Interpretation, Vol 12-2-3

A
JOURNAL
OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
May
141
& Sept. 1984 Volume 12 Numbers 2 & 3

The Lion
and the
Robert Sacks Kent Moors
Ass:
Commentary
on the
Book
of
Genesis (Chapters 44-50)

193
Justice Nature
and of a
Philosophy
Definition
of
in Plato's Republic: the
225
Mario Lewis, Jr. Jack D'Amico
An Interpretation
Plato's Euthyphro (Introduction;
Part I, Sections 1-3) 261

The Virtii
of
Women: Machiavelli's Mandragola
and
Clizia 275 287 Jim MacAdam David Boucher

Rousseau's Contract
with and without
his
Inequality
The Denial
of
of
Perennial Problems: the Negative Side
Quentin Skinner's
and
Theory
a
301
David Schaefer
Libertarianism
of
Political Philosophy:
and
Critique
Discussion
335
Laurence Berns
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State,

and
Utopia
in
Spiritedness in Ethics
Aristotelian Rational Theologians
Politics:
Study
Psychology
and
349
357
Ernest Fortin
Irrational Philosophers:
Stanley
Corngold
Straussian Perspective
Walter Benjamin / Gershom Scholem The Political Implications Time:
Heidegger'
& Michael Jennings

367 Charles M. Sherover
of
Heidegger's
Time"
Being
and
and
on
Possibility
381
Mark Blitz
of Political
"Being and Philosophy by
the
Mark Blitz
Response to Sherover
Book Review
387 Will
Morrisey Morrisey
Algeny by Jeremy
Rifkin
Short Notices
391 Will How Democratic is the Constitution?
and
How A.
Capitalistic is
the
Constitution?
edited
by Robert
Goldwin & William A.
Schambra; Statesmanship:
Essays in Honor of Sir Winston S. Churchill edited by Harry V. Jaffa; Winston Churchill's World View
by
the
Kenneth W. Thompson; Richard Hooker and Politics of a Christian England by Robert K.

and
Faulkner; Education
Culture in
the
Political
Thought of Aristotle by Carnes Lord; Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders: the Discourses on Livy by
Harvey
tract: the
C. Mansfield, Jr.; Rousseau's Social Con Design of the Argument by Hilail Gildin;
on
Rousseau's State of Nature: the Discourse Inequality by Marc F. Plattner
interpretation
Volume
12
JL
numbers 2 &
Editor-in-Chief
Hilail Gildin
Editors
Seth G.
Gildin*
Benardete*
Charles E. Butterworth
Howard B.White
Hilail
Robert Horwitz
(d.1974)
Consulting
Editors
John Hallowell
Wilhelm Hennis
Erich Hula Ellis
Arnaldo Momigliano
Sandoz*
Michael Oakeshott
Leo Strauss (d.1973)
Kenneth W.
Thompson
Associate Editors
Fred Baumann
Patrick
Coby
Christopher A.
Colmo
Derek Cross
Edward J. Erler Joseph E.
Maureen Feder-Marcus Pamela K. Jensen
Goldberg
Charles Rubin
Bradford
Will
Morrisey
Leslie Rubin
Wilson
Assistant Editors
John A. Wettergreen
Catherine Zuckert
Michael Zuckert
Marianne C.
Grey
Laurette G. Hupman
Design & Production
Martyn Hitchcock
Annual
subscription rates
individual
$13; institutional $16;
student
(3-year
limit) $7.
a year.
interpretation appears three times
Address
for
correspondence
interpretation, Queens College, Flushing,
N.Y. 11367, U.S.A.
Authors submitting
MLA Style Sheet
manuscripts
for
publication
in
interpretation are requested to

and
follow the
to send clear and readable
copies of their work.
Copyright
1 984
Interpretation
<T
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
Some recent contributors: Paul Ardal, Robert Audi, Jonathan Bennett, James Bogen, Lawrence Blum, Stephen Darwall, Alan Donagan, David Gauthier, Alan Gewirth, Bruce Landesman, Isaac Levi. Onora O'Neill, Joseph Owens, Elizabeth Rapaport, Tom Regan, Richard Rorty, Samuel Scheffler, Peter Singer, Charles Taylor, Irving Thalberg, Bas van Fraassen, Alan White and EM. Zemach Some
forthcoming articles
include:
Utilitarianism and Moral Rights by Richard B. Brandt Locke on Language by Jennifer Ashworth Nuclear Illusion and Individual Obligations by Trudy Govier On Racist Humor by Michael Philips Relevantism. Material Detachment and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument by Richard Routley Formal Traces in Cartesian Functional Explanation by Amelie Elksenberg Rorty On Robert Paul Wolffs Transcendental Interpretation of Marx's Labor Theory of Value by David Schweickart A Reply to Professor Schweickart by Robert Paul Wolff Critical Notice of Wittgenstein's Lectures, Cambridge 1930-32 and 1932-35 by John Hunter Reliability and Justified Belief by John L. Pollock Propositions for Semantics and Propositions for Epistemology by N.L. Wilson Lucas Against Mechanism: A Rejoinder to David Lewis by John R. Lucas
SUBSCRIPTION RATES 1984
Institutions
-
Vol. XIV
Students
$32.00; US$36.00 (outside Canada). Individuals $22.00; US$23.00 (outside Canada). $13.00; US$13.00 (outside Canada)
SPECIAL BONUS OFFER! New subscriptions commencing with C/P Vol. XIV, will receive FREE copy of Marx and Morality edited by Kai Nielsen and Steven Patten, regularly a $15.00 value.
Thought
A Review
Presents
a special
of
Culture
and
Idea
NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Issue
(March
Contents:
Moral'
1984)
CASPAR W. WEINBERGER EDMUND G. BROWN JR.
The Aspects of Deterrence Nuclear Addiction: A Response Nuclear Deterrence

Nonviolence A Case for
Proportion
and
a
Bishops'
and
the
Pastoral Letter
ROBERT J. ROTH, S.J.
Bishops'
the
Pastoral Letter:
of
Development
Doctrine
FRANCIS X. MEEHAN
WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN MICHAEL T. K.LARE
and
Discrimination in Nuclear
Deterrence
and
Defense
Conventional Arms, Nuclear War: The
Military Doctrine, and Vanishing Firebreak
Spiritual Deterrence in the Nuclear Age Nuclear Deterrence: A Pragmatist's View of the Moral Issues Struggling for Moral Clarity about Nuclear Deterrence:
David Hollenbach A Consistent Ethic
and
SUSAN B. ANTHONY JOHN F. AHEARNE

JOHN
Michael Novak
LANGAN, S.J.
of
Life:
JOSEPH CARDINAL BERNARDIN
An American-Catholic Dialogue Available
by
individual
copy-$5.00 each.
Send
check payable
to THOUGHT to:
Journals Dept. THOUGHT Fordham
University
Bronx, NY 10458
1j)1TYY 4\
a special
double issue,
vol.
no.
3-4
SOPHY SOCjI iVIj

ClllVlCI
Ethics
and
Social Theory
editor
nav'd M- Rasmussen,
BOSTON COLLEGE
SM
an
international quarterly journal

era
WINFRIEO BRUGGER. max weber and human rights as the ethos of the modem ROBERT VAN RODEN ALLEN, emancipation and subjectivity: kant-habermas SHIRAZ DOSSA. hannah arendt: the public realm and the private self STEPHEN DAVID ROSS, the limits of sexuality NATHAN ROTHENSTREICH. between ideas and demands AGNES HELLER, marx and the liberation of humankind ROBERT BIRT, amenca's new enlightenment: philosophy born of struggle DAVID M. RASMUSSEN. the enlightenment project: after virtue
subscription rates
student
$16
per
year,
institution
$12 per year, individual $42 per year single $5 95
issues
$3 95, double
issues
and Social Criticism Philosophy. Carney Hall, Boston College Chestnut Hill. MA 02167 USA
Philosophy
Dept
of
The Journal
Subscriptions
at
of
Philosophy
to students
$15.00/year; $12.00
to
$20.00/year
Students'
libraries
and
unemployed
price
extended
to
retired
phi
losophers. Published bimonthly 1904 to 1976, monthly there after. Complete volumes and all separate issues available back to January 7, 1904 (volume I, number 1); prices as follows:
BAC K VOLl'MES (from the
32-page
first
to the penultimate year)
issues, $1.50; 64-page, $3.00; special issues, $4.00. Volumes (unbound, volume indexes included), $30 00 each.
CURRENT VOLl'MES
(this
year and
last)
$3.00.
each.
64-page issues,
$2.00;
special
issues,
96-page or over,
Volumes (unbound,
volume indexes
included), $25.00
ALSO AVAILABLE
Cumulative Fifty-year Index, 1904-1953; articles classified by subject and author; 452 p.; cloth, $12.00. Ten-year Supple ment, 1954-1963: 98 p.; cloth $3.00, paper $2.00. 720
PHILOSOPHY HALL, COLUMBIA L'NIVERSITV, NYC
10027
? ?????^????????????????????^???????******* + **
The Lion
A
and
the Ass:
on
Commentary
St. John's College
the Book
of
Genesis (Chapters 44-50)
Robert Sacks
CHAPTER XLIV
I. AND HE COMMANDED THE STEWARD OF HIS
HOUSE, SAYING,
FILL THE MEN'S
SACKS WITH
FOOD,
AS MUCH AS THEY CAN
CARRY,
AND PUT EVERY MAN'S
MONEY IN HIS SACK'S MOUTH.
The
words as much as word
they
can
cany
are
filled
with
The Hebrew
at
for carry is the same as the length in the commentary to Gen. 19:21.
word
meaning for our author. for lift which was described
As
gins
we shall see
in the
following chapters
of
the
imagery
of
lifting or carrying be
God's
willingness
to shift a bit. In the early stages
the book it referred to
to accept the ways of man
by
in the
imagery
from God to
man
placing in which
them on a higher
level. We
New
shall see a shift symbol of the and and
lifting
will
become the
brothers'
willingness
to accept the
responsibilities of the
Way
carry
the tradition.
2. AND PUT MY
CUP,
THE SILVER
CUP, IN THE SACK S MOUTH OF THE YOUNGEST,
AND HIS CORN MONEY. AND HE DID ACCORDING TO THE WORD THAT JOSEPH
HAD SPOKEN. 3. AS SOON AS THE MORNING WAS LIGHT, THE MEN WERE SENT THEIR ASSES.
AWAY, THEY
AND
4. AND WHEN THEY WERE GONE OUT OF THE CITY, AND NOT YET FAR OFF,
JOSEPH SAID UNTO HIS THOU DOST OVERTAKE
STEWARD, UP, THEM,
FOLLOW AFTER THE
MEN;
AND WHEN
SAY UNTO
THEM,
WHEREFORE HAVE YE
REWARDED EVIL FOR GOOD?
Joseph has
them
now
decided to
put
will
his brothers to the fullest test. He
will place
be strongly tempted to treat Benjamin as they they had treated him. The point of Joseph's trial is that repentance is only complete in
a position where
when one
knows that if he
were placed
in the
same position
he
would not act
in
the same way he had acted before.
5. IS NOT THIS IT IN WHICH MY LORD DRINKETH, AND WHEREBY INDEED HE

DIVINETH? YE HAVE DONE EVIL IN SO DOING.
6.
AND HE OVERTOOK
THEM, AND HIM,
HE SPAKE UNTO THEM THESE SAME WORDS.
7. AND THEY SAID UNTO
WHEREFORE SAITH MY LORD THESE WORDS? GOD
FORBID THAT THY SERVANTS SHOULD DO ACCORDING TO THIS THING:
142
Interpretation
steward
The
in Benjamin's
sack.
knows that the cup was not stolen since he himself placed the cup But he also knows that the cup contains no magical powers.
He is certainly aware of the fact that Joseph is a human that his magic is the magic of poetry and diplomacy. 8. BEHOLD,
THE
being
like
all others and
SACKS'
MONEY, WHICH WE
FOUND IN OUR
MOUTHS,
WE
BROUGHT AGAIN UNTO THEE OUT OF THE LAND OF CANAAN: HOW THEN SHOULD WE STEAL OUT OF THY LORD'S HOUSE SILVER OR GOLD?
9. WITH WHOMSOEVER OF THY SERVANTS IT BE FOUND, BOTH LET HIM

WE ALSO WILL BE MY LORD'S BONDMEN.
DIE,
AND
Joseph's instructions to the

avoided the word
and
steward
in Verses Four
the words: it in
of
and
cup whereby indeed he divineth. The indirectness

wonder which
and replaced
it
with
which
Five purposely my lord drinketh
the accusation increases
their
has
now
turned into confusion. Like Joseph
they had
spent
time in
jail,
and
they
are now
willing to become slaves, perhaps in recompense
for the slavery
which
Joseph
suffered.
IO. AND HE SAID, NOW ALSO LET IT BE ACCORDING UNTO YOUR WORDS: HE WITH WHOM IT IS FOUND SHALL BE MY
SERVANT;
AND YE SHALL BE BLAMELESS.
Their
gestion
willingness
to become slaves was not the point of the trial, and the sug
is therefore
rejected.
The important
question
is
whether
they
are
willing
to see one of their brothers enslaved while
they
go
free.
ground,
ii. then they speedily took down every man his sack to the
and opened every man his sack.
12. and he searched. and began at the
eldest,
and left at the
youngest: and the cup was found in benjamin's sack.
The
steward
purposely leaves Benjamin's
sack to
the end in
order
to increase
the suspense.
13. THEY THEY RENT THEIR TURNED TO THE CITY.
CLOTHES,
AND LADED EVERY MAN HIS
ASS,
AND RE
There does
not seem
to be one
brother
who even considers
returning home.
YET
14. AND JUDAH AND HIS BRETHREN CAME TO JOSEPH'S
HOUSE; FOR HE WAS
THERE: AND THEY FELL BEFORE HIM ON THE GROUND.
15. AND JOSEPH SAID UNTO
THEM,
WHAT DEED IS THIS THAT YE HAVE DONE?
WOT YE NOT THAT SUCH A MAN AS I CAN CERTAINLY DIVINE? 16. AND JUDAH
SAID, WHAT SHALL WE SAY UNTO MY LORD? WHAT SHALL WE
SPEAK? OR HOW SHALL WE CLEAR OURSELVES? GOD HATH FOUND OUT THE INIQUITY OF THY SERVANTS:
BEHOLD,
WE ARE MY LORD'S SERVANTS. BOTH
WE,
AND HE ALSO WITH WHO THE CUP IS FOUND.
143
The Lion
and the
Ass
THAT I SHOULD DO SO: BUT THE MAN IN WHOSE
17. AND HE
SAID, GOD FORBID

FOUND,
HAND THE CUP IS
HE SHALL BE MY SERVANT: AND AS FOR
YOU, GET
YOU UP IN PEACE UNTO YOUR FATHER. emerged as the spokesman for the brothers. The simplicity is in sharp contrast to Joseph's magic. He disdains any attempt to discover which brother is guilty. Ever since he returned from Chezib it had been
Judah has
finally
of
his
speech
clear
that each brother must be responsible for the others. His
insight,
that unity
or
is
even more
important than
itself later in
a
discovering
whether
their sufferings are
just
not,
will express
very
odd way.
revolution the kingdom will be split in two, and Judah will from his brothers. This disunity, however, is an expression of Judah's understanding of unity. Most of the Book of Kings is devoted to the northern
After Jeroboam's
apart
live
kingdom. Kings
were
jagged
bass-string history history

which
of an ancient of
constantly deposed and their houses toppled. But like the harp Judah remained as a constant drone throughout the
the north.
Judah's way Joseph
of
shows that
maintaining unity both in the present case and throughout later he has found a place for himself among his brothers in a sense
will never
fully understand,
his brothers.
for Joseph's
magic presupposes a great
gap between himself
and
l8. THEN JUDAH CAME NEAR UNTO
HIM,
AND
SAID, OH MY LORD, LET THY
SERVANT,
I PRAY
THEE,
SPEAK A WORD IN MY LORD'S
EARS,
AND LET NOT
THINE ANGER BURN AGAINST THY SERVANT: FOR THOU ART EVEN AS
PHARAOH.
privately with his brother. He addresses him as my lord and treats him with all due respect, but the very fact of privateness begins to place them on the same level. Judah
speaks
19. MY LORD ASKED HIS SERVANTS,
SAYING,
HAVE YE A
FATHER, OR A BROTHER?
AN OLD
20. AND WE SAID UNTO MY LORD, WE HAVE A CHILD OF HIS OLD AGE, A LITTLE
ALONE IS LEFT OF HIS
FATHER,
MAN,
AND A
ONE;
AND HIS BROTHER IS
DEAD,
AND HE
MOTHER, AND HIS FATHER LOVETH HIM.
21. AND THOU SAIDST UNTO THY
SERVANTS, BRING HIM DOWN UNTO ME, THAT I
MAY SET MINE EYES UPON HIM.

22. AND WE SAID UNTO MY HE SHOULD LEAVE HIS
LORD, THE LAD CANNOT LEAVE HIS FATHER: FOR IF
FATHER, HIS FATHER WOULD DIE.
23. AND THOU SAIDST UNTO THY

COME DOWN WITH
SERVANTS,
EXCEPT YOUR YOUNGEST BROTHER
YOU,
YE SHALL SEE MY FACE NO MORE.
24. AND IT CAME TO PASS WHEN WE CAME UP UNTO THY SERVANT MY
FATHER,
WE TOLD HIM THE WORDS OF MY LORD.

25. AND OUR FATHER 26. AND WE
SAID, GO AGAIN,
AND BUY US A LITTLE FOOD.
SAID,
WE CANNOT GO DOWN: IF OUR YOUNGEST BROTHER BE WITH
144
US,
Interpretation
THEN WILL WE GO DOWN: FOR WE MAY NOT SEE THE MAN S FACE, EXCEPT
OUR YOUNGEST BROTHER BE WITH US.

27. AND THY SERVANT MY FATHER SAID UNTO
US,
YE KNOW THAT MY WIFE BARE
ME TWO SONS:
28. AND THE ONE WENT OUT FROM
ME,
AND I
SAID,
SURELY HE IS TORN TO
PIECES; AND I SAW HIM NOT SINCE:

29. AND IF YE TAKE THIS ALSO FROM
ME,
AND MISCHIEF BEFALL
HIM, YE SHALL
BRING DOWN MY GRAY HAIRS WITH SORROW TO THE GRAVE. 30. NOW THEREFORE WHEN
COME TO THY SERVANT MY
FATHER,
AND THE LAD
BE NOT WITH 31
.
US;
SEEING THAT HIS LIFE IS BOUND UP IN THE LAD'S
LIFE;
IT SHALL COME TO
THAT HE WILL
PASS,
WHEN HE SEETH THAT THE LAD IS NOT WITH
US,
DIE,
AND THY SERVANTS SHALL BRING DOWN THE GRAY HAIRS
OF THY SERVANT OUR FATHER WITH SORROW TO THE GRAVE.
Judah calmly
and
simply
presents the situation to

nineteen
Joseph
as
he did to Jacob in Jo
the preceding chapter. Verse

seph might was
is
fairly
accurate statement of what
have asked, and Verse Twenty is a clear picture of the situation as it in Canaan. In Twenty-two Judah seems to understand Joseph's desires but his
speech
the rest of
is in
part an accusation.
Joseph's
magic
has
come close
to
causing the old man's death.
32. FOR THY SERVANT BECAME PLEDGE FOR THE LAD UNTO MY IF I BRING HIM NOT UNTO FATHER FOR EVER. 33. NOW
FATHER, SAYING,
THEE, THEN
I SHALL BEAR THE BLAME TO MY
THEREFORE,
I PRAY THEE, LET THY SERVANT ABIDE INSTEAD OF THE
LAD A BONDMAN TO MY
LORD;
AND LET THE LAD GO UP WITH HIS BRETHREN.
34. FOR HOW SHALL I GO UP TO MY FATHER AND THE LAD BE NOT WITH ME? LEST PERADVENTURE I SEE THE EVIL THAT SHALL COME ON MY FATHER.
Judah's thoughts
ers, whose
return to
the
pledge
he
gave to
Tamar
when
he left his broth
willing to accept the in Canaan. His responsibility is that of a man. He makes no claim for any special relation to God; he has no magic and handles himself in a purely human way.
now
life he thought he he
assumed
could not share.
He is
burden
which
CHAPTER XLV
I. THEN JOSEPH COULD NOT REFRAIN HIMSELF BEFORE ALL THEM THAT STOOD FIRMLY BY
HIM;
AND HE
CRIED, CAUSE EVERY MAN
TO GO OUT FROM ME. AND
THERE STOOD NO MAN WITH UNTO HIS BRETHREN.
HIM, WHILE JOSEPH MADE HIMSELF KNOWN
2. AND HE WEPT ALOUD: AND THE HEARD.
EGYPTIANS AND THE HOUSE OF PHARAOH
145
The Lion
and the
Ass
Judah's
unable
speech was more effective than the sight of
Benjamin,
used
and
Joseph
was
to restrain himself any longer. The

stand.
verse contains which
two words
which are
normally translated to
used
The first one,
is
for the brothers,

reveal
was
previously implies being firmly fixed in
with regard
to the ladder in Jacob's dream (Gen.

position.
28:12).
It
Joseph
allowed
himself to
made
his iden
magic.
tity only
The
more
after
he
was certain
that the brothers had been

made
firm
by
his
word which
has been translated
himself
God
known
will
only
appear one
time in the Bible. It is the

with regard
word which
used
to describe His own ac
tions
to prophets (Num. 12:6). As we shall see,
it is
not accidental
that the author uses such an
imperious
word.
Weeping,
tears
as opposed to
laughter, is
in
our
the highest
passion of
the
book. The first laughter
were shed a
by
Hagar
over
the danger to her son's life (Gen. 21:16). These thoughts than Sarah and her
of
tears gave her

ever reach.
higher
position
could
When Esau
wept over
the loss
the
blessing
we
felt
another
force to
that passion (Gen. 27:38). We could see the genuineness of
blessing, and at the same time we defects, which rendered him incapable
that
wished
were of
his desire to carry on forced to hold in our minds his
that great act which he so
firmly
he
to undertake.
not always a sign of sadness. and again when
was
Weeping is
kissed Rachel
29:1 1 and
of
Jacob
wept
for the first time
when
he
was reunited with
his brother. Esau (Gen.
33:5), but he
to weep later over what he supposed to be the death
Joseph. With the

exception of
David, Joseph
weeps more often
than any other Biblical
character.
Up
to this
point
his tears have been
shed alone.
They
were
the tears of
a man who
knows
human
more
than other men, and
it is hard to say
whether
they
were
tears of
joy
a
or sadness.
At this
and
point
the god,
Joseph,
master
magician, reveals
himself as
being
vainly tries to
reestablish contact with
his brothers. he has
While there
is something
attempt.
genuine
in Joseph's
next
attempt to react to what

sad
learned from Judah failure

of
we shall see
in the
commentary the
but necessary
that
Moses only wept once. At that time he was a baby abandoned in an ark, to be found by Pharaoh's daughter (Ex. 2:6). Those tears, which failed to give Joseph
his
humanity
of
near
the end of his
life,
ensured that
humanity
to Moses at the
be
ginning
his.
their
During
sions, but
journey in
the
desert,
the Children of Israel cry on many occa
they only weep

genuine, and
on special occasions.
When they
(Num.
wept
for food their
needs were again when
they
were answered
11:4,10,20).
They
of
wept
they
saw the giants whom
coming
at
that time (Num. 14:1).
they genuinely incapable The other three times that the Children
were
of over
Israel
of
wept are
closely
of
related and will
be discussed
when we consider
the
death
Aaron in
the commentary to Gen. 49:5.
Judges weeping is first a tool for Samson's wife (Judg. 15:16). Then it becomes refuge for a people who feel themselves obliged to make war on
In the Book
their own
brothers, Israel
against
Benjamin (Judg. 20:23-26).
146 David
Interpretation
seems
to share two things with Joseph. He

and
weeps and
he is beautiful. In It
seems
David's
case
both his tears he
his
beauty
he
play
wept
an ambiguous role.
to be
clear that
son than
he
was more of a man when

wept at
before the death
of
Bath-sheba's
he
was when
the death of Absalom.

and
The
old
American
adage
"laugh
the world laughs with you, weep and you
is false from the Biblical point of view. Laughter always implies a weep distance between the laugher and the world, but weeping is the one passion
alone"
which can
be
shared
by
highest
shed
and
lowest
alike. us as
The tears David
which
Hagar
for Ishmael touch
deeply
of
as the
tears which
were not
shed prior
Hagar'
to the death of
s slavish.
Bath-sheba's first
common
child.
David's tears tears,

which
royal nor room
But this
levelling
is
a
leaves death
no
for the distinction between both humanize

and
king
and slave,
dangerous
and subtle
at
thing.
of
It
can
bestialize,
as
happened to David
the
Absalom.
But Joseph
the one
nor
was replaced
by
Judah
and
David
succeeded
by Josiah,
and neither
the
other ever wept.
3. AND JOSEPH SAID UNTO HIS
BRETHREN, I
AM
JOSEPH;
DOTH MY FATHER
YET LIVE? AND HIS BRETHREN COULD NOT ANSWER
HIM; FOR THEY WERE
TROUBLED AT HIS PRESENCE. 4. AND JOSEPH SAID UNTO HIS THEY CAME
BRETHREN, COME NEAR TO ME, I PRAY YOU.
AND
NEAR,
AND HE
SAID,
I AM JOSEPH YOUR
BROTHER,
WHOM YE SOLD
INTO EGYPT.
5. NOW THEREFORE BE NOT GRIEVED. NOR ANGRY WITH YOURSELVES. THAT YE

SOLD ME HITHER: FOR GOD DID SEND ME BEFORE YOU TO PRESERVE LIFE.
6.
FOR THESE TWO YEARS HATH THE FAMINE BEEN IN THE LAND: AND YET
THERE ARE FIVE NOR HARVEST.
YEARS, IN THE WHICH THERE SHALL NEITHER BE SHEARING
7. AND GOD SENT ME BEFORE YOU TO PRESERVE YOU A POSTERITY IN THE AND TO SAVE YOUR LIVES BY A GREAT DELIVERANCE.
EARTH,
8.
SO NOW IT WAS NOT YOU THAT SENT ME MADE ME A FATHER TO
HITHER,
BUT GOD: AND HE HATH
PHARAOH,
AND LORD OF ALL HIS HOUSE. AND A RULER
THROUGHOUT ALL THE LAND OF EGYPT. 9. HASTE YE, AND GO UP TO MY
FATHER,
AND SAY UNTO HIM. THUS SAITH THY
SON JOSEPH, GOD HATH MADE ME LORD OF ALL EGYPT: COME DOWN UNTO ME,
TARRY NOT.
10. AND THOU SHALT DWELL IN THE LAND OF
GOSHEN,
AND THOU SHALT BE
NEAR UNTO
AND THY
ME, THOU,
AND THY
CHILDREN, AND Tin CHILDREN'S CHILDREN,

AND ALL THAT THOU HAST: FOR YET THERE ARE FIVE YEARS OF
FLOCKS,
AND THY
HERDS, THEE;
II. AND THERE WILL I NOURISH
FAMINE; LEST THOU, AND THY HOUSEHOLD, AND Al L THAT THOU HAST COME
TO POVERTY.
147
The Lion
and the
Ass
After asking Pharaoh's servants to leave the room Joseph revealed himself to his brothers. He made a somewhat desperate attempt to meet them as brothers,
but there
was
something
which prevented that meeting. about
He began
tion in the
an attempt
by enquiring
his father. Since he had already
asked
that ques
at ease by presenting a topic for conversation. If this, however, was his intention, it is clear from the remainder of the verse that he did not succeed. The brothers still remained standing and confused. Next, in Verses Four and Five, Joseph refers to the brothers as having sold him into Egypt. He is trying to soothe their feelings by explaining to them that
whatever
preceding to put his brothers
chapter one can
only
assume that the question was asked
in
they did, it
was
in
accordance with
God's
plan.
No
matter
how
one
in
terprets Chapter Thirty-seven it is clear that the brothers did not
sell
Joseph di
rectly into the hands
of the
Egyptians. Since Joseph is re-telling the story in brief,

awkward and
his
statement
is
again compatible with either alternative.
To the
claim that
seem
reader
there is something
disturbing
years of
in Joseph's
great
words
he
will nourish
his brothers
yet
during
the
five
famine. His
honest
and
sincere,
he
plan of which
he is
speaking.
have wholly misunderstood the divine Joseph failed to understand that those five years of
appears to
years of slavery.
honor
would
drag
on
into four hundred
Joseph
was so caught
up
in his
own magic
that he was unable to see the toils and
difficulties
which would
have to be
Genesis
endured
before his brothers

great
would return
to their home. The author of
shows
his
sensitivity to be beguiled
men and
their ways
by forcing
the reader to
face Joseph's
The
greatest weakness within the same speech that shows
his
strength.
reader must neither
by
his
humanity
nor
believe that
humanity
to
be
mere pretense.
12. AND
BEHOLD, YOUR
EYES SEE, AND THE EYES OF MY
BROTHER, BENJAMIN,
THAT IT IS MY MOUTH THAT SPEAKETH UNTO YOU.

13. AND YE SHALL TELL MY FATHER OF ALL MY GLORY IN
EGYPT,
AND OF ALL
THAT YE HAVE HITHER.
SEEN;
AND YE SHALL HASTE AND BRING DOWN MY FATHER
14. AND HE FELL UPON HIS BROTHER BENJAMIN'S NEC K. AND BENJAMIN WEPT UPON HIS NECK.
WEPT;
AND
15. MOREOVER HE KISSED ALL HIS BRETHREN, AND WEPT UPON

AFTER THAT HIS BRETHREN TALKED WITH HIM.
THEM;
AND
l6. AND THE FAME THEREOF WAS HEARD IN PHARAOH'S

BRETHREN ARE COME; AND IT PLEASED PHARAOH
HOUSE, SAYING JOSEPH'S
WELL, AND HIS SLAVES.

provided well
Joseph is the mighty

and
of
ruler of all
Egypt
who
has
for his father in

spite
brothers; but Verse Sixteen

words
reminds us
that Pharaoh
has
slaves, and
will soon
Joseph's reassuring
it is difficult to forget that Israel
be among
at
them.
A distinction
was made
in Verse Two
which was not
fully
intelligible
first.
148 The
Interpretation
And Joseph
wept aloud: and
verse read:
the
Egyptians
and
and the
house of Pha
maintained
raoh
heard. The distinction between Pharaoh

life. In
Egyptians is
of
throughout the book and presents the reader with some
the gravest difficulties

need only individual the mother who
concerning the
nature of political
order to see
this problem one
forget Pharaoh
Egyptians
and
one meets
his army for a moment and concentrate on in the story. First there was Hagar, a sensitive
rule, and there was
suffered under
Sarah's harsh
whose
her
deep
love for her
child.
Then
there was
seems to
Potiphar,
trust in Joseph appears unlimited, especially
if,
as
we
be the case, he
was the warden of the prison. of
The
next
Egyptian Hebrew
shall meet
whom she
is the daughter
found in
Pharaoh,
who risked
her life to
save a
child
an ark
floating
down the
river.
When the Hebrew
slaves were about gold and silver.
to leave
Egypt,
the Egyptian people
freely
meet won
lent them their
The only
other private
Egyptian
we shall
is the Egyptian, slave to Amalek, who was of such help to David when he his first battle against the Amalekites who had destroyed his camp at Ziklag
30:11-15).
of
(I Sam.
The law
people and
Pharaoh's
Moses is clearly aware of the distinction between the Egyptian army. There is a law which reads Thou shalt not abhor an
wast a sojourner
Egyptian because thou
in his land (Deut.
23:8).
The
author
seriously
of
means
that we must
have
a soul
large
enough
to hold
both the cruelty
decency
the Egyptian people and the necessity for escaping from the
at the same time.
of
Pharaoh's house
The Midrash tells

crossed
the time when the Children of Israel that Moses gave a
finally
the Sea
of
story concerning Reeds. They say
party in celebration, to which he invited God. God, according to the rabbis, answered Moses by saying that while he thought it was proper that
His
people should celebrate mourn
their new
freedom, He, for His
own
part,
would
stay
home to
the death of His Egyptian sons.
17. AND PHARAOH SAID UNTO JOSEPH, SAY UNTO THY LADE YOUR BEASTS AND
BRETHREN, THIS DO YE:
GO, GET YOU UNTO THE LAND OF CANAAN:
l8. AND TAKE YOUR FATHER AND YOUR
HOUSEHOLDS,
AND COME UNTO ME: AND YE SHALL EAT
AND I WILL GIVE YOU THE GOODS OF THE LAND OF
EGYPT,
THE FAT OF THE LAND. 19. NOW THOU ART
COMMANDED, THIS DO YE: TAKE YOU WAGONS OUT OF THE
LAND OF EGYPT FOR YOUR LITTLE YOUR
ONES,
AND FOR YOUR
WIVES,
AND BRING
FATHER,
AND COME.
Joseph to carry his father into Egypt must be distinguished from the chariots we discussed in the commentary to Gen. 41:43. Chariots were always considered as foreign to the New Way, but wagons
wagons which gave to seem
rael
The
Pharaoh
to be an
integral
part of
it. Six
wagons
(Num. 7:3-8)
were provided
by
Is
to
carry
the tabernacle accessories.

of
They
were used again
to
carry the Ark
prior
to the
kingship
Saul,
and again when
David
made
his
aborted attempt to
149
The Lion
and the
Ass
establish a new
home for the Ark (I Sam. 6:8-14; II Sam.
6:3
and
commentary
to
Gen.
21:1).
20. ALSO REGARD NOT YOUR YOURS.
STUFF; FOR
THE GOOD OF ALL THE LAND OF EGYPT IS
There desire to
provide reads:
can
be
no
doubt
about
and
Pharaoh's
integrity
and
the genuineness of
his
provide
for Joseph
will
his family. Yet his
assurance
that Israel need not
for itself
lead Israel into dependence
and slavery.
The
verse
literally
Your
eyes shall not
the words Your eyes
technical, legal term.
have pity on your stuff. In the Book of Deuteronomy shall not have pity almost reach the point of becoming a They appear five times in the book, each time with regard difficult
punishment.
not show
to the carrying out of a
The Mosaic law does

pears
harsh to the
one
modern reader.
Yet if
ried out a
is willing to look at very different story emerges. A
itself to be a lenient law. On the surface it ap In many ways this appearance was deliberate. the fine print to see how the law was actually car
trial of any grave significance required
parts of
gathering together seventy old men from various had been accomplished no punishment could be mony
we of
the
country.
After that
the testi
meted out except on and
two eye-witnesses. There were no
jails,
in
most cases crimes which
today would consider criminal were then considered to be civil. According to modern law, thievery is a crime against the state punishable by fine and/or im prisonment. To be sure, if the stolen goods are discovered, they are returned to
their original owner,
regarded
but that is in
not considered primary.
In Biblical law the

parties.
courts
themselves
such cases as an arbitrator
between two
If the de
return
fendant
was
found guilty his
duty
was toward
the
injured
party.
He had to
the stolen goods together with

acted as a
interest. The interest in

general
played a
double function. It
deterrent
such a
and also compensated
for loss due to theft.

of
Under
nesses. ment
law,
one can see the absolute
importance
the
honesty
of wit
According
to Biblical
law
a witness who
lies is
given
the same punish
that would have been meted out had his
testimony been
to
execute this
accepted.
There
are
occasions when
it is difficult to
bring
is
oneself
law,
and yet the
im
portance of truthful witnesses
so great that one must.
In
reference
to the law
concerning false witnesses (Deut, 19:21). It is used as

ways
the formulation Your

well
for the
case of
have pity is used intentional murder since it is al

eyes shall not
hard to
put a man
to death (Deut. 19:13). It was also used in the case of a the

problem of
man who was
faced
with
exposing
a relative who
had
attempted
to
cajole
him into idolatry.

used
The formulation is
whose
in only two
other places.
One
to
case concerns a woman
husband had been

putteth
attacked and who,
in
order
come
to the assistance of
her husband,
ment own
forth her hand
and taketh
him
by
the secrets.
The
punish
for
such a crime
is
somewhat severe, even
seed, and
partly because
partly because a man does not own his human life does not have a completely clear
150
claim
Interpretation
absolute
to
superiority
over
human dignity. Nonetheless, it
would
be very
difficult not to pity such a woman (Deut. 25:12). The formulation is also used
with regard
to the
problems which we
discussed in the last commentary (Deut.
6:16).
AND THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL DID SO: AND JOSEPH GAVE THEM
21
WAGONS,
ACCORDING TO THE COMMANDMENT OF PROVISION FOR THE WAY.
PHARAOH,
AND GAVE THEM
22. TO ALL OF THEM HE GAVE EACH MAN CHANGES OF
RAIMENT;
BUT TO
BENJAMIN,
HE GAVE THREE HUNDRED PIECES OF
SILVER,
AND FIVE CHANGES
OF RAIMENT.
We discussed the importance

41:14.
of new
clothing in the commentary to Gen.
23. AND TO HIS FATHER HE SENT AFTER THIS MANNER: TEN ASSES LADEN WITH
THE GOOD THINGS OF
EGYPT,
AND TEN SHE ASSES LADEN WITH CORN AND
BREAD AND MEAT FOR HIS FATHER BY THE WAY. 24. SO HE SENT HIS BRETHREN
AWAY, AND THEY DEPARTED: AND HE SAID UNTO
THEM,
SEE THAT YE QUARREL NOT ON THE WAY.
The
out
asses spoken of
in Verse Twenty-three,
and which will reoccur through

wild ass which was
the
book,
are
tame asses as
distinguished from the
the
symbol of
Ishmael (see Gen.
16:20 and commentary).
Joseph's warning to his brothers, which may have been no more than a jest at the time, has deeper significance in the light of the events which will occur on
their next
journey
from Egypt to Canaan four hundred

EGYPT,
years
later.
25. AND THEY WENT UP OUT OF
AND CAME INTO THE LAND OF CANAAN
UNTO JACOB THEIR

26. AND TOLD
FATHER,
YET
HIM, SAYING, JOSEPH IS
ALIVE,
AND HE IS GOVERNOR OVER
ALL THE LAND OF EGYPT. AND JACOB'S HEART THEM NOT. 27. AND THEY TOLD HIM ALL THE WORDS OF
FAINTED,
FOR HE BELIEVED
JOSEPH, WHICH HE HAD SAID UNTO
THEM: AND WHEN HE SAW THE WAGONS WHICH JOSEPH HAD SENT TO CARRY
HIM, THE SPIRIT OF JACOB THEIR FATHER REVIVED:
28. AND ISRAEL
SAID, IT IS ENOUGH: JOSEPH MY SON IS
YET ALIVE: I WILL GO AND
SEE HIM BEFORE I DIE.
By
the end of the chapter Jacob had

will
That fact
be
crucial was a
Jacob's decision
of
already firmly decided to go into Egypt. for understanding the beginning of Chapter Forty-six. strange one since it seems to have been based on the sight his
son on these wagons.
word
the
wagons and
the news that he would be carried to
This may be important because the author uses for the word carry the which we have formerly translated lifted. We had occasion to discuss this
word
151-
The Lion
detail in
the
and the
Ass
in
some
of the motion of the
commentary to Gen. 19:21 where it emerged as the symbol book itself. This would seem to imply that Jacob sees his
part of
journey
as an
integral
that motion.
CHAPTER XLVI
AND ISRAEL TOOK HIS JOURNEY WITH ALL THAT HE
HAD,
AND CAME TO
BEERSHEBA,
AND OFFERED SACRIFICES UNTO THE GOD OF HIS FATHER ISAAC.
Before
leaving
for Egypt, Jacob

we
went
to
Beersheba,
where
he
and
God
spoke
com
together for the
last time. As
have already had

served not
occasion
to see
in the
mentary to Gen. 22:19, Beersheba
lence in the
ways
geographical sense
been
connected with
only for many years, but in one way the last direct contact between man
as the
border town
par excel
or another
and
has
al
God.
The
sense
name
itself
means the
it
would seem
Well of Oaths. As a border town in the double to be Israel's contact with the waters of chaos. If that is true
then the oath would seem to
be that
by
virtue of which
Israel is
enabled
to come
into
contact with those waters without

sacrifices
Jacob
would not
being completely by them. God of his father Isaac. Given Isaac's character, it be inappropriate to call this God the God of sleep. Jacob, who had
overwhelmed
to the
Haran, and in his independence of action resembled his grandfather Abraham, makes his final obeisance to the God of Isaac, i.e. the God of Sleep, because Israel, like a caterpillar, will sleep in the cocoon of Egypt for four hun
travelled to
dred
years.
2. AND GOD SPAKE UNTO ISRAEL IN THE VISIONS OF THE
NIGHT, AND SAID,
JACOB,
JACOB. AND HE
SAID, HERE
AM I.
The
same conversation
took place before. The only difference is that the text

of
now reads
Jacob, Jacob instead

In
each case
Abraham, Abraham (see Gen. 22:11,

last
words
22:1
and commentary).
these were the
they
spoke to
God.
They manifest the full presence and attention of a man who is willing to wait and keep himself constantly prepared. This conversation between man and God will
begin
again
four hundred
otherwise
years
later. That time the

will
conversation will read
Moses,
be
Moses, but
gins to
everything
the
be the
same
(Ex.
3:4).
It is
as
if the two
almost
conversations merge and
intervening
years
suddenly disappear. It
when one reads
be
possible
to
speak of the
Biblical hero
am
the words And

words which
He
said,
Samuel, Samuel,
as
and
he said, Here I Samuel
(I Sam.
sleep.
3:3).
The
Jacob heard
he dreamt
woke
out of
his
3. AND HE
INTO
SAID, I
AM
GOD, THE GOD OF THY FATHER: FEAR NOT TO GO DOWN
EGYPT; FOR I WILL THERE MAKE OF THEE A GREAT NATION:
152
Interpretation
EGYPT,
AND I WILL ALSO SURELY BRING
4. I WILL GO DOWN WITH THEE INTO
THEE UP AGAIN: AND JOSEPH SHALL PUT HIS HAND UPON THINE EYES.
As has been the
case ever since
Jacob's dream, the
contents of
God's
words at
first
seem pointless.
ready decided to
go
The promises have already been made, and Jacob had al into Egypt. Some things, however, are new. God will fall
completely silent for almost four generations, in spite of His promise to be in Egypt. One might be tempted to call this period of dreamless sleep the highest manifestation of God. From the Biblical point of view memory, and not nature, is the
guarantor of
that which
distinguishes the life
of man
from the life
of the
beasts; but
In
clear.
as we saw
in the commentary to Gen. 38:30, only God

called
can guarantee
the memory of a sleeping man.

what might
be
God's
lullaby
New
He
makes will
the nature of His promise
Seeds
will not grow
in the
open air.
Egypt
become the
womb of earth
for Israel. The Laws

are
establishment of the
Way
would
be impossible
otherwise.
only
meaningful when
they
are given
to a people, and yet no people can

of
exist without
laws. If there is
no nature, the
first impression be
law is indelible. law
This
being
the case, giving law would seem to be
impossible,
no
since without
there can be no people and without a people there can

tion to this paradox
are
law. The only
solu
is
a people which
is
not a people.
Paradoxically, only
slaves
empty This is
enough what
to receive the New Way.
speech.
When God
God is trying to indicate to Jacob in His last, rather strange says Joseph shall put his hand upon thine eyes he is referring
to Joseph's magic, which, as we saw to
in the last chapter, lulled the be in

store
sons of
Israel
sleep
so that
they
could not see what would
for them in Egypt. Jo be true only view of Chapter
seph's speech about

on a much
God's
providence
in the last
chapter turns out to

point of
deeper level than he

magic
could realize.
From the
Forty-five, Joseph's
slavery
blinded him to slavery, but in the
present chapter that
appears as well-needed sleep.
5. AND JACOB ROSE UP FROM BEER-SHEBA: AND THE SONS OF ISRAEL CARRIED JACOB THEIR
FATHER, AND THEIR LITTLE ONES, AND THEIR WIVES, IN
THE
WAGONS WHICH PHARAOH HAD SENT TO CARRY HIM.
6.
AND THEY TOOK THEIR
CATTLE,
AND THEIR GOODS, WHICH THEY HAD GOTTEN
IN THE LAND OF CANAAN, AND CAME INTO WITH him:

SONS'
EGYPT, JACOB,
AND ALL HIS SEED
SONS'
7. HIS
SONS,
AND HIS
SONS WITH HIM, HIS DAUGHTERS, AND HIS
DAUGHTERS, AND ALL HIS SEED BROUGHT HE WITH HIM INTO EGYPT.
This is the description

of
of
how Jacob left Beersheba to
go
beyond
the
borders
into the surrounding water. Verses Six and Seven stress the fact that he took his seed with him. This is the seed which he shall plant in the waters of his
world chaos.
The
old man was carried
by
the
wagon of
Pharaoh. The
deep
connection
153
The Lion
and the
Ass
of
between this
journey
and
the nature
time
was
already discussed in the
com
mentary to Gen.
45:27.
8.
AND THESE ARE THE NAMES OF THE CHILDREN OF
ISRAEL,
WHICH CAME INTO
EGYPT, JACOB AND HIS SONS: REUBEN, JACOB'S

9. AND THE SONS OF
FIRSTBORN. AND
REUBEN; HANOCH,
AND
PHALLU,
JAMIN,
HEZRON,
AND CARMI.
10. AND THE SONS OF SIMEON: JEMUEL AND

AND
AND
OHAD,
AND JACHIN.
ZOHAR, AND SHAUL THE SON OF
A CANAANITISH WOMAN. AND MERARI.
II. AND THE SONS OF LEVI:
GERSHON, KOHATH,
ER,
12. AND THE SONS OF JUDAH:
AND ONAN, AND
SHELAH,
AND
PHAREZ,
AND
ZARAH: BUT ER AND ONAN DIED IN THE LAND OF CANAAN. AND THE SONS OF PHAREZ WERE HEZRON AND HAMUL.
13. AND THE SONS OF ISSACHAR: 14. AND THE SONS OF ZEBULUN: 15. THESE BE THE SONS OF
TOLA, AND PHUVAH,
AND
JOB,
AND SHIMRON.
SERED,
AND
ELON,
AND JAHLEEL.
PADAN-
LEAH, WHICH
SHE BARE UNTO JACOB IN
ARAM, WITH HIS DAUGHTER DINAH: ALL THE SOULS OF HIS SONS AND HIS
DAUGHTERS WERE THIRTY AND THREE.
l6. AND THE SONS OF GAD:
ZIPHION,
AND
HAGGI, SHUNI,
AND
EZBON, ERI,
AND
ARODI,
AND ARELI.
17. AND THE SONS OF ASHER:
JIMNAH,
AND
ISHUAH,
AND
ISUI, AND BERIAH, AND

AND MALCHIEL.
SERAH THEIR SISTER: AND THE SONS OF BERIAH:

l8. THESE ARE THE SONS OF
HEBER,
ZILPAH,
WHOM LABAN GAVE TO LEAH HIS
DAUGHTER, AND THESE SHE BARE UNTO JACOB, EVEN SIXTEEN SOULS.
19. THE SONS OF RACHEL, JACOB'S WIFE: 20. AND UNTO
JOSEPH,
AND BENJAMIN.
JOSEPH, IN THE LAND OF EGYPT,
WERE BORN MANASSEH AND
EPHRAIM, WHICH ASENATH THE DAUGHTER OF POTIPHERAH PRIEST OF ON,

BARE UNTO HIM.
21
.
AND THE SONS OF BENJAMIN WERE AND
BELAH,
AND
BECHER,
AND
ASHBEL, GERA,
NAAMAN, EHI,
AND
ROSH, MUPPIM AND HUPPIM, AND ARD.
22. THESE ARE THE SONS OF WERE FOURTEEN.
RACHEL,
WHICH WERE BORN TO JACOB: ALL SOULS
23. AND THE SONS OF DAN: HUSHIM.
24. AND THE SONS OF NAPHTALL JAHZEEL, AND

25. THESE ARE THE SONS OF
GUNI,
AND JEZER AND SHILLEM.
BILHAH, WHICH LABAN GAVE UNTO RACHEL HIS
DAUGHTER, AND SHE BARE THESE UNTO JACOB: ALL THE SOULS WERE SEVEN.
26.
ALL THE SOULS THAT CAME WITH JACOB INTO EGYPT, WHICH CAME OUT OF HIS LOINS, BESIDES JACOB'S
THREESCORE AND SIX.
WIVES, ALL THE SOULS WERE
27. AND THE SONS OF JOSEPH. WHICH WERE BORN HIM IN EGYPT WERE TWO
SOULS: ALL THE SOULS OF THE HOUSE OF WERE THREESCORE AND TEN.
JACOB,
WHICH CAME INTO
EGYPT,
The
present verses contain certain
difficulties
which
the present commentator
is
unable
to
explain.
In
reference
to the descendants of
Leah, Verse Fifteen
says
154 All the
Interpretation
souls
of his
sons and
his daughters Dinah
were
thirty
and three.
There
were
thirty-one
of
male
descendants,
and
would make the thirty-second.
explaining the number thirty-three is to assume that there was ter. This assumption would account for the use of the word daughters in the
ral
One way another daugh

plu
in Verse Fifteen. The
number of
sixteen seven min
in Verse Eighteen,
and
Zilpah's descendants is correctly the descendants of Bilhah are correctly

would make a grand
given as given as
in Verse Twenty-five. That
total of fifty-six. Benja

a total of
and
his
sons together account
for eleven, making

Jacob'
sixty-seven;
whereas
Verse Twenty-six claims that All the souls that

of his
came with
Jacob into
Egypt,
which came out
loins, besides
sons'
wives, all the souls
were threescore and six.
This
difficulty
and
could
be
explained on
the assumption
that there
was no second
daughter
that Jacob
himself
was
included in the
thirty-three mentioned
and six mentioned
in Verse Fifteen, but
was not
included in the threescore for the total

of sev
which of cal
in Verse Twenty-six. That
would account
enty in Verse Twenty-seven but would not account for Verse Fifteen, in daughters are mentioned in the plural and in which, according to this way
culating, Jacob
other
would
have to be included
as
being
one of
his
own sons.
If on the
another
hand Jacob is
not
included in Verse Fifteen, there have

made
must
have been
daughter,
cluded,
was
which would
the sum total seventy-one. The Rabbis argue
that the sons of Joseph did not come down
into Egypt
go on
with
and
hence
are not
to be in
leaving
the total at sixty-nine.

who came
They
to argue that the
seventieth
God Himself,
down into Egypt has been
Jacob. Their
conclusions are
certainly in
explanation
agreement with what
said
in
other places and
therefore are
as reasonable an account of the passage as one can
have. The
advantage of
this
is that it
accounts
for the
of
stress
laid
upon the numbers and
is
perhaps
even more persuasive
in the light
Verse Four.
28. AND HE SENT JUDAH BEFORE HIM UNTO
JOSEPH,
TO DIRECT HIS FACE UNTO
GOSHEN: AND THEY CAME UNTO THE LAND OF GOSHEN.
Instead
and
going directly to Joseph, Jacob decided to go to the land of Goshen to have Judah bring Joseph to him. Joseph had already suggested the land of
of and
Goshen,
ration,
apparently Jacob
wished
to ensure some geographical distinction

45:10).
between his Exodus
own people and the
Egyptians (Gen.
This
geographical sepa
which will ensure when
the possibility of return, is reemphasized
in the Book
of
Goshen
will escape
the plagues which will cover the land of
Egypt
(Ex. 8:18
and 9:26).
29. AND JOSEPH MADE READY HIS
CHARIOT,
AND WENT UP TO MEET ISRAEL HIS
FATHER,
ON HIS
TO
GOSHEN,
AND PRESENTED HIMSELF UNTO HIM: AND HE FELL A GOOD WHILE. I HAVE SEEN THY
NECK, AND WEPT ON HIS NECK
30. AND ISRAEL SAID UNTO
JOSEPH, NOW LET ME DIE, SINCE
FACE,
BECAUSE THOU ART YET ALIVE.
155
The Lion
and the
Ass
Jacob's
joy
ing
his
his
son
in seeing Joseph is two-fold. Not only is there the pleasure of see Joseph, but there is also the assurance that he had erred in believing
akin
sons
to have killed him. Jacob's tears in that sense are

when
to those he shed
during his final meeting with Esau, ciliation would be possible (Gen.
ever present,
it
appeared as though a complete recon
33:4).
The
inevitability
of
fratricide
seemed
but
again at
this moment, as in the meeting
with
Esau,
the New
Way
was able
to avoid what seemed to Jacob to
be inevitable.
establishing
a new violent
At this
moment
Jacob is
aware
that his life's
work of
foun divi
dation,
sion of
foundation that did

at an
not require
the arbitrary and hence the
fratricide, is
end, and he is willing to die.
31
AND JOSEPH SAID UNTO HIS
BRETHREN,
AND UNTO HIS FATHER'S
HOUSE,
I
AND
WILL GO
UP,
AND SHEW
PHARAOH,
AND SAY UNTO
HIM, MY BRETHREN, CANAAN,
MY FATHER'S UNTO
HOUSE,
WHICH WERE IN THE LAND OF
ARE COME
me; SHEPHERDS,
FOR THEIR TRADE HATH BEEN TO FEED CATTLE;
32. AND THE MEN
AND THEY HAVE BROUGHT THEIR
FLOCKS,
AND THEIR
HERDS, AND
ALL THAT
THEY HAVE. 33. AND IT SHALL COME TO
PASS,
WHEN PHARAOH SHALL CALL YOU. AND SHALL
SAY,
WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?

SERVANTS'
34. THAT YE SHALL SAY, THY FROM OUR YOUTH EVEN UNTIL
TRADE HATH BEEN ABOUT CATTLE
NOW,
BOTH
WE,
AND ALSO OUR FATHERS:
THAT YE MAY DWELL IN THE LAND OF ABOMINATION UNTO THE EGYPTIANS.
GOSHEN;
FOR EVERY SHEPHERD IS AN
Joseph's
plan
is
somewhat
delicate. There
establish a
are two problems which

residence
he
must
face. The
general problem
is to
temporary
for his brothers
which will allow
them a place of honor and which at the same time will not se
ways.
duce them into Egyptian

hath been
The
means which
Joseph
uses are
very
strange.
He has decided to have them

about cattle
present
themselves to Pharaoh as men whose trade
from
our youth even until now,
both
we, and also our fa

are
thers. Joseph has chosen an elaborate way of saying that
his brothers
shep
herds. The
ination
elaborate speech and
its
appeal
to the nobility of tradition was meant

shepherds were considered an abom
to ensure their honor in spite of the fact that
by
the Egyptians. The
abomination
itself
will ensure
the separation.
tions
The possibility of this device can be better understood by comparing those ac which the Egyptians hold to be abominable with those actions which Israel
to be to the Egyptians. In
regards as abominable.
In the Bible three things

case
are said
abominable
they
seem
to reflect a disagreement with Israel on the proper relation
every be
tween men and sheep,

quested
if
not with people go
the animal kingdom in general. Moses re
Pharaoh to let the
for
three-day journey in
order
to sacrifice
to the Lord since
they
would sacrifice the abomination
of the Egyptians (Ex.
156 8:22). In
sider
Interpretation
addition
to
holding
to eat
shepherds a
in
abomination
they
were said since
to con
was
it
abominable
with
Hebrew (Gen.
same notions
43:22).
but
meat
served at the meal

general
(Gen. 43:16) the
may have been involved. In

man's as
.
it
would seem
to be the case that in the eyes of the Egyptians
sumption of
his
simple
priority to the animal world as a whole is

to remember the animal gods of the
abominable
The
the
reader would
do
well
Egyptians,
with
such as
Ibex, Thoth,
In the Book
etc.
of
Leviticus there
are
two sections
which
deal
the abomina
ble. In
each case the
major problem
is sodomy,
which
according to Leviticus is
the other nations.
abomination. 23.
the most fundamental

22.
distinction between Israel
and all
Thou
shalt not
lie
with mankind as with womankind:
it is
Neither
shalt thou
before
And
any beast to defile thyself therewith: neither shall any woman stand beast to lie down thereto: it is confusion. 24. Defile not ye yourselves in any of
with
lie
these things: the
for in
all
these the
nations are
defiled
which
cast out
before
you: 25.
land is defiled:
out
therefore
.
I do
26.
visit
the
self vomiteth
her inhabitants
Ye
shall
iniquity thereof upon it, and the land it therefore keep My statutes and My judg
neither
all
ments, and shall not commit any
of these abominations; among before

you: 2J.
any of your
own na
tion,
nor
any
stranger that sojourneth
{For
these abominations
have
the men
of the land done,

spue not you out
which were
you, and the

as
land is defiled:)
28.
That the land

were
souls
also,
when ve
defile it,
it
spued out the nations that even the shall ve

which
before
you.
2g.
For
whosoever shall commit
any of these abominations,

their people
.
that commit them shall
be
cut
offfrom among
any
one
30.
Therefore
keep
your
Mine ordinance, that ye
commit not
of these abominable customs,
were committed
before
you, and that ye

see also
defile
not yourselves therein:
am
the
Lord
God. (Lev. 18:22-30;
Lev. 20:13)
Verse Twenty-four is
and
perhaps one of the strongest
distinctions between Israel
the other nations presented in the Bible. In modern times we tend to think of
the belief in the oneness of

rael
God
but
as the most
fundamental distinction between Is

fundamental distinction
general or
and the other nations,
at this point the most
seems to
be the
rejection of was also
point of view woman
it
sodomy and homosexuality. As part of this held abominable for a man to dress as a woman
for
to dress as a man (Deut. 22:5).
Idolatry was also called abominable in several places, but presumably the re jection of idolatry is related to the rejection of sodomy, since idolatry presup
poses
human, if not
and 27:15).
superhuman
nobility in the
animal
kingdom (Deut. 7:25,26,

word abomination
13:15 The
same general notion
is behind the
use of
the
to de
scribe the sacrifice of children since

returned
from the
pagan point of view
the children are

and
thereby
seems
to their animal status (Deut.
12:21,
18:9-12,
II Kings
16:3).
There
to be
a general agreement
between Egypt
and
Israel that the
most
abominable actions are
those which disturb the proper relation

point of view
between
man and
re-
the animal world.
From the Egyptian
that proper relation is the
157 lation
omy. not
The Lion
and the
Ass
of unity which manifests itself in the rejection of shepherds in favor of sod This unity also presupposes that the distinction between male and female is fundamental, hence there is no strong prohibition against homosexuality or
trans vestitism.
From the Biblical

actions which
point of view cosmic order can
be
ensured
only
six
mic
days
constantly reinforce the distinctions which were made Creation. From the present point of view paganism, rejoicing in cos unity, has a certain kinship with philosophy, since philosophy can afford,
of
by human during the
upon
occasion, to disregard
fundamental distinctions,
man might
not
vant as paganism
presupposes, but because

though
nature ensures
because they are irrele that those boundaries

order to
will not collapse even
disregard them momentarily in
see another side of
the world.
Thus far
all attempts
to confuse the distinctions implicit in Creation have been

political
called abominable.
The
implications
of
of
the disgust
which
the addressee
of the
Bible is to feel for the loss

verses:
due
proportion can
be readily
seen
in the fol
lowing
Thou
shalt
shalt not
have in
thine
house divers
measurers, a great and a small.
But
thou
have
a perfect and just
weight, a perfect and just measure shalt thou
have:
that
thx
days may be lengthened in the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee. For all that do such things, and all that do unrighteously, are an abomination unto the Lord
thy God. (Deut. 25:14-16)
unity between man and the animal world Gen. was discussed in the commentary to 9:4, in which we saw that the beauties of this pagan notion are ultimately injurious to the special feeling of unity which The Biblical
rejection of a simple man must
have for
man once
the necessity for law arises.
CHAPTER XLVII
THEN JOSEPH CAME AND TOLD
PHARAOH, AND SAID, MY FATHER AND MY
BRETHREN,
AND THEIR
FLOCKS, AND THEIR HERDS, AND ALL THAT THEY
HAVE, ARE COME OUT OF THE LAND OF CANAAN; AND. BEHOLD THEY ARE IN
THE LAND OF GOSHEN.
2. AND HE TOOK SOME OF HIS BRETHREN, EVEN FIVE
MEN,
AND PRESENTED THEM
UNTO PHARAOH. 3. AND PHARAOH SAID UNTO HIS BRETHREN, WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION? AND
THEY SAID UNTO PHARAOH, THY SERVANTS ARE
ALSO OUR FATHERS.
SHEPHERDS, BOTH WE, AND
4. THEY SAID MOREOVER UNTO PHARAOH, FOR TO SOJOURN IN THE LAND ARE WE THEIR FLOCKS; FOR THE COME; FOR THY SERVANTS HAVE NO PASTURE FOR
FAMINE IS SORE IN THE LAND OF CANAAN: NOW
THEREFORE, WE PRAY THEE.
LET THY SERVANTS DWELL IN THE LAND OF GOSHEN.
158
Interpretation
the
In
more
spite of
fact that Joseph

First they
made
his
plans
forthright
and
introduced themselves
ask
as shepherds.
very carefully, his brothers were Their request is some
what ambivalent.
for
a place
to sojourn. This
is
tantamount to re
questing the
status of an alien or
their request in terms of a

ers suggest that
temporary resident. In Verse Four they present temporary need, but by the end of this verse the broth they may stay longer by using the word dwell, which usually has
more permanent connotations.
5. AND PHARAOH SPAKE UNTO
JOSEPH, SAYING,
THY FATHER AND THY
BRETHREN ARE COME UNTO THEE:
6.
THE LAND OF EGYPT IS BEFORE THEE; IN THE BEST OF THE LAND MAKE THY FATHER AND BRETHREN TO
DWELL;
IN THE LAND OF GOSHEN LET THEM
DWELL: AND IF THOU KNOWEST ANY MEN OF ACTIVITY AMONG MAKE THEM RULERS OVER MY CATTLE.
THEM,
THEN
Instead Joseph.
speaking to the brothers directly, Pharaoh addresses his answer to Apparently Pharaoh's welcome is ultimately connected to his relation
of
ship
with
Joseph
and
is
not
directed to the brothers themselves. This

and
situation
may forbode some difficulties which will appear when Joseph dies nection between Pharaoh and the brothers is lost.
the con
7. AND JOSEPH BROUGHT IN JACOB HIS AND JACOB BLESSED PHARAOH.
FATHER,
AND SET HIM BEFORE PHARAOH:
8.
AND PHARAOH SAID UNTO
JACOB, HOW OLD
ART THOU?
Pharaoh's
conversation with
Jacob
reveals
the
difference between the New
Way
the
and
the
Way
of
the Egyptians. Pharaoh is able to respect Jacob in spite of
fact that according to his own tradition Jacob practices an abominable art, but Jacob would not be able to have such respect for anyone who practices abomi
nable things.
The New
as such
Way
claims that what
it
considers abominable should

point of view
man
be
considered
by
all men.
From the Biblical
the order of heaven and earth

46:31 ).
should not
be disturbed
by
any
living
(see commentary to Gen.
But
from the
different
point of view of paganism
that order may be understood
differently by
a
any fundamental contradiction. The author seems to present the difficulties by showing Pharaoh receiving blessing from a man whom he should consider abominable.
peoples without
9. AND JACOB SAID UNTO
PHARAOH,
THE DAYS OF THE YEARS IN WHICH I DWELT
AS A STRANGER ARE AN HUNDRED AND THIRTY YEARS: FEW AND EVIL HAVE THE DAYS OF THE YEARS OF MY LIFE
BEEN,
AND HAVE NOT ATTAINED
UNTO THE DAYS OF THE YEARS OF THE LIFE OF MY FATHERS IN THE DAYS IN WHICH THEY DWELT AS STRANGERS.
159
The Lion
and
the
Ass
Jacob's
ever,
answer to
we must
first
another
seventeen
question was bitter. Before discussing that, how he believes that his life is short. In fact he will live why years and die at the age of one hundred and forty-seven. ask somewhat shorter than
Pharaoh's
Though this is in fact
the life of either Abraham or
Isaac,
it
would at
first
appear
to be a full and
long
sent
life.
The
brothers'
second
trip
to Egypt was made
during
a
the second year of the

year's
famine (Gen. 45:6), in

order
and since
Joseph
his father
full
to make the
trip,
we can suppose that the present conversation
supply of food is taking
place
during
the third
year of
famine. This
being
the case, the years of plenty

or
be
is
gan ten years prior to the present

now one
conversation, old,
was a
in
other words
Jacob,
who
hundred
and
thirty
years
hundred One
and
twenty
years old when
Joseph
was released
from his
prison.
As in the
case of
Abraham
and
Isaac, Jacob's
life is
fundamentally
other was
divided into two

private
parts.
part was
devoted to the New
Way. The
life (see commentary to Gen. 35:28). Jacob dif fers from his fathers in that his life of a hundred and twenty years was the part de
voted
to the New Way. Whatever was left for him as a private man was minor.
major part of
Jacob describes the

sion
his life
as
the life
of a stranger.
This
expres
had
of
lives 6:4).
up before as a general description not only of his life but of the Abraham and Isaac as well (Gen. 17:8, 28:4). And it will appear again in
come
the Book of Exodus as a description of the lives of the
fathers
as a whole
(Ex.
The fathers, because they were fathers, lived only on a promise. According to the Biblical author's understanding of men and their ways, birth and maturation
lasting quality is to result. We have seen this many discussion of the importance of the numbers forty in the times before, especially and four hundred (see commentary to Gen. 7:4 and 25:19). If we take a second look at the problem of tradition, this time from the point of view of the founder,
require
time if anything of
memory becomes forethought and security becomes hope. The fathers are neces future is still in the sarily strangers because for them the past is dead and the
womb.
In Jacob's
case
the life of the
stranger was a
had the difficult Gen. 32:13

to see the
was with
task of returning to Haran as a servant.

nature of the
we
discussed the dual

the
particularly uneasy one. He In the commentary to blessing. At that point we began only the lower blessing. He
spent
significance of
fact that Jacob

with
received
the father who was forced to deal the

establishment of a
the most painful problems connected

of
New Way. Much
his life had been
in fear
case of
that the New
Way
could not
be
established without
death. Both in the

proved
Esau
and
in the
case of
Joseph
what seemed
inevitable life.
to be avoidable,
but the fears had taken their toll
on the old man's
10. AND JACOB BLESSED PHARAOH, AND WENT OUT FROM BEFORE PHARAOH.
When
we consider
the
blessing
which
Jacob
gave
to Pharaoh we must remem
ber
what
blessings
are and to whom
they
are given.
The first
blessing
was given
1 60
to the
Interpretation
fish (see Gen.
1:22 and commentary).
Neither the
sun nor the oxen are are al
blessed: they have their own ways and always walk in them. Blessings ways ambiguous because they always imply a need for a blessing.
Since they always imply hope, the possibility that the hopes may not be com pletely fulfilled is ever present. This situation is clear in the case of Pharaoh, but
that clarity serves only as a reminder of more general situations. The undertaking
of
the New
Way
as a whole was
on
based
on a
blessing,
and
in fact human
existence
itself is founded
5:2 and 9:1).
placed
the blessings which were given to Man and Noah (Gen. 1 :28,
the
words
In the commentary to Gen. 1:21 we noted that the word blessing re being so. If we look at that replacement in a more general con
text
we can see
its implications
within our real
task of
trying
to get a glimpse of
the relation between the Bible and philosophy. For Plato and Aristotle the world
was
essentially intelligible and,
produce a
being
capable of
being knowable, demanded of itself that it knowing it. Human existence was guaranteed even
as
though
its highest form
might often
be hidden in
dark
corner and at times even
be invisible. For
our author
that assurance must be replaced
by
blessing. Al
has
and
though the Book of Genesis is intended to show the solidity of a well placed
foundation, God's blessing

been laid
after
will always
be
needed since no
foundation
which
Creation
can achieve
the
security
of nature
in the Platonic
Aristotelian
sense without
it.
I I
AND JOSEPH PLACED HIS FATHER AND HIS
BRETHREN,
AND GAVE THEM A
POSSESSION IN THE LAND OF

LAND OF
EGYPT,
IN THE BEST OF THE LAND, IN THE
RAMESES,
AS PHARAOH HAD COMMANDED.
12. AND JOSEPH NOURISHED HIS FATHER. AND HIS FATHER'S
BRETHREN,
AND ALL HIS
HOUSEHOLD,
WITH
BREAD,
ACCORDING TO THEIR FAMILIES.
In the Joseph
beginning
Pharaoh
of the present chapter we

over
had
seen the subtle
play between
and
the possession of the land of Goshen. When Joseph ac

with the command of
tually presented the land to his father, he, in accordance Pharaoh, presented it under the name of Rameses. So far
text Rameses and Goshen are
no two countries could
as one can tell
by
the
geographically be further apart. Goshen

was
the same,
but for the Biblical

It
author
was the comfortable womb

was
for
the new seed but Rameses

which
the
place of enforced slavery.
the city
the Hebrews were
forced to build
without straw
(Ex. 1:1 1).
13. AND THERE WAS NO BREAD IN ALL THE
LAND; FOR THE FAMINE WAS VERY
SORE,
SO THAT THE LAND OF EGYPT AND ALL THE LAND OF CANAAN FAINTED
BY REASON OF THE FAMINE.

14. AND JOSEPH GATHERED UP ALL THE MONEY THAT WAS FOUND IN THE LAND
OF EGYPT, AND IN THE LAND OF CANAAN, FOR THE CORN WHICH THEY
BOUGHT: AND JOSEPH BROUGHT THE MONEY INTO PHARAOH'S HOUSE.
161
The Lion
and the
Ass
Joseph
served as
Prior to the time in Pharaohs

of
which
vizier, the
position of
the Egyptian
was much weaker.
The
absolute power which

economic policies.
notion
Pharaoh has in the Book
Exodus had its
origins
in Joseph's
While there
seems
to
be
the
some
historical foundation for the

the
that these policies arose
during
reign of cern
Hyksos
the
'
and were
indeed the
result of
foreign rule,
our present con

cannot
is
over
author's reasons
face this
question until we
for attributing them to Joseph. But we have a better view of the policies themselves.
15. AND WHEN MONEY FAILED IN THE LAND OF EGYPT, AND IN THE LAND OF
CANAAN, ALL THE EGYPTIANS CAME UNTO JOSEPH,
AND
SAID, GIVE US BREAD:
FOR WHY SHOULD WE DIE IN THY PRESENCE? FOR THE MONEY FAILETH.
l6. AND JOSEPH
SAID, GIVE
YOUR
CATTLE;
AND I WILL GIVE YOU FOR YOUR
CATTLE, IF MONEY FAIL.

17. AND THEY BROUGHT THEIR CATTLE UNTO JOSEPH: AND JOSEPH GAVE THEM BREAD IN EXCHANGE FOR
CATTLE OF THE
HORSES,
AND FOR THE FLOCKS AND FOR THE
HERDS,
AND FOR THE ASSES: AND HE FED THEM WITH BREAD
FOR ALL THEIR CATTLE FOR THAT YEAR.
l8. WHEN THAT YEAR WAS

AND SAID UNTO
ENDED,
THEY CAME UNTO HIM THE SECOND YEAR,
HIM,
WE WILL NOT HIDE IT FROM MY
LORD,
NOW THAT OUR
MONEY IS SPENT; MY LORD ALSO HATH OUR HERDS OF OUGHT LEFT IN THE SIGHT OF MY
CATTLE; THERE IS NOT
LORD, BUT OUR BODIES, AND OUR LANDS:
19. WHEREFORE SHALL WE DIE BEFORE THINE BUY US AND OUR LAND FOR
EYES,
BOTH WE AND OUR LAND?
BREAD,
AND WE AND OUR LAND WILL BE
SERVANTS UNTO PHARAOH: AND GIVE US NOT
SEED,
THAT WE MAY
LIVE,
AND
DIE,
THAT THE LAND BE NOT DESOLATE.
Pharaoh has become the

come a nation of slaves.
given
unquestionable master of which
Egypt,
and
Egypt has be
was not
The food
Joseph had
gathered when
up
to
be
first for money and cattle; then, away but sold their land and themselves. sold Egyptians the mained, There is
that the
a sense
nothing
else re
in
which
Professor Von Rad (p. 405) is

gratitude of
correct when
he
says
main point of
the story is the
the Egyptian people towards Jo

condemns
seph, who regard

sage as
him
as their savior.
He rightly
any
use of
this pas
"an
arsenal of anti-Semitic polemic against
the Old
Testament."
On that
same
level he is
also
justified in
rejecting the notion that this passage

all
is intended life
to show "a subtle ridicule of the

freedom."
too submissive Egyptians who valued
more
than
are somewhat more
The problems, however,

Rad's
account.
difficult than
appear
from Von
carefully
presented
In the commentary to Gen. 45:12 we saw that the Biblical author the Egyptian people as noble, and often heroic, individuals. Von Rad
says
To that
1.
extent what
is perfectly true, but in the

Encyclopedia Judaica, Vol. IO,
eyes of the
Biblical
"Joseph,"
Haim Z'ew Hirschberg:

1971.
p.
208, Keter
Publishing
House, Jerusalem,
162
Interpretation
become
a means of
author, nations and their ways

ner not so
discussing
problems
in
a man
far from the way in which Socrates hypothesized the forms in order to get a better grasp of what is. If our suggestion
Genesis
was addressed to
existence of
the
that the Book of
those who came
after
the destruction of the kingdom
is
true, then the living. In this

and political
in this way without injuring the sense we must take seriously the distinction between the economic organization which Joseph established in Egypt, and the economic
author could
freely
use countries
and political policies
inherent in the laws

of one another.
of
Moses. We
shall
try
to show that
they
are mirror
images
20. AND JOSEPH BOUGHT ALL THE LAND OF EGYPT FOR PHARAOH; FOR THE EGYPTIANS SOLD EVERY MAN HIS
FIELD,
BECAUSE THE FAMINE PREVAILED
OVER THEM: SO THE LAND BECAME PHARAOH'S. 21

.
AND AS FOR THE
PEOPLE,
HE TRANSFERRED THEM TO CITIES FROM ONE END
OF THE BORDERS OF EGYPT EVEN TO THE OTHER END THEREOF.

22. ONLY THE LAND OF THE PRIESTS BOUGHT HE
NOT; FOR
THE PRIESTS HAD A
PORTION ASSIGNED THEM OF PHARAOH, AND DID EAT THEIR PORTION WHICH
PHARAOH GAVE THEM: WHEREFORE THEY SOLD NOT THEIR LANDS.
Verse Twenty-one,
which
has
caused commentators and translators so much
difficulty, is probably
plies
a reference
to Gen. 41:48 in
which
Joseph
in
various cities throughout the country.
Normally
the verse
stored his sup is translated He
removed them to cities from one end
thereof.
all
This translation
should
would
of the borders of Egypt even to the other end seem to imply that Joseph suddenly decided that
Egyptians
suppose
be
city-dwellers.
The
more obvious
interpretation
would
be
to
that Joseph transferred the people who had come to him
for food to
would
the other cities where

remain
food
was available.
There is
no
implication that they
in the
cities
According
land
of
any longer than it would take them to fill up their sacks. to the laws of Egypt, Pharaoh was able to gain control of the whole
with
Egypt
the exception of the lands
held
by
the priests, which,
by
Egyptian law,
could not
be
possessed.
Moses, according
to which the priests

upon
This law is in sharp contrast to the law of have no lands and are intended to be per
manently dependent
the people
for their
daily
sustenance
(Deut.
18:1).
Economically
als, as
such.
the situation in Egypt is
a strange
kind
of
parody
of the eco
nomic system established
for Israel. In
both
neither case
does land
belong
to individu
To that
extent
are communal. proclaimed

of
a matter of notion that
family. That freedom
Permanent ownership in Israel is by the Jubilee Year is based on the
the land is an integral part
the
family
which
lives
on
it. The
na
tional celebration of the joys of the Jubilee Year the
was a communal celebration
for
dignity
the
of
very
opposite.
individual families. Egyptian communality in this sense was the All men lived together on a land which was owned by Pharaoh.
who
Only
priests,
in Israel
were
eternally dependent, had autonomy in
Egypt.
163 Once fects

of
The Lion
and the
Ass
about the nature of a
one considers reign upon close as
Samuel's warning
king
and the ef
his
the lives of the people he rules,
one can see
the dangers
in
herent in the
rael.
Freedom,
close
relationship between the economic systems of Egypt and Is inherent in the Jubilee Year, could so easily have degenerated
the slavery of Egypt.
into its
kin
23. THEN JOSEPH SAID UNTO THE
PEOPLE, BEHOLD, I LO,
HAVE BOUGHT YOU THIS
DAY AND YOUR LAND FOR PHARAOH: SHALL SOW THE LAND.
24. AND IT SHALL COME TO PASS IN THE
HERE IS SEED FOR YOU, AND YE
INCREASE,
THAT YE SHALL GIVE THE
FIFTH PART UNTO
PHARAOH,
AND FOUR PARTS SHALL BE YOUR
OWN,
FOR SEED
OF THE FIELD, AND FOR YOUR
FOOD,
AND FOR THEM OF YOUR
HOUSEHOLDS,
AND FOR FOOD FOR YOUR LITTLE ONES.
25. AND THEY
SAID,
THOU HAST SAVED OUR LIVES: LET US FIND GRACE IN THE

AND WE WILL BE PHARAOH'S SERVANTS.
SIGHT OF MY
LORD,
26. AND JOSEPH MADE IT A LAW OVER THE LAND OF EGYPT UNTO THIS THAT PHARAOH SHOULD HAVE THE FIFTH PRIESTS
DAY,
PART;
EXCEPT THE LAND OF THE
ONLY,
WHICH BECAME NOT PHARAOH'S.
a purely material point of view the economic system in Egypt was not different from the situation in Israel. Joseph returned the use of the land to very each man on the condition that one fifth of the yield be given to Pharaoh. In the
From
case of ence
Israel the
amount to
be
given
to the priests was one tenth, but that differ
is
perhaps not so
important.
The fundamental difference lies only in each man's awareness of the fact that the land which he works belongs to his own family, and in the respect he has for
the lands of the
was
family
of
his
neighbor, while
in Egypt
each man
knew that he have been
working Pharaoh's land

same.
even though
the material
rewards might
the
27. AND ISRAEL DWELT IN THE LAND OF
EGYPT, IN THE GREW,
COUNTRY OF
GOSHEN;
AND THEY HAD POSSESSIONS THEREIN. AND

EXCEEDINGLY.
AND MULTIPLIED
28. AND JACOB LIVED IN THE LAND OF EGYPT SEVENTEEN YEARS: SO THE WHOLE
AGE OF JACOB WAS AN HUNDRED FORTY AND SEVEN YEARS.
The
general
significance of
the
number of years which
Jacob lived
was al
to Gen. 47:9. One ready discussed in the commentary arrived in Egypt at the age of one hundred and Jacob out. pointed be however, famine. Accordingly Jacob was one hun years, during the third year of the
additional
fact should,
thirty
dred fore
and thirty-four years old when

continued
famine
ceased
to plague the land. He there

years after
to live
in the land he
saw
of
Egypt for thirteen
the
famine had
Even
ceased.
During
the
that time
of
his
family
grow and
multiply
exceedingly.
during
life
Jacob it
became apparent that the return to the
Promised Land
164
would
Interpretation
not
Joseph had planned, nor would it to Gen. 45:3). Ironically, the growth (see commentary quickly which apparently enticed them to remain in Goshen will return to
be
as smooth as
come
about as
and
prosperity
them as
plague
the
cause of
the Pharaoh's
anger years
later:
they
mutliply, and it come to pass, that, enemies, and fight
against
Come on, let

when
us
deal wisely
out
with
them; lest
there falleth
any war, they join
also unto our
us,
to
and
and so get them
up
out
afflict them with their
of the land. Therefore they did set over them taskmasters, burdens. And they built for Pharaoh treasure cities, Pithom
Ra-amses. But the
more
they
afflicted
them, the
more
they
multiplied and grew.
And
they
were grieved
because of the Children of Israel. (Ex. 1:10-12)
29. AND THE TIME DREW NIGH THAT ISRAEL MUST DIE: AND HE CALLED HIS SON JOSEPH AND SAID UNTO
HIM, IF
NOW I HAVE FOUND GRACE IN THY
SIGHT,
PUT,
I PRAY
THEE,
THY HAND UNDER MY

PRAY
THIGH,
AND DEAL KINDLY AND
TRULY WITH
ME; BURY ME NOT, I
THEE, IN EGYPT:
30. BUT I WILL LIE WITH MY
FATHERS,
AND THOU SHALT CARRY ME OUT OF
EGYPT,
AND BURY ME IN THEIR BURYING PLACE. AND HE SAID, I WILL DO AS
THOU HAST SAID. 31. AND HE SAID SWEAR UNTO ME. AND HE SWARE UNTO HIM. AND ISRAEL BOWED HIMSELF UPON THE BED'S HEAD.
On the importance
Much
the
of
of
the form of the oath see the commentary to the book

will
Gen.
24:1
the
final
chapter of
land
of
his fathers.
During
the whole
be devoted to carrying Jacob back to of that passage we shall have to bear in discussed
at
mind
the symbolism inherent
in the
.
word to carry, which we
length
in the commentary to Gen. 19:21 As we shall see, when the sons carry their fa ther they do more than carry a dead body. Their lifting is the conscious human counterpart of God's act of lifting which forms one of the major threads of the
book.
By taking
the
body
of
their
father
of
upon
their backs
they symbolically
take
onto themselves the
responsibility
parts.
maintaining the tradition which their

not
wishes
father
had
set up. request
Jacob's
has two
He
only
to be carried
back to the
com
au
Promised Land
mentaries
by
his sons, but he
also wishes to
be buried there. In the
to
Gen.
35:4,8 we saw that
burial
also played a great role
in the
thor's understanding of tradition and the

are maintained
formation
of a people.
Not
all
traditions
solely
by
the conscious effort of those who maintain them. Ac

and
cording to
our
author, ideas
feelings
ways of
can
sleep underground for many
years
and yet their seeds remain
in the
the people,
from
whom
they
rise again. grow
Jacob knew that the New

sons were
were
Way
which
the
fathers
planted could
willing to take on the burden. But he also

well established
if the only knew that if the foundations

the
sufficiently
they
could outlast
insufficiencies
of
inter
vening
generations.
165
The Lion
and the
Ass
CHAPTER XLVII1
AND IT CAME TO PASS AFTER THESE
THINGS,
THAT ONE TOLD
JOSEPH, BEHOLD,
AND
THY FATHER IS SICK: AND HE TOOK WITH HIM HIS TWO
SONS, MANASSEH
EPHRAIM,
2. AND ONE TOLD
JACOB,
AND
SAID, BEHOLD,
THY SON JOSEPH COMETH UNTO

AND SAT UPON THE BED.
THEE: AND ISRAEL STRENGTHENED
HIMSELF,
The opening words of Chapter Forty-eight indicate its close relation to the last verse of Chapter Forty-seven. The precise meaning of Gen. 47:31, And Israel bowed
himself upon
the
bed's head,
was obscure.
However, Verse Two
of the
present chapter
ened
himself
is clearly intended to be contrasted with it. When Jacob strength and sat upon the bed the author uses this contrast to portray the human
effort which chapter
magnitude of
Jacob
put
forth, thereby
Jacob.
revealing the impor
tance of the
following
in the
mind of
3. AND JACOB SAID UNTO JOSEPH. GOD ALMIGHTY APPEARED UNTO ME AT LUZ IN
THE LAND OF
CANAAN,
AND BLESSED
ME,
MAKE THEE
4. AND SAID UNTO
ME, BEHOLD, I WILL
FRUITFUL,
AND MULTIPLY
THEE,
AND I WILL MAKE OF THEE A MULTITUDE OF PEOPLE AND WILL GIVE
THIS LAND TO THY SEED AFTER THEE FOR AN EVERLASTING POSSESSION.
As God
was shown
of a well-established nation
selves amongst
in the commentary to Gen. 17:1, God Almighty was not the but the God of a very few men who found them strangers. As the chapter unfolds we shall see that Jacob inten
tionally used the words God Almighty in speaking with Joseph because of Jo seph's tendency to believe that he himself had so well established the Way that
there would no longer be a need for any
radical change.
5. AND NOW THY SONS, EPHRAIM AND MANASSEH, WHICH WERE BORN UNTO
THEE IN THE LAND OF EGYPT BEFORE I CAME UNTO THEE INTO MINE: AS REUBEN AND
EGYPT,
ARE
SIMEON,
THEY SHALL BE MINE.
6.
AND THY ISSUE, WHICH THOU BEGETTEST AFTER
THEM, SHALL BE THINE,
AND SHALL BE CALLED AFTER THE NAME OF THEIR BRETHREN IN THEIR

INHERITANCE.
There is
a certain
duality
phrase
in Jacob's decision to
adopt
Ephraim
and
Manasseh. But
on the
On
the one
hand, Joseph is honored

the
by being
the
father
of two tribes.
other
hand,
final
clearly
states
that even if Joseph were to
have
another
son there would still
be
no tribe of
Joseph. Joseph's mastery
of the art of magic
would,
in the
eyes of
Jacob, have become
too overpowering, and
he is therefore
silently dropped.
166
Interpretation
This substitution,
however, does
with
not
take place immediately. In the

singled out
course of was
the Book of Exodus the tribe of Levi
becomes
for
special
duty. It
listed in its
From that
there are
of
normal place
point on.
occasions
along beginning Levi is normally treated separately from his brothers, but when Levi is listed as one of the tribes. For instance, the tribe
the other tribes in the
of that
book.
Levi
participates
in the ceremony
of the
blessings
and the curses
in Deut.
27.
Whenever
such a
thing
occurs, the number of tribes
is
maintained
by
combining
the tribes of Ephraim and Manasseh into a single tribe referred to as the tribe of
Joseph. In this
tended to
sense
the division
of
the tribe of Joseph
into two tribes

given
was
in
be
a means of
retaining the original division
into twelve,
the
fact
that Levi was not destined to form a tribe
in the
geographical sense.
7. AND AS FOR
ME,
WHEN I CAME FROM
PADAN,
RACHEL DIED BY ME IN THE LAND
OF CANAAN IN THE WAV, WHEN THERE WAS BUT A LITTLE WAY TO COME UNTO EPHRATH: AND I BURIED HER THERE IN THE WAY OF EPHRATH: THE SAME IS BETH-LEHEM.
The
place
of
Rachel's burial, Bethlehem, is

words
referred
to
by
its
old
name.
related
Ephrath. In Hebrew the

and
Ephrath
and
Ephraim
are
etymologically
a man
an
their generic forms turn out to be

a man
identical. In
other
word
words, the Hebrew
word
for
from Ephraim is identical to the Hebrew
for
from Ephrath,
and an
even though the
English translation distinguishes between
Ephratite
Ephraimite. The city of Bethlehem is referrred to as Ephrath in six passages in the bible. In Genesis it is connected with the death of Rachel three times (Gen. 35:16,19
and
Gen.
48:7).
Since it have
was
the
burial
place of
his grandmother,
and
has his
of
name,
one would
expected
the city of Bethlehem to
have fallen to the lot

his
Ephraim.
Elimelech, Naomi's husband, famous descendant, David (Ruth

confusion
was
described
and
as an
Ephratite,
17:12).
of
as was
most
1:2, 4:11
I Sam.
The
point of
this
is that Joseph believes himself to be the leader

follow that the leaders
would
the New Way. From
this
it
would will
be Ephratites. But
of
irony
is that the
of
leaders last
indeed be Ephratites, but instead

will
being
the
descendants
Ephraim, they
House
of
be the descendants
see
chapters we
had begun to
from the city of Ephrath. In the the ascendancy of the House of Judah over the
ofJudah
of
Joseph,
and we shall see
this development in greater
detail in the
course
the present chapter.
8.
AND ISRAEL BEHELD JOSEPH'S
SONS,
AND
SAID, WHO
ARE THESE?
FATHER,
THEY ARE MY SONS. WHOM GOD HATH I PRAY THEE, UNTO ME,
GIVEN ME IN THIS PLACE. AND HE AND I WILL BLESS THEM.
SAID, BRING THEM,
10. NOW THE EYES OF ISRAEL WERE DIM FOR AGE, SO THAT HE COULD NOT SEE.
167
The Lion
and
the
Ass
THEM,
AND
AND HE BROUGHT THEM NEAR UNTO HIM: AND HE KISSED
EMBRACED THEM.
1 1
.
AND ISRAEL SAID UNTO
JOSEPH,
I HAD NOT THOUGHT TO SEE THY FACE:
AND,
LO, GOD HATH SHEWED ME
ALSO THY SEED.
12. AND JOSEPH BROUGHT THEM OUT FROM BETWEEN HIS
KNEES,
AND HE BOWED
HIMSELF WITH HIS FACE TO THE EARTH. 13. AND JOSEPH TOOK THEM ISRAEL'S LEFT
RIGHT
BOTH, EPHRAIM
IN HIS RIGHT HAND TOWARD
HAND,
AND MANASSEH IN HIS LEFT HAND TOWARD ISRAEL'S
HAND,
AND BROUGHT THEM NEAR UNTO HIM.
14. AND ISRAEL STRETCHED OUT HIS RIGHT
HAND,
AND LAID IT UPON EPHRAIM'S
HEAD,
WHO WAS THE YOUNGER, AND HIS LEFT HAND UPON MANASSEH'S
HIS HANDS WITTINGLY: FOR MANASSEH WAS THE FIRSTBORN.
HEAD, GUIDING
15. AND HE BLESSED
JOSEPH,
AND
SAID, GOD, BEFORE WHOM MY FATHERS

THE GOD WHICH FED ME ALL MY LIFE
ABRAHAM AND ISAAC DID
WALK,
LONG,
UNTO THIS
DAY, EVIL,
BLESS THE LADS: AND LET
l6. THE ANGEL WHICH REDEEMED ME FROM ALL
MY NAME BE NAMED ON THEM AND THE NAME OF MY FATHERS ABRAHAM AND ISAAC: AND LET THEM GROW INTO A MULTITUDE IN THE MIDST OF THE EARTH. 17. AND WHEN JOSEPH SAW THAT HIS FATHER LAID HIS RIGHT UPON THE HEAD OF
EPHRAIM,
IT DISPLEASED HIM: AND HE HELD UP HIS FATHER'S
HAND,
TO
REMOVE IT FROM EPHRAIM'S HEAD UNTO MANASSEH'S HEAD. l8. AND JOSEPH SAID UNTO HIS
FATHER, NOT SO,
MY FATHER: FOR THIS IS THE
FIRSTBORN. PUT THY RIGHT HAND UPON HIS HEAD.
19. AND HIS FATHER
REFUSED,
AND
SAID, I KNOW IT, MY SONS, I KNOW IT:
HE
ALSO SHALL BECOME A
PEOPLE,
AND HE ALSO SHALL BE GREAT: BUT TRULY
HIS YOUNGER BROTHER SHALL BE GREATER THAN BECOME A MULTITUDE OF NATIONS.
HE,
AND HIS SEED SHALL
Israel's decision to
even even
reverse
the
order of upon
his
sons
had apparently been

could not
made
before he before he
the
met
them. He
insisted
placing the younger before the elder,
got to
know them. His decision, therefore,
have been his broth

to
made on
basis
of merit.
Joseph,
that great magician who nourished

assumed
ers
in Egypt
son.
and was praised

after
by
all,
that the
blessing
would go
his
el
dest
That, well-running ciety which has already been fully established. Joseph, in this sense, considers himself to be the last great founder. He assumed that from that point on nothing was left other than to follow the way which he had set. But Jacob was wiser and
work
all, is the way things
in
a smooth and
so
knew that
The facet
permanence
had
not yet
been
achieved.
words
displeased
and refused are quite strong.
Perhaps the
most
intrigu
ing
of the situation
and sons.
sees
in fathers
in the relationship which one normally the son, precisely because he considers himself Joseph,
is the
reversal
to be the last
man
founder, has suddenly become

the necessity
the conservative, whereas the old
has
seen
for
renewal.
168
Interpretation
DAY, SAYING,
IN THEE SHALL ISRAEL BLESS.
20. AND HE BLESSED THEM THAT
SAYING, GOD MAKE THEE AS EPHRAIM AND AS MANASSEH: AND HE SET

EPHRAIM BEFORE MANASSEH.
The selection of Ephraim over Manasseh seems to have been only temporary. In the commentary to Gen. 15:9 we showed that the Books of Joshua and Judges formed a whole and that their story was the story of the decline of the house of
Ephraim, which Joshua, from the

ship
remained continued
terminated tribe of
with
the rise of Judah. After the death of

was chosen
Moses,
Ephraim,
of
leader. After his death the leader

the death of
a
in the hands
Ephraim. Even
after
to play a central role.

mountains of
Ehud,
though
himself
Joshua, Ephraim Benjamite, gathered the

liberated them from
the home of Deborah
which
people
in the
Ephraim to begin the
war which
the Moabites (Judg. 3:15,27). These
mountains were also we
(Judg.
4:5).
In the commentary to Gen. 15:9,

paid
discussed the deference

as well as the
the next
leader, Gideon,
to the tribe of
of
Ephraim,
as we
final insult to
of
Ephraim
during
the
leadership
and
Jephtha. Next,
remember, came the rise
Micah the Ephraimite
his
private
sanctuary, as
of
well as
the story of the Levite

almost
from Ephraim
against
whose experience repeat
in the city
Gibeon forced the author, up

man
his will, to
the
line
which summed
the conclusion of the book:
In those days there
was no
king
in Israel: every
did
that which was right in
his
own eyes
(Judg.
21:25).
become
The temporary nature of Ephraim's ascendancy over Manasseh had already apparent in the Torah itself. Moses took a census of the people when he
and again at the end of
left Egypt
his journey. In the first

and
census.
Ephraim's
40,500
name appears
before Manasseh's,
and
it
was
the
larger. Ephraim had

1:34).
people
(Num. 1:32)
Manasseh
32,200
(Num.
By
the end of the
jour
ney Ephraim had dropped to 31,500 (Num. 26:37), whereas Manasseh had reached 52,700 (Num. 27:34). The ascendancy of Manasseh became even more evident when the tribe joined Jephtha's army in spite of Jephtha's insult to Ephraim. Ultimately, there
which
was a
direct
war
between Manasseh
The Biblical but
and
Ephraim in
not particu
Manasseh
was victorious
(Judg.
12:5).
author
is
larly
interested in Manasseh
as such at this point
rather wishes to emphasize
the fall of Ephraim. The situation,

able to regain the context of
however,
was not stable, and
Ephraim
was
leadership
once again under
Samuel,
an
Ephraimite. But in the Samuel's descendants
the book as a whole, it becomes evident that

to maintain the
stability government requires. Samuel therefore only became the means for the establishment of the kingship under the rule of the tribe ofJudah. This delicate balance between the tribe ofJudah and the tribe of
were not able
Ephraim
will come
up
again
Jacob's final
when
blessing
to Joseph is that his

wish
in the commentary to Gen. 49:10. house would be so

to bless anyone the
prosperous that
would
the Children of Israel
blessing
be God
make thee as
Ephraim
and
cent of this verse appears
Manasseh. The only line in the Bible which is reminiin the Book of Ruth. The passage reads as follows:
169
And
The Lion
all
and the
Ass
in the gates,
come and the elders, said,
the people that were
We
are witnesses.
The
Lord
make the woman that
has
into thine house like Rachel
and
Leah,
which two
did build
house of Israel; and do thou worthily in Ephratah, be thou famous in Bethlehem: and let thy house be as the house ofPeretz, whom Tamar bore to Judah of the seed which the Lord shall give thee of the young woman (Ruth 4: 1 1 1 2).
the
-
In these Ephraim
verses
not
only does
son of
one
find
the
intriguing interplay
between
and
Ephrath
which was
discussed in
Judah has
the commentary to Verse
Seven,
but
more
importantly
the
replaced
the sons of Joseph in the
blessing.
21
AND ISRAEL SAID UNTO
JOSEPH, BEHOLD,
I DIE: BUT GOD SHALL BE WITH YOU
AND BRING YOU AGAIN UNTO THE LAND OF YOUR FATHERS. 22. MOREOVER, I HAVE GIVEN TO THEE ONE PORTION ABOVE THY
BRETHREN,
WHICH I TOOK OUT OF THE HAND OF THE AMORITE WITH MY SWORD AND WITH MY BOW.
The
tion
word which
is translated in
portion
is
shoulder, and
no other passage
is totally obscure. The normal transla does it vary from that meaning. The
word
context would
certainly demand something like the
portion, but even if
there had been such an obscure usage at the time of the writing of the
would
Bible, it be necessary to account for its use in this passage. The word for portion is identical to the Hebrew name of the city of Shechem. This was the city in which Hamor was killed and to which Jacob had originally sent Joseph believing that he would be killed by his brothers, and Joseph's bones will, in fact, ultimately be
which
buried in that city (Josh. 24:32). Jacob concludes the chapter, in

such,
he destroyed the tribe
of
Joseph
as
by presenting Joseph with a Shechem in connection with his brothers. By returning him to Shechem he metaphorically brings up the problem of filiacide
once again.
Nonetheless there is
a great
difference between Joseph

Greek
myth
and
Kronos.
takes
But
perhaps even more relevant than the
is the filiacide
which
place
in the Babylonian
myth of
the Emunah-Elish. The older gods complained
that the children made too much noise and ate them
world might not
in
order that
the
being
of the
be disturbed. Insofar
to be almost
sake
sage the goals seem
any like activity plays a role in this pas the very opposite. It comes extremely late in the
as of
story
and
is done for the
maintaining the possibility

I took
of growth
and
change.
The final
words of
the chapter,
which
with mv sword and with which reads as
my bow, follows: And I sent
are
the
out of the hand of the Amorite intended to refer to Josh. 24:12, clearly hornet before you which drove them out
from before
Kings of the Amorites; but not with thy sword and bow. with Since the words sword and bow are not commonly used to not thy gether as an idiom in the Bible, their occurrence at this point, together with the
vou, even the two
reference
to the
Amorites,
makes
it
certain
that the reference was
intentional.
170
Interpretation
referred
The two Kings of the Amorites, who had already been words in a parallel passage in Deuteronomy 3:8, are
3:1-10).
ruled
to
by
those same
Og
and
Sihon (see Deut.

.
These two kings

who
who were spoken of
in the commentary to Gen

conquest
15:9,
the Amorites
were
lived in the
captured provinces east of

of
the Jordan River.
Their lands
results. who
inherited
by
the
half the tribe
Manasseh. This
had two
On the
on
one
hand,
fame
of
this battle caused many of the Canaanites
lived
the western shore to capitulate without
vision of the state
into two parts,

the
and the great
battle. But the resulting di distance between Manasseh and fall

of
the
Tabernacle,
If
was one of
major causes of
the
the Jubilee Year.
we compare the passage
in Genesis
with
the
passage
from Joshua
more
closely the real problems begin to emerge. According to Joshua, God said to the people of Joshua's day that they had taken the Amorites, but not with thy sword, nor with thy bow. This statement is compatible with Jacob's claim that he him
self
of
had
captured
those lands
with
his
sword and
bow. But
what are we
to make
the
claim
itself? At first it
sounds a
bit wild,
and yet
Jacob
seems sense:
to have given
it
some thought.
May it
as
not
be
understood
in the
following
by
a
making
an
extra
tribe
of
Jacob,
it were, increased the
population as a whole.
As
result, the
borders
the Promised Land were no longer sufficient, and it was metaphori

at this moment that the eastern provinces would
cally determined
be
needed.
CHAPTER XLIX
I. AND JACOB CALLED UNTO HIS SONS. AND
SAID,
GATHER YOURSELVES
TOGETHER THAT I MAY TELL YOU THAT WHICH SHALL BEFALL YOU IN THE LAST DAYS. 2. GATHER YOURSELVES
TOGETHER,
AND
HEAR,
YE SONS OF JACOB: AND
HEARKEN UNTO ISRAEL YOUR FATHER.
Chapter Forty-nine is undoubtedly the most obscure chapter in the Book of Genesis. Jacob's short speeches to his sons, which are often wrongly referred to
concerning the future life last days. This commentary makes no pre tense of having completely understood these rather cryptic passages but will try to shed some light wherever it can.
as purport which
of each
blessings,
to be brief and poetic statements

calls the
tribe,
Jacob
3.
REUBEN, THOU STRENGTH,
ART MY
FIRSTBORN,
MY MIGHT, AND THE BEGINNING OF MY

AND THE EXCELLENCY OF POWER:
THE EXCELLENCY OF
DIGNITY,
4. UNSTABLE AS
WATER,
THOU SHALT NOT EXCEL: BECAUSE THOU WENTEST UP
TO THY FATHER'S BED; THEN DEFILEDST THOU IT: HE WENT UP TO MY COUCH.
The Book
of
Exodus
ended with the
installation
office.
of
Aaron
of
as
High Priest,
when
and
Leviticus
gave the
details concerning his
The Book
Numbers
began
concerns
life in the desert
and
the conquest of the eastern provinces. It
Moses
171
The Lion
and
the
Ass
Sinai. A
second census was given after the war
took the census of the people at

with
Og
and
Sihon. In
order to understand
the story of Reuben
we must
begin
by
comparing the
results of the two censuses.
Census in Tribe Reuben Num. Chap.

