Case Digest

1 SELECTED CASES IN LPC; 2ND SEM 2012-2013; MLQU
Limbona v. Mangalin GR No. 80391 28 February 1989 Facts: Petitioner, Sultan Alimbusar Limbona, was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly). On October 21, 1987 Congressman Datu Guimid Matalam, Chairman of the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives, invited petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the Assembly of Region XII in a consultation/dialogue with local government officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members through the Assembly Secretary that there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house committee hearing of Congress. However, on November 2, 1987, the Assembly held a session in defiance of the Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the Speaker of the Assembly. Pending further proceedings of the case, the SC received a resolution from the Assembly expressly expelling petitioner's membership therefrom. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly," for which the respondents now submit that the petition had become "moot and academic" because its resolution. Issue: Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or regions. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous governments of Region XII? Held: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST. (1987), Art. X, Sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power). PD No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy. Upon the facts presented, we hold that the November 2 and 5, 1987 sessions were invalid. It is true that under Section 31 of the Region XII Sanggunian Rules, "[s]essions shall not be suspended or adjourned except by direction of the Sangguniang Pampook". But while this opinion is in accord with the respondents' own, we still invalidate the twin sessions in question, since at the time the petitioner called the "recess," it was not a settled matter whether or not he could do so. In the second place, the invitation tendered by the Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives provided a plausible reason for the intermission sought. Also, assuming that a valid recess could not be called, it does not appear that the respondents called his attention to this mistake. What appears is that instead, they opened the sessions themselves behind his back in an apparent act of mutiny. Under the circumstances, we find equity on his side. For this reason, we uphold the "recess" called on the ground of good faith. ALVAREZ V GUINGONA (1996) Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting the municipality of Santiago Isabela into an independent component city to be known as the city of Santiago. The law was challenged mainly because the act did not allegedly originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution. Also, petitioner claims that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into a component city. Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB 8817 which was filed on April 18, 1993. After the third reading, the bill was transmitted to the Senate on January 18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the senate. The committee recommended that HB 8817 be approved without amendment, taking into consideration that the house bill was identical to the senate bill. Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for the purposes of its conversion into an independent component city Held: Yes. Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of P20,000,000 for its conversion into a city. After deducting the IRA, ti appears that the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or

decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. Petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. For purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. 11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-owned-orcontrolled corporations". Issue: WON considering that Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 2770 can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives Held: Ye s. Ratio: Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that RA 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution
is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy. Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.Every law, including RA No 7720 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. It is a well entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality,. Consequently, for RA No 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Consititution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one, in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No 7720, the court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is therefore inevitable. CORDILLERA BROAD COALITIONVS.COMMISSION ON AUDIT (1991) Facts: Pursuant to a ceasefire agreement signed on September 13, 1986, the Cordillera Peoples LiberationArmy (CPLA) and the Cordillera Bodong Administration agreed that the Cordillera people shall notundertake their demands through armed and violent struggle but by peaceful means, such as politicalnegotiations.A subsequent joint agreement was then arrived at by the two parties. Such agreement states that theyare to:Par. 2. Work together in drafting an Executive Order to create a preparatory body that couldperform policy-making and administrative functions and undertake consultations and studiesleading to a draft organic act for the Cordilleras.Par. 3. Have representatives from the Cordillera panel join the study group of the R.P. Panel indrafting the Executive Order.Pursuant to the above joint agreement, E.O. 220 was drafted by a panel of the Philippine governmentand of the representatives of the Cordillera people. This was then signed into law by President CorazonAquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers, creating the Cordillera Administrative Region [CAR],which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and theCity of Baguio.Petitioners assail the constitutionality of E.O. 220 on the primary ground that by issuing the said order,the President, in the exercise of her legislative powers, had virtually pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras Issue: Constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 1987, which created the Cordillera Administrative Region - assailed on the primary ground that the President pre-empts the enactment of an organic act by Congress and the approval of such act through a

