Interpretation, Vol 19-3

Spring
225
John
1992
Volume 19
Number 3
Ray
The Education of Cyrus

"Statesman"
as
Xenophon's
243
251
Theodore A. Sumb Robert Horwitz

Edited
John Locke's Questions of Nature: A Law
by
Concerning Commentary
the
Michael Zuckert 307 John H. Herz
Looking
Point
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Carl Schmitt from the Vantage

the 1990s
Book Reviews
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Aristide Tessitore
Aristotle
on the
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Kraut Will
Liberal
319
Morrisey
Democracy
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James W. Ceaser
Interpretation
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Interpretation
Spring
John
1992
JL
Volume 19
Number 3
Ray Sumberg

"Statesman"
as
Xenophon's 225
Theodore A.
Belfagor: Machiavelli's Short
Story
the Law
243
Robert Horwitz
Edited
John Locke's Questions

of Nature: A
by
Concerning Commentary
Michael Zuckert John H. Herz
251
Looking
Point
at of
Carl Schmitt from the Vantage

the 1990s
307
Book Reviews Aristide Tessitore

Aristotle
on the
Human
Good, by Richard
315
Political Science,
Kraut Will
Morrisey
Liberal
Democracy
and
by
319
James W. Ceaser
Copyright 1992
interpretation
ISSN 0020-9635

John Ray
Xavier University
as
Xenophon's
"Statesman"
Cyrus' is that of Xenophon's Education of human beings. Xenophon begins by noting that all regimes, and espe ruling cially tyrannies, are subject to being overthrown. Men, unlike herd animals, are
The
problem which engenders
ruled
only unwillingly,
although
the human situation as one

propose
they tending
often
desire to
rule.
This
reflection upon
to disorder does not lead Xenophon to
improvements in the
constitutions of
regimes, but to
suggest
that hu
manity
requires a master of
the art of ruling, one who can rule human beings as

presents
other men rule animals.
Xenophon
Cyrus
as
possessing that
an empire
power.
Cyrus, beginning
gives the
with a small
Persian army, founded
extending to
statement central
the limits of the known world
(1.1.4; 8.6.21). Xenophon's opening

represent
impression that he
considers the problem of rule to
be the
political problem and problem of rule with universal state.
Cyrus to
the
its
solution. and
Xenophon identifies the

as
But it
would
durability of regimes be hasty indeed
Cyrus
the founder
of
the
to conclude that Xenophon
be
lieves the
problem of rule
to be identical with the problem of

universal peace.
is essentially the problem of obtaining would seem to be a necessary but not

not possible at the outset
durability, which To use a formula, peace

for happiness. It is from the
a sufficient condition
to know
whether
Xenophon
considers the solution of appear open

man.
Cyrus to the
problem of rule
to be adequate,
but it does just
ing
statement
that Xenophon is presenting Cyrus as the best political

not
Xenophon, however, does

sophic.
introduce Cyrus
as
or
virtuous
or philo
He
says rather and
that
Cyrus "struck
all men with
fear
and no one tried to
him"
withstand
that "he was able to awaken in all so

always wished
lively
desire to
please
him,
that
they
to be guided
by
his
will"
(1.1.5). If Cyrus
is the best ruler, there will still be the question whether the best ruler is like the best city in not being desired by decent people without reservation. Xenophon
view phon says
he
Cyrus'
will examine
origin, nature,
excel all others
and education with a
to understanding how he was able to
in ruling
and
men.
Xeno
intends to
covers
reveal
the soul of the

Cyrus'
political man par excellence.
Xenophon
aftermath.
in fact
the
whole of
life, including his death
its
The recording of the regime of Cyrus and its coming into being would seem to be required if Xenophon intends not only to reveal the soul of the best ruler but
I
to thank Professors Joseph
wish
Cropsey
it.
and
Nathan Tarcov for
comments on this paper and
for the
education
that enabled me to write
interpretation,
Spring 1992,
Vol. 19, No. 3
226
also
Interpretation
his meaning to
political
life. However,
we must
be
careful
to follow where
Xenophon leads, for Xenophon,

nature and education of
by
his
emphasizing the origin

statesmanship.
and
Cyrus,
of
seems
to indicate that the best
ruler cannot
especially the be
fully
have
understood on the
basis
The best
and
political man must
an education which
develops his
natural
capacity,
he
must
have op but be
portunities
history.2
(1.4.18;
1.5.4). He does
of
not
simply
appear on
the scene but has a
The
history
his activity
and
will consist not
only
of visible actions
also
of the
thought
must
generating be mixed from
therefore
justifying
in
thought behind them.
That
with certain passions
trained or not in youth and

youth.
derived
largely
certain opinions acquired
Cyrus is
a successful
practitioner of
the art of ruling at a very early age
(1.4.9; 1.4.12-15). The
book's title,
pointer to
which at
first
appears
to be a misnomer, serves as a rather

Cyrus'
heavy
The
the fundamental importance of

not without
education
to
his
success.
title
and
is, however,
imparts (and
inflicts)
an
ambiguity, for Cyrus both receives an education education. We cannot assume that these educations
education must
constitute the education consist of the

Cyrus'
Xenophon intends for his readers; that
Education of Cyrus as a whole. father is said to have been the Persian
king
Cambyses
and
his
mother
the daughter of the Median tyrant Astyages.

Cyrus'
Cyrus'
origin of
is
mixed.
Xenophon This
reveals
nature
in
brief description
and
him
as
handsome,
that
affectionate,
praise.
devoted to learning, ambitious, description presents a problem

character
willing to endure great pain
for
and a question.
First
Cyrus'
we see
natural
is
a mixture of erotic and
heroic
elements.
The
problem
lies in the
of
tension between these elements, specifically between
Cyrus'
love
will
human
able
beings
coexist rule
and
his
ambition.
It is doubtful that love
of
human beings
be
is
to
peacefully in the soul with ambition human beings. The question is whether human beings
is
rooted
when
Cyrus'
the ambition is the desire to

political ambition natural result
to him or is a product of his education. If

of
Cyrus'
political ambition
is the
combining love be
of
with ambition to
nature.
rule,
it
would appear
that
his
political ambition
in his his
Even so, his
natural character can
hardly
The
sufficient to explain
great success.
education that
and
Cyrus
undergoes
which
is divisible into three he is

prepared
parts:
Persian,
Persian
Median,
and
kingly. The last, for

refers
by
his
youthful
Median educations,
to the
of
instruction he
receives
from his father
while en route
to Media ahead
the Persian army. The treatment of the parts
is different. Cyrus does not appear in the account of Persia; Xenophon limits himself to saying that Cyrus underwent the Persian education as a boy of less than twelve. Cyrus enters first in the pages devoted to his in Media, and it stay is from them that any judgment must be made of whether or how far Cyrus
reflected
logue is
absent and
in his early boyhood the from the account of is the form

of the
regime of which
his father
present
was
king. Dia
account of
Persia, moderately
education.
in the
Media,
might
kingly
be
explained
by
Cyrus'
Cyrus in Media
recalls
ascending years instruction he received
The ascendancy of speech were it not that the adolescent

as
a
boy
from his Persian
227
teacher; Cyrus might have been shown in conversation with his teachers in the section devoted to Persia. Speech, it seems, is to be associated more with the
erotic racy.
life
of
the Median
tyranny
than
with
the severe life of the Persian
aristoc
The dialogue between Cambyses
and
Cyrus takes
place
in Persia but
on
the way to Media. While the review of Persia is

Cyrus'
dry
and
of
visit
entertaining.
Media, Hunting, for

to
were
is roughly three times example, is discussed generally

which
legalistic, the account as long, is lively and

as a means art of
by
which
Persian boys both is

shown
trained
and
in
courage and
not
learned the
war; but Cyrus
in Media chasing
law
and arrangements of
only wild animals but also men. The state, prominent in the review of Persia, are appro
killing
priately absent from the account of Media. The education provided by the Persian aristocracy is
as
remarkable
for
having
Good citi reading zens, the Persians think, not only obey the law but do not desire anything bad. The highest intention of the Persian education is to lead young men towards manly virtue. It instructs the young in justice, in moderation and in courage.
aim not or creation of good citizens.
its
writing but the
The
claim of
the Persian education to teach justice is qualified

of the
by
the Persian
identification
and
just
with
the lawful. Persian boys learn justice
by bringing
teachers.3
deciding
cases against one another under the supervision of their
Xenophon
points with characteristic
civic education which
subtlety to the problematic character of a identifies the just with the lawful while maintaining that
law-abidingness is only the first prerequisite of good citizenship and not, as most states think, almost identical to it. Xenophon observes that the Persians punish ingratitude as they punish theft and assault, ingratitude being a form of injustice. The
prevention of
demonstrations
of
ingratitude
or of similar vices
(e.g.,
of
illiberality)
is
aimed at
the enforcement of a decorum that at
least
the
imitates
genuine virtue.
understood
The ruling Persian virtue is moderation, bodily passions and demands. The Persian
passions second education
chiefly
as control of
education places the
training
of
the
only to instruction in justice. The third

of courage and
element of
the Persian
war and
is the inculcation
of praise
through
training in
the arts of
the
administration
honor. The
emphasis
upon
moderation and
courage
indicates that the Persians
require more
than the public
display
of
the
gentlemanly virtues: they soldier. To say that the Persians

practice of virtue to necessity.
require the simple but manly virtues of the good require certain virtues
is to
attribute their
Xenophon
acknowledges or rather
discloses
at
the
end of
the discussion of Persia that the Persian education cannot be under
stood without reference
to the regime it
was
designed to
practice
help
it is
maintain
(1.2. 15).
The Persian
regime
is
by
law
an
aristocracy; in
a severe
in
which
there are many poor and few rich.

sons
By
law
no one
is
excluded
oligarchy from
sending his
maintain
to the public schools; in practice only those who can afford to
their
children without work
do
send
them. The few rich (the peers)
have to
guard against
the many
poor.
They
accomplish
this
by depriving
the
poor of all
but the lightest
arms and
relying chiefly
upon
themselves as the
228
Interpretation
of
defense
lives
and
of
Persia. The
arrangement requires
the Persian
peers
to live austere
vigilance,
beginning
with a youthful education
physically toughening. The Persian education for honor among the young and in training them to endure hard ship. With the help of strong laws, including the threat of ostracism, it suc
competition
intended to be morally succeeds in encouraging
ceeds
ance of virtue
Cyrus'
in maintaining among the ruling class something but something less than true virtue.
Median
experience
more
than the appear
interrupts his Persian
education at age
twelve and
adoles
charm
lasts four years, that is, during what is usually the decisive period of cence. Xenophon's Cyrus is intelligent, affectionate, and exceedingly
ing. That he is
not without of
independence
of mind
is
evident old
from the favorable

tyrant comes com
impression he has
plete with
his
grandfather's eye
appearance; the
and
wig,
purple
tunic,
of
shadow, rouge,
until
jewelry. Because Cyrus
has
experienced
only Persian austerity
his
pleasure
nature.
in the
beauty
his
grandfather's
in Media, his immediate appearance must be owing to his

arrival grandfather's
While Cyrus likes the

(cf.
ornate
dress, he dislikes his

says
fancy
foods his
and
intemperate drinking. Cyrus

forget
that
he
objects to
his
grandfather's
drunken
parties
Plato, Laws, Bk. I) because during

is the ruler; the basis
about comment
Cyrus'
them both Astyages and
guests
who
of
objection
is thought
about
politics and
specifically
Cyrus'
the necessity of moderation to well-ordered poli
tics (1.3.10).
most
that among the Medes his
grandfather
is the
handsome but among the Persians his father is the handsomest demon strates a quick mind and a natural openness to human differences. Cyrus is
naturally politic and The existence of
cosmopolitan.
a tension
of
in Cyrus between his
ambition and
his love
of
human beings (reflexive

youthful pursuits
loved) is confirmed by in Media. But these pursuits also demonstrate that Cyrus is
his desire to be
Cyrus'
already in
these
passions.4
is
Cyrus'
the understanding which would enable him to reconcile This understanding is the essential foundation of his success. It ambition which prompts him to accept his grandfather's invitation to
possession of
stay in Media. He regards himself and is regarded as the best among Persian boys at throwing the spear and running on foot, and he wants to be the best among Median boys
always competes at
riding horses. It
and
never
seems
important to
anyone
add
that Cyrus
honestly
and
prevents
from
doing
his best.
Cyrus
wants
to
be,
to be acknowledged to
wants as well
the
admiration and
love
of all.
best among all men. He His desire to be loved leads him to
be,
the
desire to have
grandfather's
plain.
and to
consent
benefit friends. The young Cyrus schemes to secure his to allow him to take his friends hunting on the open
proves
In
benefiting
position:
his friends he
Cyrus'
his superiority
will
and places them
in
dependent
ruling.
ambition
to be the best is always in the service of
Clearly,
will
the desire to be the
best
in very many
whom
situations
be in
state of tension with
the desire to be loved
and admired.
Satisfying
both these
desires
be especially difficult if those from
love
and admiration
is

wanted
229
states
hold themselves in
competition
for the highest honors. Xenophon

less
emphatically in the opening reflection of nothing for which men compete more (or
others to
the Education of Cyrus that there is

with which
they
are
content
for
occupy) than positions of rule. Political superiority is not as easily

athletic
demonstrated as, say,

rulers. accepted
superiority, for many eagerly imagine themselves
Political superiority, willingly
even when who
by
those
convincingly demonstrated, will not be find its acceptance contrary to their interests.
The
overcoming of the tension between the desire to be loved and the desire to occupy the first position among men in political life proves to be
successful
identical The
with a
account
philanthropy calculated to of Median effeminacy and

and austerity.
gain advantage.
luxury
how,
contrasts
sharply
with
that of
Persian discipline
There is
no evidence
that Cyrus participated in than in
the vulgar activities of his grandfather. But
other
learning
to ride
horses (perhaps
Media? There is
not a small evidence
matter), is Cyrus benefited by his coming of age in that his closeness to Astyages provided his mind with
material on which
to ponder the nature of absolute rule (1.6.8). Cyrus certainly

powers
found in Media the freedom to test his in this irony,

on period of which concerns
Cyrus.)5
(the
political
teaching
contained not
those well-connected with the

Cyrus'
the young
Perhaps is his
absence
tyrant, was from Persia during a

his Median
lost The
critical
his life is
what
most significant about arrival
experience.
young Cyrus is Persian.

moned might makes
not upon
Cyrus'
highly
successful
in Media thoroughly attached to everything Median adventures cause him to be sum

to avoid criticism
of
home
well
by
his father in
order
by
the authorities,
who
have feared the Medianization
the crown prince; Xenophon to prove himself to be
the point that upon
his
return
Cyrus is
Cyrus'
called upon
the best of the Persian youth (1.5.1).
Persian
and
Median
educations are
in
state of
regards a certain whereas
tension, divisiveness in the

as are we
his
natural
characteristics.
Xenophon evidently
activity,
soul as
necessary to
great political
from the Memorabilia

that
of
learn that he
regards great philosophic activ
ity, namely
The
causes
Socrates,
to
as
reputation
Cyrus
selected
earns
requiring the unity of the soul. in his first battle while still a youth in Media
him to be
lead the Persian troops

sacrifices
being
sent
to aid Media in
its defense dred dian

men
against
Assyria. Cyrus
to the gods and chooses two hun

of
from among the peers to form the upper echelon The first opportunity to judge the combined effect of
educations
the Persian army.
Cyrus'
Persian
and
Me
is his
speech
to the selected peers. Cyrus begins to their
the men owe their
selection
having
been
observed
by
saying that him to be obe
by
dient to the
authorities.
As for
himself, Cyrus
wishes
to make known why he
has
accepted
the command. He says:

come
"I have
rate,
to realize that our forefathers were no whit worse than
we.
At any
they also spent their time in practicing what are considered the works virtue. However, what they gained by being what they were, either for the
commonwealth of
of
Persia
or
for themselves, I
can
by
no means
discover. And
yet
230
Interpretation
virtue
think that no
is
practiced
by
men except with
the
aim
that the good,
by being by
in
such, may have something more than the
bad;
and
I believe that those
who abstain
from
present pleasures
do this
prepare
not that
they may
never
enjoy themselves, but

this labor
this self-restraint time to come.