46,500 59-300
22,000 I
Census in
Num. Chap.
43,730 22,200 26
Simeon
Levi Judah Dan Naphtali
74,600
76,500
62,700
53400 45,650
41,500 54,400
64,400
45,400 40,500 53,400
Gad
Asher Issachar Zebulun Benjamin Manasseh Ephraim
64,300
60,500
45,600
52,700
57400
35,400 32,200
40,500
32,500
Reuben
mentioned met
Jacob's first-born. In the early days, when the brothers were all his name always appeared first on the list. That was true when they
was
their uncle Esau (Gen. 35:25) and when the official
list
of
Jacob's
sons was
given
(Gen.
46:8).
In the later books that
will continue
to be the case. At the very the

souls that came out
beginning
Canaan
of
the Book of Exodus a
list
will
be
given of
of
of
with
Jacob,
and again same
Reuben's
name will appear
first. The Book
Numbers begins in the marching through

emerge at
way (Num.
one
1 :5),
but
when
the tribes are lined up

name
will
for
the
desert
chapter
later, Judah's
suddenly
the
top
of
of the
list (Num.
2:3).
often
In the Book
Genesis, Reuben
plan
tries to
be the leader bad

one
of
his brothers, but

37:21
,29;
in
each case
he fails. His
in
to save Joseph was a

attempt to persuade
(see Gen.
send
42:22 and commentaries).
His
Jacob to
Benjamin
of
was
ill-timed
and grotesque was active
spite of
his
good will
(Gen. 42:37). One
his descen
of
dants, On,
in the
revolution under
Korah, presumably because

commentary to Gen. 20:1).
his
ancient claim as
the
first-born (Num.
16:1 and
Although the
replaced
establishment of of
the two tribes, Ephraim and
Manasseh,
which
the tribe
Joseph,
was one of
the chief causes in establishing the need
for the
eastern
provinces,
it is
not sufficient
to
account
for Reuben's
actions.
Ap
parently, we are to assume that Reuben's decision to remain apart

ers on the other side of the
from his broth

the first
Jordan
was rooted
in his loss
of the rights of
born. As
we
following
to the
described in the commentary to Gen. 15:9, the complex of events that decision led to the building of an independent altar and ultimately
the Jubilee Year.
collapse of
The
words the
beginning
of my
strength are
clearly intended to be
a reference
172
Interpretation
reference was made
to Deut. 21:15-17. The full context makes it clear that this

consciously.
75.
If a
man
have
the
two wives, one
beloved, hated;
he
and another and
hated,
and son
children,
both
beloved
shall
and
the
if the firstborn
sons
they have born him be hers that was

which
hated:
16.
Then it
be,
when
maketh
his
to
inherit that
he hath, that
he may not make the son of the belovedfirstborn before the son of the hated, which is indeed the firstborn, ij. But he shall acknowledge the son of the hatedfor the first
born, by giving him

his strength; the
right
double portion of all that he hath: for he is of the firstborn is his. (Deut. 21:15-17)
replace
the
beginning of
Insofar clearly
nasseh
as
Jacob had decided to

the law
as stated
Reuben
against
in Deuteronomy.
by Joseph, his actions were By adopting Ephraim and Ma
he has
quite
wife, Rachel. One
literally given a double portion to the son of his most beloved way of justifying his actions would be to point to the fact that
terms, however,
such an excuse might
a pre-legal
the law had not yet been given. In Biblical

appear
to be insufficient because the Bible presupposes
distinction be
argu
tween good and

ment would not
bad
which we
discussed in
case of a
connection with need
Cain. But this is
hold true in the
law the
for
which
predicated on
the existence of law
derly
point
The supremacy of the first-born is the most or means of maintaining law once that law has been established, but at this the New Way, i.e. the way of law, is not fully determined. This openness
in
general.
allowed
be
possible when
Jacob the possibility of making certain decisions stability became of greater importance.
we
which would no
longer
Thus far in the commentary
have
presented the replacement of

of
Reuben
by
in
as
Joseph,
cob
ultimately presents it in terms

manner.
and
by Judah,
of
in terms
Reuben's ineptness. However, Ja Bilhah. The two

are connected
Reuben's
affair with was
the
following
As first-born, it
Reuben's task to
replace
his father
way he did so, but his actions were untimely and inept. This characteristic, which we have already seen in his attempt to rescue Joseph and in the inept manner in which he tried to convince his father to let them take leader. In his
bungling
Benjamin to Egypt
with
them, is
what
Jacob described
as unstable as water.
5. SIMEON AND LEVI ARE HABITATIONS.
BRETHREN; INSTRUMENTS OF CRUELTY
ARE IN THEIR
6.
O MY MINE
SOUL, COME NOT THOU INTO THEIR SECRET; UNTO THEIR ASSEMBLY, HONOUR, BE NOT THOU UNITED: FOR IN THEIR ANGER THEY SLEW
AND IN THEIR SEIFWILL THEY
.MAIM
MAN,
OXEN.
AND THEIR WRATH. FOR IT WAS
7. CURSED BE THEIR
ANGER, FOR
IT WAS
FIERCE;
CRUEL: I WILL DIVIDE THEM IN
JACOB,
AND SCATTER THEM IN ISRAEL.
Simeon
most
and
Levi
are treated as one
in
spite of the
fact that their fates

calls them
which
were al
directly
opposite
mind
from
one another.
When Jacob
brothers he
clearly has in
their rashness and the grave
injustices
that led to after
the marriage of Dinah
in Chapter Thirty-five. Simeon's fate
was total obscurity.
173
No
The Lion
and
the
Ass
from the tribe
of
men of
importance
came
of
Simeon,
but five
and most of the men of
that tribe settled within the

granted
borders
of
Judah. Of the
all
sixteen cities which were
to
Simeon in the Book
Joshua,
of them were also

-9 with
listed Josh.
among the cities granted to the tribe of Judah (compare Josh. 19: 1
15:20-62).
Before the
settlement of the
land, Simeon
numbered 59,300
more than
any
tribe with the exceptions of Judah and Dan. At the end of the
book,
that number
of
had fallen to
less than any teronomy the tribe appears to have hence it is the only tribe which does
22,200
other tribe.
By
the
end of
the Book
Deu
no
independent
existence
whatsoever, and
not even receive a
blessing
from Moses just
before his death (Deut. Chap. 33).

The tribe
of
Levi
on
the
other
hand became the

Book
of
Moses'
most
distinctive tribe. This

Levite
distinction began
at the outset of the
Exodus,
when an unnamed
bore
a son named
Moses (Ex.
2:1).
lineage is
of some
importance. How
ever, Moses was merely an individual man, and his importance
does
not neces
sarily imply any After the sons

Moses'
special of
distinction
granted
to the tribe of Levi as a whole.
Israel had
escaped the armies of a
Pharaoh they
were met
by
father-in-law, Jethro,
Moses that his
Midianite
priest.
During his
stay, Jethro con
vinced
people were
in
need of judges and written
law.
Up
till that
point we
Moses had judged the

human
people
discussed the implications

in terms
of
of
by himself. In the commentary to Gen. 25:1 the fact that the need for law was seen by a for
after
eigner
reason
alone, and that only

origin of
this need became

much
visi
ble
were
laws
given
by
God. The
priesthood,
however, is
of
less
clear.
Apparently
a
the
notion of a priest also arose
because
Jethro.
who was
himself
Midianite
priest.
known
as the priests
At any rate, shortly after Jethro left, a group of people were mentioned for the first time, and certain duties were
placed upon
them (Ex. 19:22). Aaron had of course spoken
for Moses in front

of need
of
Pharaoh
priests.
on several occasions,
but there
which
was as yet no
The
complicated
events
any led to the decision to form a tribe

15:9.
indication
for
of
priests were
discussed in the commentary to Gen.

the fact that Aaron's sons
were
In that
same
commentary
we mentioned petual
then given the priesthood as a per

rash
inheritance. However, Nadab

were
and
Abihu, having inherited Levi's

which
ness,
incapable
of
any
relation were
to God
did
not
lead to irrational
action, and
for that
reason
they
killed in the height
of their ecstasies.
particular purpose. persuaded
The Levites
as a whole were not as yet singled out

was on
for any
While Moses
the
mountain
receiving the
law,
the people
Aaron to build the Golden Calf. On his return, Moses discovered what had hap for the assistance of anyone who pened, and punishment was swift. He called him to punish their brothers, and the tribe of Levi came forward (Ex. would
help
32:26).
At that time,
one could
begin to
see
the
relation
between Simeon
could
and
Levi. The irrational
anger which
both
of them
either
displayed
to be
dealt
with
in
one of
two
ways.
They
had
abolished
only have been as a tribe or to be
given a
purpose.
position
to
which
that anger could be tamed and
endowed with noble
174
Interpretation
affair of
Golden Calf, neither the Levites nor the priests are seen all of the again in the Book of Exodus until the very end of the book, and yet chapters are devoted chapters are those centered of around them. Six intervening
After the
the to the intricate laws
coutrements of
which
concerning the Tabernacle, Aaron's vestment, and the ac his office. The rest of the book is devoted to the labors and gifts
end of the
the people brought to honor Aaron. At the very

not
book, Aaron,
the glo
who
had
been
seen since the episode of the
Golden Calf,
emerged as
rious
High Priest.
of
The Book
Numbers, however,
Levi
owed
tells a very different
story.
According
to this
account the tribe of
was consecrated
to the services of the Tabernacle as a

or at
duty
which of
Israel
in
partial
payment,
least
see
as compensation,
for the
death
the Egyptian children (for more
details
the commentary to Gen.
22:19).
The commentary to Gen.

position which was given
20:1
described the immediate

broke
results of
the special
to Aaron and his sons. Korah became the leader of a
dissident faction
tion
within
the
Levites,
and open revolt
out.
After the
revolu
was quelled and
Aaron's
position
position
secured, further
other
revolution was prevented
by inventing
The
price. whole.
higher
for the
Levites.
new office of
priest,
however,
was a
heavy
as
burden
and came at a great
Aaron's high
position meant of
that he was responsible
for the
people as a
Chapter Eighteen
and
Numbers begins
follows: And
with
the Lord said unto
Aaron, Thou
priesthood
thy
sons and
thy father's house
thee shall
bear the
iniquity
of the sanctuary: and thou and (Num.

18:1).
thy We have already begun to

The
sons with thee shall
bear the
iniquity
see the anger of
of your Levi and its

within
relation
to the
priesthood.
duality
for the
of
the highest and the lowest

which
the
priesthood
itself is in large
measure
the
iniquity
the preceding verse

of
de
scribes, but it does

chapters
not account
whole of
it. After the death
Miriam two
water.
later,
the people again revolted, this time over the lack of

and
God
appeared to
Moses
told him to take
his
rod and speak to the
rock,
which
would then gush
forth
water.
In his impatience Moses
struck the rock
instead
of
spoke unto
speaking to it. The water came, but the following verse reads: And the Lord Moses and Aaron, Because ye have believed Me not to sanctify Me in the eyes of Israel, therefore, ye shall not bring this congregation into the land
which
I have
given them was
(Num. 20:12).
end of the chapter reads as
Though Aaron
innocent in this case, the
follows:
24.
Aaron
shall
be
gathered unto
his people; for he
shall not enter
into
the
land
which
I have
given unto
the
water ofMeribah.
Children of Israel, because ye rebelled against Mv word at the 25. Take Aaron and Eleazar his son, and bring them unto Mount
Hor:
26.
Aaron
shall
And strip Aaron of his garments and put them upon Eleazar his son: and be gathered unto his people, and shall die there. 2 7. And Moses did as the
and
Lord commanded;
congregration. 28.
they
went
And Moses
stripped
up into the mountain Hor in the sight of all the Aaron of his varments, and put them upon
175
The Lion
and the
Ass
the
Eleazar his son;

came
and
Aaron died there in

mount, ig.
top of the
mount: and
Moses
and
Eleazar
was
down from the
And
when all the congregations saw that

even all the
Aaron
dead, they
20:24-29)
mourned for
Aaron for thirty days,
house of Israel. (Num.
In Verse Twenty-six nothing is

on's
mentioned about the mysterious cause of wonder
Aar
death,
and
the
reader
is left to
how he died. lead the

people
One
18.
of the great
tasks of the
never
high
priest was to
in battle (Deut.
fulfilled that function. After his son, Phinehas, killed Kozbi (Num. 26:1), Eleazar helped Moses to quiet the people by taking a census,
and
1), but Eleazar
he took
charge of
the
booty
and
after the
Midianite forward
war
(Num. 31:12). He
was
also consulted when
Reuben
Gad
came
with
their requests to occupy
the
lands
east of the of
Jordan (Num.
32:2).
But
whenever
there was violence, such
as the
death
Kozbi
or the war against the
Midianites, Eleazar
retired, and
Phinehas, his
the
son, took
his
place.
Eleazar
was not a
true son of Levi. He was not

with war or
a violent or passionate man and would
have nothing to do
of
death
after
death
There
of
his father.
were 400 years
between the death

At the
Joshua
and
the end of the
Book
of
Judges.
During
that time the priests

way.
played no role.
The
author emphasizes this when
in
a most
fantastic
end of
the Book of
Judges,
the Children
of
Israel decide to
concubine of
attack the
Children
of
Benjamin for their

the
outrages against
the
was
the Levite from

son
Ephraim,
high
priest who
led the army
Phinehas,
Phinehas
priests
the
with
such
of Eleazar (Judg. 20:28). Perhaps the author longevity in order to remind us that there were
of
endowed no other
living
was
at
the time
the Judges whom
he had forgotten to
and perhaps
mention.
Per
haps it
his
irascibility
that
kept him alive,
it is that
irascibility
which makes
tradition work.
emerged in his priestly garments at the end of the Book of announced that he and his sons, Nadab, Abihu, Eleazar, and God had Exodus, Ithamar were to bear the iniquity of the hallowed things (Ex. 28:1,38). How
Even before Aaron
ever, their
garments were
to
keep
were
them from death (Ex. 28:42,43).
One
the
sense
in
which
they
This
to bear the
iniquity
and
sacrificial offerings. refused
was a serious
duty,
Aaron
to eat the sacrifice which Nadab and
was by eating the meat of Moses became angry when Abihu had made before they
died in front bear

was
was
of the
Lord for
having
is
burned
strange
fires (Lev.
10:17).
The term Aaron
the
iniquity
of
of the people
also used
for the
scapegoat
(Lev.
16:22).
not
likened to the
divested
scapegoat and was
to die for something that he did
do. He
the clothes that were to protect
him
and
died
on
the
mountain
where
he had
gone with
Moses
and
Eleazar.
sacrificed, fulfilled that

moment on
his task
as the one who
Aaron, like the scapegoat who was bears the iniquity of the people From
.
Eleazar
could no
longer bear the

violence
sight of not
violence,
come
and one
is left it
to
wonder whether
his distaste for

the mountain
may
have
from
whatever
was
he
saw or
did
on
from
which
Aaron, his father,
never returned.
176
Interpretation
and priests
Individual Levites
seem to
refer to
play
various roles
in the latter books, but

The
we
have
the
enough
here to
in
understand
Jacob's
speech.
words maim oxen
Levites'
role
no
sacrifice.
The tribe
of
Simeon disappeared,
country.
and
the
and
Levites inherited
Levi
were
land but lived in

each
cities throughout the
Simeon
brothers
in his
own
way
was
divided in Jacob
and scattered
in
Israel.
8. JUDAH,
THOU ART HE WHOM THY BRETHREN SHALL
PRAISE; THY HAND SHALL
BE IN THE NECK OF THINE ENEMIES: THY FATHER'S CHILDREN SHALL BOW DOWN BEFORE THEE. 9. JUDAH IS A LION'S STOOPED
WHELP;
FROM THE
PREY, MY SON, THOU

AND AS AN OLD
ART GONE UP: HE
DOWN,
HE COUCHED AS A
LION,
LION;
WHO SHALL
ROUSE HIM UP?
Verse Eight
refers to the
refers
dreams
which
primarily to the kingship of the House ofJudah, but it also Joseph had in Chapter Thirty-seven. Joseph, the great
seems to
interpreter his own; it
of
dreams,
have
misinterpreted
his
own
dreams. The
sheaf
which stood
in the
center while
the other sheaves bowed down
before it
was not
was
a
Judah's.
whelp:
Judah is
lion's
the symbol of the lion is a constant theme in the
books. In Balaam's
blessing it symbolizes Israel's ability to conquer the new land (Num. 24:9), but Moses, in his blessings (Deut. 33:22), ascribes the lion's
whelp to Dan
mind was rather
than to Judah.
Presumably
the
the young lion Moses had

a series of men
in
the
Danite, Samson,
a
who was
first in
from Israel to
his way to Timnath a Philistine wife. Sometime later he found the and in the meantime seeking lion, some bees had made their nest in the carcass, it leaving filled with honey. Now slay
a
with
lion. He killed
lion
his bare hands
one
day
on
the Philistines were

posed
famed for
riddling, and so
riddle:
to the Philistines the
following
and out
of the strong
riddle
came
forth
sweetness
Samson at his wedding feast pro Out of the eater came the edible, (Judg. 14:14).
book. How can the sweet come forth from has been plaguing us throughout the book. How can radically imperfect beginnings lead to justice? We saw this in the rise of kingship and the rise of sacrifice. We saw it in Cain's first city, and we saw it in the
riddle of the
Samson's
is the
the strong?
That
question
ground were
that could not grass.
Samson's
error was
in asking the Philistines.

and
They
the wild men who knew the secret of the
Ark,
they
were
the source of
secret of
much of
David's
riddle.
wisdom.
By trickery they
were able to
discover the
Samson's
Samson Saul
conquered
his
lion, but his battle

out rise of
was a private
battle just
as
Samson
which
was a private
hero. He turned
start
to be a false start, in the same sense in
was a
false
in the
Samson in the
saw
same
way in
which
that times were not right and
kingship. The true lion, Judah, reacted to the first Judah handled his father Jacob. They decided to bind Samson and turn him over to
177
The Lion
and the
Ass
war
the Philistines rather than risk a fatal

15:10).
fought
at
the wrong moment (Judg.
The true hero,

who went on
who
killed his lion
at a
young age,
was
David,
the shepherd,
Gen.
commentary to Once David had killed his lion, it truly became the symbol ofJudah. After David came Benaiah, the man who killed a lion in the snow (II Sam.
14:5.
to kill Goliath in that charming story retold in the
23:20).
He
who
was
the
hero David
put over the
Cherethites
lion
and
Pelethites,
Joab
men of
the sea
mon.
fought for Israel,

eater came
and
he
was
the one
who replaced
under
Solo
a
Out of the
son
sea
the edible
by killing
one
first becomes
lion
and then a
tamer of lions. tamed his
David's
the
molten
lions in
another way.
of
There
were
lions
on
the brim
of
which stood
in front
Solomon's Temple
became
and contained the
waters of ablution within
(I Kings 7:29,36).
Kingship
a great
lavabo
holding
down
it the
or
primordial
waters, in their double sense, which could
rain
chaos
bring
purification.
Lions
also
adorned
Solomon's throne (I Kings
10:19,20).
For David
case of
and
Solomon the
symbol of
the lion became complicated. In the
David it
we must
was a wild animal
that could
be
conquered and used as a symbol.
David,
listines from
remember,
largely
in the days he
with
spent with the
gained his education about order and ruling Philistines in Ziklag. Samson tried to teach the Phi and
his riddle, but David
Solomon
answered the riddle
by learning
them.
water
In the commentary to Gen. 35:2 we described the double significance of its relation to chaos and its relation to cleansing. Only lions could con
molten
tain these chaotic waters and make them available to man. Each man cleansed
himself in the
throne.
sea,
but
as
for the whole, lions
adorned
King Solomon's
In the commentary to Gen. 20:7 we quoted and discussed at length the story of the man of God and the old prophet. The man of God was the young man who foretold the
required
reunification of
the nation, but did not see how
much
time would
be
the
before that
who
reunification would
become
possible.
until
He
was
killed
by
patiently stood guard over his This lion, too, was the lion ofJudah. The lion
kindly
lion
body
the
Old Prophet killed the
came.
ofJudah also
man who
would not
help
the prophet teach Ahab (see I Kings 20:36 and
commentary to
to conquer the
Gen.
31:45).
when
After that reunification,
the Babylonians
finally
returned
land, they
And
the
sent
in foreign
peoples to
diversify
and weaken
local
practices.
and from stead
of Assyria brought men from Babylon, and from Cuthah, and from Ava, and from Sepharvaim, and placed them in the cities of Samaria, in of the Children of Israel: and they possessed Samaria, and dwelt in the cities
King
Hamath,
it
thereof.
And
so
was
at
Lord;
they
therefore the
Lord
spake
to the
King
of their dwelling there, that they feared not the lions among them, which slew some of them. Wherefore of Assyria, saying. The nations which thou hast removed, and
the
beginning
sent
178
placed
Interpretation
in the
sent
cities
of Samaria, know
not the manner
of the God of the Land:
therefore
not
He hath
the manner
lions among them, and, behold, they slay them, because they know of the God of the Land. (II Kings 17:24-26)
exile, but
Judah had
accepted
when other men with other ways and other memo
ries tried to make
live that
which could
only live in memory the
old
lion
returned
in the only way that remained. Two stages of Judah's life are described in Verse Nine
the old one. The
was used
the young lion and

same word which
first
stage
is described
as a couching.
It is the
4:7).
for the
sin which couched at
Cain's door (Gen.
The
modern
ten
dency
is
to translate crouched, as if sin were ready to spring,
will not quite
do be
cause the word can
be
used
also sometimes used to
bird resting gently on its young (Deut. 22:6). It describe the deep, but in every context in which the for
a
word couched
is
used with reference
to the
Deep
it is described
waters
.
as
the well of the

stage of
goods of the earth rather than
the home of chaotic
In the first
his
life, Judah
was patient and waited
for the
proper
time,
and
his
sons
did the
same.
They were the first to begin the conquest of the land under their own power in the beginning of the Book of Judges, but once things went awry, no member of that
Judge. The tribe simply waited, them everywhere, and did nothing. When Saul became
tribe ever
a
placed even a greater
became
while
chaos surrounded seemed to
king they
have
distance between themselves

wars after
and
the other tribes. Although to the throne, the author
they
participated
in Israel's
Saul's
ascension
begins to distinguish between Israel
and
Judah. And
when
he
numbered them
in
Bezek the Children of Israel were three hundred thousand, and the men ofJudah thirty thousand (I Sam. 11:8). The same distinction is made in I Sam. 15:4 dur
ing
the
battle
against
the Amalekites
and again cases
in I Sam.
17:52
during
the war
against
the Philistines. In none of these

and yet
Judah,
is there any rift between Israel and the fact that the text distinguishes them seems to imply that Judah distance from the
others until the time of
held itself
at some
David,
the
old
lion.
10. THE SCEPTRE SHALL NOT DEPART FROM BETWEEN HIS
JUDAH,
NOR A LAWGIVER FROM
FEET,
UNTIL SHILOH COME; AND UNTO HIM SHALL THE
GATHERING OF THE PEOPLE BE:
Shiloh first became important

see which
at the time of
Joshua,
It
when
lots
were
drawn to
the
lands
were to
be
apportioned to each tribe.
remained and and of
the
seat of
Ark
and
the center of the New
rise of
kingship
the
center of
the New
Way during Way
the
lives
of
Eli
Samuel. After the
left Shiloh,
its importance be
his
offices
came a
dead issue
when
King
Solomon
relieved
Abiathar
(I Kings
2:27).
The been
present verse
the whole of Israel
until
clearly states that the descendants of Judah will rule over Shiloh comes. The translation of these words has often
mangled and the texts corrupted
by
translators
of
who
did
not understand
them. The verse
indicates that the House
Judah
will
not rule
the complete
179
The Lion
and the
Ass
of
kingdom forever. The House

when
Judah did in fact lose its full story

and unto
will
control over
the whole
Ahijah
came.
Ahijah,
whose
be
retold
in the commentary
gathering of the
to Verse
people
Sixteen,
came
from Shiloh,
him
there was a
by virtue of Ahijah's the first rebel king of the North.

who,
1 1
.
prophecy,
gathered around
King Jeroboam,
TETHERING HIS ASS'S COLT UNTO THE VINE AND THE SON OF HIS SHE ASS
UNTO THE TENDRILS: HE WASHED HIS GARMENTS IN IN THE BLOOD OF GRAPES:

12. HIS EYES SHALL BE RED WITH
WINE,
AND HIS CLOTHES
WINE,
AND HIS TEETH WHITE WITH MILK.
In Hebrew there
are
four
words
for
an
ass, coming from four different
roots.
They
dealt
are
respectively the
wild
ass, the ass, the she-ass, and the colt. We have

wild
at some
length
with
the
ass,
but the time has
come
to speak of his
tamed
brother.
ass
The
Way,
beast
and
is essentially a beast of burden. David introduced horses into the New his men sometimes rode on mules (II Sam. 13:29). But the traditional
was
of
burden in Israel
the ass.
It is
often mentioned as part of a man's wealth. and
Pharaoh
gave some
to Abram
(Gen. 12:16),
was one of
Abraham's
slave
brought
some
to Rebekah (Gen. 24:35). It
the beasts
with which
Jacob
provided
himself before
leaving
Haran In
(Gen. 34:28),
and asses were also subject to the plagues sons of
in Egypt (Ex.
9:3).
their journeys the
Israel
captured
the asses of
Shechem. from
captured
whom
they
the
of
inherited the
notion of
kingship,
and their
descendants
the
asses of
Midianites.
Jericho Asses
who
taught them the necessity of
and of
Amalek (Gen. 35:28;
law, but destroyed the asses Num. 31:34; Josh. 6:21; Judg. 6:4).
Each
man
are singled out
because
of their special closeness to man.
is
responsible
for the well-being
of an
ass, even if
it belongs to
a man who
hates
him.
If thou
to
see
the ass
of him
that
hateth
thee
lying
under
his burden,
and wouldest forbear
help him,
thou shalt
surely
help
with
him. (Ex. 23:5)
Normally,
was the
the first-born of
only animal who, lamb (Ex. 13:13). We leader

are not told of
any animal was sacrificed to the Lord, but the ass like the first child of a man, could be redeemed with a
he
back to become
once went out
how Moses left Egypt, but he

returned an ass
when
came
his
people
looking
for
some
riding she-asses, but found Samuel
(Ex.
4:20).
Saul
and
became
King
of
Israel instead
(1 Sam. 9:3).
found his asses, David, the killer of lions, set out from his father's house riding an ass and became the true king (I Sam. 16:20). The present passage is by no means the only time that the ass and the lion ap
Although Saul
never pear together.
Samson,
who
killed
lion
with
his bare hands, later
smote
the Phi-
180
Interpretation
with a
listines
never
jawbone
of an ass.
As
we remember
he
was
the private hero who
became king.
warned
Samuel
the people that if
they
and
were
to
appoint a
king
they
he
would
take
their asses (I Sam.

ers
8: 16), but both he
Moses
argued that
were
just lead
because they did not take them (Num. 16:15 and I Sam. I2:3)Asses were once again connected with lions when Ahithophel, Absalom's face the lions,
rode
counselor who could not
home
on an ass
to commit suicide
(II Sam.
17:23).
who pretend
Those
to power sometimes ride asses also. That was true of
Ba
laam,
who rode a she-ass
(Num. 22:21),
of
Ziba,
and of
Sheba ben Bichri (II
Sam. 16:1; I Kings

Asses
were
2:40).
the
beasts
of
burden;
Jacob
one of them carried
Abraham's
way.
wood
to the
foot
of
Mount Moriah,
and of
Isaac
carried
it the
rest of
the
They
were
associated with
the sons
and pulled the wagons which carried 45:23).

man
closely Jacob's
body
back to Canaan (Gen. 42:26-27; 43:18,24; 44:3,13;

central reference
The
is the
ass who carried
the young
of God
and who
stood together with the lion guarding his body (I Kings 13:24). Jacob's words to his son went as follows: Tethering his ass's
colt unto the vine
and the son
of his
she ass unto the tendrils.
has already been established but who is his ass, that slow and steady beast of burden, dumb but sure-footed, who pa tiently plods on? They were the children bought with a lamb, who lifted the
was an old
Judah
lion
that much
weight of quered
their
father
onto their
backs to be buried
deep
in the
soil of an uncon
land.
vine,
The its
father
in
of
forgetfulness,
there the lion tethered the colt

washed
and washed
garment
wine,
in the blood of grapes he

calf to
of
its
clothes
free from the
blood
of man.
From Aaron's
Solomon's house,
the sweet comes forth these two

not
from the
strong.
From the land
blood to the land
of wine and milk man who
would go.
But
now
they
wait, guarding over the young
did
know
time.
13. ZEBULUN SHALL DWELL AT THE HAVEN OF THE
SEA;
AND HE SHALL BE FOR
AN HAVEN OF SHIPS; AND HIS BORDER SHALL BE UNTO ZIDON.
The
the
and
men of
Zebulun began life

and
as
heroes.
the
They
were of great
importance in
wars of
Barak
Gideon,
as well as
battle
of
Aijalon (Judg. 4:6,10;
6:35
Ca
12:11,12),
and
they
were one of
the first tribes to complete the conquest of tribes that
their lands.
naanites.
Quite often, it is
case of
said of other
they dwelled among

least in
the
In the
Zebulun the
phrase
is
reversed: and the

at
Canaanites dwelt
land.
among them (Judg. 1:30), showing that they were Zidon was one of the sons of Canaan (Gen.
part of
control of the
10:15,19)
and was to
have been
the inheritance of the tribe
the Book of Joshua.
Asher according to the list of cities given in However, Asher was never able to complete the conquest
of
(Judg.
1:31).
181
The Lion
and the
Ass
conquered,
to test
and presumably they remained as one of Israel by them, that is, all in Israel who
The Zidonites had
were never
the nations which the

no experience
Lord left
war
of any
in Canaan (Judg.
3:1).
was used
In later times Zidon Temple. Her

mon's
provided the
lumber
which
for
building
the
king, Hiram, became closely

with
allied with
King
Solomon. But Solo
dealings
sulting
over-taxation
Hiram eventually became much too expensive, and the re to a large extent caused the fall of the House of Judah (see
end of
commentary to Gen. 31:45). At the

gods of
his life Solomon

at
also
built idols to the

when
the
Zidonites,
which were
destroyed only
23:13).
which
the very end
the state
was reunified
by King
of
Josiah (II Kings
Zidon was,
course, the country
is
often referred
to as Phoenicia.
She is
was a great maritime nation.
Apparently
Zebulun
was able to
learn the
art of sail same
ing
not
from her
true
of
any great loss. However, the text indicates that the his brother, Issachar.
without
14. ISSACHAR IS A STRONG ASS COUCHING DOWN BETWEEN TWO BURDENS:
15. AND HE SAW THAT REST WAS

AND BOWED HIS SHOULDER TO
GOOD, BEAR,
AND THE LAND THAT IT WAS
PLEASANT;
AND BECAME A SERVANT UNTO TRIBUTE.
Aside from
one
can
bad
king
named
Baasha
and
an unimportant
judge
named
Tola, Issachar
able
only be
remembered
to face the problem of wealth.
for its riches, but apparently it was not Jacob seems to indicate that, unlike his her
riches.
brother Zebulun, Issachar became
corrupt through
l6. DAN SHALL JUDGE HIS
PEOPLE,
AS ONE OF THE TRIBES OF ISRAEL.
17. DAN SHALL BE A SERPENT BY THE BITETH THE HORSE
WAY,
AN ADDER IN THE
PATH, THAT
HEELS,
SO THAT HIS RIDER SHALL FALL BACKWARD.
l8. I HAVE WAITED FOR THY
SALVATION, O LORD!
The story of the tribe of Dan is long and complicated. He was the first son of Bilhah. In times past the first son of the concubine had been considered a first son in his
own
right,
for
example
Ishmael
and
Zimran, Abraham's first-born by

that claim
Keturah. To
a certain extent the
author recognizes
leader
of
the tribes
which marched on
the
northern side of
making Dan the the Ark during the
by
forty-year trek through Sinai (see Num.

on
2:25).
Fate
played another strange trick
Dan
much as she
had
on
Zelophehad. He
was
the man from the tribe of Ma
nasseh who
had
no sons, and the consequence of this act of

of
fate, insofar
as
it
played a role
in the fall
the Jubilee year, was discussed in the commentary to
Gen.
15:9.
similar
Something
cordingly he
happened to Dan
was given a rather small
Dan had only inheritance. However,

as well.
one
son,
and ac
when
the census
was taken at the end of the
Book
of
Numbers,
with were
there were
64,400
people.
Dan
had become larger than any other tribe quently the lands which he had acquired
Dan's inheritance
was
the exception ofJudah, and conse too small.
officially to have been in the west, but when Abram
182
chased
Interpretation
Chedorlaomer he
was said
to
have
pursued them unto
Dan (Gen.
was
14:14).
As
we go through
the story of Dan

even
we must remember that of
he
doomed to live
on the northern
border,
of
from the days
Abram.
son of
The first Danite

31:6), to
whom
any
prominence was
Aholiab. the
Ahisamach (Ex.
God
gave the wisdom of the arts so that
he
might
help
Bezaleel
build the Ark. The first indication that something

the half- Egyptian son of
verses
was
wrong in the tribe
of
Dan
was when
Shelomith,
the daughter of
Dibri,
cursed the
Lord
few
before the giving of the laws concerning the Jubilee Year (Lev. 24:11 ). Perhaps another one of the difficulties which led to the corruption of Dan was
that it happened to inherit the
land
bordering the
great
were
Philistines. The
with
other
tribes had
begun to
come
settle
their own
moment
lands. The
battles
the Philistines were yet to

and
but
at
this
his brothers
unprepared,
was not
Dan
was
forced to
private
face them
by
himself. Given this position, it

should come
surprising that the in
hero, Samson,
Because
as
of
from their
midst.
the inequities caused

with
by
her
sudden growth
population as well more
her troubles
the
Philistines,
the Danites decided to capture
lands for
was on
themselves along the northern border (Josh. 19:47).

the western
Since her it
original
lot
border her lands
would
have been
the giants,
conquered
first if the Children Joshua

was
of
Israel had
attack
not
become frightened
by
but
as
was all
forced to
conquer
from
the east.
was
Dan,
who
had
faithfully
own
helped
his brothers
not
their
lands,
forced to
then that as
they
passed through
tuary
dom
and separated of
by surprising Mount Ephraim they took Micah 's private sanc themselves from their brothers (Judg. Chap. 18). The wis
conquer
his
land
himself. It is
the arts, which God had given to
Aholiab,
now allowed
Dan to
set
up his
own altar.
This
was
the
last blow to the
practice of
the Jubilee Year.
When Jeroboam became

at
king
he
put
up the
altar at
Beth-el
and rebuilt the one
Dan. These two
altars
became the
symbol of
end of the reign of

of
King
Solomon to the final
moments of
reunify the Beth-el. But so far as one can tell from the text, the Babylonians came, altar at Dan was yet to have been destroyed.
reign
his
Josiah
was able to
lasted from the disunity Josiah. At the end King country by destroying the altar at
which
and the
when he decided to become independent. Although his grounds seem to justify this action, when he set up the private altar he became an adder in the path. The unification of Israel under Josiah did not include the destruction of the al
Dan
was put
in
a most
difficult
position.
He judged Israel
break
with
her
and
tar at
Dan,
of
which waited while
the
land
was ruled
by Babylon.
The
author
when
is he
thinking
says
its destruction
waited for
which was yet to come and of
true unification
/ have
thy
salvation, O
Lord.
AT LAST.
19.
GAD,
A TROOP SHALL TROUNCE
GAD; BUT HE WILL TROUNCE
By
would
virtue of
having been
Zilpah's
be
sufficient to understand
first-born, Gad also had certain claims. This his decision to join Reuben in his request of the
183
land
The Lion
and
the
Ass
placing himself in The words
word such a position
which are
east of the
Jordan.
By
Gad became
buffer between Israel
and the east.
translated
word
troop
and
trounce axe puns on the
Hebrew
Gad. Although the
troop
occasion
ally
appears
in
other
contexts, it is usually found in
reference
to the attacks
from
the east, and one would

sition
imagine that Jacob's himself
words referred
to the
precarious po
in
which
Gad
placed
by
pressing for the

and 24:2).
eastern province
(see I
Kings 13:24; II Kings 5:2, 6:23, 13:21,
20. OUT OF ASHER HIS BREAD SHALL BE FAT, AND HE SHALL YIELD ROYAL
DAINTIES.
The
case of
of
prophecies
concerning Dan and Gad each turn Dan the Hebrew word to judge is a play on the
words
on a
play
on words. and
In the
case
word
Dan,
in the
Gad both the
troop
and trounce are plays on the name
Gad. The
same
is
true in the
may
also
and
case, but in a more complicated way. The word used for bread be translated war (Judg. 5:8). The word for fat can also mean stout or
present
bold
is
sometimes used can also
to describe a soldier (Judg. 3:29). The word trans

rope or
lated dainties
be translated
bonds (Job
38:31 ;
I Sam.
15:32).
men
The
translation could then read: Out of Asher there
shall come
his
hearty
of war,
but it
shall provide
bonds for
of
the
king.
seems to
In the Second Book

position
Kings, Elisha
imply
that
King
Joash
was
in
to
secure
Israel's future
by
preventing
the conquest of
Hazael. The
pas
sage reads as
follows:
was
Now Elisha
rael came
fallen
unto
sick
of his
sickness
down
him,
and wept over
whereof he died. And Joash the King of Is his face, and said, O my father, my father, And Elisha And he it:
said unto said and
the chariot of Israel, and the

and arrows.
horsemen him bow
thereof.
him. Take bow
And he took
upon
unto
and arrows.
to the
King
put
Put thine hand

upon
the
bow. And he
put
his hand
upon
Elisha
of Israel, his hands it.
the
King's hands. And he said, Open the

shot.
window eastward. arrow
And he
opened
Then Elisha said, Shoot. And he

ance,
and
And he said, The
of the
Lord's deliver
of deliverance from Syria: for thou shalt smite the Syrians in Aphek, till thou have consumed them. And he said, Take the arrows. And he took them. And he said unto the King of Israel, Smite upon the ground. And he smote
the
arrow
thrice,
and staved.
And the
man
of God
was wroth with

smitten
him,
and said.
Thou
shouldest
have
smitten five or six
times; then hadst thou
Syria
till thou
hadst
consumed
it:
whereas now thou shalt smite Syria but thrice. And Elisha died, and they buried him. And the bands of the Moabites invaded the land at the coming in of the year. And it band of men; and came to pass, as they were burying a man, that, behold, they spied a was let down, and cast the man into the sepulchre of Elisha: and when the man
they
bones of Elisha, he revived, and stood up on his feet. But Hazael King of Israel all the days ofJehoahaz. And the Lord was gracious unto them. because of His covenant and had compassion on them, and had respect unto them, neither cast He them with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and would not destroy them,
touched the
Syria
oppressed
from His presence in his

stead.
as yet.
So Hazael King of Syria died;
and
Benhadad his
son reigned
And Jehoash the
son ofJehoahaz took again out
of the hand of Benhadad
184
Interpretation
ofJehoahaz his father of Hazael the cities, which he had taken out of the hand Three times did Joash beat him. and recovered the cities of Israel. (II Kings
the son
by
war.
13:14-25)
If Aphek
the words of
was a
turning
point
in the
struggle
between Israel
and
the east then
Jacob
make a certain amount of
sense, since Aphek belonged to the
tribe of Asher (Josh. 19:35).
21. NAPHTALI IS A HIND LET LOOSE: HE GIVETH GOODLY WORDS.
Verse Twenty-one is
obscure.
However the
word
translated
hind
can also
be
translated the mighty and
is
used
in that
sense
to describe those who were
cap
tured
by
Nebuchadnezzar
on
and sent
to Babylon.
Something
unclear.
of
this nature may
have been
the
author's
mind, but the point
is
22. JOSEPH IS A FRUITFUL
BOUGH, EVEN
A FRUITFUL BOUGH B>
WELL,
WHOSE
BRANCHES RUN OVER THE WALL:
23. THE ARCHERS HAVE SORELY GREIVED HIM AND SHOT AT HIM AND HATED HIM.
24. BUT HIS BOW ABODE IN
STRENGTH,
AND THE ARMS OF HIS HANDS WERE MADE
STRONG BY THE HANDS OF THE MIGHTY GOD OF JACOB;
(FROM
THENCE IS THE
SHEPHERD, THE STONE OF ISRAEL:)

25. EVEN BY THE GOD OF THY FATHER, WHO SHALL HELP THEE; AND BY THE
ALMIGHTY, WHO SHALL BLESS THEE WITH BLESSINGS OF HEAVEN ABOVE,

BLESSINGS OF THE DEEP THAT LIETH
AND OF THE WOMB:
UNDER, BLESSINGS OF
THE BREASTS
26. THE BLESSINGS OF THY FATHER HAVE PREVAILED ABOVE THE BLESSINGS OF
MY
PROGENITORS, UNTO THE UTMOST BOUND OF JOSEPH,
THE EVERLASTING HILLS:
THEY SHALL BE ON THE HEAD OF
AND ON THE CROWN OF THE HEAD
OF HIM THAT WAS SEPARATE FROM HIS BRETHREN.
Jacob's
words
concerning Joseph
appeared
of
are
the most obscure, and the present com
mentator makes no pretense of
having
in the
understood
them. First
since
of all, will
the name Jo
seph should not
have
chapter at
and
all,
there
be
no tribe of
Joseph
with
and the
future lives
Manasseh
Ephraim have already been dealt
in the
previous chapter. quite
Verse Twenty-two is Publication

side.
obscure, and the modern translation

a wild ass
by
the Jewish
Society
reads:
Joseph is
by
The
word which means either wild ass or
spring bough is not the
wild colts on a
hill for
word used
Ishmael,
or wall
and
its meaning is
20:1).
rather obscure.
However,
the word translated
hillside
com
is
shur, the name of one of the cities connected with
Ishmael (sec
mentary to
Gen.
Verses Twenty-three
the light of the
to
refer
to a
and Twenty-four present an even greater difficulty. In commentary to Gen. 48:22 one would have expected these verses passage in one of the later books. However, there is no such passage.
185
Various
The Lion
and the
Ass
it to
refer to
medieval commentators understand of
any
number of
incidents
in the lives
Joseph's
descendants, but the

but
points
make such wild guesses vocabulary.
generally does not allow us to to the passage itself by the use of a similar
author
For these
reasons say.
the present commentator is completely baffled and has noth
ing
further to
27. BENJAMIN SHALL RAVEN AS A WOLF; IN THE MORNING HE SHALL DEVOUR THE
PREY, AND AT NIGHT HE SHALL DIVIDE THE SPOIL.

put
When Joseph's brothers know that he know nothing

of
him in the well, Benjamin
was not there.
We
we
meant a great about
deal to Joseph, but from the Book

real glance we
of
Genesis
of
Benjamin himself. The first

at
had
the tribe
Benjamin
was
the frightful story
the end of the Book of Judges
which was
retold
in the commentary to Gen.

who
22:6.
That
was the
story
about
the Levite
from
Ephraim
stopped overnight
among the Benjaminites with his concubine
from Bethlehem. The story set the stage for the Books of Samuel by showing the necessity for a king. That necessity implied the need of a prophet also. The prophet came from Ephraim, the first king from Benjamin itself, and when that
king
most
proved
false,
the true
of
king
came
from Bethlehem.
continues to
In the Second Book battle
Samuel, Benjamin
was
be the leader
of
of the and
dissident factions. Benjamin

mock
behind
the
revolt
Ishbosheth
fought the
which caused so much
bloodshed (II Sam. 2:9, 2:25
and
commentary to Gen. The revolutions which

spearheaded
21:1).
were threatened
by Ziba, Sheba,
forced far
and
Shimei
were all
by
the Tribe of Benjamin. (See II Sam. 16:5, and 19:18, 21:1.) In
the
revolution
under
Absalom, David
was
north.
This
would
imply
that Benjamin had
opposed
David in that
revolution as well.
The
real revolution, the one which
broke the
attraction
state
in two, began
as a conse
quence of
Solomon's
policies and
would
his
to foreign ways.
of
At that time
God
promised
that He
leave
sent
one tribe
in the hands
David's descen
dants. Not
long
thereafter, He
the prophet Ahijah the Shilonite to Jeroboam

revolution.
in
order
to
persuade
him to begin the

ripped
Ahijah's
rhetoric was strange.
He took
a new garment,
it into
twelve pieces, gave ten of them to
Jero
boam,
Ten
piece.
and one of
them he
promised
to the house of
David (I Kings
wonder about
1 1:30,31).
plus one equals eleven, and the reader
is left to
the twelfth
As
came
a consequence of
his harsh policy Solomon's son,
King Rehoboam,
be
Israel sent a request to Rehoboam asking for easy prey for Jeroboam. taxes. The burdensome from their king refused, and the text continues:
So
when all
relief
Israel
saw that
the
King
we
hearkened not
unto
them, the
we
people answered
the
King,
saving.
What portion have

tents, O Israel:
in David? Neither have

to thine
own
inheritance in
the son
de-
of Jesse; to
your
now see
house, David. So Israel
186
Interpretation
tents.
.
parted unto their
So Israel
rebelled against the
house of David
was come
unto
this
dux.
And it
came
to pass, when all
Israel heard that Jeroboam
again, that
they
over
sent and called all
him
unto the congregation, and made
him
speed
to get
him
king
Israel: there
was none
that followed the
house of David, but
the tribe ofJudah only.
(I Kings 12:16-20)
Then,
at
the last moment, the tribe for whom the twelfth piece was
destined
was revealed.
And
with
were
when
Rehoboam
was come
to
Jerusalem, he
assembled all
the
house of Judah,
the
Tribe of Benjamin, an hundred and fourscore thousand chosen men, which warriors, to fight against the house of Israel, to bring the kingdom again to
son
Rehoboam the
of Solomon. But the

unto
word
of God
came unto
Shemaiah,
saying.
the
man
of
God,
the the
saying.
Speak
Rehoboam,
the son
of Solomon,
remnant
King
ofJudah, and unto all

,
house
ofJudah and
Benjamin,
and to
the
of the people
Thus
saith
Lord, Ye
every
return
to the
brethren the Children of Israel: up, nor fight his house; for this thing is from Me. They hearkened therefore word of the Lord, and returned to depart according to the word of the Lord.
shall not go
against your
man
to
(I Kings 12:21-24)
Benjamin,
The
who
had been the leader
of
every
revolution against
David,
altars
was
the
only tribe to stand with him

next verse
in that
of
most crucial
hour
when
the land was divided.
begins the story
Jeroboam's decision to build the
in Dan
and Beth-el which were to remain the symbols of Israel's of
disunity
until the reign
King
Josiah.
was a
Benjamin
wolf in the morning, throughout the

of
reign of
David
and
Solo
still
mon, but the meaning

perplexing.
the phrase
at
night
he divided the
spoils
is
28. AND THESE ARE THE TWELVE TRIBES OF ISRAEL: AND THIS IS IT THAT THEIR FATHER SPAKE UNTO
THEM,
AND BLESSED THEM: EVERY ONE ACCORDING TO
HIS BLESSING HE BLESSED THEM. 29. AND HE CHARGED
THEM,
AND SAID UNTO
THEM,
I AM TO BE GATHERED UNTO
MY PEOPLE: BURY ME WITH MY FATHERS IN THE CAVE THAT IS IN THE FIELD
OF EPHRON THE HITTITE.

30. IN THE CAVE THAT IS IN THE FIELD OF
MACHPELAH, WHICH
IS BEFORE WITH THE
MAMRE, IN
THE LAND OF
CANAAN, WHICH ABRAHAM BOUGHT
FIELD OF EPHRON THE HITTITE FOR A POSSESSION OF A BURYING PLACE.
31. THERE THEY BURIED ABRAHAM AND SARAH HIS WIFE: THERE THEY BURIED ISAAC AND REBEKAH HIS WIFE: AND THERE I BURIED LEAH.
32. THE PURCHASE OF THE FIELD AND OF THE CAVE THAI IS THEREIN WAS FROM THE CHILDREN OF HETH.
33. AND WHEN JACOB HAD MADE AN END OF COMMANDING HIS
SONS,
HE
EXPIRED,
AND WAS GATHERED UNTO HIS PEOPLE.
After these words, Jacob blessed his

the cave of
sons and
instructed
them to
bury
him in
which
his fathers,
where
he
would
be waiting for them in the way in
1 87
the
The Lion
wait.
and
the
Ass
dead
They bury
they
come
themselves
deep
in
land. But like Rebekah's
nurse or
Rachel's
gods
forth.
CHAPTER L
AND JOSEPH FELL UPON HIS FATHER'S
FACE,
AND WEPT UPON
HIM,
AND KISSED
HIM.
2. AND JOSEPH COMMANDED HIS SERVANTS THE PHYSICIANS TO EMBALM HIS father: AND THE PHYSICIANS EMBALMED ISRAEL.
3. AND FORTY DAYS WERE FULFILLED FOR OF THOSE WHICH ARE
HIM;
FOR SO ARE FULFILLED THE DAYS
EMBALMED;
AND THE EGYPTIANS MOURNED FOR HIM
THREESCORE AND TEN DAYS.
The
were
number
forty
has
occurred
for the last time in the book
of
Genesis. These
the number of
embalmed at
days
required
also
be
of
the end of
for embalming Israel. Although Joseph will the chapter, the word will never be used again in have been dealing, live
again. was said
on almost and
any
on
the books
with which we whole of
in fact it
will
only
appear
once again
in the
the Bible. It was

would
primarily
an
Egyptian
practice
based
the
notion
that the
body
in
In Verse Thirty-three
of the
last chapter, Jacob
to have
expired.
This
word occurs eleven times
every he died (Gen. 7:21,22; 25:8; 25:17; 35:29; Num. 17:28, 20:29, cf. 20:26; but compare Num. 20:3 with Num. 20:4). The most obvious parallels to the present verse are Gen. 25:8, 25:17, and
our
books; however,
other occasion
it
was accompanied
by
the statement and
35:29,
where
the addition of the words and

are
he died
always appear
in the text.
The fact that they

the practice the light of the
of embalming. reference
missing at this point seems to This interpretation even

to
reflect some
appears more reasonable
relationship to in
forty days,
which, as we have seen
in
countless other
instances, implies
When Joseph wrap him up in
the
whole of
a period of waiting.
commanded
the Egyptian
physicians
to
a sheet
like
cocoon, the author was not

to be wrapped up and
Israel, i.e., Jacob, but thinking

embalm
to
of
of
Israel,
which was
asleep for four hundred
years until
they
were waked
mourned
by
Moses.
The Egyptians
have
played as great a role
for seventy days. The numbers seventy and seven in the text as the numbers forty and four hundred. The
present commentator
has tried
case of
diligently
to
find
some thread
passages as
he did in the
those with
forty, but
no order appeared.
connecting those Perhaps
such an order will one
day
appear
to another commentator of greater insight.
4. AND WHEN THE DAYS OF HIS MOURNING WERE

HOUSE OF PHARAOH,
PAST,
JOSEPH SPAKE UNTO THE
SAYING, IF
NOW I HAVE FOUND GRACE IN YOUR
EYES,
SPEAK, I PRAY YOU, IN THE EARS OF

5. MY FATHER MADE ME
PHARAOH, SAYING.
SWEAR, SAYING, LO, I DIE: IN MY GRAVE WHICH I
188
Interpretation
CANAAN,
PRAY
HAVE DIGGED FOR ME IN THE LAND OF ME. NOW THEREFORE LET ME GO

AND I WILL COME AGAIN.
THERE SHALT THOU BURY

BURY MY
UP, I
THEE, AND
FATHER,
6.
AND PHARAOH THEE SWEAR.
SAID, GO UP
AND BURY THY
FATHER,
ACCORDING AS HE MADE
Joseph's
request was not spoken
directly
it
to Pharaoh.
The traditional
commenta
tors explain this
fact
words an
mourning to appear in Verse Six, spoken
have been wrong for any man in by before him. This explanation may be true, but Pharaoh's
claiming that
would
directly
to
Joseph,
would seem
to argue against such

and
interpretation. Thirteen
power
years
have
passed since
the
famine,
Joseph's
be the first
sign of
has already begun to wane. Joseph's need for the break between Pharaoh and Israel which
Book
of
an
it may be that intercessor may

the
will appear at
beginning
of the
Exodus.
7. AND JOSEPH WENT UP TO BURY HIS FATHER: AND WITH HIM WENT UP ALL THE
SERVANTS OF
PHARAOH, THE ELDERS OF HIS HOUSE,
AND ALL THE ELDERS
OF THE LAND OF EGYPT,
If Pharaoh had begun to forget

membered what
Joseph, clearly
still noted
the old men of
Egypt
who re
Joseph had done for them

we
held him in
respect. upon
In the
the
com
mentary to Gen. 22:15 of the Egyptian people
already
the Biblical insistence
decency
as opposed to
Pharaoh himself.
8.
AND ALL THE HOUSE OF
JOSEPH,
AND HIS
BRETHREN,
AND HIS FATHER'S
HOUSE: ONLY THEIR LITTLE
ONES, AND THEIR FLOCKS, AND THEIR HERDS,
THEY LEFT IN THE LAND OF GOSHEN.
Verse Eight is
again
a reference to
Ex. 10:8-10,24
ones and
and 12:37.
At that time Pharaoh
demanded that the little
flocks be left in the land of Goshen to
guarantee their
return, but Moses refused.
9. AND THERE WENT UP WITH HIM BOTH CHARIOTS AND

A VERY GREAT COMPANY.
HORSEMEN;
AND IT WAS
10. AND THEY CAME TO THE THRESHING FLOOR OF
ATAD, WHICH
IS BEYOND THE
JORDAN,
AND THERE THEY MOURNED WITH A GREAT AND VERY SORE
LAMENTATION: AND HE MADE A MOURNING FOR HIS FATHER SEVEN DAYS.
The
place of
floor
ofAtad
is
not mentioned
mourning is described as beyond the Jordan, but the threshing in any other passage and so cannot be located geo
phrase
graphically.
In the Bible the
beyond
the
Jordan
never
became
crystal
lized. From the but from the In

other
point of view of the
West Bank it
often refers to
the East
Bank.
point of view of
we
words,
the East Bank it can equally refer to the West Bank. are left with two possible interpretations. Either the
place east of the
itself actually took
Jordan,
or the statement
itself is
made
mourning from
189
The Lion
and the
Ass
would
the point of view of the make, it is

ence
Eastern Bank. While the decision

it implies that the
attacked
be difficult to
This
refer
clear
that some reference to the East Bank is
being
made.
is
of some significance since
original
plan, according to
which
south and to have inher ited only so far as the Jordan River, would necessarily fail. The ramifications of this failure have already been discussed in the remarks concerning the fall of the Jubilee Year (see commentary to Gen. 15:9)
the sons of
Israel
were to
have
from the
Although the threshing floor of Atad is never mentioned again, the Hebrew word Atad will appear twice. It means bramble and appears in Jotham 's famous
parable of
the trees. This parable presents the most theoretical argument oppos
represented the one useless man and
ing
kingship. In it the bramble
hence the
only man who would have time to be king (see commentary to Gen. On the other hand, the reference to a threshing floor may well be
to Jerusalem (see II
reference parable
35:4).
a reference
Sam. 24:16-25 and commentary to Gen. is intended it would imply a further cause for mourning,
spoken
25:21).
since
If this
Jotham 's
whereas
is
from
the
highest
point of view with regard
to politics
the
threshing floor
was the scene of
David's
acquiescence to the need
for
com
promise, given the ways of man.
II. AND WHEN THE INHABITANTS OF THE
LAND,
THE CANAANITES, SAW THE
MOURNING IN THE FLOOR OF ATAD, THEY SAID, THIS IS A GRIEVOUS MOURNING TO THE EGYPTIANS: WHEREFORE THE NAME OF IT WAS CALLED
ABEL-MIZRAIM, WHICH IS BEYOND JORDAN.
The Canaanites,
grievous
who witnessed
this ceremony, renamed the floor of Atad the
ficance.
mourning of the Egyptians, but these words may have a double signi They certainly refer to the old Egyptian men who mourned over the
death
place
of
Jacob, but they may

years
also refer to another
mourning
which was
to take
four hundred
not
later.
saw
It is
nation
impossible that the Canaanites day. At least it is

on
in
this act Israel's
fervent determi
upon a mourn return
to
return one
said that when of
Napoleon happened
Jewish community Av, Day for the destruction of the Temple, he too predicted that they
on which
the Ninth
it is traditional to
would one
day
to their homeland.
12. AND HIS SONS DID UNTO HIM ACCORDING AS HE COMMANDED THEM:
13. FOR HIS SONS CARRIED HIM INTO THE LAND OF CANAAN, AND BURIED HIM IN
THE CAVE OF THE FIELD OF MACHPELAH, WHICH ABRAHAM BOUGHT WITH
THE FIELD FOR A POSSESSION OF A BURYING PLACE OF EPHRON THE

BEFORE MAMRE.
HITTITE,
14. AND JOSEPH RETURNED INTO
EGYPT, HE.
AND HIS BRETHREN, AND ALL THAT

AFTER HE HAD BURIED HIS
WENT UP WITH THEM TO BURY HIS

FATHER.
FATHER,
190
Interpretation
word carried which appears
The
in Verse Thirteen is the

the book. But the
same as
the word
for
lifts,
so central to the movement of
imagery
shifts a
bit. The
brothers become the

of their father
asses committed to
taking
on their shoulders the true
burden
by
carrying
on the responsibilities of
the New Way.
15. AND WHEN JOSEPH'S BRETHREN SAW THAT THEIR FATHER WAS
DEAD,
THEY
SAID,
JOSEPH WILL PERADVENTURE HATE
US,
AND WILL CERTAINLY REQUITE
US ALL THE EVIL WHICH WE DID UNTO HIM. l6. AND THEY SENT A MESSENGER UNTO COMMAND BEFORE HE
JOSEPH, SAYING, THY FATHER DID
DIED, SAYING, JOSEPH, FORGIVE, I

PRAY THEE
17. SO SHALL YE SAY UNTO OF THY
NOW, THE TRESPASS
BRETHREN,
AND THEIR SIN; FOR THEY DID UNTO THEE EVIL: AND
NOW,
WE PRAY
THEE,
FORGIVE THE TRESPASS OF THE SERVANTS OF THE GOD
OF THY FATHER. AND JOSEPH WEPT WHEN THEY SPAKE UNTO HIM. l8. AND HIS BRETHREN ALSO WENT AND FELL DOWN BEFORE HIS FACE: AND THEY
SAID, BEHOLD, WE BE THY SERVANTS.
19. AND JOSEPH SAID UNTO
THEM,
FEAR NOT: FOR AM I IN THE PLACE OF GOD?
20. BUT AS FOR YOU, YE THOUGHT EVIL AGAINST
ME;
BUT GOD MEANT IT UNTO
GOOD, TO BRING TO PASS,
AS IT IS THIS DAY, TO SAVE MUCH PEOPLE ALIVE.
The
word which
has been translated forgive in Verse Seventeen is

and which was referred to
again
the
word which mentary.

whole.
had been translated lift,

appearance
in the last
com as a
Its final
in the text
represents a comment on the
book
The New
Way has
been
represented as a
way
of compromise
a com
which
promise
between God's
original aspirations own
for his
creation and the
way
men would
have taken left to their

spoken of
devices.
This understanding
the New
The forgiveness
in Verse Seventeen is further defined in Verse

plan to good. of
of
Twenty
divine
which
in terms
of
God's converting the bad
providence
is
perhaps the clearest
way
the lowest desires of men are set within proper

of purpose. of man
stating bounds
Way,
within
and endowed with

Hobbes'
nobility standing
The New
Way
must
be distinguished from
under solid
by
that nobility, which
Hobbes believed deleterious to the

pagan
ity
of the
lowest,
and
it
must
be distinguished from
the
practices,
used
which pre
suppose that the chaotic waters within of mankind of nor
human
soul can
be
for the benefit

circumcision,
their natural state.
Therefore
pagans
do
not practice
do they
understand
the rise
of art
to be painful.
21. NOW THEREFORE FEAR YE NOT: I WILL NOURISH
YOU, AND YOUR LITTLE
ONES. AND HE COMFORTED

22. AND JOSEPH DWELT IN
THEM,
AND SPAKE KINDLY UNTO THEM.
EGYPT, HE,
AND HIS FATHER'S HOUSE: AND JOSEPH
LIVED AN HUNDRED AND TEN YEARS.
While Joseph's Joseph himself fell
words
in Verse Twenty-one
seem to represent not
short of
those expectations. He did
live
God's position, full life of one
191
The Lion
and
the
Ass
hundred
most
and twenty years but died at the age of one hundred and ten, as will his famous offspring, Joshua (Josh. 2:8). As was indicated in the last chapter, these labors will ultimately fall on the shoulders of Judah.
23. AND JOSEPH SAW EPHRAIM'S CHILDREN OF THE THIRD GENERATION: THE
CHILDREN ALSO OF MACHIR THE SON OF MANASSEH WERE BROUGHT UP UPON

JOSEPH'S KNEES.
Joseph's
ther of
joy
at
the birth
of
Machir is intended to be ironic. Machir
was
the
fa
Zelophehad,
the man who had three daughters but no sons. The the
sons of
Machir
as a whole were
innocent
cause of
the decision to extend Israel's bor

9:15).
ders beyond the Jordan (see commentary to Gen.

BRETHREN,
I DIE: AND GOD WILL SURELY VISIT
YOU,
TO
AND BRING YOU OUT OF THIS LAND UNTO THE LAND WHICH HE SWARE
ABRAHAM, TO ISAAC. AND TO JACOB. SAYING, GOD

WILL
25. AND JOSEPH TOOK AN OATH OF THE CHILDREN OF ISRAEL,
SURELY VISIT 26. SO JOSEPH EMBALMED
YOU,
AND YE SHALL CARRY UP MY BONES FROM HENCE.
DIED, HIM,
BEING AN HUNDRED AND TEN YEARS
OLD;
AND THEY
AND HE WAS PUT IN A COFFIN IN EGYPT.
The last two

And
the
verses of
the Book of Joshua read:
they in
bones of Joseph, which the Children of Israel brought up out of Egypt, buried Shechem, in a parcel of ground which Jacob bought of the sons of Hamor
of Shechem, for an hundred pieces of silver: and it became the inheritance And Eleazar the son of Aaron died; and they buried him
.
the father
of the children of Joseph

in
a
hill
that pertained to
Phinehas his
son, which was given
him in Mount Ephraim.
(Josh. 24:32,33)
In these
verses
Joseph's last
request was
fulfilled, but his burial

and
spot was
the
city of Shechem, the place in which himself came so near to being killed
Levi had killed Hamor
in
which
Joseph
by
his brothers.
EPILOGUE
Under the
oak at
Allon-bachuth Rebekah's
nurse
lies;
come,
let
us wake
her.
There is
it? Have you not up in Dan to be torn down. Who built Philistine and plant the vanquish came to Hegel heard that one day genera fourth and third the even to their banner in the sea? We, their children, their ban all. But now tion, lulled to sleep by the baubles of progress, believed modern myth is dead. ner is sunk; once again the sea rages around us, and the
still an altar
the sons of
Science, they
and
said, can make the earth grass grass,
but there
came
forth
weeds
mushrooms.
192
Interpretation
no man prays at
Today
the altar of progress, but its ghost still

nothingness remains. expectation of
reigns over
the
land. We believed
A farmer
hung
only himself on the
all. and
plenty
and a world on
the
hope
of
eternal peace.
A disappointed
generation runs right east
through the lands of the wild ass,
spoiling it
as
they
go.
They
did
to leave the cities of the plain, now called megalopolis.
but they wandered city. The serpent's

pent, can
we not
in
search of
Eden,
our
no place
for him
who
has known the kill the

ser
curse can still
be
blessing. If
science cannot
bruise its head?

that
The laden
modern spies tell us
God is dead. But caring
not
for the dumb beast

could
with
not see the
spicery lion.
and
balm
and myrrh who guarded over
His body, they
Justice
and
Philosophy
of a
in Plato's Republic:
The Nature
Definition
Kent Moors
Duquesne
University
Socrates'
approach to
justice in Plato's Republic
continues to attract comment
in twentieth-century Platonic scholarship. Justice, during the course of the dia logue, is applied both to political concerns and to the condition of the individual. In the first instance, the definition of justice is extracted from a discussion which
considers applied
the proper ordering of
a city.
In the
second
instance,
have
the
definition is
the paral
to the order of the soul.
Several
commentators
noted that
lelism between city
and soul seems to
to conclude, on various
break down in the dialogue, leading some that there exists a basic grounds, inconsistency between justice in the dialogue.
analysis that this
collective and personal conceptions of
It
will
be
advanced
deliberate
and
intentional
manner of argument
inconsistency may be a Plato. There is little doubt, owing to the in the Republic, that Plato could well have constructed a
statement
in the
following by
more effective connection

soul.1
between the justice

is
not
of
the city and the justice

would
of
the
That
such an approach
forthcoming, I
suggest, is due to the the
essential objective of
the discussion of justice in the dialogue

of political conceptions of
indication
of
the basic
insufficiency
justice,
and,
further,
the abso
lute necessity of individual order as the most important concern of life. At the foundation of this objective is the important distinction between opinion and ap pearance on the one hand, and knowledge and truth on the other. This distinction
permeates the
Republic.
This is certainly not intended to demean or discount the political themes of the Republic. Unquestionably, the political occupies an important and pivotal posi
tion in the ever, the Republic stands as Plato's
politics.2
dialogue. Rather than constituting a revision fullest commentary

Whereas the Politicus
and
erly study
An
existing politics, how how one should prop the Laws confront matters of
of on
expanded version of
this paper was presented at the Annual
Meeting of the
American Political
Science Association, Washington, 1980. An earlier version had been presented at the Annual Confer ence of the British Study Group in Greek Political Thought, London School of Economics and Politi
cal
Science,
1
.
1978.
All translations
are
mine, with line numbers referring to the Burnet

Republic,"
Oxford Texts. in G. Vlastos,
The
most persuasive attempt
to reconcile the two applications of justice is found
"Justice
and
Psychic
Harmony in
cially pp. 5 19f. ). See also Platonos (Athens, 1970: Bibliotheke Sophias N. Saripolou
tablished
Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), 505-21 (espe K. J. Vouveris, Psuche kai politeia: Ereuna ati politikes philosophias tou
the
7).
Vlastos
considers
the
relationship
es
Plato between justice in the city and justice in the individual to be one of equivocation (op. cit., 517). It is precisely this absence of a precise identity which this paper will suggest consti tutes a deliberate teaching on the part of Plato. To amend the argument, so as to remove the equivoca
by
tion, is
2.
equivalent to discounting the very point which Plato See K. Moors. "Plato's Republic on the Study of
wishes
to make.
2
Politics,"
Polis 2,
(1979),
igf.
194
Interpretation
legislation in
some
practical political rule and
detail,
the Republic is
attention
curiously
to politics
Socrates'
lacking
may
praised,
in
such
discussion. Of course, the
results of
well provide all and
manner of standard
by
which actual politics
may be ap
not
the Republic may also provide bases

of
for
actual political revision.
The basic intention
the
political
dimensions
of
the
dialogue, however, is
provides
focused
of
upon such appraisals or revisions.
The Republic deserves the distinction

the necessary
being
the first
work
in
political
conditions which a pursuit of
philosophy because it knowledge about politics

construction of an
requires.
Those
condi
tions do not flow merely
from the
idealized
polis.
The
position of ]ustice
in the Republic
between
owes
its
significance addressed
to the intermedi
the
ary location of the concept held standards of opinion in

philosophic
concerns
by
collectively
a political system and concerns addressed
by
the
life. I
shall contend
that it is the latter which provides the most
im
of
portant and most essential realm of concern
for Plato in the Republic. Part I Socrates
this paper considers the

tice of
demands
placed upon
by
the arguments on
jus
Glaucon
and
Adeimantus
at
the outset of Book 2. Since dialogue
is
collec
tive
discussion,
and since considerations of subject
treatment and argument are

some need
advanced
by
participants other
than
Socrates,
is
we
have
to
consider
first the
point of
in discussion from
speech
which
Socrates departs. Part II

constructed
will consider
the
function
the city in
which
in the dialogue,
and which
comprises
the groundsel of the political themes in the dialogue. Part III will ad
dress
and
the relationships
between the two
applications of justice
to soul. Part IV
will advance
the position
held
by
philosophic
in Book 4 to city investigation

will suggest
in the understanding
some of
of the
dialogue's
approach
to justice. Part V
the significant dimensions which the concern for

opinion and
justice in the Republic
has for the basic distinction between
knowledge.
I
The
achus
approaches to
justice
provided
by Cephalus, Polemarchus,
types of actions are to
and
Thrasym
in Book
should
1 are all projected as personal opinions about what
justice is, how

just.
justice
tion.'
be regarded,
responses
and what
be
considered
The Socratic In
each
to each comprise fine examples
of elenchus
in
opera
case, Socrates has as his primary objective the identification of in in the position held by his interlocutor. If justice is to be understood consistency adequately, the definition arrived at should contain nothing lacking of the es
sence of the
concept,
the
and should
be
applied
successfully
nature of
to all situations within
3.
Elenchus is
foundation
of
the
"questioning"
Platonic dialogue. Through
elen
chus, the capabilities of

cause one must
interlocutors
are tested.
Elenchus is
propaedeutic to the pursuit of truth opinion.
be
and
first be
aware of the
limited
vision provided
by
See Theaet. I55c8-d},
Rep.
and
47564.
This
method
Socrates'
undoubtedly
contributed to
unpopularity.
See Apol. 20b9-e2.
22e6-23a3;
cf.
Rep. 539b2-7.
195
which
Justice
and
Philosophy
considered.
in Plato's Republic
justice is to be
ognition of
inconsistency
difficulties
in
of whatever
are
Elenchus has as its primary objective the rec held opinion, but it is not, by itself, the resolution uncovered. lamentations at the conclusion
a
Socrates'
ci-3) indicate that he considers the discussants no closer justice than they had been at the beginning of the discussion. Throughout Book 1 we do not hear what Socrates thinks is justice. Rather, we
of
the book
(354b4-8,
to understanding
are provided with
three other
of
individuals
who provide
their personal opinions on
the subject.
Each
these opinions is based upon what is experienced in life. De
spite the character of the

what
Socratic
responses to these
of
opinions,4
relating justice to
is
seen comprises the situation
tenor of all
Book
This
and
is
dramatically
altered at the outset of
Book
2.
There, Glaucon
of
Adeimantus,
require
a
unlike
the tenor of Book
1,
present conceptions
justice
as
which
full
of
and concerted
rejoinder
as
by
Socrates.'
Each
presents
forceful
as
defense
a
injustice
of justice
over
justice
he can, thereby
response
hoping
to occasion
forceful
defense
by
Socrates in
(358d3-6,
367a8-b2).
In
as
each
case, the argument which is presented is not viewed

the correct
one.6
being
Rather,
and
each argument
is
viewed as
by the interlocutor being most fitted

basic
to
compel
Socrates to
present
his definition
of
justice. In
the course of these argu

several
considera
ments,
however, Glaucon
some of
Adeimantus introduce
tions which will comprise major elements throughout the remainder of the dia
logue,
pear to
these predicated
argument
upon matters uncovered
in Book Socrates
1.
wishes
Glaucon begins his have
by
questioning
not
whether
persuaded or
truly
to persuade that
by
all means
"to ap it is possible to be
better just than

wishes
unjust"
(357a5-b2). It is
simply
persuasion which
Glaucon
to receive from Socrates in response to the argument he is about to give;

persuasion which
rather, he seeks
is
also true.
of
therefore, the from

what
nature and
dimensions
At the very beginning of Book 2, persuasion have been changed drastically

1
.
had been
viewed of
during
Book
It is
not persuasiveness per se which
is to be the
mined
by
discourse. The adequacy of argument will be deter the degree of truth contained in persuasion. The outset of Glaucon's ar
us
with
"barometer"
gument
provides
distinction between truth (dtkntieg)

will constitute a major element
and
opinion
(doxeiv),
and
that distinction
throughout the re
roots a
mainder of
the dialogue. What Glaucon will present finds
its
in
common be-
opinion,
In
not
in the
opinions
held
by
a particular
individual. It is
dialogue
4.
each case
in Book
Socrates
or
either provides an exception
to the general situation created
by
an opinion of what
justice is
takes issue with the particular argumentative form which an indi
vidual's opinion
has taken. In first book
no case
does the Socratic
rejoinder extend
to the essence or nature of
justice. The
5.
entire
of the
Republic, in
this regard, acts as a grand elenchic exercise.

"Republic"
I have
more
fully
treated the structure and import of these presentations in Glaucon and

2
Adeimantus
1981).
on
Justice: The Structure of Argument in Book
of Plato's
(Washington,
6. See
Glsucon
358a and c6,

.
el, 359b5, 360C5, c8-dl
36ie3, 36234-5, c6, 36264-36332, as, a6-7,
363^5-36431 or
C5-6,
d3-5,
e4, 364ai-b2, 366a6-b2, and 36735-8. In esch of these esses, either to others ss
Adeimsntus
refers
speaking in defense
of
the argument
being
presented.
196
Interpretation
ba
tween common opinion and Socrates on the question of justice which is at the
Thrasymachus'
sis of
Glaucon's
attempt
to reformulate
contention
argument
(358b7~ci),
upon
one which was
directed to the
that injustice should be preferred over
justice (see
343ciff.).
Glaucon's
Gyges'
approach will call the entire

question.
foundation
which common opinion rests rendition of
into
This becomes
manifest
during
his
and
the myth of
ancestor, the
first
myth told
in the Republic,
Socrates.7
the only myth in the dialogue told

myth
by
somebody
capable of
other than
In this
(359c6-36ob2),
nor
the tale
of a
ring
producing
invisibility
an
is told.
Neither justice
presented which
injustice is
referred
to in the myth. There is no other standard

of political
than
the
successful
acquisition
power,
acquisition
is
effected
through
regicide
(360b 1-2).
Gyges'
Equally
present
significant
is
the manner whereby
ancestor
successfully
gains
the throne of Lydia. He succeeds through a basic deception
the ability to
be
in fact but
not
appearing to be so.
By
allowing
one to escape the sensual
standards which comprise the conventions of existence, the myth undercuts the
saliency
appears
of appearance.
The
myth calls
the usage of opinion
into question,
re
quiring that a distinction be made between opinion, and its foundation in what
to
be,
and
true being. The power of the ring is first seen

of
during
an assem
Gyges'
bly
not
(359C2: ovXXoyov)
the shepherds employed
by
the
king,
of which
ancestor
is
one.x
Others
are unanimous
in their
Gyges'
opinion that
ancestor
is
present,
and
they
are wrong.
Such
proceedings, we are
manner of
led to understand,
are
insufficient in
identifying
the proper
distinguishing
between
what
is
true and what is appearance

of appearance).
(or,
more
Opinion itself
as a
precisely in the case of the myth, the lack subject for serious discussion in the dialogue asking whether Socrates believed for itself, another as a good
is introduced here. Glaucon had initiated his

there to be three goods
presentation
by
one regarded as a good
both for itself

arises
and
for
what arises
from it,
and a third seen as a good
for
what
from it
only.
Socrates
agrees
that these goods exist, and. in response

second category.
and
to Glaucon's question, places
justice in the finest
something
which is regarded as a good
both for itself
for
what arises
Not simply as from it,

who
but,
arise
rather, considered to be so "in the

would
sense,"
for
which
"one
is to be
which
blessed in the future from

it"
be
grateful
both for itself
and
for the things
(35831-3; cf. 41939-10, and Gorg. 507c 1). The Glaucon had provided for each of these three categories of good
while a
examples which make clear
that.
distinction is here intended between intrinsic

product whether
and extrinsic worth, which
it is
still
the
transient
or
long-lasting
means of
determines its
whether
some-
value.
Appearance
remains as the
primary
ascertaining
7.
The
other two constructions
Socrates,
of
are the myth of
autochthony
specifically labeled as myths in the Republic, both presented by at the end of Book 3 (4i4b8ff.) and the myth of Er at the end
the shepherd
I
Book 10 (6i4b2ff.). 8. See

359d2-3.
This is
a reflection of
ated
the final portion of
his
argument
in Book
analogy with which Thrasymachus had initi (343bff.). Cf. 4l6a2-6, 44od2-3, and 45^4-9.
197
Justice
good.
and
Philosophy
initial
in Plato's Republic
leads
one to surmise that appearance
thing is
may
not
Socrates'
response
be the
proper standard with which
justice is
to be gauged.
Glaucon, for his

the third
of
part,
indicates
that common opinion usually places
justice in
category
something
which
is
considered
among the
forms (Ei'bovgf
drudgery, done for

avoided as
the sake of wages and reputation, but "for the sake of itself
is
being
arduous"
"what
each
[justice
and
injustice]
he
will
(35836). Glaucon, however, wishes Socrates to tell is and what power it has by itself in the soul,
things arising from
them"
leaving
Glaucon
where
aside the wages and proposes that
demonstrate "what they say justice is

practice
04-7). To that end, and from
[it
"second, that all who is] necessary but not because [it is]
say"
it
comes,"
it do
so against their will
because
that
of
good,"
and
"third,
that it
is reasonable
they should do this, for indeed the just, so they (ci-6).

In the
process of suggests that
then the
life
of the unjust
is better than the life
just acts,
agree not
at
articulating these three dimensions of his argument, Glaucon justice is actually a product of the commission and reception of un least in its political sense. Having suffered injustice, individuals
do injustice
us nor
to
to suffer
injustice (35863-35932). At 35933-4,

parties to the agreement
Glaucon informs
thst this
is the
beginning of the
"set
ting down l3ws and agreements among them, and the naming of that which the law orders as both lawful and This is both the being and the genesis of jus
just."
tice (35).
and
Finally,
at
b4~5
Glaucon
contends that this

such
is "the
nature of
justice,
it is
of
this sort 3nd it naturally results from

occurrence
things."
This is the first

"nature
justice,"
in the dislogue Glaucon's
of the term
of
however,
as
argument makes clear,
qvoig ("nature"). The is produced by
convention
doing
the initial 3greement among individusls to refrain from suffering or injustice, snd the subsequent laws and further agreements established to
ensure that
injustice
not
will
be
neither experienced nor practiced.

wish
Further, justice
,
is practiced,
not able
because individuals
to commit
offers
Glaucon
tended that
justly, but because they are injustice and evade suffering in return (a8-bi b6). a second conception of nature at 359C5-6, where it is con
naturally
pursues a good,
to live
"any
nature
but is distorted force
by law,
through
force, to the honor

justly. Left to their
only because sufficiently
ture is
of the
equal."1"
A basic distinction between law
and nature
is
here introduced. It is law,

own
and not nature, which

men would
by
compels one to act
devices,
to
follow their
natures and attempt to
gain advantage through

men
injustice. It is
not natural
to refrain
from
so
doing, but
are unable
escape
convinced
that
they
can
suffering in return, or at least are not do so, is the original agreement made. If na
whatever answer
presented as
provides must
producing injustice as a good, then take its bearings from an understanding

had been is
used
Socrates
of what
justice
and injus-
9.
10.
The term
injustice
siboc;
for the first time in the dialogue
by
Glaucon
at 357C5.
That is, law
replaces an acceptance of equal treatment

a pursuit of the unequal
for the
more natural
commit
which
to one's own advantage.
propensity to Cf. Aristotle N.E.
H28J3iff., and U30b8flf.
198
Interpretation
tice naturally are. Short of

other conventional
this, Socrates is put in the position of defending an interpretation, but not pursuing the argument to its essential foundations. Unless the essence of justice is contrasted to the essence of injus tice, Socrates cannot succeed in answering Glaucon's position. Such a concern
with essence requires an examination of
the natures of justice and
injustice,
not
an examination of their appearances or results.
Similarly,
ical
with
the two natures presented
in Glaucon's
argument contrast
the polit
the individual. It
is the
nature of justice
in the
political sense
natural
to establish
impediments to the
attempt
commission of unjust
acts,
yet
it is
for individuals to
to gain
advantsge
through
injustice. The
nature of man would pursue ac
tivities at
variance
to the
standards of conduct set
forth
by
law if that
nature could
reasonably
expect
to evade the force of law. The difficulties of applying one en
intimated. How compassing definition of justice to both individual and city is ever, Glaucon's demand to Socrates that justice and injustice be viewed with re
gard
to the power each has

of
within
the soul suggests that, for
Glaucon,
a true
understanding
how
each affects
the individual possessing it implies that justice

absent
be
considered as a standard
for individual conduct, justice is
any
reliance upon
the
external coercion of
law
or convention.
which
It is not, therefore,
to two
other
considerations
simple
at
issue. Rather, justice is
applied
and
one addressed to the conduct of the
individual,
the
considering the position of justice in political life. The former is contained in Glaucon's desire to hear Socrates present the relationship between individual
individual
conduct.
order and
The latter is
reflected
by
of
the presence and applica to
tion of convention and
law. Glaucon
makes no attempt
bring
these two con
ceptions within a common rubric.

posited. and
Both dimensions
his
argument are
merely
Socrates, however, owing both

The
presence of
to the structure of Glaucon's argument
to the necessities which that argument puts
forward,
a
must pursue such a con commit unjust acts,
nection.
injustice,
or at
least
desire to
in
the nature of man is prior to the presence of justice in the city, at to Glaucon's
can
argument.
Socrates
cannot respond
by
least according demonstrating how justice
be
made more secure relates
in its
political sense without also
demonstrating
is
how
justice
to the individual soul. Now
Glaucon's
presentation
predicated
upon common ance. of
opinion,
and common opinion operates on opinion and
the basis of appear
The relationship between

reflected most
justice, is
application of a
appearance, especially so in the case in the since political life is basically the city, clearly held foundation of belief. It should come as no sur collectively
of
prise, therefore, that upon completion
Glaucon's
Adeimantus'
and
arguments
Socrates
city in speech. This is not a city in fact, that is, it is not an existing city to which Socrates turns. Such a city would al ready possess and apply preconceived opinions, traditions, and the like. The city
will turn to
the construction of a
presented
in the Republic is
one
completely founded "from the

We
beginning."
By
so
doing, Socrates
stage
can crystallize the positions of opinion and appearance and set the should expect that the
for the
advent of philosophic pursuits.
discussion
199
must
Justice
and
Philosophy
in Plato's Republic
eventually leave the realm of appearance, since Glaucon's essential de mand of Socrates is that he demonstrate the conditions of soul produced jus
by
tice and
ance
injustice,
either.
absent
any
concern
for
advantages or what results
in
appear
from
While Glaucon's
position establishes the regard
held
by
common opinion on
of
the subject of justice,
it is
not complete.
There is little discussion
the founda
tion upon which that regard

presentation are concerns
is
constructed.
Specifically
absent
from Glaucon's
of
for
what the poets tell and the
function
the
gods."
Adeimantus,
presentation.
on
the other
hand, directs his
attention to these points
during
his
Adeimantus
not
initially
seeks
to understand the arguments opposed
to those of
Glaucon
namely, those praised,
which praise
justice
and
blame injustice
(362e3). Justice is
however,
for itself, but for the
good reputations
resulting from it (36331-2). It is a result of opinion (a3) that one who appe3rs to be just (a2-3) will realize advantages. Appearance, therefore remains the stan dard in the introduction to
sdvsntsges arguments
Adeimsntus'
srgument.
It is
not
justice,
nor even the
3ccruing from 3Ctually being just, which constitutes the basis of these in defense of justice. It is the appearance of being just, and the advan
which
tages resulting from such appearance,
is
at
issue.
In justification
Hesiod
snd
approsch, Adeimsntus turns to the poets, specificslly Homer for exsmples of the gods honoring the just (363a8-c2). Ac
of this
cording to the poets, sppsrently, justice is rewsrded by the gods. Unfortunstely, there is snother form of speech concerning justice snd injustice which is spoken
in
private
snd
by
and
the poets
(36365-36431). '2 It
maintains
thst moderation
(ococpgoovvrj)
(a3-4)."
justice
are noble
but arduous,
the
while extrav3gsnce snd
injus
lsw
tice are pleasant and
easily acquired, made shameful only

of speech contends that
most part. unjust
by
opinion and
This form
is
more profitable than
the just
and a
(a5-6), for
the
bad life to many

who are
good men
Further, the gods are seen as giving ill-fortune (b3-4), and the opposite fate (b5: /xolgav) to
second version of
those
opposite.14
In this
gods and
justice there is
no guarantee
that
living
the relationship between the just life will produce any tan-
1 1
where of
The only entrance of the poets into Glaucon's presentation occurs at 36ib7-8 Septem. The gods are introduced Glaucon employs lines 592-94 of
Aeschylus'
and 362a8-bi
at
the very end
Glaucon's
12.
presentation
(at 362CI-8),
of
almost as an afterthought.
and speech and
The juxtaposition
twice
form (eldog)
(Adyov) is
significant.
peared
in Glaucon's
the
argument
(357C5
35835), this
usage
by
While eldog had ap Adeimsntus is the first in the

remainder
"form"
dialogue to
of the
speak of
by
which argument
is
expressed.
Socrates throughout the
discussion
will consider
both the
substance of argument snd the msnner of
its transmission.
13. This is the only appearance of the term aloxQov in either brother s argument. It revises the Glaucon (at 359c5>- There, law, relationship between injustice and law originally advanced by argument, it becomes a matter of through force, compelled a perversion of nature. In
Adeimantus'
shame,
rather than
force,
which
does
so.
This shame,
being
a result of
law
and opinion,
is likewise
product of
both
convention and appearance.

portion"
in earlier literature, a usage also found in Plato. properly meant "one's See Critias I2ia9; Crat. 398bio; Prot. 32233; Soph. 235C4; Tim. 35b5, 73d!; Phaedr. 250d7; Charm. I55d7 (quoting Cydias); Phileb. 5387; Epin. 98536; Rep. 474di, and 533e8.
14.
Moiga
more
200
gible
Interpretation
benefits. In
fact,
Adeimantus'
rendition
of a man's
even choose
to take cognizance
one who
clearly implies that the gods may goodness and still give him a bad life disposition may yet be blessed by being just nor appearing to
and
in
return.
Similarly,
is
not good
by
the gods with honor and advantage. Neither actually
be just
As
will produce a
better life
with certainty.
a result of this second approach
in speech, both Hesiod
Homer
are em
ployed to
the gods
indicate the ability of one to do unjust acts and evade punishment from (c7-e2). The deficiency of the poetic counsel on the subject of justice is
graphically indicated
here, for
the
the same poets are utilized as proof of two contra

second
dictory indicating
propositions
that the gods
first claiming that the gods reward the just; the can be deceived by those who commit injustice.
what
Noting
(a7:
cf.
this confusion, Adeimantus asks the young
this does to the souls (36536: xpvxdg) of

who
hearing
such
things, specifically the young
have fine
nstures
evcpveig) and sre csp3ble of
determining
how to follow the best life (365b!;

Adeimsntus'
496s9f., snd 6i2e8-6i3bi).
It is
not s concern with nsture effect
generally
which occupies
atten-
tion, but the
produced
upon
those with
fine
nstures.
Socrates is
now
obliged to present the psth to
be tsken for the introduction
3nd consideration of
the proper ordering of those with philosophic capability. It
is
not
surprising,
therefore, that,
tion
of
when
Socrates
attempts to move the

reflection of
discussion from
a considera
the city in speech and
its
the order of the soul to a considera the disorder of the
tion of
degenerate
will
regimes snd their consequent reflections of who chsllenges
soul, it
be Adeimsntus
Socrstes to
present a
"whole form
cf.
of
argument"
he had intended to
keep
from the interlocutors (449C7-8; Adeimantus

places
Glaucon
Soc
at 543C7f-)-
During
rates on
the course of his presentation,
demands
upon
four occasions,
although the essence of each
demand does
not constitute requests that

evil a
a separate requirement
in
argument
in
each case.
At 36665-9, he
good."
justice
and
injustice be
portrayed
"in speech,
[so]
that one is the greatest
have in itself, while justice is the greatest Adeimantus contin ues, "for if this had been spoken by all of you from the beginning and had you persuaded us from youth, we should not guard against each other so that injustice
soul could would not
injustice, he
mand
be done, but each would himself be his best guard, lest fearing doing might be dwelling with the greatest (cf. 503b5). Glaucon's de
evil"
has thus been

a
revised.
It is
now
incumbent
of
upon
that
justice is
good, but that it is the greatest good. The
Socrates to indicate, not further allusion to each

reflected
individual
of
being
his
own
best
guard
will,
course, be
Socrates'
both in the
rise
the guardians the
in the city in arising
speech and
in
final,
and powerful, coun
sel on
subject
during
of
the myth
of
Er in Book
10.
There (6i8b6f.)
we are advised
that the pursuit
the soul's order is the greatest necessity
during
life,
to
be
pursued to the exclusion of all else
if
such
be
required.
that justice
At 367b2-5, Adeimantus demands that Socrates "not only prove by speech is stronger than injustice, but what each itself does to the one hav-
by
201
Justice
and
Philosophy
in
Plato'
Republic
is
good."
ing it,
cient
on account of which one
is evil,
while the other
It is
not suffi
Socrates indicate in discourse why justice is to be preferred to injustice. Socrates must likewise indicate the essential justification for such a position,
that
given
the
relationship between the

it."15
possession of either and the condition of the
individual possessing
At 367d2-5, Adeimantus demands that Socrates

tage
praise
justice in
what advan what
justice itself has to the

that
at
one
having it,
at
and to
blame injustice for for
harm it
(cf.
does, but
Glaucon
Socrates leave
and
aside wages and opinions
others to praise
35836-7,
Socrates
speech
6i2a8-b2). The
requirement that
justice
be
of
praised and
defended in
by
Socrates is
also now extended to a
defense
life is
to be
deeds. Not deeds alone, but the very manner in which Socrates has lived his now at issue (d8-ei ). Whatever advantage is to emerge from justice is not
one of common opinion or
utility, but
one of
direct
and personal
benefit to
the one possessing justice.
Finally,
ously
at
36761-5, Adeimantus
raises
his last demand. This is substantially

make no or
the same demand as that voiced at 367b2-5, with one addition, itself one previ
mentioned
or evil exhibited
man or not
by Adeimantus it is to by the presence of justice

Appearance,
of
difference
whether
the good
gods and
injustice is
recognized
by
(cf.
366e6-7).
with which and the
Adeimantus had initiated his

of
consideration of relied upon
the praising
justice
blaming
injustice is Glaucon
not
to be
in
Socrates'
rejoinder.
Now
we
have
given some attention to the arguments of
and
Adei
mantus at
the outset of Book 2 in the Republic to indicate a basic dimension of
what will occur
later in the dialogue. Rather

arguments
than merely
being
personal opinions
about what
justice is, these two
have
orchestrated a
lenge to Socrates
what
one which requires that

appearance
Socrates
extend
compelling chal discussion beyond

of
opinion
and
generally
to
provide
on
the
subject
justice. do is
Socrates is
so
asked
to defend
justice,
in
justify its
the
essential
superiority, and to
and
along lines
which are
introduced into discussion

which
by
Glaucon
Adeimantus,
will unfold
not
by
Socrates."1
The
manner
body
of the
dialogue
dictated both
upon
Socrates
by the structures of these arguments and by by Glaucon and Adeimantus. In the process,
political and
the demands placed
plied and
to both the
the individual. It
is
manifest
justice has been ap from what Glaucon indica
Adeimantus have presented, however, that
each considers the truest
tion of what justice
is,
and
the
most soul.
the
condition of
the individual
correct portrayal of its nature, to be found in It is important to recognize that, when Soc
rates sets about
the task of responding to these arguments,

the political and to the
he is
obliged
to relate
of
justice both to
individual, but it is
Platoni,"
the
expectation
Archeion philosophias See A. A. Krystallis, "Diksiosune kai dikaia psuche psra "Glsucon's C. snd Kirwan, kai theorias ton epistemon 8 0937). 147-84, 338-62;
15.
Chsllenge,"
Phronesis 10(1965),
16. 12.
162-73.
uncommon
This is far from
in the dialogues. See Moors, Glaucon
and
Adeimantus, 48,
n.
202
Glaucon
Interpretation
and
Adeimantus that the
most correct not
understanding
of
justice is to be
found in its relationship to the soul, rely

upon opinion and
Adeimantus'
to the city. That understanding cannot

must concern
appearance, but
itself ultimately
cannot
with es
sence. course cause
Further,
such
as
presentation makes
clear, one
have
re
to tradition, especially as that tradition is presented through poetry,

tradition reflects
be
only the
confusion
with
which and
justice has been

Socrates
will pro
regarded. vide
political existence requires such a
tradition,
one, altering the dimensions and objectives of poetry

not sufficient
in the
process.
By
it
self, however, this is
to answer the demands placed upon
him.
Whatever
approach
to justice he
espouses must present an essential
justification found in the
for the
coincidence of
justice
and
goodness, a coincidence which is
soul without
the sensual appearance necessary in the city.
II
In
response
to
all of
speech.
The initial
a
reason
this, Socrates sets about the task of constructing a city in it would be easier to locate is provided at 368d2f.
an
justice in
city,
since
it is larger than
individual. This is
realized,
of one
will
not meant
to
imply,
however,
as
that
justice in the city,

soul.
when a
finally
justice in the
There is to be
likeness
be exactly the same to the other, but it is to be a

are to enter
provisional one.
As Socrates
suggests at
36932-3, the interlocutors
tain such a likeness. The city, from its
inception, is
dimensions
to be regarded as s grand
of certsin concerns which
heuristic device,
will
one which estsblishes the
son
eventuslly be considered at the level of the individual. This is the basic rea for the city's introduction. In the course of sketching this city, much will be discussed
which
presented and
hss
direct
besring
upon politicsl
life,
snd
the
definition
snd
of justice which
is ultimstely
provided
for the
political will,
if believed
these
practiced, provide an ordering of the politicsl.

politicsl at
Nonetheless, despite
be the final
and
import3nt considerations, justice in

Socrates'
life
csnnot
conclusion to-
wsrds which
snslysis
proceeds,
least
not as the
objective of that
analysis.
The truest
conception of
justice,
which
Glaucon
Adeimantus have
not pro and the
demanded,
ceed
concerns
the soul and the conduct of

concern with
from
primary
individual life; it does politics, collectively held opinion,
world of appearance.
have already observed, the presentation of the nature which political justice exhibits and its relationship to common opinion, as put forth by Glaucon,
we require
As
that
Socrates turn
initially
and political recourse
life further requires,
very however, that Socrates
to the city. This
coincidence of opinion
construct a a
city
without
to existing political
systems.17
By fashioning
"degenerate"
ning, the
17.
discussion completely
not until
controls what opinions are
city from the begin to arise and how they

Socrates turns to
regime. sn
It is
Book 8,
snd the
discussion
cslled
of
regimes, thst
Laconian"
existing
politicsl system.
Timocracy
is
"the Cretan
and
(544C3)
203
are
Justice
and
Philosophy
in Plato's Republic
a
to be regarded and applied. Such an approach would be quite impossible in

since such opinions would
upon which
factual city,
opinion
base
this
city in
speech
already be present. By constructing the is to operate, the discussants are

opinion.
made aware of pects of sesses
the
that nature
a
radically conventional nature of become more apparent. The force
The defective usually
as
which opinion
pos
in
city, therefore, is
decisively
undercut
in dialogue.
Despite the
one which sented
by
claim often advanced that the city of the dislogue is meant to be is realizable, a city which is to be instituted, and, therefore, is pre Socrates as a blueprint for political Socrates indicates on nu
reform,18
merous occasions
that the city's possibility is quite
unlikely.19
It is
meant
to be
city in speech, made from the beginning and taking its bearings from the needs of the discussion (369C9-10). As Glaucon is made to understand at
a
592aio-bi, it is
city
made
in speeches, is
of
not one which

created a
is to
exist on
earth.20
This is
a theoretical
city,
whose rationale
by
the direction and require
ments of conversation.
It is also,
course,
theoretical construct which may
have
some quite
important bearings
upon actual political
life. The necessity

occasioned
of
its
entrance
into the dialogue, however, is institutions

or political
not one which speaks of
the need to re
vise actual city's
life. Through the discussion
by
the
founding, Socrates
dimensions
produces an awareness
essential soul
of collective
among his interlocutors of the life, but it remains the order of the individual
towards which discussion
is directed.
It is the
Since the city is
predicted upon the needs of the
eral revisions as the
dialogue
proceeds.
groundsel of
discussion, it undergoes sev discussion, provid

needs"
ing
a continuous
can
backdrop,
reflected.
a grand appearance, against which the elements of
discussion
be
We have the
genesis
luxuries"
"city
of staple
presented
by
Socrates
at 369b5f.
owing its
to necessity (b7:
transformed
such
by
into the "city of by Glaucon at medicine (di-2) introduce These luxuries Socrates at e3.
concerns not
That city is 372d7-ei, identified as

and warfare
and
vdt)g).2i
(373e2),
the
found in the
original city.
The necessity
of
fashioning
educating
a guardian class transforms
the city into a
camp,
"city
of
the armed
au-
conclusion of which
does
not arise until
the implications of the myth of
18.
and
See, for
example, W.
the Older Academy, Rep.
Fite, The Platonic Legend (New York, 1934), 37-38; E. Zeller, Plato Ed., trans. S. F. Alleyne and A. Goodwin (New York, 1962), 483; M.
Magnesis,"
Davis. "On
the Imputed Possibilities of Callipolis and
(1964),
397; A. E.
Taylor, Plato: The Man

Republic,"
and
his Work (New
York,
American Journal of Philology 85 1957)- 281; and M. Ostwald,

ed.
"The Two Stages in Plato's
in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy,
J. P. Anton
and
G. L. Kustes (Albany, 1971),

19.
with
316-27.
E.g.,
376d9-io; cf. 4i4b8-c2 and 459c8-d2 with 485C3-4; cf.

