condemn the work of those who are working on it. Often said Gen. AV Hrulev, we have many know-alls who are always ready to give advice on how to bring up difficult children how to treat incurable diseases, how to build a house, and finally, how to manage the home front! .. Not yet fully been eliminated misapprehension on the home front, the significance of it in the common struggle against the enemy, and that we are much to blame, the generals and officers of the home front, we are guilty of that too behind in research, compilation and promotion of the rich experience accumulated in the last war. Hard, very hard work tylovika at the front. The employees at the front of the rear rest weaned, they are always enough sleep. In the first years of the war, I took large doses of caffeine and any other agents to stay awake and remain operational up to 5 - 6 am. At 6 am, I usually had dinner and tried to sleep. But what a dream! .. If each of the heads of departments under my only concern is for their specific issues, I called everywhere, from all directions, in all specialties. Phone calls, caused by radio and HF, came to the front of Moscow from Commissariats, from the chief of the rear of the Red Army from the republics and regions. Phone calls and calls the report commander, a member of the military council, called all the army commanders, chiefs of army logistics. Every minute, every hour, I had to be ready to give an accurate, concise and comprehensive answer - "water" in the conversation, especially in the report, no one suffered. On our front (yes, probably on other fronts) there was the means by which the commander almost daily until late at night listening to (itself or through the Chief of Staff) telephone reports of commanders. Last call at about 2 - 3 am was the deputy commander for logistics to deliver its task, rather, a number of problems. The conversation usually ends like this: "Take action and report back at 9 o'clock in the morning." Of course, for the remaining five or six hours of no special measures not accept, if it has not done everything necessary at least in the main. But before I had time in the morning to check what is being done in accordance with the earlier data [343] directions, and encourage artists. At 8 am, after two hours of rest, I already had the exact data as of 6 am, the location of the transport of

ammunition, fuel, food and other matters that are disturbed at the moment the command. At exactly 9:00 am, I had called the front commander and reported on the situation and the measures taken. And so every day, month after month, year after year, until the end of the war ... Some ask: when sleeping head of logistics? As they say, "on the day". Sometimes managed to snooze for 40 - 50 minutes of sitting in the car on the way to the first level or the front. Those were the sweetest moments of sleep, when no one could call or visit with a question. Sometimes I spoke to the front commander, would not on its part of any indication in the next few hours, and frankly reported to him that I want to take a sleeping pill and "into oblivion" in order to recover and re-work and work. Of course, I'm not one has been in this position - the majority of commanders at the front lived nerves - in a war! But every year the war subtracts years from tempered human life span. In those years of it, in fact, no one thought. Solidarity, partnership, friendship, mutual understanding and respect - it brightens up life at the front. This general atmosphere in the workplace and in everyday life keeps us courage, confidence, and performance. Welcome now comrades in front of our big family meeting, always remember about the cordial relations that have helped us endure the most difficult days. Well, if in times of peace reigned throughout this atmosphere! Many workers took the glorious war of military logistics. The memory of them can not be forgotten. Without the selfless and truly heroic effort tylovikov victory would be impossible in such a large and exhausting war. Some of the foreign armies belonging to a strong military power, have adopted the Soviet experience in logistics troops. So with great care and respect we must refer to my own experience, which gave such a high price. He went golden page in the history of the armed struggle of the Soviet people against fascism, and a generation of military leaders will find in it much that is instructive.

NAME INDEX
Azarkh R. 94 Ayta 30 Ana Cooley 40, 42 Andreev AA 7, 200 Antonov, PS 259 Apeksimov 119, 258 Artemenko 201 Akhutin MN 305 Baghramyan I. X. 340 Banaytis SI 305 Drums AY 98, 171, 173, 187, 213, 219, 240, 261, 324

PI 107 baht Bayukov VA 337 Ran VV 258 Belokoskov VE 248, 336 Belousov VF 301 Berzarin NE 220, 222, 272, 285 Burling 141 B. Take 185, 188 Bogdanov, SI 141, 272 181 strikers Borisov NV 156, 157, 200, 228, 252 Boruhson JA 318 Knolls KP 221 NA Bulganin, 67, 181, 192 NN Burdenko 305 Fast NM 43 Vavilov AA 259 Wiseman, PS 165, 166, 181, 237, 274 Vasiliev AM 158 DG Vasil'ev 201 Vasiliev 268, 271 Vakh NP 181, 318 Venediktov NA 126 Vinogradov VI 60, 248, 337 Vinogradov VP 80, 88 Wisniewski AA 305 Cherry 260 Vlasic NS 280 Vlasov V. 82