.
they
.
themselves to have many times greater enjoyment

science undergo
military because they think that by gaining proficiency in the arts of war they will secure for themselves great wealth and happiness and honor both for themselves and for
their country.
those
who practice
"But
and
when men go
through all this toil and then allow themselves to

.
become
would
old
feeble before they reap any fruit of their labors, rightly be considered guiltless of folly.
"Now you, I take
not even
[they]
do
of
it,
could make use of the night
just
as others
the
day;
you
and you consider toil the guide
to a
happy
life; hunger
sauce,
and you endure
drinking
plain water more
regularly as a than lions do, while readily

else."
you use
have
stored
up in
your souls that
best
of all possessions and the one most suitable
to war:
Cyrus'
I mean,
you
enjoy
praise more
than
anything
(1.5.8-12)
own sake of virtue.
speech
is
aimed at
and at
supplying
a qualified
undermining the view that virtue is for its hedonism as the ground for the practice
The
the
argument runs good
in
part as
follows: Virtue is
practiced
is pleasure; the pleasure of the soldier is great honor. The hedonism of Cyrus is qualified by the nobility
honor.6
for gaining the good; wealth, happiness and

of
his
chief
pleasure,
Virtue is
good
because
of
the good things that may be acquired
by
its
practice.7
From the hard
point of view of pleasure virtue
is
a means,
but it
appears as
necessary
negative
in forms both In both
passive and active: as either abstention

cases virtue
from
work."
pleasure or as
is bodily. Cyrus does
not speak
of gratitude or of other virtues of the soul

would not seem useful
these virtues,
Cyrus'
in their true form,

to "what are
in acquisition; their
virtue"
practice would seem unpleasant
from the
point of view of material
pleasure.
reference
considered the works of
may
catalogue)
principle of
imply
of
that he considers the Persian cata
logue (or the The
conventional
the virtues incomplete or mistaken.

not meet with
corruption of
the
aristocracy does
any
objec
tion from the peers. Their easy conversion to the view of virtue as the the greatest pleasures (and to the view of the good life as the pleasant
means
to
being
identical
with
life) indicates
of a
either a serious
flaw in the Persian
education or
the
impossibility
derstands
were not
virtue
completely successful citizen education to virtue which un as being its own reward. The latter case would arise if virtue
teachable, or teachable to only a very few. Here it is useful to recall that Xenophon's philosophic mentor was Socrates, whose most famous teach
ing
was
that human beings lack
knowledge
of
the most
important knowable
things and
should therefore conduct virtue would not obvious
themselves
with moderation.
The understanding that

carries the
be
fully
teachable if it were not
fully
implication that the Persian

unknowability
education to simple virtue was
hindered
by
the
ultimate
of true virtue.
that Socrates never claimed
In the Memorabilia Xenophon says to teach virtue, but made his companions hope to

become like him
orabilia that
23 1
by imitating
him (1.2.8). Xenophon

things are acquired
virtue.9
also says
in the Mem
that the
the good and
noble
by
practice and
society may be
of good men
acquired
If virtue, or something akin to it, through habituation, then the Persian education cannot have
is training in
been simply unsuccessful. This thought encourages a reconsideration of the regime. In particular, the opinion of Persia advanced above, that the regime is legally an aristocracy but is in fact an oligarchy, is not adequate, principally for
the reason that the
Persians
aim at
making the best
men
(of wealth)
preeminent
Politics, 1293b2). The impurity of aristocracies in practice is to a certain fact, namely, that the virtuous are always too few to fill the owing of (cf. Aristotle, Politics, 1283b6). The description offices government many
of
(cf. Aristotle,
Persia
as a simple
appeared
to
chy
pure
being
oligarchy would offer the doubtful explanation that what be the easy corruption of the peers is not a corruption at all, oligar the regime dedicated to wealth. The description of Persia as an im
peers
aristocracy (an aristocracy of notables) would explain the corruption of the by maintaining that the Persians always viewed virtue as mostly instru
not
mental
to
wealth
but to
preservation.
Accordingly,
the corruption of the

self-
peers consists
satisfaction as
in the
replacement of noble self-preservation with vulgar
the end of virtue.
Cyrus
must
have felt this

speech
corruption
know from his is
to the peers
whether
necessary to his project. We cannot he contemplated empire seriously

ambition
from the beginning. He does

required of
appear at and
the outset to have a larger

wish
than
by
his
commission
to
to establish great
ambition
in the
hearts
own
the peers. But the ambition he wishes them to feel is for wealth; his
which must
ambition,
Persian
practice of virtue
be political, he keeps prudently to himself. As the is instrumental, it is not difficult to persuade the peers
preservation
of
that there is something better than

concludes
that is the
end of virtue.
Cyrus
his
speech
by
assuring the peers
the justice of the Persian mission.
One may wonder whether the act of stating the just nature of the Persian cause corruption of Persian virtue. The is the first act made necessary by
Cyrus'
problematic character of peers not
that virtue is intimated
by
Cyrus
when
he
calls
the
not
lovers
of virtue
but lovers
of praise.
Cyrus, however,
would
change
his army for any other, even for one many times larger. This is because for Cyrus the virtue of the soldier consists in his love of praise, for "lovers of
danger"
praise must
gladly undergo every sort of hardship and every (1.5.12). It will become a question whether courage may be
of
sort of sustained
in the
face
the
corruption of virtue.
Cyrus is
able without
difficulty
to combine the
manly virtues of the peers together with the natural human desire for pleasure. To use and maintain this highly problematic combination would appear on its
face to
This
require a
very
great political wisdom.

receives
Concerning
this we
must
turn to
the instruction Cyrus

section
from his father Cambyses

Xenophon's Socratic It begins
on
the way to Media.
is
an example of
rhetoric.
It
contains
the
political
teaching necessary
to
successful rule.
and ends with discus-
232
Interpretation
the
gods.
sion of
It begins
with
gods
own
may be
manipulated of the of
by
Cambyses observing that as the signs of the soothsayers Cyrus ought always to rely upon his
and
reading Cyrus of the limit opening
divine revelation,
it
ends
with
of
Cambyses teaching divine

wisdom.
human
wisdom and
the necessity
The
gods
observation who
is followed
by Cyrus
while
agreeing
with
his father that the
help
own
those
help
themselves,
the last ends
with
the assertion that the

to
gods are under no compulsion to
help
anyone.
Man
would appear
be
on
his
and
in
world where
successful political
activity belongs to
to manipulate
energetic
gifted calculators
favored
by
the
good
fortune.
possible
Having
tance
of
indicated to Cyrus that it is

of
believing
had in
men
through interpretation
divine
signs and
having
underscored once
the impor
which
self-reliance, Cambyses
recalls a
discussion they
they
agreed that while
it is
a great
task to prove oneself
truly
good and
noble, it
is equally great and equally worthy of a man to provide for himself and his household. And worthy of the greatest admiration is to understand how to gov ern other people so that they have all that they need and become all that they
ought. good and noble.
politics and
This is to say that to rule wisely and well is It might be suggested that in
the regime in
more
worthy than to be truly

case
Cyrus'
the elevation of
the political good over the soul and the private good
which
is
mitigated
by
is
not
absolute
most
kingship being
an
the
private good of
the ruler
nearly identical
as
with
the
political or common good.
But Cyrus does his
begin
absolute
king; his very beginning is
owed not to
being
the
monarchical
the field
of
impoverished aristocracy but to youthful success upon battle. It seems that success in politics demands that one sacrifice or
of an
heir
something of one's private virtue; this fact is obviously of less importance if virtue is understood to be wholly instrumental. When Cyrus says
compromise
he is
prepared
to trust the Medes to

of
supply his army
with
provisions, Cambyses
teaches the important lesson

provisions and
arranged
securing
what
revenue.
relying upon one's own arms for obtaining Simple trust is dangerous; things should be
in
such a gain
may
often
way as to make it unnecessary. The possessor of an army he wants through intimidation: an army makes one's
words persuasive
(1.6.9-10).
Following
whether glected.
the discussion of provisions, a perhaps concerned

recalls
recalls
Cambyses
asks ne
Cyrus
Cyrus
the other
points which
they had
the
agreed must not
be
the education he received as a

Cambyses'
boy
from
an
incompetent
education.
military instructor and Cyrus had not been taught how to

to
construct
review obtain
of
failings
of that ensure or
provisions, how to
create
health, how
ensure
the
artifacts of
war, how to
enthusiasm,
how to
obedience, but had learned only tactics. This list of topics is nearly that now reviewed by Cambyses, with the following exceptions: in place of the discus
sion of
tactics are discussions of love and
taking advantage,
One
cannot
while the arts of wonder whether
war are subsumed under
the tactics used in love and in
taking taking
advantage.'0
help
advantage are comprehensive.
It is
note-

worthy that Cambyses sent his son to receive instruction in those fields by his incompetent military instructor. Cambyses had refused at
time to teach generalship. Does he tactics with love
and now
233
not
taught
that
teach
it? Or does the
replacement of
generalship with the love and taking advantage, generalship
taking advantage signal the replacement of the teaching of teaching of rulership? If tactics may be subsumed under
would appear
to be
of
subsumable under
Cyrus'
rulership (1.6.12-14). However this may be, the review now undertaken by Cambyses reveals that education as
education needed sions
education
falling
short of the
of provi
by
the ruler. The two topics
following
discussion
health
and
enthusiasm
indicate, first,
that Cyrus
conceived
of
the
ruler's task too

wardly.
narrowly and, second, that he approached it too straightfor He conceived of health as something to be regained by doctors when
than as something to be carefully
maintained
lost,
was
rather
(the
ruler's
foresight danger
must extend
to maintenance as well as to acquisition). He thought enthusiasm
best
created
by inspiring
men with
hopes but did
not consider the
of
creating false expectations. Cambyses he is not certain but make "certain
suggests
that Cyrus say nothing of which

mouthpiece
others"
his
(1.6.19;
cf.
2.2.17;
7.5.55; 8.4.11).
Cyrus believes that the
chief
incentives to
obedience are praise and
honor for
Cam
the obedient and punishment and dishonor for the disobedient.
This,
says
byses, is
road
the
road
to compulsory obedience, but there is a shorter and better

man who
do"
to willing obedience. "For people are only too glad to obey the
their
they believe takes wiser thought for (1.6.21). Cambyses cites the case of
But the
sick
interests than they themselves the sick willingly obeying their doctors.
the knowledge
obey their doctors not only because they think their doctors possess needed to become healthy but also because they trust their doc
tors to apply that knowledge in their interest. The doctor must not only in fact
be
wise
valuable possession
in medicine, he must seem to the patient to be wise. The doctor's most is his good reputation. Cyrus, displaying his keen political
understanding,
effectual
they."
immediately interprets his father to mean "that nothing is more toward keeping one's men obedient than to seem to be wiser than
to
Human beings typically choose the course they think most advantageous themselves; it is then a large part of the ruler's activity to convince those he
would rule that
following
be
made
him is the
most advantageous choice
available to
them. It is obviously a question
whether or
how far the
same course
may be
advantageous,
asks
or
to appear advantageous, to different people. Cyrus
how to
acquire a reputation
for
wisdom.
shorter road
to a
reputation
for
wisdom
Cambyses denies that there is any than really to be wise in the things in in
which one wishes proven an
to seem
wise.
The
risk
feigning
wisdom
is that
wise
one will
be
impostor. Cyrus
asks not
how
one
replies
may become wise in foreseeing that which that Cyrus ought to learn all that is possible to
which are not possible either
may become will prove to be
but how
one
useful.
Cambyses but
acquire
by learning,
to those things
to learn or to
foresee, Cyrus may
234
Interpretation
art and
apply the soothsayer's The employment of the

the
art made
thus prove himself

the
wiser
than
others
(1.6.23).
soothsayer's art
feigning
of
divine knowledge
is
necessary by the inability of human beings to foresee the future. Human beings can at best plan and prepare.
Reviewing the terrain thus far ing the opening references to the
sions
such as
covered
by
Cambyses
we notice
that,
exclud
gods, there has been

are
a constant ascent: provi
food
and
clothing
or at
necessary to mere
to creating the
life,
while
health is
necessary to the good

the good
concern
life,
life; from
concern
any for the
rate
political conditions of
healthy body
from the
the discussion ascends to

to the
self-
for the
enthusiastic
soul,
and
enthusiastic soul
understanding soul, that knows it serves itself best by willingly obeying him who knows best. Cyrus now attempts to ascend from willing obedience to love. The "love of one's is to him "one of the most important
subjects"
quest
Cyrus
suggests
"the
same course
that
you would
take if you wished to gain the to be their
friends,"
affection of your
factor"
namely, "you
cautions
must show yourself
bene
(1.6.24). Cambyses
whom you
that it is difficult to always be in a position
to benefit those
ness to
will
will;
one
may instead
not yet
show
as
help
(cf. 8.2.1). Cyrus does

and
see,
sympathy and an eager Cambyses does, that there be friends. Cambyses his
be limits to philanthropy
(made
possible
that
not all subjects can physical
adds that soldiers
the sight of the general enduring
hardships better than his

contributes to
by
his
being
the
center of
attention)
being
in
loved
common of
by his men; one may be excused for thinking that this love has a lot with fear (consider 2.4.3 together with 2.4.28-29). In the impos
sibility
would seem
completing the ascent from willing obedience to love, the discussion to have reached its peak. This peak proves to be a plateau. Cam
prepared
byses has thus far

dom:
of what sort
Cyrus to
must
receive
the core of the statesman's wis

Cyrus'
he himself
be.
Cambyses'
moderation of successful politics
incli
to
nation
Cyrus'
to elevate the
successful
importance
of
love to
is
critical
indoctrination.
that
when
Cyrus
suggests
the army achieves its best
fighting
form it is
wise
to engage the enemy at the first opportunity.

ought never
Cambyses, however,
says that one
to engage the enemy unless one expects to gain some advantage

condition not
from it (thus the enemy

over
must
be
considered).
only of one's own troops but also those of the Cyrus asks what is the best way to gain advantage
the enemy.
"By
Zeus,"
said
[Cambyses], "this is
me
no
easy
or simple question
that you ask

must
now, my son;
but let
tell you, the

and
man who proposes
to
do that
be
designing
and
cunning, wily
father,"
deceitful,
with a
a thief and a
robber, overreaching the

a man you
point."
enemy at every "O Heracles,

become!"
said
Cyrus
laugh, "what
say I
must
"Such, my
righteous and
he said, "that you would be at the lawabiding man in the world. "(1.6. 27)
son,"
same time the most

When Cambyses
Cyrus'
235
says
question
is
not
simple, he
means
that there is no
may be consistently applied. The art of the statesman con in rightly judging of and acting upon the demands of an individual situa tion. The complete application of this art requires a complete freedom of mind.
single answer that sists
Cambyses gently (and without difficulty) leads Cyrus away from gentleman ship, from its moral restraint and straightforwardness. Cambyses refers again to
Cyrus'
early Persian education, reminding Cyrus of the devices he If Cyrus will apply these to men, he will not fall hunting small
game."
used
in
short of
any enemy. (Obviously it is a desire to rule is limitless, and

are not
question who whether
the enemy are
for the
man whose
the
devices to be
used upon
the enemy
in
principle
identical
not
with
those used upon subjects and the Persian gentleman's
friends.) The
education
kingly
rather
education
is
the
perfection of
but
its undoing (1.6.31). The ruler needs a reputation for piety and lawabidingness, however, for the same reason he needs a reputation for wisdom.
In the
more
beginning being by
the
ruler rules with
the consent of the ruled, and the ruled are
willing to obey the god-fearing;
but,
when no
longer needing consent, the

prefer
ruler,
the consummate calculator, continues to
to rule
by
consent
rather than
force.
perfects
Cambyses
Cyrus has
a natural
and, second,
by
understanding of calculation, an art for which taste, first, by liberating him from the moral conventions stimulating him to creativity. The ruler is one who thinks
Cyrus'
literally
night and
day
and who
is
an
inventor
of new schemes.
But
having
Cyrus to calculation, Cambyses warns of man's fallibility the knowledge necessary to foolproof calculation is unavailable to man. Because
encouraged
"mere human
wisdom12
does
not
know how to
choose what
is
best,"
man must
wait upon the gods.
From the
practical wisdom of
the ruler Cambyses ascends
briefly
and
to the theoretical wisdom of the
philosopher.13
Cyrus, for his

with
part,
asks
no questions about wisdom;
Cambyses, crossing praying to the Median gods, departs for home. first act is the revaluation We have seen that
after
Cyrus'
Cyrus into Media