plebiscite. Held: EO 220 envisions the consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by the administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the enactment of an organic act and the creation of an autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions. The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras which undoubtedly, will take time. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime the organic act had not yet been passed. Petitioners incidentally argue that the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces composing it. It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative autonomy of local government units or, in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political autonomy, not just administrative, to these regions. As said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QC V ERICTA (1983) Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No 6118 requires that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial. For several years, the section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed the a resolution directing the City Engineer to stop selling memorial park lots where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space for pauper burial. Respondent reacted by filing with the CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The Court declared the Section 9 null and void. Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter, in the exercise of local police power. On the other hand, respondent contends that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because the ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Issue:WON Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the police power Held:No Ratio:An examination of the Charter of Quezon City does not reveal any provision that would justify the ordinance in question except the provision granting
police power to the City. The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit (. A fortiori, the power to regulate does not include the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery. There are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof. The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover,

the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations. Mariano v. COMELEC G.R. No. 118627 Ponente: Puno, J. FACTS: Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati). Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen. ISSUES: Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new citys acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law HELD/RULING: Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that: Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute. Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs. It is not an end in itself. Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court 07 March 1995
litigation. Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that: Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati. Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following: Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events. Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. Mariano v. COMELEC G.R. No. 118627; 242 SCRA 213, March 7, 1995 (Constitutional Law Requirements in challenging the constitutionality of the law) FACTS: Petitioners suing as tax payers, assail a provision (Sec 51) of RA No. 7859 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati) on the ground that the same attempts to alter or restart the 3consecutive term limit for local elective officials disregarding the terms previously

served by them, which collides with the Constitution (Sec 8, Art X & Sec 7, Art VI). ISSUE: Whether or not challenge to the constitutionality of questioned law is with merit. HELD: No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. City of Pasig v. COMELEC G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999 Facts: On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be separated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Brgy. Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996. Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend/cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended/cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court. Issues: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended/cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the 2 local governments. Held: A case involving a boundary dispute between LGUs presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. While it may be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, in the interest of good order, the SC can very well suspend action on one case pending the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the first. While the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it cannot deny that portions of
the same areas are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the RTC of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed barangays. A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in futility. In Mariano Jr., vs. COMELEC, the importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of an LGU cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare. Merely because a plebiscite had already been held in regard to a proposed barangay does not necessarily render a pending petition for settlement of a boundary dispute involving said barangay moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo RTC.
Magtajas Vs Pryce Properties G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, FACTS: There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project.The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.he reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353.Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement ISSUE: WON Ordinance 3353 and 3375-93 valid HELD: No Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted

by law.The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void. Vicente De La Cruz vs Edgardo Paras Subject Shall Be Expressed in the Title Police Power Not Validly Exercise De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84 which is further in pursuant to RA 938. HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets. Dela Cruz v. Paras Facts: Ordinance 84 was passed by the Municipality of Bocaue. Petitioners are business owners who had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue Issues: 1. WON a municipality may rely on its police power to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. NO. Police power granted to municipal corporations: "General power of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.- The municipal council
shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." US v. Abendan: An ordinance enacted by virtue of police power is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law, an act of the legislature, against public policy, or is unreasonable, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. US v. Salaveria: The general welfare clause has two branches: 1. attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal council by law. 2.It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. **reasonableness, consonance with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein employed. 2. WON a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. NO. RA 938: the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: . . . Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "prohibit . . ." The title, however, remained the same and the exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe RA 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals," in the language of the Administrative Code, such competence extending to all "the great public needs," and to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise.