Vovsi MS 101, 305 Ascension NA 7 Wolves 181 Ravens 162 Voyachek VI 305 Vurgaft 56 Galadzhev SF 125, 204, 263, 331 Galanin IV 110 Halperin 190 Garnyk VA 142-146 Girgolav SS 305 Hitler, 103, 141, 188, 286, 287 Gladyshev 162 FI Golikov 82 Famines GA 226 Goncharov 181 Gorinevskaya VV 218 Peas 181 M. Gorky 75 Grun DM 50, 77, 81, 222, 275, 276 Gurko VA 221 Gusev, 64, 67, 68 Delatr de Tassigny J. 268, 271, 272 Dementiev NI 54 Dengin SA 330 Dikan 180 Domashev 162 Donets, GT 98, 129, 130, 159, 160, 194, 213, 226, 237, 251, 280 Dragomoshenko TK 231

Drachev P. 303 Druzhinin IV 317 Dutov VN 181, 191, 192, 314 Egorov VP 158 Elanskii PN 138-140, 305 Eremin, N. 52, 53 Yermolin PA 337 Lark VG 86 Zheltikov V. 249, 250 Zhizhin NK 98, 119-121, 181, 213, 216, 258, 262, 310 Zhmakin 175, 310 Zhorov JS 169, 170, 218, 240, 305 GK Zhukov, 112, 146, 189, 196, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 221-223, 234, 243, 245, 247, 252, 265, 267, 268, 270-272, 274, 279 , 285, 294, 299 317 beetles Zhum 162 Zarudenko LS 318 Zakharkin IG 39, 61-63, 73, 74, 76, 80, 82 Grain PN 277 Znamensky GA 240 Zotov VP 127, 268, 285, 301 Ibragimov BI 240 Ivanov SP 259 Ivanov 162 Ignatov NG 85-87, 134 Ievlev 126 Izotov 317 Itskin MS 84 LM Kaganovich 200

Kazakov VI 89, 203, 234 Kazan VN 259 Kalinin MI 329 Kalinowski NA 76 Kalinchuk TN 317 Kalnin 38, 39 Capon EM 240, 321, 323-325 Pockets IM 97-99 Karpenko 216 Karpinski N. 302, 303 Katukov ME 233 Kashirin NV 183, 184, 268, 271, Keitel, 268, 270, 271 Klimov, 128, 129 Kovalev IV 200, 207, 303 Koval 317 Kowalczyk 176, 310 Kozlov P. 30, 37 Kolosov YS 337 Komlev 74 23 F. Cohn Kondratiev ZI 303 Konkov VF 233 Kormilitsyn MI 248, 303 Kornienko 40 Kosoglyad GD 279, 281 AN Kosygin 7 Kravchenko D. 318 Mongers NI 158

Krenkel ET 46 Hooks VV 176 Kugutov BN 146, 147, 162, 236 Kudryavtsev SP 259 Kunich LA 218 Kupriyanov PA 305 Kurbatov 20 Kurguzov 181 Kurnosov GA 107 Kurochkin PA 137 Kurylev AK 319, 320, 322 Lavrukhin 162 Lane 318. Lakhtin 181 Leviticus VS 168, 305 VI Lenin, 22, 23, 327, 338 Lesnyak MA 117 Drifter 162 Litvinov, AI 61 Likhachev P. 220 Lozhkin NI 153, 155 Lopasov IA 314 Mules, DI 321, 330 Luvsan S. 77 Lunacharsky AV 75 Lutsyk 320 Lucinschi AA 41 Makarov, I. 85, 86, 88, 319 Malinin, MS 89, 111, 112, 181, 203, 244, 254

Malinowski YE 269 J. Small, 53 Mamekov 262 Mariupol BA 241, 244 Martynov 23 Marshak 121 Maryasin M. J. 120, 121 Maslowski JE 49, 50, 52 Matveev P. 130-132 Mihetko EP 268 AI Mikoyan, 7, 88, 89, 123, 200, 270, 283, 284, 285, 301 Mikushev NG 52, 53 Milovsky MP 79, 81, 337, 339 Moladnitsky II 317 Monasevich MM 45 Morgunov AV 268 Moskalev IL 201, 248, 250, 251 Naidenko AG 320 Nesterov 190 Nikolaev 38, 39 Nikolaev 72, Nikolaeenko 322 Novikov, MS 100, 317 Eagle GN 203 Orlenko PV 55: Eagles MA 40 Aspen A.. K. 323 Osobka Moravian E.-B. 185, 188 Pavlov VM 268-270