466d6-8.
and
450C8-9
and
54odi-3
485bl-4,
472C4-d2; 473ai-7;
499d3~4:
cf.
48saiO-b3
with
5i9c8-d9; 497&I-7;
499an-l4 (cf. cs: bi rvyjig with 20. Socrates responds that it is himself
what
a paradigm
592al0-b5. tJ Movaa nokeiog); 54005-54134; and for the one who wishes to see it, and to found within whether
he sees, but it
himself
makes no
difference
this
it
exists or will exist somewhere. of no other
For
one
would concern
21
of
four
by itself, snd Socrates originslly offers "the most bsrely sufficient or five persons, however, is immedistely expsnded.
with whst
is
of
city
(592b2-5).
calls
city,'
3s
he
it
st 369di 1
This city
204
Interpretation
3."
tochthony
waves of
are presented at
the end of Book

of
Book 4 (4i9ai-434ci0): the "city
arises in The "city of in Book 5 (comprising the "three

degeneration"
virtue"
45ib9-474C3).23
The
"city
of
arises
in
Books 8
9 (comprising What possibility for the

and
the
four "degenerate
regimes").
city's existence entertained
in the dialogue is the
re
sult of
the
position which
existence apart owes
the city holds in the discussion itself. The city has no from the discussion. It is completely a creature of discussion and
wholly to the forum in which it is presented. The primary focus throughout the development of the city in speech is the basic ob that is, the function it serves in making known, jective which the city presents its
existence
in
speech
in terms
cerned.
of
appearance, the presence of concepts with which Socrates is con

objective
That
is
initially
cast
in
a regard
for
what
is
required
for the
city's material existence mental reflection
what, in other words, provides for the most terms of the city, its survival. As the
rationale of
funda
con
in
physical
dialogue
tinues, however,
ries"
so also
does the for

a
the city develop. The

a purification of
"city
of
luxu
introduces the
need
purging
or
the city.
That is
accomplished almost an
individual
citizen.
exclusively While the

the
through a
long
purging discussion of poetry, music, metre,

attentions throughout
or purification of
the soul of
and
discussants'
rhythm which occupies occasioned earlier
Books
2 and
3 is
This
by
the position poetic authority holds
in the
argument of
Adeimantus
in Book 2, its
conclusions address the proper conditions of the soul.
is
seen most
both
gentle
clearly in the dual nature possessed by the guardians they must be and spirited (375C6-8). They are to possess moderation and courage.
as
Additionally,
ful
at
Socrates
suggests at
375e9-
1 1
those who are to be most

of
skill
guarding
must also
be
philosophic
in nature, that is, lovers definition

reason of justice.
wisdom.24
Very
which,
early in the discussion in Book 4. will produce

courage,
of the guardians are posited the three virtues
Socrates'
moderation,
wisdom,
and
more
the
The positioning of for their discussion jus

the ob
of
tice
will
be further
revised.
Of
than passing
interest, however, is
in the
each
servation
that each of these four concerns

and
had
appeared
arguments
Glaucon had been Socrates
Adeimantus
at
the outset
at
of
Book
2.
In
instance,
in
the concern
incorrectly
applied
least to be
4.
considered so with respect to appears once,
how
will position
them
in Book
Wisdom
Adeimantus'
presentation, at 36sd4 (oocptav). It
is there
used to speak of the
"wisdom"
that
teachers of persuasion can convey. It is the wisdom of the public assemblies and
courts, and
it
will
be
employed to practice
injustice
without
Courage
appears once
in Glaucon's presentation,
is
at 361
b4
paying the (dvdoEi'av).
penalty.
while
its
22.
proper
While
term
initially
the entire warrior class
called the class of
guardians, gusrdisn becomes the

-6.
for
ruler snd
suxilisry the
proper
term
for
warrior at 414b!
23.
24.
See475b7f.
Philosophers
and
Kayser
are specifically identified as the most precise K. Moors, "ukribe logon, akribologei, akribestatos.
guardians at
m_Politeia
50354-5
See J. R.
503b,"
34oe-^4ib,
Apeiron 8 (1974),
31-32.
205
Justice
and
Philosophy
in
in Plato's Republic
argument, at 366d2
privative appears once
Adeimantus'
(ctvavdgiac) It is
.
the courage of the

which
perfectly
unjust man, while
who nonetheless appears to
be just.
is discussed
the causes of men

tice.
by Glaucon, being unable

once,
Adeimantus
suggests cowardice as one of
to commit
injustice
and,
,
Moderation
it
with
occurs
at 36432
( ococpgoovvt])
where
therefore, praising jus Adeimantus asso

are
ciates
justice in
introducing
These
the
those
who claim that are
both
difficult,
while
their opposites are easy.

onstrate
same
individuals
those who proceed to dem

punishment.
of
how had
one can
be
unjust and yet still avoid
divine
Justice,
of
course,
provided
foundation for
the
Adeimantus'
entirety
Glaucon's
and
presentations, and, as those presentations sought to

not
demonstrate, is
to be preferred to
desire to
tues
injustice. Both Glaucon snd Adeimsntus hsd expressed s hear what justice and injustice were in the soul. The coincidence of vir
applied
being
incorrectly
and
the
development
of
the condition of the soul
which
will
is to be preferred,
to proper
however, has
placed obligations upon
Socrates
which
require the expansion of
proper regard
discussion beyond justice knowledge.
to order, and
beyond
The
entire
treatment of education and poetry in the

position of common opinion
of
dialogue is
made
necessary
argument.
by
prevailing specific discussion Justice

polis or
the
in Glaucon's
argument, and the
the poetic portrayal
of
the gods in
Adeimantus'
cannot
be located, however, if the understanding of order, be it of the of the soul, is not likewise considered. While the discussion of education
is
seen as required
by
the
discussants'
desires to
understand the nature of
justice
(367C7-d5), it is actually
ment of poetry.
the condition of the soul, rather than the condition of
the city, which constitutes the
basic theme throughout

the argument
which
Socrates'
rather
long treat
The
gravamen of
Socrates is suggesting here
is
advanced at 403d2-4:
it is
not a
favorable
makes a soul good.
Rather,
a good soul
body which, through its virtue, provides a body with its own virtue, thus
for
a concerted attempt
making it as good as it can be. The city in speech is meant to
set
the stage
to under
stand the order required of the soul.
As it is
not
the
human
body
which
is to de
termine the relationship of virtue to individual conduct,

ward structure
so also
is it
not the out
if
you
will, the
body
is
speech
of the
not
city
which
is to
produce
the
presence of virtue. pearance.
Nature,
of
or essence,
The function
presented a
the city in
accurately reflected by outward ap in the Republic testifies to this. What
is
initially
in terms
of material counsel
formed into
device intended to
necessity becomes progressively trans inward ordering. The "city of in
Book 4 is designed to introduce the functions of the four virtues within the soul. In point of fact, however, the relationship between these virtues and the soul has
already been introduced throughout the "city of the armed discussion of education and poetry. When we have reached the final
the city in
speech
camp"
during
the
of
"version"
the
degeneration,"
"city
of
we are provided with
four inferior
regimes, each presented, not in terms of

of
its
political
structure, nor even in terms
its
conception of political
justice, but in
terms of how each regime reflects a
206
Interpretation
corresponding, and
inferior, ordering
and 590C8L).
of
the soul (see 544e4f.; cf. 575c8-di,
58oc9-di, 581C3-4,
Despite the
radical purification of political of and even with
life
which
the
of
city in
speech exhib
its in the
"city
the introduction
the philosopher in the
paradox,"
"city
of
it remains,
as with all cities, a conventional appearance.

put
The be
ultimate answers
to the themes
forward
by
Glaucon
and
Adeimantus
must
found
The city crystallizes the positions of appearance and opinion, but must, eventually, be transcended. So long as the correct definition of justice is pursued in a transient and superficial way, as one must in the political, it will
elsewhere.
escape
the hunt. The Republic
will provide an approach
to
justice
which will
be
adequate
for
political
life. That
political application of of
justice, however,
will not
prove sufficient more
for
a correct
understanding
the concept. For that purpose, a
introverted,
and
philosophical,
approach
is
required.
Ill
Book 4 begins
regimen and entation of with
life-style had been

myth of
Adeimantus suggesting that the guardians, whose outlined in the discussion subsequent to the
strict pres
the
happy
they
(41932-3).
autochthony at the end of Book 3 (4i6d3-4i7b8), are not They do not enjoy anything good from the city (a4~5);
namely, material goods and riches.

are not
Socrates
responds
that, in
founding
the city,
seeking the
the
whole
sible, that
of
fairly founded,
ness.
special happiness of any one part, but, to the extent pos city (b6-8). As Socrates adds at 421C4-7, if the city is they must allow nature to give to each part its portion of happi
The judged
question of as
happiness is
advanced again at 427d3~7. now
The city is
now
justice
necessary be found in that city, how they differ from one an other, and why it is that the man who is going to be happy possess justice, irre spective of whether or not gods and men see it. Socrates suggests that the city, if
and
having
been founded (c6-di). It is

are to
to ascertain where
injustice
it has been rightly founded, is completely courageous, moderate, and just (eio-11: ".
. . .
good
.
(e6-7). It
. . .
is, therefore,
.
wise,
dixai'a"). The identification

of education
of
oocpr] "complete Socrates Since

that
dvdgEia
with
ocbcpgcov
goodness"
the presence of
the four virtues had been
intimated
by
on several occasions
during
the
discussion into
as a
in Books
2 and 3.
discussion had been
entered
necessary
component of the
discussants'
desires
to understand the na
ture of
justice,
and since the presence of such
virtues,
or at
least the disposition

conception of good
of
toward them, had
been
seen as a
(see 409c3-e2),
development.25
such an
necessary identification is consistent
element
in the
with
the flow
dialogical
25 See, for example, J. R. Workman, The Evolution and Meaning of agathos in the Philosophy of Plato (diss. Princeton -University, 1940); L. Quattrocchi, L'idea di Bello ne! Pensiero de Platone (Rome, 1953); H. D. Voigtliinder, Die Lust unddas Gute bei Platon (Wurzburg, i960) [diss. Univer-
207
Justice
that,
and
Philosophy
in Plato's Republic first three virtues, justice must be whst re to locate wisdom, courage, and
as
Positing
mains
hsving identified
the city.
the
(427ei3-428a6), Socrates
proceeds
moderation within
Wisdom is found
the
distinguishing
virtue of the
guardians, or rulers, who as a class comprise the

nature
3nd
fewest number of individuals by (42868-42933). Courage is cslled the power 3nd S3fe-keeping of the right lawful opinion concerning whst is terrible (or snd whst is not
"wonderous")
that
(430b2-4).26
class.
It is locsted smong the Finally, moderation is viewed as
soldiers
a certain
(429e8),
kind
is,
the
auxiliary
of order snd self-discipline
over certain
kinds
of plessures snd
desires
(43oe6-7).27
It is locsted throughout
the city, snd produces s
unity
of
its
members
(43232-7).
comicsl pas
beginning"
Justice, however, continues to elude the discusssnts (witness the sage at 432C7-e3). Justice, ss it turns out, wss present "from the
cf. 366ei -2, 36731
,
(d7;
369C9,
and
433ai), but hsd
not
been
recognized.
Justice is
minding
one's own
business
snd not of
becoming
involved in the
which
sffsirs of others
(43338- 9). 28
This definition
justice in the city,

sdds thst
tskes
its depsrture
from
esch
doing
very
that which his nstures mskes him nsturslly fit to do
presented when
provisionslly.
Socrates
it
comes
into
being
in
3 certsin
msnner, is
"minding one's likely to be
(35-6), is own business,

(b3~4). Ini
the
justice"
tially,
this
provisionality
seems the result of two considerations.

cl3ss must exhibit
First, from
st3ndpoint of
the city, e3ch
the proper virtue or virtues in prac
ticing its
correct function within the city. The difficulty of this situstion actually arising is well sttested to by the discussion in Book 3, 3 discussion which culminstes in the necessity of s "fslse being presented 3nd somehow being be
myth"
lieved
by
the citizens (see 4i4b8-d4). This myth is presented
by
Socrates
with
great reluctsnce
(see
4i4c8-d2).
It
concerns 3 m3tter which
hss
not come to psss
in contemporary times, snd could not, slthough the poets hsve happened before (C4-7), snd requires much persussion (C7).
contended thst
it
Secondly,
the definition
of justice
in the city in
of
speech
snd
is
presented provision
slly becsuse the
most essentisl
dimensions
justice,
justice's corresponding
rehtionship to order, c3nnot be sdequstely provided by 3 convention3l enterprise like a city, even the city sketched in the Republic. That region is properly one of
the soul. What can only be
sity
of
reflection with reg3rd
to the city, over

kai he
which
the
Frankfurt,
1959); N.
Bousoulas,
"He demiourgikotes tou
agathou
metapsusike
tes
Platonikes
meixeos,"
Republique de
26.
Platon,'
Platon 14 (1962), 177-226; snd E. de Strycker, "L'idee du Bien dans la L'Antiquite Classique 39 (1970), 450-67.
This is,
more properly, political
(JioXirixr}v)
courage, as Socrates observes at 430C3.
C. Hoffmeister, Uber den Begriff sophrosune bei Plato (Essen, 1827); O. Knuth, Quaestiones de notione tes sophrosunes Platonica Critica (Halle, Saxony, 1874); J. A. The New Scholasticism 6 (1932), 19-31; snd A. KollMourant, "Plato's Doctrine of
27.
See, for
example,
Temperance,"
Wiener Studien 59 (1941), 12-34. See I. Ogienski, Welches ist der Sinn des Platons ta hautou prattein? (Trzmeszno, 1845); A. W. H. Adkins, "Polupragmosune and 'Minding One's Own Business': A Study in Greek Social and Classic al Philology 7 1 (1976), 301-27; V. Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosune: A Study Political
mann,
28.
Values,"
Politics,"
"Sophrosyne,"
in Greek
Theaet.
18464;
Journal of Hellenic Studies

quatrs ser.
67 (1947),
46-67;
and
W. J. Verdenius, "Rep.
433ae,"
Mnemosyne,
8 (1955), Parm. I37b6; Gorg. 526C4;
193-95and
Cf- Rep. 55ie6, 620C6-7, 434c8, 549C6-7;

l6ldn.
Charm.
208
Interpretation
discussants have image his
founding
be
authority only in speech, may
nonetheless present an
of what should
each
individual's be
concern with respect
to the order of
own soul.
This very
point will
made explicit
by
Socrates
rather
shortly in for the
the discussion.
In
3ddition to
these two observ3tions, there exists snother bssic resson the
provisionsl nsture of
definition,
3nd this relstes to the
very wsy in
3
which
jus
tice
is sddressed, both
which
by
conventionsl undertskings snd
by
the common opinion

consideration
with
those
undert3kings
3re
buttressed. It likewise is
which relates
to the very manner whereby Socrates effects the transition
from
consideration of politicsl
justice to
a consideration of soul
justice. The
essentisl
clesr what
underlying
point which
Socrates is
directions in dislogue, is not whst the just life is. Justice may be addressed in two basic
tutes just
action or what
to, by progressively justice is, but, in s fundsmentsl sense,
drawing
3ttention
ways
either what consti
latter to
which
identifies the just individual may be considered. It is the Socrates is leading his interlocutors. This is precisely what the de
and
mands of we shall not
Glaucon
Adeimantus had
required of
him. The just individual,
as
see, is just because of the internal order which structures his soul;
he is be
just
by
virtue of what
he does. The actions, the

make
outward
appearances,
of
ing just
sult,
do not, themselves,
the individual just.
Rather,
the actions are a re
not a
cause, of justice. That
is,
the extent to which an individual possesses
of
internal ordering is the extent to which he is to be considered just. The projection justice in conduct extends to the manner whereby the individual lives his life also a demand placed upon Socrates by Adeimantus (that Socrates defend
the manner in which he has lived his life). The

a relationship.
just life is
condition,
not
rather
than
It is the
concerted
ordering
a
of
oneself; it is
in
which one relates
to others, although that relatedness is at least
primarily the way implied later

of the soul,
as
by
an
Socrates (443a3f. ). The just life is ordering

which will require
life
animated
by
an
ordering
philosophy,
and as we shall see,
having
its
ulti
mate objectives concerns which cannot
suggest, therefore, that the essential
reason
be adequately stated in speech. I would for the provisionality of the definition

provide as the
is
occasioned
by
what
Socrates intends to
final
statement on the
nature of
justice,
one which will not admit of an adequate expression within
the
confines of nonphilosophical considerations nor within the
limits
of
collectively
power al
held
opinion.
Justice in the city is
viewed
by
Socrates
as
that which provides the
lowing
the other virtues to come

so
into
being
and provides the other virtues with
safekeeping
long
as
it
remains
(433b8-ci).2"
It is both
a product of the other sine qua non
three virtues (since the presence of these virtues the presence of

ent.
in the city is the
for
justice)
and that which allows the other three virtues to
be
pres
The dialogue has
experienced
difficulty
in
locating
justice
within the
city in
29.
Here (433b8), ynovtjoroK ("prudence") is

"wisdom"
employed
instead
"wise"
of
the
(ooq-tj)
of
428e8 or the
(ooqiia)
of 433dS
209
speech
Justice
and
Philosophy
as
in Plato's Republic
suggested st 42766-7, had been com pletely founded. Justice becomes indistinguishable from the order which the city exhibits. The very constructing of this order has been the concomitant develop
ment of
because that city,
Socrstes hsd
justice in the
city.
To
see
justice it is necessary that

virtues
one view the whole
of the
city, not the parts of the city and the

the other virtues can
only
of those parts.
Only by
it is only after isolat identifying other virtues, and the the ing understanding relationship each has to constituent parts of the city, that the whole, both of city and of virtue, can be adequately ex
since
pressed.
justice be uncovered,
Justice, however, is
virtues
also regarded as a match
for
(433d7
and
du)
the other
in
bringing
about the virtue of the city.
the remaining virtues

taken
of
governing its
proper element or elements order
It is not, thus, simply that each of in the city, if

accomplished
by itself,
will produce order.
The
is
from the
condition
the whole, not of
its corresponding
parts
in isolation. Justice is
regarded as
in
competition with
wisdom, courage, and moderation
because it is only in the

to
continue
pres
ence of
justice that the remaining

the city.
virtues are allowed
governing their
of
proper spheres of which
Justice, therefore, is
the
of
the constant mediating virtue
identifies the
correct application of
other virtues.
The demands
jus
per
tice place limitations upon the

spective
directions
the other virtues
deriving
its
from the
order of
the whole city, justice necessarily proscribes the appli

moderation
cation of wisdom,
courage, and
in
a manner which none of these an
virtues can accomplish
individually. There is. however,

perceived as
unsettling
aspect of
this
competition. as
If justice in the city is

a
demanding
certain actions
individuals'
(or,
is
more
likely,
refraining from
certain actions)
reflecting
philosopher-
it may actually appear at cross-purposes with one or more of the re It is for this reason that the later introduction of the maining ruler becomes theoretically necessary. The competition between the city and the
natures,
virtues.
wise,
which
is
not answered
by
the introduction of the philosopher-ruler, merely
explained
addressed
away by later in the dialogue, definition

.
argumentative
fiat,
is
comes
to light. Such
competition will
be
and we shall comment upon

applied
it.
The
political
of justice
to
matters
at 43363-43431
There,
those who rule in the

standard as
city
are
requiring legal attention to decide private disagree
ments, applying the same
that which encompasses the
idea
of
justice
in the city properly belongs to

affairs of others, or greatest ous own
one should possess what

others.
Any
and
of
properly belongs to that person, not what the three classes becoming involved in the between classes, is rightly identified
regarded as
exchanging
such affairs
regarded as
the
damage to the city
is to be
most
the most villain

against
s
(b9-c2). This
condition
is
immediately
as
injustice
application of justice to legal city (c4-5). The in that situation to which justice trates the definition of
situations not
only illus Thra

(see
common opinion most of
ten applies
symachus
it, it
and
slso serves
to
undermine
the
material advantages which
Glaucon
had specifically
associated
with
being
unjust
343d8-344<-"8, and 362b2-7).
210
Interpretation
considered
Further, injustice had been

individual than had justice
far
more
to the private advantage of an
during
Glaucon's
argument
in Book
(36oc8-di).
Now, however,
a third
the private advantage
is
seen as
being justice,
are not an
and
justice is the
in the city
of
result of an ordered whole.
There is,
of
course, the obvious
addition
of
party to adjudicate private contests;

vision of
they
to be left to the vicissi the
tudes of individual conduct. Even

"whole"
here, however,
important dimension
no private
justice is
made manifest.
There is
interest
apart city.
from the
order of
the city. The private
There transpires What is
a radical revision
regarded refer
has been completely absorbed by the in the Republic of the concept of "one's individual order, is
own."
initially
as
the seeking after advantage in material

an
terms,
almost
comes, ultimately, to
to the pursuit of
intense,
erotic, concern with the condition of the soul. It the distinct possibility that anything apart
relegated
a concern which carries with condition of the soul
it
from the
city.10
is to be
to less important realms. Included within the purview of this possibility

and even the
of
is the household, the family,
Having
definition
soul,
ered.
completed the
discussion
justice in the city, Socrates

nor
now
turns to
justice in the individual. It is not, however, justice simply,

of
justice in the "the
city, which
is
addressed
specifically the in the transition from city to

which
but,
form"
rather
(434d3:
to
Eldog)
of
justice
is to be
consid
with regsrd
At 435bi-2, Socrates suggests thst the just msn will be like the just city to the form of justice itself. There is no specific equstion of identity
between the just city snd the just man posited anywhere in the dialogue. A like ness between the two is presented, taking its direction from the manner in which city
and man reflect the
form
of
justice
itself.11
This is
a consistent reflection of
the initial passage at 36932-3, at the very outset of the
in
speech.
We
are made aware
tion of justice in the city snd
development of the city in some decisive th3t, respect, the complete equs justice in the soul is to be held 3s problematic. The
of justice
very
that
manner
in
which
the
discussion
in the
soul
is introduced indicates
notes thst
Socrates is
swsre of this problem.
At 435di-3, Socrates
the pre
cision which
the
discussants
seek will not emerge
from the
road which argument required.
has thus far traveled. A longer

will
and more complete road
is
That
road
lead to the intense discussion

and 7. of the
of philosophy's objectives and
dimensions in
Books 6
Each
three classes of the city, and the
corresponding
virtue of virtues
associated with are advised,
each, is quickly located in the component parts of the soul. We

that the original pattern (443c 1: tvjtov) which the dis-
however,
cusssants chanced across
during
the
founding of the city

1 i4ff.
Plato'
(b8)
produced a
"kind
of
30. 31.
See Moors, Glaucon
and
Adeimantus,
and
SeeT. J. Anderson. Polis

12
Psyche: A
Motif in
"Republic"
s
Pays,"
(Stockholm. 1971); L.
Galis, "The State-Soul Analogy in Plato's Argument
that Justice
Philosophy
gienischen zu
(1974), 285-93; and the early line of analysis advanced in Platons Staat und in der Lykurgischen Grundschrift in ihrem Verhaltnis den Antilogiai der Wochenschrift fur Klassiche Philologie 29 (191 2), 808- 14.
Bestimmungen
Protagoras,"
Journal of the History of by C. Frick, "Die sozialhy-
211
Justice
and
Philosophy
in Plato's Republic
it is
right
justice"
(ci). This justice
posited that
(C5) for
one to
do that for
which
labor"
he is fitted
principle,
by by which
nature
(cpvoEi). Socrates is here referring to the "division of each person was assigned a function in the city based
city.12
on
his
ability (C5-7). This principle, however, is likewise that upon which the political definition of justice is founded in the Socrates now calls this principle,
and
certainly by implication its presence in the city, a "kind of image of (C4-5). "But indeed the truth is that justice was something of this kind, not
justice"
con
cerning
of
doing
one's external
business, but concerning [what is]

(c9-di;
one's
own,
truly
concerning
"one's
oneself and
the things of
oneself"
cf. 474c4-d2).
The idea
own"
is
now
that condition of the soul
clearly associated with the condition of the soul. Further, is considered to be the true interpretation of what is
that justice
"one's
own."
The formula
ness and not
vsnced psrts.
advanced at
ss
becoming belonging properly

soul
43338-9 involved in the

to the
is
minding
one's own
busi
ad-
sffsirs of others,
is
now
(st 443di-5)
individusl in
soul
snd
whst
its three
constituent
"One does
the
not sllow esch psrt
oneself to
do
is
snother's nor the
classes of
to become
involved in the
affairs of each
other, but one ar
ranges one's own one's own
house
well and rules oneself 3nd orders oneself snd
becomes
friend
3nd unites the
three psrts [of the

csn
soul]."
Hsving done
ities (e4), "in
which
so, the individu3l

things
then set in either politicsl or privste

and
capac-
all such
believing
naming
as
just
and noble 3ction
thst
both
msintsins and
helps to
complete this condition
[of the
soul]"
(e4-6).
Injustice becomes those completing ship between justice

of
activities which
do
not accord with
the maintaining and
this
condition snd
this
proper
ordering
of the soul.
The
relation
injustice
so regsrded snd
the nature of the soul is explic

the parts of the soul sre
ar-
itly
made at 444d8-n.
Justice is
produced when
rsnged
both to
govern snd
be
governed
by
one snother
injustice is
ner
produced when the psrts of
the soul both rule 3nd 3re ruled
sccording to nsture, while in a man
contrary to nsture. Virtue thus becomes 3 certsin heslth, besuty, snd good disposition of the soul, while vice becomes sn illness, shsme, snd weskness of
the
soul
(di3-e2). Since
noble sctivities 3re
of virtue while shsmeful sctivities sre
bssicslly related to the maintenance bssically related to the prevalence of vice
(e4-5),
the dialogue then
proceeds
to a consideration of the advantages of prac
ticing justice as it has now been identified (the proper ordering of the soul). The connection between how one should properly regard the actor and how one should properly regard the action, alluded to earlier, is commented upon di
rectly in this
passage.
actions themselves
The quality of action is a result of the quality of soul. The do not determine the order or disorder of the soul, although
to the degree of virtue or vice existing. The
which
they certainly
ordering,
contribute
individual
however, is that
is
considered when
the correct approach to jus-
"Republic"
32.
443bft
,
Cf. J. Adam, The

263, n. on 443C16.
of Plato,
2 vols., 2d
Ed. (Cambridge, 1969), I, 262,
n. on
212
Interpretation
is
employed.
tice and injustice

tions which
If there is
correct order
in the soul, then the
ac
follow
would also
be
considered
just. If there is disorder in the soul, into
that disorder would be
reflected
in the
actions entered
by
that
individual. The
is. The just
act, however, is
condition of
action.
not
the controlling the act
factor. The
soul order of the actor of
the
actor not
is the primary determinant
or unjust
Socrates is
to do
now
(at 444e7f.)
prepared
to consider whether it is advantageous
just
and noble acts and
to be
just,
whether or not
is
advantageous to
do
unjust acts and
be
no
unjust.
they go unnoticed, or if it It is Glaucon, however, who

since the proper na
contends that such an
investigation is
longer necessary,
has been identified, and, further, that the necessity of evading vice and in justice and pursuing virtue and justice has been demonstrated (445a5-b3). As
ture
far
as
Glaucon is
concerned, these things

gone through 2 which
argument
they have
of
(b3~4). Since it
that
have been adequately disclosed in the was Glaucon's argument at Socrates do so, this
statement
the
beginning
Book
had demanded
likewise
relieves
Socrates
of an earlier obligation placed upon
him. Socrates
nonetheless proceeds to sketch

made
to exhibit the advantages of just action and the
how the likeness between city and soul can be disadvantages of unjust ac
regimes can
tion.
Before the
scenario
of
degenerate just
unfold,
however, Adei
The
parabasis of
mantus
demands that the
argument
completed
be
extended.
Books 5 through 7 results. The immediate reason for eldog
Adeimantus'
demand that
Yet there is
"whole
form"
(449C2;
6Aov)
of
the argument be presented concerns the common possession of
women and children
in the city
(C4-5).11
deeper
manifestation of
the likeness between city and soul which Socrates
has
not yet
disclosed. The
likeness between justice in the city and justice in the soul has been viewed from one direction. The order of the city had been presented and. only then, had the
likeness
yet
of that order to the order of the soul
been discussed. The dialogue has
to
losopher
allel
discuss seriously the soul apart from the city. When the pursuits of the phi are finally introduced in Books 6 and 7, they stand as the necessary par to the initial presentation of likeness between city and soul. It is not the
"like-to-like"
function
of
comparisons
in the dialogues to Such
present an
absolute
identity between the compared ity which is of use in discussion.

dialogue,
the city
gard
subjects.14
comparisons
indicate
a similar
the correct
view of
the soul
we
While the city in speech has developed in the has not. While the objects to be sought by
have been introduced,
have
yet to
hear
a parallel
discussion
with re
to the soul. See 42366-42432, where the communal concept is first introduced on the See also 4i6e4, where it is maintsined that the soldiers will live
"like-to-like"
33.
subject of women
life"
and children.
"common
(xoivf]
34.
u/v).
comparisons, see Rep. 350C4-8; Polit. 269ds; Euthyphr. 5dl; Gorg. 47638, 488c5-d2, 5iob4; Critias I07d5; Crat. 43605; Soph. 23ob6. Parm. I48b4; Laws 72231-2, 86832-3; Tim. 30C6, 32b4; Phaedr. 240C2f.; Ep. 7.323diof.; Minos 313^-3; snd Aristotle N.E.
n69b5-io.
On
213
Justice
and
Philosophy
advantage
of
in Plato's Republic justice

4.
over
Additionally,
skewed
the
in the
presentation of
Book
Glaucon,
to
injustice has been curiously be sure, believes that the ar

ss pref
gument on
erable
this matter is closed, but the

not
justification for regsrding justice
gested, and
those
At 442e4~443C2, Socrates had sug Glaucon had agreed, thst sctivities sssociated with being unjust entered into either to produce advantage for the one<acting at the expense of
established.
what would
to
injustice hss
been
others or not
exhibiting be done by those

at
be
considered
having
is
correctly
ordered soul.
would simply unjust conduct No argument, however, es

seem settled
tablishing
such a position
put
forward. What may

no
to
Glaucon,
prove
re
quiring thereby, anything but settled The definition
least in his mind,
further explanation, may
to be
upon serious reflection.
of justice provided
by
Socrates
have
acts as a synthetic prescription,

a standard
in
a manner common to
predicated upon
many
of the
dialogues. It is
for discussion, it
self
elements
which
comprised
foregoing
discussion.
Rather than serving as a definition accentuates the
conclusion of
the concerns addressed to
justice,
the
or
need
for
movement
from
experiential
foundations,
those based upon collective opinion, as sufficient
indicators
of what
justice truly
is. In its relationship to the city constructed in the dialogue, however, the defin ition retains a connection with something which possesses sensual dimensions.
These dimensions
are not
the result
of
the city actually existing.
Yet, in dis
can
cussing the city, the dialogue is

proached
still
projecting
an
entity
which
be ap
by
the participants as containing understandable features. The ultimate,
and most
precise, understanding of justice,
however,
will compel
the interlocu
tors to consider the soul

quired.
for
which much use of
imagery
and symbol will
be
re
No
equivalent
feature
of the sensual world exists
for
which a meaningful
comparison can
be
made. of
concerted
demonstration
the
truly just
man
(that is, the
one ordered ac
cording to the discussion of the soul in Book 4) as also conventionally just does not appear in the dialogue. I would suggest this difficulty arises because of the in ability to
precisely conventional Moreover, if viewed from the standpoint
equate standards of what
to
philosophic
standards.
philosophy
counsels, as we
sufficient.
shall see, no amount of conventional regard

emerges a
for
justice will
be
There
fundamental
incompatibility
between justice in the city,

a philosophic concern,
a conven
tional enterprise, and
justice in the soul,
if
one seeks
the
most essential and truthful understanding of justice. Nonetheless. Socrates does provide a connection between city concerns and the definition of justice which, if
believed,
an
will provide a more ordered political situation. of
The distinction between
understanding
justice
sufficient
for the
needs and capabilities of common of the concept
opinion, and an understanding

sis of
essential
for the truth
lies
at the
ba
the lack in the Republic
of a
Somatically
of
argued assimilation of conven
tional
justice into
not an
philosophic
justice.
This is
tion
of
indication
of the
deficiency
Socratic
argument nor an
indica
opin-
inadequacy
in Platonic dialogue. It is
endemic
to the relationship of
214
Interpretation
Since any
conventional
ion to truth.
enterprise,
regardless
of
the
beliefs life is,

which ob
espoused, operates
on a series of accepted
opinions, and,
further,
political
in this regard, the

what constitutes such opinion
exercise of accepted
will
opinions, it follows that any acceptance of

of opinion and the manner
justice
be
function
in
is
re-enforced
by
appearance and sensual experience.
What is
served will constitute
the sinews of what
is
accepted
of what
is to be
called
correct political opinion. opinion
The
prevalence of appearance and the application of and
become progressively,
correct when
mutually, justified
by
the polis.
Opinion is
Both
deemed
it
relates to
appearance, and appearance is likewise enter

of
tained as useful or meaningful

opinions
in terms
its affinity to prevailing

any
opinion.
held
and appearances recognized can undergo
manner of alteration
in the
collective perception of the
community, but neither is transcended. While
certain
difficulty of equating philo is sophic standards to conventional standards that there ultimately is produced no significant common ground upon which to effect the equation. The city in speech
and can
directions
insights
be gained, the
in the Republic
narrows
the distinction between the two because its opinion foun
dation is entirely a product of the discussion. The discussion, in turn, as becomes quite clear from Book 5 on, draws its focus from the philosophic pursuit of truth.
Still, duct,
dards
this
and
city
remains a conventional
enterprise,
reflected
in
structure and con
thereby
remains one which requires opinion and appearance as stan
of measure.
The city in
speech, as the shaft with which the
dialogue is
transfixed,
serves to
city, cannot
the political
purify opinion, but, owing to the political necessities of a go beyond opinion. The basic difficulty of equating philosophy and in the city in speech is by fiat with the introduction of
"resolved"
the philosopher-ruler, who embodies the very

sions which
interconnection
of the two
dimen
discussion
When the definition
have
not considered
precisely is provided in Book 4, however, the discussants the dimensions of the philosophic life and the difficulties of
of justice
cannot
combine.
ture had been

or
applying those dimensions to political life. Various reflections of philosophic na introduced in Book 3, but no concerted explanation of philosophy
its
practice
had been
advanced.
It is
of
interest to the
of
present consideration,
address
therefore, to indicate
why the
political and
some of the
dimensions
that explanation which
the philosophic cannot be expected to combine.
IV
Platonic dialogue is the
agreement on a given
objective.
specific
use
of collective not seek
speech.
Dialogue
seeks
mutual
subject, it does
victory in
themes
argument as
its
ultimate
Through the
employment of
dialogue,
and and
a specific
discussion among
nature
state
pro-
individuals,
various statements
can
concerning human
and
human activity
be fixed upon,
the essential aspects of those
ments and
themes made
known. It is
collective
speech, therefore,
which
215
vides
Justice
and
Philosophy
by
in
Plato'
Republic
the most obvious vehicle
which standards are established and mutual
understanding is brought about in Platonic dialogue. Related to this objective, as the course of the Republic
makes
clear, is the
un
folding
ion
of opinion's
deficiencies
and
the
inadequate
undercuts
standards provided
by
ap
pearance.
During
the
dialogue, Socrates
the normal strength of
opin
and appearance as the sufficient path to what of mutual

truly.35
is
regarded as correct.
The basic
direction
of what
rection
discussion is from the

essential
realm of what seems
to be to the realm
is
Such is the
direction
of philosophy.
Basic to this di from

opinion
is the
attempt to
distinguish
about nature.
True
speech
understanding is directed toward the essential
a true
of nature
nature of whatever
is
being
considered.36
To
accomplish
stantly the range of

speech sddresses must
discussion,
at esch stsge
the nsture of
whst
this, it becomes necessary to narrow con further refining the wsy in which is being exsmined. Whst s thing is said to be
be
made
ing
examined
to approximate its nature as closely as possible. When what is be is man, that refining becomes the unfolding of the order and har
mony of the soul. Despite the dominant
position of speech
in Platonic dialogue, the dialogues
also provide us with a staple
tenet concerning the basic limitations of
Xoyog.
Since they
limitations
attempt
remain
dialogues, however,
regsrded as
the distinction between what is held
by
opinion and what
is to be
true must still be made in discussion. The

resort to the use of abstraction
which
of speech require that
Socrates
in the
bring fundamentslly incspsble

to
one can opinion.
into the
purview of
the discussants that
is, in its
essence,
of
being
be led to
understand
precisely communicsted. Through sbstrsction, the deficiencies of reliance upon appearance and
presence, leads one away from the
variegations
Abstraction, by its very

actual experience.
related
by
The Republic itself
stands as a grand example

radical
in
of
this respect, since there the
exists throughout
the dialogue a
deprivation
body
and
its
concerns."
Abstraction, in its
Socratic
reached use of
most concerted
image. When the highest level

and
form in the Republic, is to be found in the of philosophic discussion is

three consecutive images to convey
in Books 6
be
7, Socrates
presents
what cannot
related
relationship based
upon an
precisely in speech, and as we have already observed, it is image which connects polis and soul in Book 4. Im
a of as
age,
however,
since
philosophy and much in the famous

35.
device intended only to adumbrate the dimensions its objects, also has its limitations. Socrates tells Glaucon
it is
passage at 533&i
-5:
See Rep.
4l3b4-c3, 476c9-478dl0, 506C2-10, 5%gbS-C4; 26431^3; and
Polit. 277e6-278eio; Euihyd.
286diff.; Crat. 429dlff.; Soph.

36. 37.
Theaet.
and
nobiff.
277b5-c6. seen most
Cf. Theaet.
iSge6-T,
Soph. 26363-5;
of
Phaedr.
"purified"
The discussion is
bodily
concerns
(this is
clearly in the text
with the
in speech, at 39905-6). The entire discussion transpires, however, purging of luxuries from the city stamins. Hussey contends thst the dislogue lasts for twelve hours. G. B. without regard for
bodily
Republic,"
Hussey, "The Incorporation

83-
of
Several Dislogues in Plsto's
Classical Review
10
(1893),
216
Interpretation
will you
No longer my
part as
be
able to
follow
not
because
of any
lack
of willingness on
rather you would not see an
image
of what we arc
saying,
but the truth it
self,
it
appears
to me.
But if it is
of
so or
not, this no longer deserves to be affirmed

most
certain.1"
confidently.
But that something
this
kind is seen, is
It is
at
this point in the dialogue that the ability of symbolic manifestations pre
sented
in
speech reach
their apogee. To proceed
further is to
pursue the task of
philosophy, and that task

plished
is
one of
self-persuasion,
not one which can
be
accom
in
collective speech
(cf. Phaedo
22965-23037).
Nonetheless, Socrates is
pable of
still able to sketch

"purifying,"
how it is that the
philosopher
is
ca
refining further, of understanding. This philosophic
usage
Xoyog to reach the highest plateau of of Xoyog concerns the essence of dialec
without
tic. Its import is advanced at 532aiff. There dialectic is presented as an attempt through
naocov
cease of
logos (a6-7: bid

nov
rov
Xoyov).
at
recourse
to the senses (dvev
aio&ijoEcov),
one seizes
"arriving
each what
thing
good
which
itself"
is,
and
does
not
use a
before
by
intellect itself
is
(a7-bi). This
Xoyog. being beyond

accepted opinions or
the realm of the senses, cannot be demonstrated
by
proof predicated upon opinion or
appearance,
either
concerning
nature or reflect
ing
beliefs. concerning the essential Glaucon in Book 2 can be made.
It is only at this "goodness in
point that the philosophic response which
itself"
had been
required
by
It is likewise only at this point that the nature of one pursuing the good (required both by Glaucon's introduction of the relationship between nature and good and
Adeimantus'
connection of virtue and
the "best natures") can

point
be
equated
clearly
the
to the pursuit of goodness in

nature of
itself. This
is
made at
535a9-b3,
where
the individual who pursues the education culminating in
dialectic is
mentioned
twice (at a9 and again at b2). The successful completion of this edu the nature of what is
cation produces a coincidence of
truly
and
and the nature of the
one who can perceive
The
nature which
it truly (537C3). has been attuned to the dialectic,

are
thereby
to the
percep
while
tion of things as
they
truly (see
534b3~4). encompasses a correct understand
ing
of
both deed
some
and
knowledge
(54oa6).
Those, however,
who,
possessing highest things
intelligence,
prevented
nonetheless succumb to
interpreting
less than the
from governing the realm of the highest things. Socrates states at 534d3-4 that they have been raised and educated in speech and that the governing of the highest things should be prevented to them "if ever they
are were raised
in
deed."
Aside from this
metaphor'
"rearing
concerns
relating to the
the dialecticians
can
educa
tion in the
city in speech, it primarily
who pursue the
nature of things as
they truly
are
only these individuals

at which
themselves be pos
sessors of natures which admit of the truth about speech and

one
deed. Onlv
when
is
successful
in reaching that level

is foresrradowed
4737^8.
at
Xoyog can
and
bc
continued without
38.
This
pssssge
snd
49763-4.
at
50731-2,
again
st
50909-10.
Cl
5903l0-b5;
Tim.
217
recourse possible. cannot
Justice
and
Philosophy
will
in
Plato'
Republic
most
to the sensory world
the ultimate, and

since
truthful,
response
be
Such
response,
however,
it
admits of no sensual verification,
be articulated effectively to meet the exigencies of common opinion. Twice previously in the dialogue this separation of the philosophic pursuit of truth from the prevalence of opinion in the sensual world has been presented for
specific comment.
The first
occurs at the end of
Book 5,
where
Socrates
con
fronts the texture of opinion.

predicated upon what
At 477a9~bi, Socrates ignorance is
states that
knowledge is
not.
is,
while
predicated upon what
is
The dis
cussion must seek
something
while
which
is between these
be
two.
Opinion is
regarded as
referring to
power
one
thing,
knowledge
refers to another, each a
according to its
which one what
(b7-8). Powers
to
are
further
considered to
kind
of
being by
do
is
able
do
what one can
do,
and, so, everything else is

powers
able to
it
can
do
(ci-2). Socrates distinguishes between

upon and what and complete
in terms
of what
they
are
based
they
complete
(c9-di ). Those
which are
based
on the same
thing
the same things are said to be the same power; those

and complete
which are
based
on
different things
different things
are said since
to
be different
not con
powers
(C9~d5). Opinion is not the
same as not
knowledge,
is
not
it does
sider what
possible power
is (478b3-4). Likewise, it is
opinions about
the same as
ignorance,
since
it is
not
to have
not
something
which
(b6-9). Since
opinion's
is
the same as the
power of
knowledge,
the two
nor
the same as the power of

which considers nor
ignorance, it properly belongs between

what
between that has
is
and that which considers what upon opinion
is
not.
Neither knowledge
a
ignorance
will
be based
(d7-8). Rather,
existence.
opinion
different
power
from
either, and,
hence,
rejects
-2).
different
Opinion
self
the existence of the noble itself and the idea of the beautiful it
maintains
(479ai
It
that there are many noble things U3).
Occupying
position
between
what
is
and what
is
not, these things opined as noble also

regarded as
ap
pear as shameful, and
similarly those things

as
just
also appear unjust,
(a6-8).w
and
holy
things
appear
unholy
The
conventions
of
the
many
(d3_4)
where
the foundation
of common opinion and
in the
polis
"roll
about some
opinio
between
ai2:
not
being
being
(d4-5). "Lovers of
(48oa6,
not
cpikodoôvg),
justice itself (479e3),

(e4-5).40
having
Socrates continues, believe many things just, but opinions, but not knowing what they have opin
and
ions
about
The argument,
the
book,
concludes with
Socrates
and
Glaucon agreeing thst the philodoxers, the lovers of

12),
a passage with which
philosophers,
the lovers
of wisdom, rather thsn
the
1
-
opinion,
embrace each
thing
as
it is itself (480a 1
the discussion of
philosophic nature
in Book 7 closely
to be
coincides.
There is
39.
no
correspondingly detailed
consideration of opinion's position
The
coincidence of
nobility, just actions, and 365a4-bi, and 36336-7.
holiness had been
posited
by
Adeimantus in
his
srgument
in Book
2.
See
40.
The two
canon.
usages of cftXodo'iovz at 48036 and ai2 are
the
only
examples of the term
in the
Platonic
218 found
ates
Interpretation
in the dialogue. The
essential
elsewhere political
deficiency
of
opinion, as
it
oper
in
life, is here intimated. The

not take
conventions upon which political
life
the
is
predicated
do
their bearings from the truth of what

what
is. but from

One
can
middle
ground
between
is truly
and
what
is
not truly.
hardly
expect, as Socrates observes, that opinion will produce correct
interpretations
is opined, specifically so with specifically so with regard to justice.

about what
regard to
the political conventions, and
The
second
discussion in
which
the distinction between philosophy and the
standards of opinion
is
addressed occurs at 48832-49506.
This is.
properly, the
introductory by
portion of a
longer
duce the images
of sun and
in Book 6 which, ultimately, will pro line. In point of fact, Socrates begins this discussion
section
city.""
referring to it as an image and apology (48835). Socrates intends to indicate the difficulties which the philosopher experiences in s Turning first to the inrage
those
of
the true helmsman
(4-5), Socrates
points out thst the most suitable of
in philosophy
of a city.
are useless to the
msny (489b3~4)
those who comprise the
majority
Philosophy has
the
grest
difficulty
Socrates'
in 3cquiring
position
s good reputstion
(C9)
under such not
circumstsnces, but it is
thst this resction to to the nsture
philosophy is
possessed
fsult
of the philosopher
(dio-ei).
noble snd
Owing
(e4)
philosopher, the one who
is
good, he is directed
who
by
truth,
by the following it
in true
totslly
snd
in
all
things,
or else
he is
braggart
in
no
way
participates
philosophy (49031-3). The lover of lesrning nsturslly be.42 with the vsrious things believed to He does not
until soul
contests with wh3t cesse
is,
not
from this
endesvor
he
resches
the nature of each
thing
which
is, realizing
each with what of
the
lsys hold
of thst sort of
thing
(s8-b4).
to the multitude. While the few philoso
The
philosopher
is
now contrasted 3re
phers sre
useless, the msny
thst
is,
the implications of
bsd, thoroughly evil (d3). It is not the srgument, the discussion, which is attracting the 3ttention of
Socrates here. It is the individuals themselves (di-2) with which he is con cerned. How is it that a nature can be so corrupted? While Socrates first turns to both the
virtues of the
lower
segments of the soul
courage 3nd moderation
(49ib9)
ruption of cause.
snd the scquisition of
goods,
such 3S
besuty,
wealth,
bodily
strength,
snd relstives positioned well
in the city (C2-3) as contributing csuses of this cor nsture, it is sctuslly bad education (e2) which constitutes the principal
not
It is
the sophists themselves who are responsible for such bad educa those who say
such
tion, but,
rather,
things who are the greatest

characterized as
or
sophists
(492a8-bi). This "greatest
sophistry"
is
taking
place whenever
or
many
41
come
together sitting down in assemblies

considers
law courts, theaters
military
Socrates
the
position which
the philosopher holds in the city to be srduous (488a2).
This
reflects the position of 2
justice in
common opinion, at
st 36432.
least according to Glsucon's
argument
in
Book
(see 358a6). Cf.
Adeimsntus
cf.
42.
On the phrase,
376b5,
b8,
c2, 4iidl, 43567, 475C2, 48sd3. 53sd4. 58169; Phaedo

23od3.
67b4, 82d, 82d9, 83a!,
es; snd
Phaedr.
219
Justice
and
Philosophy
blame
in
Plato'
Republic
of the
encampments, or
any
other common
gathering
many (b5~7; heart
cf.
359e2).
At these gatherings,
In
such
much
and praise
take place, alwsys to
excess
O7-9).
them
pur
sffairs,
will
what
is the
condition of the
young
man's
hearing
(C2-4)? He
sue what
say
that the same things are noble and shameful as
they do,
they
pursue, and be as
they
are
(c6-8).
Socrates is addressing these here espoused is found in

specific
points to
Adeimantus. The basis for the

argument on
position and
Adeimantus'
justice in Book 2,
the
texture
Socrates'
of
remarks
here takes its bearings from that discussion.
It is the
opinions expressed about virtue, nobility, and shame
by
the city which
constitute
the correct
are
understanding
of
sophistry
and the corruption of one's na
ture.
These
the things heard
by
the young, subverting
thereby "fine
(cf.
and
Adeimantus'
injunction
at 365a4-bi). which
,
Additionally,
also
the
blaming
of
injustice,
Adeimantus had
367b6-c5),
the praising of justice demanded that Socrates
address ered
(see 36262-3, 366d7f.

standards set
and
cannot
be properly discov
common
in the
down
by
common opinion.
It is precisely this
opinion which produces
the corruption of young natures. If one persists in prais

no
ing justice
and
blaming
possibility to ascertain Those who are generally

ceive payment
injustice according to the dictates of the city, there is correctly what truly deserves praise or blame.
regarded as professional
sophists
those who re
other
for their
services
(493a6)
actually teach
2
nothing
than the
beliefs
of the many, produced
by
their opinionating when gathered together, call
ing
such
things
wisdom
(a6-8). Adeimantus in Book
had
referred
to the teach
and
ers of persuasion court
(365d4)
who would provide the wisdom of
assembly
law
of
(d4-5), allowing thereby
the commission
of unjust acts without

"wisdom"
the
fear
punishment.
Now, however,
what
the sophists see as
is nothing
other
than a
reflection of
the accepted beliefs of the city. It is the city,
by
of
means of
these
beliefs,
The
not the sophists through their teachings, which produces this

sophist
"wis
dom."
knowing
merely which truth in concerning nothing
professional
parrots the real
of these
sophistry beliefs and desires is noble,

names all
the city
or shameful, or good, or opinions of the
bad,
or
just,
or unjust,
he
according to the
city (493b7-c2), how the nature of the necessity and the good are actually distin considering guished (C4-6). What originally had been required by Glaucon's argument in Book
one
calling the necessary just and noble, while not
that the perfectly

other
just
and
perfectly
unjust
individuals be distinguished
from the
(36001-3)
cannot
be
accomplished
in
the city.
The
stan
dards
of common opinion will not permit such a what
distinction. Similarly, the dis

on nature,
tinction between
addresses practice
is necessary
and what
is good, based it
directly
Glaucon's
position st
358C2-4,
where
wss posited thst good.
individuals
justice because it is
necessary, not
because it is
It is the necessity
consideration,
of the city's common
beliefs
which makes such a coincidence a natures
not the true understanding of the
involved.
Anybody
the city
will
who
involves himself
with
the beliefs produced

view of what
in
the assemblies of
and
invariably apply
the city's
is necessary
thereby
220
Interpretation
provide what the
city
(49434), they
a philosophic
will
(493d5~7). Since the many cannot be philosophic necessarily blame those who are (a6). Further, one possessing
praises
nature, if his
body
matches
his
soul
(b6),
will
be
made use of
by
those in the city who desire to advance their own ends (b8-io). He will
rupted, and
be
cor
believe that he is
capable of
becoming
involved in the
affairs of
both
ad
Greeks
vanced
foreigners (c7-di; thereby violating the definition of justice in Book 4), and will possess pretentions and conceit (di-2).
and all of
One who, despite
greeted with all manner of
this, is turned toward philosophy (ei-2) will be deed and persuasion aimed at drawing the individual
away from philosophy (e4~7). The corruption of the best nature regarding the best pursuit (495M-2) thus comes to pass, and there follows the greatest evil
that is. the greatest evil in both to the city and to private individuals (b3~4) both public and private pursuits. The few remaining who nonetheless retain a
view of
the value of the philosophic
life leave
the
city
and are replaced
by
those
of no worth
(b8-c6;
cf. 347b5-c5). speech
While it is the city in

pursuit of
to
which
Socrates
will
that philosophers must rule
in the city
entire of a
or
philosophy
must
shortly turn, indicating become the guiding
those who do rule (499ai I-C2), and stating
further thst
vs.
neither of
these is
impossible (03), the

made
discussion
of
philosophy
the beliefs of the
city has
the
possibility
philosopher-king
most unlikely.
Aside from the
considerations which meet
the philosophically capable, and which contribute to

exists as well the position of the city's
the corruption of
his nature, there This is the
beliefs
city,
as the true sophistry. regardless of expressed. can such a
existence which
is
presented
by
any
actual
the
specific regime or system of
laws through
which
that regime is
beginning"
Only
city completely founded in discussion "from the coincidence of political ruler and philosophy be possible. In any city
a
would exist
in
in fact, there
rise,
or
the elements of common opinion which undermine the
continuance,
of philosophy.
Only
in
argument can
Socrates
make
this
profession of must
possibility, and it is for the purposes of discussion that the city possible, not for the purposes
the cave
of political reform.
be
regarded as
In Book 7,
upon completion of
image, Glaucon
questions whether
they have
committed an
injustice
against cave
those who have
seen
the true sun

responds
by
re
compelling them to return into the minding Glaucon that it was not for
entered
(5i9d8-9). Socrates
by
one part of
the city that the discussion was
into, but,
is
rather,
for the
standable that philosophers
city (ei-3). While it would be under arising in other cities would feel no compulsion to
whole
rule, such
phers
not the case with
those of the
city in
speech, since these philoso

which
have been
educated
by
the city and owe the city for the opportunity
they have been

agsinst
(52035-03). No injustice, therefore, is committed the philosophers, st least with regard to their relationship with the city.
afforded
Such
a connection
sion; the same connection

capsble
between philosophy and opinion is controlling only in discus holds for the presence of one philosophically hardly
in
city in fact.
Resolving
difficulties
occasioned
by
the equation
of jus-
221
Justice
and
Philosophy
in Plato's Republic
tice in the soul with

upon
the rubrics of the city

not
justice in the city does not result from placing great reliance in speech, since those rubrics are paramount only in
life. While the discussants have
a succeeded
dialogue,
in
actual political
in de
veloping throughout the dialogue

emergence of
body
of common opinion which requires the
philosophy, such does

Socrates'
not occur
in
an actusl city.
The importsnce does

not
of application
spplicstion of a
definition
of
justice to the city
producing a precise understanding of the nature of justice. Rather, the importance results from the of political order
necessity"
lie in that
which
the consideration of justice unveils. Political
life is
not predicsted upon a
precise
understanding of existence. Despite the advsntsges which result from a investigstion of politicsl life, philosophy itself is not s staple com in collective existence. A city cannot produce within its structure the cor modity rect understanding of justice, since, regardless of the dimensions of the city, it
philosophic
remains an endesvor
bssed
upon opinion 3nd appearance.

philosophic of
duced
which
do
no
damsge to
transcended.
The
precise
understanding
Beliefs may be intro but belief itself csn never be truth, justice is an individusl commodity,
speech
one which requires
the philosophic pursuit. The city in
schieves, through
its
present3tion 3nd
discussion,
s recognition of csnnot provide
this deeper source
for
precise
un-
derstsnding, but the city itself
it.
V
Plstonic dialogue,
pursuit, is
while
taking its
ultimate standards
from the
philosophic of
not conveyed
to an audience of philosophers.
Only
few
,
Plato's
listeners
Soph.
of
possess philosophic
254s8f.).
capability (see 42809-42933, Dialogue must perform a two-fold function

reslm of opinion
49434L
503b6, snd
provide an avenue
cspabil-
departure from the

and
for
those possessing philosphic
ity,
and
developing
cf.
a structure of right-directed opinion snd
(see. for example. 43ob3

remsinder.
43106;
Svmp. 20235-9,
Meno 97bi-d3) for the
The lat
ter
will continue
to employ opinion as the only foundation
availsble
to them. It is
people. recipi
for
this reason that Platonic dialogues say different things to different

provided as
What is
ents.
instruction
must
be
equated
to the
capsbilities of
the
Socrates'
Only in
sbout
this way can we
regard
Plsto
as
having
answered
misgiv
ings
the written word, ss those
misgivings sre presented
in the Phaedrus
this msnner. Ad-
(275d4ff.)-
The definition
of justice provided
in the Republic
operates
in
43.
The identificstion
of whst
ception of what
is
compelled.
is necesssry often is transited in s Plstonic dislogue into a con In the Republic, see, for example, 344d3~s, 405c8-d4. 420d5-ei,
5iob4-9- 5>ic3-d5, 515^1-7. 5i9c8-d2, 52167-10,
47335-7, 50505-10, c6-8,

522C5-8,
509C3-4.
525d5-7,
526e2-4.
snd
e6-7,
52921-2,
555d3~5.
"necessity"
556a9-b4.
565b2-3,
58723-5.
6ood7-e2, 6loc6-d4,
Republic.
6nb9-lo. The term for
(avdyxn)
sppesrs
197 times in the
222
Interpretation
dressing
both the orchestrating of opinion snd the essence of philosophy's pursuit of truth, justice becomes perhsps the most bssic vehicle for the instruction of both the few who msy pursue the philosophic life and the many who will not.
of right-directed
Through the development whereby the beliefs of sophic. Still, the basis
opinion, Socrates
made
suggests
wsy
politicsl
life msy be
less
antagonistic to the philo
of political
life
remains one of
opinion,
and seeks stan
dards found in
to be
appearance.
The
most essential
Platonic
counsel on political
life
found in the Republic

in
surrounds this
issue. Despite the unlikely It is not, however, understanding foundations

appearance.
within of
presence of
a philosopher-ruler
actual
life,
the very writing of the Republic offers a philo

opinion.
sophically instructed approach to of opinion that one is to find the justice in the
former is icated
the domain
most precise
justice, despite
in the city and different. The
pred
the instruction which is provided. The

soul
difficulty of equating justice

essential are
arises
because the
predicated upon opinion and reflected
in
The latter is
upon
truth and admits of no external appearance. It is toward

posits
lessening the
man
distinction between the two that Socrates
the philosophic
as also
participating in common standards of justice. That relationship, however, as we have observed, is not demonstrated in the dialogue. In Book io, Glaucon agrees
that Socrates has succeeded in that
demonstrating during
injustice
with regard
the course of the discussion

to what each accomplishes
soul
justice is to be
soul
preferred to
in the
(6i2bif. ) The relationship
which
justice in the
has to justice
in
the city,
however,
which
remains problematic. contained
To
suggest that the true nature of
jus
tice, that
achieved
is
in
political
belief
can replace
only in the individual ordering of the soul, can be is tantamount to suggesting that collective activity and life, the responsibility placed upon the individual himself, a matter
myth of
which the
concluding
not
the Republic
the myth of Er
clearly
rejects
(6i9b7). This is
to say that the unlikely presence of philosophers in positions of po to be a Platonic statement on the
litical
rule
is
meant
impossibility
his
of
individuals
in
a
becoming
quiries.
polis
philosophers.
One
with philosophic
capability
must still reside
community.
Socrates
required an agora
in
which
to conduct
philosophic
of
in
the
The
philosopher
is first
nourished
by
the
collectively held beliefs
before entering is
upon
the pursuit of truth. We should expect, therefore, that
he
would retain some measure of an erotic pursuit
sympathy for them

one which
although the pursuit of could place the phi

not a collec
truth
(6i8b7-c4),
conceivably
losopher
against
his
political comrades.
The
pursuit of
philosophy is
for
tive commodity. It
is the
a
most private of all undertakings
(535b8). The
undertak
ing
is held
out
only for
few;
the
many
not
having capability
philosophy.
The be
Republic thus generally

44.
sical
counsels a certain subtle practice of philosophy.
What
cannot
conveyed stands subject to all manner of

the utilizstion of
snd und
interpretation.44
Hence,
World-jS (1978), 83L; schen in Dauer

Dialogen,"
irony by Socrates. See K. Moors. "Plsto's Use of Dislogue," Clas G. Muller, "Das sokratische Wissen des Nichtwissen in den PlatoniUberleben des Antikens Geistes (Festschrift fiir H. ed. K.
Diller),
1975), 147-73.
Vauveris
and
A. Skidias
(Athens,
223
Justice
and
Philosophy
justice
in Plato's Republic
The identification
philosophy
soul and
of a precise
of
since the
that ordering cannot
understanding of justice with the practice of is found in the correct ordering of the be accomplished if the condition of the soul does
the soul
not contain wisdom
in its
proper
location
indicates the
some
nonegalitarian founda-
tion of
Plsto's
regard
for individuals. While

can
have
attempted
to
suggest
that
the approach to
stance ways
justice in the Republic
be
made
egalitarian, there is no sub

al
to the contention, given what the
the temptation to read

must
dialogue actually tells us. There is Plato through the later developments of
"classical"
liberalism. We
acknowledge,
however, that, for Plato in
the
Republic,
true understanding of justice would be possessed
by
but
few. individual
Socrates does justice
not provide a complete coincidence of political and
during
the Republic because to do so would
be to
collapse
the true nature
of justice an
a convention, a dogma, precisely understood into that which it is not appearance. It is endemic to political life that it pursues less than the absolute
realities with
less than the
absolute
means.
Political life does
not pursue
the
whole, but only that part of the whole
which admits of appearance.
Its
nature
is
limited,
from the
and
by
providing visibility to the distinction between the order of the
polis and
the order of the soul, Plato

standpoint of
likewise
4S
comments upon
that limitation
the
wider whole.
Aristotle
gives wise counsel when
he
advises that one should
precision admitted
by
what
is
being
studied
(N.E.
I094bi i
14).
look only for the The Republic,

such a counsel
and
its study
of political
life, indicates
that
Plato both
agreed
in
and practiced
it.
45.
See L. Strauss, The
City
and
Man (Chicago, 1964),
138.
PUBLIUS:
THE JOURNAL OF FEDERALISM
Published
by
the
of
Center for the Study

Temple University North Texas State
Daniel J. John
Federalism
and
University
Elazar, Editor Kincaid, Associate Editor
PUBLIUS is a quarterly j ournal now in its fourteenth year of publica tion. It is dedicated to the study of federal principles, institutions, and
processes. reviews on
The journal
publishes
articles,
research
the theoretical
world.
and practical
dimensions
notes, and book of the American
federal
system and
intergovernmental
relations and other
federal
systems
throughout the
will feature articles on Canadian federalism, fiscal stress in the United States, state and provincial govern ments in international affairs, diffusions of information and innova tion, Reagan's New Federalism, consociationalism and federalism, and much more as well as the PUBLIUS Annual Review of American Federalism. urban
Forthcoming issues
A subscription to PUBLIUS includes membership in the Conference for Federal Studies, an international organization of scholars and prac titioners who share an interest in the various aspects of federalism. Members of the Conference receive its newsletter, the CFS Notebook, and are also invited to participate in research projects, conferences,
and periodic workshops.
EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD: Samuel H. Beer, Lewis A. Dex ter, Ivo D. Duchacek, Max Frenkel, Irving Kristol, E. Lester Levine, William S. Livingston, Alexander Marc, Vincent Ostrom, Neal R. Peirce, William H. Riker, Harry N. Scheiber, Ira Sharkansky, Donald V. Smiley, David B. Walker, Murray L. Weidenbaum, Deil S. Wright.
YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Individual Student and Retired, $15.
Inquiries regarding be sent to:
$20; Institutional $30;
subscriptions
Manuscript
should
submissions
should
be
sent to:
PUBLIUS
PUBLIUS
of Political Science North Texas State University Denton, Texas 76203-5338 (817) 565-2313
Study of Federalism Temple University Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19122

(215) 787-1480
Center for the
Department
An Interpretation
of
the Euthyphro
Marlo Lewis, Jr.

Claremont College
INTRODUCTION; PIETY AND PHILOSOPHY
Plato's Euthyphro
accomplishes the most urgent
but
unrealized goal of
Socrates'
the
Apology
rejection civic
of Socrates. It provides a sufficient defense of of official Athenian theology and, more generally,
impiety
of
his
the popular or
understanding of the divine. The Apology leaves little room for doubt that Socrates does not believe in the gods in which the city of Athens believes. But on
the basis of the

much
Apology
alone we are unable to
learn the
grounds of
his disbelief,
on the other
less decide the
question of their adequacy.
The Euthyphro,
hand, is centrally
gent refutation of sider
concerned with those grounds.
What is more, it
contains a co
the city's authoritative opinions about the gods. When we con
that the
Apology
is
one of struck
the few
truly founding books

piety.
of the
Western tra
dition,
The
we cannot
but be
by
its inner dependence

In the
on the
Euthyphro.
subject matter of the

said
Euthyphro is
cities of ancient
Greece,
an
piety is
tom.
Piety
be the worship of the ancestral is also said to be a virtue. But is it a

to
gods
according to ancestral cus Must

one
virtue?
worship the
of
cestral gods
man?
according to ancestral custom in order to be In the Euthyphro, the question of the goodness or excellence
raised.
a good citizen or a good
piety is
of
not
explicitly is concerned. For defense

of
Yet this
upon
question
is the
most urgent one with which
the dialogue
the answer to it depends the success or
failure
Plato's
Socrates
against
his Athenian
accusers. city's
In the
opinion of
the accusers,
Socrates is impious because he denies the
gods, and he corrupts the young
by teaching his
he is
impiety. The
accusers assume that a man cannot an
be
be
good or
just if bad.
not also pious, and
conversely that
impious
man must
unjust or
Piety is
(vouog)
ture as
undoubtedly
a virtue
if,
as citizens assume,
the
city's ancestral custom
was
instituted
by
gods or
demigods
or
disciples
of gods.
The votiog,
at
least originally, is the

well as
city's supreme constitutive
law, determining
offices.
class struc
the
order and prerogatives of
ruling
It is
also all-inclusive,
regulating in detail the
practices, opinions, and mores of the community.
Pervad
ing
all aspects of ancient
fathers,"
the ways of "our

vine
civic life, therefore, is the view that one must adhere to first ancestors were divine or semidibecause
"our"
beings,
or were
instructed
by
such of
beings. Ancient
civic
life "is
character
ized
by
the
the
primeval
identification
longer
Ed.
and work
the good with the

on
ancestral."'
This
pesr
is
first
part of a
by
Mario Lewis
the Euthyphro. Subsequent psrts will
3p-
in the
next volume.
i.
Leo Strauss. Natural Right
History (Chicago:
University
of
Chicago Press, 1971)
pp.
83-84
226
In
a
Interpretation
community ruled by ancestral votiog, religion, politics, and morality are practically indistinguishable. We can form at least a general conception of this
profound
unity
of
life
by
considering the
following
facts. First,
cult.2
citizens are
those
who share
the worship of the same civic or local

right of
deities. A
man
is
a citizen
if he
has
an
hereditary
magistrate performs a enough
membership in the city's hieratical function as part of his city there is
Second,
official
every business. It is not The city dis

are
almost
to say that in the
no separation of church and state.
antedates the
idea
of a
transpolitical moral authority, without which the very
tinction
between is in
church and state cannot
be
conceived.1
Third,
all
laws
be
lieved to be
legal
act
divinely
sanctioned,
if not divine in The

epithet
origin.
a sense a
sacrilege.4
"unholy"
Thus every criminal or il is typically reserved for
the most unjust
deeds,
is
such as
murder
and
treason.5
Fourth,
the task of
ap
peasing the
not
gods
unending.
It is customary for
citizens
to observe sacred
ritual
only
at meals,
festivals,
and numerous ceremonial occasions,
but
at almost
any time whatever: when rising up or
lying
down, before going forth
or
coming
in,
at the start or completion of
work.6
any
command.7
Since the votiog is comprehensive, it implicitly forbids whatever it does not It does not command citizens to philosophize. On that account
an
alone, philosophy is
son.
illegal
name
activity.
It is illegal for
or claims
a more
fundamental
rea
Philosophy,
But this
as
its
implies, is,
to
be,
the love and pursuit of
wisdom. available
pursuit
is
neither
necessary
nor possible
if the highest
wisdom
to men has already been vouchsafed to the city
by
the gods. The most
elementary premise of philosophy, therefore, is the contention that ancestral cus tom does not provide authoritative guidance on how one should live. This
means, of course, that if the votiog is
the pursuit of
wisdom
a god-given
law, philosophy is
not at all
useless and corrupting endeavor. In order his way of life in spite of its illegality, he must prove that the ancestral way of life is not the right way. He must refute the ageold identification of the good with the ancestral. He must, in other words, prove a
but
thoroughly
for the
philosopher to
justify
that piety
is
not a virtue.
What is
The
of
at stake will
become
clearer
if
we compare
briefly
the pious man and
the philosopher.
pious man
and
is the
of
fully
dedicated
He is
citizen.
family
love
country.8
attached to
His outstanding qualities are love his community, and to its dis
tinctive traditions, beyond his most pressing wants.

2.
Macaulay
memorialized this
Fustel de Coulanges, Numa Denis, The Ancient City: A
tutions of Greece and Rome (Garden

3. Harry V. Jaffa, Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally,
"Aristotle"
City. N.Y.:
Study on the Religion, Doubleday Anchor, n.d.) pp. 146.

ed.
Laws
and
Insti
193-94.
and
in History of Political Philosophy, 1969) pp. 65-67.

4.8.
Leo Strauss
Joseph
4.
Rousseau, The Social Contract
Plsto, Republic 615c. 6. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City, pp 7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1 1 38a6 7. 8. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City, pp.
5.
210-12.
99, 198-99.
227
kind
An Interpretation of the Euthyphro

in the
character of
of man
his Horatius,
who
knew
no
better way
to
die than
of
to face fearful odds

gods.
defending
soldier,
a
the ashes of his
fathers
man
and
the temples
his
Being
a citizen
warrior, the pious
is
proud.
His pride, how
ever, is mingled
ancestors.9
with an
habitual his
reverence or shame
which
His
sense of
the sacred, with

and
he is
deeply imbued,
And
before parents, gods, and is the union

experiences
of
his
proud patriotic
as
love
civil shame.
Since he
his primary
loyalties
alties are
sacred, their worth
is for him beyond
question.
since those
loy
hereditary, he is
of
whereas
unable to
customs or
the truth of received
doubt seriously the goodness of inherited opinion. The more pious he is, the more his soul looks to the laws
as the rule and measure of
which
is the
"internalization"
the commands and prohibitions of the votiog.
Now,
the good citizen
his
actions, the philosopher endeavors to follow the argument tells him is

best.10
his
own reason
accepted verities.
His first step toward becoming a philosopher was to doubt the He acknowledges no rightful limits to his questioning, except
those necessary to the orderly progress of his inquiries. shame, is his to life
itself.12
Wonder,
not pride or
soul's characteristic
response."
He is
more attracted
Since he
seeks an
impartial
or objective view of
clarity than things, he seeks

It is this de
to
detachment from the
attachments that
bind the
souls of pious men.
tachment, ire against

loyalties them,
as
more
than any
debunking
pious men
of popular
myths, that provokes the citizen's
him.13
He is
often suspected of
being
in league
with
the city's ene

which all civic
mies, so difficult is it for
to conceive a standpoint
standpoint
from
appear problematic.
If that
is
somehow
made credible
guilt or a
to
it
Aristophanes'
was
to
Strepsiades, they
as a
are
likely
to feel
ter
emptiness.14
rifying freedom. He Ancient

ways of
The philosopher, describes it
on the other
hand, delights in
of
that very
sometimes
bridge to the Isles
the
Blessed.15
piety and philosophy are fundamentally different and opposed life. The former is the archetype and limit of man's reliance on divinity
civic
for the ordering of public and private affairs. The latter is the original form of man's attempt to free his mind from bondage to authority and
self
and classic
guide
him
by
reason alone.
Although it is usually
there
possible
for the
philosopher
to avoid
persecution
by
outwardly conforming to
citizens
accepted modes of
behavior, between
death.'6
him
and
his fellow
is, in
to
principle,
action of
a war
to the
Plato
shows this
above all through the
dramatic
the
Apology
the
of Socrates. In
that
dialogue, the Athenians
vote
execute
Socrates for the

at one with
crimes of
impiety
pre
and corruption of the young.
The Euthyphro is
Apology in
senting
9. 10.
the former crime as the cause and inner meaning of the latter:
Socrates
Plato, Laws 647a-c. Plato, Crito 46b. Plato, Theaetetus 115b.

Cf. Xenophon, Memorabilia
4.8.6-8.
Cf. Plato, Laws 803b, 804b. Aristophanes. Clouds 1474-79,
1505-10.
Plato, Republic
519c;
Nietzsche, On
517a.
the
Genealogy
of Morals
2.7-
Plato, Republic 492d,
228
Interpretation
young by teaching them not to believe in the gods in which the city Both dialogues treat the theme of piety within the context of So
corrupts the
believes.'7
crates'
mortal struggle with
his
native city.
It is important to realize, however, that if

quarrel
one
is too
quick
to see in
Socrates'
with
Athens
a conflict
between piety
one risks
and
philosophy, philosopher and
city,
or
free
inquiry
with
and
authority,
begging
the decisive question. For
the quarrel can represent or

not
exemplify
a more general problem
only if the
good
is
identical
the
ancestral.
so
Every city in the ancient world has its own gods, customs, rituals, myths, and on. And every city is composed of families, each with its own gods, customs,
The
practice of
and so on.
piety differs
not
family
to family. For the citizen, the meaning of piety elements; what makes
only from city to city, but from lies in its irreducibly

are the activities and tradi
own group.
particular
life
worth
living
his
tions he shares exclusively with the that the ancestral custom of
members of
He
would
deny
has anything important in common with that of another people. He certainly does not regard his city's cult as an instance let alone "man's reliance of a more general phenomenon called "civic his
people
piety,"
on
divinity."18
These facts
should give us pause. a
By formulating
who
a generic con
cept of
piety, and
by describing
"pious
man"
is the
citizen of no
city in
particular,
we relegate
to the status of the merely contingent what every citizen
considers essential. content of not
Athenian
piety.
We abstract, for example, from the specifically Athenian But if the Athenian way of life is the good life, would
Athenian piety be the only piety worthy of the name? It would surely be wrong to regard Athens as typical of other cities, or to suppose that the essence
of
Athenian piety
can
be
grasped
in terms
of
the general
features
of
piety
as
practiced
throughout the ancient world.
By
the same token, if the sacred dogmas

a successful critique of
nor would
of even one
city
other than
Athens
are
true,
Athenian
piety
would not establish
the
necessity for philosophy,

piety"
it legitimate
neces
our recourse
to such universals as "civic
and
"the
city."
Yet if it is
sary to
whether
investigate the
piety is
a
ancestral traditions of
virtue, the defense of
every city in order to determine philosophy is impossible: for there are
literally
a
thousands of cities.
another
There is
difficulty
try
to be considered. Athens and Socrates are parties to

out which side
dispute. Our task is to find

demand that
a we
is in the
right.
Justice
and
alike
to understand each side
from its
own point of view
philosophy be
fore rendering
judgment. But it is horizon

of
by
no means certain that we can recover the
Socrates'
authentic moral
accusers.
The
problem
is
not so much the
17. 18.
Plato, Apology 26b; Euthyphro 2b. Cf. Harry V. Jaffa, "The Csse Agsinst Political
Theory"
in
Equality
and
Liberty (New York: Revolution: An

Inpp.
Oxford
University Press.
1965) pp. 221-29;
and
Harry Neumsnn.
"Rebellion
or
terpretstion of the Platonic Christisn

161-74.
Tradition,"
The Journal of Value
Inquiry
9 (Summer 1975),
229

of present
we
incompleteness
character.
day
historical
studies as their
inherently
theoretical
Unless
cannot rule out
already know that Athenian orthodoxy is a delusion, we the possibility that it must be in order to be understood.
"lived"
The
philosopher wants
to examine
all
the pros and
cons of an
issue before
mak
ing up his all but the

serious ered
mind.
But is it
not conceivable
that his very
impartiality
reasonable
blinds him to
most superficial aspects of
the citizen's life?
We seem, then, to be faced study

of
with a predicament. grant
It is
to undertake a
the
the
universal
Euthyphro only if we in the singular event of
the possibility that Plato discov

trial and condemnation, and
"
Socrates'
was able
to embody his universal vision
in the
particular
images
of
his
poetry.
Yet if
we
suppose, however provisionally, that the case for "the
stands or
falls
with the case
for Athens,
regards
peoples. suppose
For every city

that the case that a
impugn the self-understanding of all ancient itself as unique in the decisive respect. And if we
we
can
for Athens
be
reconstructed
from historical
materials,
we tacitly deny training in Athenian sacred tradition provides any special insight into the requisites of a good life. In both instances we assume beforehand what
Socrates
must
try
to prove, namely, that the good
is
not
identical
with
the
ancestral.
These difficulties have
as a rule
been
overlooked
in
recent studies of
Platonic
dialogues. Almost equally ignored is the problematic character of the most fa defense speech at his trial. Socrates repeatedly con mous argument in Whereas they think they know fellow than his tends that he is wiser
Socrates'
citizens.20
what
is
noble
and
good, but do not
know, he
at
neither
knows,
nor thinks
he
knows. Although
not wise
other
himself, he is
mistake
least
aware of
his ignorance. The
Athenians,
knowledge
It is
not
on
the
hand,
their opinions
about virtue and
divinity
for
of those
matters.21
clear,
however,
that their error is as serious as Socrates
suggests.
Per
haps they are unable to prove the truth of their convictions, not because ortho intelli doxy is false, but because the ancestral code is a work of superhuman guide gence. Would divine legislation be necessary if men could correctly
themselves
by
their own unaided
powers?
And
would
they
not
they
zens
could understand
fully
the reasons behind a divinely-revealed
have that ability if law? The least
one can
if citi guidance would not be "the one thing say is that divine is reasonable, then, could find a rational foundation for their way of life. It beliefs to
appear somewhat unreasonable.
for
pious
Their
unevident character
Socrates must have does not, in itself, furnish grounds been aware that there is an alternative to philosophy for those who have lost their dogmas faith. Faith is entirely compatible with the simple trust in orthodox for questioning
them.22
19.
Leo Strauss, The
City
and
Man (Chicsgo: Rand McNally, 1964)
PP-
141-45-
20.
21
.
Plato, Apology Apology 22c-e,
20d-23e.
29a-b. and
22.
Cf. Strauss, Natural Right
History,
pp. 74-75-
230
view
Interpretation
divine but do
not
that men only
know the highest
good.23
Unless knowl
edge of
ignorance
goes
beyond the insight that the truth

the mere belief that traditional
of
known, philosophy
dom. The
the right
essary.
rests on
wisdom
orthodoxy is not is not wis
philosopher would and
have to
quest
admit
that
life,
hence that his
for
evident
way of life might be knowledge is not evidently nec

city's
his
In
other
words, he
would
have to
admit that
he
presumes
to know
what of
he
does
rance
not
know.
Philosophy
is the
pursuit of wisdom
not."
only if knowledge
igno
includes the knowledge that "Zeus is

radicalism of
The uncompromising cursory reading could be cited in be

of a
the Euthyphro may not be apparent from a for Socrates does not make a single statement that book, court of law as plain evidence of unbelief. But we should not
the
exercises restraint
otherwise.
dangerous for him to do
in presenting his thoughts; it would be Meletus has already indicted him for impiety and corrupting the young; Euthyphron, young interlocutor, is a diviner who considers himself a favorite of the gods; and the conversation takes place
surprised that
he
Socrates'
just beyond the

whom
hearing
of the
Athenian high priest, the
King Archon, before

him
questions mani
Socrates has been
summoned to answer the charges preferred against
in the indictment. Yet it
cannot
be denied that
Socrates'
some of
festly
of a
tend to make orthodoxy look ridiculous, or that some of
his
statements are
kind few god-fearing men would dare to utter. Socrates is not outspoken, but he does speak boldly. For this we have Euthyphron to thank. He is too dull to see
the implications of
Socrates'
remarks.
In his
own peculiar
way, moreover, he is
pro
shameless and an outsider to mainstream

phetic experiences make
Athenian life. Most important, his doubt

about the gods.
him
proof against all
to
Euthyphron, therefore, Socrates

be
neither safe nor
can permit
himself
degree
of
In speaking latitude that
would
Once
one understands
one realizes see
that
Plato,
as
ordinary citizen. is Socrates not free to why say exactly what he thinks, a writer, is subject to similar constraints. One begins to
spokesman a master of subtle
fitting
in
a conversation with an
why Plato
chose
for his
irony. But Plato's
re
serve
is dictated
even more
by
pedagogical considerations than pious men.
by
his
wish nei an
ther to
harm,
nor to
be harmed by,
life.24
A Platonic dialogue is
aim
intro
duction to the
philosophic
Its controlling
is to
enable
thoughtful
acquire
readers to arrive at their own

Socrates'
independent insights,
presents
and to
help
them
something
of
openness, precision,
and speculative
daring. Accord
as
ingly,
what a
Platonic dialogue
a
is
not so much a
teaching
the essential that evi
evidence
for
teaching, along
as
with clues
for
finding
in
what
and
interpreting
what
dence. The
clues and the evidence
lie
as much
is done, in
as
happens in
in the dialogue,
23.
in
what
is
said.
Plato's teaching is,

Republic
of
it were,
embedded
On
Socrates'
skepticism sbout the good, cf.
505a-e.
see
24.
and
On the
pp.
literary character and
pedagogical
function
on
Plato's dialogues,
-Meno'
Strauss. The
Man,
50-60, and Jacob
Klein, A Commentary
Plato'
(Chapel Hill:
City University of
North Carolina Press, 1965)
pp. 3-31.
231
the

of
interplay
the speeches and deeds of his characters. The

on all
"meaning"
of a
given speech clude
depends
the circumstances
bearing
the
upon
it. These may in

the theme and
situa poetic
the character, abilities, and
intentions
as a
of
interlocutors;
conversational
setting
of
the
dialogue
which
whole; the immediate dramatic
tion and thematic context
in
the speech occurs; historical events,

or
verses, and previous arguments to which the speaker refers

effect of
alludes;
and
the
the speaker's words on other characters in the work.
Only by
paying
close attention to circumstances

quences of
like these
can the crucial premises and conse
the arguments be
brought to light.
The Euthyphro has two

"interlude."
main parts which are separated
by
brief
and comic
Each
main part
has
tacit thesis. In the
to
conclude
that ancestral custom
is beset
by
of
first (2ai-nb5) we are led irremediable contradictions which

who seek guidance
foster
confusion and
discord in the lives
those
from it.
Specifically, we discover that pious devotion to the ancestral is in tension with justice; yet it is precisely the most pious men who consider justice the noblest of
the virtues, and who regard
its basic
precepts or rules as sacred commandments
laid down
by
the gods. The chief conclusion to
be drawn from the

rule us nor care
second part us.
(Iie4-i6a4) is that the gods, if they exist, neither is a human affair, not an attribute of divinity.
The theme
of justice runs through
for
Justice
both
main parts of
the
dialogue; it is
the real
source of the work's unity.
The Euthyphro invites us, in different
ways and with
varying degrees of explicitness, to examine the holy (id doiov) in light of its re lation to the just (to dixaiov). It is sufficient to mention here that Euthyphron
and
Socrates first
come
to sight as prosecutor and defendant in
legal battles
In
con
cerned with
injustice
and
impiety,
and not as prophet and philosopher.

never occur
fact,
word
"philosopher"
the
word
and
kindred terms
Socrates'
in the dialogue; the defense "in
"prophet"
(Lidvrig)
occurs a
The Euthyphro is
only once (3e3). defense of justice;

nor
speech
not a
for
Socrates
ample
makes no
formal apologia, be
solely "in
deed,"
although we are given
opportunity to observe his justice in action. It

what could called whose a
"care."
who proposes
apy"
is Euthyphron, not Socrates, definition of justice: {fEgonsia, "ther

make
or
It is Socrates deeds
deeds
that definition
intelligible
and
bear
witness
to its truth. Yet
if,
as
Euthyphron
also
contends, piety is justice to

skillful
Socrates'
the gods,
man
cannot vindicate
him.
Socrates'
beings, his
"corruption"
of the young,
is
unjust
if the
impiety
caring he
of
hu is
"teaches"
a crime against the gods.
In
spite of this
fact,
or rather
What justice is ultimately depends on what divinity is. just because of it, the critique of ancestral gods sug
out of a simple
what
gested
in the Euthyphro develops

justice among
men.
Socrates'
but
sustained reflection on
even
the
practice of
And,
is remarkable,
if in
a sense en
tirely
predictable,
choice of that procedure also
retical grounds.
It is
partly
a consequence of
solely on theo his intention to do justice to

not rest
prophet
does
Euthyphron, by administering
the
therapy
which
the
desperately
needs.
232
Interpretation
PART ONE: NOMOI
I. The Indictment (2alê6)
Socrates
Archon
on
and
Euthyphron
meet
by
chance.
answer
Each has
come
to the Porch of
against
legal business: Socrates to

to
the charges
brought
him
King by
ei
Meletus, Euthyphron
ther
bring
suit against
his father for
murder. called. out.
Socrates has
just
arrived or
completed
has been waiting for his turn to be (cf. i5e2-3) and is on his way business his
Euthyphron has
It is then that their
paths cross. opens the dialogue by abruptly asking Socrates what strange new come about to make him leave his familiar haunts in the Lyceum and has thing pass his time instead at the King's Porch. He doubts that Socrates too has a case
Euthyphron
(dixn) before the King. Apparently he knows that Socrates shuns the courts of law, but has not yet heard about impending trial. Euthyphron's igno
Socrates'
rance
is
more
an event of
revealing of his character than is his knowledge. An impiety trial is intense public concern. In the city's view, the impious man betrays
the gods; in a very real sense,
the highest authority

Meletus'
he is guilty of treason. is the most talked about political topic of indictment, may suppose, the day. Euthyphron's ignorance of it suggests that he is not a political man, nor
we even an
informed
citizen.
speaking to a foreigner.
Socrates, at any rate, answers him as though he were a suit Athenians, he observes stiffly, do not call
"it"
(dixn) but
an
indictment (ygacpfj). If 'What
on earth are you
doing
you
here?'
is
the gist of Euthyphron's opening question, 'Where on earth the import of

Socrates'
have
been?'
is
Socrates'
reply.
first
statement
borders
law"
on rudeness. not speak
Aixr]
can mean
"case at
corrects
suit."
as well as
"civil
Euthyphron did
carelessly, yet Socrates

to
notice
him
as
though
he did.
Ignoring
or
failing
the
cool
reception,
Euthyphron
cannot
conjectures that
Socrates
must
imagine Socrates
indicting
anyone.
asks
be the defendant in the case, as he is terse and "Surely

not,"
Socrates'
uninformative reply.
Euthyphron then
Socrates
whether someone
has in
dicted him. Socrates merely answers, "Of We begin to suspect he would prefer not to have this conversation. As the drama unfolds it will become
increasingly
obvious
to us that
Socrates is
not
fond
of
Euthyphron. In fact,
Socrates tries repeatedly to bore and annoy the young prophet. The discussion lasts as long as it does because the garrulous Euthyphron is not easily put off: he is perhaps the most obtuse of Plato's characters. Euthyphron, moreover, is not
the kind of person Socrates could
discourage
by
claiming
that the
daimonion for
in
bids them to
associate
(cf. Theages I28e, Theaetetus 151a).
By
profession an
"demonic"
man termediary between gods and humans, Euthyphron is himself a (cf. Symposium 202e-203a), and, as may be inferred from some of his later re marks, imagines he is on good terms with unseen guide. Socrates could
Socrates'
233
avoid
An Interpretation of
only
the
Euthyphro
this exchange
a previous engagement and
the
latter he
cannot
simply rude, or by pleading the excuse of his leave. The former he is unwilling to do; taking do. His appointment with the King that is, the law
This
will not
by becoming
obliges
him to
remain.
be the last time the discloses both
combined
forces
of
law
and obtuseness compel
Socrates
to
speak.'
The
beginning
of
the Euthyphro
who
does
and who
does
not
take part
in the discussion. Not far from the
scene of the
action, but far
enough to
hear nothing of what Euthyphron and Socrates say to chon. At no point in the dialogue does he make
Euthyphron's opening
the
work
each
an
other, is the
King
and
Ar-
appearance;
after
reference to
him,
still
the
King
is
not mentioned again.
When
ends, he is presumably
out
in the court,
hearing
cases.
Plato has
from the dialogue, and with good reason. The King is the official representative of Athenian orthodoxy. An investigation of piety could not take place under his watchful eye; accordingly, it will occur behind his
singled
him
for
exclusion
back.
Yet,
though the
at
King
plays no part
in the dialogue, he in
a sense makes
it
possible.
Only
his
official residence would
Socrates have been
constrained to
talk with Euthyphron. And even as the
his Porch is the setting
of the conversation, so
main
King
himself
epitomizes
the larger political setting in which the
the
we
matic problem of must review a
the Euthyphro first comes to light. To see why this is so,

of
bit
history
that
was and
The
ships,
Kingship
or chief
was
the oldest
familiar to Plato's contemporary audience. most sacred of the nine Athenian Archonpolitically.
magistracies, but the least important
The
man occu
pying the position was called

monial
King (BaoiX-Evg) because

Kings, but he
neither commanded
he
performed the cere
functions
of the ancient
was not even a
titular monarch.
Appointed annually
the councils of
of
by
lot. he
the armies nor participated in
war and peace.
His judicial
competence was
limited to the
sphere
his priestly duties. He initiated hearings in cases of impiety and disputes over priesthoods. Homicide cases also came before him, since it was commonly be
lieved that
ered
an unavenged or unexpiated
unacceptable
killing
polluted the
its devotions
to the
gods.2
The Kings
of old
community and rend led the armies and
broadly
invoke
justice
administered
justice;
ruled
and their political power was
founded
on their sac
right
erdotal authority.
They
the city in
virtue of an exclusive
hereditary
relation
to
the gods and offer the

and
sacrifices.3
An
inquiry
into the
between
piety would have been inconceivable in the age of the Kings. The dis tinction between politics and religion, being of no practical consequence, was all
but invisible. In democratic Athens,

"merely"
on
the other
hand,
with
its annually ap
than
pointed
King
who was
a priest, that
distinction
was more evident
in any
of
previous regime.
The opening lines
of
the dialogue disclose its "conditions
possibility."
i.
Cf. Plato, Apology
19a.
2.
nings
Aristotle, Athenian Constitution 57.1-3; Martin P. Nilsson, Greek Piety, Rose (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948) p. 44.
Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City.
pp.
trans.
Herbert Jen
3.
176-79;
Plato, Statesman
29od-e.
234 It is
Interpretation
not
versation.
only necessary but fitting that the King He is the law's spokesman, and law is
Thou Shalt Nots. It does
to be
accepted as
not
take part in a
Socratic
con
nondialogic.4
The law
"speaks"
in the imperative. Ancient law in

Thou Shalts
and
particular presents not give
itself
as an assemblage of
reasons,
or
such as are meant gal
final
and not open
to question.
very few, and only There are "le law
questions,"
to
whether
says, not
it
be sure, but their intent is In speaks truly or

rightly.5
always to establish what the

view of
the appropriateness of the

suspect that simple obedi
King's
exclusion
from the dialogue,
we are
inclined to
ence cannot be one of Euthyphron's outstanding traits.
Some
confirmation of not
this
has already appeared. We noted earlier that Euthyphron said he could ine Socrates indicting anyone. A more literal rendering of his words
that
imag
be
y
would
he does
not
impute
such
thing
to
Socrates
no
(oti
ydg
exe'ivo
xarayvcboopiai, 2b2).
prosecute a case on
Apparently he
of
thinks
self-respecting
person would
behalf
the
city.
Euthyphron
now asks a
third question of Socrates: Who has indicted you?

not
Socrates Socrates
replies that
and
he does
(vsog, 2b8)
unknown;
but
people call
exactly know the man, him Meletus Euthyphron
who appears
and
to be young his deme is Pittheus.

with
goes on
to ask
whether and a
can recall a
Pitthean Meletus
says
lanky hair,
and
a sparse
beard,
hooked
a
nose.
Euthyphron
he
cannot.
Socrates'
portrait of
Meletus is
beautiful
example of the union of seriousness
play which is ever present in Platonic dialogues. "New (\'Eog) and is the opposite of old and established; the phrase is almost a formula for ignoble distinguished ancestry could be identified by his patronym; it be necessary to specify the shape of his By describing Meletus (oi< "not well Socrates again hints that his ac evyeveiov, 2bn),
man of
nose.6
birth. A
would not
bearded"
as
cuser
is
not well
born (oil
evyEVEia).
And
by
Socrates insinuates that democratic Athens is
not well
calling him Pitthean Meletus, born. This is a serious al is linked to
legation, for
whatever
lacks
a noble pedigree stands outside the order constituted

of
by
ancestral custom.
cal events of
Here again, the meaning Athenian history.
the text
certain criti
The
custom of name
identifying
a citizen
by
the name of
his deme
rather of
than
by
his
father's
racy.
had been instituted
by Cleisthenes,
the true founder
the Democ
His
purpose
origins of of the
in altering the official mode the multitude he had elevated to

was
of address was
to camouflage the
or man
citizenship.7
The demesman,
Cleisthenes'
dfJLiog,
Socrates'
originally
a sort of profane
being.
Lacking
ancestral ties to the
gods, he was not

4.
permitted
to approach the
city
altars.
innovations
dialogue
with
the Laws in the Crito
(50a-
54c!) is actually
a conversation with
himself.
5.
Plato, Laws
722b-723b; Statesman
294c
6. Adam hooked
speculates that the particle
nose was regarded as majestic
de before i.-tiygiurov ("hooked nose") is concessive; a (cf. Republic 474<*7), as was a full growth of beard. Socrates
ed.
seems to suggest that

'Euthyphro'
Meletus makes up in nose what he lacks in beard. See James Adam, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1890).
21
.
Plato's
7.
Aristotle, Athenian Constitution
235

the overthrow of the aristocratic priest caste, which had retained its the
religious organization of
completed
sanctity
reforms political
and control over
the city despite the

stripped of
earlier
introduced
by
Solon. The
continued
old
families had been
hereditary
of
privileges, but
to command respect and obedience as heads
the four Ionion tribes. Cleisthenes suppressed the traditional tribes,

them with ten new tribes
and replaced
divided into
the smaller geographic units called demes.

males on
In the demes he
equality.
enrolled all men
freeborn Athenian
the basis of strict legal
As
result,
formerly
excluded altogether
from
religious associa
Meletus"
tion obtained a
minder of
worship and access to priesthoods. "Pitthean the profane basis of democratic politics. Athens, in becoming
is
a re
a regime
of equality,
forfeited her
claim
to be founded on the
sacred.8
Orthodox piety is
cestral custom.
gods"
said to
Meletus,
who claims
be the worship of the ancestral gods according to an to indict Socrates "on behalf of the ancient
of
(3b3),
could vouch
for the orthodoxy
the democratic
regime
by
citing
gods
all
the ancient rituals that are

a
faithfully
of
observed
.
by
the Athenians of his day. But

-
worship is essentially
properly, one must
rendering
all their
honors (cf
1 5ao.
1 o) , and to
honor the
which
keep
commandments,
including
law,"
those
bind the To
community to its way of life distinguish the "ceremonial

one
by
law"
sanctioning the rule of a from the "political

the
ultimate
specific class of men.
in
order
to obey the
but
not
the other,
is
to
deny
authority
of
the
ancestral.
Without
being
aware of
it,
the Athenians have acted on the

of
principle
that man
is free to
choose
his
own
way
life,
or that
divine law is
subordinate
to human law.
Athens
To
shares
in the
guilt of
Socrates.
what sort of
return to
the text, Euthyphron asks Socrates
indictment has
least,"
been brought
against
him. "No
offers
ignoble9
[sort], it
seems
to me at
claims to
Soc
know
rates replies, and
he
the
following
explanation.
Meletus
how the young are corrupted and who it is that corrupts them, and it is no mean thing to have understood so great a matter when one is young. Perhaps he is a wise man, who, "observing how my ignorance is corrupting his peers, comes be
me."
fore the city,

the
as
his
mother,
in
order
to accuse
And Meletus
appears
to
be
the only one among the

right
statesmen
to rule in the right way
(dg-dcog,
2cio).
For
so that they will be the best way is to have taken care of the young first, plants possible, even as a good farmer is likely to have taken care of the young
first before attending to the

us"
rest.
And
perhaps
Meletus is first weeding
out
"those
of
who corrupt
the
tender sprouts of
the young. After he has done that,
he
will of course take care of and greatest goods
his
elders
too,
at
and so
become
the
responsible
for the
most
for the
city.
Such,
least, is
likely
result of
the kind of
beginning
We
he has
made.
are struck
by
the
incongruity
We
of these remarks.
Why
should
Socrates lav
a
partic-
ish
such praise on
his
accuser?
must not
forget that he is speaking to

pp.
8. As Seth Benardete
"Ignoble"
argues
in Herodotean Inquiries (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969)

"clanless"
144-46.
"familyless."
9.
translates ayevvi)g. which

word
literally
means
or
In this literal
sense, the
aptly describes Euthyphron's lawsuit.
236
Interpretation
he may
wish
ular person whom soon
to affect in a
particular way.
Euthyphron,
as will
become
apparent extols
^5-305), is
contemptuous of political men.
Perhaps,
in
order
then, Socrates
Meletus'
wisdom, statesmanship, and public spirit

Socrates'
to antagonize Euthyphron. It may seem obvious to us that

sincere.
praise
is in
might
But if it
seems so
to
Euthyphron, he
might still resent
it; for he
perceive that
will also
its blunt
sarcasm applies more
directly
not
to him than to Meletus. As

who
become apparent, it is Euthyphron,

Socrates'
Meletus,
fancies himself
surpassingly wise and presumes to know better than his elders. In any event, remarks because they do not answer his Euthyphron should be irked by
question.
He had
and
asked:
What
sort of
indictment has been brought is ygacpr)
against you?
The
simple
legally
correct
answer
dof3iag
said a
indictment for
impiety. Socrates
withheld
this
information; in fact he
from
law"
the legalities of his case. This "abstraction
is
nothing at all about clue to a deeper mean

of guilt and
ing
of
his
Socrates'
reply.
words
are
at
once
confession
an
affirmation of
his superiority to
is just
and
The declare
citizen's view of what
law-abiding citizens. corruption is decisively shaped by the laws. unjust, holy and unholy; and they typically
the city's
The laws
reflect,
if
they do
not always
determine,
dominant
opinions about what
is
noble
and good.
In
democracy,
the
the connection between public opinion and law

routine manner
is
ex
ceptionally
an
close.
It is true that the
in
which popular assemblies
make and repeal
laws is
daring
innovation. Law in the

would view
ancestral
polity
was
inheritance
and thought
to be irrevocable. It
be
mistake,
however,
to
to
suppose
of
democratic
citizens
hold the
"sophistic"
that law
is merely the
will
the stronger.
They
itself,'"
believe the
gods
have
authorized the
community
lay
down laws for

against
and that the gods
stand
ready to
punish
transgressions
of cor
those laws.
From the
citizen's point of
view, therefore, the height
ruption would
be
disrespect for law
so extreme that one could no
longer tell for
right
from
wrong. we
Socrates,
law
man
may infer,
corrupts
"the
young"
by
replacing their
respect
with moral skepticism.
For he
"teaches"
that the wise man and only the wise

while
knows
what
corruption
is,
denying
Meletus
opinions
could not
be the only
statesman to rule
that any man is truly wise. in the right way if the lawful
men as a
regarding
corruption were true.
And if Meletus is to
farmer is
to plants, his wisdom is greater than

wise enough
to know that wisdom
human. Socrates, however, is apparently is like farming. Farming is an art of tending

on some
things that grow ture (cpvoig).
(cpvxoi, 2d3),
know-how based
natures of men,
knowledge
of na
Meletus knows the
and cares
practicing an art. He begins by distinguishing the lawful from the from the natural; then he rules as though the lawful did not
10.
for the city by artful, and both

Meletus is
a
exist."
Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1281317. On the classical distinction between nature, art, and law. see Lawrence Berns. "Rational Animal Political Animal: Nature and Convention in Human Speech and in Essays in Honor of Jacob Klein (Annapolis: St. John's College Press, 1976) pp. 30-31 ; cf. Lav IWS
11.
Politics,"
Plato,
237

Socrates
retracts this playful suggestion even as
philosophic statesman.
he
makes
it: Meletus
confounds
comes to
the city "as

with
his
mother."
It is
not sufficient to
the lawful
'2
the natural,
for he
seems to
say that he have forgotten the male