It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of might clubs. They may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
VILLANUEVA, ET. AL. VS CASTAEDA, JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987 (damnun absque injuria) Appeal from a decision of CFI Pampanga holding that the land in question, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy. CRUZ, J.: Facts: In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, there stands on a strip of land, a conglomeration of vendors stalls together. The petitioners claim they have a right to remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization (Resolution no. 28) granted to them by the municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public property per municipal council Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218. Issue: WON petitioners have the right to occupy the subject land. Ruling: Petition Dismissed. It is a well-settled doctrine that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. The petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a contract. Hence, the loss or damage caused to petitioners, in the case at bar, does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong - damnum absque injuria. Facts Respondent Macalino, OIC of the Office of Mayor of San Fernando issued a resolution requiring the demolition of stalls constructed on what the respondent claims to be a public land which is now proliferated with the vendors stalls called talipapa. The petitioners contend that by virtue of the contract of lease issued to them by the previous municipal council they have the right to stay and do business at the place in issue. Thus, the petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the Court of First Instance contending that they are protected by the lease contract. Their petition was denied hence this action to the Supreme Court was filed for certiorari. Issue Whether or not the land in issue is a public land? Whether or not the respondents act to order the demolition of the stalls amount to grave abuse of discretion and whimsical?
Held It was held by the Supreme Court that the land in issue is a public land. In the year 1961, it appears that the municipal council of San Fernando adopted resolution no. 218 that authorized vendors to construct permanent stalls on the land in issue by virtue of a contract of lease. The resolution was opposed in a Civil Case no. 2040. In 1964, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted resolution no. 29 declaring the land as a parking space and a public plaza of the municipality which in effect impliedly revoked the resolution no. 218. In the Civil Case no. 2040, it was held that a public plaza is beyond the commerce of men. The decision was not appealed nor reversed hence the court finds no need to disturb the final adjudication of the Civil Case 2040. It is settled therefore that the land where the stalls were constructed remains a public land. The petitioners cannot claim the right to occupy the disputed premises by invoking lease contracts. Being an object beyond the commerce of men, the land in dispute cannot be an object of a lease contract. The respondent has the duty to restore the public land to what it is intended in nature and no whimsical action was taken in ordering the demolition of the stalls. It is an act within the scope of exercising police power and such police power cannot be bargained away through a lease contract. Thus, the court ruled in favor of the respondent. TATEL VS. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC [207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992] Facts: Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of Virac. Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was then appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and properties of the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the Municipal council declaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of the Civil Code (2) Whether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void.
Held: The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the provisions of Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets the criteria for a valid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute, 2) must not be unfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory, 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade, 5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. The purpose of the said ordinance is to avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of government. The lower court did not err in its decision. Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative vs Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete In 1985, the SP of Dumaguete sought to conduct an investigation in connection with pending legislation related to the operations of public utilities. Invited in the hearing are the heads of NORECO II Paterio Torres and Arturo Umbac. NORECO II is alleged to have installed inefficient power lines in the said city. Torres and Umbac refused to appear before the Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) and they alleged that the power to investigate, and to order the improvement of, alleged inefficient power lines to conform to standards is lodged exclusively with the National Electrification Administration; and neither the Charter of the City of Dumaguete nor the [old] Local Government Code (LGC BP 337) grants the SP. The SP averred that inherent in the legislative functions performed by the respondent SP is the power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether or not LGUs can issue contempt. HELD: There is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in the LGC (BP 337) granting local legislative bodies, the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt. Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of non-members for contumacious behavior would be for said power to be deemed implied in the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the SP of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers. Even assuming that the SP and the Ad-Hoc Committee had the power to issue the subpoena and the order complained of, such issuances would still be void for being ultra vires. The contempt power (and the subpoena power) if actually possessed, may only be exercised where the subject matter of the investigation is within the jurisdiction of the legislative body.
Balacuit v CFI G.R. No. L-38429 June 30, 1988 J. Gancayo Facts: Petitioners, theater owners, assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan on April 21, 1969. This called for a reduction to of the ticket price given to minors from 7-12 years old. There was a fine from 200-600 pesos or a 2-6 month imprisonment The complaint was issued in the trial court. A TRO was then issued to prevent the law from being enforced. The respondent court entered its decision declaring the law valid. Petitioners attack the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 640 on the grounds that it is ultra vires and an invalid exercise of police power. Petitioners contend that Ordinance No. 640 is not within the power of' the Municipal Board to enact as provided for in Section 15(n) of Republic Act No. 523 where it states that the Muncipal board can only fix license fees for theaters and not admission rates. The respondent attempts to justify the enactment of the ordinance by invoking the general welfare clause embodied in Section 15 (nn) of the cited law. Issue: Does this power to regulate include the authority to interfere in the fixing of prices of admission to these places of exhibition and amusement whether under its general grant of power or under the general welfare clause as invoked by the City? Held: The ordinance is under neither and thus unconstitutional. Petition granted. Ratio: 1. Kwong Sing v. City of Manila- the word "regulate" was interpreted to include the power to control, to govern and to restrain, it would seem that under its power to regulate places of exhibitions and amusement, the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan could make proper police regulations as to the mode in which the business shall be exercised. In this jurisdiction, it is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of public exhibition are subject to regulation by the municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power by the local government. People v. Chan- an ordinance of the City of Manila prohibiting first run cinematographs from selling tickets beyond their seating capacity was upheld as constitutional for being a valid exercise of police power. The City of Butuan, apparently realizing that it has no authority to enact the ordinance in question under its power to regulate embodied in Section 15(n), now invokes the police power as delegated to it under the general welfare clause to justify the enactment of said ordinance To invoke the exercise of police power, not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the courts. Petitioners maintain that Ordinance No. 640 violates the due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive, unfair, unjust, confiscatory, and an undue restraint of