Persian
of
virtue:
whereas
virtue
had been
now
understood
to be both good
in itself
and useful
to
preservation, it is
preservation
promulgated acquisition.
means
to be merely useful, and not merely to

act would
but
also
to
This
be
of
little
significance
had
Cyrus been
means an
without
the
to acquire.
Indeed, it is
with
Cyrus'
army consisting his

second
steps.
of one
thousand peers trained to
very fight hand to hand

which
modest
and
thirty
thousand commoners experienced only
bows
and spears
necessitates plished
act, the
reorganization consists
of
the
army.
This is
accom
in two
The
The first step

the
peers
hand to hand
successes.
alongside
in
new
exchange
in asking the commoners to fight for an equal share of future

of concern
peers
accept
the
arrangement out
gain.
for their in stag
safety, the
commoners out of affirm
desire for
The
second
step
consists
ing
discussions that
the army
the principle of reward according to merit. Cyrus

a system of promotion uncontrolled
prepares
for this
by instituting
by
236
Interpretation
Cyrus'
is the creation, or rather unfettering, of a natural aristocracy in the army, but it will be an aristocracy in which the best are those most obedient and most capable as military officers. The emergence of a natu
social position.
aim ral
reorganization aristocracy must subvert the conventional aristocracy: of the Persian army effects an unauthorized and therefore illegal democratiza tion of about one fourth of the whole citizen body (commoners as well as
Cyrus'
peers).
Cyrus'
corruption of represents a return of
Persian
virtue and social
democratization
of
the army
to nature. At the center of the account of the reorganization

Cyrus'
the army, Xenophon includes a scene from the question

whether
dinner table in
which
he
raises
the commoners are any worse off than the peers the Persian education. Cyrus wishes to make
war.
because they have
not received
the commoners acceptable to the peers as equal partners in
He does
as
not
in
fact believe in the equality of the commoners: he describes them body but having souls needing training in courage. Even courage
together will not gain the highest
heart,"
strong in
and strength
honors, however:
only
one
commoner, "a
gentleman at also
ever reaches a position of peers
5.2.17). The
tell
stories
superiority (2.1.11; 8.3.5; see ridiculing the commoners, and Cyrus be

made
laughingly
piece of rytellers
says that
the commoners
peer
can
friends "with austerity
even
little
sto new
meat"
(2.2.10). A
known for
extreme
rebukes
the
for
inciting laughter;
this
friend
of
the old order sees that the

peers'
preference over new
for
pleasure over virtue undermines
the
claim of
superiority
to
of
the commoners. The

order
(i.e.,
the
Cyrus;
again.
the austere
laughing lowering of their status) in a manner peer, although finally induced to smile,
peers express
their complaint against the

not offensive
is
not
heard
Now
occurs the
first
of
two staged discussions of

to
reward
merit,
even
a measure would
Cyrus be
wishes
be
accepted
"for the
more
sake of
the
according to (for
more
peers"
they
of
made
better
more
obedient,
competitive,
de
sirous to please
One
the peers
by it) and one which shame prevents them from laughingly tells of a commoner who also is against
is, receiving
risks an
rejecting.
share and
share alike
against, that
well
equal
share of
hard
work.
Cyrus for the
knows perfectly
pleasant
that in relying upon man's natural preference
to motivate his soldiers he
infecting
them with viciousness, "for
the
vicious are often able vicious must
to demonstrate that vice
does
advan
gain some
The
all
be
weeded out at
any
cost and replaced with
the best "from
sources"
(2.2.26).
The
corruption of
Persian
of
virtue once
begun is
perhaps
hastened
by
the at
There clearly ensues a increasing army general decline of discipline and morale (5.4.15; 6.2.13; 7.1.30; 7.2.6). Cyrus feels it necessary to exhort his men to courage before the great battle some
tachment to the
numbers of nations.
thing he
refused
to do before the first battle on the ground that no speech could

good.14
make men
instantly immediately dividing
Cyrus
maintains obedience after

men
the great
which
battle
by
among his
the
Lydian spoils,
he
obtains

peacefully
city We
237
(plundering
of
would
have
rewarded
the disobedient
and
destroyed the
this is one
many
examples of with
justice
deriving indirectly
from
Cyrus'
calculations
[7.2.5 together
7.2.11]).
philosophic
are now
in
a position
to understand Xenophon's
show of
intention
behind his
explicit
Cyrus'
intention to
corruption
how Cyras
solved
the
problem of rule.
Underlying
standing
modern of
Persian
aristocratic
principles
is
an
under
the natural
as
human
condition not and
dissimilar to that
that
presented
by
such
writers
Machiavelli
Hobbes,
and
is,
one of violent struggle
necessitated wealth.
by
Given the
stable politics?
in a world of limited grasping the human condition, how does one build a More fundamentally, what is the basis of political life? Three
man
being
competitive
character of
answers suggest
themselves:
kinship, friendship,
coercion.
Kinship
mitigate
is
ruled out
by
natural kinship friendship is the seems on its face a dubious but it answer, Friendship answer explicitly and publicly given by Cyras at the peaceful end of his long life (8.7.13). Cyrus cautions that friendship does not arise naturally, meaning that the basis of friendship is not love, and asserts that faithfulness in men must be created and maintained by acts of kindness; he denies it can be compelled.
the fact that
without
is insufficient to
the
condition
(1.6.32).
Perhaps Cyrus
gained
considers
this last claim to be a noble lie. The first alliance

of
by
Cyrus'
efforts, that
Armenia, is
secured most
force. The Armenians become

the
weightiest
allies
by
a self-interested calculation
emphatically by in which
factor is fear
of violent
death.
Cyrus'
initial kindness to the
Armenians
consists
a small
taking only
the
in sparing their lives, in returning their women, and in part of their money, in exchange for their participation in
political
campaign.
The
life
or
of the
subjugated
slaves,
whether
they
are
Persian
this fact
commoners
in Persia
defeated Babylonians,
rests upon
coercion, but
the rule of the
is, for
(8.1
two reasons, alleviated and the best
even concealed under
best
of the First, by three enemy forts taken by Cyras, one is taken by force, one by intimidation, and one by persuasion (5.4.51). Second, the best ruler desires as far as possible to make all enemies into friends, for the reason that his desire for the honor of ruler
.43-44).
ruler practices coercion
degrees:
mankind
is
unlimited except
The
ruler
is he
who can
by his desire to rule mankind, which is limitless. by management turn naturally faithless human be
art of
ings into faithful friends. The

men
be
treated according to their
managing friends demands that different differences. Men follow Cyrus chiefly be
cause
he knows how to harm
enemies and enrich
friends;
some of the
best
men
follow because they

manliness and good
are attracted
or
by
his
natural
excellence,
by
his
superior
because they wish to requite some service he has done them (4.1.23; 4.2.9). Xenophon emphasizes in various ways how impres sive Cyrus is in appearance. He looks and behaves like a leader among men
looks,
themselves noted
for
physical endurance and courage.
However,
better
Cyrus'
love
for
other men
bears
a resemblance
to the
men as
love
other men who are
have for their dogs.

or worse
He certainly looks
upon
individual
tools,
only
238
Interpretation
as
insofar
virtues
they
are useful
(5.3.46). For
and
but in their vices, loves,
Cyrus, men are useful not only in their hates; indeed, they become useful through
ignoble."
appeals to their strongest

stacle
passions,
whether noble or
The largest
ob
to
transforming
the
circulation
men
into friends is the limit

good will of
of good
things to give
away.
Cyras
wealth
maximizes
in
his philanthropy by keeping his (8.2.20). While Cyras shares wealth, he does not share
political
the highest political honors. There will always

who consider themselves equal constant source of contests and
be those
jealous
who
envy the
ruler and
to him. These armed and capable men are a

must
sedition, and
be
made
of one another
through
the circulation of positions of honor.

establishes empire.
Once Cyras
and enlarge
himself in
Babylon, he
considers
how to
maintain
his
Concluding
that
it is necessary
urging the
ruler,
to persuade the peers
and other men of upon
influence to
remain
together practicing virtue and waiting

establishment of
needs
the
king
at
court, Cyras gives a
speech
Per
sian practice.
Cyras,
as an established peacetime
the Persian vir

allies"
tues as the Persian regime needs them. Cyrus assures his "friends and
that
they have
not acquired their wealth
unjustly
and warns
that
will
without
it.16
the
continued exercise of measures taken
self-control, moderation,
and care
they
lose
The
by
the peers to rale
hostile hostile
commoners must now peoples
be taken
by
for
the peers and allies to rule far more

not
(7.5.77). But Cyrus does
justify
says
the institution of Persian virtue only on the ground of necessity,
he
that
ground
that
they they are
must claim
the right to rale over their subjects only on the
their
most capable of successful political

war.
betters (7.5.79). For Cyras, the best men are those action, the fundamental form of which is
Masters
as
of political action possess certain virtues common to gentlemen
but,
or
for the
Cyrus learns from Cambyses, they do not possess them in the same way same reason. Cyras does not go so far as to say that the rale of the
the conquered nations
will remain
peers and allies over
is just because the
rale of
the
best is
just,
or
that their rale

ruled
better than the

one respect
just only as long as they themselves remain (7.5.83-84). As it is unjust for those who are superior in
everything, the
absolute and permanent
to
have
superior shares of
subjugation of civilized peoples will always gates peoples whose
be
unjust.
Moreover, Cyrus
existence
subju
only
offense
is their independent
but
(8.6.19-20).
What
of
the
justice
Cyrus'
of
gentle
absolute rule over
the
peers and allies?
Following
Cyrus'
speech,
chief officer
Chrysantas tells the

only by be willing
peers and allies that
they distinguish themselves from

willing obedience; their
Cyrus1
slaves
their obedience to
Cyras
being
obedience can
because,
as
mon
enemies,
rule
is to their
common advantage of
(8.1
.4).
they have com The justice of

extent to which
Cyrus'
absolute rule and
his just title
king
are
found in the
his interest is identical

reaches
with
the interest of the governed.

with
This identification
its limit
under
Cyras,
the result that
for the willingly subjugated,
there is only one ruler and only one
interest.

The imitation The both
of peers good
of
239
the Persian practices

of
will not establish
the Persian virtues.
had been imitators in itself

and
virtue, but they had
understood virtue
to be
useful;
a
virtue, but it
will
be
they and the allies will now imitate the imitation thoroughly vulgarized practice without faith in its
return
independent
Persian
tues
goodness.
For this reason, the
to Persian
virtue
through the vir
practice
is impossible. Xenophon in himself
provides an annotated and
list
of
Cyras
wished represented
the nobles,
of
which
is
conspicuous
for allotting justice to

gain.
second place and
speaking
it
as a men
deterrent to improper
Piety
occupies the
first
position
(god-fearing
the
being
and
less
likely
to
commit crimes against the

obedience
king); justice
practiced
the second; showing
respect the
third;
the
(not,
of
course,
by Cyras)
fourth;
last is
modera
tion (8. 1.23-30). It seems that the

need
heavy
emphasis upon obedience reduces secured
for
moderation
network of spies
among the subjects. Obedience is known as the "king's created

eyes,"
through a vast
by
Cyras'
"rewarding
hear."
liberally
those who reported to him

says of
whatever
it
was
to
his interest to
Xenophon
the discredit
plainly that "people are everywhere afraid to say anything to the (8.2.10-11). Competition under Cyrus is not for
king"
honor among
Cyras'
gentlemen
but for
Cyras'
favor. different
ever character
regime
is
then of an altogether
no or
than that of the

reproduce
Persian
regime.
There is
indication that he
intended to
that
regime on a
large scale,
that he desired to produce a regime superior to

Cyras'
Persia in the dian
cultivation of
individual
excellence.
adoption of the
Me
lavish giving are not done with a view to improving upon political calcu Persia by alleviating its harshest aspects, but are part of lations (to make himself and the nobles formidable in appearance and to make
costume and
Cyrus'
sedition
on as
the part of the nobles less likely). Not even if the good life is
and enjoyment of wealth can
defined
regime
the obtaining
at
Cyrus be
said to create a
aiming
the good
life, for in
truth no one but Cyras owns anything the best

political man
(8.1.17; 8.2.15-19). The

which as
achievement of
is
a regime
in
king
he is
called
father (8.1.44).
For Cyras, virtue and friendship are merely useful for the obtaining of ruler ship of the largest possible empire. But what is rulership of empire for? A
possible answer
is
universal peace.
But the
state of peace must
itself be for
conversa
something,
for,
say, the
about
cultivation of
domestic
life;
or
for leisured
tion,
or
thought,
the world, and ultimately about the most important
things of the world. It almost goes without saying that the adult Cyras is never
shown show
participating in family life. As a young man in Media, Cyras does not any interest in an Armenian philosopher; as general, he fails opportunities
to show interest
in the
nature
of wisdom
and
the soul
(1.6.46; 6.1.41-42;
question
7.2.28-29);
at of
immortality
his death, Cyrus professes the soul, but apparently has
an not
interest in the seriously
of the a
studied
it. Whereas
state of peace
is necessary to contemplation,
a state of contest
is necessary to
240
Interpretation
activity;
we
political
have already
noted
that Xenophon
at
seems
to think this
seems
applies
equally to the soul. The state of
being
peace,
or at
rest,
funda
mentally unattractive to the political Cyrus considers, or at any rate thinks others consider, empire to be a good in itself (4.5.16). He does not say, however, that rulership of empire is the
man.17
good or
one
is the
can
aim of
the best life. He

most
says rather
that he
counts most noble
happy
the
who
"acquire the
ends"
and use
the most to
(8.2.23).
Empire then is like the
original
Persian
itself
and
for the
sake of noble ends.
friends
an
and
immortality
never more
country happy to such an of fame. Cyrus is able

than mildly interested
in being his leaving extent that he should be justly accounted to live for an immortality of fame and yet
conception of virtue
in
a good
Cyrus believes
that
he dies
be
in the
immortality
best
of
the soul
because he
doubts the
immortality
that supports virtue. The
political man
for the highest
political end
unceasing
and unequalled
reason
lives entirely honor. The man most
loving
those
of
honor is
a political man
for the
that,
while one can
live hon
orably alone,
who
one cannot
bestow honor
obeyed more
upon oneself.
Cyrus himself "honored
unhesitatingly
than those who thought
they
exhibited
who
virtues,"
the greatest and most elaborate
meaning that
Cyras loved those
loved him, more than he loved the good (8.1.29). The Education of Cyrus contains two prominent
politically ac One is Cambyses, who while possessing the knowledge necessary to empire, is ever the first of the Persians to obey the authorities (1.3.18). Cambyses is restrained by the under
tive men superior to Cyras in their attachment to virtue.
examples of
standing that aristocracy is a better political solution than is absolute beneficent monarchy because the regime in which gentleman are dedicated to virtue is
better than the
regime
in
which nobles are
dedicated to
prosperity. or
We do
not
know how far Cambyses

tions had he been in
might
have
pursued either the we
enemy
Persian
to
ambi
Cyras'
place, but
Cyras'
being
recalled
by
his father him
after
may consider the first great battle (6. 1

return
references
.4-5)
and
to the cool
at which
view
reception
Cyrus
warns
receives upon against
his
to Persia as the Great
King,
Cambyses
subverting the Persian constitution with a

other man
to
self-aggrandizement
who while and
(8.5.21-24). The
skill of
is the
commoner
Pheralus,
shows
possessing the
the ruler, possesses the soul of a gentleman
therefore cares more for virtue than for gain. The case of
while
Pheralus is
not
that,
Cyras himself is incapable

Cyras'
of
leading
men
to virtue, it
impos
sible under
rule
both to
succeed and to practice
virtue, if
one
to take unusual
measures
(8.3.7; 8.3.47-50). The

man even on
conclusion that the
is willing best po justified its
litical
man
is
not the
best
the political plane would seem
if it is true that Xenophon does

Xenophon is the "the best
calls and
author of a
not regard virtue as
merely
useful.
Fortunately,
end
book devoted to
Socrates,
not call
whom
he
calls at
happiest
man."
Xenophon does
Cyras happy, but
rather
him,
at the
beginning
of
the Education of Cyrus,
"deserving
of all admira
tion."
Xenophon invites
comparison of
Socrates
to any other man,
but invites

comparison of
241
Cyras only to any

could
other ruler
(Memorabilia, 4.8.11; Education

political man and
of Cyrus, 1.1.6).
That Xenophon
the simply best
about on
think Cyras the best
think Socrates
man reflects
the disjunction of politics and philosophy brought

political man's
the one hand
by
the
disinterest in fundamental
participation,
the best political
ques
tions and the philosopher's disinterest in the other hand

untouched
cal
active political
and on
by
the
inferior
while
scope of politics:
man
lives
by
philosophy,
the philosopher lives in association
with politi
life. But
perhaps no man ever participated as
fully
as
Xenophon in both
same man
politics and philosophy. wrote
One
and
cannot
fail to be impressed that the
both the
Anabasis'*
the Memorabilia. The
most extensive claim one
might make
in
serious
for Xenophon is that in exceeding Socrates in manliness and Cyras reflection, Xenophon is more than either the complete man. Xeno
phon, but not Xenophon's

political aim.
Cyrus, knows
reason
that there
is
higher
aim
than the
He does
not
for this
despise
politics or the
life devoted to Xenophon
it. One in
would
have to turn to the Memorabilia to know live in the
whether
thinks the philosophic aim requires the political aim to be the virtuous regime
which
free
men
exercise of noble actions.

virtues not
by
itself teaches the
need of the simple
only to self-preservation but also to
healthy
political
political
but manly life. In teach
ing, in
and,
on
the context of the grandest political activity, the precariousness and

remoteness of other
therefore
justice
and goodness
and
in
life,
on the one
hand,
life
of
the
hand,
the possibilities
therefore the limits of the

a
the best political man, the Education of Cyrus teaches

tion.
true political modera
NOTES
1. Xenophon, Cyropaedia, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge, Mass: Loeb Classical Library,
1914.)
2. It
than
would
be
interesting
of
to know
whether
in Xenophon's
view
the coming into
being
of a
statesman on the
level
Cyrus does
not require more complicated and more specific conditions
does the coming into

(3.1.38).
youthful
being
of
the philosopher, who, appearing in
Armenia,
might appear
almost anywhere
3.
to
During
his
training in Persian justice Cyrus is

tunic of a little
emphasizes
once punished
by
his teacher for
awarding to a
big boy
the
big
boy
rather than the small one which natural
belonged
legally
turns
him (1.3.16-17). The story out to be essential to him.