Athenian
factor
of generation. civic
Meletus'
piety is
of
an extension of
his filial
piety.
He
regards
cit
izenship
all.
as a
kind
He
would
quality one like to believe young Athenians
family
trait,
either
has "in the
blood"
or not at citizens
develop
into
into full-fledged
mature plants.
with
the same necessity that "tender
sprouts"
grow
If this be
lief
were
true,
however, he
law. Socrates
would not need
to care so much about the young:
"roots"
their
in Athens
would
be natural,
and would not
have to be inculcated
by
ev
education and
corrupts the
best
of
the young
by destroying
is
subversive
their
naive
identification
with a particular place on
the earth. This
in
ery city, but
more so
in Athens than in
soil of
most.
According
no reason
to an ancient myth, the
first Athenians sprang from the dants a blood tie to the

not a
Attica,
and so transmitted to their
descen is
motherland.13
There is
to think that Meletus
believer in this autochthony myth. From the philosopher's point of view, the lawful belief in the naturally impossible. is piety Before we proceed any further into the dialogue, let us try to formulate more precisely how Socrates corrupts "the man to rule correctly is the one who proceeds He implies that the
myths and ancient
"teaches"
young."
According
after are
to
him,
the only states
the manner of a good farmer. to be
principles of wise
statesmanship
drawn,
not
from
He
traditions, but from the
natural order of
human
needs.
some of the
young that the only genuine good is the natural good, and
that what
good
is
good
by
nature
or of
merely by convention how cities should be governed, is uprooting because it is universal; it is skeptical because the principles of nature, and in particular of human nature, are
may be different from and even opposed to what is or law. Nature as a standard of how one should live,
controversial.
Socrates,
the
at
any rate, denied that he

nature.14
or
any
other philosopher
had
attained a genuine science of
The
simile of
statesman as
farmer invites
comparison with
that of the
leg
islator
while asks
as
cross-examining
tell
who
horse trainer, which Socrates, in the Apology, obliquely introduces When Socrates Meletus about the corruption
charge.15
him to
makes
the young
better, Meletus
bids him to
replies, "The
laws,"
Socrates
objects
that this
is
no answer, and
place this
name a particular
laws."
human democ
being,
"who knows in the first

who make
racy it is the many

that all
corrupts.
the
laws, Meletus is
young
very thing, the at length

all except
Since in
compelled
to affirm
the Athenians improve the
for Socrates,
proves
who alone
Socrates does
that the
not
deny
this
accusation.
In fact he
it
to
be true
by
implying
12.
law,
or at
any
rate
the laws of the
Democracy,
are the real
Cf. P\ato, Republic
4l4c-e.
13. 14.
15.
Plato, Menexenus
Plato, Phaedo
Plato. Apology
237b-238b; cf. Laws
663e-664a; Statesman 296b,
27ia-b.
953L-99C.
246-
25c.
238
Interpretation
In the
case of
source of corruption.
horses, he
observes, it is some one person, or
very few, have to do
the horse
trainers,
who make them corrupt
better,
whereas
the many,
if they
other
with or use
horses,
adds.
them. And the same holds
for every
kind
of
animal, Socrates
similies suggest
Both
while
the need
for
and the
impossibility
of
the rule of wisdom,
alluding to nature as the standard of the human good. But the

to the natural root of convention. There is
horse trainer
more
simile points
in fact
than a
vir
superficial resemblance
between
a good citizen and a well-trained and
horse: the
tues
not
of
both
are produced
by
habituation. Unlike horses

The horseman is
a ruler of
citizens,
plants can
be habituated
or trained.
horses; only in
farmer is
the
loosest but
a
sense
is the farmer
a ruler of plants.
The
statesman as
not a ruler
cultivator of
the mind
an educator.
His
main task appears to
tive: weeding out the sources of corruption so nature can

none other than
be purely nega take its course. He is he had

earlier
Socrates himself, who, in the

compared
of
conversation
in the from
day
with
Theaetetus,
opinions
his
maieutic art of
delivering
young
men
their
false has
to the art
farming.16
To
phron
come
no
statesman.
back to the conversation, we are not surprised to find that Euthy idea Socrates has been praising himself as the wisest Athenian Nor is he aware that Socrates spoke the truth in suggesting that
succeeds
Meletus, if he
mines respect natural order. modes.
most and greatest goods
in weeding out persons like Socrates, will procure the for the city. The city is injured by anything that under
appeals
It
for its laws, but philosophy would appear that Socratic

can
from the lawful

principal
order to
the
Socrates
dissemble his thoughts

what
irony by saying
mean.
has two
techniques or
not mean,
what
he does
and even more guilt seems so
by saying exactly incredible at first, that

as sense of
he does
His truthful
as not
admission of
we are apt
to
dismiss it
tended, is, cause he has no

that
praise great
ironic. Euthyphron does
not make
seriously in this mistake, but only be

Socrates'
humor. Oblivious to the
comedic aspect of
for his accuser, Euthyphron says that although he hopes the city will reap benefits, he fears the opposite may happen. "For, in my opinion, [Meletus]
simply harms the city,

you."
beginning
with the
hearth,
public
when
he
undertakes to
injure
Euthyphron
compares
Socrates to the
for
or
common
hearth
(xoivr)
families
Eoxia), the most sacred object in the city. The establishment of this shrine was the
decisive into
act
in the
city's
founding;
what
originally bound
unrelated
a single
same altar.
strike
at the community Even in Plato's day, many Athenians believed that calamity would if the eternal flame were ever permitted to burn Euthyphron implies
out.17
was their agreement to offer common
devotions
that
Socrates is
a pillar and support of community, perhaps a sacred
being. He is
16. 17.
Plato, Theaetetus \49e; cf. Phaedrus 276b-277a. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City. pp. 137, 146-47.
239
not

a
joking. He thinks Socrates is
fellow
prophet
(304),
and that
prophecy is the
salvation of
families
life
and cities
(cf. I4b4).
The
religious
of the ancient
family,
even more than
that of the city, cen

and
tered around a sacred

almost royal
fire. Each
family
was a
tiny
congregation,
the father's
as priest of
authority within the home was inseparably connected with his role hearth.18 the domestic Hestia, the goddess of the hearth, consecrated
the
union of each
political
truth
household worship with the is reflected in the fact that this
common civic
worship.19
A basic
of the
goddess, the central
deity
polis,
was also
the defender of peace and concord within the home. Love

can sometimes conflict with
of
fam fam
ily,
although
it
patriotism, is
nonetheless
its firmest
a
foundation. Devotion to the city is the

whose
natural consequence of
devotion to
well-being is perceived to be dependent upon the city, just as respect ily for fellow citizens is largely an extension of respect for citizen parents. Simi
larly,
obedience
to the
city's
laws
can
nurtured and supported attacks
by
the
"laws"
disposition only if it is of the household. Is it not Euthyphron who become

a settled
the city at its
hearth, by undertaking
his fifth
and
to prosecute his own
father?
wants
Euthyphron
now asks
last
question
in the dialogue. He
to
know
what
Socrates has been
accused of says
doing
young.
"Strange things.
are not strange
Socrates,
(noiovvxa, 3a8) to "at least on first
corrupt
hearing"
the
implying they
continues,
if
one gives a maker and
the matter some thought.

of gods. old
Meletus, he
he has in
accuses
him
of
being
(noinxf]v, 3b2)
not
"And because
make
(noiovvxa, 3b2)
me on
new
gods,
do
believe in the
gods,
dicted
behalf
of those old ones, as

exchange
he
says."
The
pose
emphasis and
in this its
is
is
on
the
verb jtoie'iv
(to
do,
to make, to com
poetry)
cognate noun
fact that his

behalf
of
accuser
a poet.
KOir\xr)g (maker, poet). Socrates alludes to the Whereas he says here that Meletus indicted him on
the
ancient
gods, in the
Apology he
no
says
Meletus
attacked
him "on be
Aside
half
of the
poets."20
There is
no contradiction
between the two
accounts.
from
stake
prophets
like Euthyphron,
group in the city has

was
a greater professional
in
the gods than the poets.
It
commonly believed, for
example, that
or
poets composed their works with the aid of

sion."21
divine
"inspiration"
"posses
The
great
poets, moreover, were
revered as
teachers and authorities on
theological
"makers"
matters.
Homer
and
Hesiod
can with some
justice
even
be
called
of the Greek world, as their poems

virtue and
defined in
divine.22
more or
less final form

critique of
Socrates'
recognizably Greek view of would be incomplete without notably Hesiod,

18. 19.
20.
the
law
a critique of poetry.
For it
was
the
founding
poets,
who
fixed in
the Greek mind the belief in Olympian Zeus as the
See James Adam's
Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City. pp. note on Euthyphro 2a3.
25-29.
21. 22.
Plato, Apology 2^5. Plato, Ion 533d-535a, 535e-536d; Phaedrus 245a. Herodotus, Inquiries 2.53; Plato, Republic 6o6e-6o7a.
240 avenging
Jioit]Tt]g.
Interpretation
guardian of
the lawful
order.23
By
playing
on
the dual
Socrates hints that the Olympians
are conscious or unconscious
meaning of inven
tions of the poetic imagination. He intimates that Meletus should

and
indict himself
to the conflict
the
other members of
the inspired tribe. The old quarrel
between philosophy
as that conflict
and poetry, mentioned
by Socrates
in Republic X, human
refers above all
between philosophy
pears
and
the sacred element of political

reason. or
from the
perspective of unaided
more strange: that
Socrates is
a maker of
gods,
ap It is difficult to say which is that he is a poet. What ceases

notion
life,
to be strange when the matter

made.
is
given some
thought, is the
that gods are
In the Apology. Meletus does
not accuse and
Socrates
of
making
new
gods, but he
does
accuse
him
of
atheism;24
it is
more
than probable that a man who
makes new
gods,
who
and
does
not
believe in
the old ones,
believes in
none at all.
atheism, hears only the ring of Euthyphron, accusation of making new gods. He immediately as the familiar in the sumes Socrates has been falsely accused of "making innovations with regard to
apparently has
"strange"
no conception of
divine does
things"
of
tampering
his
with
traditional modes of sacrifice and prayer.

sure
He
not
bother to
ask
rassed on account of
constantly comes to him. Nor does Euthyphron doubt that Meletus (whom he never deigns to men
tion
how this calumny arose; he is daiiioviov, "the demonic
Socrates is
that
being
ha
thing"
by
name) acts from the basest
motives.
"He is going into the

such
court
in
order to your
slander
(diafiaXcov, 3b8) you,

are slandered
since
he knows that
things
[as
daiLioviov]
many."
easily Now Socrates is suffering from an "old prejudice (diafioXrj), but Euthyphron has Socrates discusses it
near
(EvdidfioXa, 3bc>)
not
to the
or, more accurately, an old
slander"
correctly divined
2i
what
it is.
beginning of the Apology. For a long time he has been suspected of investigating "the things in heaven and under the and men who investigate those matters are suspected of not believing in gods. It is this prejudice which the jurors "have held for a long and in which Meletus
the
time,"
earth,"
"trusted"
when
he brought the indictment. Its
source
is
Aristophanes'
comedy,
the
Clouds. In that play, Socrates is

between justice
the Olympian
and
presented as
conflict
nial of
injustice,
and this attitude
profoundly indifferent to the is traced directly to his de

might share
Gods.:"
Euthyphron,
evidently, has never seen a perfor the
mance of
the Clouds. Were it not for
his humorlessness, he too him
popular prejudice against
Socrates.
of atheism gives a certain resemblance to
Euthyphron's
Aristophanes'
unawareness
Strepsiades,
who, upon
hearing
from Socrates that "Zeus is

rules
imagines
23.
24.
"Vortex"
has dethroned Zeus

Days 213-93;
cf.
and now
in his
place.27
On
the
Hesiod, Works Plato, Apology
and
Homer, Iliad
16.384-93,
Odyssey
23.351-60.
26c-d.
25.
26.
Apology
l8a-d,i9a-c. 245-48.
Aristophanes, Clouds 886-87,

Clouds 364-425, 817-28.
27.
241
other

Strepsiades'
hand, by prosecuting his father, Euthyphron

a
resembles
son
Pheidippides. After receiving
for
failing
to appreciate a
Socratic education, Pheidippides beats his father Euripidean verse celebrating incest, and defends his
to nature and the right
subverts
of
unfilial
behavior
by
an appeal
the learned to
rule
the
ig
Aristophanes'
norant.28
Socrates
bunking
plicit phron
the
sacred prohibitions against
hence the city by de family incest and parricide. Plato's quarrel with
the
and
Aristophanes is
trust
a subordinate
but
not unimportant aspect of
the Euthyphro. Im
in the Olympians is
unfilial
an equivocal support
for the
family
of
tie, for
Zeus'
Euthy
defends his
behavior
by
an appeal
to the
justice
show
punish
ment of
his father Cronos (5e-6a5). Plato intends to

better than Aristophanes the
that
his Socrates
also
understands
requirements of civic
life. He
in
tends to show that

core of
he
can write
better
comedies than the

portrayal of an
best
comic
poet.29
The
every Aristophanic comedy is the though it were possible. Euthyphron is

Strepsiades
and
something impossible as impossible combination of rustic

of the
his
sophisticated son
Pheidippides,
father
and the father-
beater. "The Platonic dialogue brings to its
completion what could
be thought to
When
have been
completed
by
Aristophanes."30
many."
Euthyphron
ever
proceeds
to describe his
own
troubles
with
"the
he
as
not
says
laugh
said,
anything in the Assembly and foretells the future for them, they though he were mad. And yet, Euthyphron protests, nothing he has one prediction he has made, ever turned out to be untrue. "But they are
envious of all
ous
[persons] like
us,"
he
assures
Socrates. Rather than face the
obvi con
fact that they find him ceals a secret spite for the privileged few
But
although
ridiculous, Euthyphron supposes their

who
laughter
of
enjoy the
special
favor
divinity.
he
would
disdain for
ol jioXXoi
like to be proudly indifferent to their taunts, he is not. His is not free from bitterness; he resents them for not paying
one
him the in the
respect
he thinks he deserves. On the

many (ovdkv
calls
. .
hand he tells Socrates to take
no thought of the
same
cpgovxiueiv, 3C4); on the other
hand,
and
breath, he
for
a confrontation with them
(diidoE livai,
305).
envy Euthyphron, it would not be remarkable if they did. Prophets, like philosophers, are liable to both the envy and the con tempt of the multitude. Nonphilosophers are easily persuaded that the philoso pher knows things which are lofty and difficult to comprehend, but they do not
Although the Athenians do
not
see what
he
gains
man, yet one
from his knowledge. Thus they tend to regard him as a superior who foolishly neglects his own advantage. As for the prophet, he
and his closeness to the gods. But when may be envied for his divinatory power he foretells the future, his state of mind is one of madness or is akin to madness. As Plato's Timaeus explains, "Prophecy is a divine gift to human thoughtless
ness,
28. 29.
and no one
in his
-1473-
senses can
have any
share of
it; for it does
not occur
un-
Clouds
1 32 1
Essay,"
Allan Bloom, "Interpretative
in The Republic of Plato (New York: Basic Books,
1968)
pp. 380-81.
30.
Strauss, The City
and
Man,
p.
62.
242 less the

ease or
Interpretation
power of thoughtfulness
by
kind
of
enthusiasm.""
is fettered in sleep or disturbed, either by dis These words are not in themselves
prophecy, albeit
with uncom
irreligious; they
mon precision.
express a common opinion about
Prophecy
cause
in Sleep.
appear
decidely irreligious view is taken by Aristotle in his treatise On According to him, prophetic visions cannot be god-sent be
only to "the
men,"
they
even
most
paltry
not
to the most
intelligent.32
Now,
if
one grants that prophets are stupid or
mad, it does not
necessarily
follow that they are not divinely inspired. One must also human reason is divine or the most nearly divine thing in
tion
assume that perfected

man.33
If this assump
possible.
is rejected, a very different interpretation of the same facts is By re vealing their wisdom through the ravings of madmen, the gods show that human reason bears no relation to the highest things; and by putting true predictions into have
us
the mouths of paltry men, the gods would
know that
it.34
revelation comes
from them, There is

in the
not
from the
persons who communicate
the one prophecy Euthyphron himself. If Euthyphron were reflective, he

still another view of
half-consciously held by
might account an
for himself
following
terms.
Prophecy is
a union with the
divine,
"assimilation to
god."
It is thus simply enviable. Because a genuinely prophetic state lies outside the bounds of ordinary experience, it is essentially incommunicable, incapable of verification, and easily mistaken for lunacy. In truth, it is a divine madness, as
much above common sense as common sense
is
above mere madness. not to
Socrates
people
now advises at
his
"friend"
Euthyphron
be
so concerned
that
laugh
think someone
moment
him. The Athenians, he explains, do not care very much if they is clever, as long as he refrains from teaching his wisdom. But the
of
they
think he makes
get
angry, "whether out
(jtoie'iv, 3di) other people become like him, they envy (or jealousy, cp&ovog). as you say, or for
reason."
some other
that Socrates has been accused not only of making new gods but of human beings. Both charges are false. It is the city fathers who mould making the young, just as it is the poets who invent the gods. However, it is because
appears
It
Socrates is ology
which ways.
"maker"
not a
in
either sense that
he is
a radical
innovator in both the
and education.
the divine things Socrates introduces into the city, are conceived to exist of necessity or al And what exists always cannot be made and was never new.
contrast
In
to the
Olympians,
"ideas,"
the
Socrates'
view of the
logue
proceeds.
"method"
divine is radically unpoetic, as will become more evident as the dia As for his innovations in education, it suffices to say here that his is opposed to every kind of "social whereas it is only
conditioning,"
through such conditioning that the

other
dialogues,
there are quite a
young become citizens. As we know from few young men who consider Socrates the
31.
32.
Plato, Timaeus
7ie.
-24.
33.
34.
Aristotle. On Prophecy in Sleep 463b20-24, 464a2i Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics \11f12-l-j, H77b27-28, H78b20-23 Cf. Plato, Ion 534c-e.
243

in the
city.35
wisest man
They
They
own
respect,
honor,
and, in
some
consequently try to pattern themselves after him. cases, even love him more than they do their
the
parents.36
Small wonder, then, that

punishment of
Athenians
not
are
angry
at
him: He
alienates
the affections of their children.
Jealousy,
envy, is the passion that
cries out
for the
Socrates.
not eager
Euthyphron
attitude
remarks that
he is
to test the
toward
him
as a
teacher of wisdom. He
does
not realize show
Athenians regarding their he has already

clearly
enough
put them
what
to the test many times. think of
By
their
laughter, they
they
from them,
if,
as
less he
moulds
perceive he has nothing to fear Socrates suggested, the Athenians do not resent a wise man un others in his own image. Euthyphron cannot teach men to be
his
"wisdom."
Nor does he
prophets.
Prophecy
"art"
is
either a
divine
gift or a psychic
aberration; it is
not a
XEXvr],
an
or
teachable skill.
Socrates
makes no attempt to
dispel
Euthy
phron's apprehensions. cape
Instead, he
his
suggests that
Euthyphron has
on as
managed to es
indictment because he
never puts
himself
"But
display
and
is therefore
thought to be unwilling to teach
wisdom.
for
me,"
says
Socrates,
os
of
tensibly contrasting his
own situation with
Euthyphron's, "I fear
that
because
my love of mankind, they think I speak to every man, pouring have [in my mind], not only without pay, but even paying gladly pocket if anyone wants to hear
me."
out whatever
out of
my
own
We may safely
erty,"
assume that
Socrates,
on a
who
lived in "ten-thousandfold
pov
never paid anyone to
listen to
him.37
In the main, he has been
describing
out
Euthyphron,
whatever
not
himself.
mind
Putting
display, teaching his wisdom, pouring

point was to
is in his
these are the very things Euthyphron does

Socrates'
whenever
he
prophesies
in the Assembly.
biblical
founders
of modern
criticism.
outpouring
an urgent
of an uncontrolled
bluntly by According to Spinoza, prophecy is the imagination. According to Hobbes, a man who
made more
be
the
claims to speak
by
divine inspiration
or a
should
be
understood as
desire to speak,
high
opinion of
himself, for
It
was
which
saying that he has he can adduce

when
no natural or sufficient
reason.38
Socrates does describe himself

'id']).
he
refers
to
his love
mythical
of mankind
(cpiXav&gcoizia,
steal
this affection that led
the
Prometheus to
condemned
fire from the
gods and share
it
with men.
For
that crime Zeus
him to
a cruel punishment.
He bound Prometheus in
chains,
upon
nailed
him to the Caucasus Mountains,

which grew
and sent an eagle to
feed
daily
sto
his liver,
back
during
the
night.39
Socrates,
of
course, has
len nothing from Olympus. But he is, in Cicero's words, the first to call philoso comphy down from the heavens, to establish it in the cities and households, and
35. 36.
on
Plato, Apology
Cf. Lysis
23c, 33c, 37d-e; Symposium 174b,
d-e,
2i5a-222c;
Phaedo,
end.
207d-2iod and
David Bolotin's commentary

1979)
pp.
on that passage
in Plato's Dialogue
Friendship
37.
38.
(Ithaca: Cornell
University Press,
65, 84-86,
337d.
197.
Cf. Plato, Apology
23b-c. 3lb-c. 33b;
Republic
2;
Spinoza, Theologico-Political Treatise Hesiod, Works

123.
and
ch.
Hobbes, Leviathan
521-25.
ch. 32.
39.
Days 43-54.
Theogeny
561-70;
Aeschylus, Prometheus
Bound 11,
244
pel
Interpretation
about morals and things
good
it to inquire
and
bad.40
As the founder
of
ethical and political
philosophy, Socrates is compelled to examine and talk with

"pre-Socratic"
his fellow
citizens
to a
much greater
degree than any

philosophy, the activity
will
philosopher.
His Promethean
corrupts
gift
is this
conversational crime
by
which not
he
the
young.
For this
he
be
punished
by
the
Athenians,
by
Olympian Zeus.
We
are now
in
a position
to
see
tice. If
Euthyphron, fearing
"wisdom,"
an
jus something of the character of indictment by the Athenians, abstained from longer
expose
Socrates'
teaching his
Nor
would mysteries.
he
would no on
himself to
public ridicule.
he try,
He
as
he does later
spare
(5b5-c8),
to instruct
Socrates in divine
spare
would
himself
considerable
abuse,
and
Socrates
of
good
deal
of
bothersome
chatter.
But Euthyphron is in
consists
no real
danger
being in
dicted.
Socrates'
justice, then, partly

benefit. be
might well
in
deceiving
to
an
interlocutor for the in its
sake of their common

Socrates'
justice
mankind"
called
"friendly
view of
transpolitical character. "good

and
The young about whom he cares most are those with there is no necessary connection between having a good na
Socrates'
ture and that it
being
an
Athenian.
is informed
by
a sober
philanthropy differs from fascination with human things rather than
Prometheus'
in
for human
suffering.4'
Its
most obvious manifestation
pity is his gentleness, freedom
by
from anger, and the playful manner in which he treats the gravest matters. Typi cal of him is the remark he now makes to Euthyphron. "If [the Athenians] are go
ing
to laugh
at
me,
the time
joking
and
how this
situation
say they do at you, it would not be unpleasant to pass laughing in the court. But if they are going to be serious, then will turn out is unclear, except to you Euthyphron,
as you
prophets
on whom
much
humor is wasted,
"[Y]ou
will
responds that the affair

your case
probably
will not amount
to
fight
mind,"
I think I
mine."
shall
We
of course
according know that
to your
trial (or
he explains, "as
Socrates'
Plato's dramati
zation of
it)
proved
to have tremendous consequences for the whole of Western

perhaps the prophet made no mistake
thought and
history. But
in predicting
Socrates
would attain and
the outcome he
desired. There
are numerous
indications,
suicidal
in the Apology
defense.42
elsewhere, that Socrates conducted a
deliberately
//. The Lawsuit (3ej~5d6)
Euthyphron's
mention of
his
own case gives
Socrates
an
the questions and thus to

prophet's answers are at
gain a measure of control over
opportunity to ask the discussion. The

Euthy-
first
as
terse as the ones

purpose
Socrates
gave at the outset of the
dialogue. But
Socrates'
whereas
there was to avoid conversation,
40.
41
.
Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5.10. Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound 324-44.

Almost any passage of the Apology could be cited; but Also consider Meno 9ic-95a and Crito 45e-46a.
consider
42.
especially
250-276 and
36b-37a.
245
phron's
here is to create suspense. For example, when Socrates asks who the de fendant is, Euthyphron says, with a note of pride, that it is "Someone whom, by once again thought to be prosecuting, I am Euthyphron enjoys shock involved in a scandalous ing people. He shows no trace of shame about
mad."
being
lawsuit. It is
sure
not
unlikely that this
god-intoxicated enthusiast takes a certain plea
in making ordinary citizens squirm by his mere presence. His taste for the luridly spectacular is more noticeable at another place. When Socrates later asks
him
Cronos'
whether
castration of
not
Uranos
and other
hair-raising
not
tales about the
gods are
true, Euthyphron fail to
only
affirms that
they
are, but boasts of
knowing
and
"even
marvelous"
more
"astonish"
which cannot
things, which Socrates
the many
when
do
know (6b5-6),
whether
he hears them (6C7).
Socrates, wishing
is thought to be be
mad someone with wings. would mad
perhaps
to annoy the prophet,

"prosecuting"
inquires
or
Euthyphron
It be
because he is
As
with most
"chasing"
(bicbxEiv, 4a2)
has
a serious point. could not not exist.
Socratic jokes,
this one
to chase a
man with
wings, not only because he

winged men
caught, but also, and
more
importantly, because
after a spurious
do
Eu
thyphron, let him even if it
us
say, is chasing
immortality
which would elude
were
the genuine article. In the sequel, Socrates compares the little

Socrates'
diviner to mighty Heracles. Euthyphron responds to
from flying,
own
when
as
father,"
quip by remarking that the defendant is far he happens to be very old. "Then who is Socrates asks, "My the prophet replies. Socrates is startled, or pretends to be. And
he?"
it
finally
goes
comes out on
that the charge is murder, he exclaims:

are
"Heracles!"
Socrates
to say that the many

not
indeed ignorant
of what
is
right
(dgftdg,
(dgfjcdg,
advanced
4ai2). 4b I
For he does
what
any chance person could do correctly Euthyphron is doing. Rather, it would take someone far
think
in
wisdom. second
"Far indeed
by
Zeus,"
is the he
reply. wise man alone
This is the how to

and
time Socrates has suggested that the
knows
act correctly.
He did
so earlier when
praised
Meletus
as a wise man
rule in the right way (205 Socrates said Meletus because he knows how the young are corrupted and who corrupts them. He later disclosed that Meletus accuses him of corrupting the young by making
the only statesman to
-di).
is
wise
new gods and not
believing
is
correct
in the
in the
of
old ones
(3b2-3). Does Socrates

of our
imply
that
knowledge
of what
handling
affairs, or practical wisdom,
is inseparable from knowledge

grants that the
the true gods, or theology? Whether or not one
humblest
questions of practice
cannot
inevitably point to the

common sense
most
far rang
pow re
ing
questions of
theory, it
be denied that
is virtually
erless
to defend its judgments
against criticisms
drawn from
natural
science,
vealed
theology,
and metaphysics.
This is
one reason
public, contends that the
human
good must
why Socrates, in the Re be problematic as long as the idea of
the good is not

of that
idea.'
known. And according to him, we do not have a sufficient grasp Socrates is properly modest or pious in that he makes no claim to
505a-b, 505d-5o6a.
Plato, Republic
246
Interpretation
of
knowledge
sophic, as
divine things.
By
the same token,
tively
who
ascribe
it is nothing other than a quest to Socrates the view that true piety is
what
his piety is hubristic or philo for such knowledge. We may tenta

a theoretical virtue of
the man
knows
"by"
he does
not
know.
When Socrates
swear recognition.
mentioned
Heracles, he did
is
not use
any
of the particles used to
divinity.
"Heracles!"
not a protestation or an oath
but
cry
of
two ways.
Euthyphron may remind Socrates of the As the prophet seeks an assimilation to god,
an
legendary
so
in strong Heracles was the only

man
acci
purification,2
hero to become
Olympian. And
and
Heracles'
as
mortal
father, Amphitryon,
dentally consequently had to undergo a ritual so Euthyphron's father has more or less inadvertently killed a field hand,
must, according to
e3).
killed his uncle,
and
Euthyphron, be
purified
by
means of
just
punishment (4b7-
lawsuit is
That Socrates already knows of the prophet's reasons for instigating the not implausible. Euthyphron has probably been as little reticent in
about
talking
event,
of
his
case
since murder
man
is
a capital
the
who gave
he is in predicting the future (cf. 5e2-4). In any crime, Euthyphron is attempting to take the life him life. His lawsuit would seem less monstrous if he
as
Zeus.3
were, like
Heracles,
now asks
a son of
Socrates
man. ous.
Euthyphron
whether
the man slain

wonders
by
his father
answer
was a
kins
Before the
"Surely,"
prophet can
reply,
Socrates
if the
is
not obvi
der
outsider."
of
an
he continues, "you wouldn't prosecute [your father] for the mur Euthyphron finds this patently ridiculous. It makes no
difference, he
member.
tells
Socrates,
whether
the victim was an outsider or a
family
4b9)
or
The only thing to consider is whether the slayer killed justly (ev dixj], not. If he killed justly, then you must let him alone. But if unjustly, then
you must prosecute
him, if indeed he
or
shares your
hearth
and table.
For
whether you
the victim
with
is
kinsman
not, the pollution is the same if

not
the murderer and
do
purify both
yourself and
knowingly him by bringing

is
central
live
him to
justice
(xfj dixr),
403).
The belief
piety.
or attitude
Euthyphron
scorns as ridiculous
to
orthodox
Orthodoxy
attaches the utmost moral significance
to the distinction be
tween kinsman and outsider. The

own"
kinsman
or
family
member
is
literally
"one's
(olxEiog, 4b8),
own.
and the ancestral with
If the
good
or
is identical
may be defined as the old which is one's the ancestral, it is impermissable for a son to
"prosecute"
"take
upon"
vengeance
(ejteîevcu,
4bio) his
father,
except per
haps for
a crime committed against another
to subordinate
family
loyalties
not
to what
Although willing he deems the higher imperatives of jus
family
member.4
tice, Euthyphron does

thinks
2. 3.
"pollution"
simply deny the moral relevance of family ties. He (ui'aoLia, 4c 1) is communicable only or chiefly among family
"Heracles!"
Apollodorus, Library 2.4.6. Cf. Plato, Lysis 2o8e: Socrates
exclaims
just before asking Lysis

92-93,
1 16.
whether
he has
done anything unjust to his parents. 4. Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City,
pp.
247

no
members,
ceremonial meals. collective
doubt because they worship at the same hearth and This opinion is not peculiar to him: the many
share common
also
believe in
if the
guilt, the
family
is it
curse,
and the
efficacy
of
purification.5
family is
Only
a sacral union
possible
for the
sins of the
fathers
to
be
visited upon
the children.
family is sacred, Euthyphron's action is sinful. Thus, ac cording to traditional religious beliefs, Euthyphron is damned if he prosecutes and damned if he does not. Here we receive a first glimpse of the defectiveness
of ancestral custom as a guide
Yet if the
to right action.
case.
Euthyphron attempts to relate the facts of his he tells victim, Socrates, was a hired laborer (jiekaxng, 403) who worked on the family farm in Naxos. In a drunken fit, he became angry at one of the house slaves and cut his throat. Euthyphron's father, having learned of this, bound the laborer's hands and feet and threw him into a ditch. He then
point
At this
in the
conversation
The
murder
sent a messenger
to the
mainland6
to
find
out
from the
Interpreter'
what ought
to
be done. In the
meantime.
Euthyphron's father
neglected
ing
that since he was a murderer, it would not matter

and
his prisoner, think if he died. Because of hun
his bonds, the laborer perished before the messenger returned from the Interpreter. Euthyphron's kinsmen are angry at him because he, on be half of a murderer, is prosecuting his father for murder. claim his father
ger, cold,
They
be wrong to care about a vic tim who was himself a murderer. They also say it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father. "So poorly do they understand divinity, Socrates, how it is disposed
no
killed
one,
and
that even if he
had, it
would still
with regard
to the
holy8
and
the
unholy."
Let
5.
us pause
to consider this somewhat

and the
bizarre
narrative.
Euthyphron's father,
of
E. R. Dodds, The Greeks
Irrational (Berkeley:
"Athens'
University
California Press, 195 1 )
PP- 33-34-
6. Euthyphron
7.
where. phron's
never uses were
the words
"Athenians."
or
The Interpreters Their

most
Apollonian
priests who expounded sacred customs at

purification
Athens
than
and else
important
father
was most
duty was likely seeking
to prescribe the rites of

expert
in homicide
rather
cases.
a
Euthy
judicial
legal
counsel
from the Interpreters

the
decision. See D. M. MacDowell, Athenian Homicide Law in Manchester University Press, 1963) pp. 1 1- 16.
8. This is the first time
theme
of the
holy."
Age of the Orators (Manchester:

soon
to
ooiov, "the
is
mentioned
in the dialogue. It
becomes the
discussion; hence
the traditional subtitle of the work, On the Holy. In the dialogue ooiov
is
sometimes used
ous."
Since the idea

as
"holy"
interchangeably or redundantly with eioefieg, a term commonly translated as "pi of a Holy God is chiefly biblical in origin, it might seem better to translate both
In
a
Greek terms for retaining

ooiov
"pious."
commentary
notion
as the
translation of ooiov. In the
is
quite close to the
biblical
there are compelling reasons first place, Euthyphron's understanding of the of righteousness; there is in him something of the Old Tes
on ascribes
the
Euthyphro, however,
tament prophet, and the

"pious."
moral grandeur
he
to the ooiov is
inadequately
conveyed
by
the
word
In the
second
place, without separate
English
equivalents
or
two problems arise. One is

xai eiioejieia
that it is almost impossible to translate
evoe/h)
xai 001a
(I2e4)
doiori};
(1304).
ac
The
other
is that the
reader
is
apt
to miss the central

of not
paradox of
the dialogue. As
Socrates has been
cused of civic
impiety
iaoejieia), that is.

or
believing
in the
city's gods, the question arises whether

"holiness"
piety (evoefteia),
might not occur to us as were rendered
belief in those gods, is true piety or readily if the dialogue contained only
{6oioti]C). This question

or
one
term
for piety,
if both terms
by
the same English word.
248
whatever
Interpretation
his crime, is
not
guilty
of murder
of
in the first degree. His victim, the la

accomplishes
borer,
poses
was not altogether
undeserving
his fate. Plato
two pur
a
not-so-
by
making Euthyphron's father only questionably

homicide.9
responsible
for
regrettable
First, Plato
while
avoids
presenting
a clear-cut opposition
indicating
even
how be
such a conflict could occur.
between piety and justice, Euthyphron's lawsuit would be in

cold
unholy
if his father had killed
blameless
man
blood. One
wonders
whether
it
would
holy
for Euthyphron to defend his father in

Mafia
chief
such a case.
If
so,
one might
have to
to
admit that
Frank Costello
was a model of
piety
testify against "the States Senate. However, the principle

when
he
family"
refused
before
a committee of
the United
of
unswerving
loyalty
its
to one's own
does
not exhaust
the ethical content of piety. Divine
law
commands citizens to
victims.
honor
their parents,
should a son
but
also
to
oppose
injustice
and avenge
What then
do if his father
commits murder?
The vdfxog
confronts
him
with
contradictory demands. He cannot fulfill one commandment without breaking another. A conflict between piety and justice is, therefore, always potentially
present within
rates'
piety itself. This fact is, however, questioning of orthodoxy. Ancestral custom between its
prescriptions.
not sufficient to
justify
Soc
provides a means
for settling
a
conflicts sult a
In
such cases, citizens are supposed to con
prophet,
and
who will
declare how
divinity
find
is disposed. But Euthyphron is
prophet,
his interpretation
of what
the gods
demand is
anathema
to tradi
tionally-minded citizens. Thus in order to

alternative
out where the right
lies,
one
has
no
but to think for oneself;

second purpose
one must philosophize.
Plato's
is to
give
Socrates
a principled motive
to dissuade
Euthyphron from prosecuting his father. In the remainder of the rates will act as the defender of family. He will thereby refute "in
tophanic portrait of him as a man who ternal authority.
dialogue, Soc
deed"
the Aris
heedlessly
and
irresponsibly
can
subverts pa
Euthyphron's
and
zeal
for justice is genuine, but his lawsuit

and others.
benefit
gain
no
one,
may
prove
harmful to himself
punishing his father. The
old man poses no

public service what
The city would threat to his fellow
nothing by citizens. In fact,
he may have rendered a bonds (assuming that is

rage and then
in allowing the laborer to perish in his happened); for a man who drinks himself into a hand is
butchers the
person nearest to
hardly
an asset
to society. Of
pay for his be encouraged his negligence, example to take the law into may by their own hands. But it is not clear that he acted as negligently as Euthyphron claims. The old man seems to have done the lawful thing in putting the laborer in bonds. Indeed, according to one commentator on the dialogue, if the laborer was
course, one
could argue
that if
Euthyphron's father is
not made to
other citizens
9.
A. E. Taylor,
who
did
not perceive
this twofold purpose, was driven to conclude that the

fiction."
Naxos incident "must be historical fact; the situation is too bizarre to be Man and His Work, 7th ed. (London: Methuen, i960) p. 146.
natural
Plato: The
249
caught
An Interpretation of
in the act,
which appears
the to
Euthyphro
the case,
have been
"Euthyphron's father had

scrupulousness."'"
the legal right to execute the murderer on the spot;

struction
sending to the Exegete for in
under these circumstances might
was
an
act of unusual
In addition, it
fed him,
as
be argued, to have brought the murderer into the house and Euthyphron presumably wished to do, would have infected the whole
pollution."
family
death
with
Finally,
we
must
also
wonder
why, if the
not
laborer's
easily foreseen as the himself to clothe and feed the man,

was as
prophet or at
indicates, he did
urge
take it upon
so.
least
his father to do
suit.
Euthyphron's
benefit
as
family
would
be better
people piety. a
off
if he dropped the
well; for
cause to
with
fewer
have less
off.
deride filial
calling him unholy and And Euthyphron himself
The city might mad, he would
would
be better
For
at
present, he is
headed for
is holy. In
humiliating
defeat. Even if he
could per
suade
the judges of his father's guilt,
which
is doubtful, he
He
will
could never convince

will
them that
his
own action
what
follows, Socrates
suit.
try
to undermine
the suit
Euthyphron's belief in the contrary to the best
wisdom of
his
do
so
because
is
or
interests
of all concerned
contrary to the common good

the Naxos
justice.
Having listened
sertion
to the prophet's version
of
incident,
and
to
his
as
that his kinsmen
badly
and
misunderstand
divinity, Socrates
asks
Euthy
so
phron, in the name of

precisely, and things
case are as act
Zeus,
whether
he thinks he knows divine things

as well, that even
very
the
holy
unholy
court.
assuming the
Socrates,"
facts
of
he says, he is
not afraid
that
by hauling
not
his father into
he in turn may be committing an unholy "I would be useless, the prophet

the many human beings in any respect,
replies, "nor
would
Euthyphron
such
surpass
if I did
name,
know
all
things
Euthyphron
sui
refers to
himself
by
as though
he
were a
being
some
generis, or a
upon
disinterested
witness
to his
own greatness.
This throws
doubt
his
account of the events on
Naxos.
of we
And is it heaven
not
likely
that a man who believes he speaks
by
the
inspiration
can convince
himself
at
of almost anything?
On
one not
point,
however,
may take him strictly

the
his
word:
he is
useless
if he does
know the divine
and
holy
things
precisely.
In his
own opinion,
it seems, he is beneath the from feelings

of
com
mon run of men
if he is
not above
it. Does he
suffer
inadequacy,
delusions bined
of grandeur, or
with
both? Is prophecy born of overweening ambition com less than mediocre talent? We have seen an example of Euthyphron's
himself before. On the (305). On the
trial"
ambivalence about
one
hand he
resolved next
to confront the
many "at close

clined
other
hand, in his
statement, he de
"to
make a
of
their attitude toward him (3d3~4).

beings"
In
response of
to the
phrophet's
knowledge
10.
piety
and
in boast to "surpass the many human the divine, Socrates observes that the best thing for him
and the
R. E. Allen, Plato's 'Euthyphro

1970)
p. 21. p. 42.
Earlier
Theory
of Forms (New York: Humanities
Press,
11.
Cf. Nilsson. Greek Piety,
250
to do
Interpretation
pupil.
is to become Euthyphron's
to
He
could then
issue
a pretrial
chal
lenge12
Meletus,
affirming that he has for a
long
time considered it
claims
important
commits a
to know about divine things, and that now,

grave error
when
Meletus
he
speaking loosely and making innovations in regard to such mat he has become Euthyphron's pupil. "'And I would say, 'if you ters,
by
Meletus,'
acknowledge
Euthyphron to be
way, and
wise
in these things, then

"
suppose
that I too be
lieve in the
case.'
right
drop
the
Let his
us
be
clear as
to why Socrates cannot possibly
wish
to apprentice
himself
to the prophet. The Athenians laugh at Euthyphron

of
wisdom:
whenever
he
makes a
display
Meletus
would never acknowledge
his
expertise
in divine things.
Even if the
prophet's credentials were pupil
beyond dispute, it
right way. of
would not
follow that his
Socrates believes in the

could accuse
Socrates
to
might
necessarily be a poor
learner,
der the
or
dishonest. Meletus
him
trying
hide his
unbelief un
guise of
discipleship
to a
holy
man.
More important, if Socrates has
learned to believe correctly from Euthyphron, he must have been in error for most of his life; he is guilty as charged. Further, Euthyphron is considered un
holy by
suit.
his
own
family,
ill
perhaps
by
everyone else who
has heard
about
his law
the
suit
Socrates
can
afford to
be
associated with such a who
teacher.
Finally,
of
Athenians
would never
believe it is Socrates
is the
pupil.
Euthyphron's
would confirm
their worst suspicions that

then
Socrates teaches the
legitimacy
fa
ther beating.
Why
does Socrates
request
instruction from the say if Meletus
prophet?
The
answer, if it is not already apparent, becomes obvious in the sequel.
Socrates
edge
goes on to explain what

wisdom:
he
would
refuses to acknowl
Euthyphron's
you
"[T]hen
bring
him
the action against
him, my teacher,
both his fa
him."
before
do
against
me,
and charge me and
with
corrupting his
and
elders,
ther and me,

adds that
by teaching
by admonishing
before the
see,
if Meletus is
not persuaded either to release can repeat
He then chastising him from the trial or to in

the same points he
made
dict Euthyphron instead, he in the challenge. Socrates,
court
we can now
proposes to use
Euthyphron
as a
lightning
Meletus'
rod against
bolts. This
ought
to make the prophet a little un that Socrates is de

would
comfortable.
Indeed, if Euthyphron is deceived into believing

break
off
ceitful, he
much
will
the conversation and go away. Socrates

not
very
like that to happen. Although he does
forego
the
opportunity
to suggest
that
Euthyphron too may be indicted if he continues to prosecute his father, main purpose in resorting to trickery is to win back his privacy. Soc rates has no interest in promoting a common good that does not in the first place
Socrates'
and perhaps
preeminently
known
be
as
include his
own
good."
12. mand
ments
In the in the
procedure
.
"challenge"
(ngoxXnoig),
If
one
party
made
"an offer to, or a de
of, the other.
These
were recorded and preserved referred to at the trial.

case."
along
one of
with the evidence and other
docu
case and might
the parties declined a
reasonable
ngdxXqoig, that
rates, and
13.
would prejudice his John Burnet, Crito (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924). Cf. Plato, Republic 345c 346c, 5i9d-e.
ed..
Plato's Euthyphro,
Apology
of Soc
25 1
-An
Interpretation of
the
Euthyphro
strategem backfires. Euthyphron not only fails to notice the trap Socrates has been pretending to set for him, he welcomes the prospect of facing Meletus in court. Swearing by Zeus, Euthyphron asserts that if Meletus ever did
Socrates'
try
to
indict him, he
would
discover the
about
man's weak
points, "and the talk in the

me."
court would sooner et's
have been
him than
past
about
So
vivid
is the
proph
imagination that he
concludes
in the
tense,
as though
his victory
over
fact. This boast, like his forecast of success in his is preposterous. own case (305-6), Not only is it unwarranted by the facts, but Euthyphron himself thinks the many envy him and are easily manipulated by
Meletus
were an accomplished slanderers
bly
and
in the
like Meletus, and it is the many who preside as judges in the Assem courts. How can Euthyphron be so confident if he is surrounded by
can
enemies?
There
be but
one answer:
he trusts that the
gods will not
foresake
their own.
In the Philebus, Socrates defines the

know
himself.'4
ridiculous man as one who

of
does
not
There
are several
types
defective self-knowledge, but the
most common
is the
conceit of
being
more virtuous than one
is, especially
when
wiser
than one
selves
is.'5
Socrates divides
groups.
persons who
who are and
have this false
opinion about them
into two
Those
at are called
revenge
powerful, terrible,
strong and able to retaliate hateful. Those who are weak

ridiculous.16
laughed
to
and unable
themselves are properly called

second group.
Euthyphron obviously be
classification
longs in the
proves
Upon reflection, however, this two-fold

powerful and vindictive
to be only provisional. A imprudent to criticize or offend,
man,
whom
it
would
be
can more
easily hide his deficiencies from him
self and others than can a man who must
Certainly
tragic tue or
one point
Socrates
wishes
meekly and patiently submit to ridicule. to suggest is that folly, when arrayed in the
apparatus of power and

wisdom.17
ceremony, often masquerades successfully as vir
Now if the
man
is
ridiculous who cure
fancies himself
wiser
than
he
is,
and
this
error
tends to be hardest to
in
powerful
men, it follows that

wisdom rests
Euthyphron is
on a
ridiculous
in the
extreme.
His
conceit of
surpassing
delusion
of superior strength.
would not admit
Although he
it,
perhaps not even
to
himself, Euthyphron is
doubts concerning his sanity. He is not fully able to look down upon the many who look down upon him. He is not insensitive to honor. For, as he later points out emphatically to Socrates (15a 10), this is the very thing men owe
disturbed
by
to the
gods.
But it is the many
who
bestow honor. Euthyphron therefore

.
cannot
,
be simply is mad.
contemptuous
of popular opinion
And in the
eyes of
the
multitude
he
Euthyphron is thus
oppresses
caught
in
a vicious circle.
him. To
gain some relief
His subjectivity is from it, he is driven to "make a
radical and
display"
of
14. 15.
Plato,
Philebus 48c.
48e-
Philebus
49a.
16. Philebus 490-c. 17.
Philebus 49c;
cf.
Republic
577a-b.
252
Interpretation
himself, to share with others the private world of his dreams and visions. But by so doing, he makes himself a laughing stock. The result is his further isolation
from
other
men,
which
in turn intensifies his dependence he

could
on an
imaginary
com
munion with
the gods. Perhaps at one time

are gone.
find
some consolation
in
family
of
life. But those days

off
himself
from
all
By attacking his father he has effectively cut human ties. In this little Heracles, Plato presents a caricature
destroys his
the tragic hero
who need
humanity
in
futile
attempt to
transcend it.
Euthyphron's
more acute.
for
someone to
Socrates
pretends
believe in him has probably never been to believe. He takes command of the conversation is
well
by humoring
Euthyphron's
the prophet. He
aware, he says, that his "dear

fellow."
comrade"
could turn the tables on

pupil.
"this Meletus
What is Euthyphron's
me so
secret?
That is why he wants to become Meletus seems not to notice

and
him
me
at
all, "whereas he sees through

impiety."
sharply
easily that he has indicted

to
for
Invoking
the name of
Zeus, Socrates implores Euthyphron

clearly.
explain what
the pious
he just confidently asserted to know and the impious with regard to murder itself
What
sort of
thing is
not the
and other matters?
Is
holy
the same with itself in every action, and the unholy the opposite of
yet similar
thing holy,
cases of
to
and
possessing
of
a single aspect
every ((dm, 5d4) in all

query, Eu
poses the
me
unholiness,
whatever
the unholy
might
be? To this
obscure
thyphron replies,
question that will
what
"By
all
means,
Socrates,
the
course."
Socrates then
now on.
be the theme
of the conversation
from
"Tell
then,
do
you assert
is the
holy
unholy?"
and what
///.
Piety
as
Retributive Justice
and as
Imitation of the Gods (5dj-6eg)

now
the one who commits
doing: prosecuting (xcp ddixovvxt, 569) whether his sin involves murder or temple robbery or anything else of that sort, whether he happens to be your father or your mother or anyone else at all. And failure to prosecute is un holy. "For behold, Socrates, as I tell you a great proof that we must not toler
the
The holy, Euthyphron
declares, is
very thing he is
injustice
ate
the
one who commits

not
Euthyphron does
5e5) no matter who he distinguish the impious man from the unjust man. He
impiety (xcp dof3ovvxi,
is."
just.1 His conception of justice is not specifi tacitly identifies the holy with the Athenian or even Greek. A just man, in Euthyphron's view, does not com cally
such as adultery theft, or other crimes "of that is forthright in taking action against wrongdoers and in
mit
sort,"
murder,
and perjury.
He
demanding
that
they be
made to answer
for their
deeds.'
Temple robbery is
is
somewhat on
more abhorrent
to him than
Although
by
common standards this position

moral conflict
extreme,
most citizens would affirm and
that the
on
fundamental
is between injustice
the one
hand,
"the just
life"
and
holy
the other (cf.

2.
Plato, Laws 663b,d; Republic
368b, 427c).
In his
attitude
toward crime and punishment, if in no other respect,
Euthyphron
comes close to
being
a model citizen
(cf. Plato. Laws 730d, 907d-e).
253
other

of
kinds
theft,
as
it
constitutes an attack upon religion and

of
betokens
a man
a wan consid
ton disregard
ered
for the decent feelings
the
community.3
Such
is
just in virtually
all ages and climes. must
His
actions conform to
basic
rules of
conduct which
every society
tolerably
enforce
are
roughly
equivalent
to the second table
of
the
merely to exist. These rules Decalogue. They include in ad

public observance and
dition,
or so all premodern philosophers
assumed, the
support of religion. good order of sacred or
For it
was
thought that sound morals, on which the peace and
society depend, cannot be preserved among a people who lack a religious regard for the obligations of citizenship. Since these para deducible from the
right.4
"nature"
mount rules are versal
of
society,
they
could
be
called uni
justice
or natural
Euthyphron is
to honor
a naive champion of natural right. one's parents
However,
phron
since the commandment
is
also a rule that no
society is
can afford
entirely to dispense with, it is
more accurate to
a naive champion of a certain part of natural right.
say that Euthy In traditional Greek

all
but
terms, Euthyphron's zeal for dixr\ (cf. 4bn-c4) or interfamilial justice has obliterated his concern for {JELiig or justice within the family
group.5
pious
man, Euthyphron
believes,
must
justice
should
he
commit a serious
crime.
be willing to bring his Euthyphron's family,
own
father to
on the other
hand, believe it is
This disagreement
always reveals
unholy for
a son to seek the punishment of

roots:
his father.
that piety has two
the love of one's own, and
avenging justice. From the first arises the belief in ancestral gods; from the sec ond, the belief in divine retribution. Usually the two roots of piety are mutually
supportive.
Ancestral
gods are always gods who

or
defend justice, for

and anger
we are angri
est at what
threatens, harms,
destroys
our
own,
is
self-righteous.
It
is
also
the case that gods who punish injustice
almost always command
the hon
oring filial
of
father
and mother.
For there is little

there
a parent considers more unjust than a tension
ingratitude."
However,
is obviously
and equal
between
"logic"
loyalty
to
ac
one's own and the
principle of
fair
as
treatment
out
for
all.
Euthyphron's
of
tion can
justice.7
in
part
be
understood
working
of the
impartial
Euthyphron
proceeds
to tell his "great
proof"
that
custom
what
he is
doing is
of the
right
(dgftcdg,
and
5e4).
It is
a proof
drawn from
(#
vdpiov, 5e3), and

and most
he has
gods,
already told
it to
others.
Men believe Zeus is the best
just
they
Cf.
agree
that he put his father Cronos in bonds for unjustly
devouring
his
3.
4.
5.
and
Cf. Marsilius On the
Plato, Laws 854c-d. of Padua, The

trans.
Defender of Peace
2. 12.7.
origin and significance of these words, see
Emile Beneviste. Indo-European Language

Fla.:
Society,
Elizabeth Palmer (Coral Gables,
University
of
Miami Press,
1973)
pp. 385-86.
6. Cf. Plato, Laws 7l7d, 88oe-882a; Xenophon. Memorabilia 2.2; Shakespeare,

1. 5. 276-91. 7.
King
Lear
The
ultimate
incompatibility
between
particular attachments and
the pure
logic
of
justice
is
brought
out more
clearly in Plato's Republic (4i9a-420a)
and
Gorgias (48ob7-d6).
254
Interpretation
as
sons, just
are
Cronos
castrated
his father Uranos for
similar
reasons.8
"Yet they
com
angry plains, "and

about
at me when so
prosecute
they
contradict
my father for themselves in what they say

wishes
wrongd
Euthyphron
about
the gods and
me."
It
seemed at
first that Euthyphron
to define piety
as
doing justice,
espe
cially in the sense of retributive justice. Now, if we consider his proof, it may seem that he understands piety to be the imitation of divine retributive justice. Upon further consideration, however,
consists we recognize
that Euthyphronean piety

what
in
doing
the
what the gods gods
do,
as
distinguished from
they
tell us to
just"
do.
the
For
although
tell us to honor our
fathers,
the "best and most
of
gods
manifestly did not honor his. Let us take a closer look at Euthyphron's piety which it implies. Euthyphron accuses men
punish
proof
before examining the
specific
view of
I.
was
of
contradicting themselves.
consider
They believe
men are
Zeus
just to
his father,
ish his. The ileges to
contradiction
unholy any they disappears, however, if gods and

yet
man who would pun
essentially
different beings,
a
orthodoxy child, or human
as
assumes. rights to
It is
a
contradictory to deny adult priv beast. Might not father-beating be a

not
uniquely divine
and men
privilege or right?
Euthyphron
or at
acts on the assumption that gods
belong
to the same class,

not
any
rate
that the
moral norms appropriate offers no argument
for
other men
do
apply to him (cf. 4ai i-b3).

proof
Since he
in
support of either
assumption, his
is little
appeals
more than a
bare
assertion.
2.
To
justify
his action, Euthyphron
"believe"
to
what men
on the
ba
in punishing Cronos. But men also believe on the same basis that it is for a son to prosecute his father. unholy Euthyphron is thus refuted by his own authority. He contradicts himself by ap
sis of
"custom,"
namely, that Zeus acted
justly
pealing to
3.
and
from the
to
same criterion of proof.

"agree"
According
Euthyphron.
claims
"concede"
men
or
(dfioXoyovoi, 6ai)
Zeus'
that Zeus put his own father in
lematic? Euthyphron
bonds. Do they sense that to be doing what the most just
justice is
prob
of
the gods did. But
Zeus, it seems, was only doing what Cronos had done to Uranos. By imitating his Zeus, Euthyphron imitates the imitator of the god who "unjustly
devoured"
children.
4.
Or does he?
Every
action
derives its
character
order to
from the
particular set of cir of another swallowed
cumstances to which
we
it is
related.
Thus in
imitate the deeds

to his.
must, in the first place, be in
a situation comparable
Cronos
Few
his children; Uranos imprisoned his in the bowels
of the
earth.9
would
fault
Euthyphron for prosecuting his father if the old man had undertaken to eat him or is defective bury him alive. The analogy between Euthyphron's deed and in another respect. The murders attempted by Cronos were family crimes. By
Zeus'
8. Cf. Hesiod, father

9.
Theogeny
154-81. 453-506.
Euthyphron does
Zeus'
not mention the names of
and grandfather.
Hesiod, Theogeny
156-59.
255
punishing his
other
father, Zeus
behalf
avenged
his brothers
and sisters.
Euthyphron,
proof
on
the
hand,
acts on
of an outsider.
Turning
that
to the specific
to
view of
piety implied in Euthyphron's
namely
we
it is
pious
do
what
the gods
do,
rather
than
what
they
tell us to
wonder whether
Euthyphron If so, he
would admit
that the gods tell us to

admit
honor
and
may de
fend
our parents.
would also
have to
he is disobedient to Zeus; he
of
would never
have to
argue that
it is
holy
his
to
disobey
Zeus. Euthyphron,
course, has
faced this
most
consequence of
position.
to
be the
faithful
observer of
Indeed, his proof is actually a claim divine law. Euthyphron then supposes that
commands us
Zeus
orders us
to imitate him. But Zeus obeys no one. If Zeus

commands us not to
to
do
so
as
he does, he
obey him. We
to
submit to
his authority only

me!"
far
as we rebel against
it.
and
the more vigorous our efforts at self-emancipa
tion, the
more complete our subservience
his
will.
"Do
not
obey
is
commandment
as
the Cretan
absurd
paradox.
equally impossible to keep Euthyphron's predicament

or to
law"
how
is
the appeal to a "higher
in
perplexing how necessary and yet society ostensibly founded on di

shows
break. It is
a riddle as
vine vduoi.
liberating authority is resolved, to the extent it can be re the in solved, exemplary teacher-student relationship between a mature and a po philosopher. It is this relationship which Socrates sought with some of the tential seeks with the best of young men he was accused of corrupting, and which Plato his young readers. Euthyphronean piety is a faltering half-step in the direction of
The
paradox of a
philosophy.
The philosopher, too, is

can
an
imitator
nor
of
the
divine.10
The
gods whom
he imitates, however,
each
and
other."
be
neither
just
unjust, as
they do
not rule men or
They
else.
are
knowers
and
Perhaps they exist them by pursuing wisdom, but neither at their behest nor against their will. A pi itself if justice is an attribute of divin ety of imitation is a monster that devours
nothing
nothing else; their divinity is their wisdom The philosopher imitates only "in
speech."
ity. For if the
gods are
just, they
are supreme rulers who can of
being
one's
overthrown.
The true imitation
Zeus consists,
after
all,
be imitated only by not in punishing
father, but in dethroning

In fact, this
crime
the highest god.

although
And Euthyphron has done just that

speech."
is
committed
by
all who
unwittingly and only "in believe Zeus is the best and
most
just
of the gods.
Their judgment
presupposes a standard
divinities.12
by
which
Zeus
can
be
compared and ranked with other

Zeus'
The
standard must exist
inde
will, pendently of less. For if justice is whatever Zeus

most
or else
the
affirmation of
his
superior
wills
it to be, the be
people who praise
justice is meaning him as

opinion
just say in
effect
that
he is the Zeusest
of the gods.
Common
thus
cannot assumes the existence of moral truths which
negated
by
godly
power.
io. 1 1
.
Plato, Theaetetus Plato, Republic

266-77-
I76a6-b3;
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics
H77b32-36,
H78b8-i8.
500c.
Euthyphro,"
12.
Harry Neumann,
"The Problem of
Piety in
Plato's
The Modern Schoolman 43
(March 1966),
256 It
Interpretation
the
competence of
also assumes
the human mind to apprehend those truths. It
implies
not of
Zeus is praiseworthy only so far as he conforms to moral standards his own making. At best, Zeus is only the best imitator of justice. But why
that
possible
imitate the best imitator if it is

praise of
to imitate
justice itself? The

"ideas,"
common
Zeus implies that the
gods are subordinate

"ideas."
to the
and that
hu
man reason
is
Socrates
comment on
says
grasping the Nor does he nothing at first about Euthyphron's the propriety or impropriety of his lawsuit. Instead, Socrates specu
capable of
"definition."
lates
as to
why he has been indicted. It
occurs
to him that
whenever
he hears tales
may
of strife
among the gods,
he
gets annoyed
a reaction which some people
regard as a grave error.
However, he
continues, if those tales seem

such
fine to
Euthy
phron,
who
is
so
knowledgeable in
what are we
matters,
it
"we"
seems that
too must
give our assent. we
"For
to say, those of us who concede (or agree) that
know nothing
statement
things?"
about such
Socrates here
alludes to
Euthyphron's
ear
lier He
that men agree or concede that Zeus beat

contrasts
his father Cronos (6bi).

of agreement
implicitly
knowledge
of
ignorance
as
the basis
among
philosophers with mere
tales as the basis of agreement among fellow citizens.

are mistaken agrees
The tales
produce agreement
are mistaken
because they for knowledge because

(that
for knowledge;
and
they
he
"everyone"
they
are true.
whether
Swearing by friendship
is, Zeus), Socrates
asks
Euthyphron
truly believes the events described in those tales actually occurred. Euthyphron affirms that he does, and claims to know even more marvelous things, which the
many do depict
not
know. Socrates then inquires

and
whether
there really
is
war
among the up to the which he
gods, and terrible hatreds

on various sacred
battles,
such as
the
poets
tell and the good painters
objects, especially
Panathenea."
on
the robe which
is
carried
Acropolis
during
the
Great
In thus asking
a question
knows Euthyphron
the prophet's
will answer
affirmatively, Socrates hints at the real source of

though
conception of
divine things. Unorthodox

conventional man.
be,
the
Euthyphron is
deeply
His
mystic visions are
his behavior may filled with
Greek poetry and Athenian ceremonial painting. Socrates follows up his last question by bluntly asking whether the tales
of
images
about
war and
battle among the
gods
are true.
Euthyphron,
predictably,
affirms that
they
are, and offers to relate many others which, he avers, will astonish Socrates
This
the most
13.
was
important
and elaborate
Athenian festival. Held for

and was
an entire month, the
affair commemorated the city's
dedicated to Athena, the tutelary deity of Athens. Among the chief spectacles were athletic games, public feasts and sacrifices, and various contests among poets, rhapsodes, and other imitative artisans. On Athena's traditional birthday, the festival culminated in a city-wide procession to the Acropolis. A magnificent robe was borne aloft at the head of the procession, and bestowed upon the statue of Athena Polias. The robe, richly embroid most skilled workmen, was decorated with scenes ered by depicting the victory over the Titans. To understand the significance Socrates probably attaches to all of this, one needs
Athens'
founding by Theseus,
goddess'
only to recall the Cave Simile of Republic VII. The Great Panathenea periodically to its zenith the power of the image-makers and image-carriers.
renewed and raised
257
when
he hears them. Socrates responds, ambiguously, that he would not be amazed. We observe that Euthyphron is eager to tell the very kind of tales Soc rates finds annoying. Socrates denies him the opportunity, however.
Advising
Euthyphron to
save
his
stories
for
a more
leisurely
occasion, Socrates bids him to
try
clearly the question which came up a while ago. Euthyphron, Socrates continues, has not yet taught him adequately what the holy is. Euthy phron said that what he is now doing, in prosecuting his father, is holy. Perhaps it is. But there are many things which Euthyphron says are holy, and he was not
supposed
to answer more
to teach one or two
holy
things are
these, but the form (ddog, 6di i) by which all holy. "For I suppose you said it is in virtue of a single look (pud.
of
On unholy and holy things Euthyphron's agreeing, Socrates requests to be taught the of the holy, so that by keeping his eye on it and using it as a standard (nagddEiyua, 6e5), he can assert that whatever is like it, of the things Euthyphron or anyone else may unholy
are
"look"
idia, 6di2)
that
things
holy?"
do, is holy, and whatever is it, Socrates, that's how I'll

wants.
unlike
it, is
not
holy. "Well, if that's how
you want what
tell it to
you."
Socrates
says
it is exactly
he
Students
of the
Euthyphro have
other
never
found in it The
which enlivens so
many irritating. There is a good

Socrates'
Platonic
for
works.
spontaneity In fact, the dialogue is somewhat

whole
the charm and
reason
this.
conversation
not to
is
not
to
taste; the
manner
in
which
it is
conducted
is
Euthyphron's.
Socrates
and
would rather not talk at
all; Euthyphron has
no
interest in
formulating
testing definitions of piety. In order to terminate what is for him an unpleas ant discussion, Socrates will make it unpleasant for Euthyphron. We, the readers of the dialogue, feel the irritation of the prophet and the philosopher. Before turning to Euthyphron's second definition, we should be clear as to
Socrates finds wanting in the first one. Euthyphron said the holy is the very thing he is now doing: prosecuting anyone who commits murder, temple rob bery, or other serious crimes. According to some commentators, Euthyphron has
what
"universal"
"particular"
confused a own
action).14
(piety) with However, this is not
of which
it is
predicated
(his
now
the case. His emphasis on what
he is
doing
and
is merely defensive of self-justifying. He is not suggesting that his lawsuit the holy are identical. Euthyphron offers a general criterion by which partic be judged
answer
ular actions can so
holy
or unholy:
to avenge
injustice is holy,
not to
do
be-
is
14.
unholy.
His
is insufficient
not
because it lacks universality but
R. E. Allen,
Plato'
'Euthyphro'
"Socratic
ticity,"
Reasoning
in the Euthyphro.
G. Wolz, "The Paradox of Piety The Southern Journal of Philosophy

Socrates'
and the Earlier Theory of Forms, p. 24; Albert Anderson, Review of Metaphysics 22 (March 1969), p. 476; and Henry in Plato's Euthyphro in Light of Heidegger s Conception of Authen
"
12
(Winter 1974),
it?"
p.
499, to
name
only
few. It is
often gen
said that
interlocutors, in
'early'
the
eral propositions when

of
this view, see
questions. For a well-documented critique trying to answer Alexander Nehamas, "Confusing Universals and Particulars in Plato's Early Dia
dialogues, his "What is
tend to mistake specific examples
for
logues,"
Review of Metaphysics 29 (December 1975),
pp. 287-305.
258
cause
Interpretation
or one-sided.
it is incomplete
As Socrates indicates, there

(6d6-7).15
are noXXd
dXXa
ooia
honor
one's
being holy many father. Devotion to the tribe

other ways of
are
One
of
these, certainly, is to
and
its
ways and
bringing
wrongdoers
are
to justice
both
valid meanings of piety.
The
problem
is
whether
they
intel
ligibly
to
related as parts of a whole.
In effect, Socrates has

piety,
or
challenged
articulate
Euthyphron
find the
measure of all genuine standards of
to
the principle
of their unity.
This unifying principle would be the Eidog of the holy. The task Socrates has set for the prophet is Heraclean. The basic rules
whose observance unity.
of
jus
tice, logical
Euthyphron tacitly identifies
with
piety,
possess a
teleo
vation of offensive
That is, they all contribute to a society. But to view them solely
common end:
the peace and preser
as rules of social
utility
would
be
to Euthyphron or anyone else who regards them as sacred. The moral
man seeks comfort.
justice for its

regards the
own
sake,
not as a mere means to collective act
security
and
He
disposition to
justly as
a genuine
excellence, a neces
sary
soul
attribute of a
is best
attained
healthy soul. But by prosecuting

The
it is
not evident
that the health of one's own

more
malefactors
or,
generally,
by
working im
for the
good of society.
various criteria of justice seem
to cohere around two
principles neither of which can proves or perfects
be derived from
or reduced to the other: what
the soul of the
individual,
and what promotes the material wel
fare
of
society
at
large. That both
principles are parts of a
whole, that
they
are
manifestations of
the same phenomenon, is
far from
clear.16
Still
more problem
atic of
a
is the
coherence of piety.
As
we
impartial justice
are not always compatible.
have seen, the demands of piety and those Yet the defense of justice is itself
there appear to
fundamental dictate
of piety.
Furthermore,
be
several
kinds
(ddrif)
of piety, and the actions commanded or commended
forbidden
by
another.
For
cumstances
be
permitted
by a piety of obedience. ddr] of piety, civic and philosophic

tance of the lawful gods, the other
edge of
zen
prosecuting one's imitation but would always be prohibited by piety More important, if there should prove to be two main
a of
example,
kind may be by father might in some cir

one
the one
demanding
consisting in the but
unfettered search
unquestioning accep for knowl
divinity
then the pious actions of the philosopher and those of the citi
common
would
have nothing in
the name.
It
was
Euthyphron,
not
Socrates, who affirmed are holy (5d6, 6e2).

Should
we
that the
holy
has
a single
Eidog
by
which all
holy
not
things
conclude, then, that there is
"idea"
no
of piety?
Perhaps
in the
paradigmatic sense of a standard with reference
to
which particular actions can

"idea"
be denominated
sense of a
a
holy
or unholy.
But the
existence of an
of
piety in the
fundamental
problem, with a
necessary
presupposition of the
determinate form, structure, or shape, is Euthyphro and indeed of all rational discourse
have that there is
the
"idea"
about piety.
Perhaps the best
evidence we
such an
is the
but
Euthyphro itself. The

15. 16.
questions posed
this point.
by
dialogue
and
are not adventitious

pp. 289-94.
I follow Nehamas
on
"Confusing Universals
p. 337.
Particulars,"
Cf. Bloom, "Interpretative
Essay,"
259
arise

subject
from difficulties intrinsic to the
matter;
one can even
discern
an or
der
of rank
isfactory,
is the
are at
among them; and the answers offered, though of course not fully sat least plausible and highly typical. The sldog of piety, I submit,
"look"
whole problem of
piety,
or rather
the
that is has
when
its
various
di
mensions are mapped out.

conclude
If these Plato's
remarks are
just,
then we can,
incidentally,
piety in
con
that Plato's playfulness is no mere matter of individual taste or personal
temperament.
cludes
For it is
not
doing
that the
of
"idea"
or problem of
the question of whether the
holiness
holy
things derives
from their
"idea."
formity
to an unchanging standard or
Annals of Scholarship
METASTUDIES OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
Studies
of
the
history
and
current
development
of
the
disciplines
and
methodologies as well as the manner
in
which scholars and their political
scholarship
structures
influence
and are
influenced
by institutional,
and social
Volume II, Number 3

Editors'
Preface. The Paraphrasts of Mont Parnasse
by
Allen Mandelbaum
GEOFFREY H. Hartman, Representation Now Paul Ricoeur, Mimesis

and
Representation
and
Geoffrey Galt Harpham, The Grotesque Representation Mary Ann Caws,
the Limits of
Edging
and
Hedging
and
M.E. Grenander, Science, Scientism,

Donald
Literary Theory
as Non-
G.
Marshall, Aristotelian
"Imitation"
Positivist Representation
Bruce Wilshire, Theatre

Historical Life
as
Phenomenology: The Disclosure of
William V. Spanos, The Indifference of "Difference": Retriev
ing Heidegger's Destruction

Stephen David Ross, Representations
and
Paradigms
The Annals of Scholarship is

essays are
published quarterly.
Single
articles and review

and
$1.75. The
annual subscription price
for individuals is $18
for
libraries
and other
institutions $27. For

to
countries outside the
United States
please add
$4. Mail
Annals
of
Scholarship, Inc.,
201 East 36 Street, New
York, N.Y, 10016.
The Virtu
of
Women:
and
Machiavelli's Mandragola
Jack D'Amico
Canisius College
Clizia
When Machiavelli it is better for her down
concludes
a prince
Chapter 25 of The Prince with the judgment that to be impetuous because fortune is a woman and to keep
and struggle with
one must
beat her
her, he
We
seems to
be saying
some
thing
mand
about women as well as about
fortune.1
are told
that fortune favors

com
younger
men, preferring those
more
fierce
he
and audacious
in the way they
to those who proceed more coldly. Luigi

e urtarla, warns against what
Russo, in
a note on the verbs

rather unclean
battarla
tasies of
sexual
calls
the senile and
fan
interpreters
who read
the collision in this passage as a special kind of
trampling.7
Indeed,
too literal a translation may

purposes of
destroy
the
undercurrent
of naughtiness
in the image, but for the

must
this study the analogy be

and the private manli
tween the public manliness of a prince

ness of a
confronting fortune
lover
be
considered explicitly.
The analogy
that
suggests
that
women are
capricious, strong
and
they
respect
force,
heat
and
youthfulness,
that
in resisting control, enjoy be they

might even
ing mastered.
to
act and
This famous
passage
fits the definition

sometimes
of virtu as that
manly ability
to impose
one's will on
the
passive,
sometimes recalcitrant
substance
provides
(or materia)
experience.'
of
Because
experience must
be shaped, it
to
command.
the occasion, the needed
challenge, for
a man who seeks
In
political
terms, the
founder, lawgiver,
or prince must overcome always
the disorder
in
nature represented order
by
fortune. The feminine is cyclical, fortune
revolving from
to
disorder, but
also productive, the source of new modes and orders when

union of and active virtue
mastered
by
virtu.
From the
reasserted
the state is born.
Mastery
There
regularly
is, however,
embodied
leads to the glory of lasting orders. distinction to be drawn between mastery
and rape.
Satis
faction
of
of narrow self-interest, or
lust,
produces
tyranny
rather
than that
fruition
desire
1.
in
lasting
ed.
orders.
The distinction is drawn in the Discourses],

p.
// Principe
Discorsi,
Sergio Bertelli (Milan: Feltrinelli, i960),

che respettivo, perche
101:
Io iudico bene
necessario,
chez Machia-
questo,
che sia meglio essere
impetuoso
la fortuna
"
donna;
et e
fortuna'
volendola tenere sotto,

vel,"
batlerla
et urtarla.
On fortune
515-
see
Joseph Macek,
'La
Le Moyen Age, II Principe, For

a
(1971),
320-21
&
16.
2. 3.
nal
ed.
Luigi Russo
(Florence:
Sansoni,
1964), p. 194. n. 91.

1969,"
Vim)."
pp.
Jour John Geerken, "Machiavelli Studies since Search of Machiavellian "In Plamenatz. John and 360, (1976), of the History of Ideas, 37 in The Political Calculus, ed. Anthony Parel (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), Prince and Discourses Re also I. Hannaford. "Machiavelli's Concept of Virtii in The
survey
of criticism on virtu see
157-78;
Political Studies, 20 (1972), 185-89.
and
Jack D'Amico, "Three Forms

22
of
Character:
Discorsi,"
Virtu, Ordini
and
Materia in Machiavelli's
Italian Quarterly,
(Summer 1981 ), 5-13.
262
10
Interpretation
(pp. 157 &
174).
&
16
Praiseworthy
rulers are said to
live
under
law
and pro
vide a vivere
libero for
subjects who need not
fear for the honor
of their wives or
the security of their goods, while tyrants
dishonor women,
expropriate goods and
leave behind
eternal
infamy. Given this distinction, fortune
one must correct
the
overly
simplistic equation of examine
the
virtu of women
manly in Machiavelli's Mandragola and,

paradigm
and woman, control and
virtue.
more
I intend to
briefly, in
Clizia in
order to complete
understand
the
To properly
guard against
womanly
virtu as
introduced in Chapter 25 of The Prince. dramatized in the plays, one must

In
other
confusing
nature and custom.
works, Machiavelli criti
cizes
the
tendency
to attribute to nature modes of behavior that are the result of

subject
custom and
are, therefore,
to human
will.
For example,
at the end of
Book I
of
heads ies (di
of
his Florentine Histories Machiavelli denigrates contemporary Italian state for lacking military prowess and for being dependent on mercenar
the
proprie armi
choice,
while
disarmati, 1, 39, p. Pope, Giovanna of Naples

for
a religious
134).4
He
says
that
they
are unarmed
by
and
the
Florentines
are unarmed of
necessity.
It is
a
the
Queen,
leader to bear arms, it is not the nature of woman, to be militant, and in Florence the mercantile ruling class
not proper
old
has destroyed the

there were
warrior
aristocracy and with it military virtii. But we know that Popes and that Machiavelli respects the religion of ancient
Rome for its
manliness and
is
critical of
Florentine Histories
aggressive uation
we are given
two striking
Christian passivity; at the end of the instances of women acting with Florentines to
alter
virtii; and we know that Machiavelli wants

history."
the
sit
that is a product of their city's
In
each case custom rather than
nature
havior that
raries
is to blame; he is making ironic reference to conditions and modes of be seem fixed by nature only because of the weakness of his contempo and their failure to understand what can be changed.
entitles
When Machiavelli
Chapter
26 of the
Discourses,
in, "How
because but
of
Women
State is
Ruined,"
his
subject
is
not
feminine
capriciousness
rather
that the abuse of

the
women can cause rulers
to
fall. If
we compare
this
chapter with
tine
Discourses, 1, Histories, vn, 33,

16
(p. 176),
or
the picture of
Galeozzo Visconti in
mind:
the Floren
we can see what
he has in
need.6
it is politically imprudent
to take what
men consider
their own, to abuse women, goods, or

citizens
laws, thereby
There is, for Machiavelli, noth destroying security good or bad about ing intrinsically taking women; the act must be considered in the context of the political security of both rulers and Lucrezia's con
the sense of
subjects.7
version of
Callimaco from lover-tyrant to lover-prince
must also
be
seen
in the
context of prudent self-interest raised to the
level
of
the common good, of some
thing judged
4.
to be good
because it
prevents rather than causes the ruin of
family
Istorie fiorentine, See 11 Principe,
ed.
5.
572.
11
&
Franco Gaeta (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1962), p. 135. 25. pp. 56 & 100; Discorsi, 1, 11; Istorie, vm, 34.
p.
571, and 35, p.
6. Cf. Discorsi, III, 26, p. 459; Istorie, VII, 33, p. 503; and Discorsi. 1, 16, p. 174. 7. Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958),
p. 283.
263
or state.
The Virtu of Women:

If
a ruler
Machiavelli'
Mandragola
and
Clizia
tyranny, there manly
must
is to live securely as a prince and avoid the ruin engendered by be balance between the necessity to command fortune with
virtue and
the equally
strong necessity to respect,
or even
be led by,
able to
wom
anly
virtue.
Put
another
way, the
truly
successful man must
be
character
because
even youthful
aggressiveness
change.8
is
not an
absolute good
vary his in a
world where conditions order and
they
an
are
Other virtues contribute to constantly centered in the substance, the materia of society.
example of this
lasting
We find
War.''
interesting
of
duality
The discussion
things
ancient and modern
in the opening of The Art of begins with the setting of the
dialogue,
a shady part of the Rucellai gardens where the participants take refuge from the heat of the sun. Fabrizio Colonna's praise for the site and especially for
the shade trees

prized certain
leads the host Cosimo Rucellai to describe the trees
as
more
by
the ancients than
by
moderns; Fabrizio
responds that
he is
reminded of
Neapolitan
princes who
delighted in
such cultivation.
Fabrizio
criticizes
this practice because men should imitate the ancients in things strong and
not soft and
harsh,
delicate,
under
the sun rather than in the shade. Excessive concern
for the
this
soft arts
led to the
decay of Rome.
is
Since Fabrizio is
appropriate.
introduction to the
exposure
rough art of war
a military commander But Cosimo demurs since state of nature unbecom soft or
he takes
to the sun to
represent a
rude,
fierce
ing
civilized men. and
Machiavelli
provides contrast
between the
delicate in
(via di
nature,
the hard
or savage
(fiera). Fabrizio for the

a
seeks a compromise
create
mezzo), arguing that stern but humane laws in fact
society, constraining
love for fellow
citizens and respect
common good.
Thus the
the
shaded pro
tection of civilized
sun.
life is
planted
by
founder
who can endure
heat
of the
Fabrizio
proposes a
balance between the
valiant and
the good, between the
arts of peace and war, with peace, or
shade, the end achieved

ways of
by
men who
know
how to imitate the
ancients
in the hard
war; and it is war, the precondi
tion for peace, that dominates the ensuing
dialogue.1"
The
toral
nymphs and shepherds whose
song begins Mandragola

cares
come
from
a pas
existence exempt
from the worldly
that
oppress mortals.
The hero his He
Callimaco has
come
from Paris,
a place of shaded, pastoral retirement where

soft arts of
time was divided between the
pleasure, study and
business."
8. See Discorsi, ill, 8 & 9,

9.
417-
19-
Arte della
guerra e scritti politici minori, ed.
Sergio Bertelli (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1961),
pp.
330-31-
10. 1 1
.
Ibid.,
pp.
337 & 342;
cf.
Discorsi, I,
ed.
11.
// teatro
e tutti gli scritti
letterari,
Franco Gaeta (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1965),

Mandragola,"
p. 55.
See the
Mera J. Flaumenhaft, Mandragola (Prospect Heights. 111.: Waveland Interpretation: A Comic Remedy: Machiavelli's "The her and Press, 1981), essay Journal of Political Philosophy, 7 (May 1978), 33-74 Also of note are Theodore E. Sumberg, "La Journal of Politics, 23 (1961), 320-40, Martin Fleisher, "Trust and Mandragola: An JHI, 27 (July 1966), 365-80, and Timothy J. Lukes, 'Fortune Deceit in Machiavelli's
translation and introduction
by
Interpretation,"
Comedies,"
Works,"
Comes
33-50.
of
Age in Machiavelli's
Literary
Sixteenth
Century Journal,
11,
no.
4 (1980),
264
grew
Interpretation
retreat while
up in this
his
native
Italy
he
was caught
up in the harshness
of
war and political
turmoil precipitated the age
by
the invasion of Charles VIII.

would
Callimaco
has just
reached
(30)
at which
be
eligible
to participate in
politial affairs
of public spiritedness
in Florence. He has not, however, been drawn back by any sense but rather by his desire to see for himself the beauty of up his retired,
unpolitical
Lucrezia
and
to possess her.
gives
Callimaco
rapes
life to satisfy his
sexual
desire. He
Lucrezia, using fraud
and guile
session of a woman who about
may be said his desire to triumph his initial objective from its
natural
end,"12
conspiracy that gives him pos to represent the city. There is no question
a comic or
in
rule, to enjoy pleasure "di
vorced
strongly
a
suggests a parallel
between lover
to deceive her
(rap
fool
ist)
and
tyrant. He
finds
way to
we
subdue a good woman and
ish husband, but if his

permanent
objectives are transformed
by Lucrezia,
not
do
have
a paradigm
virtu
into something softer and more for the conversion of the loverhimself is
ulti
tyrant to lover-prince? If Callimaco's
takes the woman, he
mately taken,
only
by
her
beauty
but
by
seed that will shadow
Lucrezia,
the son who
her womanly virtu. He plants the will protect her and complete her
or made to serve
family; in
To
a political sense
his lust has been tempered

and
her inter
ests, the interests of the

accept
family
by
extension the city.
this thesis we must see Lucrezia as
victim, the
there for play,
materia subdued and used
by
the
something other than a passive aggressive Callimaco. What basis is
looking
at
Lucrezia in this
the
we should reflect on
Before examining evidence from the relationship between the Florentine ruling class
way?
and all of those groups,
including
women, excluded from
government.
Richard
fifteenth century, a beleaguered gerontocracy of judicious fathers condemned, as had their ancestors, the common faults of all those groups that were excluded from Boys (fanciulli), young men
C. Trexler
points out
that "In the
government."
(giovani),
ate
plebs and women were all controlled
thought to lack "the gravity, the dispassion

were
reason, and the
sexuality that
the necessary
of
moral qualities of
governors."13
In Mandragola
we witness the
parasite-counselor, a mother and a priest, all outside the

gether
to satisfy their
perpetuate
own
interests
and
the young man, a ruling class, working to to deceive Nicia.
conspiracy
To
who produce and youthful
itself the gerontocracy needs the young. It needs fertile women sons, the future giovani, and young men who offer their special arts
as
vitality to the ruling class,
Callimaco does
rich and
when
tor or the sacrificial
wife, is
inseminator. Nicia, fortunate fool, a man frustrated

72).
can
in
possession of a
playing the doc beautiful
by
his failure to
produce a son and
by
in the city (11, iii, p. his lack of the Florentine gerontocracy. Nicia
of status
He
represents the
inherent impotence because he de

the
medi-
be easily
manipulated
sires a son and
because he follows
opinion or
fashion;
he naively trusts
12.
13.
Strauss,
p. 285.
Public Life in Renaissance Florence (New York: Academic
Press,
1980),
p. 367.
265
cal art
The Virtu of Women:

Callimaco
pretends to
Machiavelli'
Mandragola
and
Clizia
into the do the
bring from France,

the corrupt
and will
deliver his
wife
arms of another man

same.14
because French kings

recognize
and gentlemen are said to

materia
In Nicia
we
of a
city
being
exploited
rather
than reformed
by
an aggressive
young man;
fortune,
but
or the
master
circumstance, is
identified
not with a woman
with a
opportunity to foolish represen
tative of the
ruling
class.
virtu-fortuna
To
understand
the difference between the
Prince
and
the relationship
between Callimaco
and
analogy given in The Lucrezia we need to consider
the strengths and weaknesses of the
impetuous young man. Callimaco's desire has drawn him back to Florence to engage in conquest, but left to himself Calli
maco appears needs
suicidal, or capable
an outsider
of some
equally desperate
enough
aggression.15
He
counselor,
passion.
who
is
wise
to temper the heat of than youthful

who acts or
Callimaco's
ardor.
An effective,
lasting
of
seduction requires more
Ligurio,
the counselor, is one
the many characters in the play
out of
money.
self-interest, but his
motivation goes
beyond acquiring
free meal,
Whether
moved
by
his love
of manipulation
itself,
or
by
his desire to
join
a spirited
young
man and an astute
strain
the
devised bagni
impetuosity and cure by Ligurio, Lucrezia is

psychological
young woman, to succeed he must re the desperation of Callimaco. In the conspiracy
treated as though she were in need of a cure, the
or mandragola, while
in fact her
and social
fertility
ills
of
and
beauty
will
be
used
to cure
and
the physical,
Nicia.16
the men,
both Callimaco
Callimaco
needs
help
not against
Nicia,
or
fortune, but
against
Lucrezia,
be
so
or
nature, for her
goodness represents marvels
the
major obstacle
to the
satisfaction of
his
intense desire. Ligurio

nate as
that so foolish a man as Nicia should
fortu
fit to only beautiful but is wise, mannerly govern a kingdom. Similarly, in the prologue she is described as accorta. sharp, Her nature and the internal state of war her honesty triggers clever, or within Callimaco create greater difficulties for him than the assault on Nicia. We detect something of her character when Nicia tells Ligurio how wary his wife has pestered by a priest while fulfilling her vow to hear forty become after
to have a
wife who
is
not
and
aware.17
being
city
counseled to try by a neighbor as an assist to morning masses, something she was fertility. The pattern is typical of Lucrezia; she participates in the customs of the but is neither a fool nor about to be abused. Her natural astuteness and hon
superstitious
esty distance her from the

14.
vulnerability
of other women who de-
Callimaco
calls
Nicia
neither
62)
see
and, after
his triumph,
11, vi,
an old
p.
tutto vecchio: 1. i, p. young nor old (se non e giovane non e al husband (marito vecchio: v, iv, p. 109). On Nicia's lack of status
gullible
11,
15. 16.
iii,
1,
p. 72, and
77 for his
veleno
imitation
oi re e principi e signori.
iii,
p.
67:
qualche partito
bestiale,
della
crudo,
nefando.
Mandragola"
See Ezio Raimondi, "II

to placate
remarks
in Politico
1-
e commedia
(Bologna: Mu-
Ligurio'
teatro,"
lino,
1972), pp. 253-64. and "11 Segretario a

stomach
pp. 21
12. on
s name and a precious
stone with the power
ills. 66: bella donna,

savia, costumata e atta a governare un
17.
Cf. Ligurio's
I,
iii,
p.
regno, and Prologue, p. 57.
266
pend
Interpretation
church and
too much on the
its disreputable
Lucrezia is
priests
(fratacchioni) The fact

.
that she resists going to the baths or giving Nicia a urine sample
betokens
some and
thing
might
other
than
foolish modesty
on guard
in
a word of
fools
knaves.18
In considering the
use she makes of
baptism
at
the end of the play, we
detect her ability to
keep
up
appearances when need

replaces
be,
and
to manipulate
them
when a
pleasing knave,
or
devil,
the bothersome priest and offers

an astute woman must
both
secret pleasure and public protect
benefit. In Florence
know
how to
her reputation, how to be fortune into the in Act III,
aloof or proper
in church,
and
how to
transform good
appearance of predestination.
Her
crezia
entrance
scene x, confirms
Ligurio's characterization, for Lu
astutely analyzes the situation husband to the error (errore) of the
excessive
desire for
a son
has brought her
proposed use of a potion and a sacrificial
lover. She strongly resists the further outrage (vituperio) of causing the death of a man who will dishonor her. Anticipating Frate Timoteo's argument, she rejects her
mother's
persuasions, asserting that

resurgence of
even were she
the
last
woman on
earth,
to this
responsible
shame.19
for the
mankind,
she would not submit
her
body
The
words vituperio and errore show moral outrage
astute awareness of the
foolish,
of
mistaken method
nicely balanced her husband has chosen.

over
by
Act IV,
scene
i,
opens with
Callimaco agonizing
the conflict between
the simplicity of Nicia at his disposal, and Lucrezia that resists temptation. He is like a ship driven by contrary winds, unable to reconcile his good fortune with his percep tion of her good nature, caught betwen conscience reproving the planned seduc
the good
fortune,
fortune
having
nature, the natural wisdom of
tion-rape and
desire telling him to be a man and risk even damnation.20 Clearly Lucrezia is not identified with passive materia, nor with capricious fortune. The one character who is confident that s wisdom and goodness can
Lucrezia'
be
overcome
is Timoteo, the in his
churchman who controls women and their opinions.
the counselor who subordinates

as
morality to
worldly
sense of the common
good,
he
shows
response to
the abortion test. Timoteo considers Lucrezia
smart
for
woman, like a one-eyed man
among the blind; he is
confident that
her
very Lucrezia is Biblical

that
goodness can
be turned
against
her.21
prepared
for Timoteo's
as we
counsel
because
of
her
previous experi
ence with a priest and example of
because,
have seen,
she anticipates
his
use of
the
Lot's daughters
as a precedent
for her
sacrifice.
He
argues
morality but be justified because they serve a noble end, in her case the perpetuation of her family, if not mankind. His promise to pray to the Angel Raphael to accompany her alludes ironically to the
means
may
challenge conventional
18.
19.
Cf. Nicia m, i,
ill, 10,
p.
p.
79,
on
the fratacchioni and 11,

,
ii,
p.
71, & 11, v,
p.
74,
on
her
reluctance.
88:
che
io
non
crederrei, se io
fussi
sola rimasa net mondo e
da
me avessi a
resurgere
I'umana natura,
che mi fussi simile partito concesso.
20.
21
.
iv,
i,
p. 92: e sono
in inferno tanti
ill,
uomini
da bene.
For the
abortion test see
iv,
p.
83; his
remarks on
Lucrezia
occur
in ill, ix,
p.
87:
perche
in terra di
ciechi chi v'ha un occhio e signore.
267
The Virtu of Women:

Tobit
against
Machiavelli'
Mandragola
lover
and
Clizia
protection given
Asmodeus,
Timoteo.22
the demon
who
killed Sarah's
who
first
seven
husbands
to
on their
wedding
nights.
Callimaco is, in fact, the devil is
will come
her bed
assisted
by
Lucrezia
anticipates the sacrifice towards which she
being
led
by
her
con
fessor
left
and
by
her mother,
world
a woman she still trusts and who reminds a

beast.23
her that to be
alone
in this
is to live like
Lucrezia
experiences a passion
(passione) and calls on the Virgin Mary for assistance, but the passion too is ironic for she must submit her body to the planned outrage (vituperio) as a sac
rifice
designed to
Florentine
redeem
the
family.24
In her
passion she
fulfills the
comic mys
tery
of
womanhood
in
church and and one
state, giving her
body
to produce
the male child who can protect
her
day
take the
father's
be
place
in the
home
and
the city, with, she
hopes,
more success
than Nicia. Lucrezia is
being
be
persuaded cause
to
act as a woman
should; as Timoteo puts
it,
she can
her.25
excused
her
vituperio will please
her husband
and
displease
But
If the
victim
lover is
saved
from death it is because

sense.
of clever
deception;
pay
there
is
no miracle of redemption
in any Christian
we should
close at
tention to the changes Callimaco undergoes, the masks he puts on as doctor and
victim, as
well as
the transformation he
undergoes
from demon to
protector once
in bed
or
with
Lucrezia. That final transformation

the
role assigned
shows
Lucrezia stepping
out
of,
beyond,
to her
by
the conspirators, confirming Ligurio's ob
servation
that she is fit to
rule. good conscience and prostrate a man.
When Callimaco describes his internal debate between
bad desire, the bad advises manliness; he should not be weak and self like a woman but should rather take his chances and act like
that same
monologue good conscience warns
him
But in
that
he, like
than
most
men, will
find
less
satisfaction
in the
accomplishment of
his desire
he
expected.
Whether
this is so because of Lucrezia 's

e
good nature and probable resistance always outruns
(providenzia
durezza), because
her
expectation
performance, or because one
night with
cannot equal
say.26
the
anticipation generated
by
the conspiracy, con
science satisfied
does he
not
must
desire
22.
so
fiercely
p.
It is implied that for the better side of Callimaco to be find something more than the momentary pleasure his manly pursues. For Callimaco to become more than the tyrant-lover
Remedy,"
ill, xi,
90;
see
Flaumenhaft, "The Comic
p. 53.
The worldly Sostrata shares certain values with Ligurio who refers to her as one of the boys (<? stata buona compagna, I, i. p. 63); to Nicia he says that she is on their side (e della opinione Nicia (e uflizio d'un prudente pigliare nostra, 11, vi, p. 77); she counsels worldly prudence to he p. 79); Timoteo echoes the warning she gives her daughter when cattivi partiti el
23.
de'
migliore, m,
una
i,
calls
Sostrata bene
bestia (m,
ix,
p.
complicity (la
24
111, x,
semplicitd
di
mia madre,
v,
87); Lucrezia does iv, p. 109).