trade, and violative of the right of persons to enter into contracts, considering that the theater owners are bound under a contract with the film owners for just admission prices for general admission, balcony and lodge. Homeowners Association- the exercise of police power is necessarily subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions of the fundamental law The court agreed with petitioners that the ordinance is not justified by any necessity for the public interest. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means. The evident purpose of the ordinance is to help ease the burden of cost on the part of parents who have to shell out the same amount of money for the admission of their children, as they would for themselves. A reduction in the price of admission would mean corresponding savings for the parents; however, the petitioners are the ones made to bear the cost of these savings. The ordinance does not only make the petitioners suffer the loss of earnings but it likewise penalizes them for failure to comply with it. Furthermore, as petitioners point out, there will be difficulty in its implementation because as already experienced by petitioners since the effectivity of the ordinance, children over 12 years of age tried to pass off their age as below 12 years in order to avail of the benefit of the ordinance. The ordinance does not provide a safeguard against this undesirable practice and as such, the respondent City of Butuan now suggests that birth certificates be exhibited by movie house patrons to prove the age of children. This is, however, not at all practicable. We can see that the ordinance is clearly unreasonable if not unduly oppressive upon the business of petitioners. Moreover, there is no discernible relation between the ordinance and the promotion of public health, safety, morals and the general welfare. Respondent further alleges that by charging the full price, the children are being exploited by movie house operators. We fail to see how the children are exploited if they pay the full price of admission. They are treated with the same quality of entertainment as the adults. Moreover, as a logical consequence of the ordinance, movie house and theater operators will be discouraged from exhibiting wholesome movies for general patronage, much less children's pictures if only to avoid compliance with the ordinance and still earn profits for themselves. A theater ticket has been described to be either a mere license, revocable at the will of the proprietor of the theater or it may be evidence of a contract whereby, for a valuable consideration, the purchaser has acquired the right to enter the theater and observe the performance on condition that he behaves properly. Such ticket, therefore, represents a right, Positive or conditional, as the case may be, according to the terms of the original contract of sale. This right is clearly a right of property. The ticket which represents that right is also, necessarily, a species of property. As such, the owner thereof, in the absence of any condition to the contrary in the contract by which he obtained it, has the clear right to dispose of it, to sell it to whom he pleases and at such price as he can obtain. In no sense could theaters be considered public utilities. The State has not found it appropriate as a national policy to interfere with the admission prices to these performances. This does not mean however, that theaters and exhibitions are not affected with public interest even to a certain degree. Motion pictures have been considered important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perceptions by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits are considerable. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation
must be within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power. A police measure for the regulation of the conduct, control and operation of a business should not encroach upon the legitimate and lawful exercise by the citizens of their property rights. 34 The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of the due process clause. Although the presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside when the invalidity or unreasonableness appears on the face of the ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence Lim v. Pacquing: FACTS: The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409). On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes. On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments. In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771. ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. HELD: NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional. RATIO:

Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers). Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90) Acebedo Optical vs Court of Appeals On June 24, 2011 Municipal Corporation Proprietary Functions Police Power Acebedo Optical applied for a business permit to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local optometrists, Mayor Cabili of Iligan granted the permit but he attached various special conditions which basically made Acebedos dependent upon prescriptions to be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo is not allowed to practice optometry within the city. Acebedo however acquiesced to the said conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract. ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege estoppels does not apply. SANGALANG V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
*This case is about how Jupiter street was opened up to the public by a city ordinance contrary to the wishes of the Bel Air village residents who wanted to keep it closed for
their private use.
FACTS: 1. Bel-Air Village is located north of Buendia Avenue extension (now Sen. Gil J. Puyat Ave.) across a stretch of commercial block from Reposo Street in the west up to Zodiac Street in the east. Plaintiffs are all either residents of Bel Air village or the Bel Air Village Association (BAVA). In the 1950's Bel Air Village property was sold by Makati Development Corporation which was later merged with Ayala Corporation. The lots were subject to certain restrictions namely: 1)All lot owners would automatically be a member of BAVA and 2) The lots may only be used for domestic purposes, which would last for a period of 50 years. At the time the area was open to all kinds of people and even animals. The residents decided to build a wall along the commercial side of jupiter street. Eventually Ayala Corporation decided to sell the lots on the commercial side of jupiter street to the public. In 1972, Bava and Ayala agreed that the lot owners would be members of BAVA and would be subject to the same deed of restriction of other residents in the subdivision. On April 4, 1975, the municipal council of Makati enacted its ordinance no 81, providing for the zonification of makati. Uner this ordinance, Bel air village was classified as a class A residential zone with its boundary in the south EXTENDING TO THE CENTER LINE OF JUPITER STREET. The other side of the street in between buendia and until the center line of Jupiter street was made an Administrative Office Zone. Jan 1977, The office of the Mayor wrote to BAVA that in order to ease traffic congestion Jupiter street would be opened up to the public. BAVA requested for the indefinite postponement of the plan because of the concern of the residents. Finally on August 1977 the officials of Makati removed the gates in order to open the entire length of Jupiter street to the public. Because of this there was a huge increase of traffic along Jupiter street. The commercial establishments on the southern side of jupiter street broke down the wall as it was no longer necessary and set up shop. Even the residential lots on the northern side of Jupiter street some chose to use as commercial due to the increase in traffic in the area. On March 1981, the 'comprehensive zoning ordinance' was passed by the MMC as ordinance 81-01. This ordinance made Bel Air village BOUND BY JUPITER STREET and no longer the center line. Significantly the other side of Jupiter street was classified as High Intensity Commercial zone.