4. Given ity? The
while still a
Cyrus'
Cyrus'
freedom
of mind, a
quality
which
nature, to what extent
does he
need an education
Cyrus'
to successful
political activ
answer
performance in his very first battle is partly indicated in the comparison of youth in Media with his performance as general in the great battle with the Assyrians. a
In the former he takes the lead like

surveys the whole scene
"well-bred but inexperienced
hound"
(1.4.21). In the latter he
from
tower and
dons the
same armor as
his
staff
(7.1.39; 7.1.2).
5. The freedom Cyrus has finds philanthropy difficult to
by
virtue of
successful use requires considerable skill.
his relationship with Astyages is not unrestricted; its Cyrus is a contriver of pleasure for others (1.4.15) but
practice under
tyranny (1.4.26).
242
Interpretation
having
"had
at
6. On Xenophon
his disposal
hedonistic justification
need to
of
pp.
see
Leo
Strauss, On Tyranny,
7. In his (7.5.82-85). 8. Cyrus
speech
revised and enlarged
(Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1968),

will
96-99.
Cyrus links
virtue to gain.
Later he
link it to
maintenance
speech the word for self-restraint, enkrateia, but not the word for modera Moderation is the ruling virtue, including self-restraint and deriving from pru dence. Is there something immoderate or imprudent about the Persian expedition? See note 16 uses
in his
tion,
sophrosune.
below. 9. Does training in virtue share a relationship with true virtue similar to that shared by philoso phy and wisdom? The thought is that the gain from training in virtue is imperfect virtue as the gain from philosophy is imperfect wisdom.
10. The list
provisions, provisions,
recalled
by
Cyrus from his boyhood
conversation with
Cambyses is
as
follows:
reviews:
health, health,
arts of
war, enthusiasm, obedience, tactics. Their
present
discussion
enthusiasm, obedience,
love, taking
advantage
(1.6.12-14).
11
The Education of Cyrus (1.6.39).
contains numerous comparisons of men to animals; subjects and
potential subjects are compared to mies to wild animals
herd
animals
(1.1.2), friends
to domestic animals
(8.2.4),
ene
12. Whereas Cambyses had

now uses
formerly
used the word
phronesis,
indicating
practical
wisdom, he
sophia,
indicating
has
theoretical wisdom (cf. 1.6.22 with 1.6.46).
13. This
peaceful
or
advice
a significant effect upon
Cyrus,
but
who
describes himself
at
the time of his

see
death
as always
having lived
as
he
wished
as always
having
feared that he "might
hear
unpleasant"
something 14. Cf. 3.3.50-55 with 6.2.13-22
or experience
(8.7.7).
and
7.1.10-22. In the
great
battle the
infantry
follow the
Persian cavalry, whereas in the first battle the Persian infantry precede the Median cavalry; the switch from hand-to-hand fighting on foot to hand-to-hand fighting on horseback seems to indicate
a
decline in Persian
courage
(7.1.26). In the
great
battle (but
not
in the first
battle) Cyrus
makes
extensive use of
devices,
such as
scythe-bearing chariots, towers, and, to frighten horses,

and
camels
(7.1.34, 7.1.47-48).
15. Compare Araspas
with
Abradatas (6.1.36
6.4.9). Other
examples are
the
justified but
consuming hatreds of Gobryas and Gadatas for the Assyrian king. Note that Cyrus goes to Gadatas against the Assyrian king that he may "gain an advantage to (5.3.31-32).
ourselves"
help
16. In
Cyrus'
original pronouncement upon
virtue, he had
concluded
by
their mission
is
not
unjust; he
now
twice assures them and their allies that
they have
assuring the peers that not been unjust
(adikos). In the
now uses
original pronouncement word and
Cyrus
used
only the
word
for
self-restraint
(enkrateia); he
of
both this
the word for moderation (sophrosune). Perhaps this change reflects the
placed upon the nobles
difference between the demands
in time
of war and
in time
peace, when
they
in governing (cf. 1.5.8 with 7.5.74 and 1.5.13 with 7.5.73; 7.5.77). 17. A state of peace is necessary not only to contemplation but to hedonism: in willing the satrapy of Media to his younger son, Cyrus says that Tanaoxares shall have every human pleasure without the interruptions to happiness brought by royal power, which power leaves "one able to
participate
find
rest."
no
Tanaoxares
would seem
to be thus encouraged to live as the self-indulgent Cyaxares
lived (8.7.12; see 4.1.13-18). 18. The Anabasis is Xenophon's Great
account of
King
and of
Xenophon's
leading
the
Anabasis (5.6.15) that he
was accused of
Cyrus the Younger's failed campaign against the Greeks safely back to Greece. Xenophon reports in the desiring to found a city.
Belfagor: Machiavelli's Short

Theodore A. Sumberg
Story
"Your letter
to a
was short and a cura
friend (Opere
in rereading it I made it Thus Machiavelli di Franco Gaeta [Milan: Feltrinelli, 1961] VL228).
long."
The meeting
sought,
central
of minds that
is
friendship
of value. short
helps in making letters long, but
un
stated meanings are
hard to
come upon with
friendship
eight
absent.
They
how
will
be
the
however, if believed
meaning
of
Hence
our effort
to enlarge
on
upon
Machiavelli's
What
story (some
pages)
devil,
Belfagor,
took a wife.
rereading several The story begins in hell. Its ruler, Pluto, sends a fellow-devil to earth to investigate the complaints of the many men descending among them that their
wives are at
merely as a comic trifle recalls upon important themes in The Prince and The Discourses on Livy.
appears
settles
man.
fault. The devil chosen, instructed to live as a man among men, in Florence, where he marries the beautiful daughter of a poor noble Very much in love, the devil-man indulges his extravagant wife in her
every whim, soon using up the large sum given him for his earthly mission. Forced into debt he cannot pay off, he flees Florence, coming upon a farm laborer near by who, under promise of a rich reward, protects him from his
creditors
in hot
pursuit. mission
Narrating
pact with
his
to the peasant, the devil-man out of gratitude makes a
him.
Reassuming
out
diabolic powers, the devil
will
take possession of
the
souls of
the daughters
of rich men who will
pay the peasant
handsomely
with
when
he
calls
the cooperating devil. After two lucrative exorcisms, the

of gratitude again.
devil, feeling
that his debt
is
paid
up, threatens the peasant

content.
death if he importunes him
Later, however,
Mindful
of
the same
Pockets full, the peasant is devil enters a daughter of the
King
of
France.
the royal request

peasant
threat, the peasant, now famous for his exploits, refuses for aid, but the king also threatens death. Much troubled, the devises a clever scheme carried out in Paris. While speaking into the
the devil's
ear of the possessed
girl, he
parries the
him that his

girl.
abandoned wife
Free
at
last
of
is coming the "marriage

abrupt
after
menacing anger of the devil by warning him. In a panic the devil leaves the
the devil
returns
yoke,"
to the peace and
security
of
hell. His
return,
while
their wives,
yet cuts short a mission planned
confirming for ten years. Meanwhile,

rewards
happy,"
men's complaints about with
his
daughter healed Laden

with
by
the
hoax,
the French
gold, the
peasant returns
comedy.1
home
king "entirely
the peasant generously. to quote the last
words of
the ingenious
interpretation,
Spring 1992,
Vol. 19, No. 3
244
Interpretation
At the
"I
outset
Pluto delivers
an
important
address to
wish.
the "infernali
alone possess
and
this realm and I can rule it as I

fellow-devils."
choose
to
rule
it
under
law
in
consultation with
together,
and after open
discussion, in
consents to go
which
True to his word, Pluto different views are
calls
them
ex
freely
pressed, they decide to

though unwilling at
political regime that cal
send earthward one of their own.
The devil chosen,

typical of a
politi
first,
is
in
a spirit of civic sacrifice
broadly
based. Machiavelli
In fact he
of
notes
the
longstanding
stability
of the nether world.
pays more attention
to the political
arrangements of government to
hell than the logic He
the plot requires. Why? Where

readers
is
good
not
be found? In hell. His

wants
know
well enough
that
it is
found
of
on earth.
them to share his joke about the political superiority

of
the imagined kingdom
hell.
a concern
Machiavelli
even claims
for hell
for truth
and
justice. Assembled
for consultation, the devils hold that they would show little love for justice were they to fail to investigate men's complaints. It is this alleged love of justice that found?
The
storyteller
pushes them to seek the truth.
Where
on earth are
truth and justice
carefully
sketches
the limited monarchy of hell.
Now, limited
monarchy is monarchy
superior
prevails over
superiority
to absolute monarchy according to his tracts. But absolute in heaven, as everybody knows, so the story suggests hell's heaven as well as over the earth. It may well be that Satan,
having
one
made good
his
revolt against
God, has
set
up
better
regime
than the
he
rebelled against.
The story quietly leads the

urged
reader
to such insidious
thoughts.
For
centuries man
has been
to look to the heavens (or the

challenges
divine) for
guidance and
inspiration. Machiavelli between jest

and
this tradition in offering the
advice,
when
advanced
prettifies
earnest, to look
down,
not up.
Especially
popular
he
veneration
hell, he slyly carries out his apparent aim to undo for heaven. There may be a prudential law of opposites
weaken
at work
here. You
opposite.
the hold of heaven on men's minds when you exalt
its
Caesar, Machiavelli has pointed out, is not to attack Caesar but to praise Brutus (Discourses, 1:10, in Opere a cura di Mario Bonfantini [Milan, Naples: Riccardo Ricciardi, 1963], p. 120).
safest
The
way to attack
noble regime of hell is not the only invention of Machia for men; after all, lacking sympathy it would not heed their complaints. This view is the very opposite of the conventional one. Hell is where demons torture the damned in dread punishment. Classical
The
law-loving
cares
velli.
Hell
also pictures
hell
as a
dark, gloomy
If hell's
place
inhabited
by
pitiless
mythology devils (Hesiod,
Theogony, 455). It
God
alone who
seems
man.
that Machiavelli wants it understood that

residents also
loves
it is not love man, then the traditional
Belfagor:
belief in the
uniqueness of
Machiavelli'
Short
Story
245
Ma
divine love is
called
into
question.
Apparently
chiavelli wants
not state
his
readers
to
entertain such subversive
thoughts even if he does
them openly. You
will reach your
goal, he
notes p.
in the Discourses,
by
hiding
your
intention (1:44 in Opere, Bonfantini ed.,
185).
II
On
seri
earth
the middle regime
nothing
seems to work out well
for its
"mi-
mortali."
able to
all
Once in Florence, for example, the devil-man becomes vulner its evils, listed as poverty, jails, sickness and many others. The
so entrenched
city's evil
is
that it seems to defeat the compassionate interven
tion of heaven and hell alike.
As
a woman rained
for the devil-man.

also
Knowing Lucifer,
Paradise for the first man, he finds his
so a woman ruins
the earth
wife more prideful.
She is
insolent,
capricious, ungrateful, querulous,
foul-mouthed, deceitful, de
manding his money.
and wasteful.
Her only art lies in quickly separating her husband from Her servants too find her insupportable; the little devils accompa
earth as servants soon return to under
nying the devil-man to rather than live in the

successful
hell "to be in the fire
world"
the wife's rale. Happiness seems to
lie in
flight from
woman.
Most
comedies end with
the lovers marrying and
living happily
"vexations
of
ever after.
This
one ends
in the
escape of the
husband from the
matrimony."
Marriage is
no panacea.
The
wife's name
is Onesta,
which means
decency. She
was
probably
chaste
before marriage, but afterwards she practices a sort of cuckoldry on her hus band in loving him little, if at all, in favor of her family. She persuades her
husband to pay for the dowries of her three (all failures) of her three brothers. Love of
sisters and the
business
enterprises
family, not only marriage, appears Even chastity itself lacks the radiance of virtue because it does not carry over into decent dealings of the wife with people outside her consanguineous family. The traditional view that chastity is the
in
a poor
light in this
story.
glory
of woman
women with virtue storyteller
may be misguided. Machiavelli may also be insinuating that do no less harm than women without virtue. The impish
throughout.
vita"
is
all smiles
The
evils of
the earth's "tumultuosa e inquieta

society's corruption.
arise not
from
in
natural particu
defects but from lar that

rains
It is
respect
for
public opinion
the earthly career of the devil-man. Once on earth he seeks praise

and
from fellow Florentines,

velli specifies that
in fact he forms himself in their image. Machia his wife, he

signs of
the devil-man soon "takes pleasure in the honors and pomp
world."
of
the
Prompted
by
even surpasses other
Florentines in
propre
festivals
and other conspicuous
lavish living. Amour
defeats
him.
Entering
the world, the devil was instructed to submit to "all the human
246
Interpretation
He took
a wife?
passions."
No
the
wife
took him and
without
"mercy
and
concern."
The
passion of
love took him. Love is the demon

name of
that
overpowers
even
demons. The devil-man's
Belfagor
merits a word
here. Accord
ing
to Saint
Jerome, its
origin
is traceable to the Hebrew

n.
equivalent of
Priapus
(Opere, Bonfantini
weakness. women.
ed., p.
1036,
7). So
what stands
for
man's strength
is his
Machiavellian
irony
is endless,
and
he laughs
at men as well as at
Ill
Fortune is
other
an active player
in the
story.
By lot
Belfagor
was chosen over
help
devils for the earthly mission. By luck the peasant gained his chance to the devil-man when in flight. What counts, however, is not luck alone but
seizure of opportunities while chance
the bold
that come along.
Chance
well used
leads to
overwhelming inept man leads to failure. Machiavelli reports that although the devil's ally in the hoaxes is only a He is spirited, resourceful, clever and strongpeasant, he is a "uomo
comedy,
animoso."
willed.
tunata"
Advancing
from
success to
success, he
embodies
that "astuzia for-
that his creator calls
for
at
the start of Prince 9. Machiavelli even
specifies
with
in the story that

or astuteness yet
one cannot
liberate
oneself of
deceit
("inganno
o astuzia").
If the
earth
earthly evils except is not made for

to
prosper.
man, it can
be
made a suitable place
for human
enterprises
The
other.
storyteller also notes that the peasant works on a
farm
owned
by
an
Farm tenancy is not the theme here; Machiavelli wants to show rather that one can rise high from a very low rung on the ladder, with good lineage, moreover, not counting at all. In his three adroitly managed exorcisms, the peasant outfoxes a rich merchant, the King of Naples and even the King of
France. An
The
unarmed
man, if clever, can
win over armed men.
Fraud is both
enough
to prevail over
force. Such thoughts
come
easily to the wideawake reader.
peasant even outwits the
devil-man. This one,
knowing
heavenly
pomp and infernal fury, according to Machiavelli, knows less than the peasant. What the peasant knows how to make his way on earth counts for more
than the sum of the
abode that
knowledge
can yet
of
heaven One
and
hell. So the earth,

energy,
miserable
it has been,
no room
be
an arena of success once can add
courage and
intelligence
there is yet
are mobilized properly.
that if the past is a mistake,
for despair
were vigorous new one sense
leadership
to
arise.
The
peasant
is very ordinary in
he
seeks wealth.
Why? To
buy
land, not pleasures, according to Machiavelli. Indifference to pleasures is ex traordinary in all classes of men. Yet it may be needed, the story suggests, to
favor those seeking economic advance. The pleasure of love, on the other hand, is in particular to be avoided because it is the element in man's life that escapes his control. So attests not only the unhappy experience of the devil-
Belfagor:
man
Machiavelli'
Short
Story
247
but
also
the absence
of
women,
family
and marriage
in the
peasant's
success.
Machiavelli's two
the nonpolitical
man
chief
tracts tell the new prince how to act. This story tells
act.
ing
in the kind
can
of
15. But he
appears that Machiavelli is engag moralizing exhortation that he disavowed openly in Prince defend himself from the charge of inconsistency by claiming
noble or
how to
It therefore
that he is not urging

phers and
high goals,
as was
the custom of past philoso
theologians. The
modest one of economic success
is certainly
open
to
all,
even
to a
farm laborer,
without great strain.
IV
With his first

uomo"
words
Machiavelli
states that
he
plucked
his story from the

such a
oral tradition of ancient
Florence, specifically from

one
the report of a "santissimo
lost in
prayers.
Can
imagine
all
a more pious
beginning? That
man
is held
responsible
for narrating
the outrages in Belfagor is the greatest
outrage of all. relics
fails
to
amused
view
by
For example, such a man allegedly reports that resort to holy carry out exorcisms that are arranged easily by the devil openly that failure. Machiavelli also attributes to that very saintly man the
made
that the devil is
flesh, lives among

and
us,
suffers
tortures on earth and
then returns to his point of origin, hell. All too clear is the blasphemous paral
lelism between the devil-man