Timoteo's
not, apparently, suspect her mother's
p.
88: Io
sudo per
la
passione and
preparatevi a questo
misterio, p. 90.
Callimaco's song is in 25. hi, xi, p. 89: e la

piacere, e
26.
voi ne avete
iv. ix. p.
103.
cagione
del peccato
dispiacere
al marito, e voi
li
compiacete; pigliarne
dispiacere.
sai tu quanto poco
iv,
i,
I'
p. 92:
Non
bene
si truova nelle cose che
uomo
desidera,
rispetto a
quelle che
uomo
ha
presupposte trovarvi?
268
whose oncile
Interpretation
lust is his
own
limitation he
needs wise
counsel, something that can rec
the inner split between conscience and desire. Machiavelli
is
defining
in
the
or
genesis of
tyranny, the
compulsion
to repeat rape, the act of manly control,
der to
overcome the suggests
inevitable
sense of
dissatisfaction.
Ligurio
that Callimaco extend
his
pleasure
and
keep
the woman
within his control by warning her that if she sets herself up as his enemy she will suffer infamy, but that she can be safe as his friend or lover. When Callimaco
finally
threat.
reports what
happened
poco
with
Lucrezia
we
find he
needed
to make no such
Echoing
the
bene (iv,
i,
p.
72)
conscience
had
warned would
taint
his
satisfaction,
mi parve
Callimaco describes the
mixture of great pleasure and
discontent
(non
buono) he
experienced
in bed before he
revealed
his love to
dissatisfaction derives from his previously stated interest in prolonging pleasure. If we recall Callimaco's life in Paris, we see a young man who enjoys secure pleasures and for whom the excitement of seduc
Lucrezia. We
can assume the
tion
is merely
or
an
interlude. Now, is founded
either
desire
to
prompts
him to
sacrifice
his free
mo
dom,
rality
the promise of marriage

on
is
used
sustain
his
pleasure.
The future
of marriage
the adulterous pact sealed
lovers, but immoral desire has

chiavellian
also
been
reconciled with
between the young public morality in a Ma

rulers
blend
10
of self-interest and propriety.
Like the
discussed in the
Discourses, 1,
must refrain mail
& 16, Callimaco
must respect at
least the forms, the institu

passions
tions and customs of the city. The prince can
indulge his
offensive.
in
secret
but he black
from anything openly bestial or brings with it a danger for Callimaco
Ligurio's
threat of
the danger of that very

a citizen's
infamy
he
of
would use against
Lucrezia. Reputation, like
belief that the honor
his
wife
ruler a
is safe, may be no more than an illusion, and the fame of a law-abiding noble lie, like the good name of a lover. But Lucrezia seems to have faith
conscience or enlightened
self-
and the young man fail to fulfill his promise, she would still be left alone like a beast, with the addition of a son to care for. There is, however, something in Callimaco's nature which heeds the
in the efficacy of both desire and some form of interest in Callimaco. If her husband were to die
warnings of conscience.
Trusting
this and other more tangible manifestations of
his love (Callimaco proudly
compares
his
performance
in bed to
Nicia'
old
rule.27
s),
Lucrezia,
In the
with a
smile, shows herself to
be indeed
a woman
fit to
private world she proves to
be the
most astute
and, perhaps, Machiavel
lian
character
in the
play.
She
converts
momentary
satisfaction
into
a new order.
Unlike the Roman Lucrece
she
does
not commit suicide out of a sense of shame;
rather, she changes vituperio
into
lasting
of
satisfaction and makes those who providence.
have
point
forced that
would
shame
into instruments
divine
Her
smile at
this
be truly beatific
and
her lover's cleverness, husband's silliness,

wickedness
are
mother's
simplicity brought her to bed; the

27.
said.
confessor's
the providential
means
that have
child and continued pleasure are the ends marked out
by
Cf. Ligurio's
advice
iv,
ii,
p.
96,
and
v,
iv,
p.
109 for Callimaco's
report of what
Lucrezia
269
The Virtu of Women: Machiavelli's Mandragola

wanted
and
Clizia
God. What her husband

ever;
for
one night are
will,
under
her regime, last for
limited
ends and
momentary desire
or
transformed
by
her
passion and
mystery into something eternal, signed to render her a victim as
nearly
so.
Redefining
as
the scheme that was de
a new providential
order, Lucrezia demonstrates
her cleverness; it is
ther and
way to
save
appearances,
publicly
baptizing
the
illegitimate be
child.
is making Callimaco the godfa Her astuteness, if not divine

only if Callimaco
the
providence, serves the common good of the
family.
respects
The
pleasure of one night can
made
lasting
essential
honesty
and
the obvious cleverness of Lucrezia. The
ceremonial
bap
the
tism she orchestrates reconciles city,
fierce
or
youthfulness with the
institutions
of
joining
what
had been hidden
disguised
with what
is
made public.
We
say that Lucrezia has recognized in the young man something of fortune, the opportunity to use her virtue to shape experience in a way profitable to her
might
family
and
to the city. His lust
provides
the occasion
for
a renewal of the old or
der. Though the balance is

rience), Lucrezia
precarious a
(thus the her
passion and
mystery
of
her
expe
does find
way to
uphold
integrity
within
while
using the
ways of
the world; pleasure redeems the good conscience
Callimaco, making him
into
an obedient master,
ready for
the
marriage.
Assigning Callimaco
not, I
would
role of
lord,
It is
master, guide, father and defender is
argue, an act of submission

scene of the play.
respect
by Lucrezia,
a
of
for
she
missive
ture of
way playing his manly pride, thus holding him to her and to the city. In Machiavelli's world, when this balance is achieved there is no way to distinguish means from ends, appearance from reality. We need not ask whether Lucrezia really uses the more lasting orders merely as a means to
in the last
on
is anything but sub both the good na
Callimaco, his
for her,
and
serve
her
own pleasure.
The two have become one;
pleasure
lasts longer
when
reconciled with
virtue,
command
is
more secure when

union of
it
creates security. and
That is
of
the
lesson
we should
learn from the

Lucrezia'
Callimaco
ruin.
Lucrezia. Abuse
women and sure when
law is
unpleasant
because it leads to
s
Callimaco finds
more plea
he follows
and
lead
and allows
who
his interests to
coincide with ways of
hers, Nicia's,
the city's.
Lucrezia,
knows the deceptive
lovers
in the bedroom
and priests
in the church,
manages
to use both flawed human na
ture and flawed human institutions to

of civic
promote
the continuity that is the essence
life.
Is there any essential difference between manly and womanly virtue as re representative vealed in Machiavelli's Mandragolal We might see in Lucrezia a if its materia, of those traditional virtues of piety and honesty needed by a state
or character,
is to
remain uncorrupted.
But in
order
to survive, those virtues must the other women to appearances
be tempered Timoteo
by
wisdom, and
in this, Lucrezia is is
aware respect
quite unlike
manipulates.
The
priest and
that a
failure to
attend
has led to
decline in piety
in
for the institutions

of
of the church, and

themselves.28
we recognize a more serious
failing
in the behavior
the priests
28.
These
remarks introduce
Act V.
270
Interpretation
not maintain
Blind faith does

the
and city.
those virtues needed as an underpinning for
law in
In Lucrezia
respect
is balanced
be led
combined with
the ability to
act
by decisively
wariness, her
willingness
to listen
when alone.
Ligurio is
ture. He
Machiavellian
others
counselor who
takes a realistic view of
human
na
manipulates
by drawing
on shared
self-interest,
as with
Calli
maco and
Sostrata,
or
by
Lucrezia. There is
siders
more
employing fraud or force, as with Timoteo, Nicia and of the fox than the lion in the comedies. Callimaco con
violent and
attempting something
makes possible
Ligurio
of
counsels
blackmail, but it is
sexual prowess.
fraud that
the
demonstration
Callimaco's Ligurio
The
distinctive difference between the anly

as
virtu
astuteness of a
and
Lucrezia's
wom
is that
she utilizes the power of good conscience within

more permanent.
Callimaco to
to recognize
represented
make their
relationship
Machiavelli
would seem
clearly
as certain of
his
critics that
Machiavellian counsel, here
by Ligurio, is blind to, or often chooses not to concern itself with, traditional vir tue. But love, the voice of conscience, the shame and seeming deference of Lucrezia, the instinct to serve, please and protect that emerges from Callimaco,
are all shown
to be strong forces
in human
nature and within
the city. In the
pri
vate world of the virtu rules
bedroom,
a pastoral retreat we never see
directly, womanly
these
forces.
young man, cannot escape the city and its customs, no mat they become. She must stay on during warfare and turmoil,
while
Lucrezia,
amidst
unlike a
ter how corrupt
fools
and
knaves,
Callimaco is in Paris. If
she represents the uncor
rupted virtue of the
city, preserved because distant from the centers of power, it
is
virtue
fully
aware.
Perhaps the
most
striking
characteristic of
womanly
virtii
is
the
ability
to combine shame and respect for public
forms
of
ceremony
with re
strained self-interest.
If Callimaco is the
spirited
youth
who
may
return
to take over the

who can enlist
city
the
charismatic, attractive even to

right counselors and allies
city.29
Nicia,
will
a master of
disguise
he
have to do
more
than rape or abuse the
He
will
have to wed,
or at
and
desirable.
Only
that virtue
least listen to, that which makes it beautiful can, in turn, convert his limited interests into
a new order.
something honor and

pleasure
more
permanent, into
That
order preserves the
forms
of
providence while
and
but continuity Callimaco

a
the
require quite unconventional crezia and
new vigor; the union generates not only security needed for family and city. Renewal may means, but Machiavelli seems to identify with Lu
planting
kind
of virtue capable of
and the more conventional respect
for
public, ceremonial
encompassing both those means forms. Only through

renewed, that
this comic
newed without
duality can having
the
family
or
city be
preserved and
is,
re
to undergo the painful passage through ruin or disorder.

v, ii,
p.
29. of the age of
For Nicia's
misplaced admiration see
107; a potential prince who
respects
the virtues
mirror
city
might promise
to take over if or when the republic dies.
Callimaco becomes the fall

of
im
and
Tarquin,
the man whose open
disrespect for law
and a woman caused the
the
institution
kingship
of a republican
form
of government.
271
As
a
The Virtu of Women:
Machiavelli'
Mandragola
and
Clizia
dramatist Machiavelli
the secret
gives us new modes and
orders, for his comedy ends the comic spirit of a society

and potential
with
adultery
and public
baptism, evoking
join to
achieving continuity In Mandragola a young

vent
and order after a period of

man and woman
deception
discord.
to pre
create a new order and
the
decay
of a
family
through an unconventional merging of the public and
the private, of
ceremony
and
desire. In Clizia
we see a mother
taking
on the role
of reformer and
her husband,
making foolish representative

sexual pursuits
use of pain to preserve a of the
family. The
object of reform
who
is
Florentine gerontocracy
is in
dulging
giovani.
in the
that were supposed to occupy the prepolitical

what she considers
When Sofronia describes
the right order
of Nico-
maco's
former life, He
we see
his time divided between the
centers of adult male
responsibility:
home.30
piazza, mercato, and magistrati outside and scrittoio inside the the proper behavior of a Florentine
merchant-citizen
once exhibited
and, therefore,
instructing by
a
example, earned the respect

and
of
his
son. youthful
When that
order
breaks down
of
the old man begins

with
frequenting
for Clizia, is
out
haunts, making
self
fool
himself
by
decorum is lost. The young lose (ognunofa

a suo modo).
respect
competing for the
his
son
traditional
old and everyone
for him
As
a result
the home (and
by
danger
of collapse
unless, as Sofronia says, God does

oppose
something. on
analogy the city) is in What God
does is to inspire Sofronia to
her husband's designs

and son are
Clizia, using his

manipulate
disgrace to
effect a reformation.
Both father
attempting to
the public ceremony of marriage through a substitute husband-servant as a means

of
gaining private control over Clizia, for a night or more of pleasure. Fortune opposes Sofronia and favors Nicomaco in the choice by lot
of
the
would-be
husband, but
the
old
virtii of
the wife overcomes fortune and the foolish

suffers vituperio,
husband. Like Lucrezia,

ate punishment of
Nicomaco
in his
case
the appropri
sodomy for
a man eager
to imitate the vices of young Floren
tine giovani;
unlike
Lucrezia, however,
a
the old man is unable to redeem what

and
happens
when
he finds
devil in bed. Kicked
ences the
shameful
courses, in, I and

which
suffering 28, Sofronia invites her husband to

she
that prepares men
sexually attacked, he experi for Echoing the Dis

reform.31
return
to that order from
he has departed;
is
the
braccio
regia
leading
her
mate
back to
respon
sible civic life, just as a reformer would lead the state back to its founding virtues after men have lost respect for the common good and have suffered because of their own corruption. Strength of character must inform the institutions and laws when that materia becomes deformed time is no longer properly di of the
state;
vided
between the
between
are
political and ceremonial places of
the city, and the right rela

right
tionship
generations
is lost. Those
who
have the legal
to rule (the
gerontocracy)
least
able
to curb their own
desires; they
corrupt the
imitating
30.
the
slack ways of giovani while still
pretending to authority.
young by The cycle
// teatro,
ed
Gaeta,
11, 4, pp. 132-33pp.
31
Cf. Nicomaco v, ii,
159-60, and
Sofronia v,
iii,
p.
162:
Se
tu vorrai ritornare al segno.
272
Interpretation
of corruption and
anarchy. and
discontinuity
a
From that disorder

a taste of that respect
eventually leads society to strong and virtuous founder
collapse
into
a state of
can
begin
a new state,
from
disorder
a wise reformer can prompt a return to civic
good
sense,
for the his
common good
and, in the private world, restraint.

and
When Sofronia
says that she
had to
use
deception
Nicomaco 's
own shame
to
force
a correction of
grave
error, we are reminded that the suffering that pre

engineered
pares corrupt men
for
reform
may be
by
an
a wise and clever reformer.
The
woman as reformer an outsider who
is
someone who
aware
has
interest in
a return to the old
forms,
is
fully
of what makes the system
work;
like
Lucrezia draw the
she combines astute observation and greatest common good greater
decisive
action with
the ability to
from the
self-interest of
those around
and she
her. So
fronia has
worldly Cleandro's
conventions marriage when
authority within the family than Lucrezia in every respect, as we can see when she
to a girl who
follows
her
son
opposes
lacks
dowry; her
is
opposition
by
fortune
Clizia's
noble parentage
finally
lesson
revealed.
is only resolved Both women know

good out of
how to benefit from the seeming

of
schemes of men.
For Sofronia,
bringing
corruption means
using the
painful
visited upon
her husband
as a
way shocking him out of his second childhood back into the form of life she respects, the form that provides security and continuity for her family. No new order emerges; the husband returns to his movement between piazza, mercato,
magistrati and scrittoio, while
the son
is
given the acceptable
wife acts as much through self-interest as through any moral ply inappropriate for most men of Nicomaco's age and standing to spend their time trying to act like young men; in most cases they will end up getting hurt. It
young bride. The judgment. It is sim
is the
virtii of a woman
to recognize that
incongruity
and
to preserve
her
own
in
terests. For Machiavelli it seems not so much a moral question as a question of

what promotes
security
of
and
tween Sofronia and Nicomaco is that
continuity within the community. The difference be her self-interest harmonizes with social or
she
der; it does
dition to
so,
course, because
is
clever enough to make

of a
it
prevail.
In
ad
being
advised
fox
she
is
also
something
lion, for her
use of
the
of
private
error committed
by
Nicomaco
amounts to
use against
blackmail (like the threat Lucrezia). She forces
infamy
Ligurio
Callimaco to
a return to the
kind
of
behavior
she considers proper.
We he
must recall
that old Nicomaco tried

was
force,
prayers
and
then threats to
overcome what
substituted
his manly advances when himself for the bridegroom-servant Pirro. Exhausted and unsuc
resistance to
and
he thought
Clizia's
cessful, he lapsed into sleep

what
was, as
he describes it, in fact he

not was
attacked
from behind
by
he first thought
was
the knife Clizia was reported to
be wielding in despera
assaulted
tion before the enforced marriage, while
being
sexually
to ex
pun
by
the substitute the
bride Siro. Nicomaco is

of a violent
only
out-substituted
but
made
perience
fear
death
and then
the shame of being abused. The
ishment fits the crime, for he had

mony
and
wanted to
force Clizia.
Comedy
promotes
har
productivity
and,
therefore, it is
appropriate that
Nicomaco be driven
273 from his
The Virtu of Women:

senile
Machiavelli'
Mandragola
and
Clizia
his
imitation his
of
Tarquin back to the
more productive rhythm of

or
peregrinations within
the city.
Nothing
but harm
shame, and least of all,
plea
sure,
will come of
preposterous error. can
We know from Mandragola that city find in Clizia. implicit in

works.
new
and procreative
comic
forms
the
be
created within a
and made as much a part of the

we
order
as
more
conventional
reform
Man
dragola is the
need
more original and
daring
in
play, yet
both
comedies show that we our
to examine more carefully the assumptions about
sex
reading
of such
key
terms as virtu and materia
all of
Machiavelli's
AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
VOLUME
sl'MMl
.SI
NUMBER
R ll>X4
50th
Part II:
Anglo-
Anniversary
Daniel Bell
Peter Berger
American
Perspective
_~~ _~~-
1934-1984
Stanley
Diamond
Clifford Geertz
Robert Heiibroner Dell Hymes Alasdair Maclntyre Talcott Parsons
Philip
Rieff
^^.
Charles Taylor
f?_
Individual Subscriptions:
$20; Institutions: $35
Single copies available on request Editorial and Business Office: 66 West 12th Street, New York. N.Y. 1001 1 Room GF341
Rousseau's Contract
Jim MacAdam
Trent University
with and without
his
Inequality
The
overall purpose of
nected problems of
problem
this essay is to make interpretation of Rousseau's
sense of some
hitherto
uncon
political philosophy.
The first
is what, if any, relationship exists between Rousseau's Discourse On Inequality and The Social ContractV The second is whether or not it is
possible
to
bring
a
into direct
confrontation recent writings that either
do
or
do
not assume
will consider
relationship between Inequality and Contract. Third, the essay whether there is a continuous argument between Rousseau's works. interpretation. To
provide
Connection
gue
of these problems requires an

self-interest which
it, I
will ar
that it is
is the
principal cause of
inequality,
that the prob
lem
of self-interest
links
Inequality
and
Contract,
and
that Rousseau's attempt to the two read

argu
unite
justice
and self-interest provides common ground upon which
ings
can confront one another.
Although
is continuous, the essay to that interpretation.

ment
will conclude
favoring by propounding
the
interpretation that the
a problem germane
WITH AND WITHOUT
Two interpretations
tract.
are given of
it"
The first is
"with
the Contract
is based
upon
the relationship between Inequality and Con interpretation according to which understanding of (presupposes or is, in some sense, dependent upon)
Inequality. The
two
second
is
an
interpretation "without
it,"
divided specifically into
alternatives: either
the relationship between the two works is

one of aside.
logically
con
tradictory, and thus impossible, or the relationship is which case Inequality can, and perhaps should, be left
C. E. Vaughan favoured the
independence, in
argument
alternative of contradiction
but his
an
for
it is based in
on an eccentric and unproved claim that

"collectivist"
Rousseau is
"individualist"
Inequality
and a
in the
Contract.2
What is disturbing, however,
is that his conclusion,

posits that
as opposed to
came
Rousseau
his supporting argument, may be correct if it to believe that the outcome of the argument of In
stage"
of the poor fellow who is sawing off the equality is comparable to the plight of inequality limb that he is sitting on. For, as will be shown, "the last
I.
All translations from Rousseau's
writings
are
from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, CEuvres
com
pletes, tome
are given 2.
111, Du
contrat social ecrits politiques
(Bibliotheque de la Pleiade).
Only
page numbers
in the
essay.
(Oxford. Basil C E. Vaughan, ed.. The Political Writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau
Black-
well. 1962).
Vol.
I,
p.
21,
also pp. 4-6,
14-19.
80;
vol.
II,
p.
14-
276
Interpretation
the condition of modern men as that of crazed
seems not to apply.
when
(188-94) depicts
whom political men
degenerates
to
in the
preface of
philosophy the Contract (351)
Is Rousseau referring to these he says that he proposes to "take
are?"
men as
they
Does he he
propose says
to leave them as
they
are?
Does Rousseau
have them in
that
mind when
human
nature must
in Contract, Book Two, Chapter Seven (381) be transformed by the actions of the Lawgiver? Transfor
such
mation seems
consistent with
in order, but then how can the freedom of the moral

autonomy?1
interference
by
the
Lawgiver be
agent and with what
Andrew Levine
calls the politics of
This line
that
of questioning could serve also as the basis of the second alternative, it is better to consider independently Inequality and the Contract. For one
say that whether or not the works are inconsistent, it seem apparent that if Rousseau seeks to build upon the argument of Inequality, and takes as his subject
might
men who are out of control, he sets himself a hopeless task. Better then simply to forget Inequality or, at least, to interpret it in such a way as not to raise any seri ous issues. Hence, if we forgo Vaughan's too extreme version of the "without
it"
alternative,
it"
we are
left
with
two possibilities: a "with

and
it"
interpretation in
a
which
the relationship between

out
Inequality
We
the Contract is significant, and
"with
in
which
it is
not.
are also, of course,
left
with a major problem
in that
those who write as if the two major works are

sustained case
guments
independent
seem never
to make a
are no ar
for treating them independently. In consequence, there

quarter to which one can give a reply.
from that
GOOD EUROPEAN MONOGRAPHS (GEMs)

AND ABLE BRITISH COMMENTARIES (ABCs)
Despite this difficulty, it is

ceptable
scholarly
works on
out significant reference
intriguing to see the extent to which equally ac Rousseau's philosophy can be done with and with to Inequality. A survey of recent writings on Rousseau's
is
one
political
philosophy
suggests that there
interpretation
of man
which
is
heavily
de
pendent on
Inequality (viewing
from his nature)
and
the condition
in
Inequality
as enslaved
and alienated neglects
Inequality
another, equally acceptable, which virtually certainly that reading of it suggested immediately above.
and
For the
sake of provocative categories:
argument, let
me
into two
The
GEMs
(Good
crudely separate these European Monographs)

and
writings and
the
ABCs (Able British Commentaries). The first is to be

presupposes significant reference to not.
understood as that which
which does is entirely felicitous, not all the books in the first cate indicates a philosophical style rather than a gory are monographs, and nationality. Amongst the GEMs I would include Bronislaw Baczko's Rous-
Inequality
the second as that
Neither
abbreviation
"British"
3.
Andrew Levine, The Politics of Autonomy. A Kantian

of
Reading
of Rousseau's Social Contract
(Amherst, University
Massachusetts Press,
1976).
277
Rousseau's Contract
with and without
his
Inequality
1974), L. Coletti, From Rousseau to Victor Press, 1972), Goldschmidt's Anthropologic et (Monthly politique, Les Principes du svsteme de Rousseau (Vrin, 1974) plus the inspira
seau, solitude et communaute
(Mouton,
Lenin
Review
obstacle (Gallimard, 1971) by Jean Starobinski. Louis Althusser's stimulating essay on Rousseau in his Politics and History (NLB, 1972) comes under this category because its argument doesn't march well but for its implicit reliance on the argument of Inequality.
et
tional
J.J. Rousseau, la transparence
I'
ABCs
cal
should
include J. C. Hall's Rousseau: An Introduction
to
his Politi
Philosophy (Macmillan, 1973), Ramon Lemos's Rousseau's Political Philos ophy (The University of Georgia Press, 1977) and Andrew Levine's Rousseau and the Politics of Autonomy (University of Massachusetts Press, 1976). There
are exceptions which prove
the rule. John
Charvet's The Social Problem in

with
the
of Rousseau (Cambridge, 1974) belongs David Gauthier's "Rousseau: The Politics of
Philosophy
Papers
the
GEMs
three
as
does
Redemption,"
Trent Rousseau
(University
of
Ottawa Press,
on
1980).
and
I have
produced
Contract,"
flawed
GEMs, "The Discourse

and
Inequality
of
The Social
Egoism"
Philosophy,
1972, "Rousseau's Criticism
Hobbesian
of
in Trent Rousseau Papers
"Rousseau: The Moral Dimension
Peoperty,"
Theories of Property, Ar
often
istotle to the Present (Sir Wilfred Laurier
It is surprising that the The Social Contract is about equality and democrat. Such claims appear to
which
Press, 1979). ABCs neglect Inequality, for it is

and
held that
that Rousseau is the original egalitarian
necessitate an
understanding
be
of
the sense in
of
Rousseau held
men
to
be
unequal, and therefore a close
study
the dis
course addressed to that subject.
Nonetheless, it
political
would
mistaken
to argue that
which a
the ABCs are wrong. A weaker thesis seems warranted, one
by
dif
In
ferent interpretation
equality
and
of
Rousseau's
philosophy follows from
linking
the Contract. this thesis into view I propose to review the argument of
To
bring
Inequality
and
in terms
of certain
puzzling
a
passages
concerning
self-interest
(or self-love)
to
indicate from them
continuity
avowal
of argument with
the Contract.
Happily,
this
work provides a common ground
for the
in the
confrontation of the two
interpretations,
starting from Rousseau's interest (351).
preface of
the Contract to unite right and
SELF-INTEREST IN INEQUALITY
Rousseau clearly
the
alternative
regards
Hobbes
as
the principal exponent of egoism and as
to the reigning
political
part of
Inequality
Rousseau
credits of
philosophy of Natural Law. In the first Hobbes with having seen very clearly the de
character
of rational, prescriptive universal moral
mean
fault izes
of all modern
modern
definitions
as
Natural Law (153)- Earlier Rousseau
Natural Law
consisting
principles
(124). Hence I take Rousseau to
that prescriptive moral
prin-
278
Interpretation
insufficient to
govern the conduct of man motivated
ciples are
by
self-interest.
However, Rousseau
that
. .
also cautions:
evil.
.
man
is naturally feature
"Especially let us not conclude with Hobbes The wicked man, (Hobbes) says, is a robust
is that
although
child"
(153).
curious
of this comment
Hobbes does
compare
the
wicked man evil.
to a robust child, Hobbes
Indeed, Hobbes
claims that such a thesis
denies emphatically that man is naturally is inconsistent with his philosophi

claim occur on
cal method and principles.
the same page of
In addition, comparison, denial and text (in Man and Citizen, edited by B. Gert,
Doubleday
or
An
chor,
p.
100).
Either Rousseau
deliberately
misrepresented
Hobbes,
derived
com
the misrepresentation
parison with
from is
a commentator.
Even
without
the
full text the
the robust child suggests that evil is not natural, as one would mean
child."
if
one were
to say, "He
no more
The curiosity
suggests at
naturally evil than a robust least that Rousseau is as interested in the

is Hobbes himself (Hobbes,
p. 98).
constitutive
problem
causes of moral relations as
That
is
a reiteration of the purpose of
Inequality,
men.
which
is to in
account
for moral,
and
and not
natural,
unequal relations
among
One
sense
which
Hobbes
Rousseau
differ is that Rousseau development. But the

see
mention of
seeks
to understand moral relations as part of a process of
Inequality
perceives
as a
on
the Discourse
seau
us to another puzzle. It is very easy to of modern civilization in the manner of indictment sweeping the Sciences and the Arts. It is far harder to explain how Rous
development brings
the development of
inequality
particularly
as
necessary
condition of the
development
of
human nature,
and
of moral relations.
If
we
assert,
an
as the text requires us to
do,
that the
history
of
inequality
is
negative
in
being
indictment but
the cause of
in accounting for human development, then quite plainly inequality, whatever it is, must be sufficient to explain both negative
positive
and positive aspects. cause of
Quite plainly too, the claim that property is the fundamental is the claim of every superficial interpretation of the inequality, argument, is inadequate. Property may suffice as one cause of negative inequal
which
ity,
although even that
is
exaggerated
certainly, property is even more
We
ment.
require
then a cause
if the desire for property is itself dubious in accounting for the positive sufficient to explain both indictment and
an effect;
aspect.
develop
In this connection, three other passages are noteworthy. At the one, where he previews the argument to come (162) and towards the
end of part end of part
two,
where
he
reviews
the entire argument

of
(193), Rousseau identifies

mind.
inequality
with successive
developments
the
human
It
Equally
are
noteworthy is the fact

spoken of as causes of
that perfectibilite that

of
which
(142)
and
V amour propre (189)
both
is
evil and good
in
man.
seems
men
from these
paralleled
passages that the growth
inequality
and alienation
among
is
by
stages
in the devel
At the be
opment of consciousness,
especially
stages of conscious evaluation.
ginning injunction "Know
of the preface of
Inequality (122) Rousseau
takes special note of the

means
thyself."
As I understand him, he
that we
attain
279
Rousseau's Contract
with and without
his
Inequality
self-knowledge
through stages of awareness of ourselves as beings who evaluate
and are evaluated.
But if
ask: what
conscious evaluation
is the
means of self-knowledge then we need to process?
is the
place of self-interest
in this
The dominant
amour
sense of
self-
interest in
self
Inequality is
upon
that of
interest in
one's
self,
propre, an esteem of
dependent
the esteem of others. It
is in terms
of this concept, and
the
forms
what
of social relations that grow with and support
it.
that
Rousseau
explains
he calls the history of inequality among men. Men judge themselves by ranking themselves in comparison to others. As the story of inequality unfolds, the interest in self, the desire for esteem, strengthens to the point that it overpow
ers all other
interests. A
critical
juncture
occurs when an
individual lacks,
or
lacks to
sufficient
degree,
the natural qualities that
bring
esteem.
Then,
of
appear
ance replaces
reality
and artificial
qualities,
natural ones.
Possession
is
the prime example of an artificial quality. the development of self-interest
One is
what one owns. valued.
property The causal
principle of
is: To be is to be
The desire for the

self
approval of others causes each
to begin to live outside him
(193.
195). to exist
to seek the satisfaction

of
only in the eyes of others (169, 193). It causes each not of his own interests, but rather to alienate his evaluation
are amongst the most passionate
himself,
all
and
therefore his self as well, to the consciousness of others. The
final in
pages of
Inequality (190-94)
writings.
in
expression
Rousseau's
They
show modern man as a seeker of satisfactions
who
who
is is
yet not
satisfied, as one
who
is
an artificial
being
with
factitious
passions
yet
accompanies self-interest others.
becoming inequality
in the
conscious of a
lack is
of self-worth.
The dependence that
in its final
stage
psychological.
Man does
acts
not act from esteem of
sense understood or should
by
most
ABCs. He
for the
He yearns,
yearn, for recovery of himself. He may want to act
from
self-interest and regain
appreciation of what would rience of what will not.
independence but the way is not open to him. His give him satisfaction with himself is limited to expe
at the end of
And,
Inequality, Rousseau is
of no
help
to
him.
THE QUESTION OF CONTINUITY
That Rousseau is
open the
noncommittal
on the problem of
human
alienation
leaves
question whether or not
there is continuity of argument
between In
equality
and the
Contract. The
terest seems to be taken

the
next step in the argument concerning right and in in Chapter Two of The First (or manuscript) Version of claims
Social Contract. Vaughan
that Rousseau suppressed this chapter

refutes the
be
of
in it, according to Vaughan, Rousseau conclusively Law.4 Vaughan is wrong. Rousseau condensed, but did Natural
cause
4.
doctrine
not suppress the
Op.
cit..
Vol. 1,
pp.
16, 17. 440-42. 444
280
Interpretation
argument of
doctrine. The
opposition
Chapter Two is better
understood
between
supporters
of self-interest and of on
by examining the Natural Law. Rousseau

indi
when
of
supports self-interest against vidual would
Natural Law his
the Hobbesian ground that an
be foolish to
and
govern
conduct
by
duties
Natural Law
others
which
do not,
that the individual should
be
mistrustful of political systems of
he is the
victim.5
once thought that perhaps this chapter marked a

of
judgment
the relationship between

modern man
Inequality
and
turning point in Rousseau's Contract; that it might con

that
tain signs that
is beyond
redemption and written
Rousseau
to
was
shifting
the
to
a position tantamount
to never
having
is
not
the
Inequality,
ignoring
plight of
that alienated man who lives only in the eyes of others. I now
believe
that this judgment of Chapter Two

vidual
by
is
which
is rightly mistrustful of rulers they do not themselves obey. Alienated man, it from
self-interest
necessarily true. Significantly, the indi and others who offer him principles to live
might
be said,
prefers
to act
because he knows
no
other
principle
of action
that
more reliable.
We
can assume that

addresses when
it is he
someone at this stage of conscious
ness whom
amiable
Rousseau
promises that
will
in
new associations and that the
the
accord of
can
justice
and
happiness
to
be guaranteed,
in
dividual
derstood"
"learn to
prefer
his
apparent
interest his interest
well-un
(288-89).
the argument which seems to hold when comparing The First Version of the Social Contract. According to Inequality, acts from apparent self-interest, but in giving over his self-esteem to
Let
me now summarize and
Inequality
the
modern man
seau
esteeming of others, he becomes increasingly dependent and alienated. Rous describes him as an artificial being driven by the fervor to distinguish him
self.
only a causal Version Rousseau defends someone

as principles of
Inequality
offers
explanation of this condition.

who refuses
In The First
to accept principles of Natural
Law
most
conduct,
even
though Natural Law is the political morality

and who clings
favored
by
philosophers and
jurists,
in
instead to
self-interest
will pro
as the principle of conduct. vide a new and
Rousseau then
promises that
which
in this book he
just form
of association
that person can learn to prefer

and
his interests
tice and
well-understood over well-understood.
his
apparent
interests
enjoy together jus

re
interests
point
At this
words
my
argument should
logically
continue that
Rousseau merely
the promise of Chapter Two and, at the same time, takes the next step when he writes in the final version of the Contract:
shall
try
always to unite that which right permits with what
interest
prescribes
(350-
Were this
a
next
reasonably
5.
clear
step taken, then Chapter Two of The First Version would provide line of association running from Inequality to Contract.
ed.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan,
C B. Macpherson (London: Penguin Books, 1977), Ch.
15,
p. 215.
281
Rousseau's Contract
with and without
his
Inequality
CONFRONTATION WITH ABCs
However, the majority of commentators, especially those in the British tradi tion, disregard the seeming continuity suggested above. Instead, they expound
with admirable
ingenuity
Rousseau's
attempt to
unify justice
and
interest
as
if
Rousseau
Hobbes, Bentham, Kant, J. S. Mill, Henry Sidgwick or John Rawls. That is, they argue either in the manner of Hobbes and his successors that moral duty and self-interest are not distinct, or in the manner of Kant that they
were
are
distinct.
Now I have two
problems with commentaries of this sort.
The first is general,

could
philosophical and yet simple. understood
Both the Hobbesian
and
Kantian
think
they
Rousseau's distinction
this
of apparent and well-understood
interests
by
translating
distinction into
what
they
call
being
irrational
and rational about
one's self-interest.
Concerning duty
the relation between self-interest and morality,
the Hobbesian would argue that if everyone acts morally then everyone will
be
better
off.
It is
everyone's
and
in
everyone's rational
would
law (Leviathan,
what
216-17).
The Kantian
interest to obey natural interpret self-interest in terms of

and would contrast
the individual desires for his own benefit

with
acting from
desire
regard
acting from moral duty. In consequence, moral philosophers rightly Hobbes and Kant as polar opposites on the issue of the correct relation be
what distincommon or
tween morality and self-interest.
wish
to argue that the

and
important
one
point
quishes must
Hobbes
Kant from if
one
am
regarding Rousseau is not another, but what they have in any
have in
common
is to
make what
sense of their arguments.
This
point
is important because, if I
them
right,
by
Rousseau. And if so,

can explain and
neither a
they have in common is not shared with Hobbesian nor a Kantian interpretation of
but
essential
Rousseau
his
argument. common the simple
Hobbes
vidual
Kant have in
idea that the indi
common ground
is entirely able to know and can best judge his own self-interest. This between Hobbes and Kant seems basic to their philosophies. In
Hobbes's case, the individual has to be able to recognize that morality is not con trary to his best interests. Hence, he must be able to correctly judge his interests
if the
argument
is to
succeed.
For Kant, the individual

demands. Kant
must
be
able to
know
what
self-
is in his interest interest

and
and what
duty
can allow that correct
duty
coincide, as
they may in giving

and
occasionally change. But if some be

able
thing is both in
guish
of
one's
interest
is
one's
duty
then one must
to distin
between them. Hence, it is

and
essential
to the otherwise
distinct
philosophies
Hobbes
Kant that the individual
can
know
and
judge his from
own
interests.
this
More, I
ment
think that both would have to

not
hold that
But it
one who cannot make seems plain
qualify from The First Version that Rousseau does not share this assumption. In Inequal ity, man acts from apparent interests and in The First Version Rousseau writes of
does
as a moral agent.
judg Inequality and
282
the
Interpretation
Natural Law, "Let him learn to he does Kant's
prefer
man mistrustful of
his interest
it. In
addition
well-underst
which must mean
not now prefer
to
showing that Rousseau does Moral
not share
and
Hobbes's
assumption, this pas
sage reveals a related philosophical
difficulty. distinction between

moral
philosophers often attend to a
knowledge
duty. How
and
and moral motivation.

one's moral
complete moral
motivated
theory
that
would enable one
both to know
duty
and to
relate
be
by
knowledge
to
do
one's
does
such a
theory
to Rousseau's conception of man in
Inequality
The
First Version? Does

such
man
know his interests
well-understood and of moral
those of others
we seem
that
they form
the basis of
knowledge
apparent
moral
duty? At least
to
know that
man prefers
instead his
interests. Such
a preference provides
motivation
but not, presumably,
motivation; apparent
not
interests,
on
the
contrary,
mon
produce moral
degradation. Thus, in
sharing the
assumption com
to Hobbes and
Kant, Rousseau
is textual,
when
creates philosophical problems
for those
who assume
he does.
The
second problem
of
having
to do with passages in Chapters Six and
Seven
Book Two in The Social Contract.
They
occur after
the discussion of
self-government
by laws,
interest.
Rousseau begins to
The
passages
ponder what
is actually
nec
essary for uniting
such a system to work.
bear
directly
on the problem of
right and
(i) The People

how
can a
submissive to the
laws
ought to
not
be
author of them
what
.
[but]
blind
.
multitude which often
does
know
it
wills
execute see the
an enterprise
as
difficult
dares to
as a system of
legislation?
The individuals
not see
good that
they (2) The one
reject: who
the public wills the good that

undertake the
it does
(380).
institution
of a people should
feel him
).
self able
to change human nature
[and]
to transform each
individual (381
In the last
sentence of the
either the compound assertion see and
first passage, there appear to be three alternatives: is self-contradictory in that the same persons both
do
not see
the good, or the public and the

or
individuals
who comprise
it
are
distinct
individuals,
us assume
the term good is used ambiguously. In the interest of san
ity, let
tion
mon
is that the
is correct. In that case, the meaning of the asser in willing self-rule wills that which accords with the com good, but, through inexperience or for some other reason, do not recognize
that the third
public
the common good in particular cases. The that
individuals,
on the other
hand, know
they
ought
to approve of that which accords with the common good but re
ject this
method of
decision-making
analysis
out of selfishness.
However, if this
tract, Rousseau
terests
objection
continues to
is correct, then as late as half way through the Con believe that individuals are not acting from their in
in
need of
well-understood and are
help. This forestalls

might argue that
another potential
by
one who neglects
Inequality. He
Rousseau
means
that the
will
very practice of citizen-sovereignty, of being ruled by the general will, wean individuals from acting on their apparent interests. Hence, the oppo
nent might urge that
continuity between Inequality
and
Contract is
of no
con-
283
cern.
Rousseau's Contract
with and without
his
Inequality
this interpreta
Unfortunately
for the opponent, the text does
not support
tion. Rousseau replies to such an objection, albeit somewhat obscurely, when

says that
he
for it to hold:
It is necessary that the effect [should] become the cause men would have to be before the laws what they ought be become by means of the laws (383).
That is, tors,
men would
have to
will
the common good
before they become legisla

seems to mean that
which
evidently they
are not prepared to
do. Rousseau
overcoming the
condition of
rule of apparent of
interests
as the principle of action
is
necessary
sovereignty Hence I interpret the
the general
will.
second quoted passage
(where Rousseau
transform
says that the
Lawgiver
should undertake to change
human
nature and
individuals),
interests.
mood
to mean that the Lawgiver should seek to
wean men
from their
apparent
To
speak
provocatively,
moral
we can put
Rousseau's
problem
in the Kantian
asking:
how is
autonomy for
men possible?
Rousseau
seems to answer:
by by
a
transforming human
condition of
nature, through the interference

the apparent
of the
Lawgiver, from
acting
upon
interests
of
Inequality
to one of acting upon
interests
moral
well-understood.
This
seems to mean that the

action
autonomy is the antiautonomous for this conclusion, but it does suggest

ruled
necessary condition for of the Lawgiver. One may not care

to the plight of men
a continued attention
by
apparent
interest.
This
conclusion
is
similar
to that reached in the

not share
philosophical
comment
above, namely, that Rousseau does

can
the
assumption
that the individual
know
and
judge his
and
own
interests. In
having
this assumption in common, the
despot Hobbes
the liberal Kant are
more
democratic than Rousseau.
A POLITICAL MORALITY OF SELF-REALIZATION
Perhaps the two difficulties I have

gest a political
moral
exposed provide sufficient grounds
morality
which
is
neither
Hobbesian
nor
to sug Kantian. A desirable
theory is
or
one which:
first,
enables one
to cope with the distinction between
apparent and
well-understood
interests;
second, does not collapse either

permits a
into
be
Hobbesian
tween tion
Kantian ethics; and, third,

and
continuity
of argument
Inequality
of
the Contract. At
present some version of
the self-realiza
theory
am
morality seems most appropriate. content to begin by admitting agreement

Rousseau's morality in the
the
essential characteristic of
.
.The
with
Andrew Levine
when
he
characterizes
following
humanity,
words:
[Liberty] is
man cannot
without which
the ends of
a moral agent
be fulfilled
end of
man,
his destination, is to be
(The
Politics of Autonomy,
6. As, in
seau
p.
14).
GEMs,"
effect,
H. Cell
argues
in "A Bridge
of
Newsletter No. 5,
Society for
Rous
Studies, September
1980.
284
Interpretation
this view, Levine compares Rousseau to Kant. We
presumes not.
In
holding
disagree in that
and
whereas
Levine
demur that he has
has already realized his end, Rousseau Self-realization, like freedom (356), is both a right
that man
and a
duty. We
respect
can suppose
that the chief moral principle of Rousseauist
morality is to
moral
those rights and

a right
duties that
realize moral nature
in
oneself and others.
One has
to
realize one's nature as a moral enable
agent,
and one
has
duties
to oneself and others to
this
realization.
Other
political
moralities, in
condemn
denying
My
citizen-sovereignty, are blind to these rights and duties.

moral
They
and
humans to
Version
passivity
and
do
not treat them as moral agents.

arguments of
suggestion, therefore,
is that the
of
Inequality
The First
jointly
dictate
morality
self-realization, based on the distinction
be
tween apparent and well-understood

self who who
interests,
to which Rousseau addresses him
in the Contract. The does

not
man who
fulfill his
natural
lives according to his apparent interests is one capacity to govern himself as a moral agent. One
an attempt
treats himself and others

and
in
to satisfy the apparent
interests
of
In
equality debases
that moral
presses
degrades human
nature.
Man is
capable of
liberty,
the freedom and obedience of moral self-government,
understanding best ex
his
essential nature and
his interests
well-understood.
A GEM PROBLEM
Could
alienated
retention
Rousseauist morality of self-realization overcome the problem of the man of Inequality] If the overcoming of alienation is dependent on
of apparent
interests then it is
not clear that
the problem could
be
conquered.
As I
understand
it,
the general problem of alienation

sense of
in
Inequality is
one of
alienation of self.
Man has lost his
nothing
other
than what others value
self-identity and self-worth. He is him as being. This suggests that in re
gaining his self, he will recover a sense of being which enables personal develop ment and self- fulfillment. He will be himself and not another, or the possession
of another.
The
residual problem
here is that
apparent as
interests
as
seem to
be both
what
indi
viduates or alienation
distinguishes individuals
other
well
being
the
dominant
cause of
well-
in the first instance. In
words,
Rousseau identified interests

But if the
understood with the one's moral self cies and
development
of one's moral nature.
realized self
is
(or
oneself as a moral
all members of some
agent) then this self
is
universal to the spe
is
shared
by
it. It is
not that self which serves to
is personal, dis
me as an
tinctive or unique in
way
or other.
What
distinguish
in
dividual,
is myself, is my apparent interests. But, according to Rousseau's argument, it is apparent interests that alienate and degrade. They cannot be included, even to save individuality.
the realization of
self which
and to enable
Now, it
could
be
argued
that not
all apparent
interests
need
be excluded, that
285
Rousseau
Contract
with and without
his
Inequality
save
some can complement well-understood

ity.6
interests,
and
thereby
individual
However, according
supported and
to
Inequality
the
desire for the
esteem of others, caus
ally
by
the system of social relations, is so

all
erences
hence
apparent
strong as to govern all pref interests. It is the overcoming of this causal

may ultimately justify the antiautonomous Inequality doesn't distinguish any apparent
nexus, to use a
action of
Marxist term,
which
the Lawgiver. In any case,

are
interests that Friends

problem
benign.
on
of
and
ABCs
the left may urge that there is an alternative which can solve the uniting justice and interest in a way different from that of the yet consistent with the GEMs. They may point to the signifi
work of
cance of
the
the
Lawgiver,
which
is that
of
transforming
into
a
the
individual is
part of a
from
one who
is himself a he
perfect and
solitary
and
whole
being
who
whole
from
which
we
have the
sacred
being (381). Here, it may be argued, text for the overcoming of alienation of self. The self simply
receives
his life
disappears into the
communal whole.
However, if
apparent
interests do
account
for individuality, then first

alternative at
by dissolving
as
them
individuality
interests
is lost. What is more, the
least
retained apparent
while
excluding them from

self-
self-realization.
But,
I have argued, it is only the

of right
versus
presence of apparent
interests that
causes
the problem
interest. interests
If interests
well-
understood, according to the leftist guide, are identified

with right per
with communal right and
se, then the
disappearance
of
of apparent
as
entails also
the dis
sans-
appearance of right and

egal.
hence that
Rousseau
the political
moralist
The Political Science Reviewer

? Editor: George W.
Carey
? Managing Editor:
Gregory
Wolfe
? Assistant Editor: James B. Williams ? Board

of
Editors:
Christian Bay, George C.S. Benson, John P. East, John Hallowell, Robert Horwitz, Charles Hyneman, Dorothy B. James, Karl Lamb,
Harvey Mansfield, Jr.,
Nelson Polsby, Ellis Sandoz,
Mulford Q. Sibley, J. David Singer, Gordon Tullock.
Mary P
Recent Essays: Women in Western Political Thought NicholsMFear of Judging: Ely's Theory of Judicial Review DemocracyStanley Brubaker BRecent Critiques of Liberal Robert Heineman Metaphysics, Theology, and Political Theory James V. Schall Sentimental Journey: Garry Wills and the American Founding Gary J. Schmitt Liberalism and the Environment Robert Webking The Political Thought of James Burnham Samuel T. Francis BA Political Scientist as Constitutional Lawyer Raoul Berger The Right to Die as Public PolicyRichard Sherlock BOn Skinner's Politics Dennis G. Stevens.
an
annual
DT/ie Political Science Reviewer:

article-length reviews of
journal
featuring
the
great
the
leading political science textbooks,

in law
and politics.
classics and recent studies
Please enter my subscription to The Political Science Reviewer, 14 South Bryn Mawr Avenue, Bryn Mawr, PA 19010
Price per volume $8.00. All back issues cept Volumes 1 and II
available at
is
ex
are
Name Street
this
price.
City State/Zip
? ? ? ? ?
Enter standing order Volume XIII Volume Bill me Check enclosed
The Denial
of
Perennial Problems:
of
The Negative Side

David Boucher
La Trobe
Quentin Skinner's
Theory
University
The
ated
a-
methodological writings of
Quentin Skinner have, in

severe attacks upon
recent years, gener
great
deal
of controversy.
His
the prevalent methods
commonly employed by historians of political thought have provoked an equally forceful response. This response tends to focus upon his positive prescriptions
for recovering the intentions of the authors of literary and discursive There is nothing new about stressing the need to retrieve authorial intentions.
Leo Strauss, for example, dencies in the study of the
rives much of
opposed.2
texts.1
advances the view
in
order
to counter historicist ten
history
a
of political philosophy.
Skinner, however, de
that Strauss had
his inspiration from Strauss is

of
some of the
historicist
sources
strongly lems in the

thoughts of
which
firm believer in the

philosophy,1
existence of perennial prob
history
political
whereas and
Skinner
an
combines
the
Croce, Collingwood.
J. L. Austin into
of
intentionalist theory
he
uses to are two
deny
the permanence
There
distinguishable
aspects
any problems. to Skinner's theoretical writings, both

a
of which arise
from his
conclusion that
understanding
text necessarily entails there is the positive
recovering the meaning the author intended to convey.

aspect of adopt
First,
his theory,
which prescribes the general procedure a of
historian
must
for the recovery
intentions. This involves the limits to

him.4
construction of contexts of
conventions which circumscribe the
what an author was able
to
do
with
the vocabulary
I
would
available
to
The
second aspect of
the
theory
pertains to the
like to thank the

paper.
anonymous reader who made such
helpful
suggestions
for the improve
ment of
this
am also
indebted to Dr. Joseph Femia for his
general encouragement, and
for his
incisive
i
.
comments on the penultimate

most
draft.
criticisms of
Reference to the
of
important
and
Skinner
will
be found
2
in
his "Some Problems in
Action,'
the Analysis
Political Thought
Political Theory,
(1974).
277-303.
The
most per
ceptive appraisals and critiques published after
John Graham, "Intentions

Ideas,"
and
1974 include Lotte Mulligan, Judith Richards and Conventions: A Critique of Quentin Skinner's Method for the study of
the
History
of
Political Studies, XXVIII (1979), 141-48; Michael Freeman, Edmund Burke

Ideas,"
'Revisionists'
and the
Historicist Critique
ory.
Critique of Political Radicalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), chap. 1; Joseph V. Femia, "An History and The Methods for Studying the History of of
1 12-34;
XX (1981),
Keith Graham, "How do
(1981), 124-35; Deborah Baungold, "Political

American Political Science Review. 75 (1981), tory of Political Theory: Apology and
Illocutionary Descriptions Commentary on the History

John
Explain?"
Ratio, XXII
of
Political Thcon
928-40;
Gunnell,
"Interpretation and the His

76
Epistemology,"
The American Political Science Review,

History,"
(1982),
2.
317-27.
of
See, for example, Leo Strauss, "On Collingwood's Philosophy Metaphysics, V (1952). 559-86.
3.
The Review of
1969),
Acts,"
Leo Strauss, Thoughts
on
Machiavelli (Seattle:
Sec. for
example,
Q. Skinner,
"Conventions and the
University of Washington Press, Understanding of Speech
p. 14. Philo-
288
Interpretation
variety
of
generation of a
historical
mythologies
by
those who subscribe to the
belief that
tion of the
and
great
texts embody timeless elements
which contribute
to the resolu
perennial problems.
This is the
negative side of
from it
arises prescriptions
negative aspect of
It is the
study.
concerning what Skinner's doctrine that
Skinner's doctrine, the historian ought not to do.

provides
the
focus for this
The first
part of this paper

with
deals
with
the argument against the existence of
perennial
problems, and
Skinner's
In the
criticisms of
the methods employed
by
historians Skinner's
avoid
of political thought.
second section
will
offer a critique of
negative views and suggest of
that his own historical practice fails to
many
the
mythologies
he
castigates other
historians for
perpetuating.
My
concluding
remarks are presented
in the third
section.
I
Both Croce
ricity
of
and
Collingwood formulate
an argument which affirms the
histo
tion,
or
every utterance. Every statement is, for them, given in answer to a ques is intended to solve a problem: "Not only does the answer presuppose the
question."5
question,
but every answer implies a certain Collingwood goes a further than and maintains that no can be understood in isola this statement step tion from the question it was meant to answer. If we do not get the question right,
then we are bound to misunderstand the answer. In this respect the questions to
which a
text of
political
evident.
Questions
are
selfphilosophy may have been addressed will not be often supposed by authors to be in the minds of their audi
ences.
As times change, these

appear
questions
reader.
may lose their
significance
and
no
longer
in the
mind of
the
Consequently,
the question asked
by
the
al
author can
only be
appear
historically
they
reconstructed."
Each question, for Croce, in
though it may
to be the same as others, will always be

seem to
different, "because
effect
the words, even
when
be materially the same,

of
are
different,
according to the spiritual

wood expands upon
differences
those
who pronounce
them."7
Colling
past phi
this and argues that the questions that we

are not
identify
losophers answering in
history.8
tion and answer complexes. Thus
unchanging entities: they belong to different ques he denies that there are any perennial problems
enables
The
work of
J. L. Austin
Skinner to
suggest that people
do
more
things with words than answer questions. The idea of an

sophical
illocutionary
Lexicon,'
force is
Quarterly, 20 (1970), 121-38; Q. Skinner, "The Idea of a Cultural Essays in Criticism, XXIX (1979), 209-11. 5. Benedetto Croce, Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept, trans. Douglas Ainslie (London: Macmillan, 1917), p. 208.
6. R. G. Collingwood, An
7.
Autobiography
pp.
(Oxford: Oxford
University
Press. 1970), Chap. V.

Metaphysics
Croce, Logic, 8. Collingwood,
209.
(Oxford: Clarendon
An Autobiography, Press, 1969), p. 72.
67-68; R. G. Collingwood, An Essay
on
289
crucial
The Denial of Perennial Problems

here. Austin
argued that people perform acts when
they
use words. of acts.
Ex
actly the same word sequence can
be
employed to perform a
variety
can
For de
example, the word sequence "clean the

a
floor
toothbrush"
with a
be
an
order,
plea, an exhortation, or perhaps even a
joke. The
speech act performed
pends upon
the context in which the words are uttered, and upon the conventions
actions of that
invoked in performing
mance of speech acts
kind. A
condition of the successful perfor
is that
conventions exist which regulate their use, and that

are addressed
the audience to whom
they
have
an awareness of
their
existence.9
The
illocutionary
force
the
of an utterance
is the
act which a speaker
intends to
per
form in using
words.
Thus, in saying "I
will meet you
tomorrow
morning,"
the
avowed the
speaker performs
illocutionary
act of
promising
without
having
performative verb.
Extending Croce's and Collingwood's theory of question ing on to it Austin's idea of an illocutionary force, Skinner
statement embodies a particular rected
and answer
by
graft
maintains that
intention
unique to a particular occasion and
every di
to solving
a specific problem.
Consequently,
there can
be
no perennial
problems
tions,"
in
philosophy:
"there
are
therefore, it
authors."10
must always
only individual answers to individual ques be futile to "attempt to learn directly from the
characterized as a
classic
The
negative aspect of
Skinner's doctrine is best

in the
theory
about misunderstanding.
The
and
most comprehensive statement of this negative the
ory
sic
appears
in
"Meaning
Understanding
never
History
Ideas,"
of
but the ba
writings.
ideas
are
presupposed, and
premise of
repudiated, in all his theoretical
The fundamental
his
argument
is that there
of
are two orthodox methods
being
employed
in the
history
of
ideas, both
which, he suggests, are theoreti
cally defective, and inimical to good historical practice. The first method he calls Those who practice it, Skinner suggests, maintain that the text it
"textualism."
"sole" "self-sufficient"
self provides the
and
object of enquiry.
Reading
the texts
carefully,
over and over
again, will prove

calls
The
second method
he
"contextualism."
sufficient for revealing their meaning. Exponents of this approach are precipitate of
said to
hold the
view
that the total context is the

of
the appearance of a
and 39).
("Meaning,"
text,
and
the determinant
thetical
opposition
its meaning between
pp. and
3, 4
This
anti
"textualism"
"contextualism"
is
presupposed
throughout the
whole range of
Skinner's
writings."
subsequent object of
"self-sufficient"
The idea that the text

9.
provides the
inquiry. Skinner
pp.
J. L. Austin. How to do Things

120-21.
with
Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1962),

Ideas,"
6, 8-9, 25,
63,
99, 103,
10.
History Q. Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of (1969), 50. Subsequent references to this article appear in parentheses in the text. New 11. See Q. Skinner, "Motives. Intentions and the Interpretation of
Texts,"
and
Theory, VIII
Literary History,
New Literary History, Role of 3 (1971-72), 393-408; Q. Skinner, "Hermeneutics and the Vols. 1 and 2 Political Modern Foundations Thought, The Q. Skinner, of 7 (1975-76), 209-32; (CambridgeCambridge University Press, 1978), Vol. I, p. xiii. Subsequent references to the
History,"
Foundations
appear
in
parentheses
in the text.
290
Interpretation
("Meaning,"
asserts, "continues to
govern
the largest
number of
p. 4).
He, therefore, devotes
a considerable amount of time to
examining
and criticiz
"mythologies"
ing
the assumptions of this approach. textualism have a common
Essentially,
contain
the
he
associ
ates with
source
in the belief that the
great works
in
philosophy, or
any branch
of
of
literature,
timeless and eternal elements.

recover an
The "whole
swers
point"
studying these
works,
for the textualist, is to

("Meaning,"
to the perennial questions of our civilization
pp. 4-5).
From
the theoretical standpoint of his denial of perennial problems Skinner systemat
ically convicts all the prevalent methods associated with textualism, of embody ing philosophical errors. Practitioners of these methods are, in consequence, ac
cused of
writing, not
histories, but
mythologies.
doctrines"
Skinner labels the first type, "the mythology of This is typified by the view that each classic writer
relating to each of the important
given subject matter. position
("Meaning,"
p. 7).
will
have
espoused a
doctrine
issues
which
dominate
within
the confines of a
This attitude, Skinner maintains,
often results
in
a predis
to convert scattered statements into theories.
Thus,
meanings
that were
simply not available to authors are frequently attributed to them. In the history of ideas this is illustrated by the tendency to articulate the salient characteristics of a
modern
doctrine,
which
is then
used as an
ideal type
against which
to compare
the
doctrines
of the classic writers.
the historian to talk of the

cession of great
fully
danger here lies in the propensity of developed doctrine as being immanent in a suc
great
The
thinkers. In
of
tracing
the
development
be
of
doctrines,
textualists too
readily fall into the type
language
which would
more applicable to
describ
ing
the growth of a natural organism. talk of
Thus, Skinner
The
search
castigates those and the
historians
of
who
ideas in terms in
"birth,"
"evolution,"
of their process.
transcendence
"obstacles"
a teleological
for
approximations to
ideal
types too readily tempts the

accomplished
historian into accrediting earlier thinkers with having the remarkable feat of having anticipated later doctrines. Further,
in the
("Meaning,"
this kind of activity tends to generate debates about whether a given doctrine
emerged"
"really
alternative
work of a particular writer
pp.
10-12).
An
form
of
the mythology of doctrines

about what
is
generated
a classic
by
the preconceived
expectations that
historians have
issues
theorist will address.
When there is clearly no doctrine relating to these issues, the authors of the texts are criticized for having failed to contribute to the resolution of the significant
problems gument
in their
area of study.
In Skinner's view, this is
fallacious form
of ar
because it
that
hardly
seems proper
to criticize an author for
failing
to do
pp.
something
12-15).
he did not,
or could
not, have intended to do
("Meaning."
The
second type of
mythology Skinner
to this myth
names the
"mythology
of
Historians
who subscribe
assume
that an author of a classic text must
have
spect
a coherent and consistent
it is "dangerously
easy"
every theme he addresses. In this re for the historian to indulge in the common practice
theory
on
291
of

an author spell of
pear
supplying the underlying coherence that to have. Historians who fall under the
classic
may
not
immediately
may
never
ap
the
mythology
or
of coherence
ignore the fact that intended to attain,

search
theorists may never
have attained,
ideas
at
have
the
a systematic
theoretical statement. A study

a
motivated
by
for
coherence
"becomes
history
not of
all, but of abstractions: a
history of thoughts
A third form ogy
was
which no one ever
actually
succeeded
in thinking,
p. 18).
at
levels
of
attained"
coherence which no one ever
("Meaning,"
of
prolepsis"
("Meaning,"
of
actually mythology in the history of ideas Skinner labels "the mythol p. 22). This is the tendency to concentrate upon
of
the significance of a work, at the expense
trying
of the
to analyze
what
the author
doing
and
saying
within
the
limitations
historical
circumstances
in
which
the text was composed. The preoccupation with significance
leads to the
considered
attribution of praise and
blame, depending
of a
upon whether an author or
is
to
be instrumental in the development

of
good,
bad doctrine. A less insidious

text: "the
danger"
version
the mythology, although equally misconceived in its aims, is the

a
search
such
for characteristically modern elements in forms of interpretation will "part

achieve"
here is that
writings
company"
with what
"political
p.
were meant
to
or
"were intended to
mean"
("Meaning,"
24).
The
form
of explanation generated and
by
the mythology of prolepsis is teleological
in
character,
implicitly
postulates the absurd notion that a text must await the
future for the
revelation of
its true
meaning.
A further absurdity
ascribe an
prevalent p. 24).
in the
history
of
ideas is the
"mythology
of paro
chialism"
("Meaning,"
A historian, from the

to a text. He may,
vantage point of
the present,
for example, in reading one believe that the later author in text, be reminded of another, mistakenly tended to refer to the previous work. Here the historian indiscriminately attrib
may incorrect
reference and
utes
influences
on
the basis of random similarities. Another

of are
form
of parochialism an author
is
evident
in the incorrect description

to be articulating ideas that
the
sense of a work.
Because
a
may
seem
familiar to
us
today, there is
tendency
of
to expect him to be employing a

"sole"
meaning to our own. All these mythologies, Skinner maintains, are a direct consequence
similar
taking
focus does
the text
as
the
determinant
of
its
meaning.
However,
The
to shift one's
of attention to the circumstances which surround the appearance of a text not solve the problem of methodological confusion.
contextualist approach
to the study of past thought
postulates
that texts are responses to the

must always
immediate
circumstances which surround them.
Thus, it
be
appropriate to
fo
cus upon the context
in
order
to
explain a text.
Skinner
maintains that
the textual
undermines
ists have "consciously

their belief in
this
contention
because it seriously
to
the transhistorical timeless wisdom that texts contain.
The
contex-
tualists
assume
that a text
is
ineluctably
related
its
context.
The fundamental say here
proposition
implicit in this
causal
approach
is that texts
pp.
are
the results, or products of
("Meaning,"
"antecedent
39-40).
It
suffices to
292
that
Interpretation
or
intentions,
and not antecedent
illocutionary forces, are an integral aspect to its production. Illocutionary forces and
distinct.12
of
the text
itself,
causal conditions
are, for
Skinner, categorically
of
Skinner's ical
are:
own positive recommendations attempt
to synthesize the antithet
methodologies
textualism
and contextualism.
The
positive
injunctions
"close"
first,
to
focus
upon
the prevailing social and linguistic conventions; second,
to
identify
the empirical beliefs of certain authors
in
order
to restrict or
the context; and,
third, to
advice
enable
the historian to infer the intentions a writer

negative aspect of
had
in writing what he content in terms of
wrote."
his theory has much to historians that the positive aspect. Skinner's
The
more nega
tive prescriptions amount to an exhortation to avoid all the mythologies gener

ated
by
the erroneous
idea that there
are perennial problems
in
philosophy.
II
Skinner's hensive for
and
attack upon
historians
of political
thought
is,
at
first sight,
compre
compelling, but on closer inspection he seems to sacrifice accuracy The danger in putting forward any new methodological perspective, is that there is always a tendency, and a temptation, to exaggerate the deficiencies in the methods already prevalent in the discipline. The arguments in a debate
effect.
may be set in such terms that the participants could not accept themselves as hav ing been parties to such a discussion. In other words, there is a tendency to build
straw men comprised of abstractions
from fuller
and richer arguments
in
order
to
knock them down

Skinner
comes
and pronounce oneself
the winner. It is my contention that
perilously
close to
his
arguments against past as textualists and
employing this kind of device in constructing historians of political thought. In characterizing histo
an antithetical position which
rians
contextualists, Skinner sets up
which
is
much
too contrived. The opposition,

of political
he
suggests exists
in the his
tory
of
histories
thought has little basis in the evidence. In order to
characterize the and purposes of
history
in
such
those historians
terms, Skinner has to distort the arguments, aims whom he uses to justify and illustrate his conten
a more appropriate characterization of
tion. I have elsewhere suggested
the
his
to
tory
of
histories
of political
thought.14
but here I
relation to
want
to restrict
myself
Skinner's ideas
He
on perennial questions
in
this history. timelessness

with
associates the notions of perennial questions and
the
tex-
tualist approach to studying the, history of political thought. But this is

12.
Meaning'
Action,"
by
no
and
Q. Skinner, '"Social and the Explanation of Social Philosophy, Politics Society, Fourth Series, eds. Peter Laslett, W. G. Runciman and Quentin Skinner (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972). pp. 136-57.
13.
ing',"
These injunctions
154;
are presented as rales

Intentions,"
for aspiring historians in Skinner, "'Social Mean

Old?"
p.
14.
Skinner, "Motives, David Boucher, "New Histories

1 12-21.
p. 406-407. of
Political Thought for
Political Studies, XXXI
(1983),
293

Most historians
of political
means a self-evident correlation. not recognize
thought simply did

and contextualism.
Skinner's
of
artificial
division between textualism

present
From the time

there
Robert Blakey, to the
is
some connection
between
political
day, historians have believed that ideas and political Many

events.15
even suggested
that only in times of social unrest was good and outstanding po
litical thought
ous conflicts great classic
produced.
An understanding
of
the nature of these contemporane

a better understanding of the Rousseau. However, this did
would, it was maintained, theorists such as
facilitate
and
Plato, Hobbes
not prevent
the very same
historians from viewing the

who stress
history of political
and of a
thought
are
in terms
of a series of perennial questions.
Phyllis Doyle
Sheldon Wolin
typical examples of
historians
time acknowledge the
the
of
circumstantial
theories"
perenniality of conditions in which

while
text, and historicity the issues it addresses. Doyle

the
a text
at the same argues that
is
produced act as
the
"mainspring
the
it contains,
Wolin
contends
that "most of the great state

crisis."16
Nev philosophy have been put forward in times of exis feel able to postulate the Skinner's contention, they ertheless, contrary to tence of perennial problems. For Doyle, some of these issues concern "the nature
ments of political
man,"
of
his "purpose in
life,"
and
his
relation
to the state. Wolin provides a

perenniality.
more extreme example of
the
coexistence of
gests that persistent questions are

stable
historicity and addressed by theorists

"
He sug
"a
in terms
of
fairly
is
categories."
vocabulary Skinner is mistaken, then, in

associated with
and set of
believing
that the idea of

no
perennial questions
exclusively
textualism. There is
thought has a general, or universal, aspect if one

concrete element which pertains
logical necessity to deny that acknowledges that it also has a
to
specific circumstances.
Some historians
sim
ply made a it has a time
distinction between the

and
historicity
of a
text and its logicality. Because
place, a text
is
an element
in
historical occurrence, but it is logic. Thus, the historians,

authors were able
considered
also a set of statements which conform to the rules of
rightly
or wrongly,
maintain what
believed that they could ask whether the they asserted. In this respect, a theorist was
historian
concede
should engage
to
to be of
example,
fering
a series of propositions which are right, or wrong.
Sabine, for
in itself
endorses the view that the
in the
not
critical evaluation of
historical.18
theories,
although
he does
that his activity is

motives
Skinner is
also mistaken about
the
that past historians had in conceiv
ing
the
history
of political thought
in terms
of the existence of perennial ques
tions.
He
suggests that historians study what
they believe
to be
perennial
prob-
15.
Robert Blakey, The
(London: Richard Bentley,

16.
1855).
History of Political Literature from the Earliest Times, Blakey claims in his preface that his study is the first
Vols. I
of
and
II
its kind.
Sheldon
Phyllis Doyle. A
and
Wolin, Politics
17.
and 244.
History of Political Thought (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937), Vision (Boston: Little Brown, i960), p. 8.
pp.
14-
p. 7;
Doyle, A History of Political Thought,

George Sabine, "What is Political
'5;
Wolin, Politics
and
Vision,
pp. 27.
243
Theory,"
18.
Journal of Politics. I (1939). 2-
294
Interpretation
order
lems in
52).
to "learn
directly
from
("Meaning," answers"
the
given to them
p.
It would very Skinner imputes. Those

a
be
naive commentator who read the classics who engage
for the
reason
in
exercises similar to those
described
by
Skinner
recognize that the thought of the past needs to
be
mediated
if it is to be
commit
applicable
to the present. Even
Strauss
and not
Plamenatz,
who are
strongly
ted to the
who seek
idea
of perennial
issues, do
fit into Skinner's
class of
historians
answers expect
to offer solutions to today's problems
by directly
appropriating
from the
past.
Strauss contends, for example, that "we

of classical political
use,"
cannot
reasonably
that the fresh understanding

recipes
for today's
or
and
Plamenatz
suggests
philosophy will supply us with that "if we do not get from
Hobbes
Locke
answers to the questions we now put, we put our own questions more
mistaken
clearly."1'
do, by examining
their theories
learn to
Skinner lems in
that
seems
to be
in his
notion
that there are no perennial prob
believing
have
that those who discuss the past

"essential"
in
such terms
have to
assume
words
an
meaning,
p. 50).
not
or
that their meanings always "remain
same"
("Meaning,"
the
In
order to see certain similarities postulate
in different
thinkers, the interpreter does
have to
that
they
meant
the same
thing
terms; conversely, he does not have to assume that these people could not have conveyed the same meaning as one another by using different terms. In the first instance, to say that Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rous
by
using the
same
seau all saw a role
for
a civic religion which could
adherence to a common
not
morality,
and
be instrumental in securing in maintaining obedience to the laws, is
to say that
a
they
all meant
the same thing. What
it does
suggest
is that they be
lieve that
say this is
dual
obligation within a
realm,
or
state, is inimical to good order. To
not meaningless, or senseless.
of politics
to apply to his own time, and
It is sufficiently general for the theorist in doing so he will not be denying that Rousseau faced
are all
the situations that
Machiavelli, Hobbes,
and
different from
his own, and different from each other's. Nor is it a denial of the historian's inter est in the particularity of each formulation of the general argument. It is merely a
commitment applicable
to the view that some aspects of past
thought,
although not
directly
to any present situation, enable the theorist to gain
insight into the

can
generalities of particular
war, revolution,
famine,
or
democracy,
It
which
he
apply to the
instances that he
wishes to understand.
seems a
very
obvious point
that a modern-day theorist would not even be able to
identify
a present revolu
tion,
civil war, or
were used
coup d'etat without to describe in the past.

of
having
some
idea
of what
these concepts
On the level
specific
occasion, there
meaning that a specific text had for a specific can be no doubt that it will be unique to that
author on a context.
No
set of circumstances and
ideas
could ever
be
reproduced
in
way
which could
we
negate the uniqueness of past configurations of
thought and meaning. But
do
19. Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago. University of Chicago Press. Plamenatz, Man and Societv (London: Longmans, 1970), Vol. I, p. \i
1978),
p.
11; John
295

this level of meaning. That original meaning may have
an aura which
not always remain on
faded, leaving behind

much easier
is only
of
recoverable
in the
quasi-world of
texts. We often talk and think
generalities, and we frequently find it in similarities, rather than to differentiate what may seem minor differences. We like to think that civilization benefits from the experiences of the great men it has elevated above the status of lesser mortals. In this respect
to
in terms
identify
we sometimes
identify
with a
beautiful poem;
that
it
expresses what we ourselves are
feeling
we may feel, rightly far better than any of
or
wrongly,
our contem
poraries could express political own
be the attitude that many historians of in thought, studying the classic texts, had towards the problems of their age. It may be that this attitude is entirely inappropriate in conducting a
appears to all
it. This
historical inquiry, but

meaning
perennial with which can argue
the methodologist can do is to point out the level of

ought
the
historian
it
to concern himself. The methodologist

a postulate of
that
it is,
or that
ought to
be,
history
that there are no
problems; he cannot prove that there are
no perennial problems.
Those
who see
history
in terms
of
of perennial
issues
elevate
the thought
of
the past to a
sufficiently high level To
generality to
enable them to compare past
theorists in
terms of the answers that
they
gave to
enduring
problems.
deny
way
that texts have both
concrete
meaning, that
is, in
reference to a
specific this or some
that,
and universal
meaning, that
is,
an
similar circumstances elsewhere,
is to
reject on grounds of
ability to illuminate in logic some
thing
which
does in fact happen. Writers have
used the work of other writers
in
helping them to understand the predicaments they face. Because no adequate the ory has yet been articulated to explain why texts have meaning both in relation to
the particular and in general, that does
not
necessarily
mean
that
they do
not.
Po
litical theorists did
not
only live in
arguments
a particular
time and place,

written
they
also read
books
places. was
and
assimilated
and
distinctions
in
other
times and
The intentions
was
of
the authors of these tracts
were not of
importance. What
important
the meaning of these works as interpreted in the
light
of cir
cumstances similar
to,
or even
different
from,
those in which the theories were

ask questions about can't we
formulated.
politics,
Livy
certainly
enabled
Machiavelli to
Italian city
same
with sort
and
about
politics
in
general.
Why
do the
Machiavelli? I
of
can understand
why
historian
might
be
precluded
from this
activity If
on
the grounds of anachronism, but I fail to see why Skinner should

theorist
object
to the
political
indulging
in
such activities.
perennial
we accept
Skinner's
contention
that there are no

we will
problems, then
we
have to
reconcile ourselves
to the fact that
have
is
ready-made answers
to
a number of
historical questions,
method.
which, of course,
a well-worn criticism of
not
Marx's historical
search, but from
without even
These
answers will
be derived,
would
from historical
say,
re
methodological
theory.
We
have to
was
looking
at the evidence, that
Machiavelli
for example, mistaken in believing
supply him with useful parallels to sixteenth century Italy. Like Livy intention to convey truths to posterity would have to be prowise, Dante's
that
could
296
Interpretation
From
a
nounced a misplaced endeavour.
theoretical argument formulated
in the Aus
twentieth century and based upon the theories of
Croce, Collingwood,
and
tin,
are
we would
be
employing the unsubstantiated presupposition that our methods

perennial
retrospectively
to paraphrase
insofar
as
they apply
to the known past, but the
thoughts of the past have nothing whatsoever to say to us. This would seem to
be,
Vico,
an extreme case of
the conceit of scholars.

upon a
Even if the
negative aspect of
Skinner's theory is based

thought,
we
faulty
ask
charac
terization of past
cessful
suc may he is himself in avoiding the mythologies that he says are generated by the belief in the idea of perennial problems. Skinner's historical writings demon
histories
of political
still want
to
how
strate,
order
however,
are
that
he is
prepared
to
to facilitate historical
not
practice. of
ignore many of his negative conclusions in He tells us, for example, that Machiavelli's
revelance."20
arguments
merely
"parochial
But,
more
than this,
which
Skinner
appear
frequently
portrays authors as
addressing themselves to questions

time.
to be recurrent over
long
periods of
Indeed, Skinner
suggests that certain p. 48). an even
Machiavelli devoted himself "to exactly the same range of as writers who lived two and a half centuries before him (Foundations, I,
themes"
Moreover, Machiavelli longer lineage, that is,

posed:
addresses
himself to
question"
"key
fortune?"
which
has
the problem which the "Roman moralists

an alliance with
how
can we
hope to forge
had originally Not only is the ques
tion of such terms that
long
standing, but the answer Machiavelli gives is "in precisely the

used."21
they (the Roman moralists) had already

the radical
Similarly,
the ques
tions
and answers which
Calvinists formulated
reappear over a cen

p.
tury later in John Locke's Two Treatises of Government (Foundations, 2,

239).
In addition,
we
have
more explicit recognitions of

of
the existence of
the
peren
nial problems.
The humanists
"same"
the early
quattrocento often raised answer
issues
tion"
as their
predecessors, but gave a distinctive

the appropriate
educated
theory"
to the "perennial ques

can consider
regarding himself to be well

of
teaching
a man must
pp.
have before he
issues,"
(Foundations, 1,
we encounter and
73, 90).
In the "main tradition

namely, "the
Italian
to
political
two "perennial
need
preserve political
liberty
the dangers to
liberty
represented
by
the
armies"
standing mercenary (Foundations, 1, only have full meaning when they are seen in relation to the immediate circum stances which surround them, I fail to see how Skinner can view these questions
prevalence of
p. 200).
If
questions
and
issues,
which are said
to reappear over periods
centuries, as perennial; and if

says
they
are,
as
that there
are no perennial problems
ranging from one to fifteen he suggests, then he is wrong when he in the history of ideas.
and
Having
timeless
conceded, in his historical work, that there are perennial issues
elements
in the
great
texts,
we would
justifiably
expect
Skinner to take
mytholo-
extra precautions against
relapsing into the
employment of the various
20.
21.
Q. Skinner, Machiavelli (Oxford: Oxford
University Press,
1981),
p. 24.
ibid.,
p. 28.
297
gies which are generated avoid
by
such a
the very
infelicities he
criticizes others of
the category of the
mythology
belief. However, in many instances he fails to for committing. Take, for example, doctrines. Under this category we are exhorted
the writings of one person as an anticipation
about whether a
of of
to avoid, among other

of those of
things, seeing
another; engaging in futile discussion
doctrine really
emerged at a particular
Skinner has
authors
time; and, talking in terms number of ideal types, or models,

the theories of
modern
biological
metaphors.
doctrines
toward which the
in his
stories progress.
John Locke's Two Treatises
are
taken to be the
modern
paradigm articulation of
constitutionalism, the
conception of
the state, and the idea of modern secularized revolution. Skinner
frequently looks for signs ing the language of

about
in
earlier works of
these later doctrines. Instead of us

"hints."
"anticipations"
he favours that
ruler,
of
When he talks
"hints"
the
idea
of the popular right to resist a
we are
told that
of
the
argument are
to
be found in Mair's History. In

to be
"suggestive"
addition, certain passages of
The
Prince
are said
of
the modern conception of the state. In the to "glance
process of
looking
in
for origins,
order
we are sometimes asked of
forward have
more man
century"
than a
aged pp.
to take stock
how closely
certain writers
pp.
to anticipate Locke's doctrines
(Foundations, 2,
for the
343, 353-54. Also
see
156, 165, 227, 231,
338 and 353).

search
origins of
It is Skinner's desire to
theories that
"recognizably
modern"22
Indeed, in searching for

about when a emerged. origins
forces him to employ the same historical devices he once deplored. origins the historian is bound to engage in discussions
rudimentary form of a later doctrine can really be said to have This is adequately demonstrated in Skinner's attempt to search for the of the modern conception of the state. Initially Skinner argues that the
who
historian
search of
has
fixed doctrine,
or
idea, in
mind and goes
to the
evidence
in
it, readily falls into

some sense
always
in
the trap of speaking as if its full-fledged form was immanent in history. But, in his historical work he takes
as
identifying the emergence of important ideas. We are informed, for instance, that by the end of the quattro cento the modern conception of the state is beginning to emerge. During this
fully
articulated
doctrines
his
reference point
for
period we
begin to his
see signs of
the
crucial
transition
from
the
an
idea
of
the ruler
'maintaining
apparatus,
state'
to the
more abstract which
idea that there is be

said
independent
a
political
maintain
that of the state,

which contains
the ruler may
to have
duty
to
the
work
the
strongest
hints
of
this transition
is
of course
Machiavelli's The
Prince (Foundations, 2,
p. 353).
more
blatant
example of
the transgression of his negative methodological prin
ciples occurs
in Skinner's
search
for
the origins of the
Calvinist theory
of
revolu-
Revolution,'
22.
says
Q. Skinner, "The Origins

ojJ.H.
of the
Calvinist
Theory
of
After the Reformation: Es
in Honour
Hexter,
ed. Barbara C. Malament (Manchester: Manchester
University Press,
1980), p. 309.
298
Interpretation
he is
prepared
tion. His statement of intent suffices to show that

characteristics as order
to select salient
definitive
when
of a particular emerged.
doctrine,
He says,
and
then go to the past
in
to discover
classic
they first
of a
The
formulation Europe
fully
secularized and popularist
theory
of revolution
.
in
early
modern
most convenient
in John Locke's Two Treatises of Government It may be therefore to begin by surveying the leading elements in Locke's ac
occurs
count as a prelude
to asking
when and where
this
canonical version of
the argument
modern
in
favour
of active political resistance was

thought.23
first unequivocally
stated
in early
political
The
search
for
origins also predisposes
ological metaphor.
Doctrines
evolve
Skinner to slip into the language of bi toward their definitive versions, encoun
tering
of
numerous obstacles upon
the way, which often serve to

spread of
hinder the "pro
cess"
of their mature
formulation. For example, the

neo-Darwinian
"formative"
the political
theory
pp.
Lutheranism is described in
terms.
Like
an
organism, the po
litical theory
and
goes through a series of
stages
of
(Foundations, 2,
when
65
81), culminating in its

became
"most decisive
with
stage"
"evolution"
the secular
preached
authorities
involved
the
heresies
that
Lutheranism
p. 89). In addition, early modern constitutionalism had a par difficult and ticularly evolutionary growth. We can see it "beginning in and in the conciliarist theories of (Foundations, 2, p. d'Ailly "evolving
(Foundations, 2,
Ockham"
Gerson"
65), but Ponet, Goodman

mulated
and
Knox,
the doctrine which Locke wrote over a
writing in the 1550s, had still not quite for century later: "there is still one
them "from this 2, p. 239).
point at which a wide conceptual gulf continues to

'liberal'
revolution"
classic
theory
of popular
(Foundations,
the laws of
same
These
Calvinists
gious
ceives major
regarded popular resistance
to a ruler who acted ultra vires, as a reli
duty based
it to be
on a promise to uphold
God,
whereas
Locke
con
a moral right.
Later, in the
these
volume,
we are
informed that the

con
Huguenot treatises
divide,"
of
the 1570s managed to pass across this "crucial

developments"
ceptual
but "in
spite of
they
of
still
differed
at
"two
important
points
from the
p. 338).
classic
version
early
modern
(Foundations, 2,
I have shown how Skinner's predilection for searching for origins disposes him to employ many of the historical devices associated with the mythology of doctrines, but the same preoccupation also has a tendency to generate the my
thology
which
of prolepsis.
the commentator
Here the danger is seeing too readily the has thus programmed himself to
on the
modern
"elements
p.
find"
("Meaning,"
24).
In abstracting these elements,
basis
of a conception of
the later
fully
of
articulated
certain
doctrine,
the historian is
implicitly
future,
suggesting that
when
the
full meaning
"anticipations"
has to
await the
the mature
theory
casts a ret
rospective significance upon the prior
There is
23.
no need
to
rudimentary attempts at its formulation. demonstrate here that this is exactly what the search for
ori-
ibid.,
310.
299

It
gins entails.
is,
as those opponents of
"whig"
history
never
tire of
telling
us, to
look
at the past
through the wrong

of their
end of not
the telescope.
author
Aspects
of the past are
selected
because
importance,
a
for the
himself,
or
for the times

or articu
in
which
he lived, but for fully. for
later time
when someone uses
his theory,
lates it
more
The
search
origins also
leads Skinner He
saw
to transgress
his initial
precepts on
the mythology of parochialism.
influence
work,
25).
model
very little point in the historian using the for historical explanation because "it can very rarely be made to it
can
and when
be,
there
is scarcely any
point
in
so"
doing
one
("Meaning,"
p.
However, in
as
order to make connections
between
thinker and another,
Skinner is
not averse
to using the concept quite liberally.

and
such phrases
"new
influential departure";
"immense historical Also
see
respectively.
Consequently he uses "immensely influential argu

influence"
ment";
pp.
"deep influence";
and 2, p.
and
(Foundations,
2,
pp.
34, 91, 231;
19
1,
pp.
49
and 242;
22,
24, 26, 214,
337).
In
demonstrating
prolepsis,
of
that Skinner
and
himself tends to
not
subscribe
to the mythologies of
doctrines,
the
parochialism, I have
been
concerned to
detract from
quality been at pains to
his
contribution to the
history
work
I have merely
to the type of
negative criti
emphasize
that his historical

and
is
much closer
history we have been used

cisms of past
to,
different from that implied in his
historians
work would
Indeed, had Skinner followed his

have had to have taken
a
own prescriptions
his historical
very
dif-
erent
suggest not
form. The differences that I have detected between theory and practice that The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, for instance, does
and
"superbly"
articles";
exemplify what Skinner has "recommended in his theoretical book,"24 which is the opinion of most re if it is a "wonderful
viewers, then it
cisms of past
is,
to a large extent in spite of, and not because of his criti
historians.
Ill
In summary, then, Skinner's characterization of the history of histories of po litical thought is defective because he associates the belief in the existence of pe rennial problems with the textualist approach to interpretation. It was suggested
that
most
historians
of political thought
did
not
distinguish between textual
and
contextual study. vented the
The
two approaches
complemented each other and neither pre
rennial
historian from viewing the history of political thought in terms of pe problems. Moreover, Skinner misunderstood the reasons why the histori
ans viewed their subject matter
in terms
of persistent
issues.
They
did
not
believe
24.
Julian H. Franklin
and
Judith Shklar's
reviews of
Skinner, The Foundations, Political The
ory, 7
(1979), 554
and
599
respectively.
300
Interpretation
be
that the answers given to them in the past could
directly
appropriated
for
solving the problems of the present.

classic
Instead, they generally
maintained
that the
texts could
help
us understand present problems more
clearly,
and per
haps
even stimulate us
recognition of
to give our own answers. In addition, the specific meaning a text
it
was maintained
that the
has
within an
historical
con
text, does
which can
not prevent the elevation of that thought
to a higher level of generality,
then be used in coming to terms with similar situations
far
removed
in
time and space.
knowledged the its

conclusions
However, by implication, Skinner himself seems to have ac untenability of his negative theory because he ignores many of
in his historical The aspiring historian Skinner's negative theory with due
practice.
of political
thought, then,
should approach mind
circumspec
precepts. and
tion, It
ical any
bearing
remains
in
that even
its
author
is
unable
to subscribe to
negative
its
to ask why this
discrepancy
between the
theory
is
histor
In
practice occurs established
in the
work of
Skinner. I think the
answer
quite clear.
activity, modes
of procedure will arise which
facilitate the
In the
prac
re
tice of that activity. These procedures will

sponse to the problems encountered
have
arisen not
fortuitously, but in
were used
by
the
various practitioners.
history of
in
order evidence
histories
of political thought various methodological
devices
to establish relations between the evidence, and
in
order to
form that
into
a continuous and coherent story.
Although the devices may
not stand
up to
philosophical
examination,
they
nevertheless embodied much that gave character
to the activity. It is easy for the rationalist to come
foundations dures
upon which an
activity rests,
and to put
along and dismantle the very in their place new proce
which promise
to produce better
all rationalists
results.
tempted to
do, but like
he
was
This is exactly what Skinner at eventually forced to acknowledge
the practical difficulties of
grin, I suggest, that in
order
attaining the theoretical ideals. He found to his cha to practice the activity of being an historian of polit
reject
ical thought, it
that
name.
was
impractical to
everything that had hitherto

was
gone under
to the tra recognizably he had to invoke of the devices that had revolutionize, many traditionally been employed. It is impossible to start afresh; you can alter the tra dition, but you can never totally ignore it. There is reason in a tradition, even if it
related
In
order to produce
anything that
dition he
wished to
is
often
that the philosopher of

which
hard to find. Austin, I think, is making a similar point when he suggests language should not reject out of hand the distinctions
stood the test of
have
time in the realm
"These
concepts will
have
evolved over a
the test of practical use, of continual

vals.25
ordinary language. He says, long time, that is, they will have faced hard cases better than their vanished ri
of
25.
J. L. Austin. Philosophical Papers,
3rd ed.
(Oxford: Oxford
University Press,
1979),
p. 74.
Libertarianism
A Critique
of
and
Political
s
Philosophy
and
Robert
Nozick'
Anarchy, State,
Utopia
David Lewis Schaefer
Holy Cross College
Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State,

what
and
Utopia,
published
in 1974,
The
constitutes
spired
is probably the philosophically most by the increasingly influential

book
was
interesting
treatise
yet produced or
in
"libertarian"
movement.1
significance
of the
highlighted
by the
fact that it
appeared
only three
of the
years after the
publication
by
Nozick's Harvard colleague, John At the time,

academic
Rawls,
over
Theory
Justice.2
of
debate
the merits
widely acclaimed of Rawls's ar
gument was at rejection of
its
peak.
the reasoning employed
To many readers, Nozick's thoroughgoing critique and by Rawls to justify a policy of redistributing
"primary
among individuals for the sake of achieving a greater degree of seemed to establish Anarchy, State, and Utopia along with A Theory has equality as one of the two fundamental alternative sources of philosophic guid Justice of
ance
recommends
goods"
for the contemporary liberal polity. A critical study of Nozick's book thus itself in at least two respects: first, as an occasion to assess the goals
the
and principles of a characteristic
evaluating present-day understanding of political philosophy (one held in common, I shall argue, by Rawls and Nozick). I have undertaken the present study in the belief that the understanding of jus
tice that Nozick sets
cies
libertarian movement;
and
second,
as a means of
forth is seriously defective, and that the root of its deficien is to be found in the conception of the philosophic enterprise that Nozick
Rawls.3
shares with
While the immediate is to
aim of
this study is to
uncover certain
defects in the libertarian

more
position as exemplified suggest
fundamental
purpose
the
by inadequacy
Nozick's
of
exposition of
it, my
aca
contemporary
demic
political philosophy, as
substantive
typified
by
Nozick's work,
by
contrast with
the
great tradition of sche.
Western
of
political
philosophy from Plato to Nietz

that
Although
number
particular
arguments
Nozick
makes
over
ab-
including,
all
especially, his critique of Rawls

shall
are sound and of
insightful, his
approach, I
argue,
suffers the
defects
being
at once
excessively
The
present article
is
a revised version of a paper that was presented at the 1980 annual
meeting
of
the Southern Political Science Association

a grant
in Atlanta. The
preparation of
this study was supported
by
tance he
from the Institute for Educational Affairs. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assis analysis that an anony received in preparing this article for publication from the painstaking
for Interpretation
provided of a previous
mous referee
draft.
(New York: Basic Books,

(Cambridge, Mass.: The
1974).
All
parenthetic page citations
in the text
refer
to this book.
2. 3.
anny?
Belknap
Press
of
Harvard
University Press,
1971).
I have
set
forth
a thematic critique of
Rawls's of
enterprise and
Justice"
A Critique of John Rawls's "A
Theory
methodology in Justice or Tyr (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press,
1979)-
302
Interpretation time-bound,
and thus prevents
stract and
him from articulating
theory
of
liberty
one.
that can serve as an adequate alternative to Rawls's admittedly
deficient
Since I believe that the underlying methodological defects of Nozick's approach inform Rawls's work as well, I shall intersperse in this critique a number of com
parisons
between Anarchy, State,
and
Utopia
and
Theory
of Justice.
I
Nozick
opens
his book
with an abrupt and
sweeping
statement of
the moral
test that any government must meet in order to be legitimate:
Individuals have rights,

out
and
there are things no person or

and
group may do to
may do. How
them
(with
raise
violating
their rights).
So strong
far-reaching
its
ix).4
are these rights that
they
the question of what, if anything, the
state and
officials
much room
do individual
rights
leave for
the state? (p.
Nozick's
starting-point reflects an
assumption,
which
he
states a
few
pages
later,
be
about the purpose of political philosophy:
the "fundamental
about
at
questi
it
must seek
to answer,
organized,"
before engaging in any inquiry is "whether there should be any state

theory, if
tenable,"
"how the
state should
all,"
as opposed to
"anar
chy."
"Since
anarchist
would undercut
"the
whole subject of
philosophy"
political
(p. 4;
emphasis
can
archist position at all. of
before there
in original), it is necessary to refute the an be any point to engaging in political philosophy
Hence "it is
major
appropriate to
begin
political
its
alternative,"
theoretical
anarchism
philosophy (p.
4).5
with an examination
Nozick's initial
attribution of rights
to
individuals,
as well as
his
proposition
that the study of politics should begin with the consideration of anarchy, appears
4.
of social
Compare Rawls's equally sweeping and uncompromising beginning: "Justice is the first virtue institutions [L]aws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be
.
.
reformed or abolished
if they
are unjust.
Each
person possesses an
that even the welfare of

5.
as
override"
It
should
society as a whole cannot be noted that Nozick's reasoning does

believe. Even if it
could
(A
not go
inviolability founded on justice Theory of Justice, p. 3). nearly so far to justify his starting-point
anarchist position
he
appears to
be demonstrated that the
is in
some sense
ultimately correct, this would not make political philosophy a practically irrelevant enterprise, unless one had good reason to expect the imminent replacement of all polities by a superior anarchic alterna
tive. So
long as we expect men to continue to live
under
governments, there
would at
be
good reason prevented
for
continuing to investigate how those governments might be improved, or getting worse. It should also be noted how Nozick's conception of political
the original (and
least
from
philosophy departs from

that
can never
literal) understanding
of
that enterprise as a
of
(never-ending) pursuit of wisdom

their very nature
proof of
is,
as a perpetual quest
for the illumination
issues that
by
be
settled
be
of
yond
doubt. From that

(or
of
older perspective, not even a would
seeming
the superiority
of political
of one
form
of
government
nongovernment)
value.
deprive the
continued
and
study
philosophy
its
intrinsic theoretical
Despite the admittedly "abstract
metatheoretical"
character of parts of
his reasoning (p. 3), Nozick,

continued pursuit.
by
contrast, appears to
view political
philosophy
as a species of practi
cal problem-solving, the success of which
(Cf.
Ludwig
in attaining its goal would the very need for its Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [New York: Macmillan,
"undercut"
1953],
sees.
133, 255).
303
to place
Libertarianism
him
that
within was
and
Political Philosophy
liberal
political phi
the modern, social contract tradition of
losophy
"awful
initiated
of
descriptions"
Thomas Hobbes. Nozick expressly rejects such the prepolitical state of nature as Hobbes provided, how
by
ever, on
the ground that
they "rarely
.
convince,"
since support
"[t]he
subjects of psychol
so
ogy
and
sociology
are
far too feeble to

"
generalizing
the argument
pessimistically
the need
across all societies and persons.
Moreover,
not
inferring
for
government
from
such
fearsome
upon
accounts of the alternative
is inconsistent,
"since the argument

about
depends
how the
operates"
state
(p. 4;
emphasis
making such pessimistic assumptions in original). It would be more use

upon a nonstate situation
ful
and
persuasive, Nozick contends, "to focus
in
which
people
generally satisfy
could show that
moral constraints and
ought."
generally
act as
they
Only
"if one
the state would be superior even to this most favored situ
ation of
anarchy, the best that realistically

state"
it] by a process involving no to "justify the (p. 5).

The
quite
be hoped for, or would arise [from could one truly claim morally impermissible
can
steps"
foregoing
he devotes
argument constitutes
Nozick's
rationale
for the
lengthy,
one to
and
novel,
account of
the state
of nature, and of
the genesis of a state out of

account will
it,
to
which
most of
Part I
his book. This

necessary,
help
deter
mine whether governments are persons must

ble."
truly
and
if so, "whether
all the actions

permissi
do to
set
up
and operate a state are
themselves morally
Nozick's
"starting
point
then, though
nonpolitical.
is
by
intention far from
since he believes that "[m]oral philosophy sets the background for, boundaries of, political philosophy": the state's coercive power is legitimate only insofar as it conforms to "moral prohibitions [that] it is permissible to en
nonmoral,"
and
force"
(p. 6). But this
inquiry
into the
state of nature
political
has
point as well.
Only
if
one can
derive "the
a purely theoretical from nonpolitical phe
nomena, Nozick
it"
believes,
in
a
can one claim
to possess "a fundamental explanation
of
(p.
6;
emphasis
original).
explanation of
By identifying
doctrine does
fundamental
the political as one that
derives
from the nonpolitical, Nozick

that views
politics as
confirms
his
acceptance of
the modern, liberal
the Aristotelian understanding

not
in contrast to essentially artificial and derivative of it as natural and irreducible. Although Nozick
indicate his
the
reason
describe
particular
for assuming the validity of this perspective, he does notion of explanation he will employ: it derives from the
scholars as
writings of such ence.
contemporary
Hempel'
Carl Hempel
"potential
on the
philosophy
of sci
explanati
Nozick
cites
s concept of
as a precedent genesis of politics.
for the
particular approach
he
will adopt
in
describing the
Ac
cording to this view, "[a] theory

general
of a state of nature permissible and
that begins with
fundamental
and of
descriptions
of
morally
impermissible actions,
would violate
deeply
based
reasons
why
some persons
in any society
these moral
"explanation"
constraints,"
may thereby
state, 'Yt 'en
offer an adequate
way"
of
the origins of the
if no
actual state ever arose that
(p. 7;
emphasis
in
original).
The
rationale
for employing the
concept of potential explanation
in
physical
304
science
Interpretation is manifest, in that the

but to do
so. physical scientist
often, if
not
always, has
no
choice
Observing
only
a certain measurable pattern of
behavior in
he is
the
phenomena
he studies,
without yet
knowing
what causes
that pattern,
hypothetical explanations, the validity compelled of which is then tested by their capacity to predict the future behavior of the phe nomena. But it is not at all obvious why one should adopt such an approach in
to formulate
and make use of
dealing
or at
with
human
and political things. are not
Here,
after
all, the
causes of
least
some of
them,
totally hidden from

in the
motives
us: as a
human
behavior, being, the
political scientist
inevitably
the
shares
that impel the political conduct
of men
in
general.6
Moreover, historical
records that serve to explain major po
litical events,
the
cal
including
are
prefer
founding
for
a
of political societies us.
(albeit,
of
course,
not
first ones),
philosophy
readily
available
to
Why, then,
should a student of politi
"potential"
to settle
explanation of
operative?7
the origin of the
state, rather than the one that was actually
Nozick's justification for this procedure, it previously litical philosophy. If,

Aristotle's
view of
would
appear, is contained in his
quoted remarks as
concerning the proper relation between moral and po

moral
he contends,
discipline,8
philosophy, understood
(contrary
is to
set
to
it) in
contradistinction
to political philosophy,
the
boundaries
ments
of
the latter
then
historical inquiries into how
govern
actually arose, or conjectures drawn from the observation tives and behavior into the likely character of a state of nature, are ondary importance,
or
of men's mo of
or even
beside the
point.
The
problem
is that
such
merely sec inquiries

are
conjectures, no matter how well grounded (or

relied on to provide a
precisely because they

"moral"
grounded) in fact, cannot be the foundations of

6. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan,
duction,"
sufficiently
account of
government.0
In
other
words, the motives that commonly im-
ed.
C. B. Macpherson (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), "The Intro
pp. 2-3.
7.
Both Sheldon Wolin
and
the absence of substantive historical or political reference in it:
Milton Himmelfarb, in reviewing Anarchy, State, and Utopia, noted Wolin, book review. New York Times
Book
no.
Review, May
11, 1975, p. 32;
Himmelfarb, "Liberals
of ethics as a
Libertarians,"
and
Commentary,
and
vol.
59,
6 (June, 1975), pp. 67-8. 8. Contrast Aristotle's description in live.
"kind
of"
political
science,
his
view
that the
virtues
of
to be inculcated in citizens as children must

which
be determined
with reference to the particular sort
regime
they
Nicomachean
Ethics,
theory,"
i094bio-n;
Politics,
l26obl2-I7,
I337JI2-
16.
9.
Compare Rawls's
dichotomy
between "social
about
which attempts
to explain human be
havior
120.
and
by
starting
might
with
"assumptions
the
work,"
actual
tendencies
at
and
"moral
theory,"
which
aims to select principles
that "are acceptable

constitute
from
a moral point of view":
What
be thought to
the original precedent
A Theory of Justice, p. for the approach adopted by Nozick

political
Rawls is Locke's remark, in his discussion of the origins of from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great
sec.
society, that "an Argument
force"
103, 11.
14-15)-
(All
references to the
Second Treatise
are
(Second Treatise. Chap. VIII, based on Peter Laslett's edition of the

plays
Two Treatises [Revised edition, New York: New American Library, 1965]). To be sure, Locke fast and loose with evidence in ostensible support of his doctrine (see Richard H.
"historical"
Cox,
Locke
Peace [Oxford: Clarendon Press, i960], Chap. 2). The considerable difference be tween Locke's approach and that of Rawls and Nozick the fact that Locke endeavors to derive the principles of political right from man's nature, rather than from supposed institutions will,
on and
"moral"
War
however, be
emphasized
later in this
essay.
305
Libertarianism
and
Political
Philosophy
therefore to have
and produce understands
moved
pel men's political

prepolitical
conduct, and that are
likely
them
in
condition, may be far

moral
different,
far different results,
from those that

and even
philosophy (as Nozick
it)
would recommend
demand.
this points to a complex of problems
proper relation
All
of
meriting
serious
investigation: (i)
and moral philos
What is in fact the

ophy?
between
political
philosophy
(2) To
what extent are
the research methods and assumptions of natural
science adequate
for the
analysis of the
human
or political realm?
(3) How far

human
may
legitimate
moral code
safely diverge from the
common manner of
conduct?
Nozick does
them more
not
thoroughly
explicitly address any of these problems. Had he considered than he appears to have done, his investigation into the
state of nature might serious
have taken
different turn. As
things stand,
shall
argue, a
doubt
must arise
regarding the adequacy of

the
soundness
his
account of that condition,

principles
and
consequently
about
of the
political
he derives
from it.
II
"awful"
As
we
have seen, Nozick
rejects such
descriptions
of
the state of na
and
ture as Hobbes's on the ground that
they
are
inherently
the
implausible
not
are at
insufficiently
supported
by
the
findings
of social science. account of
He does
himself
tempt, however, to on the basis of an independent follow "the evidently is appear less
respectable
construct a more
likely inquiry into human

Locke,"
prepolitical condition
nature.
Rather, he
chooses to
tradition of than Hobbes's
whose account of
the state of nature
more acceptable violent and
inasmuch
did.10
as
it
makes that condition
terrible than Hobbes's
Using
Locke's
account of
the state of nature as his point of

ambition
departure, Nozick disclaims

accurate
at the outset
moral
of
providing
"completely
statement
of the
any back life
ground"
of the argument that

execution.
is to follow,
a task that
he fears
might require a
time
for its
He is to
some extent comforted,
however, by knowing
Treatise"
that Locke himself "does not
provide
tion of the status and basis of
anything resembling a satisfactory explana (p. 9). the law of nature in his Second
considerable
cerning the the Second Treatise. In
body of Locke scholarship confirms Nozick's judgment con inadequacy of the explanation and grounding of the law of nature in
recent
decades, however,
that this
a number of
scholars, begin
product of an rhetorical of these
suggested ning with Leo Strauss, have intention rather than a failing on Locke's part,
inadequacy
is the
and reflects
state of
the
heavily
nature."
character of
his
overall
initial
account of
the
A
Several
1 1;
10.
or
Nozick's
,
preference echoes
that of Rawls: see
Theory
of Justice,
p.
Schaefer, Justice
Tyranny?
il.
pp. 39-4-
See Leo Strauss, Natural Right

pp.
and
History
(Chicago:
of
University
Law,"
of
Chicago Press, 1953),

Philos-
Chap. V, Part B.
202-51;
idem, "Locke's Doctrine
Natural
in What Is Political
306
scholars,
Interpretation
including
the
between Locke's
one pursues
state of nature and

of
Strauss himself, have persuasively argued that the difference Hobbes's is far more apparent than real: if Locke's
argument with care and
logic
juxtaposes his
some was
times
contradictory in
statements with one

same
another,
view of
one
discovers that Locke

nature that
really expressing the

albeit
fundamental
human
Hobbes did,
that Nozick
a more prudent
fashion.12
In short, there is Locke's
reason
to doubt that the sani
tized, de-Hobbesified
chooses as
version
of
state-of-nature
teaching
his starting point is at all faithful to Locke's own thought. At most, it represent Locke's popular doctrine, as distinguished from his truly philo may
sophic argument.
What is
at stake value
here is
more
than a mere matter of textual
interpretation. In
nature,
taking
at
face
Locke's
initial,
surface account of the state of

law"
includ
in that
ing
the notion of an "understood natural
that restrains men's actions
state
(p.
n), Nozick
despite noting the
inadequacy
of
Locke's doctrine
an ade
presupposes that the surface

quate point
teaching
of
the Second Treatise constitutes

of politics.
for understanding the foundations starting Locke himself understood the matter, the "law of
self to restrain men's self-interested
But if,
as
nature"
has
no
capacity
by
it
actions; if the content of that

more
"law,"
analyzed, proves to command nothing

tion
than the
dictates
of selfish
properly inclina
itself;
and
if the
net effects of men's
superior"
common able
to ameliorate or control
state of
operating according to it, without "a its consequences, are indistinguish
from Hobbes's
of the
nature, then Nozick

of
interpretation
reed
Lockean law
at
nature,
not
himself, by adopting a is basing his theory on a very

property that,
Goldwin,
as we
"moral"
weak
(and
read)."
What is
issue is
merely the
a
empirical correctness of
Nozick's
account of the state of nature
have seen, he
in Leo Strauss
ophy?
(New York:
Free Press, 1959),
pp.
197-220; Robert
"John
Locke,"
and
Joseph
pp.
Cropsey (eds.), History of Political Philosophy

452-60;
1972),
Cox,
op. cit.;
(second edition, Chicago: Rand McNally, Michael Zuckert, "The Recent Literature on Locke's Political Phi
Reviewer, vol. 5 (1975), pp. 271-304; idem, "An Introduction to Interpretation, vol. 8, no. 1 (January, 1979), pp. 58-74 In the second chapter of the Second Treatise, Locke describes it as being "besides my present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the Law of Nature, or its measures of (sec. 12. 11. 10-12 [emph.
Locke's First
Treatise,"
purpose'
losophy,"
The Political Science
punishment"
in original]); one of his editors comments that it for Locke to demonstrate the existence
"Introduction"
appears to
have been "always 'beside his

law,"
present works
and content of natural
in any
of
his
(Laslett,
12.
to the Two the
The
central section of
Treatises, p. 95.) Second Treatise, no.

