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J. L.

Austin
Prior to Austin, the attention of linguistic and analytic philosophers had been directed almost exclusively to statements, assertions, and propositions to linguistic acts that (at least in theory) have truth-value. This led to problems when analyzing certain types of statements, for example in determining the truth conditions for such statements as "I promise to do so-and-so." Austin pointed out that we use language to do things as well as to assert things, and that the utterance of a statement like "I promise to do so-and-so" is best understood as doing something making a promise rather than making an assertion about anything. Hence the name of one of his best-known works: "How to do Things with Words".

How to Do Things With Words


How to Do Things With Words is perhaps Austin's most influential work. In contrast to this positivist view, he argues, sentences with truth-values form only a small part of the range of utterances. After introducing several kinds of sentences which he asserts are neither true nor false, he turns in particular to one of these kinds of sentences, which he calls performative utterances or just "performatives". These he characterises by two features:

Again, though they may take the form of a typical indicative sentence, performative sentences are not used to describe (or "constate") and are thus not true or false; they have no truth-value. Second, to utter one of these sentences in appropriate circumstances is not just to "say" something, but rather to perform a certain kind of action.[5]

He goes on to say that when something goes wrong in connection with a performative utterance it is, as he puts it, "infelicitous", or "unhappy" rather than false.[6][7] The action which is performed when a 'performative utterance' is issued belongs to what Austin later calls a speech-act [8] (more particularly, the kind of action Austin has in mind is what he subsequently terms the illocutionary act). For example, if you say "I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth," and the circumstances are appropriate in certain ways, then you will have done something special, namely, you will have performed the act of naming the ship. Other examples include: "I take this man as my lawfully wedded husband," used in the course of a marriage ceremony, or "I bequeath this watch to my brother," as occurring in a will. In all three cases the sentence is not being used to describe or state what one is 'doing', but being used to actually 'do' it. After numerous attempts to find more characteristics of performatives, and after having met with many difficulties, Austin makes what he calls a "fresh start", in which he considers "more generally the senses in which to say something may be to do something, or in saying something we do something". For example: John Smith turns to Sue Snub and says Is Jeffs shirt red?, to which Sue replies Yes. John has produced a series of bodily movements which result in the production of a certain sound. Austin called such a performance a phonetic act, and called the act a phone. Johns utterance also conforms to the lexical and grammatical conventions of

Englishthat is, John has produced an English sentence. Austin called this a phatic act, and labels such utterances phemes. John also referred to Jeffs shirt, and to the colour red.To use a pheme with a more or less definite sense and reference is to utter a rheme, and to perform a rhetic act. Note that rhemes are a sub-class of phemes, which in turn are a sub-class of phones. One cannot perform a rheme without also performing a pheme and a phone. The performance of these three acts is the performance of a locutionit is the act of saying something. John has therefore performed a locutionary act. He has also done at least two other things. He has asked a question, and he has elicited an answer from Sue. Asking a question is an example of what Austin called an illocutionary act. Other examples would be making an assertion, giving an order, and promising to do something. To perform an illocutionary act is to use a locution with a certain force. It is an act performed in saying something, in contrast with a locution, the act of saying something. Eliciting an answer is an example of what Austin calls a perlocutionary act, an act performed by saying something. Notice that if one successfully performs a perlocution, one also succeeds in performing both an illocution and a locution. In the theory of speech acts, attention has especially focused on the illocutionary act, much less on the locutionary and perlocutionary act, and only rarely on the subdivision of the locution into phone, pheme and rheme. How to Do Things With Words is based on lectures given at Oxford between 1951 and 1954, and then at Harvard in 1955.[9] Illocutionary act is a term in linguistics introduced by John L. Austin in his investigation of the various aspects of speech acts. We may sum up Austin's terminology with the following example. In uttering the locution "Is there any salt?" at the dinner table, one may thereby perform the illocutionary act of requesting salt, as well as the distinct locutionary act of uttering the interrogatory sentence about the presence of salt, and the further perlocutionary act of causing somebody to hand one the salt. The notion of an illocutionary act is closely connected with Austin's doctrine of the so-called 'performative' and 'constative utterances': an utterance is "performative" just in case it is issued in the course of the "doing of an action" (1975, 5), by which, again, Austin means the performance of an illocutionary act (Austin 1975, 6 n2, 133). According to Austin's original exposition in How to Do Things With Words, an illocutionary act is an act (1) for the performance of which I must make it clear to some other person that the act is performed (Austin speaks of the 'securing of uptake'), and (2) the performance of which involves the production of what Austin calls 'conventional consequences' as, e.g., rights, commitments, or obligations (Austin 1975, 116f., 121, 139). Thus, for example, in order to make a promise I must make clear to my audience that the act I am performing is the making of a promise, and in the performance of the act I will be undertaking an obligation to do the promised thing: so promising is an illocutionary act in the present sense. Since Austin's death, the term has been defined differently by various authors. A perlocutionary act (or perlocutionary effect) is a speech act, as viewed at the level of its psychological consequences, such as persuading, convincing, scaring, enlightening, inspiring,