Machiavelli Literate ideas
or
wrote
the God-man.
One
must not overlook
that
for
people who saw
things through the prism of the Bible.

was made
not, the people's
imagination
up
of scriptural
stories,
and so on.
He
could
therefore trust some of his readers to
understand
his
story in the blasphemous way that he apparently intended. Open would of course have outraged his readers excessively.
blasphemy
There is nothing pious about the exemplary peasant save his name: John Matthew. Mammon, not God, is the motor of his energy. Even worse is his shameless use of religion to advance his avarice. He insists in carrying out the
three sham exorcisms amidst elaborate religious ceremony, especially the third
one
that he
and
stages
barons
If
bishops. The
before Notre Dame in Paris in the company of the king, most solemn moment in the story is the biggest hoax. in the
past
religious ceremonies
have been tricks
played upon
the common
mind
by
prince and priest
well,
they
will
now
be turned
against
them,
as
Belfagor illustrates.
Machiavelli is carrying out an exorcism of his own. He wants to cast out the souls of his readers the respect for rituals, relics, miracles and mysteries
the
whole
of
farrago
of man's religious
life
of past
centuries.2
Folly
as catharsis of
folly is his tactic. Half-gentle, half-malicious irony will empty minds of the awe nurtured on blind and terrified credulity. The process will of course take
time,
so
Belfagor may be
considered part of
Machiavelli's long-range
plan.
The
248
plan
Interpretation
itself is entirely political, for once you change people's imagination, you change the political order in which they live. A change in mentality is the
change that
lasts the longest. With for the
playfulness and
gravity the
storyteller
there
fore
works
political philosopher.
of
John Matthew takes hold

creator
the chances that come his way; why should

self-confidence should
his
be less
opportunist?
With
Machiavelli
will
insert
serious
thoughts in his little

writer
comedy.
Why indeed
is the
having
Also
time?
useful and
not
strong to be
convictions overlooked
that are at war with those

oft-repeated goal of
anything less be expected of a dominant in his
Machiavelli to be The
reformist
indeed he is the first
philosopher
dedicated to
utility.
imagination-dissolving
character of
Belfagor is
no surprise.
The
is the
cause
quickest
way to
open
the eyes of the people, Machiavelli claims, is to
descend to
particulars
(Discourses, 1:47 in Opere, Bonfantini
ed.,
p.
191). This
game he is playing here, where this descent has special resonance be the reader is asked to look down, not up. As to particulars, a story is a
string of them that are made attractive to simple souls by plot and characters. Machiavelli probably wrote his story for the ever-expanding number of people
learning
shops.
to read Italian in cheap editions rolling off newly installed printing

would
He
scholastic
treatises
certainly in wide
not give
them the technical
generalities common
to
circulation
in
schools and monasteries. of
Machiavelli
also separates
himself from the humanist literature

a
his day.
girl
Most
of
it
was written
in Latin,
language laughed
at
in his
story. speaks
The first
whom
the peasant exorcises,

one
when possessed
by
the
devil,
in Latin. In
lucid moments,
now
gathers,
people will avoid

of
that language. Latin also con
tains the accumulated to be put aside.
knowledge
the past. Language and knowledge both are
Humanist literature is
affect noble sentiments.
also
for
well-bred gentlemen of elegant tastes calls
who
But Machiavelli
leisured
"pernicious"
gentlemen
(Discourses, 1:55 in Opere, Bonfantini ed., p. 205). hand, is for hardworking people innocent of cultural
sions.
His story,
and
on
the other
preten
intellectual
They
appears
works.
have no difficulty accepting John Matthew as hero. He first in the story building high a dunghill before the farm in which he The scene will not offend new readers.
will
intoxicated by love, especially Platonic variously interpreted. That was reason enough for a rebel to write against it. Love as mediatrix between God and man is also one of the ideas to be discarded. Machiavelli probably also wanted to stress the danger of love's force to the bright young men whom in his tracts he was to
was also
and
Contemporary
literature
as
Christian love
ward political
leadership. His
directing
new
readers, mostly men,
would also
enjoy the
Belfagor:
joke that
should
with velli?
women use marriage
Machiavelli'
Short
Story
249
wives
to
capture and enslave not vice a
them.
Anyway,
be
controlled
by
their
husbands,
versa,
as occurs
in Belfagor
unhappy
results.
Have
we stumbled upon
traditional note in Machia
The first girl, when possessed, also enters into philosophical disputes. Those avoiding demonic frenzy will stay clear of them. By this open contempt for
philosophy Machiavelli
at ease with
rels.
will no
doubt
gain merit
among
most people who are
ill
philosophy, especially
Machiavelli knows how to

peasants
Machiavelli knew Florence. That

same
allegedly his story low. It is well to remember that from having lived with them when in exile from
pitch
with
its
endless and
useless quar
first girl,
when
possessed,
also reveals
the sins of many people,

years
including
girl no
those of an unnamed monk

as a
who
during
four
kept in his
cell a
dressed
pioneer,
boy. With this ribald

we
remember
anticlerical
note,
however, Machiavelli is
Boccaccio. Machiavelli's originality lies else more important themes that are common to tracts and story where, covering alike. One such theme comes to light, however, from a conspicuous difference
if
of
several
story and tract. Taking place in hell, the story's chief characters include devils. Now, hell and the devil are absent in The Prince and Discourses
(Leo Strauss, Thoughts on Machiavelli [Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958], p. 31). The political comedy thus expands its author's field of observation, which may be interpreted in the
phers should
following
with will
way.
keep
company
runs,
the divine
Plato has Socrates say that philoso (Republic, 500D). Only in such
the best political
order.
company, the
argument
they
create
Machia
velli prefers to
keep
political understanding.
company with the diabolic, also presumably to advance The special locale of Belfagor, a manifest demonstra
tion to
of
Machiavelli's tie to the
diabolic,
thus
fortifies the
hostility
in
of
the tracts
philosophy.
In the story only

when you
a woman possessed engages
philosophy.
More generally,
whole tradition of on the
keep
company
with
the
devil,
you challenge
the
philosophy,
classical and a place
divine. So Belfagor has

a
medieval, because it was centered in Machiavelli's animus toward past work, Machiavelli
was
thought. Nevertheless in
cerned to speak against
manifestly
popular
less
con
philosophy than against religion. And against the so
lemnities
defenses
of religion, ridicule
is
a natural
weapon,
given
the
tendency
is
of com
mon people
to fall easily into
laughter,
whose well-known effect
to
lower
against
welcoming disreputable ideas.
NOTES
1. For details
edited
on
text and
original publication see
Niccolo Machiavelli, Operette Satiriche,

"
by Luigi Foscolo Benedetto (Turin, 1920). una nuova battaglia contro le superstizioni della moltitudine. 2. Belfagor is ". Editori Laterza, 1972), p. 159. Also: "II Machiavelli vuole (Bari: Machiavelli Russo,
. .
Luigi
sradicare
250
della
cose
Interpretation
mente
del
volgo
la
millenaria credenza
in forze
soprannaturali continuanente
Belfagor"
intervenenti nelle
Gilberto Paolini, "Machiavelli in Kentucky Foreign Language Quarterly, 8, No. 3 (1961); 123. Machiavelli wishes to uproot from the mind of the volgo the centuries-old belief in supernatural forces intervening continually in the affairs of this world.
di
mondo."
questo
John Locke's Questions A
Concerning
the
Law of Nature:
Commentary
Robert Horwitz
Edited
by
Michael Zuckert
Carleton College
EDITOR'S NOTE When Robert Horwitz died in 1987, he had been working for many years to coordinate the publication of a new edition of John's Locke's early writing on the law of nature, and to prepare a commentary on the work. Recently a part of his
project came to
fruition:
a new
Clay,
and a new
English translation
were
statement
by Horwitz,
of Locke's work, edited by Jenny Strauss by Diskin Clay, together with an introductory published by Cornell University Press. Horwitz's
Latin text
commentary was not published, however, for his coworkers could not find a text of it which they judged to be complete enough. Such a text has turned up, and that is
substantially what is being published here. This is not the text Robert Horwitz would have published it is clear that he considered it incomplete in content and
rough
in style, for he
set off on at
least
one more serious revision after
he
completed the
nearest
draft. Nonetheless, this text seems to be the most complete and to final one that we have, and its publication is more than warranted by its
whatever
many excellences, despite believed it to contain. it
deficiencies Professor Horwitz
might
have
was
Professor Horwitz's commentary required editing in a number of respects. Since but a draft, the text needed some editing for smoothness and clarity.
marked
Professor Horwitz had
the places
in the text
not
where
he
wished
to put
footnotes, but in
in the
notes as
this
draft
at
least he had
In
most cases
inserted them. I have
attempted to at
fill
best I
could.
I feel
fairly
confident
I have found
least
some of the references
he
wished to or
include; if
the
reader nonetheless
finds
the notes
insufficient, I beg him

a
her to
lay
the
blame
belongs. In
English
footnotes. I have
very few cases, I have also revised all but
moved material one quotation
my head, where it from Horwitz's text to

on correspond to the
revision was
from Locke to
new edition.
version which
finally
was published
was
in the
This
necessary because Professor Horwitz
working from
a version of the translation
My
studied
commentary is deeply indebted to my teacher, the late Professor Leo Strauss, with Locke's Two Treatises of Government and political philosophy generally. More
whom
specifi which
cally, I have drawn
directly
on
the
unpublished
transcription of two seminar sessions
in
Professor Strauss discussed Locke's Questions, Locke's doctrine of natural law.
as well as on
his
several published statements on
interpretation,
Spring 1992,
Vol. 19, No. 3
252
Interpretation
itself
much revised attempted
which was
by
the time
it
was published.
It
should go without
undisturbed
saying that I have

all
to
leave Professor Horwitz's meaning

the text.
of
in
my I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Dean support in having the manuscript retyped.
editorial
intrusions into
Carleton College for
INTRODUCTION TO THE TEXT OF LOCKE'S QUESTIONS
Locke's Questions
and
Concerning
the
Law of Nature
are
perplexing,
even when measured
by
the standards
uncommonly complex set by his other works.
The Questions
abound with manifest and massive
of other complexities which will
be discussed below. One
contradictions, to say nothing response to the glar

suggestion
which
ing
his
contradictions throughout the
Questions has been the

that he wrote under the
that Locke
worked on the text over a considerable period of time

mind"1
during
he "changed
of a
on some
points,
and
influence
broad
variety
my
of natural
law theorists
who
themselves disagreed on many points. In
comments
attempt to make the case
(tentatively,
not
definitively) for
an
alternative
approach:
that Locke was completely consistent throughout this
though, on the face of it, this by no means appears to be the case. Within this text, full of manifold contradictions, seeming confusion, and even, at times, apparently total disorder, Locke has nevertheless provided careful
work,
even
readers with
everything
required
to resolve the manifest difficulties with
which
the
work abundantly abounds difficult to comprehend.
and
which, to say the
least,
make
it extremely
The commentary that follows is less

themselves than
an attempt
detailed
analysis of
the Questions
to provide the
reader with an overview of
Locke's
argument as a whole. points
With
respect to each of even
the
Questions, I
raise a number of
in Questions III, VI, and IX, where consideration, Locke provided only one-word responses, "Negatur."2 Some Questions are treated far more extensively than others if in my opinion they play an especially
reader's
for the
important
part
in the development
the issue of
of
Locke's
argument.
The titles
of
Locke's Questions indicate

whether
a work of
Question I
through VII
raises ask
there is a
four parts, as follows: law of nature; Questions II
there be, can be known; Questions VIII through X discuss the obligatory force of the natural law, if it exists; while Question XI asks whether "the private Interest of each individual constitutes the
natural
how the
law, if such
Foundation
of
the law of
nature?"
QUESTION I
"Does there
exist a rale of conduct or
law
of nature?
There
does."
The first English translation of Locke's Questions rendered the title of Locke's opening disputation thusly: "Is there a rule of morals, or law of nature,
Locke's Questions
given
on
the
Law of Nature
253
to us?
Yes"
(Essays,
p.
109). This translation

or
points
toward a reply of
this character: God has
"given"
laid down
moral rales
through the natural

under
law for
man's of
guidance,
an answer as
in line
with
the initial translator's
of
standing the Christian
Locke's Questions
natural
having
been
composed within the
framework
"given"
ophers
man
have held that

and
by God,
Still, one must observe that many philos to may exist without having been it leaves the issue open here in the title of Locke, appears,
a
law tradition. law
of nature
the first unit of his

with a statement of
work.
In any case, Question I begins very conventionally,

master plan
the Christian natural law position: Locke's observation that the creator's
one
of
finds
evidence of
in the
workings of
every
aspect
the universe
and
finds its
counterparts
in the
works of
erson,
ates the
many other writers in the great disputation in this conventional manner, he introduces into it. It does
not seem such
Hooker, Culverwel, Sand tradition. Yet, even as Locke initi

somewhat
dis
two
turbing
considerations accepted
to be the case that belief in the

said to
deity
is
by
all men.
Rather,
belief is
be
"granted"
by
classes of
necessary"
name
(1) those who hold "that some rational account of our life is and (2) those who hold "that there exists something deserving the of either virtue or (Questions, fol. 9). Even these criteria, however,
men,
vice"
as well as the postulated criterion of an ordered
universe,
can
be
met without
the
"assumption"
of a
deity.
Locke
erned some
by
suggesting that if everything else in the universe is gov law, then it must be asked whether man alone is left "entirely outside
continues
by
.
Jurisdiction
without
plan,
without
law,
without a rule
for his life
(fol. 10). Locke
submits
that this will not be
"easily"
believed
by
those who
have "given thought

ment of the entire
either to race
god, best
and
greatest,
or to the universal agree
human
.
his
own
conscience
(fol.
in every time and place, or, finally, to himself or 10). Within the first paragraph of the first
natural
Question,
the argument for the existence of

on the postulated existence of
law
appears at
first to have
on
been based
God
and then
to
have been based
two alternative foundations: universal agreement and conscience. Later Locke

will examine
in detail this
alleged
"universal
exists,
agreement of and
the entire human
race"; he finds that
no such agreement
along
will
with
the argument based on
conscience.
ultimately rejects it outright, Careful readers of the Questions
come rather
quickly to
observe
that Locke makes

states a
frequent
and
use
of
this
it he strongly position, thereby an authoritative cast, but then he gradually raises doubts about it, or even flatly contradicts it. For this reason, it is wise for the reader to regard every assertion
technique of writing.
Initially
gives
in the Questions Locke

fied"
as provisional
in character,
rather than as a pronouncement
by
of a
definitive doctrine. identifies "the

various names common
Locke
next
by
which
[the
natural
law] is
signi
(fol. 10). Of the three
definitions
of natural
with
law
provided
by
Locke,
while
the first and the third are
connected
by
him
the Stoic position,

view
the second identifies natural law as right
reason.
In
of
Locke's
embrace of reason as
discursive
reason
only in his later discussion in Question
254
Interpretation
the significance of his observation that
as
reason
V,
we must note of
in
this under
rather
. .
standing "some definite
"natural law
right
reason"
is
not
the discursive
faculty, but
practical principles
from
which
flow the
sources of all virtues
(fol. 11). Locke
relates of
the third definition of natural law supplied
here to the
which
show
nature,"
famous himself
precept
the Stoics:
reference
makes no
immediate
"live according to to God. It is to this law that

which which
a man
demand
"ought to
obedient
tional account
in everything, [and] (fol. 11), of his

duty"
he
perceives as
demanding
a
a ra
is to say that this is
law
which
man cannot transgress
if he is to live
rationally.
strong bows to traditional Stoic and Christian doc trines of natural law, Locke injects into the discussion a thought from a sur prisingly different source. As Professor Von Leyden astutely observed, Locke proceeds to endorse the Hobbesean distinction between natural law and natural
Having
begun
with such
right,
for,
says
something,
tion."3
Locke, "right (jus) consists in the fact that we have a free use of but law (lex) is that which either commands or forbids some ac
as part of a general complaint about of which
Hobbes deploys this distinction
the
natural
law traditions, to the authority

to be
Locke has been
appealing:
lex, right and law: yet because consisteth in liberty to do, or distinguished; RIGHT, they to forbear: whereas LAW, determineth, and bindeth to one of them: so that law, and right, differ as much, as obligation, and liberty, which in one and the
"they
that speak of this subject, use to confound jus, and
ought
inconsistent."
same matter are
at
Natural rights, according to Hobbes, impose no obligations; they leave men Natural law, which does impose obligations, "liberty to do, or to
forbear."
is, according
cludes that
to
Hobbes, derivative from

every
man
natural rights.
Hobbes therefore Yet "as
con
"Naturally
every
.
has
thing."
right
to every
long
as this
everything endureth, there can be no security to (Leviathan, ch. 14). In order to escape the inevitable injury and any man the likelihood of premature death inherent in this condition, men use their rea
natural right of man to son to generate
ought
the
"precept,"
or
the "general
rale of
reason, that every man,