Locke,"
123, constitutes the
most
dramatic
and obvi
ous evidence
in the preceding note, Jason Aronson, "Critical Note: Shaftesbury on American Political Science Review, vol. 53, no. 4 (December, 1959), PP- 1101-4, which discusses the view of an intimate of Locke's that that thinker was in fact a Hobbist. Cf also, on the relation between the state of nature and the state of war in
addition to the references
for this
point.
See also, in
Locke's teaching, Nathan Tarcov, "Locke's Second Treatise

lion,'"
13.
and 'The Best Fence Against Rebel Review of Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (April, 1981), pp. 203-4. Cf. Locke's argument in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1, ii, against the be
"innate"
lief that there
are
moral principles
implanted in human nature;
and
his remark, in
sec.
of
that chapter, that

and
"Robberies,
murders, rapes, are the sports of men set at
censure."
liberty
from
punishment
307
avoids
Libertarianism
claiming for it
morally
and
Political
Philosophy
or
but
whether
it is meaningful,
logically
coherent, to
speak of a
operative
law
of nature
Having
Nozick's
pone a
outlined what
1 believe
are
existing in a prepolitical condition. the fundamental difficulties involved in

of nature on
claim
to base his account of the state

of
Locke, I
must post
further development
this point in
order
to
of
survey the details of Nozick's his derivation

of government
own portrayal of
the prepolitical condition, and
from that
condition.
Following Locke,
inherent
see
Nozick
presupposes that all
men,
being
prop
by
nature
free,
possess an
right to
direct their lives
and use their
bound, by the law of nature, to respect the equivalent right possessed by all other individuals, and thus are prohibited from violating any other person's life, liberty, or property; and are endowed, by that same law, with a right to enforce the prohibition by punishing its violators to a degree proportionate to their crime. But whereas Locke, having noted the "in
erty
as
they individually
fit;
are
conveniences"
stood natural
and that men
of this situation the facts that, in Nozick's words, "the under law may not provide for every contingency in a proper who are judges in their own case cannot be relied on to enforce the
fashion,"
law
of nature
in
in
an equitable manner order
directly
inferred the necessity to institute

stresses
might
a government
to remedy these
incommodities, Nozick
inconveniences."
the need,
before making
such
jump,
to "consider what
arrangements
be
made
within a state of nature
to deal with these
Only
a government
quotation
after
evaluating
coercive
the voluntary arrangements individuals tion to ameliorate its defects

can we
might make within a prepolitical condi
judge how far

a
having
authority is truly needed, or whether (as gests), "the remedy is worse than the The
alternative
lengthy
from Proudhon sug

detail is
a system of
disease"
(pp.
io-u).
remedy
which
Nozick
considers
in
great
voluntarily-organized
"mutual-protection
associations
that serve to render more them.
secure
the
rights of
the individuals
joining
Operating
much
like the early

more eco
. .
American fire
protection
societies, these organizations are,
however,
nomically different prices, for those

tion"
sophisticated, offering "[different sorts of protective policies

who at
at
may desire
as
more extensive or elaborate protec
(pp.
12-13).
Although
the outset each
territory
would
have
a multitude
of such associations, such

mies of
factors
"division
of
labor,
market
pressures, econo
run
self-interest"
scale,
and rational
would protective
tend in the
long
to produce a
agency"
situation
in
which one
"dominant
came
to possess "a virtual
"market"
monopoly"
in
each geographic
(pp.
16-17).
its
an
members against violations of their rights
by
Each agency will protect nonmembers, but will institute

right"
in such quarrels, in or orderly procedure for determining "who is in the in quarrels which a member has der "to avoid constant and costly arbitrate disputes will it instigated. Similarly, among its members so as unjustly 13). At the same time, an agency (p. settlement to provide a peaceful and just itself by the fact that it may be deterred from becoming "openly from people who "would cooperation of itself deprive would voluntary
involvement"
thereby
view themselves
simply
as
its
victims rather
than as
its
citizens"
(p.
17).
308
Interpretation
In assuming the functions both of protecting its clients against external ag gression and of arbitrating their internal disputes, the dominant protective agency
"minimal"
comes
to resemble a
a state:
state.
Two features
not claim
seem at
first, however,
to
distinguish it from
(i) it does
may
tive
use
force
when."
but
must allow
"a monopoly on deciding who individuals "who refuse to join any protec
society"
to judge for themselves
whether their rights and/or
have been violated,
and
to enforce their rights

who
"by
even
infringed
them,"
punishing if the violators
exacting
compensation
from those
agency;
are clients of the protective
and
(2) it
provides protection
"differing
degrees
protection"
of
only to those who have paid for it, to be purchased, without obliging
and allows anyone
"to
purchase or contribute
to the purchasing of protection for
others"
(pp. 23-4). To
legitimate the
must show protective
existence of
the state against the anarchist's objection to
it,
one
how
a government
missible"
agency appears steps "that violates

method of
possessing the two key powers that the dominant to lack would arise through a series of "morally per
rights"
no one's a moral
(pp.
51-2).
of
Nozick's
protective
providing
derivation
the state from a
dominant
agency is
area will
as
follows. First, he
argues that since an
agency that is dom
inant in its
monopoly"
over
necessarily acquire, by virtue of its dominance, "a de facto the exercise of force against its clients allowing outsiders
to punish its clients only on occasions, for reasons, and
appropriate
("independents")
methods
by
in
that
it deems
the distinction between
it
"state"
and a
this regard
is
contends that
natural right
or practically eliminated. Second, however, he because its monopoly imposes a disadvantage on outsiders, whose to execute the laws of nature against its clients has effectively been
inevitably blurred,
rendered outsiders
nugatory, the dominant agency is morally obliged to compensate the
for this disadvantage. "The least
way"
expensive
with
for it to
provide such services
compensation cover
to independents is "to supply them

with
protective
to
conflict"
situations of
its clients,
without
charge them
for this
service
(pp. 108-10;
emphasis
in
little
reason
to fear that the
availability
only
of protective
claiming The agency has services on an unpaid basis

original).
riders,"
the right to
will stimulate an excessive number of people
to
become "free
since com
pensatory
an
protection other
is
provided
against
injuries
committed
by
the agency's
which
clients, not
by "unfancy
outsiders; and the protection is equivalent only to that

would provide.
policy"
At the
same
time, the
anarchist's objection
to the redistributive character of the state

protection to those who refuse to onstrated would
taxpayers
being
obliged to provide
pay for it
is quelled,
since
Nozick has dem dominant agency

-
how, starting from
the anarchist's own premises, the
be morally compelled to provide such protection (pp. Nozick himself admits the "somewhat fuzzy" character
1 1 1
of
13).
the principle of
compensation on which
fully"
his
argument
rests, noting that its "details have not been
worked out
(p. 87). A
more obvious
difficulty
do
is that it is simply
not clear
why, given Nozick's assumption (at least for the purpose of

vation of
describing
morally
the deri
required
the state) "that generally people
will
what
they
are
309
do"
Libertarianism
(p. 119),
and
and
Political
Philosophy
the anarchist's premise that there is a
will,"
to
his
refusal to question
set of moral enough
principles, knowable
all
"independents"
"by
all men of good
which
is
clear
to settle
disputes (p. 141), the dominant

to exact their
protective
agency
cannot
be
trusted to allow
clients who
fair"
and
pensate
agency have unjustly injured them, so long as the independents use "reliable procedures (p. 108) thus releasing itself from the obligation to com for
own punishments against
them
denying
them the right to punish.
Only
on
the supposition that
the dominant agency would exercise

outsiders would compensation
its de facto monopoly to the disadvantage of clearly be required; but this premise contradicts
the benign assumptions about the operation of the law of nature that Nozick has
presupposed.14
Even
aside
that Nozick
has
from this difficulty, it is questionable to what extent the institution professed to legitimate properly deserves the label of a state. As
organization
he concedes, this
right
is
still obliged
to
grant anyone who wishes
it the
to opt out of paying taxes to
it,
while
it
continues
to
provide
him
with a
minimal
level
of protection.
Moreover,
the organization expressly refrains from
intervening
in disputes among independents occurring within (as well as outside) its territory (except, presumably, so far as is necessary to protect innocent by standers who are its clients). The fact adduced by Nozick that within existing
recognized as states some
bodies
groups, like the
Mafia, may
exercise violence
without
the government's authorization, and that others, revolutionaries or pacif

refuse
ists, may
23), does
effort
to recognize the the
legitimacy
that the
of
the state's monopoly of force (p. to

such a monopoly, and
not refute
proposition as
claim
the
to actualize it as
fully
possible, are essential to the state's existence. Yet

state
Nozick's protective-agency enforcing hardly be

such a said
is expressly
cases cited
prohibited
monopoly in the to have resolved this

protective
involving difficulty by proposing "occasionally [to]

agency'
from claiming or independents. He can

re as
fer to the dominant
agency
as 'a statelike
instead
of
simply
'a
state'"
(p.
118).
Ill
the difficulties involved in Nozick's
that
given the realities of
anarchist
Regardless
state, it is
ognized
of
purported
derivation
of the
understandable
human life,
which are rec
by
everyone except
the stray
most of
the discussion of Anar

of
chy,
State,
For
see
and
Utopia has
centered on
Nozick's teaching regarding the limits

of
14.
an anarchist critique of
Nozick's derivation
Anarchism,"
the state, on a different but partly related

vol.
ground,
Robert L. Holmes, "Nozick

especially
250.
on
Political Theory,
5,
no. 2
(May. 1977),
pp. 247-56,
Nozick's life in
inability
to
provide a
to his benign
onstrate
assumptions about
a prepolitical
convincing derivation of the state, owing condition, recalls Rawls's similar failure to dem
the
need
for
or
men
to
establish
government, given
his
sanguine view of
human
nature
(see
Schaefer, Justice
Tyranny?,
pp. 40-41).
310
Interpretation
the legitimate state's authority, in Part II of the book.
Yet,
as
shall
emphasize,
of
the deficiences of the latter
are
ultimately traceable to the
unrealism
the
former.
reveals that
of
authority his perspective, even more than Rawls's, is limited by the horizons present-day political debate. For both Rawls and Nozick, the fundamental is
justice involves striking goals of individual liberty,
realm), on the
other.
Nozick's treatment
of the
issues involved in
determining
the
state's
sue of eral
a proper
on
balance between
the one
hand,
and
contemporary lib equality (especially in the

the
economic
But A
Theory
discussion
thetic
of the views of
which and
Aristotle
and
of Justice does at least contain a Nietzsche (albeit a brief and unsympa
discussion, "perfectionism"),
claims
treats both thinkers as adherents of a doctrine

with
labeled
Uto
deals
that oppose the liberal
view.15
(if only to dismiss dogmatically) By contrast, in Anarchy, State,
religious
and
pia, Nozick simply disregards the possibility that the true purpose of politics is neither liberty nor equality, but consists rather in virtue, salvation, or national
glory.
(He does
consider
the
place of such goals
in the
nonpolitical realm
in his
concluding chapter, Nozick begins Part II

posed
which will
be discussed
subsequently).
with a concise and
direct
.
answer
to the
question
he had
in the Preface
of
"[h]ow
much room
individual
rights
leave for the
state."
of
Having previously defined the minimal state as "the night-watchman state classical liberal theory, limited to the functions of protecting all its citizens
theft,
and
against violence,
on"
fraud,
and
to the
enforcement of contracts, and so
(p. 26), he
now asserts
that this minimal state "is the most extensive state

rights."16
that can
be justified.
Any
state more extensive violates people's
Rec
ognizing that "many persons have put forth reasons purporting to justify a more extensive but finding it "impossible within the compass of this book to ex
state," reasons,"
amine all
[these]
acknowledged
Nozick
proposes to
demonstrate the failings

influential"
of
"those
generally
15.
to be most weighty and

pp.
(p.
149).
"
A Theory of Justice,
205-9, 325-32;
cf.
Schaefer, Justice
on,"
or
Tyranny?,
pp.
37-8,
48-51,89. 16.
We observe, in passing, that Nozick's "and

theory,"
so
as well as
his
generalized reference to
"classical liberal
phrases are
in
harmony
may raise with Nozick's
greater
difficulties than the

approach,
author
acknowledges; but both

attention on the
overall
which aims
to
focus
issues
that the author finds most

gential problems. (See
interesting
such
or
significant,
without
getting
his
exposition of
"the entitlement
theory"
up in what he sees as tan of justice, discussed in Section III.

caught
infra.) In compensation for have not received their due

front
in
omissions, Nozick does
raise a number of questions that perhaps
consideration
from
within the
tradition of political philosophy: for in

persons strapped onto the
stance, the problem of whether
it is morally
permissible
for "[i]nnocent
without also
of the tanks of aggressors so that the tanks cannot against those who are
be hit
hitting
them"
to "fight back
to the
self-defense"
counterattacking the tanks
and
thereby risking injury

"rough
and
tanks'
"innocent
shields"
(p.
35).
17.
of
Compare Rawls's
reliance on
validating his
proposed principles
"admittedly of justice by weighing

with a
the
unsatisfactory ready"
method of traditional
principles
them against "a short list
conceptions of
together justice, Theory of Justice, pp. 122-3)
few
suggested"
other possibilities
by
the
{A
311-
Libertarianism
of
and
Political
Philosophy
limits to the
state's
The keystone he
calls
Nozick's
endeavor to set
of justice.
authority is
what
the entitlement
"holding"
theory
According
to this theory, a person

acquired or of
is in
en ac
titled to a
or possession
if,
and
only if, he if
that
holding
cordance with or
the principles of "justice in
acquisition"
'justice in
transfer,"
through some combination thereof. In addition,
a person's present
holdings
a
derive
directly
or
indirectly
from the
injustice"
commission of past acts of

comes
injustice,
"principle
I5I-4)-
of rectification of
into play
to
remedy the wrong (pp.

and
One
of
the most remarkable

own admission
features
of
Anarchy, State,
practically
Utopia is that
to spell out
Nozick, by his
"details"
(p. 153),
makes
no effort
the
or, consequently, the precise meaning of his three principles, except

certain elements of what
for provisionally adopting

.
he believes to be "Locke's
appropriation"
theory
of
(p.
178).
His strategy, instead, is

account of
largely
its
negative. exclusive
He distinguishes between his

emphasis on
"end-result,"
"historical"
justice,
with
the
process
by
or
which a
holding
was
acquired,
and what which
he
calls
"end-state,"
principle^
"current time-slice
"judg[e]
the
justice
distribution"
of a
entitlement
theory is
also
(pp. 154-5). The purely by "who ends up with distinguished from another subclass of historical prin
which
what"
"patterned,"
ciples,
called
judge
distribution to be just only insofar

such as moral merit or social
as
it
rewards some particular personal
attributes,
utility
(pp.
155-6).
Nozick's theory,
by
contrast, is unpatterned, in that "[t]here is no
dimension"
one natural sanctions.
or sum of such
dimensions that
words, to
yields
the distribution
it
This theory is indifferent, in

(p. 157):
except
other
whether a person acquired
his holdings from work, gambling, his

spouse
gifts, a return on
investment,
or reliance on
for
acquisitions
that interfere
acquired
with other people's pos
session and enjoyment of their
legitimately
holdings (most obviously,
theft),
all modes of acquisition are
Nozick's defense
of such an unpatterned
equally legitimate. distribution bears
some similarity, as
he notes, to that of the economist Friedrich Hayek, who holds that any attempt to impose a particular pattern of distribution on society is an unjust interference
with
individual freedom. Nozick
criticizes even
Hayek, however, for defending

will
the
free society
as
by
arguing that in such a society "there
be distribution
in
accordance with
the
perceived value of a person's actions and services
to oth
accord
determined
by
the market. The problem with
Hayek's argument, in
ing
to Nozick. is that it
"leav[es]
room
for the
complaint that a
free society does

society
arise
pattern"
not realize
exactly this
(because
some acquisitions
such a
gifts for arbitrary argument fails to justify the initial pattern of holdings with the because erally [p. 158]). For Nozick, nothing can, or should, be said in began which a society
from "inheritance,
reasons, charity, and so on"; and more gen
positive
justification
except
of
the
workings of a system of almost unlimited economic economic system compatible with
freedom,
that
it is the only
(what he
un
derstands to
be)
the individual's fundamental rights. Yet
it
must
be
emphasized
312
that
Interpretation
makes
Nozick
practically
should
no attempt
to explain why the rights specified

rights.18
by
the
entitlement
theory
be
acknowledged as
Rather than endeavoring to elaborate the ground on which his theory rests, Nozick immediately turns to the attack, challenging "those holding alternative to discover a rationale for rejecting the entitle conceptions of distributive
justice"
ment
theory (p.
in
160).
The
core of
his
argument against all patterned principles
is
contained
a section entitled
"How
Liberty
Upsets
Patterns."
In that
section
he
the
uses the example of
the former basketball star Wilt Chamberlain to
illustrate
maintaining any given pattern of distribution while properly respecting human freedom. Let it be assumed at the outset that some distribution of holdings has been established that strictly conforms to a favored pattern of
impossibility
of
some
kind. If
people whose
holdings have been determined
by
that pattern should
expend some portion of their evitable result
holdings
by paying to
see
Chamberlain play, the in
is that Chamberlain
relatively to others, than he was The only way to prevent such an erty from spending their money
ute principle or
become wealthier, both absolutely and before, thus upsetting the initial distribution.
will
outcome would
be to
prevent
holders
of
prop
as
they
wish,
or else
to confiscate and redistrib
the result of such transfers as soon as
they
are made.
In sum, "no
end-state
distributional
patterned principle of justice can
ized
tice"
without continuous
interference
but the
(pp.
lives"
with people's
be continuously real a level of interfer "distributive jus
ence that
presumably seriously
none
most
fanatical
advocates of
would commitment
advocate
161-3).
Among
the consequences of the
to maintaining a
fixed distribution
at all costs
is that
people would
be
allowed
to expend their properties only on

with
themselves,
not on others
(since
all
transfers
interfere
the pattern); and that the maintenance of the
family
would
be endangered,
gifts,
since the acts of redistribution that

must
take place
within
it (parental
inheritances)
be forbidden (p.
167).
The
never
moderate advocate of
demanded that the
pattern of economic
distributive justice may reasonably reply that he holdings be absolutely fixed to one
precise
level, but merely
that a government set some general limits to the degree
Michael Zuckert has pointed out that the central notion of the entitlement theory derives its plausibility from its similarity to the ordinary legal treatment of property rights: in applying the law. a judge does not ordinarily investigate whether the possessor of a holding it, in the sense that his possession of it is more conducive to the common good than the transfer of the holding to
18.
"deserves"
someone else would
be;
gal) way from its previous
[unpublished
of
paper.
only with whether property was acquired in a proper (le ("Distributive Justice and Rights: Nozick's Case for the Carleton College], pp. 9-10; cf. H. L. A. Hart, "Between Utility and Rights.
concerned
owner vol.
the law
is
Market"
'
Columbia Law Review,

many
of
79,
no.
5 [June, 1979],
p.
834). But
since
Nozick denies the

of
legitimacy
the conditions that are ordinarily attached to the acquisition and transfer
as redistributive
taxation), he
can
hardly
rely
on conventional practice
"labor"
to
support
property (such his theory. Nozick Locke ap its
seems,
pears
indeed,
to presuppose some variant
of the
theory
of acquisition to which
to adhere in Chapter 5 of the Second
Treatise; but his
own analysis of
that
theory
emphasizes
incompleteness (174-8).
313
of
Libertarianism
and
citizenry.19
inequality
would not
that can arise among the
Surely
the
setting
of such
lim
its
in itself require anything like the extreme describes. Yet in the context of much of contemporary
consequences that political
Nozick
particu
thought,
larly
culty
that
which
is
carried on
in
academic
environments, Nozick's
emphasis on
the tension
of
between
liberty
and
equality,
and
his
reminder of the practical
diffi
without
distributive justice, is not actualizing any particular, Unfortunately, Nozick himself deprives his warning of much of its utility by proceeding to infer from it a set of implications so extreme, in the
abstract pattern of
value.20
opposite
direction,
as to make
the case for

are the
freedom
appear either
laughable
(p.
or
outrageous.
Among
these
inferences
following: forced
labor"
(i) "Taxation
appears, for any
of earnings such
from labor is
on a par with
169).
(Hence to impose
taxation for any
"redistributive"
purpose
or
indeed, it
who
purpose other than the protection of those
individuals
have
voluntarily
agreed
to pay for it
[along
with
the protection of those "free
riders"
who are entitled
to it
by
the previous argument]

a a
is illegitimate [pp.
168-73]).
precau
(2) If
tions"
one person
to prevent
his
water
among group inhabiting hole from drying up when
desert takes "special

all
the other
water
holes do,
he has
able
no moral obligation to make water which
he himself does
terms,
not need avail
to others in order to save their
lives,
except on such
and at whatever
price, he chooses to demand (pp. 180, i8on).
(3) More
generally, it is an
horror"
open question whether even
the avoidance of "cat
astrophic moral
could
justify
any
abridgment of an
individual's
rights as
Nozick has defined them (p.
30m).
(4) Acceptance
resentment at
of
the entitlement
theory
ought
to prevent anyone from
feeling
theory
at
occupying
a subordinate position to someone else, since the

no essential connection
reassures
him
by
stressing that there is
between the
tainment of
superior position and
the possession of superior qualities (or the per
formance
of worthwhile
esteem
deeds),
and
hence there is
no reason
for the
subordinate
individual to
19.
himself less for
being
in that
situation
(pp.
246-7).
Journal of See, e.g., Alan H. Goldman, "The Entitlement Theory of Distributive Philosophy, vol. 73, no. 21 (December 2, 1976), pp. 834-5. for the total 20. Consider, for example, Hal R. Varian's proposal, in the name of confiscation of every individual's property by the state upon his death; and R. A. Musgrave's recom
"fairness,"
tax" assets,"
Justice,"
mendation of a
"lump
sum
on people's
"natural
in
order
to compel
"recluses, saints,
and
(nonconsulting)
tivities in
order
scholars who earn
but little
to allocate more of their time to income earning ac

an
to contribute more to
idea
that
Varian
also
takes far too seriously.
Philosophy and (Varian, "Distributive Justice, Welfare Economics, and the Theory of Public Affairs, vol. 4. no. 3 [Spring, 1975], pp. 223-47; Musgrave, "Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 88, no. 4 [November, 1974], p. 632.) Leisure Nozick's observation of the hostility towards the family, as well as towards liberty, that is implicit in
Trade-Oft."
Fairness,"
radical egalitarian thought
(p. 167), is
well
taken,
as these examples
demonstrate. For
a more
thor
ough exploration and critique of the moral
implications
and effects of redistributive
policies, how
ever, see Bertrand de
Jouvenel, The Ethics of Redistribution (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni
versity Press,
95 1).
314
Interpretation
will protect an
(5) A truly free society

slavery"
individual's
right
"to sell
himself into
(p.
331).
cavalcade of critics of
so.
Anarchy, State,
cannot
and
Utopia has jumped
on
these
points, and rightly

pointed
whether
Income taxation
be
equated with
forced labor, it is
out,
to
since
the former allows the individual a choice regarding both trade to

work.21
work and at what merit
Being
aware
that one's superior
has done nothing to

to
his
position will not make subordination to
him
easier
bear;
quite the
contrary.22
And Nozick's defense
of the
individual's
"moral"
right
to ignore his
men
fellows'
garding indeed
(and
as
only as Nozick remarks
suffering is a travesty of the Kantian principle of re Such a doctrine is ends, to which Nozick pays lip
service.23
of
his
redistributionist
opponents,
with a
in
another context
with almost as much
reason)
"individualism
(p.
167).
Nozick's advocacy of such seemingly farfetched conse There is nothing in Anarchy, State, and Utopia to suggest that its au thor is himself a man indifferent to the sufferings of others (indeed, he goes out of
How
can one explain quences?
his way to
lous,"
endorse vegetarianism on moral grounds
[p.
38]).
Nozick himself
rec
ognizes that
the views he has adopted will be widely viewed as

will put
"apparently
a
cal
and
fears that they
him "in
some
bad
company"
(pp. ix-x). He
justifies these views, however, as the necessary consequence of takes the primacy of individual freedom seriously. But is it really
the cause of freedom to demonstrate that
theory
that
supportive of
it
entails consequences that are repellent
to the moral sensibilities of the vast majority of
human beings?
and
A survey
that
of
scholars more reveal
the leading favorably disposed
critical responses
to
Anarchy, State,
Utopia from
than Nozick to the redistributive state would
few, if any, among

Nozick
sets
them have been moved

"libertarian"
by
his
argument towards a
greater appreciation of the virtues of the
position
despite the tell
ing
criticisms that
forth
of
the justification for
redistribution as es
poused
by
Rawls. More significantly, however, Nozick
himself
undermines,
principles principles
through his principle of rectification, the support that his first two
seemed serve to
to give to individual freedom. As he acknowledges, those two
legitimate existing holdings only on the (wholly implausible) supposition that the history from which such holdings derive did not in itself involve
significant violations of the principles.
In the
absence of such a
legitimate deriva
account
tion for existing

organize
holdings,
so as to
the
first
requisite of of
justice
on
Nozick's
is
to
society
rectify the effects
the previous
injustices. Such injus

"in the
short
them."
tices might well

run"
be
so
great, Nozick acknowledges,
as to require
the establishment of "a more extensive state in order to rectify

21
An
Goldman, "The Entitlement
Theory,"
p.
that "the abridgment of than
freedom involved in
redistributive taxation
stealing"
829. But Goldman surely is no

(p. 834).
goes too
far in contending
more a violation of rights
is that involved in the
prohibition against on
22.
Virginia Held, "John Locke
Robert
Nozick."
Social Research,
vol.
43. no.
(Spring,
1976), pp. 192-3.

23.
Ibid.,
p.
179;
Nozick,
p. 32.
315
Libertarianism
and
Political
Philosophy
suggests,
might
appropriate
group in the society, on the supposition that "have the highest of being the (descendants of) victims of the probabilities they most serious injustice who are owed compensation by those who benefited from
the
injustices"
position" well-off"
policy for such of the "least
a state to
follow, he
be "to
maximize
the
(231). Thus the
"libertarian"
Nozick
ends
up
justifying
precisely
those policies sanctioned
by
Rawls's "difference
have been
principle,"
the redistributive
import
of which
he
purports to
opposing!24
One critic of Nozick's argument has quite plausibly taken him to task for supposing that the needed rectification could be accomplished adequately "in the in view, for instance, of the enormous injustices perpetrated against short
run,"
Blacks
and of
Indians in the
course of
American
history.25
"conservative"
de
fender
property rights, recognizing the same difficulty, concluded that the rectification principle constituted the sole flaw in Nozick's theory, and recom
mended
that it should simply
be
eliminated.26
But this
recommendation
is
mis
guided, inasmuch as it overlooks the
inseparability
of the rectification principle
from Nozick's
of a set of
none of
entire entitlement as
doctrine. That doctrine
establishes the
history
holdings
can
the
sole criterion of
its justness. If the
its fruits if
basis
be just. The
conservative amendment of
is unjust, Nozick's doctrine
history
is
groundless:
one asserts that the
history
that
sufficient
of
its justness,
quite
no part of
holding constitutes the sole and history may legitimately be ignored.

of a
Of course, it is lish the

what we
impossible to
or
"historical"
legitimacy,
information necessary to estab lack thereof, of any present holding. From

acquire the
know
of the
that
existing circumstances, it turns

24
site
any
history holding derives

out
of political societies,
however, it is
most
wholly that Nozick's theory
from
unblemished origin.
unlikely Under these
provides no support
for
individ-
direction), Schaefer, Justice
which
See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 75-80, 302; on Rawls's own Indian-giving (in the oppo or Tyranny?, pp. 56-7. The compounding of past injustices to Nozick's proposed application of the rectification principle is likely to lead is indicated by his
off,"
own admission that the
and hence is owed compensation under the group that is presently "worst or their descendants. One of "the most serious principle, may include past imagines that Nozick would not have had to look far in order to notice that the ethnic group which has
"perpetrators"
injustice,"
injustice"
suffered
"the
most serious
in the
twentieth century,
if
not
in
all of
human history,
ranks sta
off,"
tistically among
of all people, to
the "better
and
hence, according fact

that
to
his
proposed
would
"compensation"
rectification principle, now owes
to others.
the
One
formula for applying the also have expected Nozick, like that
of the
have
appreciated
in
liberal-capitalist
most
regime
United
States (where his book is between

tenuous. (See Anarchy.
most
widely
read and
hence
likely
to have
influence),
and
the connection
a person's own achievements and the treatment
his
ancestors received
State,
and
Utopia,
p. 216;
George Gilder, Wealth
is likely to be most Poverty [New York:
Basic Books, 1981],

some groups
pp.
55-9) While such a

extent
connection
(largely
to the
that those groups
may still limit the prospects of members of have not imbibed, or were obstructed from
imbibing,
enough to posal
the "middle
serve as the
or work-oriented spirit of the regime),

"rectifying"
it
would
hardly
seem reliable
kind
of guide to
past
injustices that Nozick
proposes.
Is the
pro
(p. x)? intended simply to distance its author from "bad Philosophical Review, 25 David E. Lyons, "Rights Against
Humanity,' Smith,"
company"
vol.
85.
no. 2
(April,
(Win
1976). p. 214.
26.
Arthur Shenfield, "An Heir to Adam

pp.
Intercollegiate Revieu
vol.
11,
no. 2
ter-Spring. 1976),
1 16-17.
316
ual
Interpretation
as one scholar
property rights, and it is as plausible to infer from it, the need for "a strictly egalitarian distribution of
argues, that it
entitlemen
as to claim
justifies any particular pattern of The proper conclusion to be drawn from the
that the right of individuals to their income
on earn
inequality.27
foregoing
facts is
not,
I think,
spend
differential
rewards
from their labor, to
in
accordance with should
their personal wishes, and to pass their wealth

subordinated
to their
heirs,
to
of
be wholly
to the alleged right of the "disad

provides an
on
"rectification" vantaged"
of their situation.
Nozick himself
inci
this
sive critique
the
degrading
(pp.
sort of sociological
determinism
which
Rawlsian Nozick's
position rests
213-16).
The problem, rather, is to issues in

this
understand
why
earnest endeavor
to defend
liberty
a consequence so
to the author's
fundamental intent. To
approached
answer
question
contrary is to discover that

the entire sub
Nozick, like Rawls, has

ject
of political
the problem of justice

end.
and
this essay and
philosophy in the final one, I
from the wrong

shall endeavor
In the
to
explain and
following section of justify the proposi
tion just stated.
IV
In
ory,
the anecdotal character of much of Nozick's argument
uncover
view of
for his the

ex
we
may best
the central problems
in that
argument
by
critically
amining
a couple of
the examples he uses to

control over
illustrate the
us
supposed
with
inviolability
of a person's right
cussed case of
to
his holdings. Let
Wilt Chamberlain. Nozick's
hinged
on the proposition that since each
already dis regarding Chamberlain individual within a given ideal pattern

the
argument
begin
of justice was
entitled,
ex
hypothesi,
resources
to the
holdings he possessed, there
could
be
no valid objection
individuals'
to any alteration of this pattern that came about as a result of
spending the
rights.
they
owned as
they
saw
fit. Hence, Nozick

with a respect
concluded, the maintenance of
any
sort of pattern
is incompatible
for
individuals'
27. 2
Robert E. Litan, "On Rectification in Nozick's Minimal

p. 233.
State,"
Political Theory,
mind
vol. 5, no.
(May, 1977),
Going
on a
beyond the
economic
issue,
one should
bear in
Machiavelli's in
"unjust"
timation that every regime depends for its successful establishment

olence:
on some
initial
act of
vi
justice depends
foundation
regard
of
Livy,
1.3. 9, 16).
Consider in this
injustice (see The Prince, Chaps. 3, 6-8; Discourses on Nozick's sensible warning against accepting "any principle brought
us to
existing"
that would condemn morally the very sort of process that

would undercut pp.
the
legitimacy
and
of our
very
(226m);
and cf.
be, a principle that therefore Himmelfarb, "Liberals and Lib
ertarians,"
67-8.
tory"
Michael Zuckert have pointed out that Nozick's putative reliance on "his existing holdings makes him, ironically, the heir of the patriarchal theorist Robert Filmer (the ostensible object of Locke's attack in the Two Treatises) rather than of Locke himself; the
to validate
"historical"
Both Virginia Held
result of such more
arguments
in both cases,
on
as
Zuckert
points out,
and p.
is to leave
entitlements
far
up for
grabs than
Locke,"
they
would
be
the principles that
Filmer
Nozick respectively
14.)
oppose
(Held, "John
pp.
170-71;
Zuckert, "Distributive
Justice,"
10 and n.
317 The
Libertarianism
most obvious
and
as a number of commentators
flaw in this argument,

equation of an
have
perceived, lies in Nozick's
property (so
with an absolute right
to use
individual's ownership of some sort of and dispose of the property as he sees fit
whether
long
as
he does
not violate the equal rights over their
others).
That
equation passes over
the issue of
property in acquiring
possessed and
by
a
owning
piece of
property, a person does not necessarily acquire obligations towards the

which
community in
ownership.
he resides,
whose
laws
are the precondition of
any
sort of
Nozick is
problem critics
not entirely blind to this issue; and to uncover the more fundamental in his argument, we must pursue his reasoning farther than most of his have done. He explicitly concedes "that we partially are 'social
we
produ
in that
current patterns and forms created by the multitudinous long string of long-forgotten people, forms which include institu He denies, however, that that fact tions, ways of doing things, and "create[s] in us a general floating debt which the current society can collect and
actions of a
language."
benefit from
use as
it
will,"
so that an
individual
who
benefits from "a just, mutually
advanta
venture"
geous cooperative
characterized as a whole
by
"rules"
(such
as one might conceive
decent
civil
society
to constitute) is
thereby bound
system cites a
to conform
his
conduct to whatever rules

common stance public pected
the organizers of the
have instituted for the hypothetical in

"a
system of
benefit. In
which
order
to refute that claim, Nozick

of a neighborhood
in
the inhabitants
have
established
over a public address
system, each local resident
being
ex
his turn in entertaining the others. Even if an individual has en joyed the entertainment offered by his neighbors, Nozick asks, how can he be re
to take
quired to participate when
his
scheduled time comes
if he thinks the benefits he
has
(pp.
received
from the
system are outweighed
by
the costs of participating
in it?
90-95)might well agree with not
One
tion is system,
general
Nozick that the
person
in this hypothetical
situa
without
morally bound to support his neighborhood's public entertainment however agreeing with his inference that the individual has no
floating
debt to the
civil
difference between the two

that the benefits
tails. But no
of
cases
society to which he is this: a rational individual
belongs.28
The
manifest
might well
decide
of a public entertainment system are not worth
the costs
it
en
rational and realistic
individual
society
can
are
living
28.
in
decent
and
orderly
civil
sensibly insufficient to is
a
argue
that the benefits
outweigh
its
costs.
The
reason
is that
the true alternative to such a situation

points out,
Hobbesian
state of
As A. John Simmons
because
of
Nozick's
public entertainment example
"favors his
conclu
sions
largely
the
negligible value of
the benefits
in this
case
(Moral Principles
Political Obligations [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979], p. 119.) Simmons critique and refinement of Nozick's argument on this point, without ultimately dis offers a
and
lengthy
agreeing with him, however, regarding his membership in a political community (ibid.,
p.
the extent of the
individual's
civic obligation
pp. 118-42; cf. 191
-201).
arising out of Compare Rawls's denial

(A
that there is any "political obligation, strictly speaking, for citizens

1 14); cf.
generally"
Theory
of Justice,
Schaefer. Justice
or
Tyranny?,
pp.
62-3.
318
nature
Interpretation
a condition
in
which no one's
life, liberty,
therefore
or
property have any
secur
ity,
and
and
in
which
the life of all men
is
"solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
short."
Nozick,
we
recall, dismissed the Hobbesian account of the state of nature as

character
unpersuasive, in view of the insufficiently developed scientific knowledge necessary to support such a
of
the social
"pessimistic"
generalization.
"science"
But if Nozick had freed himself

the contemporary sense
of
the
unsupported assumption
that
in
human things, he erfully

persuasive
might
is the only or most fundamental source of knowledge of have recognized that Hobbes's argument is in fact pow
more so
infinitely
than Nozick's own entirely hypothetical
treatment of the state of nature.
Hobbes
called
his
account of
the natural human condition an
"inference,
bleak
made
from the
passions"
of civil man as we not
know him. It is important to human

nature as a
note
that
Hobbes did
mistic one:
himself think
of
his
account of
or pessi
sin."
"The desires,
and other passions of man, are

men are
in themselves
with
no
Rather,
The
the passions that throw
into
natural
conflict
one
another
need, greed,
problem
fear,
not
and
glory
simply there,
or at
and make us what we are.
is
to lament or combat such passions, but to devise
institutions
that will channel them into
least nonharmful, directions. That beneficial, such institutions are necessary, Hobbes dem notably, law and government onstrates to his readers by asking them a simple question: does not the fact that
they,
living
under
governments, find it necessary to take
precautions
to protect
their lives and properties, prove that

would
them?29
they
themselves
believe that life

existed
and
liberty
be totally insecure if
of
no
government
whatsoever
to protect
Nozick,
course, has sought to explain to men
how the necessary
amount of secur
ity
could
be
provided
by
a system of protective agencies
falling
short of
the absoluteness of Hobbes's sovereign. Insofar as he admits to the need for such
agencies nature
in the
state of
nature, Nozick does not

than
any less
pessimistic
thereby present a view of human Hobbes's. What truly distinguishes Nozick's

remark,
29.
Leviathan, Chap.
13,
pp. 186-7.
Hobbes does indeed
in
response
to the
charge
that
a condition of subordination to government

without some
tic"
incommodity
other"
or
"is very (Chap. 18, p. 238). But
miserable,"
that "the estate of Man can

such a response will appear
never
be
"pessimis
only by comparison with the Utopian premise that it is possible to liberate mankind from all incommodities surely a premise for which no historical or social-scientific evidence provides signi
ficant
support. as
Just
view of poses a
(Compare Nozick's lament at "the pangs of being limited to the [p. 308]). Nozick is wrong to claim that Hobbes's doctrine is the result of a peculiarly pessimistic man, he errs in asserting that the Hobbesian argument for government inconsistently presup
pessimistic assumption
what should
possible"
less
"about how the
operates"
state
(4;
emph.
in
original).
For Hobbes it in
as well as
Locke,
lead
on
government to serve the people's

sovereign's
interest
rather
than oppress them

make
is
not
any
particular
benignity
the
part, but
rather a set of
institutions that
the interest of office holders to
citizenry (along with the enlightenment of both the rulers and the populace regarding the proper rights and duties of government, and the harmony of interest between rulers and ruled). See especially Hobbes's argument in favor of monarchy. Leviathan, Chap. 19, pp. 241-5; ibid.. Chaps. 24, 30; Locke Second Treatise, Chaps. 13-14, 18.
benefit
the
319
Libertarianism
and
Political
Philosophy
former
a poor
state of nature on which of
from Hobbes's
and what renders the
foundation
in it
to build the principles of political right
is the
assumed existence
institutions like property, contracts, economic competition, ment of a law limiting men's pursuit of their rights.
As Hobbes
put
and the enforce
it: "where there is
no
just.'""
It is simply
meaningless to speak of
of
Common-wealth, there nothing is Un justice, morality, keeping one's

when an
contract, or particular rights in state

reason
nature, since
individual has
be
restrained
no
to expect that other men's pursuit of their survival
will
by
consideration of
his needs, he
can
have
no obligation
in turn to
avoid
taking
is
what
is
"theirs,"
in
pursuit of
"theirs"
his
needs.
Indeed, it
the
makes no sense to speak of

"natural"
"mine,"
"yours,"
and
in
such a situation: even
right of man
body,"
an unlim
useful
ited "Right to every thing; in pursuit of his
to one another's
which
he may find
preservation."
By constructing
thetical (that
an account of
the state of nature that

as
by
on
is,
one that
is
not
founded,
such
Hobbes's is,
design is purely hypo an inquiry into the na
ture of man), with a view to meeting the anarchist's objection to the state, No
zick
has
endeavored to
avoid
anarchist or
libertarian
the
position
to
transcend
Hobbesian
"law
by difficulty by
sticky questions as are presented for the Hobbes's account. He has further attempted
relying
that
on
Locke's,
rather
than
Hobbes's,
teaching
vidual
nature."
account of the
of
But
a careful consideration of
Locke's
about
the law
of nature would reveal pursuit of
it
establishes no more mean
ingful limit to the individual's is

obliged
his interest than Hobbes's does (an indi

mankind"
"to
preserve
the rest of
only "when his leads

no
own preserva
tion comes not
in
of
competition").32
And Locke's
dangers,""
account of
the natural human
condition, "full
fears
and continual
less
inexorably
than
Hobbes's to the
conclusion of
the
need as
to establish a government (hence the ab
sence of consideration
by Locke,
conflict
remarked
by Nozick,
of alternative
"ar
rangements"
for settling
within
the state of nature: for Locke as for
Hobbes,
no such arrangements are possible without the

laws).34
security
afforded
by
hu
man sovereign and positive
Nozick's
refusal
to consider in a
realistic manner what a state of nature would
be like, or to recognize the of law in such a state, leads in turn to his
meaninglessness
(to say nothing
of
the
ineffectuality)
the need
men
radical underestimation of
have for
30
31
government,
and
consequently
of
the debt that an individual
living
Leviathan, Chap. Ibid., Chap.
15,
p. 202.
14, p. 190.
Locke, Second Treatise, Chap. II, sec. 6. 11. 23-5. Chap. IX, sec. 123, 11. 14-15. Ibid., 33 Locke observes 34 Cf. ibid.. Chap. XIX, sec. 219, where "the People become a confused Multitude, without Order or
32
that
in the
absence of and that
government,
Connexion,"
the lack of en
sec.
forced,
5-9,
man-made
laws is "inconsistent
the Laws made
with
humane For
Society"
(11. 11-12, 19-20); also
220, 11.
where
he
remarks
that society cannot
be
preserved without an
"a
settled
Legislature,
and a
fair
and
it."
impartial
"society"
execution of
by
illuminating
discussion
of the relation
between
and government
in Locke's teaching,
see
Tarcov,
op. cit., pp. 204-13.
320
within a
Interpretation
decent
political
society owes to that society. It was because of his recog nition of these things that Hobbes insisted that the individual, upon entering soci right to all things, acquiring in return that "pro ety, must give up his goods he acquires in conformity with the and the which his life, by
"universal"
priety"
positive
law,
are secured
to
him.35
For the
same reason
Locke,
while
attempting
not main
to
justify
a transpolitical right of the
individual to
of a
acquire
property, did
tain that such a right

strain or
zick
limit
on
lay beyond the authority behalf of the common

justify
common good
legitimate
civil sovereign to re unlike
good.36
Similarly, Locke
to that
which
No its
attempts
to
the right of unlimited acquisition
by demonstrating
Nozick
priori.^1
conduciveness
to the
(a
position similar
criti
cizes
Hayek for maintaining),
rather than refusal
The fear underlying Nozick's

subordination of
asserting such a to follow Hobbes
right a and
Locke is that any
the exercise of men's natural rights to the good of civil
society
is
likely
to culminate in the position of Rawls and other collectivists: that no one
possesses others
(for
any inherent right to enjoy the fruits of his labor, or to convey them to instance, his heirs) as he chooses; but that the talents of those better
"rational"
endowed, or more industrious and tive asset to

chooses
(in the Lockean sense)
are a collec
be
carved
to
confer
up by the government for the benefit of those on whom it its largesse (according to Rawls's proposal, "the least advan
taged"). Nozick rightly criticizes the Rawlsian view,

nomic goods as
stressing that it treats

rather
eco
if they fell like
manna
from heaven,
and
than
being
produced
by
the
labor
of particular
individuals;
that to treat the endowments and ac
complishments of
those better endowed or more

own professed wish to
industrious
as a collective asset
directly
between
violates
Rawls's
persons"
and respect their as the examples of

on
dignity
as
"take seriously the distinction individuals (pp. 198-9; 228). But
can
surely founders
Aristotle
on the one
hand,
is
and
Locke
and the
Ameri
the other,
demonstrate
there
a wide range of plausible posi
tions regarding the relation of individual property rights and communal duties
35.
ence
Leviathan, Chap.
from the individual
15,
p. 202.
One
should contrast
Hobbes's
emphasis on the need
for
obedi
to law as the only security
for
rights with
Nozick's
It
assertion
that "if an institutional structure di
verges
rights embodied
in the
(p.
constraints"
moral side might appear
he has specified,
one should
"not be willing to let it
operate"
continue to
294).
that Nozick
Lockean
assertion of a
"right
resistance"
of
to regimes that violate men's rights:
is agreeing with the but the more sweep

with
ing, abstract, and absolute character of the rights that Nozick supposes (as compared doctrine) makes it much less likely that his teaching could furnish a basis for a stable
dered liberty. In desirable to
trine as
36.
a subsequent passage,
Locke's
regime of or
Nozick himself
shrinks
from asserting "that
it
is
possible or
create major
institutions de
(p. 298n.); but
neither
the earlier remark nor his doc
a whole reflects
this caution.
sec. 120 of the Second Treatise (11. 7-8). where Locke describes the end of (emphasis added); entry into civil society as being "the securing and regulating of ibid.. Chap. XI, sec. 138. Held, "John pp. 173-4, cites two chapters from the FirstTreatise that seem to go even further in the direction of a limitation on property rights, implying that they are
Cf. Chap.
VIII,
men's
Property"
Locke,"
conditioned on the satisfaction of
the
obligation
to charity; but these passages

and
must
bc
qualified
by
reading
37.
and
of
1,
iv,
sec.
43,
of
and
11, v,
sec.
50; cf.
Strauss, Natural Right

sees.
See Chap. V
the Second
Treatise, especially
History, pp. 242-8. 36-7, 41-6; cf. Strauss, Natural Right
History,
pp. 242-3.
321
Libertarianism
and
between the
extremes represented
by
Nozick
or
and
Rawls.
Any
as
such position will
be
more reasonable
than either
Nozick's
Rawls's insofar
it begins
of
nizing the
nomic
dual
character of all economic
activity
and
hence
by recog desert: ( i ) eco

acquire
activities are carried on
by
of
particular
individuals,
who
thereby
some sort of claim
to the
fruits
direct
their labor or investment that is greater than
that of others who
had
no
share
in producing them; (2)
all such activities
occur within a political-legal-social
framework,
such that no one can
legitimately
to
assert
empt
himself to be the
sole producer of an economic good, and

"his"
hence
be
ex
from
all claims
to a share in
property that are put forth in the name of

of
the common good of the
The
recognition of
citizenry as a whole. this dual provenance will not,
course, give
rise
to
any
his
clear and uniform rule
"redistribution"
tion,
or
regarding in a society. But then

make
the proper level of taxation, economic regula

as the consequences
of
"principle of
evident
neither
does Nozick's
approach.38
We will, however, be led

question about
by
the outlook I have suggested to ask the right sort of
how, in a so ciety fundamentally committed to protecting and promoting individual freedom, may the consent of the governed to such a system be fostered, and ways of life
the
policies
that are appropriate to a liberal society:
that
are conducive
to
freedom be
promoted?
To
pose
the issue this way
might well
lead
one to conclude that such moderate
welfare
state policies as are

regulated welfare
decried
by
extreme
libertarians (Social Security,
properly
elements
modern
programs, unemployment compensation) are essential
of,
rather
than obstacles
to, the
maintenance of
free
regimes
in the
that
world, inasmuch as
"stake"
they
give the poor and
less fortunate the
feeling
in the preservation of such a regime, despite the fact that they they have a working, obeying less well in it than others: that their contributions to it
"do"
the
laws, standing ready
to defend the country in time of need, endeavoring to

"rewarded."1"
provide a righteous
question will also
upbringing to their compel the defender

to avoid: the
children
are
capitalism
Posing
this
of
liberal
to confront another
issue that Nozick
seeks
problem of
the perceived correlation, or lack
thereof, between
enormous
economic
success and moral should
desert. Liberal society faces

pervasive
an
difficulty
emphasis
if the belief
become
that economic success

pp.
38.
Nor, I have
The
stressed elsewhere,
does Rawls's: Justice

here
on the
or
Tyranny?,
56-60, 86-91.
will also enable
39.
that
has been
placed
fact
of common
citizenship
one to answer
Nozick's
question of
why it is
considered proper
to allow people to emigrate
from
country, while
sion"
forbidding
them to remain and yet "opt out of the compulsory scheme of social provi
fortunate fellow
aider"
zens.
not whether compelling individuals to contribute to the relief of their less distress "tends to produce fraternal feelings between the aided and the behavior of its citi (p. 174). but whether the country as a whole has a right to demand fraternal Once again there is a parallelism between Nozick and Rawls, whose argument for redistribution
(p.
173).
The issue is
does kind
not rest on
any
clear conception of
the
common good of a political
community, thus
argument
inviting
for
the
of reductio ad absurdum
mandated relief
that Nozick offers

support,
in
response
("Would [the
govern-
mentally
for the needy]

173-41): see
to some extent, the
kidnapping of persons living in

make a contribution pp.
place without
compulsory
social provision, who could
be forced to
or
to the needy
in
your
[pp.
Schaefer, Justice
Tyranny7,
86-91.
322
Interpretation
is
as
within such a system
likely
(or
more
so) to be the
as
product of sheer
luck,
or
of
morally
blameworthy
activities
(such
sharking,
or the production of pornographic
false advertising, prostitution, loan films), as of honest and earnest labors belief
attains
that produce socially beneficial goods. The more that this the less the economic and social inequalities that
legitimacy.40
currency,
litical
As
Irving
Kristol has
liberty generates forcefully argued, the

be
socialism
will retain po
greatest chal
lenge
and
facing
liberal
capitalism
today may
not
which a substantial
steadily growing inefficient in practice individual holdings dividual's

the
body
but
of evidence suggests to
moral nihilism:
be
a system unjust as well as
the
belief,
trumpeted
by Nozick,
that
under capitalism
have
no moral
justification
except each
in
alleged right
to do
as
he
pleases with what
consequences.41
Kristol has
pointed out
that the
stress
belongs to him, whatever laid by contemporary

motive"
defenders
as an end
of capitalism on
the moral
an
in itself represents
considered legitimacy of the "profit enormous falling away from the understanding of
that system's earlier

gests that the of
advocates.42
Nozick, responding
rather
to such
difficulties, sug
human
need
to see a social order as just could
its
principles,"
"underlying
(pp.
158-9).
generating But he has given

should
no reason
ples"
he has described
that
be
regarded as
why the just
by the justice "resulting "underlying generating princi

met
be
than their
other than
the essentially cir

"rights"
cular claim as
they
are the
he has defined
them.43
only If, as Kristol suggests, the liberal
principles
that properly respect men's
order will remain vi
only to the degree that its overall results are perceived to be substantively good and just, its supporters must examine critically not only the (now unfash
able
ionable)
that
doctrine
of
inviolable
economic
rights, but also such

"owner"
(fashionable) doc
his
or
trines as that
which
which regards each person as

"victimless"
the sole
of
her body,
or
demands that
not
crimes
be
stricken off
the books. In sum,
40.
This is be
to say that nonliberal systems would be more egalitarian in practice; but that the
that characterize some such systems
more rigid would
inequalities
easier
(traditional
monarchies and aristocracies)
to
justify
in the
popular mind
than purely arbitrary and variable ones, since their
greater 41
.
fixity
makes them seem more natural.

Nihilism,"
in Two Cheers for Capitalism (New York: Kristol, "Capitalism, Socialism, and Basic Books, 1978), pp. 55-70: also, "'When Virtue Loses All Her Some Reflections
Loveliness'
on
Capitalism
42.
and the
'Free
Society,'"
ibid.
pp. 255-70.
Two Cheers for Capitalism, pp. 84-9. Cf. Joseph Kristol, "Horatio Alger and Cropsey, Polity and Economy. An Interpretation of the Principles of Adam Smith (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1957), pp. ix-xi, 98, and passim.
43 In addressing this problem at p. I59n., Nozick also appeals, somewhat inconsistently, to the kind of justification he had criticized Hayek for relying on, to the effect that capitalism benefits every one because "great economic incentives operate to get others to spend much time and energy to figure out how to serve us He properly adds that it is not nec by providing things we will want to pay essary, in order to defend capitalism, to believe that businessmen are "the finest human But
for."
types."
Profits,"
surely the survival of a commercial republic

acter types that
depends
on a widespread public perception that the char
flourish in it is
are at
least
respectable.
The
critical question raised politics or
looked
by Nozick,
whether a
policy
of extreme
libertarianism, in
in ethics,
by Kristol. but over dangerously
threatens such
a perception.
323
Libertarianism
and
be judged in
utter abstraction
the goodness of
which
liberty
by
cannot
from the
uses
to
it tends to be put; freedom,

moral
as a sound traditional view
emphasized,
must
be
accompanied
restraint.44
Following
concluding
the
direction
of
Nozick's
own
emphasis, I have thus far

Utopia,"
concen
trated my analysis on the economic aspect of

chapter of
this
book,
entitled
his libertarianism. However, in the "A Framework for Nozick

the nature
of
transcends the economic
issue in
order to address
the
best
social or
mini
der in
a comprehensive sense.
Here he
endeavors
to demonstrate that the

"utopia,"
mal state proper
he has
sought
to
justify,
or good
although not
in itself a
constitutes
the
basis for
an
"ideal
society"
one
that would "be worth speaking
about"
eloquently Nozick
that it
(pp. 297,
332).
Let
us now examine
this
claim.
contends that
the
minimal state provides a of an
"framework for
utopia"
in
facilitates the institution

"vision"
indefinite
number of
voluntarily organized,
to the
particu
"nonimperialistic"
communities within
it,
each tailored to conform an
"approach"
lar desires
preferable of
or
of
its
members.
Such
indirect
to Utopia
is
to direct attempts at specifying the best social order, not

or
only because
the
difficulty
impossibility
vast
of
knowing
a priori
the nature of such an order,
but
also
because the
likely
which
that any one social

best"
differences among individuals make it extremely un order is best for all of them. In support of the latter
reader whether
point, Nozick rhetorically asks the
there is
"really
one
kind
of
life
is
for
each of
the personages on a
and
long
Moses to Hugh Heffner (sic),
including
list he supplies, ranging from Socrates, Yogi Berra, Baba Ram

emphasis question:
Dass,
Let
the
and the reader's own self and parents us
(p. 310;
in
original).
first
note
how the latter
argument
begs the
(1) it implies
for
that
best way of life for a person must be the one he desires it implies that no particular model of the good society can
of ways of
men;45
or values
[p. 309]; (2)

an adequate
allow
diversity
ences
life
and
within such a
among
(3) it
emphasizes
society to accommodate the natural differ the differences of belief and inclina
tion among people who have already been
formed
by
their respective societies,
thus overlooking the possibility that Hugh Hefner (to take an extreme example) and would have chosen to pursue a different way of life from the one he did
this connection, the moral effects of the
44.
Consider, in
for
increasingly
popular state-run
lotteries.
Is
not the government,
by
and work/save
your
advertising these institutions, saying to the individual: why be a sucker, by gambling? Is it not thereby future, when you could "make a
killing"
liberal-capitalist undermining the moral foundations of a 45. Nozick acknowledges that "[n]o Utopian author has everyone in his society leading exactly but infers from this fact that no single kind of community can be best for all the same kind of follow just as easily, or more so. either (p. 311). Yet the contrary inference would seem to
regime?
life,"
men,
324
Interpretation
less
opposed to
one much
governed
Moses's
had he been
reared
in
community that
was
according to the Mosaic law.
It
almost goes without
excuse
Nozick's
casual
saying that such a question-begging dismissal of the teachings of the major

life.46
approach cannot
philosophers and
religious
teachers who thought it to be possible to articulate an
account of
the
one
best way
of
At the
same
objectively valid Nozick's own alterna time,

objections, both
"process"
tive account of a utopia-building

moral and practical.
is
open to grave
In the first place, Nozick follows

and
dangerous
path
(blazed
by
John
Dewey
society can be
out"
as
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.) a problem in quasi-scientific

good or even can
when
he treats the
building
in
of the good
"experimentation,"
which
known to be
practice
bad,
right or
wrong,
without
first
having
nothing been "tried be
in
(and
if it
was
tried
before
and
failed, it
"retried"
should still
to
17).47
see whether
it
be
made
to work under
should
Even
"crackpots"
"maniacs"
and
different conditions) (pp. 315 be given the chance to try out their sanity is? Nozick himself,
(p.
331 ).
as noted an
schemes
(p. 316); "to
who are we
to say what
previously, is
prepared
dividual's he does
cial
right
sell
to carry this himself into
principle to the extent of

slavery"
guaranteeing
in
It is
not
entirely
clear
why
so
not go
further
and sanction the retrial of some of

century.
the more
terrifying
"experiments''
of this
To be
sure, not all

as
the participants or objects
of such experimentation participated
voluntarily,
truths can
legitimate system; but if

"proved"
no political
Nozick insists they must in a be fixed without having been

we
through social experimentation,
how do
know that freedom itself
has
such merit as
Nozick
attributes to
over
it? Once the
principle of scientific experi
mentation
is
given
no
dictates that
primacy holds should be barred.
the belief in an objective morality,
consistency
46.
at all.
In the index to Anarchy, State,

main
and
Utopia, Plato is listed

democracy"
once; Aristotle and
Nietzsche
(p.
not
Nozick's
pear,
n.
is
the writings
authority for dismissing all nonliberal of J. L. Talmon on "totalitarian
views of and
the good society, it would
ap
.
messia
"political
351
6).
47.
See Dewey, The Public his
and
its Problems (New York: in Abrams

v.
Henry Holt,
150
"free"
1927); for Holmes's
ex
perimentalism,
United States, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), stressing the need for a the possible triumph of "proletarian dictatorship"; and especially his
dissenting
opinions
U.S. 616 (1919),
and
in
society to remain open to opinion in Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S.
are
200
(1927), sanctioning
unfit
another sort of experimentation

kind."
manifestly
cess of
from continuing their Law?", Western Political Quarterly, less

steadfast than
See
also
no.
to enable society to "prevent those who Walter F. Berns. "Buck v. Bell: Due Pro
pp. 762-5.
vol.
6,
4 (December, 1953),
to
sell
Holmes
see
was also no
Nozick in
defending
men's right
themselves
into slavery;
his
dissenting
One
of
opinion
in
Bailey
v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (191

articulated
since
and
1).
Nozick's
critics asserts an antilibertarian position that
ple of experimentalism as
Dewey
it: "there
can
be
no
is in full conformity with the princi final determining "[t]he

answer"
boundary between private and mined by the shifting passions

Injury,"
public,"
"the meaning
humanity"
of rights and
injuries
will always
be deter
of
interests
vol.
of
(Jethro K.
Lieberman, "The Relativity

cf.
Philosophy
73-4).
on
and
Public Affairs,
7,
no.
[Fall,
1977], p. 73;
Dewey,
op.
cit., pp.
But how
can such experimentalism
possibly be
reconciled with
Nozick's
previous emphasis
the absoluteness of moral "side constraints"?
325 These
Libertarianism
problems
and
Political
Philosophy
how Nozick's
previous account of
of
aside,
however, it is
be
not at all clear
the utopia-building process can

minimal state.
reconciled with
his
defense
the
His identification
of the minimal state with
the "framework for

a
depends critically on a distinction he draws "between (p. 322). According to this distinction, and a munity
nation"
face-to-face
com
though there
is
munities
internally
that
is,
restrictions
liberty to choose among communities, many particular com have may many restrictions unjustifiable on libertarian grounds: which libertarians would condemn if they were enforced by a cen
great
tral state apparatus.
For example, books
paternalistic
intervention into
people's
lives,
restric
tions on the range of
which
kinds in
a
of sexual
behavior,
people
and so
may circulate in the community, limitations on the on. But this is merely another way of pointing out that
free society
not
may
legitimately
to
may impose
contract on them.
into
various restrictions which
the
government
Though the framework is libertarian

need not
and laissezwithin
faire,
it
individual
communities within
it
be;
and perhaps no
community
will choose
be
so
(p. 320;
emphasis
in
original).
The
main ground of
this distinction between the legitimate spheres of state
and communal
forming als, or by
authority is that "[i]n a nation, one knows that there are noncon individuals, but one need not be directly confronted by these individu
the fact
of
nonconfor
their
whereas
"in
one cannot avoid
being directly
confronted with what one

can exist on
held."
face-to-face community finds to be
Additionally, "[a] face-to-face community

members,
whereas
land
jointly
owned
by
its
a
the land of a nation

regulate
is
not so which
For both these reasons,
community is free to
this distinction
the
ways
in
its
members
live, in
a manner
that Nozick's principles forbid to the nation as a whole (p. 322). But how
far
can
hold,
and
how adequately
can
it
serve
to
reconcile
the competing
demands
of
liberty
and community?
We note, to begin with, that Nozick's distinction can apply only to nations large enough to have a number of face-to-face communities within them. It
would not
is,
apply to a polity that was polis. Apparently, the something like the ancient
coextensive with one such
community, that
members of a
polity
so orga
nized are
free to
restrict
liberty
in
an
indefinite variety
seemed to
criterion of
of ways,
including
inter
ference
with what
Nozick had previously

rights.
represent as nigh-absolute
individual property
pear
Nor does the
to
add anything:
since no present property-holders can
joint ownership of land ap demonstrate their from its first

owners
possession
of an unblemished title to their
land
all
deriving
in
which
(present
patterns of
ownership
originate
in
probability
out of some previous
historical
political
conquest), there
is
an
important
held"
sense
community is
private
"jointly
by
its
citizenry,
the property of every if it belongs to anyone at
all.
All
land titles, in
other words,
are subordinate
to,
and
derivative
from,
We
the
collective one.
must next ask
how far Nozick's nation-community distinction actually

even within those polities
serves to protect
liberty,
to
which
it
applies.
On the
326
Interpretation
appears to offer
surface, it
very
great protection:
individuals
are
free to institute
whatever sorts of
to which
ates
community they desire, and no one is subjected to restrictions he personally has not chosen to submit. But this seeming liberty oper fully only at the time when communities are originally founded: Nozick
an
denies that
already
existent
community is
obliged to accommodate an
individ
Ulti
ual who wishes
to reside there but who
wishes
to "opt
of
its
practices.
mately, once communities
have been formed throughout the
nation or the
world,
presumably choosing to occupy the most desirable land, the nonconforming indi vidual may have few, or no, real options:
Even if
weren't
almost everyone wished to
live in
a communist community, so
that there
any viable noncommunist communities, (though it is to be hoped that one would) allow a sharing
arrangement.
no particular
resident
community need also individual to opt out of their

but to
conform.
The
recalcitrant
individual has
his
no alternative
Still,
right
the others
do
not
force him
to conform, and
rights are not violated.
He has
no
that the others cooperate in making
his nonconformity feasible (p. 322;
emphasis
added).
Only
emerge.
when
the
foregoing
of
passage
is
put
together with several other aspects of

utopia"
Nozick's
account
the
"framework for
does its full
significance
of
These
aspects
each community's
within
include (1) Nozick's already cited acknowledgement right to restrict "the range of books which may
circul
it (p. 320); (2) his inability to resolve the conflict between children's right to be informed of "the range of alternatives in the and their possi ble desire to
people's even about exclude such
world" parents'
knowledge from them (p. 330); (3) his

possesses a right to emigrate
affirmation of
"right"
to
sell
themselves into slavery (p. 331); and
(4) his hesitation

from
a commu
how far the individual

can
plausibly be viewed as owing something to the other members of a community he wishes to (p. 330; emphasis in original). The reader is invited to consider the extent to which, when all these remarks are considered to
nity,
"if
[he]
leave"
gether, Nozick
fering
a recipe
starting from a for universal tyranny! All do in
"libertarian"
perspective
has
succeeded
in
of
that a universal network of tyrannical
communities would need to
order to
legitimate itself, it
would
appear, is to
demonstrate free
contract
that the original character of each
years
among the persons (or centuries) had elapsed,

was
community was determined by a then residing in it. But after a period of some
during
which
an of
appropriate
books
maintained,
who would
know the truth
the matter?
censorship of And from the

have
what
perspective of an
individual
who comes on the scene after all communities no alternative
been founded, and who therefore "has possible difference can it make?
We may reasonably
was presume
but to for
conform
that to provide
a rationale
farthest thing from Nozick's Utopia. Nonetheless, the fact that his
the
a
mind when
he
wrote
tyranny Anarchy, State, and

in
such a ra
universal
argument seems to culminate
tionale serves as
further
confirmation of the
insufficiency
of
his understanding
327
of
Libertarianism
and
Political
Philosophy
freedom. Even though Nozick's reasoning on behalf of "the framework for is intended to be fully independent of his previous argument for the mini
state,
with which
mal note
it
"converges"
nonetheless
ultimately
(p. 333),
we must reason
that the latter argument is not really separable

the minimal state, taken
feeble"
from the former. The

own account
is that
and
by itself, is by Nozick's
deepest loyalties
a
too "pale
to
to command
"luster"
men's
or give adequate
their
lives (p.
297).
Life lived in
merely
minimal state
is banal
and
meaning
less; but life in
the total community that the minimal state is intended to
facilitate
may leave no room for freedom. Have we not gone radically astray somewhere? Let us turn from the world of Utopian theorizing to an actually existent liberal polity, the United States. Nozick's strictures about the extent of redistributive legislation notwithstanding, the
strate that example of
a nation
the United States seems to demon

while
it is in fact free to
Napoleon
possible
for
to survive and prosper
leaving
its
citizens
pursue a
or
not
that
of
relatively wide variety of particular ways of life, if Mohammed (most of the individuals on Nozick's list on
this country, few of whom encountered
p. 310 were residents of
legal
obstacles a
to their pursuits
here).48
American
citizens
have
also
traditionally
enjoyed
broad freedom to form

cialist
communities of various sorts: religious
communities, so
context of
communities,
and so on.
What
fundamentally
distinguishes the
such communities state governments give
from Nozick's do
framework, however, is
lives,
or
that the national and
not grant particular communities
the latitude Nozick would
members'
them to
control
moral
their
to violate what are regarded as the

all children must
"voluntary"
fundamental
foundations
of civil
life. Hence
be
granted
an appropriate
education; slavery is
and no
"owes"
illegal,
whether
or
not; polyg
amy is banned; parting because
of what
community may to it. Nor he
prevent one of can
its
members
from de
community
eral are
excuse anyone
from obeying the
other
membership in a particular laws by which citizens in gen

support of
bound, including
welfare and
the laws requiring him to pay taxes for the
the common
defense.
In calling for
the establishment of a
federation
of communities that are
free to
experiment with the
institution
of various ways of
life,
without
being
subject to
most of the restrictions that the
American
government
imposes
taken
on
by during the
48.
chist
them, Nozick curiously recapitulates, at a Stephen A. Douglas in defense of the principle

controversy.49
(or any other government) broader level, the position

of
"popular
the
sover
slavery
The very
maintenance of
Union, Douglas
The exceptions to the latter qualification include a tax protestor (Thoreau), a militant anar (Emma Goldman), and a purveyor of illegal drugs (Baba Ram Dass, a.k.a. Timothy Leary). Douglas: 49. Compare with Nozick's experimentalism the following remarks by The
each
question
.
what are
[the
privileges
to
which negroes are

.
entitled]
is
a question which
State
must answer
for itself. We in Illinois
tried slavery,
that reason,
finding
that
it
was not profitable, we abolished
it for
kept it up for twelve years, and became a free State.

a wise
and
You in Missouri
must
judge for
yourselves whether
[emancipation] is
policy for
you.
If
328
Interpretation
"indifference"
"local"
argued, depended
on an attitude of
regarding
pointed out
such
purely
institutions standing
men or of
as slavery.
In response, Lincoln
that Douglas's under the claim of some the
freedom
was self-contradictory:
in
legitimating
to
enslave
others,
it
undermined
the very
ground on which
former group,
any group
of
men,
might claim
the right to rule themselves. It was the central that the defense of freedom presupposed a
theme of Lincoln's
political rhetoric
certain moral consensus
among the citizenry about the meaning and purpose of

could not
freedom. Freedom, indifference to how in the teaching
as
Lincoln demonstrated,
be
grounded
in
a mere
one's
fellow
citizens of
lived. It
required rather
to
be
grounded
of the
Declaration
Independence, according
their very nature
.
to which all men
are entitled to a certain treatment
by
virtue of
The
right to
free
dom is inseparable from

spect
a respect
for the
dignity
of all men, which entails a re
for the
rights of
others.50
Nozick,
sition
as we
have seen, is his
perhaps no
men
less fervent than Lincoln in his

against the will of
oppo
to the enslavement of some

ground
by others,
the enslaved.
Yet he fails to
vulgar
concern
relativism, according to
which no one
for human freedom in anything deeper than a is entitled to say that one way of life
would appear
is objectively better than another. According to this doctrine, it that the right not to be enslaved by others against one's will stands
ground
on no
higher
than the right to be an alcoholic. Our obligation to protect men's
"right"
to dispose of their lives as
they
please
(presumably
through
drug
abuse or prosti
tution, if they choose,
as well as
self-enslavement) has
duty
of
to guide them towards a
decently
thing"
morality is "do
who
[your]
own
priority over any human way of life. But if the ultimate rule (p. 312), Nozick has no answer to give
absolute
those
over
their fellows. All

everybody.
say that their preferred way of life involves enslaving or tyrannizing he can say in response to this problem is "Well, you can't
(p.
320).51
satisfy
you choose not ours.
to
follow
at
our example,
very good; if
you reject
it.
still well,
it is
your
business.
(Address
Alton, Illinois, October
15, 1858, in Robert W. Johanssen
[ed.]. The
Lincoln- Douglas
added]).
Debates [New York: Oxford
University Press,
Douglas,
1965], pp. 299-300 [emphasis
50.
The issues in the debate between Lincoln

teaching, have been
and
and the
fundamental
principles of
Lin
coln's political
vided
brilliantly expounded by Harry

Also in
relevant to the present
(New York:
of
Doubleday,
Religious
See
also
of
1964).
V. Jaffa in Crisis of the House Di discussion is Jaffa's essay "On the
Nature
1965),
Civil
Liberty,"
and
pp.
169-89.
(Albany: State
University
and
the Declaration of
Independence,"
(New York: Oxford University Press, Glen E. Thurow, Abraham Lincoln and American Political Religion New York Press, 1976), Chap. 3; idem, "The Gettysburg Address and
Equality and Liberty
burg Address,
55-76. 51.
American Constitutionalism
in Leo Paul S. De Alvarez (ed.), Abraham Lincoln. The Gettys (Irving, Texas: University of Dallas Press, 1976), pp.
to those who complain that his principles of
Compare Rawls's
"moral"
response
justice, supposedly
"fair"
founded in the is their
nature that all men share and
designed
to advance their good

"
in a
man say:
ner, are actually

nature
detrimental to their good,

(A
given their natures:

p. 576).
[H]ere
one can
only
their
misfortune"
Theory
of Justice,
329
Libertarianism
to Nozick's
and
Political
no
Philosophy
federation
or nation
Contrary
from
viet
belief,
lasting
(as distinguished
and
temporary
alliance such as existed
between the United States
the So
World War II) can be built on the mere principle of allowing each community to do as it pleases. Nor can Nozick give any reason why na as well as of an bent (pp. tions, persons, 319-20) should not seek
Union
during
"imperialistic"
to
impose their
and
will on others.
By radicalizing
or
absolutizing the gap between

to nations the authority
"liberal"
"communal"
political principles
denying
to
among their citizens, while ex empting communities from the obligation to respect the fundamental rights of individuals Nozick undermines both community and liberty.52
inculcate
some substantive moral consensus
VI
I have
to demonstrate that Nozick fails to articulate in
attempted
Anarchy,
or
State,
and
Utopia
an adequate
understanding
of
the principles of a
free
liberal
regime.
This failure is surely not the result of any lack of mental acuity on Nozick's part, but is due rather, I believe, to the defectiveness of his starting
point:
the understanding of the nature, purpose, and methods of political philoso
phy in Part I
with which
he began. Four features

study,
cripple
of
Nozick's approach, to
which
alluded
an ade
of this
from the
outset
his
endeavor to
formulate
quate, liberal
political philosophy: assertion of a
(1) The dogmatic initial

sive
doctrine
of
individual
rights so exten
that it
calls claim
into
question
the very
legitimacy
it
of
government;
(2) The
the state
that the fundamental question of political philosophy

whether
is
not
how
should
be organized, but
should exist at all;

under an
(3) The
philosophy;
subsumption of political and

"potential"
philosophy
independent
"moral"
(4) The
derivation
Each
of
adoption of a
explanation of the state's
origin, in lieu of a
of
it based
either on actual
renders
history
or on
human
nature.
these features
Nozick's
approach
abstract,
in that it
removes
him from the

more
actual problems
that
political men
face. And
each of
them reflects a
fundamental defect that Nozick's
approach shares with
that of Rawls and of
many contemporary Anglo-American

52.
writers on political and moral philosophy:
basis
of
How little thought Nozick has apparently given to the problem of organizing a polity on the his principles is signified by the favorable reference, in his concluding footnote, to Martin
Federalism"
Diamond's essay
mental political
on "The
Federalist's View
of
(p.
353).
The
central
theme of Dia
or
mond's writings on
federalism, including that essay, is that federalism was not an ultimate principle for the Founders, but largely a practical compromise necessary
dedicated to the
can achievement of of
funda
to secure
consent to the establishment of a national government

specified
the purposes
in the Declaration
proposal
Independence. Thus Diamond
hardly
be
said
to provide support
for
"federation"
Nozick's
of a
of communities organized
solely
on the principle of mutual
noninterference.
330
the
Interpretation
of the question of what
disjunction
is
right and
just from the
consideration of
nature.53
The sweeping assertion of the primacy of individual rights with which Nozick opens his book suggests his agreement with the authors of the Declaration of In
dependence
doctrine is self-evidently true. But unlike the authors of the avoids he Declaration, admitting at the outset that the exercise of such rights de pends in practice on the institution of governments designed to secure them. And
that this
his
account of such rights
is commensurately is
unmoderated
by
a consideration of
what sort of rights
it is
reasonable
to expect any government to guarantee.

of course not self-evident
The doctrine
of natural rights
in the
sense
that all
reasonable men throughout philosophic architects of
history
have
accepted
its
validity.
Surely
the original that a
this
doctrine, Hobbes
more
and
Locke, did
men
not think
bare
enunciation of
the doctrine would persuade men to accept it.
Rather, they
more
endeavored to
demonstrate that it is interests

of
duties.54
salutary for
in
general
conducive to their
to understand politics in terms of rights rather than
in the
older
language
In
order of
to make this argument,
they
were
compelled
to engage in an investigation
which
human
nature so as
to demonstrate
that the rights of

needs of men
they
spoke answer more arise
than
do the duties that

In claiming
one,
directly
precisely to the fundamental from the individual's member

that the natural con
selfish needs of
ship in a dition of
community.
man
contrary to Aristotle
is
a prepolitical
they
were
arguing that the
the
individual,
trinsic to
which pre-exist
the establishment of civil society, are more

civil and
truly in
his
nature than
ety
should therefore
be
rather than with a view
society generates; expressly to satisfy the former sort of needs, to inculcating virtue and a concern for the common good
organized as
the needs that
that civil soci
in the individual, as Aristotle had prescribed. Neither Hobbes nor Locke makes a dichotomy,
realms of moral and political nated to the
Nozick does, between the

subordi
philosophy,
such that
the latter could be

would
former. For
neither
thinker (nor for
Aristotle)
it
make sense to
articulate a moral code prior to

and that set
the boundaries
of what
examining the needs that actually motivate men, is politically attainable. To the contrary: a
the morality of rights over that of duties is supposed to be in conformity with the recommendation of Machiavelli it narrows the between the and the the demands that political society gap limiting makes on the individual to those that conform to his own manifest self-inter
major advantage of
that
"is"
"ought,"
est.55
Thus this morality is, in

On Nozick's
abstraction pp.
Rights,"
"self-enforcing"
sense,
and
(as is illustrated
most
53.
from
nature
his underlying link to Rawls,
"Liberals and
tributive
54.
Libertarians,"
67-8;
17-
see also, on the
see Himmelfarb, Rawls-Nozick connection, Zuckert, "Dis
Justice
and
pp.
19.
ways of
On the difference between these two

Politics,"
understanding politics,
vol.
see
Steven G. Salkever,
"Virtue, Obligation,
pp. 78-92.
and
American Political Science Review,

15.
68,
no. I
(March, 1974),
55.
Machiavelli, The Prince, Chap.
331
Libertarianism
and
Political
Philosophy
Adam Smith's "invis
graphically in the
economic realm through the operation of
ible
hand").56
Because Hobbes
and
Locke
were concerned
to
formulate in
be politically effectual, they

motives
were more realistic
morality that could than Nozick in portraying the

a a state of
that would actually

more realistic
determine
men's conduct
nature,
and
in recognizing the need to limit those rights in order consequently political to make society possible (and thus to secure the rights). As a result, even though both Hobbes and Locke manifestly favored a limitation of the scope
and purpose of governmental regulation of the
individual
restraining his
con
duct only
require
man's life, liberty, and property security down any dogmatic formula limiting the steps that government may take in pursuance of its limited end. Hence neither Hobbes nor Locke forbade governments from setting limits to individual freedom in such so as
far
the
of
each
neither philosopher set
critical
domains
as
economics, religion,
or
speech.57
And the
most
farsighted
of
the
American founders, notably Hamilton, similarly appreciated the need to in vest a liberal government with broad powers in order to achieve its end of secur
ing
men's rights.
(One
and
should note also that even the opponents of
broad Federal
of
powers
in 1787,
those who
most
strenuously
national
advocated a
Bill
Rights,
reli
were concerned
primarily to limit the

not
government's powers vis-a-vis
those of the states
to
deny
of
authority
over such matters as
economics,
gion,
and speech
to all
levels
of
government).58
liberty, Nozick is understandably concerned to de individual freedom fend the cause of today against those who would erode it in His critique of these the name of vague and illiberal doctrines of "social
As
a passionate
friend
justice."
doctrines is
zick's
well
taken and
belief,
one cannot make

all
lute priority to
56.
deserving of a wide influence. But contrary to No liberty secure by dogmatically assuming its abso other human ends, and denying to government the authority to
professes a
explanatio
Nozick himself
his
taste for "invisible-hand
on esthetic
grounds, and
represents
account of the possible genesis of a state as an attempt at such an explanation
(pp.
18-19).
But
as noted
of
in Section II
Nozick
a
of
this study,
his
explanation
depends
on
illegitimately
and
smuggling
relations
into the "state
nature"
institutions
and practices
that could not have existed prior to the establish

which
ment of government;
underestimates
the degree to
hand"
social
economic
among men litical choice

73-4-
resulting from
and action
seeming "invisible
presuppose
the prior exercise of conscious po
to
make such relations possible.
Cf.
Revolution,"
in The Spirit of Liberalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "The Right of University Press, 1978), pp.

Toleration,"
57.
Cf. Robert P. Kraynak, "John Locke: From Absolutism to

vol.
American Political
Science Review,
58.
74,
no.
(March,
1980), pp. 53-69.
Jefferson,"
and Jay, The Federalist, ed. Clinton P. Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), no. I, p. 35, no. 63, pp. 387-8; Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., "Thomas in Morton J. Frisch and Richard G. Stevens (eds.), American Political Thought (New York: Scribner's, 1971), pp. 37-8, 48; Herbert J. Storing, "The Constitution and the Bill of in M. Judd Harmon (ed.). Essays on the Constitution of the United States (Port Washington, N.Y.:
Cf. Hamilton, Madison,
Rights,"
Kennikat Press, 1978), pp. 32-48; Walter Berns, The First Amendment Democracy (New York: Basic Books, 1976), especially Chaps. I, 3.
and the
Future of American
332
Interpretation
through policies that
make
promote those ends

it.59
liberty
more secure
by limiting
Both
by
subordinating
call
politics to an abstract morality,
and
by denigrating
name of a
what one
may
the common sense understanding orientation, Nozick
of politics
in the
putatively
scientific
is led to disregard
much empirical
infor
mation about politics and and which constitutes political philosophy.
human
proper
nature of which
the
starting
point
Nozick's
claim that
any for any serious the fundamental problem
sensible citizen
is aware, investigation in
of political
philosophy is to legitimate the very

chist's critique of
existence of the
state, in response to the anar
it,
exemplifies
the
abstractness of
his
approach.
This
problem
may (arguably) be first in logic, but it surely is not first in practice for most men. And because life is short, and the matters with which politics deals are urgent,
the
serious political
inquirer
must
begin
by
considering these
matters.
(He
can
not, in other words,
postpone
deciding
for
whether government
adequate social science techniques
"testing"
is necessary until its necessity have been devel

to the
"idealist,"
oped.) Whatever the
rhetorical appeal of anarchism
any
serious.
down to doubt its der
earth man-in-the-street
workability.
regimes such as
is fully capable of stating adequate reasons to It is noteworthy that anarchism as a doctrine flourished un late Tsarist Russia and pre-Franco Spain, which lurched be
tween authoritarianism and instability. Whatever the causal connection
here, it
is
does
to be
not
bode
well
for the future
of
American
politics when a prominent scholar
such as
. .
Nozick takes seriously the

.
claim of a
Proudhon that "to be

squeezed,
choked
governed
.
exploited,
monopolized, extorted
from,
hunted down, abused, clubbed, disarmed, bound,

i
hoaxed, robbed; ", etc., etc.

government can
(p.
in.),
and uses
this claim to raise a doubt
whether
any
be
legitimate. What
connection
does
all of this
have
with
Rawls? Like Nozick, Rawls begins

"intuitions"
by
presupposing the validity of a set of moral beliefs (called Rawls), loosely derived from the liberal tradition, without adequately
by
question
ing
either
their
foundation
derive the
principles
implications. Like Nozick, Rawls purports to of justice from a purely abstract and hypothetical account of
or
their
a prepolitical condition
such a condition would
these facts
about
without considering how men in be to live and deliberate, or what limits actually likely human nature place on politics. And as Nozick does, Rawls
(the "original position")
subordinates politics to an abstract science of moral
philosophy,
which
he
calls
"moral
theory"
(hence Rawls's postponement
of
his
"just"
account of the
consti
tution to Part II of A
attempt
Theory
facts
of
Justice,
and
his deferral to Part III

that
of the
unsatisfactory, in my
opinion
to
demonstrate
his
view of justice
is
compatible with the
about
human
nature).60
59. In this connection, cf. Harry M. Clor's argument that a moderate policy of censorship of por nography may be essential to preserving the civic morality on which a liberal polity depends: Ob scenity and Public Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), Chap. 5. 60. These points are developed in Schaefer, Justice or Tyranny?, Chaps. 3-5.
333
The
and
Libertarianism
and
Political
Philosophy
philosophy that Nozick thinker claims to de
consequence of the abstract approach to political

common
Rawls have in
is
manifest
in the fact that
each
rive sanction uel
for his
view of economic
justice from the

the
argue
moral
teaching
of
Imman
stand at vio
Kant;
yet
the two doctrines
"rectification"
opposite poles.
Each
scholar
(leaving aside may legitimately
issue)
that the other's
theory
lates the Kantian dictum that every man should be treated as an end. As Nozick points out, Rawls's policy of treating each man's natural assets and their fruits as
a collective good
disregards the fact
of men's
separateness; Rawls
might
that a
self
theory
that
denies any
on
moral obligation
to
help
one's
fellows in
need
reply is it
insufficiently
yet
respectful of
human
dignity.61
The two thinkers

one
argue at cross
purposes,
draw
a common
source.
How may
respond
to
such
conundrum?
The response, I believe,

nize
should
be twofold. In the first place,

practical
one must
recog
that
that the
truth,
as regards
the
issue Rawls
being debated, lies

and
somewhere
between the
extreme positions adopted

must
by
be
Nozick:
a government
treats every individual as an end

than Rawls's
zens'
more respectful of
theory
ordains, but
more concerned with
his property rights alleviating his fellow citi
distress than Nozick's
allows.
alleviating the
portunities each
genuine miseries of
This is to say that policies aimed at the less fortunate, and at increasing their op
to advance themselves, are consistent with the principle of

as an end
treating
individual
by
respecting his rights; but
policies aimed at redistri
bution for its
own sake, on
the ground that the mere existence of large economic
inequalities is unjust,
61. On the
one
are
not.62
It is
also
to say that voluntary, individual charity

Justice,"
hand,
as
Goldman
observes
("The Entitlement
oblige
Theory
of
p. others
830), Kant
need": see
himself interpreted the
categorical
imperative to
the
individual "to
help
in
Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysic of Morals, transl. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), First Section, pp. 14-15; Second Section, p. 41 On the other hand, Kant de
.
nied
that the mere fact of economic

man as an
inequality,
as each
no matter
how extensive,
civil rights
violates
the principle of the right to own
treating every
end,
so
long
individual's
see
"
(including
property and bequeath it to one's heirs) are respected: Be True in Theory. But It Does Not Apply in
ings (Cambridge, England: Cambridge
Kant,
"On the Common Saying: 'This
May
and
Practice,'
in Hans Reiss (ed.), Kant's Political Writ The

effort
Goldman to
policies
use
the categorical imperative to
University Press, 1970), pp. 74-7. justify requiring governments

of
by
Rawls
to institute redistributive
rejection of an
is thus
at
least
as much a
distortion
Kant's teaching
as
is Nozick's
individ
ual obligation to charity.
62. Under
some circumstances
those of a traditional, agrarian regime
the excessive concen

of
tration of land ownership in the hands of a few may itself serve to deprive the poor of any means the confiscation of some land owned advancing themselves. In such a situation, "land
reform"
by
the rich, and
its distribution to the
poor
may
well
be
mandated
by justice
as well as
by
prudence.
economy moves from an agrarian to a commercial and/or manufacturing base, so that ownership of fixed assets is no longer a prerequisite to individual advancement, this ar gument for redistribution loses its force.
But to the
extent that an
An entirely different
nomic
set of
issues is
raised
by
the classical arguments in favor of

and
limiting
eco
inequality,
such as are to
be found in Plato's Laws

the
Aristotle's Politics. Those
arguments
depend
that
fundamentally
they
on considerations of prudence rather than on
justice. It
suffices
to note here
rests;
that such
and
arguments are
essentially inconsistent
with
principles on which a
liberal polity
are even more
in
conflict with
the goal of Rawls and other contemporary
redistribution-
334
or
Interpretation
objectively superior morally, even if not as a dictate of justice, to selfishness; and that liberal regimes ought therefore to seek to encourage the former attitudes. Above and beyond this immediate issue, however, the more
liberality is
fundamental lesson to be learned from the Rawls-Nozick debate is that

political
complex
issues
on
of
the sort
they discuss
cannot
be
resolved
by
abstract
theories
are
founded
the presupposition that one's particular, initial moral
"intuitions"
correct and must
be
enforced absolutely: such claims, and threaten to
like
all political appeals
to
faith,
are
irreconcilable,
inspire those
readers who are
influenced
to sever to the lat
by
them towards fanaticism. Both Rawls and Nozick

considerations
have
endeavored
"prior"
"moral"
from
practical
ones, making the

"utilitarian"
former
ter, in order to avoid the bugbear of a all individual rights in the name of some
attitude
that would
disregard
But
as
standard of overall social utility.
the examples of Locke and the American founders

possible
demonstrate, it is entirely
the
protection of
to formulate a political doctrine that
will make
individ
ual rights while
its primary goal,

on
without
ignoring
practical political
considerations;
practice
to define individual rights without regard to their
dependence, in
or
exercise,
the maintenance
of a viable political
undermine
both. The
severance of
the study
of
community, is ultimately to politics from that of morals is

to
unworkable and
pernicious,
whether
it is
undertaken with a view
insuring
the
independence
of
the former (as was intended
by
the positivists), or
with a view
to
Nozick).63 The subordinating the former to the latter (as attempted by Rawls and great political philosophers of the Western tradition understood this fact. It is of
the greatest urgency that present-day
philosophical scholars should releam
it.
ists
and socialists of
increasing
the total stock of material goods possessed
by
the "less
pp.
Rose Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Avon Books, 1980), Jouvenel, Chap. I; Schaefer, Justice or Tyranny? pp. 57-60. 63. It is not accidental that Max Weber, the most influential exponent of the
and
,
See Milton
136-9; De
"fact-value"
dis
tinction in social science, conceived and perhaps even
desired
as
the necessary outcome

"values,"
of recogniz
a bitter and un among the adherents of different ideals. See Weber, "Politics As a and C. Wright Mills (eds.). From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 123-8; "Science As a ibid., pp. 147-56: Strauss, Natural Right and History, pp. 64-74.
ing
the alleged
impossibility of rationally deciding conflicts among
ultimate
compromising in Hans Gerth
struggle
Vocation,"
Vocation,"
Discussion
Spiritedness in Ethics
and
Politics:
Study
in Aristotelian
Berns
Psychology
Laurence
St. John's College, Annapolis
the
light
of reason,
from
which all
the
clarity and beauty of virtue is derived. Summa Theologica, II -II, Q. 142, A. 4
Admirers
works
of
Aristotle's
writings on ethics and politics
have
often
hailed these
for their "sublime
good
sense", their common and their uncommon sense.
We
modern scholars are
both
amazed and puzzled
by
the concentration, compre the master of the
hensiveness
and uncommon
theoretical seriousness
with which
scientific syllogism articulates and analyzes the positions of common sense. ous
Seri
thought,
we
have
come to
expect, splits apart the
world of common
sense,
from the "ideal", or, with Plato and modern science, the separating the knowable from the merely opinable, or with Kant, the realm of nature from the realm of morality. Aristotle's procedures seem, in contrast, to vindicate good
common sense.
unity.
"real"
Ethics
and tough-minded realism are natural
found together in
its inherent Aristotle's
organic
Every
goal
has its
basis, every
natural power
goal.
Despite this admiration, the depth

tractors command our serious
and classical political
and competence of
greatest
de
attention.
The Machiavellian
critique of
Aristotle
elegantly than by Francis Bacon: "As for the philosophers, they make imaginary laws for imagi nary commonwealths; and their discourses are as the stars, which give little light philosophy was, perhaps,
never put more
because they
"high"
are so
high."'
Classical
political
philosophy is beautiful, but too
to be
truly
useful, seems to be the

to be
verdict.
Bacon's
where ruled
criticism might seem
borne
out
by
Book One
of
the
Politics,
Aristotle draws the fundamental distinction between

nature.
ruler
by
nature and
by
The distinction is fundamental if the fundamental

what
political ques
tion is who, or
kind
of
man,
ought
to govern the political community.

ruler and ruled
Among
next
associations or
pairings, the pairing of
by
nature ranks
in
unreflective natural male and
female. As
A
paper
primacy to the first pairing, the pairing of male and female pair together for life and procreation, so ruler by naAnnual
delivered
at the
Meeting
of
the American Political Science
Association,
Sep
and
tember, 1 98 1, under Political Philosophy.

1.
the auspices of
The Claremont Institute for the
Study
of
Statesmanship
Advancement of Learning, 11. Emphasis
supplied.
336
Interpretation
ture and ruled

of
by
nature pair
together
for
preservation.
"For that
which
is
capable
looking
ahead
through intelligence
[by thinking
which
things
through] is
nature and a master
by
nature,
and
that
is
capable
[only]
things [which the
ture a [servant or]
by
former has thought through] with his body is The political man in this account is defined primarily his intellectuality, his thoughtfulness, as if only intellectual differences mat
slave."2
by doing those ruled and by na

a ruler of
tered. It requires only a modicum of experience with human affairs, not to speak
of the
reading
of
history,
to know that something
essential seems
to be
missing
from this
account.
Hobbes's gibing
of
comment seems plausible:
Aristotle in the first booke

men
his Politiques, for
foundation
of
his doctrine,
maketh as
by
nature, some more
worthy to
Command,
others as
meaning the
to serve,
wiser sort
(such
he in
thought himself to
be for his
were not
Philosophy;)
Wit:
which
(meaning
those that
were
had
...
strong bodies, but

troduced
Philosophers,
of
he;)
not
as
if Master and Servant

against
by
difference
is
only
reason; but
also against
experience.1
Hegel,
cal
the
least
commonsensical of
philosophers, begins his account

entitled
of politi
life
with a speculative
mythology
"Lordship
Bondage,"
and
which
corresponds to
Aristotle's
distinguishing by
between
ruler and ruled
by
nature.4
If
we
discount the form is Hegel's

risk
and concentrate on
the content, how much more down to earth
account! a
Driven
the desire
his life in
battle for domination.

Lord. It is, in
clear
Subordinating his
for recognition, the Lord is willing to desire for recognition to

yields and submits
his desire for self-preservation, the Servant

domination
of the
himself to the
non-Hegelian
language,
superior spiritedness
that most characterizes the political man, the natural ruler.
Aristotle,
knew
about
as
is
to every reader of his

on
and
reflected
the
importance
of
Ethics, Rhetoric, and Politics, spiritedness, dvuoc, in the
makeup of the political man. In Politics, Book Seven, Chapter Seven, he says, "For all men, both ruling and freedom derive from this power: for spirit is some
thing inclined
the best
to rule [or command] and
unbeatable."
In the
same
chapter, Aris
totle goes on to describe what the natural qualities of the political multitude of
regime ought
to be: spiritedness and

of
intelligence
are
are
of
the qualities fo-
cussed upon.
The tribes
are
the cold places in
Europe
full
spirit, but lack in
telligence.
neighbors:
free but politically unstructured and unable to rule their They have political freedom without civilization. In the empires of they intelligent its
and
Asia the
people are
artful, but lack
spirit.
Slavish
one
and enslaved,
spirit
they have
edness
civilization without political
freedom. In Greece,
can
finds both
with
and
intelligence;
material
cities
combine
civilization
political
freedom.
The human
for the best
regime should
be,
as are the
Greeks,
not
only
2.
3.
I252a26-34.
Leviathan, Ch.
15.
4.
Phenomenology
of Spirit, Ch. IV, A.
337
Discussion
the natural ruler of Book the
intelligent, like
edness
One, but
also spirited.
Why
was spirit
left
out of
discussion in Book One? One
possible answer
is that in
other.5
Book One Aristotle is seeking that which can justify the rule of one man over an Spiritedness may be a natural presupposition of that rule, but it cannot
justify it: superiority in capacity to discern what conduces to their common good can justify it. Why does spiritedness not justify rule, and more generally, how
does Aristotle
understand the relation
between
spiritedness and virtue?
II
Before addressing these questions,
efficient
some
prefatory
remarks are or
in
order.
The
cause
of
practical
action
is
called
forechoice,
pre-election,
jTQoaigeoig,
It is usually mistranslated as choice. (Children and animals, Aristotle says, lack forechoice; they do not, as his translators have him say, lack choice.) The full definition of forechoice is deliberative appetite of
by
Aristotle.6
those things
appetitive petite and
in
our power. or
At
one point
Aristotle
remarks that
forechoice is
either
intellect intellect
intelligent
appetite,7
thus raising the question as to how ap

action.8
are related
in
practical
The
efficient cause of fore-
choice
itself then is
appetite and
reason,
reason which
is directed to
some end.
But the distinction between
appetite and reason
is
not altogether clear.
Appetite,
wish,
or
(ogsîg),
consists
of
desire, (jic&VLiia.),
are
spirit,
({hiLtog),
and
wanting, (fiovhrjoig)? but wish, Aristotle says, is in the

while spirit and
rational part of
the soul,
desire
than
in the irrational part, though

This for
and other evidence an unambiguous
spirit seems somehow
closer
to
reason
desire.10
indicates that Aristotle

of the soul
did
not
have high
no
expectations
prevented
division
and
into
parts.
This in
way
him from analyzing he
describing
its
powers
and their relations with as much precision as the subject allows.
There
moves,
are
three factors
in
movement,
are
argues: the mover, that

movers: movers
by
which
it
and the moved.

without
There
two kinds of
and
that cause others
to move
This
moving themselves,
first
suggested
movers
that are themselves also
5.
solution was
to me
by
Hilail Gildin.
6. Nicomachean Ethics, vi.2,

7.
1 139a3i
32.
'Oqektixoc
vof'cor
ogeîg biavonrixi), ibid.,
ii39b5-6.
8. More Which
precisely, there are two questions raised.
( 1 ) Which
of the two
of the two most
determines the
true"
character of practical action? of
actually moves? and (2) I have discussed these matters in

Ethics."
an unpublished essay, as
"The Natural Basis
What Is Not
by
Nature in
appetite.
For the first question,
Thomas
puts
it,
the "more
alternative
is intelligent
Cf. Aristotle Metaphysics, IX,
Ch. 5; De Anima, 433-3 1-32. 9. De Anima, 4i4by, De Motu Animalium,

10.
700b22-23.
De Anima, 432h5~7 and Metaphysics, i072J26-28; N. Ethics, U49hi- Cf. Politics, in infants is clearly irrational i334bl7-28, where povfajoic is included in the irrational part. Wish desire and spiritedness. It is, however, that part of appetite that is most susceptible and dominated
by
to, be
or transformable
understood as
by,
reason and separated
intellect. The different

"parts,"
powers of
the soul, then, are not to
spatially
but
as
interpenetrating
powers.
338
moved.
Interpretation
Forechoice,
the term:
we
recall, is the
mover of practical
action,
and
the
distinc
tion between unmoved and moved mover reveals the relation between the two
"fore"
parts of
indicates deliberation
or reason as unmoved
mover,
"choice,"
appetite as moved mover.
This matter, however,
admits of a more
de
tailed treatment.
The
ultimate
unmoved
mover of practical
action
is the
object of appetite
(dQEXTOv). In the soul,

appetite as presented
presents
however, the immediate unmoved mover is the object of by the imagination, or fancy (cpavzaoia), the power that
the appearances of things. Irrational animals are moved
by
the sensitive
imagination, keyed primarily

moved
to pleasure and pain, while rational animals are
by
what
Aristotle
under
calls
the deliberative or calculative

or
imagination,
the
imagination brought has found to

unmoved
the
influence of, For
into
accord
with, what the reason
be, in
general,
good.
rational animals
the object of appetite, the

as
mover,
good.
is
presented
by
the
imagination
formed."
the
apparent
(tpcuvoLievov)
primarily to
appetite
spirited
Thus,
goals,
the higher appetite, the part of appetite

wish or
directed is
ends or
or
wanting, is
The
moved mover
itself,
lower appetite, the

moved
affections and passions of the
desiring
and
elements,
shaped and prepared
by
the imagination. With ex
through habituation this shaping goes on for a long time, if not for a lifetime. In the Movement of Animals Aristotle speaks of how the imagination through sensation or intellection fittingly prepares the appetite, the appetite fit
perience and
tingly
parts.
prepares
the passions or affections,
and
the passions prepare the organic

another,
That
which
is moved,
without
itself moving
is the
animal
itself.12
In the
out of the
beginning of the Politics, after arguing that the polis family household and the village, Aristotle writes,
man we
develops naturally
And that
is
a political animal more makes or
than
any bee
voice
or
herding
animal
is
clear.
For has
nature, as
affirm,
Xoyog,
as
rational
speech,
nothing in vain, reason. Now then
and man alone
among the
nature
animals
is
a sign of
the painful and the
pleasant, therefore it
also
belongs to
the other animals; to
for their
has
gone as
far
this, to have But
sensation of painful and pleasant and rational
signify these things to
one an
other.
Xoyog,
speech
or
reason, is for making the advantageous and the

other ani
harmful clear, mals is special

the
n. 12. rest.
and so also
the just and the unjust. For this in relation to the

alone sensation of good and
to men, to
have
bad
and
just
and unjust and
And the community

l072a27-28.
of these
things makes
household
and a
ndkig
Metaphysics,
De Anima,
esp.
in.
io, 433aloff.; N.
Ethics,
vi.2, 1139^2-33; De Motu

ed.
Animalium,
pp.
vi-vm,
255-56.
700b4ff.,
702-17-
19; The Ethics of Aristotle,
John Burnet (Methuen, 1900),
Aristotle's De Motu Animalium, Text, Trans. Commentary and Interpretive Essays, Martha Craven Nussbaum (Princeton, 1978), pp. 333-36. Strictly speaking, the second major factor, that which
by
movement takes place, the

pneuma,"
instrument,
should
include
an account of what
Aristotle
calls
"connate
that
bodily
element closest to the psychic or
divine
p.
Aristotle, Generation of Animals, Loeb ed., pp. 576?., esp.. Motu Animal., x, 703a4-28. (The analogue to the connate would appear to be the neuron.)
13.
See A. L. Peck's Appendix B, in 578. and pp. lxviii and li\. and De
in contemporary physiology
pneuma
I253a7-i8.
339
Discussion
possess a great
Animals
and
many
of
them
erned
by
sensual
variety of characteristics analogous to human virtues, have memory and various capacities for learning.14 Yet gov or sensitive imagination and passion, they are confined in their
signification of the pleasures and pains are unable to communicate apart
mutual
signaling to the
moment;
they
are
feeling
at
the
present
they
information
about
the na
ture of the causes of their

on their
feelings,
from
what
is
revealed through the effects
feelings.
Human thought,
however,
through intellection has access to the intelligible

what men sense and
natures, the universals, implicit in

the universals, when
action
do. In
matters of practice a certain
fully
explicit, issue in
a true
Xoyog about
kind
of
being
good
for
a certain
kind
of
being,
such as a man or a
community; the
as
true practical
Xoyog
expresses
what right
appetite pursues.
But,
Aristotle
notes, in practice
who can
men with experience are universal
discourse in
to be
much
not seem
usually more successful than those terms, but lack experience. In practice there does difference between experience and science or art, for both
experience and practice are concerned with
individuals,
with particulars.
Experi
ence,
(^puieigia), for Aristotle, is

rises
the link between memory and science or art.
Experience
from memory,
a unity:
when
linked together in
this was
good
many memories of the for Smith, it was also
same good
thing
are
for Green
and
though experience
for Quinn, therefore it should also be good is cognition of individuals, universals (a certain kind
for Jones, Wilson.15 Al for

of good
14.
15.
Hist, of Animals, viii.i,
588al8ff.
reason," power,"
Thomas Aquinas
and ad 1.
speaks of a
"cogitative
1 ad
or
"particular
a reason
directed to
particulars.
Cf. Summa Theologica, I, Q. 78, A. Cf. Aristotle, De Anima,

operative
H42b
3, A. 3, A. 4
and ad
5; Q.
81, A.
3; II
II, Q.
that
also
74, A. 3
11.
6,
4i8a7-26,
and 428"i8-26, which establishes
some power of
judgment is
10 and
in the
perception of accidental and common sensibles.
Cf.
N. Ethics,
tics,
vi.
11,
end
to H43bi4; Hist.
and
Animal.,
viii.i, 588al6-s88b3; and Poli
very close in meaning, i.e., "a operates on sensible particulars, or cor that judgment in animals of power The bringing together") relates individualized notions, Thomas calls the estimative power. It operates by natural instinct, nest building. In man it is e.g., when an antelope flees a lion, or a bird takes a piece of straw for
l29ia27-28.
(Aristotle's ovveoic,
Thomas's
collatio are
called cogitative power,
because,
although
it is
a power of sensitivity,
it is joined to
universal
intel
lect. The
cogitative power
united
"apprehends the individual
thing
as
because it is
to intellect in one and the same subject.
existing in a common nature, and this Hence it is aware of a man as this man,
and a tree as this
whereas instinct is not aware of an individual thing as in a common nature, The ante but only in so far as this individual thing is the term or principle of some action or lope knows the lion not as this lion, but as something to flee; the bird knows the straw not as this on Aristotle's De Anima, trans. straw, but as something to put in the nest. Thomas's Commentary 395-8This uniting of intellect sections Sylvester 1959), Humphries, (Yale, Kenelm Foster and
tree;
and sensation that allows the object of sense

what constitutes the qwraoia
to be
sensed as an object of a certain
Xoyionxi).
the calculative
kind, is evidently imagination, for Aristotle. Cf. De An

connected
ima,
420h29-34. 433b30-434alo;
power of judgment
De Motu Animalium,
mode,
700b4-702a2i.
This
in its deliberative
because it is
to reason and "reason in
courses,"
judgment,"
contingent matters
Thomas,
have in
son
of
may follow opposite the Aristotelian doctrine of free
is "free Op.
will.
cit..
is the basis, according to I, Q. 83, A. I and ad 5. Thomas may

and
mind, among other places, the arguments

a
in ix.2, I046a36ff.,
of the
Metaphysics,
about rea
being
faculty
of contraries.
340
Interpretation
action, a certain kind of man, in a certain kind of situation) would seem
thing
to
or
be
operative
in the linkage
are
and
recognized.
or science
When they and art. With

so.16
fully
art and
explicitly explicitly recognized we have knowledge, science one knows not only that something is so,
and or conduces
the unity, even though not
fully
and
but
also
why it is
The
advantageous
is
what
is,
to, the
good
for
some
individual is
or al
some particular
ways
group.17
The
good or the
always
bad in practice,
since practice
the practice of
individuals,
practice
takes the form of the advantageous or the
the harmful. Sound

carried out
in the
service of
truly
advantageous cannot although rational
be
by
men of experience without
some
awareness,
not
full
knowledge,
of the goods
making that
practice sound.
Aoyog,
speech,
(which is essentially thoughtful, and only accidentally though necessarily audi ble,18) makes it possible for men to share and to compare one another's thoughts
and
experiences,
including
their thoughts about the advantageous and the
harm
advantages ful. Such thoughtful sharing leads naturally to consideration of and disadvantages are to be shared, apportioned, and distributed, especially
how
those that accrue
from joint
or
interrelated
actions.
The
right or correct
distribu
tion of advantages and
harms among
men who
live together, distributive
justice,
politi
is their
cal
mutual or common and
advantage, their
common good.
"Justice is the
good,
this is the common
advantage."19
Some bad
shared awareness of
how
advantages and community.
disadvantages
are to
be distributed is
operative
in every
political
This
shared awareness of good and

and
and the common
advantage,
justice,
animal?
makes
the household
the noXig.
But why does Aristotle say that man is more political than any bee or herding In the History of Animals he distinguishes between herding, or gregari
ous, animals and
solitary (tiovadixoi
swimming is one
of
"loners")
these.20
ply to both
footed,
winged and
animals alike.
herding
and solitary: man
The distinctions ap Some animals, he adds, are These animals are divided fur
animals. of political animals are man,
ther into the political and the scattered.
Examples
bees,
one
wasps, ants and cranes. "Political animals are all those from which some
work
and common
comes
into being,
effect."21
which
is
not
the sort of
thing
all
herding
can
or gregarious
animals
than the other gregarious political animals
Man, then, would be more political because the result of human association
than that
be
a work which
is
more one and common
resulting from any
other
animal association.
Our discussion
Metaphysics,
Rhetoric,
De
of man's
distinction through the
possession of
Xoyog thus
far
16.
17.
1. 1, 98oai-98iDlo.
I389bend.
18.
19.
Sensu,
4?l']'L4-\~], De Interpretation?
i6a9-n.
263c;
Politics, I282bi6-i8, l279"i7-i279bio; N. Ethics, Rhetoric, 1. 6. 16, I362b.