or otherwise getting someone to do or realize something. This is contrasted with locutionary and illocutionary acts (which are other levels of description, rather than different types of speech acts).[1] Unlike the notion of locutionary act, which describes the linguistic function of an utterance, a perlocutionary effect is in some sense external to the performance. It may be thought of, in a sense, as the effect of the illocutionary act via the locutionary act. Therefore, when examining perlocutionary acts, the effect on the hearer or reader is emphasized. As an example, consider the following utterance: "By the way, I have a CD of Skrillex; would you like to borrow it?" Its illocutionary function is an offer, while its intended perlocutionary effect might be to impress the listener, or to show a friendly attitude, or to encourage an interest in a particular type of music. John L. Austin's Philosophy Austin's approach begins with an analysis of the different things people do with words. Through the ages, language philosophers have been impressed with language which has been used to represent how the world is, to say what is or is not the case. The notion of truth has been central to the philosophy of language. He points out the many other things people do with words. They do not just represent how things are, they ask questions, give commands, make suggestions, give advice, tell jokes, make promises, even insult, persuade and intimidate. This led Austin to draw a three-fold distinction between different kinds of "speech-act." The Three Speech-Act Austin developed the following forms of speech-act. 1. Locutionary Act - First, words have a distinct, conventional, meaning. The expression "The cat sat on the mat" refers to a cat, a mat and a relation between them, one sitting upon the other. This ordinary sense of meaning constitutes the "What is said" of any particular speech act. 2. Illocutionary Act - Secondly, in saying certain words one actually commits an act. For example, in saying "I do" at a wedding, one makes a promise, in saying "Will you?" one asks a question, and saying "You will!" one gives an order. 3. Perlocutionary Act - Finally, he points out that by saying something, one performs an action, by saying "I do" one weds, by saying something like "I will give you a better deal than the competitor," may cause a buyer to be persuaded, and so on. Connecting the Three Speech-Act However, these different functions of words are not necessarily exclusive. Austin is aware that many utterances can involve all the three kinds of acts. For instance, saying, "It's hot," is a locutionary act describing how one feels. It might also be taken in the context of a room with a close window, as an illocutionary act a request to open the window. Finally, as the hearer responds by opening the window, the single utterance has also performed a perlocutionary act.

These distinctions significantly increase an understanding of the way in which language functions. They have profound effects on what is required of a theory of meaning. Works by John Langshaw Austin Austin wrote two philosophies that continue to be studied throughout the world today.

How to do Things with Words, 1962. Austin attacks the view that the main purpose of uttering sentences is to state facts, which can either be true or false. He argues that uttering some sentences is neither to state a truth or a falsehood, but to perform a kind of action, he calls an "illocutionary act." Other sentences can cause an action to take place, he calls "perlocutionary act."

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