. .
to endeavor peace, as
of this
far
it"
branch
rale, containeth the
is,
of
to
seek
peace, and follow
he has hope of obtaining it. The first and fundamental law of nature; which (ibid.). The derivative character of natural law,
as
.
first,
rights, is a fundamental element formulation. This teaching stands in radical juxtaposition to the traditional, Christian natural law teaching which held that obligations, rather
as opposed to
Hobbes'
the primary character
of natural
than
rights,
are primary. not
any reason for his abrupt introduction right and natural law. Yet his insistence on it suggests that it will subsequently be of some importance. It is not, in any case, the first, nor will it be the last instance in the Questions where Locke inserts passages of undesignated import into his manuscript.
provide
Hobbes'
Locke does
in Question I
of
distinction between
natural
Following
this terminological excursus,
Locke
provides us with
his own,
Locke'
Questions
is
on
the
Law of Nature
255
tentative
definition
of
the law of nature. "It

of
.
a command of
the divine will,
knowable
for
by
the
light
nature,
indicating
down is
what
is
and what
a
is
not consonant
of
with a rational nature reason
(fol. 11). He denies that "it is
dictate
reason;
as
does
not
so much
a
lay
"
and
decree this law
of nature
it
discovers
and
investigates
our
law
which
ordained
by
higher
power and
has
been implanted in
Locke
endorses
hearts
(fol. 12).
will,"
acteristics of must
this definition, for it appears to embody three essential char law: (1) It must be "the declaration of a superior (2) it any "prescribe what is to be done and what is to be and (3) it must
omitted," men"
be
"binding "sufficiently
upon
and must
men"
be
promulgated
in
such a
fashion
as
to
be
known to
(fol. 12). The definition
seems
fashioned, indeed,
of natural
to meet these criteria.
Nonetheless,
law
or and upon
one must reflect
both
upon
his
provisional
definition
these criteria.
They
are as
interesting
for
what
they leave
unsaid,
incompletely
law, for
stated,
one
as
for
what
they
tell us. This provisional definition of
thing, is a purely formal definition. Locke has not yet engaged in any systematic demonstration or proof of the existence or character of the law of nature. Yet in his summary of this Question and in other Ques
natural
tions he
writes as
if he had. The
reader must
be very
cautious
face
value
Locke's reassuring
assertions
that particular
in accepting at doctrines have been es

such
tablished or demonstrated. The Questions abound

one must always pause when confronted
with
statements,
whether
and
by
them to determine
Locke
has in fact
To
eleven
accomplished what
he
claims.
who
return
to our subject, the reader

will
carefully
adds
considers all of
Locke's
cri
Questions
discover that he later

law"
additional,
indispensable,
teria to those laid down in Question I. It seems

of
"the
conditions
necessary to
are
then, that Locke's initial criteria incomplete and therefore somewhat
misleading.
In any event, having laid down these three criteria, Locke now concludes Question I by sketching portions of five arguments that have traditionally been
advanced to establish the existence of natural phasis
law. Given Locke's
prior em
power,"
in this Question
it
on
the source
of
the natural law in a "higher
who ordains pected
and who
has
"implanted"
it in
our
hearts,
one might
have
ex
to find numerous references to the
deity
in these
proofs
for the
existence
of natural
law. This is
"first
not
the case, for only in the third of these proofs does
Locke
artificer."
speak of a
The first
sages
of the five arguments seems to be based essentially on two pas from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. The import of these passages, one natural
gathers, is that
rational animal and
universally valid law which is suited to man as a therefore determines his duty. The quotations from Aris
law is
totle
are
followed
by
a sudden
interjection
of
the
observation
that "some object

. .
to the law of
nature:
claiming that no such law exists

no point
at all
(fol. 15;
these
emphasis supplied).
At
in his Questions does Locke
ever
identify
256
Interpretation
who pose a series of objections throughout
anonymous thinkers
the
text, but
reminds
they
one
appear with some
frequency. Locke's
use of
this
stylistic
device
in
some respects of the of
form
of scholastic
where
disputations,
and
particularly
of
the
writings
Thomas Aquinas,
objections
are raised and responses
made
to them.
One
will
be
rewarded
by
paying
special attention to
the sub
stance of made
these objections, and to the character and adequacy of the responses

particular objection raised at
to them. The
this juncture is unquestionably

with
of considerable
importance to those
concerned
the question of whether

are
there is a
natural
law. The
problem
is this:
although
human beings
rational,
they do not, the argument contends, know the natural law and therefore cannot be guided in their conduct by it. For them, the natural law has not been ade
quately promulgated or made sufficiently known. Locke responds to this objection in an extended but ion. He does
natural not
deny
here
or elsewhere
rather obfuscating fash in the Questions that ignorance of the
law is
widespread.
further
the
by exploring largely "hidden and

sounder
a possible explanation unperceived
For that matter, he takes the argument one step for this ignorance. He suggests that laws
nature"
of
can
"the
perceptive"
and more seldom
part of mankind
be fathomed only by (fol. 17). Even so, the
natural
law is
perceptive."
discovered fully, much less easily, by even the "more In subsequent Questions, Locke emphasizes the unbelievably ar say heroic has
efforts required
duous
wrest
one might
by
even
the wisest of men to those secrets of

33-
from
"nature"
recalcitrant, unsympathetic,
which she
and unkind
the
natural
law
so
effectively hidden (cf. Question II, fols.

a moment with
35).
Contrasting
ral
Locke's formulation here for
the Christian natu
law teaching, one is immediately struck by an important difference between the two. For example, Nathaniel Culverwel, that eloquent proponent of the Christian tradition, spoke of God's eternal law as providing a "fountain of Law,
out of which you sons of
men."4
may see the Law of Nature bubbling and flowing forth to the For Culverwel and other Christian natural law teachers, the law
"imprinted"
of nature was somehow
on
"the
breast"
of
man, or, as he also put
it,
full
man's
search
for the law
of nature was
illuminated
natural
by
"the
candle of
the
Lord."
To be sure, the
advocates of the
Christian
law did
not regard the
manifestations of
that
concerned that
humanity
easy to perceive, but a sympathetic God was find its way. God is always helpful to human beings
as
law
in their
quest
forth here
by
for understanding of the law. This is certainly not the position set Locke; far from it. Whether this is Locke's final position or not, it
is certainly one that disagrees with the established Christian legal tradition to which he initially appealed. We must not allow ourselves to forget that the
"some"
objection of
those
answered.
who contend
that
men
do
not
know the
natural
law
has
not
been
Leaving
this issue
in
suspension
argument adduced
to
establish
for the time, Locke turns to the second the existence of the law of nature, viz., that it
Locke'
Questions
.
on
the
Law of Nature
257
"can be derived from in
men's consciences
(fol. 17). The
argument adduced
support of this proposition
is that,
even
in the
absence of positive
. .
law,
men's
consciences pass
"judgment
on their
very life
and conduct and
(fol. 18). Here
Locke he is
supplies no evidence to support this
assertion,
later in the Questions

says about conscience of
much
less
positive about
the conscience. What
he
in the Questions, moreover, differs in no significant respect from his view as expressed in his famous Essay: conscience "is nothing else, but our Opinion
or
it
own
Judgment
of a
the Moral Rectitude or
Pravity
of our own
Actions.
And if Conscience be Principles: Since

others
avoid."5
Proof
of
Innate Principles,
the same bent of
contraries
may be innate
prosecute what
some
Men,
with
Conscience,
This definition
of conscience
in the
Essay
produced a storm of part
criticism
by
furious Christian
clergymen.
One
such critic
devoted the better
of a chapter
conscience, his
in An Account of Mr. Locke's Religion to Locke's analysis of the chief argument being that, aside from God's Divine Knowl
can pretend
edge, "there is no Knowledge that
to greater and more absolute
Certainty
Locke's
than that of Conscience. And

should
is impossible that Conscience

analysis of conscience
therefore, even according to Mr. Lock it Opinion."6 But the problem in be an

other writings as other
in the Questions (and in his
well) is precisely that he does

"opinion,"
not
demonstrate that it is anything

to the
than
an
and
therefore
recourse
testimony
of conscience
cannot,
this in
serve as a proof of the existence of natural

proper place. argument
law. More
will
does not, and be said about
its
In his third
designed to
establish
the existence of natural
law,
Locke harks back to the very beginning of Question I, where he had recourse to the hypothesis that some divine power may preside over the world, a power
which
"commanded the heavens to turn in their

arguments
revoluti
perpetual
(fol. 9).
Of the five
central
for the
existence of natural
law, it is only in this,

"first
the
one, that he
makes even an
indirect
reference
to what might be taken as

artificer"
a manifestation of
the workings
of a
deity. He
speaks of a
(fol.
18).
Here, too, Locke

which occurs
mentions
Thomas Aquinas
and quotes
him
through a passage taken from Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity:
indirectly "Every
Hooker,
agents,
and
thing
while
however,
in things created, is the matter of eternal is here addressing himself to the law observed by
make eternal
law."7
natural
Locke fails to
the
vital
distinction drawn
the natural law.
Hooker between the
law
and
by According
both Aquinas
to
Thomas,
"the Eternal Law is the shaping idea in divine government. Whatsoever is sub ject to divine government is subject also to the Eternal Law; whatsoever is not
subject to
divine
government
is
not subject
to the Eternal Law. Such a distinc

matters come under
tion applies also in the human

which we are capable of of
scene. not
Those
human
control
doing,
those necessarily bound up with the nature that we have a soul and hands and
things; it is
not
by
human
government
feet"
(Summa, la2ae 93.4). Some things evidently are directly determined by the eternal law, while other things lie within the province of natural law.
258
Interpretation
writes
Thomas
that "intelligent creatures are ranked under divine Providence
the more nobly because
they
take part in Providence
by
their own providing
for
they join in and make their own the Eternal Rea their natural aptitudes for their due activity and have son through which they purpose. Now this sharing in the Eternal Law by intelligent creatures is what
themselves and others. Thus
law'"
we call
'natural
(Summa, la2ae 91.2). This

law
and
critical
distinction between
a rational and
the
functioning
of the eternal
the
natural
law
within
intelligent
creature such as man
is
obscured of
in Locke's Questions through his
oversimplified attribution
to Aquinas
the view that

law."
"everything
which occurs
Locke may be suggesting that in things created, is the matter of eternal natural law and eternal law cannot be properly distinguished within the tradi
tional
nas
had
Christian teaching and that this constitutes one of its grave defects. Aqui attempted to distinguish them in the following way: the eternal law be transgressed, but human participation in it may suffer from negli or other defects and thereby result in transgression of the natural law. In
cannot
gence
Thomas, the natural law can definitely be transgressed, Locke's confounding of eternal and natural law points toward a law that cannot be transgressed, i.e., a law that is not the law of nature Thomas and
short, according to
while
Hooker know (cf. fol. 9). This

which suspicion
finds
confirmation
in Locke's
quotation
from
Hippocrates,
pro great
is
directly
connected with
the quotation
from Aquinas: Hippocrates
nounces, in Hooker's translation, that '"each
thing in both
and each
small and
in
fulfilleth the
parts
task which
set
destiny
to be
was
hath
down,'
set
from the law

quotation
down for it
breadth"
not as much as a nail's
individual thing de (fol. 18).
This
is
also
found in precisely
source.
this
form in Hooker (Laws, I,

the passage rational,
3,
sec.
1),
who
is located
agents.
within
probably his discussion
Locke's
In
Hooker, however,
of the
law
observed
by
law
natural,
used
not
Again,
law that
this points to the possibility that Locke

cannot
it to is
suggest a
natural
be transgressed, i.e.,
after
nature"
a natural
which
not a moral
law. As Locke
action
which
says
suits
shortly his
the quotation, man "has a

one sense at
prescribed mode of
(fol. 18). In
least human beings

wittingly be functions as
"arguments"
could
be
said
to be subject to a form of natural law
which cannot
transgressed as
in, for
example,
of
such
breathing.
one
Bodily functions
of the
this sort may
purely be understood
the only
reflexive
bodily
as manifestations of
form
working
of natural
law,
form Locke's
here unambiguously natural law, then his

and would
But if this is what Locke intends to convey by law is radically different from that of the tradition. In the fourth demonstration, Locke suggests that social life would collapse
support. natural
be impossible
would
without natural
law. Without the

their subjects
restraints of natural
upon
law,
rulers
become ruthless,
absolute
tyrants, chiefly intent

no
de
stroying their
ments would
subjects.
Further, among
contracts or agree
by
an
be kept, "for there would be no reason to expect a man to abide agreement, because he had made a promise, when a more advantageous
Locke'
Questions
on
the
Law of Nature
259
arrangement offered
came
from
nature and not
itself elsewhere, unless the obligation to fulfill from the will of (fol. 20).
men"
promises
To determine the force knowledgement that
of
this argument,
we must
first
recall
Locke's
ac
natural
law is hidden from
men and
therefore
is,
at
best,
known to very few. Secondly, we must ask whether, because of this general ignorance of the law of nature, most peoples and most countries are in fact
generally
crashed under
the rule of unbearable tyrants. Observation
of
the exist
ing
situation of most peoples
in
most countries
hardly
reveals such
insufferable
conditions, although at various times this may be the situation in some coun
tries,
that
as
is
evidenced
seldom seek are
revolutionary uprisings. Even so, these revolutions their justification in terms of natural law, nor do the new regimes
by
brought into
being
rest on
the sound foundations of

either
natural
law
Likewise, it does
unable
wonder natural
not seem
that most people are

of
utterly unwilling
or
to
keep
contracts, despite their ignorance

there may be available
provide at
the natural law.