Several residents as well as BAVA filed suit claiming 1) Ayala corp for breach of contract in allowing the wall to be broken down ushering in a full commercialization of Jupiter street and 2)against some residents that had used their lots as commercial in violation of the restrictions..
LOWER COURTS: plaintiffs won, then lost on appeal, the CA upholding the ordinances as valid under police power and that they reclassified the area to allow commercial lots. ISSUE: 1) WON Ayala corp was liable for breach of contract for the wall and the limited use of Jupiter street? NO. Although Jupiter street was donated to BAVA in 1978 there was no intention to limit its use to bel air village residents, in fact the deed included the general public. Also as regards the wall there was no proof that there was any such agreement between the residents and Ayala corp that a wall be maintained. 2) WON the lot owners are liable? no. we likewise exculpate the private respondents not only because of the fact that jupiter street is not covered by the deed of restrictions but chiefly because the National Government itself through the MMC had reclassified Jupiter street into a high density commercial zone pursuant to its ordinance 81-01. It is not that we are saying that restrictive easements, especially the easements herein question, are invalid or ineffective. As far as the bel air subdivision itself is concerned, certainly, they are valid and enforceable. But they are like all contracts subject to the overriding demands needs and interests of the greater number as the state may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. Our jurisdiction guarantees sanctity of the contract and is aid to be the law between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it cannot contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Above all it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power designed precisely to promote health safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary... The non impairment clause is secondary to the more compelling interests of the general welfare.
Sangalang v. IAC Facts: Studies were made by Mayor Yabut et al, on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air calculated to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to BelAir. Based on the studies, it was deemed necessary, in the interest of the general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodia, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit, and Paseo de Roxas streets. According to Bel-Air they own the streets and as such, should not be deprived of them without just compensation. Issue: WON the mayor acted arbitrarily in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets. NO. The opening of Jupiter was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. The same is upheld in the case of Orbit street. There is not merit in BAVAs claims that the demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter amounts to deprivation of property without due process of law or
expropriation without just compensation. There is no taking involved in this case. The act of the mayor is in the concept of police power. PASEI v. Drilon: Police Power: state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Consists of: 1. An imposition of restraint upon liberty or property 2. In order to foster the common good The police power of the state is a power coextensive with self-protection and it is not inaptly termed the law of overwhelming necessity. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. Bill of rights: even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act accordingly to ones will. It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of the greater number. However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. Burden of showing that it is unjustified lies on aggrieved party. In the case at bar. BAVA has failed to show that the opening was unjustified or that the mayor acted unreasonably. Art. 701: summary abatement may be carried out by the mayor himself
Quezon City v. Ericta Facts: QC passed an Ordinance regulating the establishment, maintenance and operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the jurisdiction of QC. Section 9 of the Ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers & have been residents of QC for at least 5 years prior to their death. Seven years after the enactment of the Ordinance, the QC Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer to stop any further selling of memorial parks in QC where the owners have failed to donate the required 6% cemetery space. The City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. that the Ordinance would be enforced, so Himlayan filed a petition with the CFI seeking to annul Sec 9 of the Ordinance. CFI declared Sec 9 null and void. MR: denied Issue: WON the ordinance is authorized under QC Charter and a valid exercise of police power. NO. Restatement of certain basic principles: Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property' (Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare. In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez, 1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public

regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare. (Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957). The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable. It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets,
parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-owners. As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the permits to commence operations. Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the LLDA to carry out environmental protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development. PD 813 amended the RA because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply, irrigation, fisheries, and the like. To more effectively perform the role of the Authority, EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Section 29 of PD 813 defined the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner: Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50 meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water (M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form part of the bed of said lake.Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because of R.A. 7160. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority. Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000 hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity. To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. Ramos then issued instructions that all structures in the LdB not registered with the LLDA are illegal. Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against the Authority before various RTCs. The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied. Meanwhile,

temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question. Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos. 120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. CA: dismissed the Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been repealed by the LGC of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units concerned. Issue: Which agency of the Government the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the towns and municipalities comprising the region should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is concerned? Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, has granted to the municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal waters. We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region. The LGC of 1991 does not contain any express provision which categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law by mere implication. Thus, it
has to be concluded that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the LGC of 1991. Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with its mission. We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km lake surface water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km basin or watershed transcending the boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila, parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable development. This is an exhaustible natural resource a very limited one which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance." "Managing the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and sustainable development of the region with due regard to the intergenerational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when they passed this LLDA law the special law designed to govern the management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources." "Laguna de Bay therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that specific portion but the entire 900 km of lake water. The implementation of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy, therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop Laguna de Bay." The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that Section 149 of the New LGC empowering local governments to issue fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160 under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue Raising Power Of Local Government Units." On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region (Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay. There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected. **LLDA: regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in Laguna de Bay. The Authority's

pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter, the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction. Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the LGC of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it. Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the LGC of 1991 had never intended to do. Binay v. Domingo Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by the mayors office. Under this program, bereaved families whose gross family income does not exceed 2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the Burial Assistance Program. R 60 was referred to the Commission on Audit for its expected allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, COA disapproved R 60 and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. The program was stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Issues: 1. WON R 60 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. YES. Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and desirable for the safety of the people. Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." Sec 7 of BP 337: every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in the LGU, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein." Police power: power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers; greatest and most powerful attribute of the government; elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. COA: there is no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under R 60 and the alleged public safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati ." Police power of a municipal corporation: broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. OSG: "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc. The resolution is a paragon of the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have

more in law." Tatel v. Municipality of Virac Facts: Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatels warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring Tatels warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. Tatel contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. Ordinance 13 meets these criteria. In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government. The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the
petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has been conceived by the municipal government. Tano v. Socrates Facts: Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-92 which banned the shimpment of live fisha and lobster outside Puerto Princesa City from 01 Jan 1993-1998. While the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of love marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters. Ordinance No. 2 Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms was also enacted. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, depriving all the fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade. Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa, Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were charged criminally on the basis of the ordinances. The petitioners filed this action claiming that first, the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution. Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit. Third, as the Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways. Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners Tano and the others have to be dismissed. Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan defended the validity of Ordinance No.2 as a valid exercise of the Provincial Government power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the LGC of 1991 [hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section 458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory remain healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted, covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate. They likewise maintained that there was no violation of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the intention of selling it live, and a

fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not. Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class. There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The primary interest of the first set of petitioners is to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely affected by the ordinances. The petitioners claim that as subsistence or marginal fishermen, they are entitled to the protection of the State as enshrined in Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution. Issue: 1. Whether petitioners are subsistence or marginal fishermen? NO. Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the terms "subsistence" or "marginal" fishermen, they should be construed in their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section 131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman as "an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products produced by himself and his immediate family." It bears repeating that nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within these definitions. Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons. Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development and conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation, but also for the generations to come. The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their "exploration, development and utilization . . . shall be under the full control and supervision of the State." 2. Whether the ordinances in question are unconstitutional? NO. Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community." The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute
any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of ecological imbalance." Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as expressly mandated by the Constitution.. Indispensable to decentralization is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "[a]ny provision on a power of a LGU shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower LGU. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the LGU concerned." Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions and responsibilities. In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs under Section 16 (the General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1) (vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted. Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan (SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992. This statute adopts a "comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and endangered environment of the province". It is clear to the Court that the Ordinances have two principal objectives or purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing activities. The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015, which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The devolution of such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior and Local Government. The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate to cities and provinces to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment. Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. However, the requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the following reason: (1) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause of the LGC, LGUs have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in

municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. MMDA v. Bel-Air Facts: BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village. Neptune runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates. On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman, a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction. Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall. RTC: issued TRO, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. CA: MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Issue: WON the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulator and police powers. MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the
general welfare. It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or LGUs. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." The LGC of 1991 defines a LGU as a "body politic and corporate", one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. LGUs are the provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial and political subdivisions of the state. Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the LGC of 1991. LGUs exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod, that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The LGC of 1991 empowers the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality] provided under the Code. The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants thereon." Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several LGUs - i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 [24] in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. "Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual LGUs comprising Metro Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic management includes the following: "(b) Transport and traffic management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of persons and goods; provision for the mass transport

system and the institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;" The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations. It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the LGUs, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority."It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature. Contrary to petitioners claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons." Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose of establishing and administering programs providing services common to the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate
money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila. It was the MMC itself that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances, resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were subject to the MMCs approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in the MMC. Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the MMC which fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all subject to review and approval by the MMC. Under the 1987 Constitution, the LGUs became primarily responsible for the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the LGUs technical assistance in the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments accordingly." When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected LGUs." The character of the MMDA was clearly defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter. Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in LGUs, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal and the respondent CA did not err in so ruling.

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