Cf. Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, Hist. Animal.,
1 1
.
H29bi5,
n6oai4;
Plato, Sophist,
20. 21.
11.40.
487b33
488"
-
341
Discussion
on the
has focussed especially

thoughts and
experiences.22
capacity to generalize and the capacity for sharing These considerations come together in the argument
just
presented.
The basis
work,"
the notion of
nity.
any human community is the "one and common distributive justice that is in fact operative in that commu
of notion of what
This notion, the
bution
of advantages and
mon, and hence more
is most generally held to be the right distri harms in the community, can be more one and com political, because human thoughts through intellection are
the most sharable beings the same
in the world. Human thoughts, according to Aristotle, in different can be truly minds, because the human mind is capable of This is receiving the very sensible and intelligible forms of things reflected in the literature of both domestic tragedy and comedy, in their reliance
themselves.23
on
the
fact that the deepest
intimacy
comes
only through
mutual understanding.
Ill
The
virtue most and
Europeans
pable of
the
closely associated with the spiritedness that kept the northern Greeks free is, of course, courage. "For those who are not ca
are slaves
of
facing
Our
danger courageously in the third book

of the
those
who
go
against
them."24
examination of spiritedness and virtue will
begin
with
the treat
ment of courage
Nicomachean Ethics.
students
prefatory remarks seem to be called for. Serious Aristotle have always been interested in how he proceeds as well
Again,
We
some
of
as
what
he
says.
are struck
apart
by
how
we
have been
obliged
to
pull together strands scat
tered
far
in Aristotle's writings; Aristotle did

investigation the central theme of clearly important,
and
not seem
to make this kind
of psychological
between
addressees are
any may be connected for

some of
of
his books. Differences

with even more
important differences.
A heightened
proach.
sense of prudence accounts

out
the difference of
ap
evi
By
spelling
the truth implicit in

the cognitive
sound
practice, political philosophy

of experience.
tacitly
or
openly
exposes
insufficiency
Aristotle
dently
tice
such
took care,
sophistry,
as
far
as possible, and
to
prevent
the natural enemies of sound prac
fanaticism,
simple
villainy
exposures.
There is, however,

philosopher,
another
from taking advantage of reason for the difference of ap
proach.
Aristotle the
modes of
where
the
especially in his writings on human things, human understanding become essential parts of what is to be
about a particular subject, understood, was not content only to talk

Euripides'
but
seemed
Hippolytos),"
22.
Cf. Gisela Berns. "Nomos (1973)

m.
I72-73-
and
Physis (An Interpretation
of
Her
mes,
ioi. No. 2
23.
De Anima,
8,
43lb20-432a4;
De Motu Animal..
and
70lbl8-22.
Cf. Laurence Berns, "Ra

Politics,"
tional Animal
Political Animal: Nature
Convention in Human Speech
and
The Re
view of Politics (April. 1976), St. John's College Press. 1976), pp. 29-35. 24. Politics, l334''2i-23. Cf. I283''i6-23.
revised and corrected
in Essays in Honor of Jacob Klein (Annapolis:
342
rather to
tion.25
Interpretation
try
to present
his
subject matter
in its
own
inner,
or
natural, articula
The
perspectives within which exist
the
subject matter manifests prephilosophic
itself
are pre of
sented as
they
in their prescientific,
phenomena.26
form. The adequacy

on
the
subsequent analysis and refinement of views
depends
the adequacy of the
presentation of sented not as a as a normal
the initial
with
The
analysis and criticism
is itself
pre
break
the opinions
and perspectives with which
it begins, but
of
and
natural
development,
fulfillment
and
refinement
those told
views.27
For instance, early in Book One
of the
Nicomachean Ethics
we are
that it
is
the mark of an educated man to seek that degree of precision that the na
ture of the subject matter permits. Aristotle says that ethical virtue, the subject of
Books One through Five, does
not permit a
high degree
of precision. point
But the
ar
ticulation of ethical virtue and the problems

need
inherent in it his
for
greater
clarity
about
the intellectual virtues, the subject

subject
naturally to the of Book Six. At
the point where precision constitutes part of
matter,
intellectual
vir
tue, Aristotle notes that precise speech is now With the thematic treatment of the intellectual
opened up.
required.28
virtues a new perspective
is
What
was seen
before
now
worthy in itself. Old

to be
subject
necessary for the sake of ethical virtue is matters are viewed in new ways. For example,
as
the greatest of external goods in Book Four is said to
be honor,
while
in Book
Nine it is
cally.
said
friendship. The
first
contradiction
is to be
understood dialecti-
The
great-souled man at
sees
honor
as the greatest of external
goods,
of
but
within
that very chapter, as Aristotle presents the
inner development
the
great-souled man's
perspective, the doubts
about that position are
developed.
makes
Honor is
as valuable as
the cognitive capacities of its

genuine virtue.
bestowers: it only
sense when virtues
it is bestowed for
In Book
Nine,
after
the intellectual
teem from
have been discussed, it becomes clear that the most perfect form of es other human beings is the mutual love, or friendship, of the virtuous.
is based
on
This
friendship
understanding, understanding
virtue and
understand-
25.
This, I believe,
works:
more
than anything else accounts for the proliferation of commentaries on

prospect of
Aristotle's
namely, the
coming to
understand the
very inner,
or
natural,
articula
tion of the subject one is interested in.

26.
Cf. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences
and
Transcendental Phenomenology,
trans. David Carr
beginning; Martin Heidegger. Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London, 1962), pp. 96-97 (5. u. Z., p. 68); and Leo Strauss, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science and Political Interpretation, 2, No I (1971),
1970),
section 44,
Philosophy,"
(Evanston,
8-9.
27.
Cf. Leo Strauss, "On Classical Political

,
Philosophy,"
in What is Political Philosophy?

and
(Glencoe, 111.
says
1959; reprint, Greenwood

,
by Leo Strauss
least
one
quire at
and
in Political Philosophy: Six Es Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis & New York, 1975), pp. 59ff. These remarks re important qualification, which cannot be discussed here: see Leo Strauss, The Cits
1973),
pp.
Press,
78ff.;
ed.
Man (Chicago, 1964; reprint,

and
in Ancients
ed.
Moderns: Essays
Joseph
28.
Cropsey
of Chicago), pp. 240-41. Cf. my "Aristotle's Poetics, Tradition of Political Philosophy in Honor of Leo Strauss, (New York: Basic Books. 1964), pp. 76-78, and 81
on
University
the
N. Ethics, i094bi2-28,
139bi8-
19, 1 i4ia9-20;
Metaphysics.
982ai2-i8.
343
Discussion
another.29
ing
one
The
following
to what
discussion
will
attend, then, to the
mode of
presentation as well as
is
said about courage. as a mean with respect to of courage
Courage, in
feelings
of
general, had been defined in Book Two

and
fear
feelings
of
daring. The thematic discussion
in
Book Three
raises
the
question of which
with, since it
is
not concerned with all
is particularly concerned (for example, it is not courageous, but

courage
on
fears
base,
not
to fear disgrace). The presentation takes

of
the character of a dialogue.
"What kinds
fearful things then is the
courageous man concerned with?
The
greatest, I should
think;
and
the
most
frightening thing
is death.
What
kind
of
death? The noblest, I
should
where
the greatest and most noble

are also
think, and that is death in battle, for that is danger lies. The honors bestowed by cities and
In
an authoritative
monarchies
in
agreement with this.
way, then, it
might
be
said
that the courageous man
is he
who
is
not afraid of a noble
death,
even when
the dangers that

of and
bring
it
on are close at
hand;
and such
are,
most of
all, the dangers
war."
Courage in Book Three, Chapter Six,

conspicuous
comes
to sight
in its elementary
zen soldier.
most
form, in
the perspective of the citi
The
all
next chapter
begins
by
people, but there
are some
noting that the same things are not frightening to things beyond human endurance. And this sort of any rate, for everyone in its colloquial
who
thing "is fearful for everyone, ixovzi)." This word, vovv

"sense,"
at
has
sense
(.
no ye
which
usage
can
be translated
is
also the technical term
for intellect,
vovg.
With the
almost parentheti
cal mention of
the one who has sense-intellect, a new the man

who endures
unannounced perspective
emerges, the
things
ought.
which
perspective of
fears
and
is bold
towards those
and when
he ought, for the
sake of what
he
ought, as
he ought,
he
He both feels
sake of what
and acts as reason
dictates, for
the sake of the
noble, that
is,
is choiceworthy in itself. The courageous man is a mean, or altogether fearless man who is either mad or insensitive to the between median, from the general pain, and the coward. Rash men, Aristotle says, breaking
for the
scheme,
courage when
seem
to be a
mixture of
both
extremes:
they
and
pretend
to fearlessness and
with
before danger is
faced.30
at
hand, but hang back

five
states
disappear
the cowards
it is to be
Chapter Eight
speaks of
that are also said to

and most
properly likenesses
of courage.
The
first,
be courage, but are like true courage, is political, The hero

of
or civic, courage, the courage of the citizen

29.
soldier.31
the introduc-
30.
N. Ethics, H23bi5-ii24a20, and n69b8-io. Cf. the Dauphin in Shakespeare's Henry V, and Abraham Lincoln, Speech
ed.
of
December 26,
pp.
1839, The Collected Works of

177-79.
Roy
P. Basler (New Brunswick, N.J., 1953), Vol. I,
Cf Plato Republic.
.
4296-4300; and
Phaedo, 67b-69e. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theo

and purgati animi
logica. I
is
II, Q.61. A.
"social,"
5.
The
standard translation
"perfecting,"
rendered
purgatorias
is particularly misleading here: (virtutes) politicas Cf. N. Eth [not animas]

"perfect."
ics,
vi. 13.
344
Interpretation
on courage now
tory dialogue
emphasis
has first first
place
among the likenesses. The
rhetorical
here is
not on political courage's

place
falling
short of
true courage,
but
on
the excellence that entitles it to

arises on account of
an appetite
among the likenesses, "because it

shame, and on account of
and avoidance of
common
virtue, for it arises on
account of
for nobility, (that is, for honor),

Aristotle here
concedes
reproach, which is
that speaks of
disgrace."32
to the
opinion
shame-respect as a
virtue, because it is praiseworthy and good and operates pre
ventively
ter
passion.33
against vice.
Both before
and after
this passage, (in Book
Four, Chap
Nine), Aristotle
Virtue is
asserts
not a
that, strictly speaking, shame is not a virtue, but a passion, but a fixed habitual disposition toward pas
sions and
actions, determined
or
by
reason as the prudent man would
determine it.
of
Virtue is the completion,

shame
perfection, of a
fixed disposition. The discussion

be commonly he does
in Book Four
anticipates
the distinction between continence and temper
ance of
Book Seven. The
continent man
is
and should
praised
for
virtue; but the base desires that he has

"contain"
and
fears,
although
master and
them,
word.
keep
In the
general
him from qualifying for virtue in the strict sense of the definition of ethical, or moral, virtue, which occurs early in
the sections on ethical virtue, the possession of an intellectual virtue tial

requirement."*
is
an essen
Not
all passions are
equal,
and
those soldiers who are com

as the
pelled
into battle
by
their commanders are

disgrace.35
inferior,
is
fear
of
bodily
pains
is
inferior to the fear The third

spirit seem
of
and central
likeness to
courage
spiritedness.36
"Men
moved
by
to be courageous, like beasts rushing
on one who
has
wounded
them;
because
the courageous also are spirited, and spirit
is
most
dangers."37
Beasts
and spirit
itself
move
from
passion.
ready to encounter The courageous seek
the noble, but spirit works along with them. "The
'courage'
due to
spirit seems to
be
most
natural, and
when
forechoice
and purpose
have been
added
to
it, it is
courage."38
Spiritedness,
courage when
act
then, is the it is formed

in
natural and passionate
basis
of courage.
It becomes
a
by
forechoice
and wish, through
habit, into
of
fixed disposition to To
summarize
as
accordance with
the noble.
briefly:
courage comes
to sight first
who
in the dialogue form is
Chapter Six
32.
the character of the citizen soldier,
not afraid of a noble
disgrace,
print,
On the difference between shame-respect, aldibg, verecundia, as used here, and shameaioxvvn, turpitudo, cf. Kurt Riezler, Man, Mutable and Immutable (Regnery. 1950; re
Greenwood Press, 1975), Ch. 8. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II

N. Ethics, no8a3i-32, and N. Ethics, no6b36-ll07a6;
"mistaken"
II, Q.
144, A.
2,
near the end. 33. 34. 35. cf. Aquinas, loc. cit., A. I. Physics, 246al0-248a9. The attribution of Agamemnon's words to Hector at 1 1 l6a3235 may be con with Aristotle's sense of what is more appropriate for easterners. Cf. Politics, 1 285al0- 14,
i28bio-i6;
cf.
nected
where
the attribution is correct,

Iliad,"
and
the aforecited Ch. 7 of
Book VII. Cf. Seth Benardete, "Achilles

anger.
and
the
36. 37. 38.
Hermes, 91, No.
(January
1963), 1-16,
often used
esp. 5-12.
The
word
for spiritedness, rht/xic. is

"is"
colloquially for
clause as
Emphasis supplied. Some translators might
render
the
in the last
"seems to
be."
345 death
Discussion
it is
close at
when
hand. In Chapter Seven the

and courage
perspective shifts to that of
the man of good sense or the reasonable and

sented moved
is defined primarily in terms of intellect, noble. In Chapter the Eight the likenesses of courage are pre
order of
in
descending
courage,
distance from true
courage.
The
citizen
soldier,
the
ex
by
shame-respect and
the love of
honor,
who at
first
appeared as
emplar of
is
now not
the exemplar,
but the
nearest and noblest
likeness
to
of the courageous man, the man of good sense-intellect.
Spiritedness is
shown
be the irrational
and guided
pleted.
natural
basis
of
courage, the material of courage, to

of the
be
shaped com
by
reason.
With the ranking

the
courageous
likenesses the description is
It
ranges
from (i) the
mad or anaesthetic
fearless man, (2) the coward,
(3) (6)
the rash man,
(4)
man,
(5)
the
honor-loving
final
chapter
citizen
soldier,
the experienced professional soldier,
(7)
the spirited,
pugnacious
man,
(8)
the the
optimist, to
problem of
(9)
the man ignorant of dangers. The

pleasantness of
deals
with
the
intrinsic
virtue, where the virtue itself
is primarily
concerned with cannot
enduring pains. There is the briefest indication that true courage be possessed in isolation from the other virtues. "The more a man pos in its entirety (rr)v dgsrr)v Jiaoav), the more happy he is, and the pained by death; for life is most worth living for such a
theme
of
man."
sesses virtue more will
he be
The
end returns to and qualifies the
the beginning. The
truly
courageous
men might not always make
the
best
soldiers.
IV Unfortunately, in
the works of Aristotle
left to
us there
does
not seem to
be
The word is very common in any full and thematic analysis of Greek literature, especially in Homer. Aristotle was, of course, well acquainted
spiritedness.39
with
the extended discussions of spiritedness in

them.40
Plato,
and
up to
a point seems to
agree with
Spiritedness
manifests
itself
most
conspicuously in
courage.41
anger and
It is
that power of the soul that

what
is
activated whenever
something threatens or opposes
the soul seeks or
cherishes as
desirable
or
good; spirit rises to overcome the

apprehension of an
difficulty. Fear, "a
painful
disturbance
and
caused
by the
impend
spir-
ing
destructive
There is
or painful
hope
seem
to be the primary
passions of
39
such a treatment
in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologica, I, Q. 81
and
II, QQ.
23, 25, 40-48,

40. of the
on the
irascible faculty. Bloom in his translation

73ib-d, and 963c;
pp. 353-58, 375~78 and of
Republic,
cf. Allan 374b-376c, 41 ia-e, 429a-430c, 435c-44id;
Republic (Basic Books, 1968),

and
436;
Laws.
13.
Leo
Strauss, The City

41
.
Man (University
I v. 5.
Chicago,
reprint), pp. 1
10-
The
rational
control and ordination of anger
is treated
as
the
virtue of
gentleness, or good
temper, in N. Ethics,
"the domestic
side of
Gentleness is
treated as a passion
in Rhetoric,
by
Ken Masugi. Aristotle Hist, of Animals,

I328a7-
argues
3 It has been aptly called that ferocity does not go along with
11.
courage, (Politics, i338bl7-24;
cf.
629b8)
with one possible exception
"in
rela
tion to those
who act
(Politics,
11).
346
Interpretation
itedness. Daring, fear's opposite, rises with the strength of the hope of overcom ing the fearful evils. The sense of urgency that is part of fear, and distinguishes
fear from
cape.
grief and
despair, indicates
coward
that fear is never without some

spiritedness could
hope
of es
A frightened
of
deficient in
not, then, be altogether

against
devoid
evil.
hope;
what
he lacks is the
power
to
set
himself
the
impending
Not only is in
against
spiritedness
the temperamental condition of political
freedom, but
against
social and political
life it is the indispensable temperamental basis for the fight

as well
injustice. It is indispensable himself. The
for
the
individual's fight
the
a
vices within
classical equivalent of conscience would seem
to
be
certain compound of spiritedness and shame.
Shame
seems
to
bridge the
spirited
and
the rational parts of appetite. As fear of
disgrace,
shame attests
to the pres
ence of some moral
danger, but
the very recognition of the danger points to the
simultaneous presence of some standard of

wish
goodness,
even
if it
should
for the
good opinion of those
before
whom one would
be
ashamed.
only be a Some
kind
of rational
estimation,
or comparison of the
behavior
with
the standard,
man
seems to
be
implied.42
Lacking
the standard of comparison, the shameless
fails to
see
his
vices as
disgraceful. Aibcog, shame-respect, is the

moderation,
as spiritedness
natural predis as
position we
for the
virtue of
is for courage; although,
have suggested, the element of self-reproach and sense of danger in shame in dicates the presence of spiritedness there Yet, if spiritedness is material for virtuous enmity, it is also material for the opposed perversions, for vicious
too.43
spitefulness, insolence, self-righteousness, hatred and cruelty. Much, enmity if not everything, depends upon how spiritedness is guided and trained by its
leading
who are
powers.
"Spiritedness too [as

men."44
well as
desire]
is
not
perverts rulers, even those
the best
Spiritedness
to the Republic
as the soul's
fighting
is the
the
element
this same small chapter of the Politics
difficult to recognize, but in (vn.7), Aristotle informs us, in a reference

that produces the ability for
of
affection we
(375e),
that "it
spirit power
(to
cpiXrjnxov);
for this
not as
is
the
soul
(cptXoviJiev)."
by
which
love
This is
easy to understand.
As
a sign of
the two-fold character of spiritedness,

against
Aristotle
refers to spirited
ness as self
of
powerfully to be slighted, than it does

other
rising
more
intimates
and
friends,
when
it believes it
against those
of
it does
not
know. That the
intensity
the anger matches the
intensity
the affection, suggests a common source.
Among
42. 43.
lines
of
poetry, he quotes,
"Surely
those who loved beyond bounds
Cf.
note
15,
above. op. cit.,
Eudemian Ethics, i234J24-34, Thomas Aquinas,

op. cit., note
II
II Q. 144, A. 4,
ad
4; Gisela
Berns,
22, above, pp. i6sff.
44 Politics, l287d30-32. Cf. Shakespeare's Angelo in Measure for Measure, esp. 1v.ii.80ff. I have discussed these lines in Shakespeare as Political Thinker, eds. John Alvis and Thomas P. West (Carolina Academic Press, 1981), pp. 47-48.
347
also
Discussion
bounds."
hate beyond
"Not
without
reason, it
seems,"
he
says
in
another
place, "did the
first teller
or
of myths yoke
Ares together
with
Aphrodite."45
There is
ship
and or
feeling
attitude,
a substratum as
it were,
common to
both friend
cause of
and
enmity
care.46
One
shows that one cares
by
making the
one's care one's own.
"There
are two
and
things
which most of all make men care

(aycLTt]zov)""
love (cfiXelv),
one's
own
the cherishable
Ovuog,
to
per
spiritedness,
would then
be the
source of those
feelings directed primarily
the care for one's own, such as concern for self, parental
love,
patriotism,
haps
even a
feeling
for the
cosmos
itself,
seen as an object or product of personal
care.48
While Plato
emphasis
more
than does
justice
to the political
utility
of
spiritedness, his
is
on
the tension
between the love

spiritedness and
of one's own and the
love
of
the
good, the tension
between
philosophy.49
Decent
feel the
are
need
to strengthen and encourage the sources
of
naturally human decency; they
men
led naturally to exaggerate the strength and significance of the cosmic sup ports for decency. Indecent men too are led, by some strain of decency in them
selves, to
exaggerating its cosmic honesty. This tension can take a great variety of forms, even the self-defeating form of a perverted zeal for honesty that refuses to recognize the very possibility of cosmic support for decency.
justify
their own
indecency by
supports.50
Our
spiritedness vies with our
The love
man strives
of
wisdom,
of
course, implies hatred
of
dishonesty. The
philosophic
to be good without
on
being
dishonest
with
himself. In Plato's Sympo

one's own and
sium, the
dialogue is
love,
the tension between the love of
the
love
The
of
the good
resolved.
The two
come
together in the
teaching
about
Eros.
How-
object of
love,
egcog, is to have "the
good
be
one's own
forever."51
45. 46.
Politics,
i269b27-29.
op. cit..
Cf. Kurt Riezler, tled Carefreeness.

47. 48.
Part Four, Ch.
2 and
3 (Care); Ch. 4,
on
humor
and play,
is
enti
Politics. I262b22-23. Seen from the Platonic-Aristotelian

with
point of
view,
Heidegger's
"the
to
"thinking"
"authenticity"
and
"Being-in-the-World,"
(one's-ownness)
their emphasis on
and care
ready-to-h
(das
Zuhan-
dene),
"mineness"
(Jemeinigkeit),
in human behavior
(Sorge),
This
appear
be
a reevaluation and exaltation of
spiritedness
and cognition.
might provide an
interesting
and
perspective on
the
question of the connection all
between Heidegger's "existential
analytic"
his
politics
Historicism in
its forms
would seem
to entail an elevation of the love of one's own, of spiritedness. I

in a
have treated
on
these questions more
fully
paper, "The Prescientific World and Historicism: Some Reflections
Strauss, Heidegger and Association, September,
Husserl,"
delivered
at
the Annual
Meeting
of
the American Political

the
Science States
1983,
under
the auspices of the
Claremont Institute for
Study
of
manship and Political Philosophy. 49 Cf. Republic, 330a-c; and Laws, 963c;
above.
and
Leo Strauss
and
Allan Bloom, loc.
cit., note 40,

pp.
See
also
Leo Strauss, On Tyranny,

to
revised and enlarged
(Free
Press,
1963),
202-26.
p.
Harry
169,
V. Jaffa in How
Think
about the
American Revolution (Carolina Academic Press. 1978),
quotes p.
208, but see p. 209. and especially p. 210. Cf.
Aristotle, N. Ethics,
I096all-l8.
50. 51.
Cf. Shakespeare,
206a.
King Lear,
i.ii. 1-22.
348
Interpretation
spiritedness and
ever, the tension between
philosophy is
never resolved.
Where
love is
celebrated as
the
main
theme, its highest human form

unmentioned.52
being
philosophy,
spiritedness
simply disappears
The love
when
of one's own and
its spiritedness, for Aristotle,

disposed
reach
fulfillment
for
virtue.
together
own
they
are shaped and
by
reason as material
One's
and the cherishable come
together, according to Aristotle, in the
friendship
and
of the virtuous.
All the
appetitive parts of the good man's soul seek as pleasure,
the same thing:
his desire seeking it
his
his
faculty
time good for

of
of wishing wanting it as himself and good simply, and that is the

good.53
caring for it as his own, He seeks what is at the same

spirit
good of
the
dominant he is
part na
will
himself,
the part
which
is
most of all
himself,
the intellect. Since

with others
by
ture
political and
framed to live
The
with others,
living
like himself
enhance
his happiness. The

other self.
good man extends

friends'
his relationship to himself to his

their con
friend, his
virtuous
mutual conversation and
templation of their own and each other's goodness
is
pleasant
in itself. Their
friendship
itself."54
is itself
a celebration of existence:
for "to be is itself desirable through
one's perception of oneself as
being
good, and such perception is pleasant in
his painting, The School of Athens. Plato, with a troubled expression, is pointing his index finger upwards. The heels
caught
Something of this by Raphael in

feet
are up,
difference between Plato
and
Aristotle
seems to
have been
somewhat
of
his
un
shod
raising him from the

makes a
ground.
Aristotle,
a more tranquil expres
sion on
his face,
calming gesture, solidly
holding
the palm of
his hand down.
His
well-sandalled
feet
are planted
on the ground.
52.
Cf., for example, l78d-i8ob,

to dvpog.
1
i66ai3
194b, I96d, 203d, 207b, 2o8c-e, etal.,
where one might ex
pect references
53.
54.
N. Ethics,
15.
Ibid.,
1 170b8-I0.
Rational Theologians
and
Irrational Philosophers:
A Straussian Perspective
Ernest L. Fortin
Boston College
The
ceived
afflicts
Leo Strauss's pioneering work has thus far been re in specifically Christian circles is attributable in part to the disarray that present-day theology but it also has much to do with the cultivated ambi
coolness with which
guity
of
Strauss's
stance and posture
in
regard to revealed religion.
Theologians,
who are not the quire a
least
spirited of people, thrive on opposition
target at which
they
can
take aim.
but generally re Like politicians, they tend to be more

more than their share of them over the
at ease even with enemies centuries
they have had

The
matter
than
they
are with people of whom
they
cannot
tell for sure whether
they
any
are
friends
or enemies.
is further
complicated
by
the absence of
thematic treatment of
Christianity
anywhere
in Strauss's
writings or of
any
au
extended
commentary
by
Strauss
on the works of an
unmistakably Christian
awareness of
thor. One must presume that
Strauss's demonstrated divine
the most com
pelling
as
arguments against the truth of observation
revelation encompasses
Christianity
well, but the
is
hardly
conclusive
since, as Strauss himself admits,
the same awareness is already present in the Christian tradition and since in his
particular case
it
goes
hand in hand
with an explicit recognition of systematic critique of
the inherent
any In principle, one might have expected the more conservative wing of mainline Christian theology, represented preeminently by Roman Catholicism, to be sym pathetic to Strauss's attack on modernity and his attempted recovery of clas
sical philosophy,
with
limitations
or
logical
pitfalls of
biblical
religion.
which
for
long
time
its
own
destiny
appeared
to be
linked. Yet this has

tant respect with
ral a
proved not
to be the case. Even the genuine if somewhat

central section of
dis
which
Thomas Aquinas is treated in the
Natu
Right
and
History
as well as
in
other places was not enough scholars.
to stir more than

respect
passing interest
on the part of
Catholic
For
one
thing, that
is
regarding the efforts of a few unnamed by but prominent and easily identifiable Thomists about whom the least that Strauss seemed willing to say was that the right hand did not know what the left hand
accompanied a number of strictures was
of much
doing. Secondly, the accolade, if that is the right word, came too late to be help to those who stood to benefit by it. It occurred at a time when, in a
and perhaps misguided attempt
frantic
to cut their
losses, Roman Catholic
theo
logians had already begun to forsake

of newer though not politics and, of the
their Thomistic
approaches to
legacy
in favor
of a
variety
thrust
necessarily better
of
the problems of ethics and
indeed,
theology
tout court.
Here
as elsewhere, the main
Straussian
enterprise ran afoul of some of
the
most powerful prejudices of
the age. It
undermined
the currently fashionable
theology by bringing
to light
350
Interpretation
contradictions and
of continuity with the tradition to which It is symptomatic of the prevailing dedicated. supposedly that at the time of its appearance, John Finnis's recent book,
both its inner
its lack
its
practitioners were
climate of opinion
Natural Law
and not
and
Natural Rights,
should
have been
acclaimed
by
some
people,
the most
hostile
ones at
that,
as the
long-awaited Catholic
response to
Strauss's Natural Right
and
History
(NRH).
are well acquainted with
Truth to tell, few Christian theologians

work and
Strauss's
it.
fewer
still
have
engaged
in
a close
more
study
of
the classics
of
the western
tradition of the
kind that his
could
lead to
than a superficial understanding of

groundwork
As
a result of
having indirectly
laid the
for
fresh insight into
their own them.

about scene.
ceed
heritage, Strauss could still turn out to be of considerable assistance to If that should ever happen, however, it is more likely to be by the round
of an unpopular critique of
purpose
way
the whole
of
the contemporary theological
My
is
not
to outline such a critique or
indicate how it
a
might pro
if it
were
to be undertaken, but merely to set
forth
few
of the reasons of all at
that seem to
justify
it. This may be
accomplished
by looking
first
the
unique position that

of
Christianity
occupies vis-a-vis
the two other great religions
the
western
world, Islam and Judaism.

most
The simplest,
obvious, and
hence
most natural point of
understanding of the specific character of Christianity appears dicated in the opening pages of Persecution and the Art of Writing (pp. 9-10; 18-19). Whereas in both Islam and Judaism, Revelation takes the form of a Law
or of a comprehensive social order and
departure for any to be the one in
thought, in
as
Christianity
they
were
regulating virtually every it first comes to sight as a Faith

which
aspect of
human life
or a set of teachings call
("dogmas,"
later called)
of
do
not
of themselves
for
who
or encourage
the
formation
takes the trouble to read

cannot
any kind of political community. Anyone the New Testament attentively from this point of its
all
view
help being
It
struck
by
but total indifference to
problems of a
political nature.
will soon
be discovered that it
not
shows no awareness of the
properly dis
tinction between regimes,
does
indicate any
preference
for
one over the oth
ers, imposes none

reform of
of
its own,
and makes no concrete recommendations
for the
the social order. It was meant to be preached to all nations but was not
replace
destined to
them or meant to compete with them on their own level. It
simply takes for granted that Christians will continue to organize their temporal lives within the framework of the society to which they happen to belong and,
while
it strenuously
not
opposes all
forms
of
injustice, it leaves
ordained
the administration of
purpose.
public affairs to the authorities whom
God has
for this
Its dom
at
inant theme is
pretty fuzzy eral how human

another,
which
justice but love, and love as thing. Accordingly, it does not tell
a political principle
is
best
us who should
rule, but in
gen
beings, be they
a
rulers or subjects, ought
to behave toward one
is
different
matter altogether.
Even
might
as regards this
question, its
answers are not always as specific as one

are not universal
like them to be. The commandments that it issues
laws
of
351
Discussion
nature, possessed of an intrinsic
intelligibility
cases;
that would give us an
inkling
as
to
how they from his
could
be
applied to particular
they
are expressions of same
the will of
a personal and
loving
God
who
expects, nay, demands the
kind
of response
one-
creatures.
Moreover,
which
the situations that
they
envisage are
typically
on-one situations
from
there are few definite conclusions to be drawn re
garding the
behavior that is
"Love
your
appropriate when the welfare of the

enemy"
larger
commu
valid
nity is
at stake.
and
"Turn the
cheek"
other
may be
maxims
for the
person who prefers
forgiveness to
revenge and would rather give multi whom
up his life than take someone else's, but they are less readily applicable to lateral situations involving the safety and well-being of a third party for
one
is
responsible and whom one also
has the
duty
to
love. To
put
it bluntly, the is
God
of
the New Testament is not a very political animal. His own agenda
strictly transpolitical or, to use a religious any attempt to derive a coherent political Testament alone is bound to end in futility This is
not
term,
eschatological.
It follows that
the New
program
from the
pages of
or madness.
to
deny
that
Christianity
was
fraught from the

perceived as
outset with grave greatest asset was
practical consequences.
What its defenders
its
from the
man
standpoint of a political observer
its
most patent
liability.
By
calling hu
beings to
higher
destiny
and
reserving the best part of their existence for

the regime as a total way of life. It
of
the service of
God, it effectively destroyed

for
an elusive
cultivated a passion
kingdom
God beyond
history
as
and thus
tended to turn people's minds away from the only realities that reason
of
is
capable
knowing by
virtue and citizens.
itself. In the process, society the sole horizon lending meaning and substance to the
civil was
displaced
the
locus
of
activities of
its
The love
of one's own was no
longer
confined within specific
borders
human citizenship itself lost its fundamental significance. Even the greatest Shakes words of achievements were robbed of their former splendor. In the
and
"clay"
peare,
i.i.
kingdoms
were
and
it
was
"paltry
to be
Caesar"
(Ant.
and
Cleop.,
it
35 Such
and v.ii. 2).
are the real roots of the opposition that

spread throughout
Christianity
and
encountered when
first began to
its first ligion
the Roman
Empire,
to
it is to this
problem
that
apologists were
eventually
compelled
address themselves.
The
new re
would
have
gone the
succeeded
in demonstrating
not way of the radical sects of late antiquity had it society. For the needs of civil its adaptability to the
practical guidance
that the Gospel failed to provide, one could follow the exam
and turn
ple of some
early Christians
to
which
to the Hebrew
pointed
Scriptures; but they

were
these were
hardly
ble
suited
to the task since, as
Augustine
out,
the source of
the very
difficulty
Christianity
was offered as a solution.
The only
via
alternative, and the one that
finally
prevailed, was to
introduce
political phi
losophy
the
into the Christian be
scheme.
The feat
was a remarkable
one, and all the
more so as the new partner

marriage could
in the
proposed
alliance had to mend her ways
before
consummated.
Like the
captive woman of
Deuteronomy
21:10-14, to
whom she was often compared, she was
forced to
get rid of some
352
of
Interpretation
adornments, in
return
her
most precious
for
which she was granted a new
lease
on
life
and even allowed
to prosper, albeit under more or less constant ecclesias

as she remained content with
survival was
tical surveillance. As
aspire
long
her lot
and
did
not
to
higher status, her

who objected
insured.
For those
cape
to the treatment and refused to acquiesceîn
it,
an es
hatch
was available.
world and
They
could go
underground,
not
not
living
as non-Christians
with what was re
in
Christian
quired of everyone else.
wholly unfamiliar to them. It had always been more or less that of the philosopher in the city and was rendered only slightly more precarious by the existence of a reasonably well defined reli
gious
complying in deed if The predicament was
in thought
orthodoxy and of an established authority capable of enforcing it. Besides, it had its advantages. It kept alive the notion of an ideal that transcends the limits
of
the
political of
life
and allowed
for the
preservation of
the books through which
the nature
could pass
that ideal could be explored.

an
If, in Strauss's
eyes,
even a
Lessing
a philos a cave
for
"orthodox
Christian,"
the situation was not all
bad. To
opher, the
new religious
society
still
had the the
appearance of a
cave, but
that was unique in that it was characterized

within
by
the officially sanctioned presence

of
it
of
that
by
means of which
it
could
be illumined for the benefit
those
who were capable and
desirous
of such
illumination. For the basic
philosophic
distinction between
nature and convention another
distinction,
which
only
par
tially
and
parallels
it,
was
substituted, namely, the distinction between the
natural
the
supernatural or
between
what
human
reason at
its best is
capable of
dis
covering on its own and what it could conceivably learn only from some divine source. How the two might be related is itself a thorny question a fuller discus
sion of which would purposes.
take us much farther afield than is necessary for present
Reasonable
respect
as
this novel solution may
have been in
and
so
far
as
it did its best to

was not good
the legitimate demands of both faith
reason, it it
who
enough to
satisfy the philosophers of the it in the

respect
Enlightenment,
proceeded
to
mount an all-out attack on

was not
name of modern science.
The long-term
of
result
in every
the one that had been anticipated. Instead

paved
destroying
a spiri
positive
religion, the attack actually
the way for its resurgence as

of
tual
force in the West

which
during
the early
decades
the nineteenth century. Chris
tianity,
throughout the
contemporary society, was to be good in it, science and freedom included. The
to
preceding century had been blamed for the evils of suddenly hailed as the source of all that was supposed
modern world was indebted it for everything le monde moderne lui doit tout as Chateaubriand proudly announced in the Introduction to the first part of the Genius of Christianity, one of the most popular books of the and the fountainhead of so many of the century ideas later to be expounded with all sorts of new twists by de Tocqueville, Nietz
sche, and countless others who came to the conclusion that the origins of
political and scientific
modern
thought were to be sought in the ancient or the

shall
medieval problem
Christian tradition. (I
say nothing
about
Hegel,
who restated
the
353
Discussion
depth to
which
and
with a philosophical
Chateaubriand
the
could not and
did
not
aspire.)
Far from opposing their fundamental

other.
Christianity
modernity, it became fashionable to
proclaim
agreement and stress
links that bound

from the
them one to the
The
fly
the
in the
ointment
is that,
quite apart
question of
of
its historical
accuracy, the new argument was a pure and simple

pulled
inversion
the old one. It terms in

which
bag
inside out,
so to
speak, but did nothing to

exceptions, its
alter the
the problem was posed.

unaware of versaries.
With
rare
leading
advocates were
mostly
the extent to which
they
shared the perspective of their erstwhile ad

upon
They, too, had
come to
look
Christianity
it is
as a political or cultural
phenomenon and could
think of no better way to serve it than

account of
by defending
it
on
those grounds.
age of the one
In retrospect, their
barely
more
than a mirror
im it
they
rejected.
At
no point
does
one sense that a real

raised
breakthrough
had been
could
achieved and
that the issue had been
to the level on which
The
be profitably joined, if not completely resolved. argument had the added drawback of disqualifying in
tempt to probe more the
deeply
into the
problem.
Part
of
it
consisted never
divinely
alone
revealed character of
the Christian faith had past, as
any at in saying that been questioned,
advance
let
rejected,
written
by the
greatest thinkers of the
was evident
from
all that
they had
tack on
credulous"
it. The idea that they (Chateaubriand's expression) and had

praise of
in
might
have been
"secretly
in
refrained
it
as a matter of
necessity
rather
than of choice
from any frontal at was dismissed as a con
trivance of its
of religion
latter-day
opponents,
a gigantic
fraud
perpetrated
by
the enemies
for the
express purpose of
casting further discredit
upon
it. It is
no
mere coincidence
that the best case against the
existence and even
the possibility
of an esoteric tradition
extending
as
far back
as
antiquity
should
be the
one put
forward
by
Schleiermacher, the
most
famous
name
in early nineteenth-century
was
Christian
theology.1
Needless to say, the

emerge unscathed
Christianity
whose
victory
thus secured did not
from the battle. It
was all
too often a transmogrified and secu
larized Christianity, seemingly bent on making its peace with the modern world on the latter's terms and acceptable to its now weary critics because what it had to offer was not noticeably different from what they had been demanding all
along.
nounce
Lessing,
who anticipated the new
trend and was one of the first to de the time what its eventual out
it,
saw more
come was and was as
likely
clearly than to be. He left little doubt

of
anyone else at
as to where
his
own preferences
lay
fearful
the growing irrationalism of
of the new-found rationalism of
philosophy as he was Christian theology. As he puts it in a letter to his

modern
brother:
With
orthodoxy, thank
God,
things were
fairly
well settled.
curtain
had been drawn

without dis-
between it
and philosophy,
behind
which each could go
his
own
way
l.
F. Schleiermacher, Platons Werke,
3rd ed.
(Berlin, 1855), Vol. I,
pp. I5ff.
354
Interpretation
the other.
now? They are tearing down this curtain, and Christians, they are making us very irrational making philosophers. I beg of you, my dear brother, inquire more carefully after this point and look less at what our new theologians discard than at what they want to put in its place. We are agreed that the old religious system is false, but I cannot share your conviction
turbing
But
what
is
happening
under the pretext of
us rational
bunglers and half philosophers. I know of nothing in the world human sagacity has been better displayed and cultivated. The real patchwork of bunglers and half philosophers is the religious system which they now want to set in
that
it is
a patchwork of
in
which
place of the old, and with

ever presumed.
far
more
influence
on reason and
My
neighbor s
house threatens to
collapse upon
philosophy than the old him. If my neighbor

not want to raze
will
wants to raze
rather
it, I
shall
to support and
underpin
sincerely help him. However, he does it in such a way that my house

project or
it, but
ruined.
He
must
desist from his

own. ed.
shall concern myself
be completely with his collapsing
house
my Werke, IX, Paul Rilla,
as
if it
were
(Letter to Karl, Feb. 2,
1774.
Lessing, Gesammelte
p.
[Berlin,
1956],
pp. 596-97.
English translation in H. E.
Allison, Lessing
and the
Enlightenment [Ann
Arbor,
1966],
84; H. Chadwick,
Lessing's Theological Writings [Stanford, 1957], P-I3-)
The diagnosis for
was
amazingly
perspicacious.
by
all of
the efforts that were subsequently made to break the old
Its accuracy is amply vouched deadlock be

spheres of of
tween faith and reason

man existence or
by
relegating them to parallel but separate collapsing them one into the other at the risk
by
hu
obliterating
the distinction between them altogether; so much so that,
by
the end of the nine
teenth century, Nietzsche could dismiss all theologians as philosophic babblers

"Schleiermachers,"
and all philosophers as crypto-theologians or spinners of veils.
that is to say,
Later
of
attempts to redress the
balance,
such as
the one that goes under the name
Neo-orthodoxy, have only partially

of
succeeded
from the bondage

that
its
new masters.
in rescuing Christian theology Strauss's incidental remark to the effect

as
Neo-orthodoxy
is
not
the same
thing
Orthodoxy, for
"Neo"
otherwise the
would most
be superfluous, is very much to the point. It is significant that two of the influential theological works of our century should be entitled, one Church
Dogmatics
tematic"
(by
Karl Barth),
and
and the other,
Systematic Theology
(by
Paul Tillich).
and
If the Cartesian
suggest
Leibnizian
"dogmatic"
antecedents of the terms

with
"sys
nearly as clean Although vastly different from liberal Protestantism both in its inspiration its
essential
anything, it is that the break as it claimed to be.
the modern tradition was not
and
features,
up
the
Roman Catholic theology

modernity,
not
of
the same period likewise

re
failed to
come
with a solution
that could command universal respect. It
sponded to the challenge of
ignoring
it in favor
of a return
to medieval
by settling its accounts thought in its pristine or

10, the
with
it, but
by
in
premodern
tegrity. From
its
obscure
beginnings
about 18
movement grew to sizable
proportions and
gradually took the
shape of a massive counteroffensive against
the encroachments of modern thought.
Part
of
its
difficulty
it
is that it inherited
to di-
from its
romantic past a touch of archaism of which
was not always able
355
vest
Discussion
confined
itself. Its impact,
by
and
large to the Roman Catholic world,
was
only rarely felt by anyone outside of it. Nor did it produce any thinkers of the very first rank. Worse still, it never fully came to grips with the single most important ob
stacle
to any
comprehensive reinstatement of premodern
umph of modern natural science. scribes as
Its
promoters opted
modern
thought, to wit, the tri instead for what Strauss de

of a nonteleological natural crucial
"a
fundamental, typically
teleological science of
dualism
man"
science and a
(NRH, 8). In this
respect,
they
were at one with
their liberal Protestant counterparts, with whom,

since
interestingly
enough,
verdict
they have
been drawn into
ever closer partnership.
Strauss's final
is that, their differences to the contrary notwithstanding, both groups are Their leaders and chief spokesmen "all are modern really "in the same (NRH, 7). This, more than anything else, is what lies at the root of the
boat."
men"
indifference,
pays
the skepticism, or the
hostility that
so often characterizes their reac
tion to Strauss. Their most common objection to the Straussian project too
is that it
little
attention
to modern science and thus
fails to
lay
is
an adequate meta
neither
physical
foundation for itself. In short, Strauss's
position
dogmatic
enough nor skeptical enough
to please anybody today. To anyone who
has
never
seriously questioned the primacy of epistemology or the modern commitment to the ideal of certitude, the objection appears to be unanswerable. One
"scientific"
can
try
to answer
it,
as
Strauss does,
by
pointing to its
contingent source
in early
thought, but only at the risk of arousing the antagonism of one's critics. As the Introduction to Natural Right and History reminds us with the help of a
modern
quote
from Lord Acton, "Few discoveries

ideas."
are more
irritating
than those which
expose
the pedigree of
which
The deeper question,

more consistent return
is
hardly
ever addressed
any more, is
whether a
to the basic
principles of premodern
thought would
be in
the best interest of theology itself. What recommends the modem scientific view to a large number of theologians is that, to the extent to which it prescinds
methodologically from any of religion intact and hence

the
other
consideration of
poses no great
threat to its
first principles, it leaves the domain supremacy. Its danger, on

of the services of
hand, is
of a
that
by depriving theology
it
of
its traditional
it up to the
handmaiden it
either empties
its intellectual
content or opens with
influence
Few ally
host
of other
ideas
whose
compatibility
the teachings of the
Gospel has
yet
to be demonstrated.
people would go so
far
as to
of revealed religion or
deny
say that classical philosophy is the natural that the decision to introduce it into the fold in
risk,"
volved
certain
risk.
The Church Fathers

the phrase
called
it
xivdwoz,
borrowing
it
could
from Plato. Some it

was worth
of
xaXog them, like Tertullian,

no other rea
"noble
balked
son
at
it. The
shrewder ones
thought
a
taking, if for
than that
eventually lead to
all that a wholehearted commitment

mitted that
better grasp of the Christian faith and of to it entails. After all, it was generally ad
so sure of
philosophy
could never
be
itself
as to rule out the
possibil-
356
Interpretation
an unfinished and unfinishable quest
ity
of
Revelation. As
position of
for knowledge, it
was
in the
having
fundamental
problem can
constantly to re-examine its own presuppositions. If no be settled once for all, it could well be that the highest
achievement of possible
human
reason
is it
to prove, not
indeed that divine
revelation
is
to
do that
would
be to disprove its
supernatural character
but that
the
arguments adduced against
are not sufficient to establish a choice
its impossibility.
The
the
matter
finally
comes
down to
between
truth that is for the good of
intellect
alone and a
salutary
or
beatifying
the
truth that represents the good of the

them cannot
whole person.
Since, by definition,
issue between
be decided
on
the level of philosophic reason alone, and since there the

are a
is
no
higher
principle on
we
basis
left
of which a synthesis
between the two

at the
positions might
be effected,
be fruitful
with a
fundamental tension
heart
of the so-called
"Great
Tradition,"
tension which
as one
Strauss did
not
lament but
which
he thought
could
as
long By
knew how to live it.

modern science
showing that
has
not replaced
God
and that
History
has
not replaced
philosophy, or
by showing
as no one
has done in four hundred

untouched
years
that the claims of Reason and Revelation are
inherently
by modernity,
for theology as he has for philoso phy. Living as they do in an age of unbelief, that is to say, in an age in which conviction is grounded neither in reason nor in authoritative tradition, Christian
Strauss may have
performed as great a service
theologians may yet discover that
they have
as much
to learn from him as
from
one another or
could regain some
from any of their lost
of their new allies about the credibility.
way in
which
they do they
Walter Benjamin / Gershom Scholem

Stanley Corngold & Michael Jennings
Princeton
University'
Briefwechsel 1933-1940. Edited
by Gershom
Scholem. (Frankfurt
am
Main:
Suhrkamp, 1980.)
The letter
personal and
occupies a privileged position
in Walter Benjamin's
oeuvre.
His
intellectual
relationships
depend
largely
on
correspondence; indeed
his friendships occasionally seem to have been designed as opportunities for let ter writing. Benjamin also attributed to the letter an overriding political and his
torical
significance.
As
result, many
of
his letters
of
are essays
in miniature, in
works.
formed This
by
all the seriousness and
self-conscious valorization of
subtlety letter writing has
his better-known
provoked a good
deal
of
Scholem and Theodor Adorno, the editors of Benjamin's correspon dence, suggest different explanations for the special power of these letters. For Scholem, they remain primarily the testimony of a personality distinctive for its
comment.
solitude
and uniqueness.
Scholem's
subjective
reading,
which
appears
in his
comments on
the original edition of
Benjamin's letters
a
and throughout
genius.1
their cor
at
respondence, seeks and
finally
finds
complex,
brooding
Scholem's
tempt to make of his friend a man apart has found ready acceptance in America. The writings of Hannah Arendt, Charles Rosen and Susan Sontag use Romantic tropes to mystify Benjamin
as outsider and
iconoclast, in Sontag's
propagated an
phrase of
"the
last
min
intellectual."2
Adorno,
on
the other
hand,
image
Benja
truth. For exemplary for its abstraction from personality and its intellectual Adorno, Benjamin strove to erase from his person and from his writings all sub
jectivity: his Benjamin is the becomes for Adorno

message.'
objective medium of a
higher truth. The letter thus

writer and ostensible
an
independent form sublating both
Any
vidual
such one-sided
reading
of these
letters is
misleading.
Neither
approach
responds
to Benjamin's
and
sense of
the letter form

political
as a mediator
between the indi

are
subject
the historical and
context.
Benjamin's letters
intended to
1. 1.
preserve
the dialectical tension between the private and the public

Main; Suhrkamp, in Zur Aktualitdt
pp.
1966),
Cf. Scholem's introduction to Walter Benjamin, Briefe (Frankfurt Benjamin und sein pp. 7-9. and esp. Scholem's essay "Walter
ed.
am
Engel."
Walter Benjamins,
2.
Siegfried Unseld (Frankfurt

"Introduction:
am
Main: Suhrkamp, 1972),

"
87-138.
Cf. Hannah Arendt.
Walter Benjamin:
1892-1940
to Walter
nations, ed.
"The Ruins
of
Hannah Arendt (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. 1968). pp. New York Review of Books. 27 Oct. 1977. Walter
Benjamin,"
Intellectual,"
Benjamin, Illumi 1-55: Charles Rosen,

pp.
31-40; 10 Nov.
12
1977. PP- 30-38; and 1978, pp. 75-76.

3.
Susan Sontag, "The Last
New York Review of Books.
Oct.
Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, introduction to Benjamin, Briefe.
pp.
14-15-
358
Interpretation
between Benjamin
and
nature of the utterance and

respondence
with
his
addressee.
As the
cor
means
perhaps
which
Scholem plainly shows, the letter became for Benjamin a the primary means of maintaining his intellectual indepen
was
dence, for
and
he
forced to
wage a
fierce
struggle.
Attempts to
annex
Benjamin
and
his
work
to a series of political, theological
literary
movements
1930s, the
nest.
period of
date back to the 1920s, although it was only in the his exile, that the conflicts for his allegiance began in ear
correspondence
The Benjamin
-Scholem
is only the
most extensive
docu
the
mentation of a
friend's
or collaborator's efforts
to correct and
finally
steer
course of
Benjamin's thought. Scholem's

of
attempts
to convince Benjamin of the
irrelevance leled
historical in the
materialism
to the main structures of

on the part of
his thought is
paral
and
by
efforts
opposite
direction
both Bertolt Brecht

things"
Adorno. Brecht
of a
could not
tolerate Benjamin's mysticism and the resultant vision
Marxism
concerned
the "fine and
spiritual."4
direct
action were
and a
and equally with the "struggle for raw material To Brecht, this constituted a denial of the efficacy of return to bourgeois cultural values. Max Horkheimer and
Adorno Jewish
attuned, of course, to Benjamin's spiritual
delicacy, inspired by
Marxism
and to
mysticism and
German Idealism. But his

crude a
attraction to
Brecht's plain, indeed,
ish him repeatedly for

marked
thinking ("plumpes Denken") led them to admon lack of mediation in his thought. Benjamin's letters are
in them
an effort
by resistance
to all such attempts to reform him. He saw
to simplify
his thought impermissibly,

corresponds as a
and
by
excising from it apparently irreconcil

courtesy"
able elements.
The letter
noted
form to that "Chinese

never
of
Benjamin's,
of
by
friend
foe alike; he
failed to introduce into his friendships

These
served to
habits
of an almost ritualistic complexity.
define the lines
ap
proach and
to ensure Benjamin's separateness and
independence. friends
By imposing
Scholem,
physical as well as
intellectual distance
even upon
as close as
Benjamin
their
protected
multiplicity."5
"the contradictory and mobile of his "convictions in It should not be forgotten that for Benjamin to maintain his
whole"
intellectual independence in the

former friends
shelter of
1930s
required
uncommon
courage.
While
and sometime antagonists were

and secure
launching
their salvoes
from the
institutions
incomes, Benjamin
remained a peripatetic exile

place."6
who could
"no longer really

of
early days ment in Germany had been

are places where
the exile which
live in any one began for him in 1933 before

manage to
Even in the
employ
the
all
literary
I
can
closed
to
him, Benjamin
wrote to
Scholem that "there live

on
can earn a minimal
amount, and places
where
4.
and
Benjamin, "Uber den Begriff der
Geschichte,"
Hermann Schweppenhauser
5.
with the collaboration of
in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Rolf Tiedemann Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem
(Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1971- 1982), 1.2.694. All translations are our own. Benjamin/Scholem, Briefwechsel, p. 138. 6. Benjamin, Berliner Kindheit urn Neunzehnhundert (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp,
1977),
p.
M9
359
basis
Discussion
amount, but
not a single one
of a minimal
in
which
both
of these conditions
coincide."7
Scholem's letters
min's precarious strain
show that and
he
was well aware of and often worried
by
Benja
re en
financial
intellectual
situation.
This did not,
however,
seriously
him from
a series of
judgments
which seek not so much to
gage
Benjamin's
political convictions as to call

s work
into
question their authenticity. a viewpoint which
He found in Benjamin led to

polemics of
"an intensive He
and
swine."9
self-betrayal"
increasing
virulence."
could thus ask with plain sarcasm
if
essay his best insights before dialectical
a recent
was a
"communist
credo"
finally
accuse
Benjamin
of
"casting
deed condescending, is
the
one which
This tone, uncompromising and in Scholem would not have allowed himself in
with
first fifteen
years of
his
friendship
Benjamin. In the
correspondence
prior
to the period covered
in this book, Scholem's

material
attitude toward
Benjamin
was
less
assured and even

equals.
deferential; Benjamin
institutional
position
first between
lem
solidifies
As Benjamin's
his
own
established himself quite early as base erodes, however, and as Scho (he had been appointed Ordinarius at
the Hebrew
University
upon
in Jerusalem),
the
a not so subtle change of tone enters the

of
correspondence.
Benjamin becomes the prodigal, the betrayer

which
the original
ba
sis,
theology,
appears
friendship
harm
was
founded. It
underestimate
the
psychological
of this alteration
be wrong to for Benjamin. Although

would
he
to
withstand
this and similar inroads on his
independence,
small
at what
cost?
The growing
recognition of
Scholem's
writes of
stature
in the
1930s and the simulta
neous
dwindling of his
ones"
own
he
his "victories in
matters, defeats
in large
whether
provide a context
in
which
he
was conscious of the exercise of power or not, must
Scholem's intellectual imperialism, be critically for both

correspon
questioned.10
To
appreciate
the importance of this political controversy
dents,
min
one must recall their common political
background. In their youth, Benja

anarchism.
and
Scholem
professed
theologically-charged
of 192 1
Benjamin's
is something like the manifesto of this Benjamin denies any direct connection between two-member movement. There, secular political action and the intervention of a messianic nature into history.
"Theological-Political
history"
Fragment"
Benjamin demonstrates his "mystical

phor:
conception of
by
means of a meta
the flight
of an arrow toward
happiness,
which represents secular
activity,
inadvertently
sity."
accelerates
the flight of an
of
The coming of the messianic order human history toward its own extinction (even in bliss):
The
secular
representing "messianic inten is hastened precisely by the movement

arrow
is to be
sure not a
category
of
the Kingdom
but
rather one of
the most per
tinent
7.
categories of
its stealthy
approach.
For in
profane
happiness everything worldly
Benjamin/Scholem, Briefwechsel,
p. 525.
p. 39.
8. Benjamin, Briefe,
9. 10.
pp.
136,251.
Ibid.,
p. 23.
360
strives
Interpretation
for its final demise.
of world
Nature is
messianic
in its
eternal and
total transience.
The task
this
politics, which must adopt nihilism as

transience."
its method, is the striving for
eternal and
total
Benjamin's
ment.
nihilism and apocalypticism are nowhere stronger
than
in this
frag
His
sense of
history
as an
irreversible from
process of continuous
deterioration
will remain a cornerstone of
his
in
political thought.
Even in his last essay, "On the
Concept
as a
History,"
of
written
1940
Marxist perspective,
history
appears
"single catastrophe,
which
heaps
rubble on
top
of
rubble."12
faith in
As he turns to Marxism, however, Benjamin gradually brings to his nihilism a political action. As early as 1924 Benjamin had read Georg Lukacs's
and
History
Class Consciousness,
element of
an encounter
he
was
later to describe
as
"ep
the
ochal."
The Marxist
his thought,
strengthened
communism of
the French surrealists, continued to grow
by during
is
his study
of
the 1930s, espe
cially
under
the influence of Brecht. Benjamin's Marxism

of a political mood of
of course remark
ably idiosysncratic, even by the standards dated heterodoxy. But he can tolerate the
arises
theory
that
has
accommo
from
a reflection on a process of
only as it decline. There is strictly speaking no idea

optimism
historical
of progress ates
in Benjamin's thought Hegel
except
through political action
which acceler
the rate of decline.

stood on
If Marx
his head, Benjamin turns him inside
out.
Benjamin's
radically
conception of
history
is
neither progressive nor
integral, but
consists of
discontinuous
moments at a sort of
dialectical
up the
standstill:
The historical for him the
materialist must give
epic element
in history.
History
becomes
the
sin
object of a construction whose content
is
not
empty time, but
rather
gular epoch, the singular

reified
life,
the singular work.
He
explodes the epoch out of the
"historical
continuity,"
the life
out of
the epoch, the
individual
work out of
the
life's
in the
work.
The
result of
this sort
of construction
is that the life's life's work,

and
work
is
retained and
sublated
in the individual work, the
epoch
in
the
the course of
history
epoch.11
Benjamin's
of
political project
is inspired
from
an
by
this model of
historiography. The
goal
"revolution"
is to
explode
cal process a charged moment and so struction of the present.
apparently uniform and intelligible histori liberate its messianic potential for the de
of
"In the experiencing

was so
the
past powerful
forces become
Benjamin
as a sees
free
which
lay
bound in the 'It
once'
of
historicism."14
the outcome of this destruction of an
illusory
historical continuity
"messianic
freezing
a certain
of
events."15
His theology
of nihilism was always able
to accommodate
Marxism.
Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, 11,1,203-4. Ibid., 1,2,697. Ibid., 1,2,703. Ibid., "Eduard Fuchs, der Sammler und der
Ibid., "Uber den Begriff der
Geschichte,"
Historiker,'
11.2,468.
1.2,703.
361
Discussion
Unlike
cal
Benjamin, Scholem is reluctant to admit any effect of deliberate politi activity, however indirect, on the development of a theological order. Even
softened
as
he
his
anarchistic
and
antinomian
political
tendencies, Scholem
maintained a strict separation of political
mately
disturbing
letter
of
activity and messianism. In an ulti he reveals the depth and staying power of his 1933
faith in
The
that
unaided apocalypse:
most
it
will
takes the
thing about the problem is, though, if one can even dare to say so, only be fruitful for the human situation of German Jews if a true pogrom place of the lukewarm one which one will only try to stop. This represents
terrible
probably the only chance that something positive will emerge from this sort of explo sion. For the catastrophe is certainly of world-historical dimensions, and we can now
learn to
understand 1492.
16
The
reference
to the expulsion of the Jews

of
from Spain in its
1492 reveals a great
deal
about
Scholem's understanding Scholem

explains
the crisis and of
possible effects.
Con
sciousness of
this cataclysmic event is a
fundamental
constituent of
the
cabalistic
tradition,
as
in detail in his Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism;

as
by implication, then, only an event of such relentless inhumanity, unthinkable desired by any rational will, could have an enduring effect upon history.
Despite these differences,
the seriousness of their
and
however, Benjamin
both
of
and
Scholem
share a sense of
correspondence:
are conscious of on
the
documentary
in Ger intellectual his letters
the
indeed
representative
value
their
comments
the
events
many
comments often
couched, significantly, in the

refers
rhetorical and
styles of past eras. value
Scholem
to their
common attempt
to save something of
saw
from "the
un-German."17
autodafe of
everything
Reich."1*
Benjamin
as a
repository
of
dream images
Third
which together constituted
"a
picture atlas of
secret
history
in
of the
Letter writing becomes

to one
breathed."
one of the
last
forms
phere
of expression and
which
indeed
of resistance available
exiled
in
an atmos
"the
air can
hardly
be
(Benjamin
also noted that
the
condition of the air
"loses its
pertinence when one's throat exploit
is
being
progressively
theo
tied
shut"!)19
Benjamin hoped however to
in the letter
a more than
power; he saw its power as revolutionary. His understanding of the revolutionary effect of the letter is elaborated in a se commentaries in 193 1 and ries of letters by other writers which he published with German epistolary prose of examples 1932 in the Frankfurter Zeitung. He drew
retical
from
the period
1783-
1883, from
writers as
diverse
as
Kant, Goethe,
Metter-
nich, and Nietzsche. Benjamin took political effect he hoped for from the
pains
to inform Scholem and others of the

these
publication of
letters in Hitler's Ger
many
16.
17. 18.
they
appeared
in book form in
p. 55.
1936 under the title Deutsche Menschen.
Ibid., Ibid., Ibid.,
p. 59. p.
128.
19.
p. 38.
362
Interpretation
original
In the book's
ger
the work's availability in

purpose of
introduction, which was finally deleted Germany, Benjamin writes:

letters is
to show the
so as not to endan
The
this series of
face
of a
"secret
Germany"
which
is
eagerly today behind gloomy mists. For there really does exist a secret Germany. But its secrecy is not merely the expression of Germany's famous interiority
sought
for
so
and profundity,
but
an
rather
the product of
forces
which,
noisily
and
brutally, have
condemned
denied
Germany
importance in the
public sphere and, at the same
time,
it to
a secret
importance.20
This
importance, residing for Benjamin in the prose written in an earlier is not to be understood in any conventionally conservative sense. Benja period, min and Scholem shared an esoteric theory of language. Like Karl Kraus, they
secret
believed that the

aspect of
spiritual and moral condition of a culture is inscribed on every its language. But they believed also that language retained the traces of pre-Adamic harmony of the human and the divine. In their view, the timely
publication of
these letters
could
have revolutionary
consequences
by bringing to
of
bear
on
the debased language of fascist
Germany
the
language
that secret
Germany
namely, a language containing traces
of an unmediated relation
to
the divine. This intent
illustrates proleptically the most important Benjamin's late historiography: the dialectical image.
concept of
Every
present
is determined
by
those
of
images
which are synchronic with
is the Now
time that
nor
of a certain
possibility
knowledge. In this Now truth is
so
it: every Now loaded with
does the
and
it is ready to explode. The past does not throw its light onto the present, present illumine the past, but an image is formed when that which has
been
the Now come together

at a standstill.
in
flash
as a constellation.
In
other words: the
image
is the dialectic
For
while
purely temporal one, the relationship of one: this relationship is not a temporal one, but
The image
which
relationship of the that which has been to

rather
the
present to the past
is
the Now
is
dialectical image.
has the
of
character of an
is read,
that
is,
the
image in the Now

of
its
possible perception,
upon
is
marked to the
which all
highest degree
based.'1
by
the
stamp
the critical, dangerous moment
reading is
The dialectical image is Benjamin's term for the

sion
product
of
this
colli
the junction of a moment from the past with a moment in the present his
torical context of the reader. the past (what has

present
Every
such
image
contains an essential revelation of
is
critical
been) and the present (the Now). This constellation of past and because, if accurately read, it reveals in an explosive way the
barrenness
in its relationship to the past. his Marxism his original mystical understanding of the messianic course of history. The ideas set down in the 1921 fragment re main the cornerstones of his thought. As a kind of political activity, reading aids the larger theological enterprise, triggering explosions which reveal historical
of present
history
Benjamin keeps intact
within
20. 21.
Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, critical Ibid., Das Passagen-Werk, v, 1,578.
apparatus to
Deutsche Menschen, iv,2,945.
363
Discussion
and
degeneration
continues
hasten the
end of time.
It is only in this
world
sense
that Benjamin
to advocate nihilism as the "method of
politics,"
and
only in this
sense that
he
can
refer,
as
late
as
1934, to his
wholehearted agreement with
Scholem's idea
tory."22
of a
"theocracy
and
Heilsgeschichte immune to
secular
his in
Benjamin's
spired
sense of revolution
thus has more in
common with an act of
reading than it does with seizing railroads. Attributing power for change to human perception and reason, his historical materialism is deeply attached to
German Idealism. The Mandarin
optimism of
his Marxism,
with
its apparently
contradictory overlay of mysticism and nihilism, isolates Benjamin within the Socialist camp. His ascribing a revolutionary potential to the letter form is only
one example of
his
esoteric
with
idealization
occasional
of
Marxist
praxis.
Yet the
correspon
dence
with
Scholem,
its
deliberate invocation
of the style and the
letter writing from the past, makes quite clear the importance Benjamin attached to the enterprise. As in Deutsche Menschen, Benjamin meant his letters ideas
of
to
Scholem to
If
contain and elaborate
publication and
Benjamin's personality survives the Correspondence, it is the messianism of Benjamin's will to read
a single of
power
reading impression
could
revolutionary impulses liberate.
which
future
acts of
volume of
the
and write. are
His
to sustain this will and make
it
work
is
exceptional.
There
few
other
examples of
this determination to go on writing under such difficult circumstan
ces and yet at so
uncompromising
a standard of
depth
and refinement.
The fact high
that Benjamin was
a professional critic
does
not
itself explain the
persistent
quality
This
of
grounds
A relenting of Benjamin now urgently that
his
work.
standards would seem more needs
likely,
on the
to make a living.
steadfastness of
the impulse to write, as documented in this correspon

climate
dence,
comes
into
our
lukewarm
like
an
icy
wind.
Here
we are
inclined
there
to authorize the right of melancholy to undo our productive
impulses;
pain and
is
Benjamin's dislocation
power and
to
work
uncertainty.
harrowing creatively Letter after letter registers his

under
circumstances of
poverty,
despon
dency,
no
doubt, but
also news of
his writing,
that so
of new works achieved.
In this light it
cerned with the
comes as no surprise
much of
this
correspondence
is
con sus a
personality
and work of
Franz Kafka: Benjamin Kafka. He

an saw
must
have
tained himself through an
ego-identification with
in Kafka's life
fragile
material
base like his
own
and, beyond this,
bent wholly on tion to say that Benjamin's personal survival depended on his false notes in Max Brod's biography of Kafka. If this "amiable
literary
and philosophical enterprise
exemplary devotion to a salvation. It is no exaggera

rejection of
friend,"
the
the au
"holy"
thor of
works, were
Kafka,
then there existed no genuine precedent

wished
for
the
writer and
personality
which
Benjamin
to become. Indeed
of
one of the
great puzzles
for him
about
Kafka is the very fact
his
friendship
with
Brod.
22.
p.
163.
364
Interpretation
Brod's
biography
is
reprehensible
because
of
the attitude of
bonhomie,
the
lack
of
reserve, toward
its
subject:
this point returns precisely to that

and which
distance
thresh
which
Benjamin
required
from his friends

"the
author's
misses
his letters
.
accomplished.
Brod's text is
olds
enfeebled
by
and
distances.
Brod
striking lack Kafka's composure, his
of a sense of
self-posses
sion."2'
Benjamin
of
stresses
Kafka's
strength even while
insisting
on
the
fragility
and
negativity sion. There is in Kafka's
his
project
which, like Benjamin's own, required protective

work
seclu
"only
the
products of
its
decay
something less than left."24 But one of these are

which requires
"wisdom"
for
of wisdom
products
is "the
ru
about
the true things, a rumor

and so pace
intent listening. Kafka lis

"Conversation,"
tened to tradition
wrote
Max Brod
not
he did
not
talk!
know this), "takes away the importance, Benjamin's chief point the seriousness, the truth from everything I Kafka (though Benjamin did
think."25
about
Kafka's truth, then, despite its

attachment
great verisimilitude
work
to modern experience,
is its
to tradition. As a
which
arises
from
an
act of
listen
ing
tially
what see.
not of seeing,
solitary."1''
for "he
even
Yet
the best observers,

and
who listens strenuously does not it is "essen from his solitary venue, Kafka did not fail to hear like Sir Arthur Eddington and Paul Klee, were able to an exact sense
"What is really
in
most recent world of experience was

tradition."27
wildly incredible in Kafka is that this conveyed to him precisely by this mystical
Scholem,
of
criticism.
of course, shows a
lively
interest in this discussion, but the degree
his involvement is different

Their
and altogether
less
personal.
It
makes
for
poorer
key
exchange, for example, turns on this question of Kafka's re
lation to the truth

ous metaphor.
of tradition.
Benjamin
puts
the matter in the form of a
marvel
Kafka's
truth
real genius was
in
are
order
to
cling
to
ings
fundamentally
more
that he attempted something entirely new: he sacrificed its transmissibility to the Haggadic element. Kafka's writ parables. But it is their misery and their beauty that they had to
become
than parables.
They do
feet
of
not
modestly lie
it.:8
at
the
feet
of
doctrine,
the way
that the Haggadah
lies up
at a
the
the Halakah. Even
as
they have
submitted,
they
unexpectedly
raise
mighty
paw against
(Haggadah
strict
refers to
those
legends
or parables
found in the Talmud; Halakah
are
deductions from Mosaic law
issuing
into
binding
which
precepts.)
This is Benjamin's
phrases:
essential view of
Kafka,
Robert Alter
finely
para or
"Kafka's parabolic fictions
are not,
most essentially,
dreams
23. 24. 25.

p.
Ibid.,
pp.
267, 268-69.
Ibid., p. Diaries,
272.
1910-1913, ed. Max
Brod. trans. loseph Krcsh (New York: Schocken,

p. 271.
1948).
292. 26. 27. 28.
Ibid.,
Ibid.,
p. 272.
365
Discussion
but
a
theological allegories or enigmatic psychograms or prophetic myths,

of
body
es
Aggadah in
search of a
Halakhah, lore in
quest of
Law,
yet so
painfully
tranged
from
what
it
seeks
that the pursuit can end in a pounce of
destruction,
frank
the
fictional rending the doctrinal."29 What, now, is Scholem's response to this

gorization.
reading?
He
cannot resist
alle-
the coded
current
"In my view the clergyman in the Cathedral [in Kafka's The Trial] is figure of a Halakist, a rabbi able to transmit, if not the Law, then its
traditions
from
a parable about
it."30
Scholem insists that Kafka's

The
per
spective
world of
is that
of
the Jewish mystic, despite Kafka's failure to credit it. "The

world of revelation.
.
Kafka is the
out what
crux
is the
impossibility
of
carrying
ogy law
and
the
key
has been revealed; at this point to Kafka's world come together. interpretation.
.
.
a correctly understood theol

. .
The
existence of
the secret
wipes out your
Here
you
have
gone
too far
in
your exclu
bathwater."" But in a theology, tossing out baby with the Trial Scholem had also written, "Only your Nothingness is the
sion of
poem on
The /
experience
Which they
more
can
have
of
you."32
Benjamin
seizes on
this
word.
Nothingness is
to irremediable
than the
failure to carry
out revealed of
truth.""
law; it
which
points rather
absence, the lost
"consistency
And yet, in Kafka, this Nothingness

therein
is
carried over
into the
irreality
of
fiction,
finds its truth. "I have

feel his way to it this way
salva
on
show,"
tried to
Benjamin writes, "how Kafka has

'Nothingness'
sought to
tion
on
the reverse side of this
if I
can put
its
lining.'"4
min
has
made
What is generally clear in this polemic is that, for Scholem, Benja Kafka too much the modern writer operating out of a certain secu
larized
logical
negative
theology,
Kafka is
and
too little the Jew.

and
In the discussion between Benjamin
Scholem,
the dispute about the theo

accounts are
bearing in
more
a matter of nuance and

accurate
degree. Both their
evidently
plored
refined
and
than the commentaries
which read
they de
Kafka's
theological commentaries of the example, as an
Prague
school
which
Castle, for
truth is
allegory deal
of
of
"man's
search
for
God."'5
The Benjamin/Scholem
superior
correspondence on
the
question of
Kafka's
the
attitude to
to a
good
commentary today,
"superior"
even of
most meticu
lous
epistemological sometimes
kind. We say
account of
as
meaning
matter
more
faithful to
Kafka's
plain
the matter.
The
turns now on the

so astute a
question of the alleged principal

reader as
Manfred Frank
still argues
negativity for its absolute

Past,"
of truth
in Kafka. Even
negativity."1
Truth is only of
29.
and
in Defenses of the Imagination: Jewish Writers Walter Benjamin, "The Aura of the Modern Historical Crisis (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America. 1977), p. 60.
30. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34.
Benjamin/Scholem, Briefwechsel.
p. p.
159. 159.
Ibid., Ibid.,
Ibid., Ibid.,
Ibid.
pp.
157-158, [54
p. 255.
p. 272.
p.
160.
35. 36.
Inversus,"
See,
e.g.
"Ordo
in Geist
und
Zeichen (Heidelberg: Winter, 1977),
pp. 75~92-
366
what
Interpretation
not
is
the case;
unutterableness of put
truth: whatever can
it is, namely, the truth of untruth. Kafka's truth is the be said is not true. But Benjamin does not let it be added,
so sophistically.
the point either so absolutely or,
For if this
were the correct shame
form
of
Kafka's
relation to
truth,
then Kafka could rest without
shortcoming certainty for Kafka. It is true that Benjamin's highly confident him to
min
in the
certitude of
and error.
But
untruth
is
not a source of
sense of
Kafka's
"failure"
can
lead
speak of
the interpreter's temptation to
valorize
this failure.
writes, "When he
[Kafka]
was once certain of eventual
Thus, Benja failure, everything

"There is
worked out
for him
en route as
in
dream."
But he
goes on to add:
nothing more memorable than the fervor with which Kafka emphasized his fail The mood of fervor is hardly consistent with the mood of peace or, in
ure."37
deed,
Castle
with
the certainty of error.
This
point
is illustrated in Das Schloss, in

as a
which
the relation of K. to the
can
figure
form
of truth-seeking.
truth of things. In such a metaphor

carried over
Entry into the Castle is entry into the the chief quality of interpersonal relations is
and
into the
the
relation of
knower
known: the known is figured
as ac
knowledging
An early
of
knower. Where there is truth there is from The Castle

speaks this
reciprocal recognition. of
passage
way
K. 's
serious acceptance acknowl
the quest and struggle for admission to the Castle: "So the
Castle had him
edged since
him
as
Land Surveyor. On the
one
hand this
was unfavorable
was
for him,
the
it
showed that
in the Castle everything
essential about
known,
1K
balance The
smile."
of powers weighed and metaphor restates
the challenge taken up with a
the failure of knowledge in

of the spiritual object
tian terms: All you
know
is
what you
approximately these Faus assume, it is not me.

manner appro
The truth
condescends to
be known
not as
it is in itself but in the
priate to the
human subject,
a manner
that does not
jeopardize it. Truth
can
be
known only as what it is not. But this point, for Kafka,

hand,"
requires adjustment.
The
condescension of truth
figures parabolically in Das Schloss as only one side of K. 's experience. "On the other writes Kafka, the readiness of the Castle to take up the struggle
"was
also
favorable,
he
since
him
and that
would
have
it proved, in [K.'s] view, that they underestimated more freedom than at the start he had dared to hope.
And if they thought that through this intellectually-speaking, certainly super ior recognition of his land Surveyal, they would be able to keep him perma nently terrified, they were mistaken. He had a slight shudder, but that was
all."39
There is
ables
Promethean,
an altogether of
in their very independence
rightly, to perceive
37. 38. 39.
and speaks on
usurpatory feeling, too, to Kafka's par Halakah. This is what Benjamin was the first, behalf of his own intellectual daring.
p. 273. p. 464.
Die Romane (Frankfurt
Ibid.
am
Main: S. Fischer, 1972),
The Political Implications
of
Heidegger's
Being
and
Time: On Blitz's Interpretation
Charles M. Sherover
Hunter
College, C.U.N.Y.
Heidegger's
Being
and
Time
and
Mark Blitz. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
Possibility of Political University Press, 1981.)

the
Philosophy.
By
Few
philosophical works of
this century have been accorded as
wide an
inter in
national
reading
as
has Heidegger's
1927).
elicit
Being
and
Time
(originally
published
Weimar
Germany
and
in
Just because
of this
unusually
prominent
attention,
any study seeking to

man, society
port.
its implications for

that
a philosophic
matter of
politics, addresses itself to a

claims
understanding of prime intellectual im

always
Heidegger's
individual self-discovery
inheres in
an
historic
eated
context of relations with other people and with of a
things;
that
he has delin
new per
the structure
human
existence of the
in contemporary terms; that his

of
spective
demands his
rethinking
to
meaning
the western philosophic tradi the explication of

whatever
tion
all conspire
endow with unusual weight
significance
work might
have for
political philosophy.
That Heidegger had
foreclosed
reading
to
never
of
his
work
in
moral
terms only enlarges the problem of

encounter
with
its
relationship which he
political
questions.
His
National
Socialism
fully
accepted, criticized or repudiated
adds special poign
ancy to a consideration of the political meaning of his major work, written as it was before any such involvement came within his anticipatory horizon; that en counter also places him in the unusual position of a prime philosopher with a di
rect political
involvement.
respect
With
all
due
to Mark Blitz
to
whom respect
is due for intelligence, is the way to

ad
scholarship,
concern and conviction with
I do
to
not
think that this

with
dress
an
inquiry
Being
any
this import
or
write a
book
this title. What we are
given are 250 ment of void of
pages,
and
largely
consisting
prefaced
of a chapter-by-chapter summary-restate
Time; it is
by
few
appreciation of
the import of what
is
introductory pages that are de being attempted; at the end,
eight short pages of comprehensive conclusions
suddenly appear as obiter dicta myself in with no discernible relationship to the preceding discussions. I find expect the point that I the to his thrust of the with conclusions, general agreement
would
two of us
find large
areas of agreement
concerning
specific political ques
tions. But that does
not mitigate
the fact that the conclusions appear as a surpris
noted for both ingly positive, if minimal, appendix to a textual discussion to be conceiv attention to issues of the for paucity its generally hostile tone and also social or political concern. What we have is not a ably bearing on questions of
368
Interpretation
book properly bearing this title, but rather the expanded notes which an author might well have made for himself preparatory to writing such a book and capping
it
with an addendum
listing
the
conclusions which
he had
set out to establish.
The book
starts
by
Nietzsche, Dilthey
may have
and
claiming four prime influences on Heidegger: Kierkegaard, but no indication is given of how any of them Husserl
to Heidegger's thought and,
pages.
contributed
having
been named, they

author also
are
barely
gests
even noticed
in the ensuing
these
As
an
afterthought, the
that some of Heidegger's concerns

rather than
have been taken from Aristotle

pervasive
and
sug from for
Kant:
develop
in their
presence,
they
are
largely
ignored. No Aristotle
cussions:
cognizance
is taken
either of
Heidegger's tremendous
respect
or of the pervasive
Kantianism
acceptance on
which underlies all of
Heidegger's dis
Revolution'
Heidegger's full
turn'
of
Kant's Copernican
world-as-such
or
'transcendental
from focus
the
to
delineation
of
the
subjective structure of
Being
but
and
Time:
which
human experiencing itself is to be seen in the entirety of is concerned not with Being itself or Time itself (how
the
peculariarities of
could we
with
know them
except through
the human outlook?).
their meanings as seen to function in human experiencing of the world
qua experiential. concerned with
Being
out
and
Time
claims
to be a phenomenological
work:
it is
how things
appear to us, not with what
they conceivably may be

cog
as
such; it broadens
Kant's
unique conception of time as the center of a
nitive act structured
to the existential center of all human experiencing. It is informed and
throughout by transcendental forms of argumentation proceeding is actually known down to enabling conditions of possibility, taken as ontologically prior to any given actuality; in this last, Heidegger's work is not
from
what
only Kantian but

appear even
him).2
faithfully
Leibnizian
as well
(yet
Leibniz'
name
does
not once
though Heidegger traced his own philosophical
lineage back to
At the outset,
we are told
that
"Reducing Heidegger's
what
thought to secure and
familiar his
categories would
betray
Heidegger's
own sense of
the
radical nature of
enterprise"
(p.
20).
But that is precisely
virtually every
critical comment
in Blitz's book does: throughout, the

analysis'
orientation of an unexplicated
'traditional
is invoked; throughout, the vocabulary, orientation,

transcendent platonism are
standards and
doc
trines
of an unexplicated
invoked,
without argument, of
justification,
platonism; in
or even
citation; it is questionable
traced back to Plato
are
whether
many
these invoca
tions could be
legitimately
own
himself
rather than to a textbook
most cases
they
ing
1
.
Heidegger's
equation:
certainly not attributable to Aristotle. "transcendental philosophy

=
By
ignor
ontology,"1
trans. Churchill (Bloomington: 1962) [cited hereafter as KPM], esp. Section I. See also my Heidegger, Kant and Time (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971) [Cited hereafter as HKT], Ch. IV. 2. See Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 5th ed., 1965) [cited hereafter as WG].
See Martin
Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
Indiana
University Press,
3.
KPM,
p. 93.
369
Blitz is
Discussion
consistently misconstrue Heidegger's conception of his pro the development of phenomenology into an existential ontology; thus he
compelled to come to terms with the
ject
as
fails to
oped
meaning
of
Heidegger's
own term
for his devel
project, "fundamental
ontology,"
the ontological structures of the human
perspectival
outlook; and he then
plagues
it
with
the kinds of questions
which
any
phenomenological approach must
foreclose
at the outset
(cf.
p. 35).
By
thus
ignoring
the nature of Heidegger's project and
ex cathedra
by substituting his own undefined Blitz indeed found it impossible not to "betray has categories,
.
enterprise."
the radical nature of

comment
[Heidegger's]
relevance or
As
a result,
every
chapter and
is
replete with misconstruals and misunderstandings
that lead the au
thor astray, that

and
discount the
the seriousness of his critical remarks,
that make the reader wonder whether
book
or rather some grotesque caricature of crucial
he is reading it.
about
Heidegger's
own
Thus the look is
distinction between
pp.
'possibility'
'potentiality'
and
of
is
con
fused throughout (cf.

after a at
117,
194):
"the basic
of our
the book
of
drawn
Heidegger's description
discovery
environmental
tools
posed: other
does it "force
of
a new conception of the possibilities
for
practical
activity"
than that
"traditional
analyses"
(p. 61)? Which "traditional
we are not told. compatible with man as
Heidegger's
subject
conception of
to "natural
movements
possibility is held to be in (p. and natural

laws"
66)
ever.
ity'
any facing of the issues involved Despite the heritage from Leibniz and Kant,
without
or
any
or
argumentation whatso
we are
informed that 'possibil "(p. 73); just
cannot
be
understood as
"inferior to
told that
'actuality'
'necessity'
told, separately both Leibniz and Kant why for presented serious arguments precisely doing just that (cf. Kant's "Postulates of Empirical Thought"). Politically important themes such as justice, modera
we are not
nor are we quite
tion,
and courage,
we are
informed,
cannot
again without argument understood
but only
not
with ex
cathedra
pronouncement,
be
"as Dasein 's
(p.
92-93).
But that is precisely the

such,
point:
although
Heidegger does
discuss just
these
particular virtues as
what
he is
concerned with
is
discovering
precisely
how animating ideals and ideas can sibilities for us, possibilities which
enter
into human
experience
as pos
we can anticipate
form, bring into

cannot
moral
the
constitution of an existential
actualizing or can, in ontic present. If such ideas or ideals
be
conceived as possibilities
behavior
or
the validity
of
for us, does this not any moral judgment?
destroy
any
prospect of
Again Blitz
asserts
without
argument,
discussion,
or consideration of even
that "what we are is the practical attempt to be those unchanging plausibility (p. 95); that "the full obligatory presence of a moral re things we imitate (p. 141); that "man is not an quirement cannot be revealed to authentic
"
.
Dasein"
entity to
the
ment
whom what is
author
(p. 142). Had practically faced Heidegger's Kantianism, he might have faced the Kantian argu absolutely obligatory
can
practical obligations must
apply"
that 'ought implies can', that all
first be
possible,
and that
it is only
by discerning
the
moral possibilities presented
by
a situation
370
Interpretation
that one is able to act as a moral
being
within
it,
an argument
fully
in
accord with
possibility.4
Heidegger's
own
grounding
of
morality in its
conditions of
Likewise, it is difficult
to make much sense of Blitz's scattered
enabling discussions
of
an essential fea Heidegger's revolutionary conception of time and temporality ture of the book: after all, it is entitled Being and time, and Heidegger clearly at
the outset set forth the thesis which

conscious
it is to develop: "whenever Dasein

Yet this
[self-
human
being] tacitly
its
as revealed
understands and
interprets something like Being,

central examination of
it does
and
so with time and
standpoint."5
time
human experience, is one which is misconstrued at almost every turn. Although Heidegger repeatedly described temporal finitude as the horizon of man's essential finitude is this temporality,
pervasive structure of not one prime point of
in the
the chapter on death?
we are told that
he "does
not wish
to
identify
temporality's finitude with

past
man's"
(p. 158); that the three
'ecstases'
of
time
(future,
and
present)
are,
Blitz
incredibly insists,
temporalized
"equally"
(p. 160)
despite Heidegger's
of
own repeated arguments and
insistence
that temporal
integration
futurity.6
der the
aegis of
any situation is always, even when 'inauthentic', un We are even told Heidegger "makes it clear that time is
(p. 245)
objective"
neither subjective nor
despite Heidegger's
"
own emphatic
Objective'
insistence that time (a

subject."7
conception
distinct from temporality) is

also
'more
than any possible Object

'analyses'
[and]
such as
subjective'
'more
than
any
possible
On the basis
Time"
of
these,
we are then assured that the
full tem
and
porality of the structures of Being "do not come to light explicitly in Being (p. 230) because Being's historicality is only considered "from the
spective of
per
Dasein's
historicality
and not
from its
own
finite
openness"
(p.
232).
seen
Precisely
from
within
just because Heidegger's

the
concern
is to
explicate what can as
be
human
perspective or
horizon. And historicality,
Heidegger
presents
it, is
not
the mere acknowledgement of the presence of the past. Our
own present
being
is primarily formed out of what was future and is present, presently constructed in terms of what is still seen as future. Solely by virtue of this
ongoing continuity of historicality do the possibilities seen in our present vision of the alternatives before us enable the making of choices (thus expressing tran scendental freedom) by authentic anticipatory decision and thus maintain the
continuity enabling us to learn from the experiences we have already had. Such possibilities are temporally, as situationally, finite and cannot all be comprehended by our limited perspectives. This historicality that is our finite
temporal
openness enables us to
will
build
(cf.
ourselves as we
p.
build the
situations within which we
be
finding
ourselves
66).
trans.
4.
See Martin Heidegger,
Being and Time,

B&T),
pp.
Row, 1962) [cited hereafter 5. B&T, p. 39.