other
One
must
then
whether
foundations,
than that of
law,
which
may
least minimally tolerable

sufficient grounds
societies and rea
sonably stable states as well as generally tracts. The possibility comes to mind that utility may very
and the
well provide a of contracts
for
keeping
con
agreements or
based
on calculations of
political order
feasible basis
foundation for
keeping
a notion which could
hardly
have been
unfamil
iar to John Locke. These Locke's law.
considerations
overstated suggestions
may provide a sufficient response to in his fourth proposition in support of the exist
the claim "that the law
ence of natural
The fifth
of nature
and
final demonstration depends
on
without
there would
be
no virtue or
vice,
no praise
for probity
or punishment
for wickedness;
where
there is no
law, [there
to the
would
be]
.
no
"
wrong, no guilt.
Everything
is forced to
would
have to be
referred
will of men
(fol. 20). Yet based
one
wonder: could not men who
have formed
societies
on cove restrain says
nants or contracts also enact men
from
vice and to punish
laws providing the guilty? The

would
punishment
designed to
argument goes
further, for,
Locke, "it
interest
seems that a man
have to do nothing
"
except what either

not possible
or pleasure urged upon
him
(fol. 20). Still, is it
for
human beings to in this life
achieve some guidance and even quite a workable orientation
acting in terms of their interests, especially long-term interests, or in terms of hedonistic calculations? Locke at least points to the possibility of these alternatives. An orientation based on interest (utilitas) is considered in
by
Question XI, while in his later writings he moved boldly in developing the foundations for an understanding of virtue and vice grounded on hedonism. In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he found the source of this he donistic morality in "the infinite Wise Author of our being, pleased to join to several Thoughts, and several Sensations,
. . .
[who] has been

a perception
of
Delight.
...
It has therefore
to the Ideas
pleased our
Wise Creator, to from them,
annex
to
several
Objects,
and
which we receive
as also to several of our
260
Interpretation
.
Thoughts, a concomitant pleasure Essay, Locke added that "Pain has

that Pleasure
the same
has"
(IIvii3). In the
following
to
section of
the
the same efficacy

wisdom
and use
set us on
work,
and
and
he
adds
in his feel
that "Pain is
us.
often produced
by
Objects
Ideas,
that produce
pain
Pleasure in
This their
near
Con
junction,
pleasure,
which makes us often
in the
sensations where we expected
gives us new occasion of
Maker, do;
who
designing
to
admiring the Wisdom and Goodness of our the preservation of our Being, has annexed Pain to the
our
application of
many things to
and
Bodies,
to
warn us of
the harm that
they
will
and as advices scattered
withdraw
from
them"
hath
up
down
several
things that environ and affect us;
Finally, he adds that "God degrees of Pleasure and Pain, in all the (IIvii5). It is clear then that both in the
Locke demolishes the law. Locke
"
(IIvii4).
Questions
and
in his
subsequent writings
premises of
this
final demonstration for the

cussion
with
existence of natural
concludes
this dis
the assertion that "whatever virtue or turpitude the virtues and
vices possess
they
all
owe entire to this
law
of nature
(fols. 20-21). He does

the law of nature
nothing to In summary,
establish
this
assertion. arguments
five
designed to
establish
have
been found, on Lockean grounds, to be insufficient and problematic. Neverthe less Locke will, from this point on and throughout the Questions, boldly assure
us
that the existence of
natural
law has been
established.
We
cannot emphasize
too strongly that this has simply not been traditional understandings of the law
of
done,
at
least
with respect
to the
of nature as a moral mind a rather
law. There remains, different law

understand
course, the possibility that Locke has in

of natural
ing
tion
law; underlining
of
that possibility is his as yet unexplained interjec
into the discussion
Hobbes'
distinction between
natural
and natural
right (jus naturale), but he has not furnished the reader with any further mate rial for speculation on this matter in Question I. It is fair to conclude that in this opening Question he has raised a sizable number of thorny and fascinating issues for our consideration, while having decisively settled nothing at all. Among the major issues Locke raises in Question I, and on which we must
focus
our attention
throughout
our
reading
of
the
Questions,
are the
following:
( 1 ) Does (2) Is the

natural
the natural
natural
law
a
presuppose the existence of

which
God in
a theistic sense?
or
law
law
human beings
can
transgress,
does it have
the character of eternal law in relationship to nonvolitional entities?
(3) Is
the
law
accessible to
mankind, and, if so, how can it come to be
known?8
QUESTION II
"Is the Law
of
Nature knowable
with
by
the
light
of
Nature? It
is
is."
Locke begins Question II

able
assertion
the unproved
and, in principle,
recognized
unprov all
that
"some
principle of virtue and vice
men"
(fol. 22). He incorporates it into the
among
question posed
by
the title through
Locke'
Questions
on
the
Law of Nature
261
observing that "we (fol.
must next
inquire
by
what means
that law of nature, to

them"
which men offer obedience with such unanimous
consent, is known to
we
22),
one of
the
major
issues
posed
in Question I. As
have
seen al
ready, he has not in fact proved that there is a law of nature, and as we will see later he will subsequently contradict flatly the sweeping assertion that mankind obeys such a law with "unanimous
consent."
After
ness at
more reassuring and elevating rhetoric, Locke gets down to the busi hand in the second paragraph of Question II. He observes that "there are
knowledge"
three
and
means of
of
the law of nature:

considers each
(c)
sense perception.
Before he
and
(a) inscription, (b) tradition, briefly, Locke again specifi

as a source of
cally
edge.
excludes
"supernatural
suggests
divine
[Revelation]"
knowl
things,"
He tacitly
progress"
"certainly
made great
something more by telling us that human beings have in understanding "the entire nature of "the divine
spirit"
even when not
informed
by
and when revelation
lacking
[this]
"a light
come
down from the human

enters
heavens,"
i.e., divine
(fol. 23-24). Nor has this

world,"
inquiry
been "circumscribed
within
the limits of
for "it
heaven itself in its
contemplation and
has
with
spirits and
minds, their nature, their actions,

of
by
what
fair accuracy inquired of laws they are (fol.

bound"
24). The boldness

efforts
Locke's
claim
is breathtaking: human beings

the laws that govern
have
penetrated
heaven
and explored
by their own heavenly be

God's
Locke says,
there other
ings,
even as
he explicitly
rejects
grace to
man,
as a source of
here divine Revelation, knowledge. "All this

modes of
these."
the gift of
knowledge,"
"reaches the
mind
by
one of
these three
knowing. Nor
(fol. 24).
are
principles and
foundations
rejects
of
knowing
except
Locke quickly
inscription
as a source of
knowledge
of
the natural
law,
his
a topic to which
he he
will return at on
length in Question IV. He

of
concentrates
attention
in Question II
which
the central
the three potential means to knowl
edge, tradition,
rejects as a source of valid
knowledge
source of
of the natural
and
law. Tradition
rests are a
can afford no more than a on
derivative
opinion,
it
ultimately
faith,
not on
knowledge.
Furthermore,
he
reminds
us, there
variety of traditions, each of which is subject to interpretation. With inscription and tradition rejected, there remains only as a pri source of knowledge. "I that the foundation of all our knowledge mary say is derived from those things we perceive by our senses. Beginning from these,
"sense"
. .
our
reason,
or
faculty
of
for making arguments,
which
is
proper
to man, proceeds
to the creator
these things
by
arguments
ter, motion,
is
"reason,"
and visible our
frame
of
this world, and its economy

which
necessarily springing from the mat (fol. 32). It

. .
"faculty
for making
some
arguments,"
may lead
us
to discover
the law of
and will
nature.
This argument,
again
as we shall
see, is
amplified
in Question V
be discussed there in
detail.
to the device observed in Question
At this point, Locke

viz.,
has
recourse
I,
an unidentified objector enters
the disputation to draw to an adherent

of
attention to a prob
lem
which would
have been
manifest
the Christian natural law
262
Interpretation
does it
about,"
tradition. "How
nature were
come
of
asks this or
objector, that "if the
law
of
known
by
the light
are
nature,"
reason,
which all men are said
to
possess, that "so many

of this
blind?"
Why
do "most
opinions
mortals
have
no
knowledge
law,
and
nearly
all
have different
it?"
concerning
to
(fol. 33).
As
pointed out
above, Locke here

where
flatly
contradicts
the opening sentence of

which men offer
this very
Question,
obey
a
he
spoke of
"that law
of nature as no
consent,"
obedience with such unanimous
inasmuch have
they
could
hardly
con
sent to and
law
of which
"most
knowledge."
mortals
Towards
of
the end of Question II he grants that "this objection [of

the natural that the
all
widespread
ignorance
law]
would
have
a certain
inherent force
hearts"
of
law
of nature
is inscribed in
our
(fol. 33).
itself, asserting However, he replies,

were we
he is contending here is that what human beings have is simply a capacity for reason, and it is through reason that, in principle, they may discover the law
of nature.
Locke
ever.
immediately
not
adds a qualification of
transcendent
importance, how
make right use of
Even though "our intellectual faculties

yet
can
lead
us
to a knowledge of this
law,
these
it does
follow from this that

man
all men
necessarily
faculties"
(fol. 34). Not every

and
turns out to be a good

even
"Geometer,
or
has
knack for
Arithmetic,"
mastery
of
though "the nature and prop
erties of
figures
and numbers seem or through
obvious,
and
doubtless knowable from the

(fol. 34).
light
nature,"
of
the
exercise of reason
Locke's
raised,
rejoinder
does
rather
not meet
the thrust of the objection that has been

move
however, but
are at
begins to It
the discussion in another direction.
There
least two
vital and
cal and the moral spheres.
would
compelling differences between the mathemati hardly be a matter of great concern if the
to remain
greater part of mankind were
totally ignorant
of
the "nature and

and practiced
property
of
figures
numbers."
and
These
skills
may be developed
by
relatively
small number of mathematicians whose
findings
as
can then
be
applied
by
others to the practical needs of society.
But,
Locke has
empha
firm grasp of the principles of natural law is requisite if each and every human being is to lead a moral life. A society would be in a bad way indeed if a sizable number of its inhabitants were to have no understanding of moral
sized,
a
principles,
while
those
who
make errors
in
arithmetic can
hardly
be
said
to
threaten the fabric of
society.
In answering the objector, Locke has subtly shifted from the laws of moral ity to the laws of numbers, a shift fraught with implications for the question of
the
relation
between Locke's
natural
natural
law
and
that of the tradition. The tradi

so created man act
tional, Christian
tion to
law doctrine holds that God had

natural
that a
multitude of powerful
forces, including his

"Introduction,"
inclinations,
and to
in
conjunc
bring
him to
an awareness of
dience to it (Horwitz, the objector, Locke has

point
moved a
facilitate his obe 13-16). To judge from his answer to considerable distance from this doctrine, a
pp.
the natural
law
that is brought home throughout the remainder of this
Question. In
Locke'
Questions
not
on
the
Law of Nature
263
to
Locke's view, the creator, or nature, has discover natural law. On the contrary, "for
things,"
made
it easy for
mankind
a man
to penetrate into the hidden

meditation of
nature of
these
there is need for the "concentrated
the
mind"
(fol. 34). To
riches of
which
make
his
point
clear, Locke
makes use of a
striking
who
anal
ogy.
The
the natural law are compared to
"good,
and
rich veins of gold
silver,"
and
"lie hidden in the bowels

to facilitate their
earth."
of the
Those
seek
these treasures of gold and silver must use their "arms

and must
excavate
hands
labor"
reason,"
and
invent
this
"engines"
mining.
"Great
is
required
to
treasure,
and
"the idle
indolent"
and
will never succeed even most of
in their
quest
and
ever
or necessarily will many intelligent searchers for treasure. There is

neither
but
the
industrious
anyone will
no guarantee
that
discover these deep, hidden What is less
veins of gold and silver.
Few
will ever muster
the energy and resources to engage in the search for the

yet will succeed. obvious
natural
law,
and
fewer
is Locke's
suggestion that most people
will remain unaware even of
the necessity for the quest, since,

guided not as much
by
and
large,
human beings,
wherever
they live, "are
by
reason as
by
either the example of others or
the practices of their country and the custom of
the place [where
Locke throughout
as
(fol. 35). This suggestion will be amplified by they the Questions, and its consequences are enormous, relating,
of promulgation
live]"
they do,
to the issue
of
the natural law. If a law is not
properly promulgated, then it has no force of obligation. If men cannot be expected to follow it, then it is nonexistent for practical purposes. Through
these tacit suggestions, Locke
raises
profoundly
disturbing
questions about
the
possibility of discovering natural law, as understood in the Christian tradition. In the two Questions which follow, Locke takes up and amplifies the con cerns with which he concludes Question II. To these Questions we must now
turn.
QUESTION in
"Does the Law This issue

course of
of
Nature become known to

to
us
by
Tradition? It does,
not."
appears
his discussion
that "there are

ness
have been raised, and answered, by Locke in the Question II. We may recall his observation there three means of knowledge which, without excessive scrupulous
of
sense"
in my choice of terms, I 23). Locke discusses

while
tion."
might call:
inscription, tradition,
"sense"
and
(fol.
"inscription"
in Question IV
and
in Question V,
of
Question III is, to Yet two curiosities
all appearances, reserved

confront us.
for
discussion
"tradi
tion III is limited to
one word.
First, his treatment of tradition in Ques One wonders why he failed to explicate this
the Question specifically reserved for it. Secondly, and quite does discuss this issue at considerable length in the preceding he surprisingly, context of broader concerns. the within but Question,
important issue in
264
Interpretation
one makes the quite simplistic,
assumption
Unless
and,
one might and
say,
rather conde
scending
other
that Locke was simply careless,
that this
and
Question is
each of
superfluous,
one must
try
of
to figure out his intention
in this
in
the
"Negatur."
two Questions answered
by
the one word,

relation
Professor Von
Leyden, in his study

natural
Locke's Questions in
to traditional
Christian
tradition
law
of
with law writings, made some helpful observations. in his Discourse of the Light of Nature [and] he, too, denied that the nature is discovered by tradition. Behind this discussion of tradition in
"Culverwel dealt
connection with natural

endeavoured
to secure
law lies the long-lived controversy with papists who for tradition an equal authority with the written word of His
p. unwritten word
God
by
accepting it
as part of
(cf. Hooker's Laws of Eccle
siastical
Polity
.).
(Essays,
134,
n.
1).
of tradition
Nathaniel Culverwel investigates the issue
in Chapter VIII
"Not
of
his in
Discourse
tion,"
by asking "How the Law of Nature is says he, but rather by reason. Thus far, Culverwel
Culverwel finds that "God
discovered?"
by
Tradi
are
and
Locke
agreement.
having
contrived such an admirable and

Creature"
harmonious law for the guiding and governing of His has in addition "set up an Intellectual Lamp in the soul,
can read this nomos graphos
man, that he
which
by
the light of
it
[written
law],
and can
follow the
commands of
its
Creator (Discourse, p. 60). According to Culverwel, no particular nation is denied access to an understanding of the natural law, an
people or argument con
initially
directed
against those
Jewish
spokesmen
who,
as
he asserts, have
and
tended "that the
light
of
Nature
shines
only
way
upon of
themselves originally and
principally,
upon them:
and upon
the Gentiles only
by
Participation
dependence
They
all must
light their
candles at
the Jewish
Lamp"
(pp: 60-61).
While consistently denying that the Jews alone receive this light, "which doubt less is planted by Nature in the heart both of Jew and Gentile, and shines upon both
with an equal and
impartial
beam,"
Culverwel does
Natural
suggest
that
it
&
must not
be denied, that the Jewes had
even those
notions much clarified sin
(sic)
them
more
refin'd
.
from
those clouds and mists which
Original
of
had brought
upon
by
means of that pure and powerful upon
beam
heavenly
tmth which shined

. .
upon the them; those Lawes which Nature had engraven tables of their hearts, [which] sin like a moth had eaten and defaced (as in all other men it had done) but in them those fugitive letters were call'd home again, and those
peculiarly
Copy
many Lacunae (of Gods
were supplyed and made good again own
by comparing
it
with and
that
other
writing too)
the stock
which
Moses
received
in the Mount;
besides,
they had
graffed
a great number of revealed upon
indeed
discovered to them, which were of Nature, but would never have grown out of it
truths
en-
(P.
61)
asserts that
Nature is, in principle, discoverable by all men through the use of reason. At the same time God has promulgated the law of nature directly, as when Moses received and transmitted it at Sinai. The
importance
of such
Culverwel
the law of
instances
of
Divine Revelation is brought home in the
fol-
Locke'
Questions
on
the
Law of Nature
which
265
prof
lowing chapter of Culverwel's work, "The Light of itably be compared with Locke's arguments in Question
Nature."
Reason,"
may
of
Culverwel
contends
that,
while
"the
strength and nerves and
II regarding the "light bind
ing
virtue of this of
Law
are rooted and
equity
the
the commands
and
themselves,
fasten'd partly in the excellency and they principally depend upon the
Sovereignty
tion of its
welfare of
being"
directly,
as at
of God himself; thus contriving and commanding his Creature, and advancing a Rational Nature to the just perfec (p. 65). In short, although God may reveal the law of nature Sinai, it may in principle be known through human reason, but
Authority
man's obligation
to obey
stems
from the legitimate authority
exercised
by God,
his Creator,
over
him.
materials
regarding tradition in the first book of Richard Hooker's Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. Hooker asks whether we should "seek for any revealed law of God otherwhere than only in the sacred
We
also
find important
Scripture;
do to his
is
No"
whether we
do
now
stand of
bound in the
sight of
God to
yield
to
traditions urged
written
by
the Church
Rome the
same obedience and reverence we

as
law, honouring equally and adoring both (1.13. sec. 2). Furthermore, adds Hooker,
when
divine:
our answer
What hazard the truth is in

maimed and of
it
passeth through
. . .
the hands of report, how
deformed it becometh
How
miserable
had the
we
state of the
Church his
God been
long
ere
this, if wanting the
sacred
Scripture
had
no record of
laws, but only

his
the memory of man receiving the same
by
report and relation
from
predecessors?
By
world
.
Scripture it hath in the