Pavlov DV 301, 319, 337 Pavlova ED 268 Pankratov II 74-76 Paulus 93 Pahaznikov PN 196, 220 Baking LA 317 Pesenko EI 128, 129 Pescherin 162 Petrov, IA 48 Petrov N. 158 Pilsudski 186 NI Pirogov 102 Pletnev AV 220 Pliev IA 165, 166 Plyakin RG 238, 240 Pokumeyko MS 317 Polivoda GS 54 Ponomarenko HS. K. 134 Popov VI 187, 189, 218, 240, 305 Prokhorenko 69 Proshlyakov AI 160, 203, 280 Pustovoitenko AE 317 Pukhov NP 109 Pushkar, NS 29, 30 Radzievskii 272 Rassadin AN 77, 78, 330 Reuters MA 89, 91 Reichenau 287 Rodin AG 107

Slingshot VI 201 Rosenblum EY 29, 30 Rosenblum, MD 29, 30 Romanenko PL 89-91, 109, 110 KK Rokossovsky, 83, 85, 89, 93, 97, 102, 108, 111, 112, 116, 124, 134, 137-139, 146, 161, 162, 166, 181, 203-205 Rumyantsev, P. 202 Rudenko, DA 250, 251 Rudenko SI 166, 203 Rydz-Smigly 186 Ryabov MF 239, 240 Saburov M. 3. 277 Svetlitsky 260 Sviridov MG 222, 242, 244, 276 Semenov 181 Sergeev 317 Serdenko NV 220, 259 Skrigsho NS 103, 167 Skrshnpk 263 Smelov Todorov 89, 320 Smirnov EI 101, 102, 218. 304, 305 Smirnov MI 330 Advisers IG 94, 97 Falcons 67 Sokolovsky VD 272 Solomonyan 190 Sochienkov PS 160 Spaatz K. 268, 271 Stalin IV 23, 40, 67, 166, 185, 200, 204, 279, 280, 334, 336 Surin AG 45

Surkov, 74, 107, 108 Tarmosin FG 302, 303 Tedder, A. 268, 271 Telegin KF 124, 181, 204, 216, 252, 263, 265, 27.1, 331 Tissone VP 201 Tkachev VF 258 Tkachev 72 Tolokolnikov GA 176, 177 Trotsky 23 Tulchinsky AK 221 Basals IP 303 Ulbricht, W. 282, 283 Utkin 181 Firsov, 65, 66 Fursov I. pp. 78, 330 Khmara ED 69 Khomenko, V. 48, 59 Igor Khokhlov, 80, 81 Hrulev AV 7, 61, 79, 97. 98, 153, 200, 207, 248, 283, 320, 323, 332 338, 342 Khruleva ES 336 Khrushchev, NS 106 Cherporyzh LS 269, 281 Chernyakov AG 106, 118, 119, 231, 252 Chernyakhovsky ID 110 Churchill 279 Chistyakov IM 113 Chmutov NI 86 Chogub 162

Chuikov VI 212-214, 220, 235, 272 Shabalin SI 85 Shabanin 181 Shamov VI 305 Shaposhnikov BM 314 Sharkov 42 Shvernik NM 7 VF Shevchenko, 40, 46, 47 Shlyahtenko MK 90, 91, 109, 110, 166, 181, 281, 316, 317 Schmal 162 Shpagin DI 317 Speyer NM 119, 174, 219 Stumpf 268 Entin DA 305 Yakovlev, D. 207, 247 Yaroslavsky Em. 23 Yaroshenko AK 220, 221 Yatsyna TK 201 Yachenin LI 126

NOTES
{1}

"Military History Journal", 1959, 4, pp. 63-64. In the same place, page 65. "Military History Journal", 1965, 6, pp. 51-56. military transport service. C. Luvsan - now the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR. P. F. Sagittarius - now Lieutenant General reserve

{2}

{3}

{4}

{5}

{6}

{7}

"The arc of fire." Moscow, 1963, page 26. 116 author's personal archive.

{8} The

{9}

Archive MO, f. 345, op. 2342, 106, l. 8. 212 MO Archive, f. 345, op. 5516, 65, l. 1, p. 1, Op. 2370, on 139, l. 4.

{10}

{11} In the days when I was in the position of the 8th Guards Army, in one of its hospitals after being wounded was a sapper reconnaissance, Sergeant 332nd Infantry Regiment, my countryman AK Yaroshenko, now chairman of the kolkhoz Tokmak Kirov region Zaporozhye region, which includes my native village and the October. Yaroshenko was 18 years old. He - Sapper observer and squad - performing combat missions and was shot the bullet - the memory of the last war - and still remained in his neck.

{12}

MO Archive, f. 233, op. 15038, 44, l. 1. 238 "Judgment at Nuremberg," that I. Moscow, 1957, page 495.

{13}

{14}

M. Kalinin. About communist education. Selected Articles and Speeches, Vol. 3. Moscow, 1947, page 173.