6. SeeB<7\
7.
pp.
as
335-58; also,
Macquarrie & Robinson (New York: Harper & HKT, Ch. VI c
373, 397, 437.
B&T,
pp. 471-72.
371
Discussion
such as
Misapprehensions
nize
these
rest on
seemingly deliberate
refusal
to recog
Heidegger's
continued attempt to
animating impulse behind every page made his point of departure abundantly
and with
develop Kant's transcendental turn as the of Being and Time. Heidegger, himself,
clear when
he
stated
'it is only Kant in
his
transcendental questioning, who was able to take the

and
first decisive
step
since
Plato
Aristotle toward be bypassed
an explicit
laying
of the ground of ontol
ogy,'
step that
cannot
by
serious
thought.8
Blind to this, Blitz has
misconstrued
the entire project of constructing
'fundamental ontology'; Hei
degger
was not concerned
to redo pre-Critical speculative

p. 181
theory concerning
the
nature of a
transcendent reality (cf.
); he
sought rather
to delineate the fun
damental ontology by which the human perspective functions, that set of onto logical characterizations which we project as the means whereby we read our
world and our situations within
it. However
'cause'
Being
p.
continually
seeks
to treat it as a
(cf.
may be in and of itself. Blitz 181). Heidegger nowhere treats

seek, speaking
ontologic
the notion of causality as
fundamental;
whom
rather of
he
would
ally, to trace things back to their ground
again,
of
following Kant,
for
possibility (and in doing so he is, causality was merely an interpretive category
the human understanding,
not
legitimately
attributable
by
us
to things as
such).
Rather than deal in
attributions of
causality which, as efficacious, treat the

whatever
Being may be in itself, it always appears to us in terms of grounding possibilities. Being ap pears to us in terms of our future-oriented temporality. Heidegger's descriptions
present as a of of
function
the past, Heidegger has argued that
the
structures of that
temporality
which
looks to
finitely
open
not a closed pastness as
the ground of present actuality
seems, I think,
futurity and largely
in
accord with an expanded notion of teleological reason.
What Heidegger has
not
done
and
this
is
a crucial point
for
criticism of
the topic of this
inquiry even
if ignored
The
by
Blitz
is
not
to have developed to any degree the structures of
historicality,
which are
the structures of
temporality
writ
large in
social terms.
entitled
one commendable chapter

and
in Blitz's book is the discussion

Politics."
"Hei
deggerian History by asserting (not arguing to to has ethics, new or old (p. or demonstrating!) that Heidegger say nothing 203); I have elsewhere explained why I think he is open to serious criticism for
Heideggerian
It begins
ontology'
ignoring
the implications of his 'fundamental
for
questions of ethics
and moral
theory,
although
think
authenticity
But this
suggests a new ethic
be truer to say that the (which carries forward the it

would
old).9
concept of
is mainly concerned to chronicle Heidegger's encounter with National Socialism in a way that seeks to be fair and balanced. He cites the his tory, not only of the early involvement but also the quick disillusion and his re its authorities. He quotes Heidegger's two most famous statements nunciation
chapter
by
in this
regard
regarding "the inner truth
and greatness of
the
national
Socialist
8. WG.
9.
p.
15, n. 14.
Ethic,"
See my "Founding
an
Existential
Human
Studies, 4 (1981),
pp. 223-36.
372
Interpretation
as
movement"
"the
encounter
between
global
technology
and modern
(p.
a
212).
To
conclude
from
these merely that one cannot
derive from Heidegger
(p. 217) is to miss the point. One could philosophy "of the best from the paean of individual Heidegger's famous have pointed out that
political
'turn.'
regime"
authenticity that is the
substance of
Being
of
and
Time to the later
'mystical'
writ might ask
ings,
what
took place precisely
in the days
National Socialism. One legitimate

response
in
nology,"
way National Socialism was seen what indeed the great "inner
even
as a
to "global tech
truth"
of that movement was seen to

must
be.
Surely,
in its beginning, Heidegger

penchant
have been aware,
not
developing
racism, but its militarism, chauvinism,
condemnation of
its only individual

of
ity, disdain for freedom, its

own statements reveal at
for
war and conquest.
Even Heidegger's
guised
least
a sublimal
fear
of
its anti-intellectualism,
in
to
his defense
which
of the
autonomy
of
the university.
Good
philosophic questions and
I have
no answer
are
how the
author of
Being
Time,
in'
of and
his first
why to
subse
Kant book
and contemporaneous essays, could
have been 'taken
the end he declined to repudiate it.

cidence
However, I
only
think it is not an accidental coin
that the early
works were produced

'turning'
in Weimar Germany, that the

came under a regime
quent effective
disavowal
and
that
despised
the Weimar Republic.
Blitz
pear
ends
his book
blue'
with
brief
conclusions which, as
'out
of the
which
without even
indicating
sees some
the specific
"positive"
already suggested, ap discussions or com

results:
ments
from
they
emerge.
He
Heidegger has
means of
effectively
ground on
argued against
the attempt to describe human affairs
by
the
natural sciences
because any
doing
to
so reduces man to a
steer
thing; "he illuminates the between unconvincing

(p. 251)
would
which
effort
proper
course
begin"
[moral]
he had
absolutism and reductionist relativism must

spelled
that
this out! Despite earlier assurance that
Heidegger's gap between

analyses"
theory
and practice
"casts doubt
on all of
Heidegger's
(p. 170),
we are
now assured at
the end that somehow Heidegger has managed to clarify "the

.
in
telligibility
of practice as practice apart

wonder
the sense of
that theoretical
from theory [and] begins to restore can happen at (pp. 251-52). activity
all"
And finally, that Heidegger

cal
"cogently discusses
historical
and
the status of
history
.
.
and
histori
possibilities,
elaborates the
as
historical
[and can] clarify
the strange combination of

are
contingency
inevitability
with which possibilities
first His
presented"
(p.
252).
"negative"
conclusions are: that
Heidegger's "analyses
is
political"
as
they
stand
do
not allow
the full
intelligibility
entities
of what
(p. 253)
glory,
I agree; that, in
courage,
modera
contrast,
"political
[sic]
such
as
justice,
tion
and
cannot
genuinely be interpreted
are most
as ready-to-hand
in Heidegger's
sense.
that
they
fruitfully
grasped, in his terms,
Dasein"
as possibilities of
case
whoever suggested the former? The latter is so surely the is this a criticism? Further, that "the phenomena on which why Heidegger bases his interpretation of human finitude as Dasein's finitude as
'negative'
(p. 253); but
373
the
Discussion
'Being'
finitude
of man as transcendent to
[No. This is
and the
never
claimed; only
continued confusion could suggest

connection
him"
between the
can
'transcendent'
Kantian
'transcendental'
it.]
be
understood as
revealing
finitude
congruent with
the
between
man's possibilities and the possibilities of what

one accepts
is beyond
appre
(p.
254).
But, if
the Leibniz-Kant thesis that

as
all
human
hension is perspectively meaningfully talk,

much
defined,
less
'know'
Heidegger surely does, then how can one of possibilities beyond us? And, again, if
Blitz
rejects of
this principle of perspectivity, then why
doesn't he
argue against
it
instead
condemning its consequence? "Heidegger's analysis does not make clear the grounds on which the Then, political and philosophical ways of life are both intelligibly interrelated and
ignoring
it
while
(p.
254).
tive which this
But why doesn't he then tell he brings to his distinction
us about and
this, how he
sees
of
it,
the perspec
the
justification(s)
entity
it? As left here,

justice"
is
mere rhetoric. we
Finally,
256)
are told that
"the decisive
consist?
political
[sic] is
its
(p.
but in
what
does justice
it
How may
we recognize
ontic embod
iments? What
so
possibilities of
are presented
to us in specific kinds of situations
that we may recognize

are
its hidden
or partial presence?
And,
one should
add,
why
fundamental
values such as
justice
always referred
to as "entities"? Are
they
thing-like?
sibilities which are able
Are they not, rather, ideas? Ideas, Forms, or, perhaps ideal pos we seek to actualize in our finite situations to the extent that we
to their
progressive realization?
to
commit ourselves
This
ambiguous
language,
or
coupled with a rhetorical assertiveness while
persistently
declining
to define
refuses
describe its terms
dogmatically
pronouncing their
'being',
that
to take cognizance of the
philosophic structure of
Heidegger's
own outlook and
the
philosophic
history
built into it
one need not accept
it but in
a serious
book
one expects,
is to end where we began. for rejecting it then, Blitz has misconstrued Heidegger's text that believe For reasons indicated, I from the beginning. Yet I agree with what is imputed by his title, namely that Be philosophy. But I do not and Time does have a certain relevance for political
reason
ing
think that the function of
political
philosophy is to
try
to
characterize
the delinea
tions of an ideal state or a universally 'best
regime'
under all circumstances?
for
all cultures?
for
all stages of civilized

nourished
development? That is
utopianism, the
utopianism
that has
every ideological
cult and mindless revolutionary,
that has been invoked to
Heidegger may
justify the greatest tyrannies of our time. legitimately be accused of, he is guiltless of that.
we regard
states
Whatever
If, however,
portraits of
the function of
ideal
surely
to
one prime
what
we should confine our efforts
philosophy to be, not to paint lesson from Greek philosophy is that but rather to delin is attainable by
political
men
eate the grounds of
legitimacy
and
to
consider
how the
principles of such
legiti
If this
macy may be more limited

then it
tested and
incorporated in contemporary
political situations.
yet more responsible
task be the function of
political philosophy,
might seem
human that Heidegger's attempt to delineate the structures of
374
Interpretation
have something important to say to the redevelopment of politi the issues of our time. This is certainly not the appropriate to provide an alternate to what is before us. But it would yet seem in
this very critical reviewer to offer some suggestion of
existence should
cal thought relevant to occasion
cumbent upon
how that
al
ternative road of development might be seen.
which
Whatever Heidegger may have done with his own life or with the directions in he took the development of his own thinking, Being and Time is a demon
the social nature of
ways
stration of
individuality.
Celebrating
it delineates degger's
that
in
which
own particular
it may be enhanced or discussions may be regarded, however

'category'
individual authenticity, lost. However some of Hei

we
may
regret
he did
not see
fit to
social
ontology,
authentic not
develop individuality
with other
the existential
'being-with'
of
into
is
always presented as
being
presented
in
a social matrix
only
people, nature, and things, but at least
by
implication,
would start
within organized society.

ethic'
Whatever
political
suggestions
may be found for

the
the development of a 'new
and
grounds of
from here by examining, the conditioning its enabling possibility. Heidegger has effectively argued that social individuality is the crux upon which the ontology fundamental to our individual is built
thus carrying forward an old Aristotelian thesis. For reasons discuss in this brief compass, he himself did not pursue this. But
so
implications, in transcendental fashion,
its
development
outlooks
too complex to
his
own
failure to do
notwithstanding, this early

which should
work
has provided, it
would
seem,
at
least three theses
importantly
contribute to the recon
struction of
contemporary political theory. If individuality is inherently social, not only in its
actual
functioning but
also
in its grounding possibility, then the philosophic ground of an atomistic liberal ism which cannot develop any coherent notion of the common good, has been cut
off.
This 'destruction', to use a Heideggerian term, opens the way for the revitalization of the tradition of civic republicanism (which traces its lineage through
Hegel, Kant, Rousseau, Leibniz, Machiavelli

Such
ples
revitalization of which a which
and
Cicero, back
to the Greeks).
of princi
the tradition opens the way
for the development

within a responsible
by
technological culture can
function
society, a
growth of
society
A
takes as a prime responsibility the enhancement of the
authentic
individuality.
thesis of
central
Being
and
Time is that
Being
always appears to us
in the
form
time, that our working conception of time is formed by the temporality inherent in our outlook. This temporality, Heidegger has cogently argued, is fun
of
damentally structured in ized by means of which

ticular
terms of
futurity, in
terms
of possibilities not yet actual
we read our current situations and
the relevance of
par
lessons from
to be
what-has-been which seem to

we not assess
bear
upon the alternatives we
see ourselves
facing. Do
the question, what should
be done
about
any problematic it? And is not that
situation as
posing
'should'
considered
when
practical, considered
as an
intelligent
within
exercise of prudential
reason, only
it
is
confined within the
'can',
the scope of those genuine possibilities
pres-
375
Discussion
and consequent actualization?
ently available to us for discrimination, selection As Aristotle had already said, "no one deliberates
about the
past, but
about what
is future
otherwise"
and capable of
being
(ii39b). Heidegger's
radical recon
struction of
the conception of time and to
temporality
can, I
think, be
legitimately
structur
read as an attempt
systematically
think out just
what
this entails in the
ing
of
human
experiencing.10
Placed into the

tion
present context of
discussion, Heidegger's important contribu
is the demonstration that in temporal terms,

possibility)
social
each of us unrealized
with
individuality is necessarily structured by the presence of futurity (as available but as yet
us onward.
always
carrying
When this demonstration is

of
transmuted
from the
perspective of the at
individual to that
the social, as Hei that all social
degger all-too-briefly does

questions arise within
the end of
of an
Being
and
Time,
we see
the context
All
social questions arise
ongoing historicality. for any generation, as for any individual, in

seen and understood as
which
specific
historical situations,
each
being
having
grown out of
the
possibilities, actualized or
alternative courses
discarded,
time makes
it has inherited
old
for continuing development. As the
uncouth."
casions answers
teach new
duties,
ancient good
offering hymn goes, "new oc Yesterday's good

necessarily
pres
rein-
and as still
to old questions in
new problematic situations are not of social change
ently
correct
ones, for the
fluidity
does
not always permit
stitution of yesterday's
seeming
solutions.
This is
not
to say anything against our

which
necessary
which we
use of transtemporal or
abiding criteria,
by
to evaluate the spe
cific possibilities which we see presented to us
in the
mobile situations within
way
as
and
loyalties,
ideal
seek to
A sailboat, sailing against the wind, will first tack this then that precisely in order to stay its course. Values and then, appear to us as both judgmental standards and continuing goals, find
outselves.
value-
possibilities
by
which we plot
the course, evaluate specific situations we
carry forward
and which we
incorporate in determinate (finite) forms into

to which we are able.
the actuality of the present, to the
extent
But this is to
raise the question of what value(s) or norm(s)

of
may be taken
as
basic,
what
fundamental possibility
human existence, indeed,
makes our valu
ing
possible?
means of our
What is the enabling ground of the possibilities we actualize by evaluative judgments in reading our situations? In terms of the
prime evaluational concept adumbrated make the

particular choices
in
Being
and
Time, how
are we able
to
between
makes
inausituational possibilities of authentic or
thentic individuality? What
this distinction
itself
possible?
How is
our
grounded'.'
ability to make such choice "Freedom is the ground of
Heidegger's Freedom is
answer
is
straightforward:
grounds.""
our existential
condition;
not a
by
virtue of
it,
we are able
to
make
discriminations
and choices.
It is
tran
scendent abstraction
io.
but
a transcendental condition;
it "is only in the
choice of
ton: Indiana
11.
Hofstadter (Blooming See Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. pp. 229-57; also, B&T, pp. 48-49Press. 1982), University
WG,p. 53
376
one
Interpretation
and
not
possibility"
in accepting that
a political
dom then is
of
merely
choosing and its consequences. Free concept. Freedom is transcendence: at the core
act of
,2
existence, it is his grounding ability to transcend the immediate his momentary present, comprehend his wider present as a field of activity, discern the specific possibilities which by illuminating his present situa tion, beckon him onward while yet retrieving the lessons requisite to his chosen
every
man's
confines of
quest.
Freedom
is, then,
the grounding capacity for humans to be

and
human: it is
reasons
to make particular decisions "the grounding for them; it is not merely one reason or ground among
tal
capacity"
find justifying
others:
it is the fundamen
grounds
"grounding
unity
of the transcendental and courses
ticular
sight
decisions,
choices,
finding of reasons or of Building on

action.13
for
par
Descartes's in
and
that all cognitive reasoning

most
involves freedom (cf. Meditation IV),
Kant's that it is the developed the ery

possible
fundamental reality of our moral being, Heidegger has fundamentality of freedom as the transcendental foundation of ev
activity. seek
human
Rather than thenticity,

as
the source of a political implication in the notions of (in)au-
Blitz has
and
done,
the use of that transcendental reasoning which
is the
heart
of
Being
Time,
would rather ask: what makes point
authenticity
or
inauthen
ticity
ual
possible?
Heidegger's
is that it is
existential
freedom,
as
transcenden
tal ground, which makes either possible:

regardless
for freedom
characterizes
of
call
as the 'call of
road
how authentically or inauthentically if you will. For it is certainly
every individ he may respond to its
conscience'
The macy
of
to a political philosophy out of Heidegger would then take the pri

seriously. requisite to
of
freedom
the
actual embodiment
any
other social criteria
justice, fairness,
equality, morality,
individuality,
responsibility.
signed
In seeking out principles of political legitimacy in a society de for human living, the first principle would then seem to be the question of
root of
not only is it the "transcendental
freedom;
thereby
of
morality, as Kant had urged; as the root of any

root of
obligation,"14
it is the
any
seen
evaluative
activity,
and
any notion of social responsibility. That this is no heretical thesis may be quickly
of
by
applying the
of
principles
transcendental
ity
in
earlier sources. what
reasoning One
looking
might
for the
no
grounds
place
have
better
enabling possibil to look than Plato's

between
social
Crito. For
is
voiced
in its concluding passages,
as the conversation
Socrates
and the
Laws
of
Athens, precisely
be bound
call
carries with
it the thesis that law
participation not
only vidually free consent,

not
carries obligation with consent to
it but that
obligation rests on
and an
indi
by
a system of
obligation,
only to obey those laws but to
to public attention those which are deemed
to need change. As given, what might be called 'the right to resign', the right to
12.
13. 14.
B&T,
p. 331.
WG,
WG,
p. 53p. 52.
377
Discussion
thereby
the
unpunishable emigration and
essentially voluntary
nature of societal
membership,
ment";15
is
spelled out as an essential precondition of the social
"agree
transcendentally
recognized
considered, legitimate society presupposes

as
socially
seem
freedom
the basis of ensuing obligation. It would
priority of further
that the acknowledged public need

of
for free
criticism again rests on that pri
macy
of
political
any defensible notion of legitimacy. Without this, how could we have any intelligible discussion concepts of justice or any other social virtue?
which
freedom
is the
presupposed ground of
If,
as
Heidegger says, "the

as
essence of
[human] finitude
reveals
itself in
tran
scendence
and carries
ernment
freedom for [its] then, again, freedom is primordial with it a moral obligation. And the development of a theory of gov
ground,"16
that
is true to the
essence of the
human beings it is to govern,
must not
Rousseau, insist that social freedom, a free society, is the first princi only, ple of legitimacy; it might well look back to Aristotle's considerations on how
with
the demand for
freedom
can
be
squared with the social
stability that is
requisite
for it
as a condition of
its
actualization.
If freedom is
the
prior and
fundamental
ground of all other social aspirations, then
first
question that
is to be
asked about
any
social proposal or
possibility is that
aegis of a
of whether
it
serves to advance
the freedom of the citizen under the

conceived as the social
common good which can
grounding is: How, then, may freedom be maxi mized in this social setting? How may it be embodied in any contemporary state governing a mass society? How may it be related to the de-individuating (but individual freedoms. The
question always
only be
of maximal
also, in many ways,
liberating)
aspects of modern technology?
compass economic as well as are
intellectual
or recreational activity?
How may it en In short, what
the
responsibilities of an organized
the
maximal
freedom
of
its
citizens within
historical community for the enhancing of the circumstances of its current situa
philosophy which Heidegger's Being and Time suggests are to be
or socially, are tempo
tion?
It is my
ontological
view
that the possibilities for

of
political
grounding
time
human
existence
in
found:
by taking rally finite
structured
seriously: all
situations,
individually
in
terms of
inviting
possibilities; we then need recognize the
possibilities
any
situation offers and
discern those
aspects of
the inheritance
that we choose to preserve, or annihilate, in the light of the future prospects we

see
for development.
bv taking history
how
tions
seriously: we not
only
come out of a past which
is
some
living as a cultural heritage in the by resolving some and choosing

See Crito,
50 (N.B.: this term appears
present; we are now others; we
building
a
future op
do
not
have
responsibility
15. 16.
in both the Jowett
and the
Tredennick translations).
WG,
p. 54-
378
Interpretation
of which we
only to the past out honor its past-ness

also
come, to
use what
has been
given
to us and thus
we our
have
utilizing its lessons instead of having to repeat them; responsibility for the future which we are now circumscribing by
by
present choices and activities.
b\ taking individuality
even social
seriously:
all
decisions
are
individual decisions;
decisions have
a
arise out of them
by
aggregation,
consensus or
imposition;
au
as such we
responsibility to
authentic
encourage
the possibilities of
individually
thentic
deciding,
and
by
virtue of
being
true to freedom as the ground of
responsibility enabling by taking freedom seriously: because freedom

choices and also
possibility.
grounds our
ability to
make
criterion
to take responsibility for those choices; to place any value, as a for action, beyond that of abetting the social freedom which makes each individual's freedom possible is to deny the ground of his own being and may
rightfully be construed as an act of moral suicide. Insofar as what Heidegger has called the 'freedom that is transcendence, the ground of all grounds', itself arises
within
any human perspective,
as
'care'
to
about others as well as
Heidegger has argued, from the human ability oneself, the custody of political freedom would
care about
seem to entail a
which we
responsibility to
the state of freedom in the
society in
find
ourselves as
We
start with what
voluntary has been given, into
members.
including
what we
the possibilities we see pre

are
sented to us.
We
make ourselves
by building
the horizons
within which we
develop
as
the potentialities we
bring
with us and
the possibilities
accident that place
we
discern the future imaginative

freedom
Heidegger had
corded to
seen part of
offering to us. It is then no philosophic Kant's greatness to lie in the crucial
he
ac
reasoning.
For it is that imaginative reasoning that is the

who
bearer
of our
as
individuals
are, as individuals and as social
beings,
formed for the
by temporality building history. As social beings,

the
end of
of our outlook and concerned with the continuities of

we organize
ourselves, in political community
protecting
and
enhancing the
possibilities we cherish and which
motivate our membership.
individuality essentially grounds us as free social par ticipants, that each of us, individually and together, are temporally constituted beings whose life-careers are constituted by the discrimination of possibilities in a continuity of historical development we bring individual morality and social together. responsibility Only by open recognition of this essential grounding of
By
recognizing that
our
each
in his
own
can we
make sense of
freedom that is simultaneously the freedom we share with others, Heidegger's supreme moral injunction: to say, each to
are'
himself, "'become
How, then, may
what you
and
say
this with
understanding."17
we understand
the
philoso
'possibility
that
of political
which
Being
and
Time
suggests?
ciality, that both are constituted
in so By understanding individuality by temporality, engaged in building history, and

is
embedded
17.
B&T,
p.
186.
379
Discussion
in that transcendental freedom
which makes
grounded
it
possible
for
each
to be
come
those possibilities
he builds into himself. If
we are
to
do this
with under
standing, we need an orientation that enables us to

cal
do
so: the
function
of a politi
philosophy
coherent with
the structure
of
human
nature would seem
to be to
discern those
principles of social organization and practice which should accept and the specific
legitimate the
responsibilities we
freedoms
we should encourage
in the historical
situations
in
which we are engaged.
Response
Mark Blitz
United States Information Agency
The
and
purpose of
my book
was
intelligibility
wholes and
of
the concepts and
"to discuss the underlying meaning, possibility, distinctions for example theory and prac
that ultimately control the range and
can
tice,
parts,
ends and means
precision with which politics and
morality
be
understood."
My
for
political
method was
of
to examine the
implications for these

and
concepts and
Heidegger's
Being
in
Time. I
attempted to subject
philosophy Heidegger's discussion
to
rigorous analysis
order
to uncover its
full
radicalism.
Two
of
my
chief conclusions were: of
(i)
that one can find a ground for a critical

precisely"
"Heidegger's conception of Being and Man understanding tempting "to bring Heidegger's discussion to bear on the question
politics"
by
of
at
the possible
subject matter and
study
of of
and
(2)
that it is possible that "Plato and

of
Aristotle's understanding
man, rethought in light

phenomena
the
issues
raised
degger, properly
areas cause
accounts
for the
he discusses
while not
by Hei illuminating
be
he leaves in the it did

not
dark."
My
criticism was
"exploratory,
it is only
dogmatic"
"pretend to be
tentative."
conclusive where
will
discuss first Sherover's
misinterpretation of much that

of
I say, then indi
flaws in his understanding the last half of his essay.

cate some
Heidegger,
the
and conclude
by turning
to
Let
of
me
begin
by
pointing
out a
few
of
inaccuracies in Sherover's
account
my book. (1) Sherover
claims that
I take "no
cognizance"
"of Heidegger's tremendous
respect whole
before
Aristotle."
Not
so: see pp.
6off.,
the
footnote
mention
on p.
60,
and
the
book for that

"four
matter.
He
states as well
that I
Aristotle Husserl
and and
Kant
Dil
"as
afterthought"
an as prime
after
"claiming Nietzsche, Kierkegaard,

Heidegger."
they"
influences
on where
This is
an odd
misunderstanding
themes
of of
the passage in
question
(p. 20),
I say that Heidegger

"develops"
"develops"
the first four and then say that he also
themes of the other two.
My
point about
is that to try to write about Heidegger by writing very obviously stated his philosophical context would take us behind his immediate predeces
and
sors, back to Aristotle

require a
beyond. To do justice to
such a
context, I said,
would
book very different from mine. Therefore I say that I will begin with Heidegger himself, discussing others when necessary. As it turns out, I mention
more than any other thinkers, as the index makes clear. I clearly have a different view of the substance of Heidegger's rela tionship to Kant and Aristotle, but the importance of that relationship is manifest and I say so.
Kant
and
Aristotle
Sherover
and
382
Interpretation
claims on p.
(2) Sherover
tion."
and
throughout that I
invoke "transcendent
plato
or make other statements without
"argument, justification,
are there.
or even cita
In
fact, I do
make arguments and point
to phenomena that support my
sug
gestions.
use of
either
may not convince Plato and Aristotle is spelled

what
They
Sherover, but they

out on.
ignores
I say
or
explicitly forgets it as he reads
on p.
17
of
my my book. Sherover
The thrust
of
that I confuse the distinction between possibility and po (3) Sherover tentiality. (Because he does not develop the distinction it is hard to say what he
claims
has in mind.) As
maries of
evidence and
Being
he cites my pp. 1 17 and 194. But these pages are sum Time. More than once Sherover claims that I am confused
and
his
evidence
turns out to
be
passages where
am
degger's degger
or
own words.
conclude
from this
not
that I am confused about
closely paraphrasing Hei Hei

that Sherover is con
that Heidegger is confused about
Heidegger, but
fused
about
Heidegger.
claims
I have in say which "traditional mind when I am considering the implications of Heidegger's discussion of readi ness to hand. (He quotes my p. 61.) But I say so clearly and by name (e.g., Hobbes
and
(4) Sherover
that I do not
analyses
Machiavelli).
seems surprised that I can say on p. 73 that possibility cannot be inferior to actuality or necessity. As it turns out, p. 73 is part of my Heidegger's discussion of I invite anyone to look
"understanding."
(5) Sherover
understood as exposition of at
Being
and
Time
pp.
143-44.
They
will
discover
what
Heidegger
says and
why I
cannot
paraphrase
him
as
I do.
(6) Sherover
5 quotes me as saying that justice, moderation and courage be understood "as Dasein's What I in fact say is: "the Be
on p.
possibilities." possibilities"
ing of entities such as justice, courage, and moderation is not exhausted (my un (pp. 92-93; see derlining here) by understanding them as Dasein's also p. 64). My point is that none of the modes of Being Heidegger discusses in Being and Time is sufficient to grasp justice, etc. I then briefly discuss why and add to my discussion later in the book. Sherover misinterprets my point by leav out the acts as if the seven pages after p. 92 were not written, ing
"exhausted,"
and then accuses me of ex cathedra pronouncement.
(7) Sherover is incredulous

are
that I
160).
"insist"
that the three ecstases of
temporality
I say this because Heidegger says it, often p. 329). I do not that the future has priority in Heidegger's analysis; I (e.g., deny affirm it in the very passage from which Sherover quotes (see again p. 329). The question is: is the primacy of the future the heart of what is most significant in
temporalized equally (p.
Heideggerian temporality, or is the heart the unity of temporality? (Is the heart of Dasein understanding or is the heart care as a whole?) This is a matter for further discussion. To discuss it fruitfully one should pay more attention than I think Sherover has to Heidegger's remarks about the equiprimordiunity and to section on Heidegger's discussion of understanding, and to ality, my my chap ter on his discussion of death and authenticity.
ecstases'
383
Discussion
accuses me of misapprehensions about
(8) Sherover
porality,
ment
Heidegger's
view of tem
after a strange paragraph on p. 370.
If his
of
point
that the full
temporality
Time"
of
the structures
Being
or
is to dispute my state does not "come to light

read
explicitly in
section
Being
and
then I
simply
ask
him,
anyone, to
the final
final paragraph of Being and Time. particularly (9) Sherover points to my "seemingly deliberate refusal to recognize Hei degger's continued attempt to develop Kant's transcendental turn But on
and
the
the exact page
from
which
he has just
quoted
(230), I
point
to this very fact.

about which
Though Sherover
more
makes
too much of "Heidegger's
Kantianism,"
later, he is clearly entitled to argue that my interpretation of the relation is incorrect. But it is misleading to claim that I do not recognize what I do recog
nize, in this passage and
others.
(I
refer
to Kant more than to any other author.)

attempted
(10) Sherover
speculative self
acts as
if I think that Heidegger
to "redo pre-Critical
theory."
to be
clear
make abundantly clear that Heidegger believed him something much more radical (see, e.g., p. 61). I also make there that Heidegger did not treat Being as a cause. On the other hand, the
But I
doing
meaning of causality is a key problem in Heidegger's work in general. (11) Sherover says that I claim that "Heidegger has nothing to say to ethics,
new or old
(p.
203)."
I say
no such
thing. In the passage to
which
he
refers
am
discussing
(12)
political
the concept
of authenticity.
The
paragraph
immediately
Heidegger
after
this pas
sage continues
my discussion, from a new point of Sherover's brief analysis of my treatment
analysis. of
and the
Nazis
a
seems to
imply
that I
concluded
"merely
that one cannot

"
derive from Heidegger

not attempt
philosophy 'of the best

author of
regime,'
(p. 217)
and
did
to discuss
how the
Being
and
Time
could support the 217-22).
Nazis. But I did discuss this,

"Conclusion"
and reached some conclusions
(pp.
(13)
I
could
Sherover believes that the

'
conclusions
in my
appear
'out
of
the blue.
This is only because he did not have keyed my conclusion to the
attend
rest of the
properly to the body book but thought it
of the book.
unneces
sarily
pedantic.
II
Sherover's
misinterpretations arise
is important in Heidegger
should proceed.
and
from his belief that he already knows what therefore knows how a discussion of Heidegger
He thus lacks the patience both to follow a critical argument

Heidegger himself is
saying.
be
yond one or two steps, and to see what
His
obvious
basic
too closely
with
error concerning Being and Time is to identify Heidegger Kant. He therefore fails to come to grips with what is radical in
Heidegger's
thought.
Anyone
acquainted
with
Kant
and
Heidegger
can
see
Kant's importance to Being and Time. But Heidegger's questioning of Kant is Kant did not also manifest! Kant did not grasp the Being of the human subject;
384 radically
Interpretation
connect
Being
and
time; Kant did

of
an appropriate
stood man
understanding
present at and
morality and conscience in human Being. In the last analysis Kant under
not root
entity:
to be a
hand
he did
not
bring
nexus of
analysis.
death,
In
a
guilt,
transcendence to world that characterizes
into play the whole Heidegger's
not provide an ontology of Dasein. Heidegger ex plicitly differentiates himself from Kant often, and at length in sections 6 and 64. Heidegger says at different times that fundamental ontology transcendental
=
word, Kant did
knowledge
disclosing Being
=
as
transcendence
possibilities
phenomenology. His point quite none of these understanding is precisely what it hitherto has been thought to be. One should Heidegger says that "Being is transcendence no more argue that when
schlechthin"
philosophy clearly is that
hermeneutic
he is to be
equated
with, say,
Thomas,
than one should misconstrue
his
connection
to Kant because he talks of transcendental philosophy.

says
Similarly,
a subject
when
Heidegger
that time is more
'subjective'
'objective'
and
than any pos
sible subject or
nor an object.
object, he has just finished saying that time is neither

requires
does
not
only elementary subtlety to recognize that Heidegger believe time to be some sort of super subject but, rather, that he is at
to uncover an
It
tempting
interpretation beyond, but
yet at the core
of, the possibil
ity
of categories such as subject and object.
instructive to
I doubt that Sherover simply identifies Heidegger with Kant, but it would be see whether he could systematically clarify the differences without
uncover a also
being forced to
Heidegger less Kantian than the

argue that
one
he describes here.
(Of course, he is
free to
Heidegger length
sees
not see as or more clearly. need to
But to
make such an argument at
nothing that Kant does successfully he would Kant does

not phenomena
where
clarify why Heidegger discusses
phenomena that
specific
examine
fully
or
at
all
and
show
by
pointing to
my
Heidegger is deficient.) Sherover's failure seriously to

spirit which could speak as
approach
confront
of
argument also arises which
from the
he does
the
"questions
(Let
us
must
foreclose
outset."
at
any phenomenological pretend for the moment that
Sherover correctly understands transcendental analysis, phenomenology, and Heidegger's relation to them.) Sherover appears to dismiss out of hand the possi
bility
that the Greeks or any pre-Kantian can offer a genuine alternative to Hei degger (or Kant). But this possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand. There is
the heart of transcen nothing about the question of conditions of possibility dental philosophy according to Sherover that is in principle philosophically unintelligible to the pre-Kantian. To sustain such a claim one would need to ex
But Sherover points to nothing in particular which was beyond the ken. Yet the question which he claims is foreclosed is simply the question of Heidegger's justification for his own enterprise. How remarkable
amine the phenomena.
Greeks'
if is
such a question were

an analysis of
torted such a
foreclosed in a book called Being and Time whose body human being! How revealing if the analyses in the book dis question! One must not subject Heidegger to hasty pieties. But one
385
Discussion
not, in
also must
looking
at
him,
take
flight from basic
matters.
How
can we
grasp him
'transcendental'
"Heideggerian"
which
pointing ignoring thinking, I attempted throughout my book to keep before me the "transcendental" and issues of finitude and the proper manner in to account for the prior intelligibility of entities. I concluded that "practi
activity
can
at all without
to the things themselves? Rather than
cal and philosophical ence
finite precisely in refer human activity is finally rooted in the perfection that men seek to imitate; I have held that the phenomena of openness, striving, imitation, can be interpreted in the light of this perfection without inter
understood as
both be
of
to the fact that the
intelligibility
preting
ena of
man as present-at-hand
in the
natural scientific
sense, as a tool,
argued that
or as an
entity that
ena that
can
be perfectly fulfilled. Moreover, I have
the phenom
the prior
intelligibility
of entities with which we

of
Heidegger interprets in terms

analysis."
Dasein,
can
deal concretely, phenom be grasped sufficiently by
this alternative
Ill
The last half
against which to
Sherover's essay might have discuss important issues.

of
provided a useful
backdrop
Unfortunately, as a discussion of political matters that claims to be rooted in Heidegger, it is flawed in many ways. First, Sherover has said that he has "no
answer"
to the "good philosophic

in'
questions"
of
how the
author of
Being
and
Time
could
have been 'taken

for
by
"National
Socialism."
But how
could someone
with no answer
to this question even begin to presume that he understands Hei

politics?
degger's
relevance
Even though Sherover
misinterprets
it, he be
that discussion
lieves my discussion of Heidegger and the Nazis to have some merit. Perhaps indicates some validity in the rest of my analysis, on which it is
based?
Second, Sherover
Heidegger's
political
claims
Heidegger to be
"utopianism."
guiltless of restrained and
In
fact,
on as
judgment is both
immoderately
immoder
both
ately assertive, Its immoderate

sertive
assertiveness
ignores the limits
placed
political action and on the effectiveness of philosophic understanding.

"utopianism."
Such
blindness is the very embodiment of Third, Sherover acts as if his discussion

shifts
of
freedom
agrees with
Heidegger.
ontic
But he
in
an
existensiell)
and
unwitting ontological (or existential) discussions,
and
un-Heideggerian
manner
between
(or
and once more
treats
essentially indentical to Kant. has nothing to say about fate and destiny, which are central Sherover Fourth, to Heidegger's historical analysis. Fifth, he has nothing to say about Heidegger's
Heidegger
as
discussion
"people"
"public"
of
the
and
the
readiness
and
invokes
'deliberation'
without
considering
the importance of
conscience
to hand.
guilt, resoluteness,
where are
Being-in-the-world, dying, discussion of a freedom in his they
386
and
Interpretation
on
responsibility supposedly based

the relevance of
and
Heidegger? In general, Sherover's dis

political
cussion of
Being
and
Time to
say
about
Being
Time. In contrast, I
of all
attempted
philosophy has little to to discuss the implications for
political
philosophy
after
these Heideggerian concepts and analyses, and

which
did
not
limit
self. will
myself
to the areas to
Sherover
sometimes says a
that I did limit my

we
But,
a
all, I had
book
and
he has but
few pages, so, in fairness,
turn to the
final topic.
of political matters
As
discussion
in its
unfortunately empty. As usual, it is more Kant without much hint of Kant's moral and legal toughness. Sherover
Sherover's essay is also Kantian than Heideggerian, but it is

own right, makes no
distinction between
social and political
discussions. He
erarchy or production. He leaps from discussing dom and individuality to statements about more concrete individuality. He
serts the
rule, hi nothing the broadest ontological free

says of as
importance He
says
of this
deep
freedom
without
examining any
without
alternatives
to
its
primacy.
nothing
about reason or the

of
passions, referring only to de
liberation. He
assumes
or
the significance
history
seeing that
refers
much
that
he
calls
historical
temporal in the Heideggerian sense
to
ordinary
to
change and variation and
that where these need deeper analyses there are alterna
tives to the one
he
offers.
He
moves
blithely
from
"temporality"
claims about as a whole
conclusions about
everyday
affairs.
His discussion
pay attention be prudentially gauged. And yet, he in no way argues con vincingly that this truism can be grounded in the conceptual apparatus he em ploys. He announces the discovery that justice can be a possibility for us only if
should
ism that
politics should must
leads up to the tru to individual responsibility, and that how it
do this
we are
free to
choose
it,
without
wondering how it
must
be
so that
it
can
be
choiceworthy.
dards is
no problem
'will'
He simplistically assumes that the possibility of unchanging stan for Heidegger. One would think that Sherover had never
and
heard the term
had
never
heard that both it

'ideals'
and
Heidegger had
a more
than accidental connection to the Nazis.
Sherover if
analyses
'values'
merges talk of
'values'
and
were not anathema
as
if they
were the
same,
and as
based
on
to Heidegger. He talks of legiti
macy but neither gives evidence of knowing what it means politically, nor of how discussion of legitimate governments differs from discussion of the common
good
ing"
of political
communities.
He suddenly
applies
"transcendental in "earlier
reason
"looking
and
for the
possibility"
source
grounds of
of
issues
an
interpretation
and a
enabling Plato's Crito that
acts as
if
discussion
of
"indi
consent"
"right"
vidual
to resign could
once again
heart
cal
of
the
dialogue. More, he
to mundane, acting as if such consent
grasp jumps simplistically from ontologi and "free are unmediated

expression"
the political or
philosophical
moral expressions of
"transcendence
freedom."
as political
On the whole, the implications for

and
Time
are more
challenging
than readers of
philosophy of Heidegger's Being Sherover's essay would discover.
Book Review
Will Morrisey
Algeny.
By Jeremy
1983.
Rifkin "in
cloth,
collaboration with
Nicanor
Perlas."
(New York:
Viking,
255
pp.:
$14.75.)
'bioengineering,'
Consider, if you
will, two books. Both
are polemics against
the process whereby scientists combine genetic material from different organisms
to produce new genetic structures, and thus new organisms.
Both
works are obvi
ously intended for what The author of Book

what
publishers call
'A'
"the intelligent
reader."
general
observes that
men
for
some centuries we
have lived in
he
calls a
Promethean age;
have transformed their lives

"with the
fire"
by "turn[ing]
name conquer
the earth
into
themselves"
an extension of
aid of
[5]. The
Prometheus, he
nature, to
"foresight"
reminds
us, means
events.
[5];
men
have
used
fire to
control
future
new
technology begins
not
"pyrotechnology."
to supersede this
"Biotechnol
dyana-
ogy"
does
merely
reshape nature
from the outside, as, for example,
mos power machines
that reshape ore
into
new
machines,
or as modern
tyrants
attempt
to reshape
men
by
machinelike
institutions. Rather, it information
reshapes organ
isms from
within, eschewing the crude and superficial techniques of industrial

now view
ism. "Biologists
systems"
living
organisms as
[208]. Us
ing
artificial
information systems, computers,
engineers will
in
"program"
effect
organisms,
"mesh[ing] living
material and
the computer into a single
form
of
[21]. "[Cybernetics is the organizing framework for the coming computer is the organizing mechanism, and living tissue is the organiz the age,
material"
ing
The
of what
[213].
author of
Book
'A'
uses
the popularization of
Darwinism
as an example and to Mal-
is
to come. Darwin himself acknowledge
his debt to Smith
thus; the author contends that Darwin's doctrine owed much of its popular suc cess to its compatibility with the ethos of capitalism. Attacking Darwin's theory of evolution as empirically baseless and logically false or tautological, he con
tends that a
civilization's
ruling
metaphor
is usually
men
subphilosophical.
With bio if they

fittest"
engineering metaphors becoming popular, are not in the thrall of a new myth, replacing Spencer's "survival
with
should ask themselves

of
the to
the "survival of the best
informed"
[221 J. This
myth would reduce nature
a mass of manipulable
"Information,"
data.
"knowledge,"
then,
the only timeless
replaces
as
"change itself is honored

temporality"
as
truth;"
"we
are no
saturate
knowledge
with
[240].
The belief that there

can
ironclad
truths or
some objective
reality that human beings

that
discover does
not mark
the end of the great
self-deception
has
long
plagued
388
Interpretation
the
humanity, but only
beginning
of a new chapter.
...
It is
not
humility that animates
the new cosmological
jargon but bravado 1
243].
"Nature is
cal
being
will
made
anew, this time
by
human
beings"
[244],
and our
biologi
tinkerers
Book but its
'A'
should not
surely botch the job. be represented
as a
author states with all
lemic. As
ponents,
issues clearly and polemics, its author

be
with energy. reserves ask no
pathfinding effort, or a profound one, It is a skillfully- written po

the
hardest for
questions
for his op
not
for himself. He fails to

Cleinias:
as we would
we
himself, for
off use
example, the question

all
Socrates
asks
better
having
could
the gold in the
world, effortlessly,
make men
if
did
us
not
know how to do
not
it,
knowing
how to
immortal benefit
if
we
know how to
do
not
know how to live? Will

slaves,
and
men at
free
of genetic
of
immortality, if we disease, served by docile,

use
manufactured
capable,
least,
that
immortality
the transmission
of one's exact genetic structure
to another organism would
bring, really imagine

much
that
they had solved any fundamental problem? Book is far more polemical than Book
'B'
written.
Its
author
complains
less skillfully that "we have invaded the long-silent burial

and
'A'
grounds of the
Carboniferous
age"
for the fuels that

past"
enable us to construct
the
dwellings, factories,
ish testimonial to feel guilty
a mere
machines, clothes, the
and roads that
"exist
as a
kind
of ghoul
our violation of
[3] This
.
attempt to make
the reader
over men's necrophiliac
trifling
with extinct cycads and equisetums
is
foreshadowing
"society's"
of absurdities
to come.
truths"
Theories, he
gitimize a
time"
tells us, are
"tools,
perhaps, but
not
[31].
They
economic, political,
and other activities while

activities"
merely le "at the same
[35]. The theories of St. removing "all responsibility for those Thomas Aquinas, that apologist for feudalism, exemplify this dangerous human that "is the ultimate propensity toward the "legitimacy without
responsibility"
dream
elite"
of
every
political
[36]. "[S]mall
snippets of physical
deceptions"
reality
have been
remodeled chief
"humanity's
by society into vast cosmic accomplice in the appropriation

nihilism"
[41].
of
Morality
is
"goodness" nature"
[53];
influential
is
only "a mask for our The author of Book

last hundred
years.
[56].
'B'
cites
Darwinism
as
the
most
nihilism of the
lifelong interest in collecting biological specimens a characteristically bourgeois obsession. He claims that Darwin based his theory on an analogy between the Galapagos Islands and the British Isles,
calls
neither of which offers a sufficient of
He
Darwin's
ory Darwin's study of vampire bats and jaguars what larger place, South America. The author
believe"
nature;
however,
the
variety of organisms upon which to base a the biographer quoted by the author actually refers to
organisms
also claims
inhabiting
that some
that "Darwin himself

although
couldn't
[151]
his
that the eye could be the product of evolution,
in the
passage cited
(The Origin of Species, Chapter

reasons
VI, fourth
With
section) Darwin
goes on to explain
for overcoming this doubt.

with
This tendentiousness
combines
sentimentality.
each
advance
in
389
Book Review
cell, tissue
bioengineering, "cell by
bodies
as we give
by
tissue,
organ
by
organ, we give up our
time"
up
our political
power,
a piece at a
[237]. This is
locu
tion that might allow us to
ignore
to whom we are giving
selves, at least as
long
as we maintain our political
up our bodies: our liberty. But the author of

reprehensible,
Book
'B'
believes the for
collaboration of science and commerce so
men's weakness
myth so
damaging,
and
his
own condemnation of
both
so
compelling, that
in the
penultimate chapter
he
reassures
his
readers:
"Plato, St.
mis magnanim
Thomas Aquinas, Charles Darwin

guided ones.
men"
these
were not evil
[242], only
One
supposes that their shades will
be
as touched
by the
ity
as
they
are relieved
by
us
the mercy of this
soft-hearted miniature
Nietzsche. In [255].
what
the meantime,
he tells
Book
sor
'B'
will
in his concluding sentence, "the cosmos find its admiring readership among the devotees of
Profes
Harvey Mansfield, Jr. has called "cucumber liberalism": persons (they would shrink from being called 'men') who derive their morality from Erich Fromm, their politics from Charles Reich, their theology from Harvey Cox, their eco
nomics
their vision of
general
from E. F. Schumacher, their military science from Jonathan Schell, and history from William Irwin Thompson. Readers, in short, more
than intelligent.
The problem,
as you
tween the covers of
coexist be and Book have guessed, is that Book one book, Jeremy Rifkin's Algeny. This unevenness has at
'A'
'B'
least two
"has
causes.
First, according
authored
to the publicity material accompanying the book, Mr. Rifkin five books in the past five years on economic, political, cultural,
themes."
philosophical, and theological

of the
This
suggests that
Mr. Rifkin
rigorous
partakes
very industrialism he condemns, but

second cause
without
sufficiently
'quality
how to
control.'
The
think
about
is
more
fundamental. Mr. Rifkin is
not quite sure
about nature, although
he does have
fairly
and
clear
idea
of what us
he thinks
to surren
it. Nature, he
writes, consists of interdependent parts;

part"
it "asks
der to the
as
oneness of which we are a
[47]
no
to be as
"participatory"
[56]
it is. Life begins "where security is

where there are no
dependencies"
nonexistent,
where all
things are vulner

relationships and
able,
hierarchies,
life is
pecking orders, only

"not
of
"comradeship"
mutual
[249]. Life
organize
means undifferentiated
[253]. [254].
of
The human
attempt
to
unnatural,
own one
life but
death"
of
Presumably, Mr. Rifkin

course
exempts
his
book from the latter dictum. But

think,
much
the
problem remains:
how does
less write,
about
more
Mr.
than
Rifkin's Darwin
cance
genial chaos?
The
cosmos
does indeed
contain
many things,
or the cyberneticists
see, but how does one
assess
the relative signifi
of, for example,
competition and
love? Mr. Rifkin
cannot say.
In
an ut
terly
into
mediocre
In man, this would cause random thinking.

it causes unevenness
Mr. Rifkin,
who
is
not
utterly
a
mediocre,
patches of sense and nonsense stitched
motley banner for
band
of miscellaneous crusaders. alien to the vision of all
"[T]he
new world we are
entering is
the great
theolo-
390
Interpretation
past"
gians, philosophers,
and metaphysicians of
the
[218-19]. On the contrary,
it is
an extension of the
Machiavellian
project as elaborated
by
Bacon. Under
standing this project remains as important as ever, and few contemporary writers have understood it as well as the late Hans Jonas. His last book. Philosophical
Essays,
contains several pages on
bioengineering,
more
ter than Rifkin does because he

an undergraduate who wants to
understands
know
activity he understands bet thinking better than Rifkin does. To about this issue, my advice is: skim
an
Rifkin,
read
Jonas, study Bacon.
Short Notices
Will Morrisey
Studies
of
the American
Constitution
by
Robert A. Goldwin
and
How Democratic is the Constitution? Edited
Wil
liam A. Schambra. (Washington

Public
and
London: American Enterprise Institute for
Policy Research,
1980.
150 pp.: cloth
$12.25,
paper
$5.25.)
and
How Capitalistic is the Constitution? Edited liam A. Schambra. (Washington

Public
and
by
Robert A. Goldwin
Wil
London: American Enterprise Institute for
Policy Research,
1982.
172 pp.: cloth
$14.25,
paper
$6.25.)
Classifying
at
scholars and polemicists
the time of
democratic provokes as much debate among it did among polemicists and ordinary citizens today its ratification. Classifying it as capitalistic provokes little debate.
our constitution as as and
Accordingly, Goldwin
of our constitution
whereas
Schambra's first
volume virtues
and
secondarily the
and
debates primarily the nature defects of democracy,

defects
of capital
their second volume debates primarily the
virtues and
ism
and
essays.
secondarily the nature of our constitution. Each volume contains seven As Professor Bernard Lewis has noted, anthologists usually "violate the
strength."
humane Pentateuchal ban

a philosopher wrought
on
yoking
animals of unequal
us are well
But
although contrasts
may
call scholars
oxen, many of
instructed
by
by
editorial
inhumanity.
and political scientists
arguments order.
Historian Gordon S. Wood
Ann Stuart Diamond
and
Michael Parenti introduce the

mocracy,
was and and
for
our constitution's
aristocracy, de
oligarchy, in that
'real'
Wood begins badly, writing that "there

a constitution exists
is
no
Constitution
and
against which we can measure the
statements of the minds of minds can even as
Federalists
Antifederalists";
conflicting only in the
its beholders. Wood
nonetheless assumes
that the contents of those

solipsism
be discerned, thus conveniently rejecting he asserts it in textual interpretation.

presents a thoughtful account of
in
historiography
to give the re
founders'
Wood
gime
the
attempt
both
popular support and aristocratic rule.
He
suggests that
the founders
used rhetoric
that
they did
words are
founders'
equating democracy do this in such a calculating way "as here implied": "Ideas and not manipulated or transformed that Why "crudely"? The
with republicanism. not
He claims, over-piously,
crudely."
statesmanship
deed, Wood
ends
by
evidently no less subtle than it needed to be. In "furcriticizing the founders for being too thorough, for
was
ther[ing] the American disavowal

tics and encourag[ing] the
any sort of aristocratic conception of poli American belief that the ills of democracy can be
of
392
cured
Interpretation
democracy."
by
more
prerogative. remarks
He
suggests no alternative rhetoric
admittedly
historian's
Diamond
that
land is
also
aristocracy's
basis,
whereas
the constitution en
courages commerce. no
She
denies that
our regime
is
a mixed
one; there were
fixed
classes
to mix,
that
as rich and poor alike
tended toward the middle.
She have
does
not mention
Aristotle, foremost
large
middle
of mixed-regime
men,
would
statesmen encourage a means.
class,
although not of course
by
'modern'
Diamond
aims
her best
observation not at of
Wood's
aristocratic
interpretation
The latter
but
at the oligarchic
interpretation
Charles Beard
and
his
epigoni.
characteristically damn the body of the document and worship its appendage, the Bill of Rights. Diamond asserts that "the primary protection for liberty, in all its aspects, lies in [economic activity "generated by self-interest'] and in the consti
tutional institutions themselves, not in the
first ten
"
amendments. elevates men
She
of
argues
less convincingly to high office,

merit"
when
she
claims
that
democracy
a
"natural
and
then observes that such philosophers as
Hobbes,
This
Locke,
merely dom by
and
Smith believed "natural

that one to
dubious
notion
in any
case.
shows
does
founders'
not
reference attacks
Hobbes, Locke,
for the
necessarily and Smith.
exhaust the
practical wis
Parenti
the constitution from the

propertied
'left,'
calling it "a
at
legitimating
cloak
and workable system
populace."
fited
so
ordinary One is tempted to say that never have so many ordinary people pro much at their own expense, but Parenti 's essay does serve as a useful
after,"
interests
the expense of the
qualification of arguments sneers
any too-noble sketch of the founders. Tendentiousness mars his ("the property interests of the slave owners were looked he in passing) but, taken as one voice among seven, he adds a note that be
missed. volume's central
would otherwise
In the
essay, Walter Berns refuses to accept the terms of the

were no more simple majoritarian
"
debate. "The Antifederalists base their idealism

tion
democrats than
republicans
the Federalists were aristocrats in any traditional sense.

regimes on the
Modern
those rights are defended. This
liberty liberty
justified is
by
natural rights and
by
which
liberty
saved
from
what one might call mere
by
is
problematic
its basis in that very material activity, because the rights described by
materialism.
commerce.
Berns's formula
modern philosophers partake said
of philosophic wisdom?
Can the founders be
to
have had
theoretical
Wilson
Carey
McWilliams
concerns
himself
with a related problem of mod
ern political philosophy. more
Although Berns
argues that
contends that our regime
has become
democratic, McWilliams
fundamental
point that
there is less citizen participation
today
than
hitherto. He does
not substantiate
this claim, using
it instead to
arrive at the
cannot
more
individualism, particularly
life
and that the
self-preservation,
regime
comport with genuine political
American
therefore in-
393 jures its

The
Short Notices
citizens and undermines
itself. He does
not
say how the small, demo

be.
cratic, communal polities he favors

volume's
could survive.
final two
essays speak of what we are, not what we might
Joseph M. Bessette
made a
replies to
Wood
and
Parenti
by
writing that the founders
"deliberative
democracy"
that reconciles moderation and majority rule.
If the
and
citizens possessed the same
knowledge
and experience as their representatives
if they devoted the
same amount of
time reasoning about the relevant

would
information
simi
and arguments presented
in the legislative body,

policy issues
they
reach
fundamentally
answer
lar
conclusions on public
as their representatives?
If the
is
yes,
then we must conclude that the result
is
basically
democratic.
Obviously
capacity to
true as far as it goes, this assessment fails to reflect the

make good use of
need
for the
states
knowledge,
experience, and
leisure. The
manship from view.
of
both Jefferson's
natural aristoi and
Hamilton's
man of ambition
fades
Statesmanship concerns
ical
account of
Alfred F Young,
who presents an
informative histor
to agree that de
how the Federalists "made democratic

and
concessions to achieve
ends,"
conservative
how
some potential antifederalists came
mocracy needed restraint. Of the latter faction, Jefferson in particular came to like the constitution "testimony to the powerful pull of the democratic features
document."
of
the
One
might add
that Jefferson's conduct as president also tes
tified to the scope the document affords statesmanlike action.
How Democratic Is the Constitution?

cipal
will
introduce
new students
to the prin
issues
of the
founding
and stimulate
further
reflection
by
older students.
It
teaches
above all
that a comprehensive account of our constitution would take
essay or an anthology of essays. Perhaps the only attempt to care constitution using Aristotle's regime taxonomy can be found in describe the fully A Discourse on Statesmanship by Paul Eidelberg. Partisans of the aristocratic,
more than one
democratic, they
and oligarchic
interpretations
will
have to
surpass
Eidelberg
before
can claim to
have
said the
best, if not
political
the
last,
words
in the debate.
the
How Capitalistic Is the Constitution? begins Federalist's

arguments on
with an able presentation of of commerce.
the
benefits
Marc F
us
Plattner
that even
describes the
Jefferson
to
practical and theoretical
bases for this view, reminding

and retain
regarded economic redistribution as
antisocial, a violation of the right
freely
exercise one's own
industry
its fruits
"the first
principle of
association."
Plattner
observes that those who
"seek to impose
on the
large
re
public an economic egalitarianism more appropriate to
the small
in
elements."
dulge in "a
Utopian combination of
contradictory
to argue for a
of
neo-Marxist view of
Edward S.
"the
capitalist
Greenberg
He
uses the occasion

minimizes
the
importance
class
the constitution,
believing
most re
relations."
it primarily
vealing
a reflection of
"the prevailing
Perhaps the
aspect
of the essay comes near
its end,
when
he
writes
that "We have no
394 way
of
Interpretation
predicting
whether
[laissez-faire
capitalism or corporate
capitalism] is
ca
system."
successfully taming belief that he had developed the first

pable of
the emergent crises of the

scientific socialism
Marx's
proud
has evidently lost its

rights
plausibility Forrest McDonald

made
even
to
his
admirers.
argues that the constitutional guarantee of
property
capitalism
enough;
a capitalist also uses shows
erty."
He
not inevitable. Merely owning property is not his property "for the purpose of creating more prop that few Americans, and few of the founders, were capitalists. possible
but
Even American
merchants
distrusted the "depersonalized, Not

to
collateral-based credit
that is essential to large-scale capitalist
enterprise."
class relations
credits
but
states with
manship brought shrewdly
capitalism
America.
McDonald
Hamilton
indeed, surreptitiously putting the contract clause into the consti tution, with developing the practice of using public debt as the basis of "an institutionalized system of monetized private and, of course, with the
credit"
establishment of a national
bank. "Although
have
chosen
otherwise, Congress chose
Americans probably the Hamiltonian

most
'liberal.'
would
Walter Dean Burnham is the
volume's sole
He
claims
that we now
have
and
"zero-sum
society"
in
which
the economic growth described
by
He
Locke
Smith
has, for
the most part, ended. He advocates more government control

we still produce more equally. of
over
the
"feudal,"
society in order to distribute what decentralized institutions
regrets
the founders.
Nonetheless, "it
seems a
bit too late in the

no magic
day
for
a simple-minded
faith in the
state as a
'"I have
formula.
magic possessed
Neither is
by
Bernard H. Siegan,
whether or not
'conservative'
a economist.
law
pro
fessor,
plores
or
Robert Lekachman,
a socialist/democratic
Siegman de
special-interest
legislation;
its
sponsors'
intentions
are
egalitarian, the legislation itself
almost always gives
inequalities
the sanction and
rigidity
of
than the
law. The temporary inequalities of commercial flux are more tolerable long-lasting inequities of legal inertia. Lekachman, in the volume's
essay, complains that the Supreme Court
"welfare"
most elegantly-turned and superficial
has failed to
dreams
yet to
of
make
payments a
not
"constitutionally
right"
protected
Mitterand,"
and who
help, if
our
brighten
the
'small-is-beautiful'
salvation, from "our own Francois national horizon. He does manage some telling left, but gives no sign of knowing Plattner's
has
criticisms of argument on republic.
the problems of pursuing small-republican economic ends in a
large
The
the
editors reserve the most original political
founders'
late
nineteenth
essay for last. Stephen Miller shows how economy differed from the laissez-faire capitalism of the century. Economic libertarianism offers no place for the states
capitalism
manship that transcends commerce. He also argues, perhaps inconsistently, that has comported with authoritarian and even totalitarian rule. He rejects Its
partisans
economic egalitarianism as well.
do "not
realize
that it is precisely
of wealth makes
because
any
most
Americans do
that
not think
the present
to accept
distribution
moral sense
they
are
inclined
it";
their economic
inferiority
395
Short Notices
judgment
on
reflects no moral
them, feeds
and a
no resentment.
for
'conservatives,'
Having
found
space
'liberal,'
socialists,
the editors give the

to
last
word
to a
moderate.
They
risk
being
thought
inhumane
ideologues.
"A Decade
of
These
volumes constitute the

a program sponsored
first in
a series.
Study of the
Con
stitution,"
by
the American
ture the publication of more scholarly work as

nears.
Enterprise Institute, will fea our constitution's bicentennial
These
volumes
have already improved
our perennial
debates,
which
may
soon
intensify
for
more
than ceremonial reasons.
Churchill's
Statesmanship
of
Statesmanship: Essays in Honor
Sir Winston S. Churchill. Edited

1981.
by
Harry
cloth,
V. Jaffa.
(Durham,
N.C.: Carolina Academic Press,
279
pp.:
$22.95.)
Winston Churchill's World View:
Statesmanship
and
Power.
By
Kenneth 364
pp.:
W Thompson. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State

cloth,
University Press,
1983.
$25.00.)
oldest and
The
best
written
constitution, the American constitution,
will con
tinue to receive careful study as

monplace
long
as regimes of
liberty
survive.
It is
a com obviate
to say that American institutions
work so well
that
they nearly
the need for statesmen.
Studying
American institutions
seems a more serious
task than studying American politicians.
It is
also a commonplace to admit that even the
United States
needs statesman
ship
on occasion.
Englishmen, favored
a statesman
with one of midst near
the oldest and
best
unwritten
century.
constitutions, found
in their
the
beginning
of
this
It took them nearly four decades to decide what to do with him, and even then they had second thoughts. Americans might do no better, given the chance. Per
haps
we need to
Harry
V Jaffa
and
study statesmanship with as much care as we study institutions. Kenneth W Thompson evidently think so.
volume with an
Freedom."
Jaffa begins his
ship of the Politics of late directly to the practice ordinary

citizens or
essay titled "On the The "politics of

It does, but
Necessity
may
also
of a
Scholar
to re
freedom"
not seem
of
statecraft; it sounds as if it concerns the activities of

politicians.
ordinary
as
Jaffa
shows,
it is
by
studying the
practice of statecraft
by
great politicians,
statesmen, that we most
directly
confront
the issue of freedom. The statesman, empowered to take ex
traordinary
tics. "As a
who
action, shows us to what extent a

writer no
human
being
can act
freely
in
poli
less than
as a maker of
history, Churchill understood,

this difference only
as
few
wis
have
either written or made
history
We
have done, the difference between

can see
event."
dom in
and wisdom after
the
if we "make
act."
clear what
wise action
is known,
may
or
and what could not end well;
be known,
"there is
by
those called upon to
may
a genuine
indeterminacy in the
na-
396
ture of
man
Interpretation
things"
an
indeterminacy
caused above all
by the
partial of
freedom
of
hu
beings. Jaffa
contrasts this traditional

ground of
understanding
human
nature with
modern
determinism, "the
an
despotism"
whereon scientists
inexplicably
exempt themselves
from the
mechanistic universe character
they
posit.
After
Jaffa That
essay
on
Churchill's
by
official
biographer Martin Gilbert,
returns
to examine Churchill's own response to the question of
freedom.
not
response emanated considerable
from Churchill's
ethical
convictions, his character,
from his
A
intellect.
world made repudiates.
by
tides and tendencies, and not

not
by
wisdom and virtue,
is
a world
really say that it does not exist; on the contrary, he finds that this is the kind of world which, in ever increasing measure, we find ourselves inhabiting. But he does not accept it; he will not accept it. he
He does
Thus Jaffa's Churchill "asserts

ern scientific progress and
and
categorically the intrinsic human

. . .
absolute
disjunction
end
of mod errors
well-bein
"To
human
employing collective foreknowledge implies, the human condition but ending it, by returning it to the primeval human evil,
by
not
perfecting
that
condition
Creation."
preceded
This
explains the abysmal
failure
nature.
of
Marxism,
the attempt to
combine science and politics

of
to remake human
It
also explains the
failure
the gentler methods of the commercial republics, whose 'behavioral
scientists'
undermine
the virtues needed to maintain commerce and republicanism
by deny
have
if
virtue
ing
its
the doctrine of human
freedom. Both Marxists

were automatically.
and
behaviorists
would not
would
us attain
desired
ends as
it
But "virtue
be
gained."
ends were always
Mario Lewis, Jr.

Jaffa is
wars of right to
writes
"On War
as
and
Legitimacy
public
in Shakespeare's Henry
encompassed
V"
include it,
regime
Churchill's
life
the two great

attempted
this century and several smaller ones.
Moreover, Churchill
to
refound the
British
in
opposition
to certain manifestations of modern ide
ology,
sheds
particularly the modern tyrannies. Lewis observes that "Shakespeare light on the delicate matters of legitimacy and the founding of
the crux of those matters
regim
To
state
indelicately,
to be
the means of attaining the power
needed
to found a regime are not usually the means of
the same time,
legitimacy, "the
obeyed"
right
obtaining legitimacy. At is itself "a source of be
power
and, conversely, power often
inclines the legitimate.
unspirited and powerless toward
lieving
the possessor of power
Religious
as well as political
implications
for
abound
here,
want
and
Lewis discusses
them with admirable shrewdness. Even as political men often seize power but
want
legitimacy,
churchmen stand
legitimacy
but
the power to defend
their property. In
Henry V,
king
and a churchman attempt to solve these com

and
plementary problems by prosecuting better to unify England's new regime it. Lewis
notes that
sanctioning
and a
an unjust
foreign
war, the
within
ob-
and to assure
the place of the church
"every
generation
is
new"
"profound
sense of civic
397
Short Notices
unless
ligation disappears Thus Churchill's
the
kind
of experience which
recreated."
one might note the profound
originally produced it is usefulness to the British regime of be wrong to call his wars unjust. institutions because hu Machiavellian Shakespeare
interests'
warlike
actions, although it
would
"Founders
man
can and must make and remake political

support."
things have no divine
Lewis's
rather
finds Biblical teachings

and annexation of
caused eign
but ultimately dangerous. "England's conquest France proved disastrous to her real a disaster
useful
by
the
tendency
of the
Christian doctrine
debate."
of providence
"to divorce for
policy from any
conception of the public good which can
be
ascertained con
through the give and take of political
Nonetheless, Lewis wittily
cludes, "If the
absence of providence makes continual
refounding necessary, the
belief in The
providence makes
it
possible."
closest
Churchill
came to
advocating
was
unjust wars
in the opinion,
and vigorous
at
least,
of
of
many
of our contemporaries
during
his
long
defense
the British Empire. Kirk Emmert shows how this defense contributed to the
task of refounding. Although "torn between his commit
commitment
statesman's perennial ment
to
virtue and
his
to
liberty
to
and to the
democratic
and
regime of modern
liberty"
that
is, between
commitments
the
classic
the
Churchill ited
and
"finally
preferred aristocratic virtue not
to democratic
freedom."
A "lim
empire,"
civilizing
virtues
tively human
in both
rulers and ruled. with
sell-aggrandizing conquest, Although in ancient times
develops the distinc

virtue re
quired the small polis,
in modernity,
its "mass
to
provide scope
excellence.
Only
imperial
powers are of sufficient magnitude of moral and
for the
at
most
splendid and
demanding forms
the
human
Only
the head of
an extensive empire can
truly
great-souled man
have his day.
Without empire, haps worse, Churchill's
democracy
might not warrant
the devotion of a Churchill. Per
it
might not even produce one.
Wayne C. Thompson
and
Jeffrey
D. Wallin
contribute
articles
describing
In
a most
prudent subordination of
military strategy to
political aims.
informative essay, Steven A. Maaranen
presents and assesses
the ideological as
left between the world wars. sumptions behind the foreign policy of the British Although British conservatives deserve and receive much of the blame for the
government's
lethargic
and
cowardly
response
to Hitler throughout most of the
1930s,
a mixture of
fear
hope what and Utopian
Maaranen too generously
calls
"the
left" contributed political and philosophic thought of the

must
its
share
to the
disaster. One
say that
although
Churchillian imperialism
might school men
in
courage
and moderation,
evidently British imperialism failed to
produce a
sufficient number
of Churchillian imperialists.
Churchill
sia, and the
made war on
Germany
and allied
himself
with
France, Soviet Rus
United States. The books last four essays concern statesmanship allies. Angelo M. Codevilla considers de Gaulle, rightly relating to Churchill's
398
Interpretation
politics"
defining the primary "problem of modern immediately and primarily interested in their
to
subordinate
as
"how to
cause men who are
own preservation and gratification
themselves to a common purpose and, if called upon, to give their

good essay is marred by its final section, wherein Gaullist description of Soviet communism, misattrilife's meaning (Malraux asks it, de Gaulle only repeats it),
lives in its
Codevilla butes
pursuit."
This
mistranslates a
a question on
and misinterprets a pear
Gaullist
statement on modern
individualism, making it ap
to be an endorsement of modern individualism.

shows that
Edward J. Erler
ume,
Solzhenitsyn,
kind
praised
by
Jaffa
s
earlier
in the
vol
Erler'
regards a great writer as a
of statesman.
description
of Solz-
henitsyn's
viewer
effort at
refounding the regime of Russian
Orthodoxy
leaves this
re
politics to
asking Christianity. If, for example,
the kind of questions Mario Lewis raises concerning the relation of
"Orthodoxy
to
is the
ideology"
antithesis of critique spirit ques
and modern
of of
ideology
owes
its
beginning
Machiavelli, Solzhenitsyn 's

as
faith,"
the West's lack of civic courage, a critique characterized
"more in the
Machiavelli than
an orthodox
defender
of the
raises
fascinating
own.
tions. Erler
does
not attempt
to answer those questions here.
Jaffa
cates
concludes
the volume with two more short essays of the charge that he
his
One
vindi
Churchill
go
against
Lusitania to
into
an area patrolled
deliberately by German submarines.

have been to
embroil
allowed the
American ship The purpose of
Churchill's
the
alleged
(in)action is
said to
the United States
in
first
world war.
Jaffa's
refutation exemplifies the principles of
Churchillian
historiography
praises
shot"
Jaffa
commended
Franklin D. Roosevelt for

the United
introductory essay. The second essay "maneuvering the Japanese into firing the first
a war
in his
at
large majority
of them
States in 1941, thus embroiling Americans in did not want to enter. "[T]his was his finest
that a
hour."
Taken
together, these essays invite us to reflect on practical ical considerations advanced earlier in the volume.
aspects of the more theoret
Statesmanship
ship"
numbers
series published
include books
subjects
by by Emmert, Wallin, Maaranen,

not
among several books in the "Studies in Statesman Carolina Academic Press. The series includes or will
and
Codevilla elaborating
on the
discussed here. It may
be
Utopian
to hope that these efforts true statesmanship.
will
help
citizens of commercial republics
know
and prize
Winston Churchill
who write of
wrote
voluminously,
with eloquence and candor.
Those
him have little to clarify and nothing to embellish. They may wish to demonstrate some order in his thoughts, however, and they may hope to judge
today's circumstances in the
son
light
of
Churchillian
criteria.
Kenneth W.
Thomp
does both.
opinions about peace and war
He finds today's
provisation,
anism.
naive empiricism
("piling facts
vs.
on
disorderly, a jumble of im facts"), and equally naive utopi

dualities
as
The
vs.
concatenation of these opinions yields such trivial

'pessimism,'
'moralism'
'opti
vs.
mism'
'cynicism,'
'internationalism'
and
399
Short Notices
In contrast, Churchill
understood that
which
'isolationism.'
"the
are
essence of politics re
quires
ited"
men
to choose goals
and
objectives
fragmented
and
lim
"lesser
.
evils."
"Only
"
.
in
pure
thought can policies and actions remain

wisdom
uncorrupted.
Courage
and practical
animated
both Churchill's The immediate
character and what purpose of
Thompson
calls
Churchill's
"philosophy."
Churchill's
courage and practical wisdom was the quest

power resisted
for British
se
curity
and
power; British security and
tyranny,
preserved
British
manners, customs,
laws,
and
traditions. "Churchill viewed political

Burke."
leadership in
noble
the tradition of the British philosopher Edmund
Burkean
ures.
political
leadership
has
achieved
justifiable fame for its
fail
Thompson
seems
to blame mass politics for this;

good-hearted and
democracy
immense
has defeated
citi
aristocracy.
"The great,
shrewd"
collectively only
with
democratic
difficulty."
zenry "can
realistic effort
succeed
in
distinguishing
"in
the truth
The
an
statesmen will
must
therefore cast his policies "in moralistic

a certain
molds,
he
find
"demeaning"
Patriotism is the
chooses as
usual senti
ment evoked chill's noble
by
such statesmen.
Yet Thompson
to attack Nazi
his
example of
Chur
failure the
of
proposal
Europe."
Germany
citizens
through the
Balkans,
politi
"the
soft
underbelly
Not democratic
do.
but democratic
cians resisted this proposal. struct statesmen more than
Thompson thus
citizens
suggests
that certain politicians ob
ordinary
Thompson
would therefore educate
future
politicians
to aspire to, or at least
defer to,
peated
. . .
statesmanship.
Politicians have failed to do
either one
because they
persist
in
imagining
and
force"
"the bright
signs of
inevitable
progres
in this century in "re

an
failures."
tragedies, conflicts,
Modern
science, at
best
"essentially
as solu
amoral or neutral
contemporaries.
in Churchill's
estimation, mesmerized almost all of
his
"Democracy
human
and science, which

and
had been heralded

"[F]or Churchill
ferocity."
tions to war, have increased its

stituted the ultimate
while
intensity
war con
a problem modern
ideologists
exacerbate
trying to solve. Unlike Jaffa, Thompson

In
proceeds
not
chill's statecraft and suffice.
to the advice we
further into philosophy but to Chur may derive from it. Two examples must
you
July
1934, Churchill told

not
Parliament, "When
way
around.
have
peace you will
disarmament,"
have
the
other
In August 1950, Churchill

nuclear age':
brought this insight into
what was
already
called
'the
It is indeed
military
weapon.
melancholy thought that nothing

the
preserves
Europe from
attack except
devastating
time the
would
resources of
sole
the United
against
.
an overwhelming States in this awful

.
That is
at
the
present
deterrent
Communist invasion.
No
wonder
the Communists
like to ban it in the
name of peace.
By
reminding
us of this trenchant statement,
Thompson may
the
cause us
to reflect
that just as a
zens
philosopher
begins
with wonder,
statesman must encourage citi
to deliberate
on circumstances and then say,
"no
400
Interpretation
the Politics
Richard Hooker
ner.
and
of a
Christian England.
By
Robert K. Faulk
1981. x
(Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:
University
of
California Press,
190 pp.: cloth,
$24.50.)
Adam
warfare"
With "the learn

much
old
of religious
still
"before
our
we
may
and
from Richard Hooker's "diagnosis
of religious strife and of the civic
possibilities and problems endemic
to religious
Hooker's diagnosis
prescriptions
earned
him
reputation
for judiciousness; Faulkner "weighs
[Hooker's] judiciousness,
His
was a mixture of whether
speak."
so to
and
Christianity
this
Aristotelianism
and
it is
an old question
these two mix well.

of
The
mixture
most serious
task of a student of Hooker
is to
clarify the consistency
and,
fundamentally,
the merits of each part.

and
To
undertake this task seriously, one must consider

circumstance. considers
both Hooker's Laws
Hooker's
Faulkner
a weak
that circumstance
in Part I. In its first chapter, he describes
Anglican Church in
need of a new
foundation,
a church endangered
and
by
of
three classes of external enemies:
"atheists, Catholics,
Perhaps the
most
Each
these receives
a chapter's attention.
Elizabethans'
interesting
of
facts brought to
which was
light
concern the
firsthand knowledge
Machiavelli,
more extensive than
many
scholars recognize.
Hooker's zealotry worldly
subtle response of the reformers
to the "wise
would
malignant,"
Faulkner meticulously describes later showing how Christian

defenseless"
"leave the
church
against
such
wisdom.
As
defense
against
these extremes, Hooker

an
would explore
reconciliation with the
Roman church,
institution
with much experience
in
dealing
with extremes.
Hooker "restores
one
practical
judgment
after
to reformed theol
ogy,"
an
accomplishment
appreciates
only
heightens the
religio-political problem
by advancing
seeing that Christianity doctrine of "faith in other

and
worldly substance, in Christ's saving By exacerbating the zeal of the Christian flock, reformers diminished "deference, judgment, and
tion"
grace."
fear
modera
all required
for decent
politics.
Hooker
attempts to reconcile the
faith be He does
now
hind Christian
so
zeal and
fear
with the practical reason politics requires.
by
arguing
that since the end of the age of prophecy,

reason."
"grace illuminates
by
prompting Part II follows
logically
from
this.
In this
central
division
of
his book Faulkner
contrasts assertion
Hooker's Christian
made
ethics to
Aristotle's
ethics. where
in Natural Right
and
History,
as
He quietly amends the Leo Strauss describes

Faulkner
"Hooker's
right"
conception of natural
"the Thomistic
concept
observes that and
Hooker "admires Augustine among churchmen more than Aquinas, differs markedly from particularly distrusting the Thomistic doc
Aquinas,"
trine of conscience, syndaresis. Hooker
differs from Aristotle in

near
more
sharply
distinguishing mand, and duty (will,

ethics
from politics, in
not
more
habituation, is
deductive
strongly emphasizing law, com the core of his ethics), in his cer
Aristotle
reserves
tainty (he brings
to ethics the
method
for science),
401
and
Short Notices
in
displacing
of
friendship
with
charity
and religious community.
"Although
as
he diminishes
prudence"
politics and political
in
contrast to
Aristotle (even
he
fortifies them in
stringent praved
contrast to
Calvin),
Hooker
"moral
expectations prepare a even nature
polity"
wherein statesmen
end."
impose laws that "guide

Christian
de
to a right
concerns
Part III
Hooker's Christian
"the
politics.
political
prudence, in
Hooker's words,
meekness of
consists of
a
wisdom of serpents tempered with the

some readers
innocent
doves"
formulation
may find
bit daunting. As
Faulkner
tion"
understands
this tempered wisdom, it requires that "Christian salva
displace
thought.
universal
from the relatively high place politics enjoys in Aristotle's Human nature is social but not political; "Biblical universality points to
politics
fellowship
under
rule."
In this Hooker departs
God's rule, not to particular politics under human not only from Aristotle but from Aquinas. Politics, in
ruling,"
culminating in "the
to rule
exercise of virtue natural
must
be strictly
. .
subordinate
so."
by
of
God's law. "Law is

replaces
in the best
sense
politics not
Hooker's Laws dination

care not
Aristotle's
regime
theory. In practice this means subor
temporal government to church government, a meaning Hooker took
to trumpet in
Elizabeth's England. In
music and
contrast to
Aristotle, Hooker
guided
would substitute
belief for
action, instruction in true doctrine for polit

religion.
ical education,
Hooker's Laws
and
the Christian church for civic
Churchmen
by
will
supply
needed practical wisdom to the ecclesiastical polity. writes
In
a most
interesting
passage, Faulkner
that "The judicious Hooker seeks

middle
with respect
to belief or
theory
the mean, that to

practical
but
fitting
path,
that
which
conduct."
Aristotle had thought

theory"
restricted
This
suggests
Chris
tian "belief or
a
finally
.
points
to action, not thought. "Christian wisdom is

ranks prudence ahead of a
kind
of practical wisdom.
that
us
oretical
It
comes
to
finally by what
one might call a
simply the divine action, grace.
With Hooker, faith in divine grace is always a "judicious Hooker's judicious faithfulness produces what Faulkner
theological
self
miracle": a reconciliation of
faithfulness."
calls even
"a
political-
Christ
and
Caesar that
with
Scripture it
moderate
finds
unlikely.
Hooker "manages to inform his flock

the
philosophers and
both the
political wisdom of
Jews."
the theocratic political practice of the
"It
seems saw
that Christ denied the temporal sword only because His political
impolitic!"
judgment
can
it then
divine."
Faulkner
exlaims.
But
now
temporal coercion
be "both
politic and
graced with
philosopher
has been
It is tempting to say that a judicious interpreter.
judicious
political
Education
(Ithaca
and
and
Culture in the Political Thought
of
Aristotle.
London: Cornell
University Press,
much
1982. 226 pp.:
By Carnes Lord. cloth, $19.50.)

"effected
Modern
estheticians
make
of
"creativity
transformation
'imagination.'"
and appreciated as mimetic or
by
faculty
of
Classical
estheticians regard art of men
'imitative.'
If this imitation includes the imitation
"not only
402
as
Interpretation
are
they
but
be,"
educa
as
they
should
art can
"serve
as the core of a civic
Imagination, however, providing "'models of moral and political can do this only by threatening to break the audience's hold on reality. Moderns
behavior."
by
thus tend either to
dismiss
in
art as
daydreaming
regime.
or conscript
it for
propaganda.
In the last two books

cation
men
of the
Politics, Aristotle discusses

best
the right place of edu
and
culture
the
Addressing
he
himself
to
gentle
"potential
legislators"
or actual statesmen or
even and
also offers
them "prac
tical guidance
ruling
class
in the
sense."
political as
precisely in regimes where they do For such men, "musical

moral virtue and
not constitute a
culture"
should and
have
place,"
a "central
moderate
it both "reinforces
"serves to
the claims of
Thus Aristotle
can present a glimpse of part of
the
best
regime to certain nonphilosophers without

regimes
from the
were unable
causing their utter alienation live. Unlike some moderns, "Plato and Aristotle they dispense with to because they recognized that, given the poetry
in
which
limits imposed
effective
on
man
by
nature, philosophy or reason could never
be
fully
be
in
life."
political
Five
chapters
follow Lord's introduction. The first
concerns the relation education
tween education and politics

cal
in the best
learn
regime.
Aristotelian
is
politi
in the learn
sense that citizens
(by
means of
habituation)
to
be
ruled and
also
(by
means of
logos)
to rule.
Learning
to be ruled consists of
they training
the
body
and
the passions; this continues until age twenty-one and encompasses
no philosophy. education
(Indeed, "one is
tempted to suggest that scientific or philosophic
in the best
regime will
be
fundamentally
purpose
a private affair
") The
public education of gentlemen should consist of

"music."
letters,
gymnastic,
leisure"
drawing
and
painting, and
The latter's
is "noble
not mere
play
but '"a way
of
life
or an
play."
the pleasures of
activity that combines the seriousness of occupation with Music education will alternate with gymnastic: Both will
of
teach the courage required tion

will
also
for the military duties teach the noble leisure or noble is

above all an education
young
citizens.
Music
educa
pleasure of the mature citizen.

virtue,"
"Music Moral
education
in
moral
not philosophy.
virtue requires not second chapter
theoretical
but
practical reason.
In the
reason.
Lord
examines the relation
between
music and practical
Aristotle
commends
"the
enjoyment and
judgment
not so much of music
itself
as of the
'decent
actions'
characters and noble
which music pain and
is
able
to
repre no pru
sent."
While
mere
play
causes us to
forget
the purpose
pain
serves,
ble leisure dent
restores the
individual
childish.
with a view
toward
future
exertion.
It is
whereas
play is
"[W]hat is
most
fundamental in
music
is its
capacity to affect the character and the
is, its capacity for moral educa tion. It does so by imitating and simultaneously encouraging its audience to imi tate. Its power is not limited to children or young men but extends to the mature. And the it forms is "not of those imitations as imitations [esthetics]
that
"judgment"
soul,"
but
rather of
the things
chapter
they
imitate of
'decent
'
characters and noble actions.
"
In the third
Lord
examines the relation
between
music and the
pas-
403
sions,
Short Notices
the phenomenon of catharsis. All tunes and
and therefore soul
particularly "imitations of
"enthusiastic"
harmonies
are
character"
understood."
ent element of the
broadly
ethically important; "passion is a constitu Aristotle distinguishes between

and
catharsis
thusiasm"
the cure for a kind of madness
the "normal en to most
aroused
men
but does
men; it
not
by cathartic tunes, which is harmless and delightful bring catharsis to them. Tragic catharsis, however, is
passions, pity
and
for
nor
mal
moderates those normal

will
fear. It is
not
for
all nor
at
mal men. religious
Noncitizens
hear the
music
more extreme
harmonies, particularly
their
festivals. Tragic
of course
is for
citizens only.
Tragedy
involves the
harmonies. The fourth

tion. We remain things
chapter concerns realm of
in the
poetry as well as nonverbal the relation between poetry and educa the passions, but language necessarily points to
catharsis
verbal music of
beyond the
passions.
Tragic
involves
all passions associated with

passions
the experience of pain,

thymos or spiritedness.
including
and
pity
and
fear. These
have to do
with of
Obviously,
as a colleague of
of
Plato, Aristotle knew
both the
indispensability
it. Tragic
the danger
thymos,
which can guard reason or
overthrow
catharsis purifies the spirited passions of

when
"their dangerous
are at their most
gentlemen" excesses,"
thus moderating "spirited

at
they
dangerous
tharsis of
and
home, in
aroused or
peacetime, with no external enemies to

not
fight. "The
fear."
ca
anger will
be brought about,
in the
error)
fear
will
be
spirited of
by anger, but by pity and gentlemen by dramatic imitation

and of
Pity
of
the
harmartia (tragic flaw

ror.
heroes
the destructive results of such er
Thus the
gentlemen will view a man rather
like themselves;
while
imitating
for
a
the hero's
reason all
virtues
the
they more. Comedy, too,
will wish
to
avoid
his
error.
They
will admire practical
can serve as a vehicle
for
spiritedness and
instruction
against error.
Only
poetry
combines universals and particulars
in
way similar to the

or
operation of practical reason.

"
. .
Thus it
excels either appears
philosophy
presuppose
history
in the
education of gentlemen.
Aristotle
to
what would
be denied
his
by
the thinkers of early modernity

moral
"appears."
that prudent action

not
involves
and
indeed is inseparable from

choice of
virtue."
Lord does
explicitly
elaborate on
the
word
His final chapter,

some suggestions
on the relation
between
politics and
culture, does contain

view"
in that regard, however. From "a

actions
certain point of
one
can
"identify
the
deriving
from
moral and political virtue as
the primary
content of
the leisured
of gentlemen.
From another,
superior, point of
view,
moral and political action
ture,
not moral and political education,
is necessary and useful but not truly noble. Cul is "the cultivation of the mind in a man
noble."
ner that
is
at once pleasant and serious or
This may
to
resemble
the activity
of philosophy,
but Lord takes
care not to allow us

fact"
confuse culture with philos
ophy. The "fundamental

rational.
political
remains spiritedness
a species of
the ir
(Lord
writes
that the necessity for a foreign policy alone ensures this;

were one possible, would
'world one might add that even a
involve it.)
men are
The
gentlemen
are and must remain spirited.
At the
same
time, "most
404
Interpretation
activity
somehow aware that political one rules enjoyed
for the
sake of
rewards,
by itself cannot be the end of the best life"; including leisure and the "good things that are
in philosophy; their
such men
leisure."
by
Yet
most gentlemen can never engage
very spiritedness prevents it. Aristotle's leisured enjoyment of music and

moderation and
recommendation
for
is "the
poetry."
Good
music and
justice (a
word seldom seen
during
the
course of
poetry fortify Lord's argu

can
ment)
without
philosopher
weakening courage and endurance. The but a philomythos. He will share with the for the
beautiful"
gentleman will not
be
philosopher "a sense of
awe or admiration
noble and
but he
will
lack the
philosopher's
"sense habit
of
his
ignorance,"
own
mind"
needed and
to remedy it. The
his "desire to remedy philomythos "remains
it,"
and the
within
"strength
of of
the
horizon
convention."
Most important, this

philosophy.
magnanimous man will engage
in
politics while
tolerating
study.
classicist's
knowledge
of
Greek culture, particularly Greek

with a
musical
embellish
Lord's
Combined
sensitivity to the way Aristotle

this gives the book
theory, devel
bal
ops
his
argument as apolitical philosopher,
its
admirable
ance of erudition and
insight.
Machiavelli's New Modes
and
Orders: A
and
Harvey
C. Mansfield, Jr. (Ithaca
Study of the Discourses on Livy. By London: Cornell University Press, 1979.
460 pp.: cloth,
$34.50.)
show those readers who
What responsibility has Machiavelli for modernity? Mansfield intends to firmly intend to follow the argument. A firm intention to
argument requires what might
follow Mansfield's
reader must wait
be
'active'
called rather almost

will
reading; the
"find
a point
for
story,
or a
for Mansfield to
spell things out.
cap for a In this Mansfield
point,"
than passively
follows Machia leave it to be

un
velli's own technique: covered

tence."
"he
will not reveal
his intention, but

addresses
by
the potential princes whom

somewhat more
he
according
to their compe
a measured
Mansfield is
'open'
than
Machiavelli, but
readers will
interpretive
openness can
be its
own
defense; few
writes of
follow
daring
and complex
interpretation. Mansfield
men are
seems"
boldness, for
commentator.
bolder than he
Mansfield
Machiavelli, "boldness hides his not ready to believe that a bold man who seems bold is even, one might add, if this boldness is exhibited by a
presents a textual commentary on Machiavelli's own commentary Livy's book. As he follows the many turns of Machiavelli's argument as it proceeds parts marching, parts from chapter to chapter, he shows stalking
on
how
defense of liberty in fact excuses tyranny, what seems to com in fact merely uses it. "Since [Machiavelli's] fortune is broader than Italy's, indeed "all 'all are Or: "Quoting the Bible once, and in that quotation rendering God's motive as the motive of a human
what seems a mend patriotism
fortune,' forces' his."
405
Short Notices
of
king, is Machiavelli's striking way

God
rather than
Him."
obey
commended
Thus
we
saying that the new prince must imitate see a blasphemous interpretation of the
imitatio Christi
captains of
prince,"
only sends out his own, but also he himself is a captain sent out by the preceding the Prince of Darkness. "Machiavelli is determined to laugh at every
notes near the
by
theologians. "Machiavelli not
thing,"
Mansfield
same
beginning
of
the
book.
character of classics.
At the
time,
the universalist and
historical/teleological
human life
seen
Christianity
Machiavelli
attacks the
adopts
far less
optimistic view of
in the
adapts
the universalism and
'progressivism'
of
Chris
tianity
gest after
while
denying
its
the religious
insistence
on
transcendency. "One may sug
that Machiavelli learned these new remedies from
Christianity,
which
all,
with
own methods
world."
reversibly change the as we know it shall be conquered; he

without
way contrary to its own intention, will ir With Christianity, Machiavelli teaches that nature
a
will attempt
but in
to begin
notes
doing
so, of course,
word
the assistance of the

means
Christian God. Mansfield

a
that the Italian
for
"election"
"creation,"
fact that
can
be
manipulated one
"creation"
other
by
one who writes
in Italian.
Generally
speaking,
way itself is
or an said
by
Machiavelli to be Book II
of
an affair of malleability.
the Discourses shows that
"Machiavelli,
who
initiated the
modern
enterprise of seek a
expanding remedy for its
man's control over nature,
was
farsighted
enough to
success."
In the
course of this
seeking, Machiavelli dis
cards an older political science:

"regime"
Machiavelli does
the
not use an equivalent
for
(politeia),
limits
of
the notion
which
is
heart
of classical political science.
His "modes
orders"
and
lead through the do human

empire.
mestic politics of republics and principalities to test the
the religions and the classical philoso conquering his enemies Machiavelli divides them, setting them against each other. The radical phers character of the conquest he intends may be seen in this passage, outlining noth
Before
ing
less than
.
a new epistemology:
LMachiavelli]
account of
thought
it necessary to
drop
the
assumptions exists
that nature or
God
takes
human choice,
mode of
and that some
conformity
between human
as
speech
speech.
(which is the
articulating choice)
to choice,
with
and nature or
God
intelligible
by
Choosing
be
must come
firm
spirit and sudden
execution; then
words must
accommodated
to the deed.
Mansfield's
account of
the central
chapters of
the
central
Book
of the
Discourses
to the
mat
is
therefore
aptly titled, "The Modern

"soul"
Army."
Mansfield draws
attention
discovery
ing,
is
that the word

'lost'
never appears soul
in the Discourses or, for that

the human
ter, The Prince. The

willful
is
replaced
by
human
mind.
One
might go so
far
as to
say that the
body body
and the calculat of the
Christ
replaced
by
the bodies
and minds that comprise
the
modern army, no organiza

cen-
tion of Christian
soldiers.
The
central argument of
the central section of the
406
tral
Interpretation
the
central
chapter of
Book
of
the Discourses
concerns
the limited risks taken

pages
by
the captain of the forces that oppose Christianity. Some
later, Machia
who
velli takes the
"old
man,"
the
vetus
homo
of
Christian tradition,
is 'of the
'sons'
earthy,'
earth,
builds
and uses him for a new purpose. Or one can say that Machiavelli in new, better kind of fortress: "a book so devised that it gathers and
friendly
enemy
countries yet without
making them
or
so
dependent
on an au
thoritative text that
they
cannot end or
fend for themselves
learn from
exper
Because Fortune has "no

Machiavelli's book sulting
or
design beyond showing its unhesitatingly to conquer
power,"
devotees
of
can choose
Fortune,
without con
the new
supplicating Fortune. To impose human force upon nonhuman force is Belief in the progress that requires a constant meaning of
'humanity.'
spiritedness guards against ent ual
its
own success are.
circumstances,
whatever
they
by refusing to rest satisfied with pres Thus Machiavelli requires a sort of perpet
its
malleability. considers
youthfulnesss, both in
regard more
to youth's spiritedness and
In Book III Machiavelli

mestic and
thoroughly
and
the relation
between do
. .
foreign
policy.
This "disarmed The
captain with a spiritual
scends
voted
the distinction between foreign

'public'
domestic
affairs
army because he is
tran
not
de
not
state." 'spirituality'
to any one
or
of this
army is in fact
spiritual
but spirited; Machiavelli's

sense).
philospher-prince
is
more
princely than phi homeland

course, from Ma
noetic than
tech-
losophic (in the Socratic is this world,

chiavellian
not
The Machiavellian
philosopher's true
the world of speech or ideas. This

which
follows,
as
of
epistemology,
might
be described but
less
nic-al, employing
speech not
dialectically
to
conspiratorially.
or
Without
"stan
dard
of
natural
right politics
by
is
which
improve
than
[Machiavelli's]
more rather of
less dependent
men
instruct existing morality, on convention"; it

conventions.
makes new conventions classical political

of
instead
freeing
from
Unlike the
philosophers, Machiavelli depends

a
upon
the
political success
his
pupils.
He thus takes
attempts
decisive step,
perhaps the
decisive step, toward
historicism. He
to
have
others take this step:
Machiavelli
cause men
causes men to think sinful
thoughts,
each
to
sin
in thought
or
intention is to
put them under threat of
according to his capacity. To God's punish

conspiracy.
ment, and thus
impel
them to
face that
grace
punishment or
join Machiavelli's
Machiavelli drink
of
'forgets'
Christian
might
in
a chapter
Mansfield be
compares to
"a
long
poison."
This
be
contrasted to a
Christian
can
sacrament.
"Machiavelli has
and
substituted a
necessity that
a
managed to unite the new prudent and

men
the
many
ambition
for
necessity
that
divides
from
religion."
peoples
This
'progress'
again comports with
betrays the ten
dency
toward
an egalitarianism
that Machiavelli
himself despises. Machiavelli
the worship of Jesus with the worship, however unwitting, of Machiavelli. ("Moderation means staying out of sight; it does not mean taking
would replace
moderate
actions.")
Machiavelli'
An
obvious criticism of
New Modes
and
Orders
would
be that
407
Short Notices
too much in sight, too
Mansfield is
entine. exercise
not
ingeniously overinterpreting the

"Anyone do
it."
spirited
Flor
Mansfield
his
responds with a challenge:

with a consistent
who
thinks it possible to
and
ingenuity
should
interpretation
can
of an
inconsistent text,
be
added
be caught,
demonstrate that he
consistent,
new
It
might
that any
one who produces a
interpretation
of an
inconsistent text has
'revolutionized'
thereby
field's scholarship
even more neither
"caught"
that text. Those who would
deny
So
the accuracy of Mans
and
before him, Strauss's Strauss

and
must
then credit the perhaps
discomfiting
presence of original thought.
far,
such critics
have
nor credited
Mansfield.
Rousseau's Social Contract: The Design

(Chicago
cloth,
and
of
the Argument.
1983.
By
viii
Hilail Gildin.
+
206 pp.:
London:
University
of
Chicago Press,
$22.50.)
apparent self-contradictions
Rousseau's
ning.
frustrated his
readers
from the begin

to learn
Gildin
quotes the philosopher's
reply to the complaints: "There are still

who ought own readers
more readers who ought
to learn how to read than authors

shows
how to be din's
consistent."
Gildin
his
one section of
Rousseau's labyrinth, the due
section
how to find the way through titled The Social Contract. Gil
six chapters exhibit all
concision:
"I
sometimes
found that the he

writes.
same repe
point arose more
than once in the course of the to

remain when
argument,"
"The
tition
has been
permitted
it
point."
serves
to clarify the
As in any
labyrinth,
paths
some near-circular paths

ends.
lead to the
us on our
center while other near-circular
lead to dead
ends. of
Gildin keeps
way to the
center while
noting the
'radical
'nature'
dead
ism.'
One
Rousseau's
shortest paths
leads to the blank
wall of modern
and
According to those who camp in its shade, Rousseau celebrates calls for the unimpeded expression (speech alone would be too restrictive)
will,'
of
the 'general this bean
that
is,
the
uninhibited
desires
of
'the
people.'
Gildin discards
sprout of a sentiment
in his first
show men
chapter:
Rousseau does
not promise
original
to
how to
win release
from their
political
bonds
can
and regain made
their
freedom. He
promises
to
show
them how their chains
be
legitimate. Whether
men are rulers or
ruled,
legitimate slavery is the best
that
political
society has to
offer
them.
Legitimate slavery, that is to say

perity,
a
political
freedom,
yields preservation and pros
kind
of
happiness for the
mass of men who are equals.
Political freedom
ural
consists of obedience
to the "general
will,"
which
is
not nat
but lead to tyranny because "Just as the will of a private individual has that private individual's interest or good for its object, so the general will has the general or
common
a result of that
artifice, the "social
This
obedience will not
interest
as
its object,
and what
is
not of universal concern
is
not a proper
408
subject
all
Interpretation
for the
sovereign's
The
most general or common
interest
of
is self-preservation; thus
no genuine expression of
the general will can yield
rule
by
terror.
To
arrange this
in
practice and not

supplement
only in theory,
one needs
the
wisdom
to es
tablish
with
laws that
will
the individual's
desire for
self-preservation whose
the
public-spiritedness
that preserves a nation. Enter "the
legislator,"
existence
belies the
myth of
Rousseau's
egalitarianism.
The legislator has "the

task"
desire,
one might almost

'laws'
say, for divine

of opinion.
glory,"
and
are not
his "most important

at all
is
to shape unwritten
are not acts of
These
really laws
because they
the
general will.
Notwithstanding
tion as
same
this, the
myth of
Rousseau's laws
egalitarianism remains and opinions
impor
At the
tant. In order for a people with well-founded
to avoid corrup
long
as possible,
they
must resist
the snares of
would-be rulers.
time, Rousseau
sees what
his
epigoni
do
not see:
For the
sake of
individual
and national preservation, the sovereign people must

of
obey the lawful

it"
commands
their government.
Thus "the
people must
be too
weak
the government and too strong
thing
ship.
to arrange.
collectively Gildin devotes his longest chapter to this

will,"
to be disobeyed
distributively to disobey no easy by

problematic relation
"The fairness
stood as
of
the general
equal
he
writes,
"where that fairness is
under
and
derivative from its

of each
directedness to the preservation, security,

of
freedom
der."
citizen, and the perception
that
fairness
by
the members of
the city, are at the center of Rousseau's
teaching regarding
maintain the
the sound political or

means
The
general will
is
not the same as
justice; Rousseau
democracy."
it to be jus
tice's "reliable political the general will
embodiment."
To
founds, first,
"provisional
institutions that defend it, "Democracy is the

a simple act of
only form
general
of government that can
be brought into decisions
being by
need
the
will, because
where all govern no
be
made
regarding
who
is to govern"; that is,

a particular general will
by founding a democracy
that
the general
will avoids
becoming
Were the
as no one
will,
a will
directs
these men to govern and not those.
to designate specific
men as rulers
it
would
be unjust,
knows
individual's preservation, security, and freedom than the individual himself. Rousseau's "last on government in The Social Contract endorses mixed government, "with pronounced democratic
or cares more about the
word"
features,"
to be
founded
by
the provisional
democratic
government.
needs
Still, individualism buttressed by pronouncedly democratic institutions

a source of cohesion.
agriculture
Rousseau therefore
prefers
the economic communalism of
to the
institutionalized
selfishness of commerce.
Perhaps
more
impor
em
tant,
civil religion must endow
the
laws
with
"a
character."
sacred
Rousseau
phasizes
the
civil character of
this religion; with

religion
Machiavelli,
national
he deplores the
"divided
guishes
sovereignty"
that
noncivil
causes.
Rousseau's
civil religion
from "ancient
Gildin carefully distin as seen in

religion,"
Sparta, Jerusalem,
and
Rome.
409
Short Notices
national religion as well as ancient
Ancient
spirit
far
more powerful than
political more
life based
on
slavery made possible a republican any spirit one could hope to establish in their absence. A Rousseau's principles of political right will be more just and
life in
to
ancient
humane than
would
political even
times but it will not
be
as
heroic.
Something
political
that
it
be wrong
try
to recapture
is therefore
irretrievably
lost to
life in
modern
times according to Rousseau.
What
replaces ancient religion and ancient
guished
from those for

book
to "the
whom
philosophy for Rousseau, as distin he legislates? Gildin observes that Rousseau's
most political rects us
nonetheless
begins
"I"
"me."
with
and ends with
Gildin di
himself."
writings of
Rousseau the
to the
subject of which
is Rousseau
Thus Gildin leaves
us closer
center of
Rousseau's doctrine.
Rousseau's State
of
Nature: An Interpretation
of
the Discourse
on
Inequal
ity.
By
Marc F
PP-
Plattner. (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois

cloth,
University Press,
1979-
137
$9.50.)
Confessions,
the Discourse
on
According
veals
to Rousseau in his
Inequality
re
his
thoughts "with the greatest boldness not to
say
never
Nonetheless,
entirely
abandons cer
guides us
one must note that
Rousseau's
maximum
boldness
tain
defenses,
not
to say
camouflage.
Plattner carefully
to Rousseau's
argument's as
it
were natural state.
Plattner divides his book into
six chapters.
In the first he describes the

combination of
'left'
para
doxical
character of
Rousseau's
political
philosophy, the
individ
ualism and communitarianism that marks the political
to this day. Plattner
rightly identifies
nature as
the central concern of the
individuality (directly)
conceives
and political
Discourse; Rousseau derives from nature as he (indirectly) community

of
it.
second
In
the
chapter,
Plattner disposes
enemies and
false
paradoxes
in the Dis
course
those set to frustrate
to confuse the innocent.
Books, in
Indeed,
na
cluding theologically Plattner discusses the problem of ture does not speak at all; in the third chapter, human speech and the society it supports from subrational nature. Evo
authoritative
books,
can
lie;
nature
does
not.
deriving
that
mos.
lution based
upon accident appears can
to
explain
this, particularly as one
notices
"accident"
only
mean
necessity in
a nonteleological and a-theistic cos

results
"Perfectibility,"
according to
Rousseau,
from "the
chance workings
of mechanical
tory,"
"In
short, man's
philosopher
humanity
lead"
is the
product of
his his
and
Rousseau "is the first
to indicate that the modern scientific to the

conclusion
man's nature must view of man's origins and

being."
that "man
as we
know him is
historical
This teaching
makes
morality
problematic.
The fourth
chapter contains
Platt
Rousseauan morality in the light of Rousseauan nature, and s assessment of man's exisin Rousseau means animality he concludes that human
'goodness'
410
Interpretation
blind
nature."
tence as "just one more part of the

controversial man's natural
mechanism of argument
Planner's
most
interpretation here
should
be his
that Rousseau presents
than as an
pity or compassion for other men innate characteristic of humanness.

chapter contains
more as a guard against critics
The fifth
Plattner's
attempt to capture and
dissect the Rous fields. Politi
seauan paradox after
pursuing it through the
various subpolitical
cally, Rousseauan
nature
This
makes agreement or
constitutes a thoroughgoing denial of the right to rule. contract authority's only real basis. Agreement or con
'goodness,'
tract constitutes the basis not
of
which
is natural, but
of political mo
rality
or right.
Right denatures man,

s
and sound political
institutions
serve right.
However, Plattner
of nature
Rousseau The
recognizes that the complete political conquest
cannot occur.
natural
desire for
self-preservation remains runs
"the
chief principle of
human
conduct."
Individuality
deeper than
community.
"Full citizenship in
a good political
society is merely the best that Yet if "Man becomes
can
be done for
the great mass of men to minimize the evils of the unnatural condition to which
they have been

nal
condemned
being by
can
chance and a
by not by
history."
a moral and ratio
nature"
and,
"Therefore,
no moral
law
or
Taw
of
reason'
be
law
nature,"
of
one must ask
Plattner's Rousseau: What has be
come of
the apparent
identity
of chance and nature required

'history'
by
the principle
of
mechanical causation?
What is this
that does not quite rule this 'na
ture'?
Plattner
necess
concludes
by describing civil
final
society
as
"an
accidental
a neces
phrase that well expresses the
paradox of
his Rousseau. Accidental
may think, is the logical outcome of egalitarianisms: the denial of natu ral hierarchy and nearly the denial of any natural order. It is a perplexing denial. As Plattner observes, it can lead toward attempts to politics or it can
sity,
one
'perfect'
lead away from

man nature are
politics altogether.
But the
question remains:
if
nature and
hu
inchoate,
who or what shapes
them? If the legislator shapes polit
ical
men and
the philosopher escapes politics, how

existence? achievement
do legislators
Rousseau
and philoso
phers come
into
Plattner's finest
is to
help
us question
with care.
Forthcoming
David Bolotin
Articles
Socrates'
Critique
of
Hedonism:
Reading
of the
Philebus
Arlene W
Aristophanes'
Saxonhouse
The Net
of
Hephaestus:
Speech in
Plato's Symposium
Mario Lewis, Jr. An Interpretation
of
Plato's Euthyphro (Part I,
Section 4, to end) Ronna Burger

Joseph J. Carpino
Socratic Eironeia
On Laughter
Discussion
Nino Langiulli Angelo M.
Codevilla
On Richard Rorty's
Nature
Philosophy
and the
Mirror of
De Gaulle
Reflections
as a
on
Political Thinker:
Morrisey'
on
De Gaulle
Will
Morrisey
Reply
to Codevilla
ISSN 0020-9635

Interpretation, Vol 12-2-3

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Interpretation, Vol 12-2-3

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Interpretation, Vol 12-2-3

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A

& Sept. 1984 Volume 12 Numbers 2 & 3

Robert Sacks Kent Moors

Genesis (Chapters 44-50)

in Plato's Republic: the

Mario Lewis, Jr. Jack D'Amico

Plato's Euthyphro (Introduction;

Part I, Sections 1-3) 261

Women: Machiavelli's Mandragola

Clizia 275 287 Jim MacAdam David Boucher

Perennial Problems: the Negative Side

Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State,

& Michael Jennings

"Being and Philosophy by

Goldwin & William A.

Kenneth W. Thompson; Richard Hooker and Politics of a Christian England by Robert K.

Rousseau's State of Nature: the Discourse Inequality by Marc F. Plattner

Erich Hula Ellis

Leo Strauss (d.1973)

Edward J. Erler Joseph E.

Maureen Feder-Marcus Pamela K. Jensen

Design & Production

$13; institutional $16;

interpretation appears three times

interpretation, Queens College, Flushing,

N.Y. 11367, U.S.A.

interpretation are requested to

to send clear and readable

copies of their work.

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE Issue

The Aspects of Deterrence Nuclear Addiction: A Response Nuclear Deterrence

ROBERT J. ROTH, S.J.

Conventional Arms, Nuclear War: The

Military Doctrine, and Vanishing Firebreak

SUSAN B. ANTHONY JOHN F. AHEARNE

An American-Catholic Dialogue Available

Journals Dept. THOUGHT Fordham

SOPHY SOCjI iVIj

international quarterly journal

$12 per year, individual $42 per year single $5 95

to the penultimate year)

Genesis (Chapters 44-50)

I. AND HE COMMANDED THE STEWARD OF HIS

FILL THE MEN'S

AS MUCH AS THEY CAN

AND PUT EVERY MAN'S

MONEY IN HIS SACK'S MOUTH.

words as much as word

meaning for our author. for lift which was described

to shift a bit. In the early stages

the book it referred to

to accept the ways of man

shall see a shift symbol of the and and

CUP, IN THE SACK S MOUTH OF THE YOUNGEST,

STEWARD, UP, THEM,

FOLLOW AFTER THE

REWARDED EVIL FOR GOOD?

his brothers to the fullest test. He