.
wisdom of
God
seemed meet to
deliver
unto the
many
deep
and profound points of
ground whereupon the precepts of
doctrine, as being the main original duty depend; many prophecies, the clear
in belief
of
performance whereof might confirm the world

as the providence of
things unseen
such
God from time to time hath taken to have the

(1. 13. sees. 2-3).
several
books
of
his
holy
ordinance written.
While castigating tradition in good Protestant form as an unreliable vehicle for transmission of the natural law, Hooker even more strongly than Culver wel emphasizes "sacred as an indispensable Revelation of that
Scripture"
law, "those writings which contain in them the Law of God, all those venerable that are books of Scripture, all those sacred tomes and volumes of Holy "with such absolute perfection framed, that in them there neither wanteth any
Writ"
thing
the lack whereof

can
might
deprive
us of
life
(1. 13. sec. 3).
There
be
no proper what
Scripture,"
between
distinction made, it seems, between "Nature and man can discover through the use of reason and the
indispensable
and not
we
guidance and
that God grants through
contends, "Nature
Scripture do
serve
in
such
Revelation, because, as Hooker full sort, that they both jointly
severally either of them be so complete, that unto everlasting felicity need not the knowledge of any thing more than these two may easily furnish
266
Interpretation
sides; and therefore
our minds with on all

supernatural
they
which add
traditions,
as a part of
Hooker's
necessary truth, have not the truth, but are in and Culverwel's arguments that "Nature and
mankind
error"
(1. 14. sec. 5).
Scripture,"
acting
together, serve to lead moral duties may be taken

these issues
when
toward the requisite understanding of their
representing the Protestant natural law position on Locke penned his Questions. Like Culverwel and Hooker,
as
Locke
again,
flatly
rejects
tradition in stating
his
position
in Question III,
but,
once
we must ask
why he
chose
to deal
with
it
at some
length in Question II.
There, he
traditions
emphasized
the great variety and contradictory character of "men's
opinions,"
from
which
they derive
lead
the innumerable and
flatly
which serve
to
most people
in
most places most of
the time.
contradictory The
"traditions"
to which Locke is
simply.
traditions or religion
here referring seem to be, primarily, religious He asks, for example, "why a more submissive
another
. . .
faith
should
be
given
to [the claims of] one man rather than to

some
of
unless reason can

selves"
way distinguishing [emphasis supplied] (fol. 29). Or, again, "if the law of nature could be learned from tradition, this would be a matter of faith rather than knowledge
. .
discover
between traditions them
(fol. 30).
to its
Or, beginning,
still
again,
even
if
one were
to trace the origin of a tradition back
the "first author of this tradition will

some
have
made
it known to
the world, instructed

law"
[and] inspired by the spirit of god by (fol. 31). But such a Revelation would "by no means [be] a law of nature, but (fol. 31). What, then, is the status "of God's own writing positive
oracle,
which
Moses
received
in the
Mount,"
as spoken of
by
Culverwel? While Locke
might answer
that this
was an example of
divine
positive
law,
this would sim

and
bring us back cious "thinkeing

ply
of
to the
of
thorny
problem raised
by
those
discerning
tena
men"
Locke's heresies
the
lay
in his
Oxford who, through James Tyrell, objected that one having permitted a fatal separation to take place
the "Divine
p.
Law,"
between
ture (cf.
law
of nature and
as revealed refused
in Sacred
Scrip
Horwitz,
with
"Introduction,"
5). Locke
then,
as
always, to deal
seriously
tion in
sue of
ral
this charge, and nowhere in these Questions does he discuss

reason
them. Perhaps the
for this is
visible
in Locke's
manner of
treating
tradi
redefines the is Questions II and III: he carefully and subversively tradition, as it had been understood and dealt with in the Christian natu law teaching. Thinkers such as Hooker and Culverwel, among others,
firmly
Locke
insisted that "tradition

wrenches them apart. assent
Revelation"
and
had to be
considered together. one
By answering
Question III in
word, he gives
and part
his terse in
to
half
of
the argument made
by
thinkers
like Hooker
the
Culverwel,
which moral
he silently drops the other half of their insist on the they indispensability of "sacred
even as
argument
Scripture"
for
man's
guidance.9
Locke
appear to
rejects
this central
feature
of
the received
tradition, but he does

to the question of
not
have been
contrary.
anxious to give
his Questions
an untraditional appearance. whether
Quite the
By simply answering
"Negatur"
Locke'
Questions
to us
on
the
Law of Nature
Locke
appears
267
to rest
"the Law
of
Nature becomes known
by
Tradition,"
comfortably and securely in the sacrosanct camps of such orthodox divines as Hooker and Culverwel. Indeed, Question III appears to be so very traditional
that it could easily be
ingless.10
ignored,
or even excised and
discarded
by
some as mean reveals

word
Reflection
on
Locke's
one-word answer to
not
Question III thus
an artfulness answers
behind his brevity. It is difficult

and
to suspect that the
one-
to Questions VI
to
major
IX may
of
also conceal views which
may
prove
to be
as antithetical
answers
tenets
the Christian natural law tradition as are his
to Question II and III when considered together.
QUESTION IV
"Is the Law
of
Nature Inscribed in the Minds
of
Men? It is
not."
Having
dition
means
demonstrated in Question II, be the

source of natural
and reiterated
in Question III, that tra

of
cannot
law, Locke
explores a major alternative
to
knowledge in Question IV. Near the

the most
beginning
the Question is a
of
passage which prefigures one of
famous formulations
more
Locke's Es
say, viz., whether or not "the minds of men at birth are

capable of
. .
than clean slates
(fol. 38; cf. Essay Con receiving any impression whatsoever Human IIi2). In of one of those who held Understanding, cerning speaking otherwise, and who had labored mightily to establish his position, Locke writes
in MS. A. "laborat
Descartes'
Car[t]esius"
acutissimus
(fol. 38). In MS. B. he has

multi."
stricken
references are
These changing name, writing instead "laborarunt most interesting, in part because through this initial praise of
readers with one of of whom
Descartes,
Locke furnishes his

with
his
earliest
wrote:
indications
"I
of
his
familiarity
that great
thinker,
he
also
must always
acknowledge to that
justly
admired gentleman
the great obligation of my first
deliverance from the

the
Schools."
talking of the philosophy in use in Descartes, too, according to Locke, who first "gave him a "" relish of philosophical studies Nonetheless, despite his admiration and gratitude, Locke dropped from the Questions (after MS. A.) any reference to
unintelligible
way
of
It
was
Descartes Locke's
by
name.
Should this be
understood
as
yet
another
example
of
characteristic caution or
prudence?12
Some
support
for
such a supposi so
tion may be found in the fact that the

controversial
writings
of
Descartes had become

of
in the
seventeenth
century that the
teaching
his philosophy
was
forbidden in
France.13
Question IV, Locke again asserts that he has "proved (fol. 37). But I must reiterate once above that there exists a law of nature the sort. The substantive discussion in of yet done Locke has as again, nothing Question IV centers on the issue of "whether there exist some practical proposi At the opening
of
"
tions innate to the
mind
and, as it were,
natural to the soul and as
integral to it
as
it, so that they are as its very faculties, the will and intelgraven upon
268
Interpretation
that
lect,
is,
and whether
they become known
to us
without
(fol. 37). At soning, immutable and forever between distinction his does Locke discuss
sitions,
as
obvious"
no point
and
any effort or rea in the Questions

propo
are
"speculative"
"practical"
he
was
to do later in his Essay; however the former
frequently
Essay
illustrated in his
as
writings
by
reference
to such
familiar,
be,
"logical"
propositions
"that it is impossible for the

Human
same
thing
to
and not
to
be"
(e.g.
Concerning
Understanding
the example
Iii23). As
of
an
illustration
of a practical prin
ciple, Locke Justice This is I

and a
gives us
keeping
of
Contracts, [which] is
is thought to do this
of
that
which most
Men
seem to agree of
in.
.
Principle,
which
extend
it
self to
the Dens
Thieves.
without
grant that outlaws themselves as the
one amongst another:
but 'tis
receiving these
innate Laws
Nature.
They
practise them as
Rules
of
convenience within their own
Communities: But it is impossible to conceive, that
he imbraces Justice
as a practical
Principle,
who acts or
fairly
with
his Fellow
meets
Highwaymen, and with. (Ibid, Iiii2)
at the same time
plunders,
kills the
next
honest Man he
The immediate issue is
whether such practical propositions or principles are
stamped on the minds of men at
birth. Locke first

of
adduces
five
arguments
designed
(fol. 38).
to prove that that the
they
are not. at
He
denies,
are
all, that
anyone
"has
yet proved
minds with
of men
birth
more
than clean slates
Consistent hold the law

of
most
this, he finds, secondly, that human beings in various places bizarre and contradictory opinions: "Some recognize a different
all recognize
nature, others none,

of
that it is
obscure"
(fol. 38).
of a
The flow hearts
the argument
is suddenly broken
so
by
the
interjection
hypo
thetical objection to this second point.

of mankind are no
longer
Granted, runs inscribed, might not

of
the objection, that the the obvious
diversity
response
of
opinion
have
stemmed
from "the fall

"the fall
the first
man?"14
Locke's
to
this objection is threefold and is revealing on all

narrow the notion that explanation
man.
of
counts.
He
rejects
as too
the
first
man"
could provide a reasonable
for the
alleged eradication of
the natural law from the hearts of
After all,
fall"
comments
Locke, "this
have
goes on
argument
is completely
unknown
to the
man
greatest part of mankind who

or
never once given a
thought to the first

as
to his
(fol. 39). Locke
to argue "in the
alternative,"
lawyers
say: even
if theists do
offer such
explanations,
they lie beyond

this kind
the scope of the

pertains
Questions. Locke
Philosophers"
firmly
insists that "a
response of
hardly
to
(fol. 39).
Continuing
to argue "in the
alternative,"
Locke
adds no
that even
avail.
if
one were to entertain an explanation of this
sort, it
would
be to
The
excursus precipitated
and valuable
by
the
injection
of the
"objector's"
arguments
is
interesting help open the

The carefully
in itself, but it is
also perhaps
intended
by
Locke to
way for
consideration of the more
important
point which
follows.
us
restrained and undeveloped comments of the excursus
direct
to
Locke'
Questions
on
the Law of Nature
269
which
emerges as
considerably clearer aspect of the Christian natural law teaching Locke's major concern in the remainder of this Question.
Having
arguments
responded to the
"objector,"
Locke
moves on
to the third of the five
directed
with
against
the
.
notion
. .
that "there exist some practical proposi
tions born
the
mind and
graven
in
it."
He devotes
more
than four
men's
folios to the third

barbarian
or central
issue: "If this law
of nature were
inscribed in
minds, how does it

nations with
who
come about
that the very young, the uneducated, and those

[others]?"
madmen"
they, along
the people
either
know this law better than any After all, the "fools and mentioned in his fourth argument, are least "receive from elsewhere derivative opinions which can
...
do
not
pervert,
or
obliterate,
or
destroy
the dictates of nature. For than
they have
no
nature"
tutors
other than
themselves and
no guide other
(fols. 40-41).
Yet,
ples,
when we read the accounts of primitive or simple and uninstracted peo says
Locke,
we oftentimes
. . .
find "how "to their
alien are
they
to any [sense of]

of
humanity! Nowhere is there
cruelty."
such monstrous
gods"
Many
(fol. 41).
them make
bloody
human
and animal sacrifices
There
tions,"
are those who
may
argue with some of
the details of Locke's
descrip
tion, both here and elsewhere, of the beliefs and practices of "uneducated na but these details have no bearing on the thrust of the argument. The
dominant Christian
concern of natural
this Question is Locke's characterization of the

as
traditional,
law which,
he
presents
moral
it here, is
principles,
represented as
holding
to
that practical principles of conduct, or
should
be
most clear
the very young, the uneducated,

and
barbarians,
on
rude and simple
peoples,
fools,
madmen, because
"graven"
they
are
their hearts and least obscured
by
education or other
"inscription,"
forms
of opinion or tradition.
In
view of
Locke's discussion
this part of
pre
of
and the
implications
of
the excursus that
preceded
the argument, I would

a caricature of
tentatively
of
suggest
that Locke is here
deliberately
senting because Locke's mastery

plexities can
the traditional
law doctrine. I say deliberately that tradition in its rich detail, its variety and com
natural
hardly
be
questioned.
He
comprehended
far better than
most of us
that
neither
Aquinas
nor
Hooker,
born
nor, for that matter, the innumerable inter

either
preters of
the Christian
men
natural
law in
with
its Catholic
or
Protestant formula
tions, held that

"engraved" "implanted"
are
the detailed precepts of the moral code
on their
hearts. It is
not a at
detailed
code of natural
law
precepts
that
are
in human beings in His

own
birth, but
rather, according to
Aquinas,
God
shaped man
and make their own

aptitudes
image and, as intelligent creatures, men "join in the Eternal Reason through which they have their natural
purpose.
Law
by
intelligent
man's
for their due activity and creatures is what

nature, his
natural
we call
'natural
Now this sharing in the Eternal (Summa la2ae, 91,

law'"
2). It is
inclinations,
and
which
direct him toward

that
virtue.
There is
the
a radical
difference between the

inclinations
the
"engraved"
contention suggestion
by
nature man pos
sesses certain natural

natural
that the prescriptions of

as specific and
"inscribed"
law
are somehow
or
detailed
270
Interpretation
on
men's
commandments rather
hearts.
Surely
the latter notion,
if taken
literally
is simply ludicrous, as Locke wryly demonstrates. But Locke's real purpose here runs far deeper than merely making light of the traditional natural law teaching. Indeed, his underlying purpose appears to be to
than metaphorically,
point
toward the enormously important issue the "law of nature can
which
he
boldly
poses
in Question
VI,
whether
be known from
of
man's
natural
inclina
tions"
perhaps the most
fundamental tenet
the Christian natural law.
QUESTION V
"Can Reason
ence?
arrive at
knowledge
of
the law of nature through sense experi
It
can."
Question V
comes as
something
of a relief to the reader
for here,
at
last,
Locke
law in
on
of
suggests
the method
by
which we
nature,
whereas
in the
other
may come to know something of the Questions of this section, he discusses ways
views of us seek
which
the natural law

natural
cannot
be known. Before considering Locke's

to
gain an overview of nature
how
law
can
be known, let
used, but
not
his
argument.
He begins
with
the suggestion that the law
is knowable
by
of
the "light of
now
nature,"
a term
adequately defined,
lead to
an
earlier.
He turns
to a discussion of how the
light
of nature can
understanding
the law of nature. It is in this context that he

uent elements of
discusses in detail the two
constit
the light of nature: sense and reason.

with
Question V
proved,
opens
the reiteration of Locke's

proved above
familiar, but
still
un
assertions:
"we have
that the law of nature is knowable
by
the light of
nature"
(fol. 47).
Indeed,
this assertion could not be valid, since
Locke has
not yet established what the
law
of nature
is,
much
less
what
the
light
tions
of nature
is. All he has done thus far is to be

met
enumerate some of
the condi
which must
for the
natural
law to be knowable
by by
the light of
nature, nothing
more.
He
now goes on
of
to assert the importance of understand

we are guided
ing
and
discovering
be
the
light
nature, for only if
the light of
nature will we
able
to escape, says
he,
the lure of vices on the one

gain
.
hand,
and,
on
the other, the pitfalls of error, and

gods
thereby
that great happiness "to

.
which
both the
beckon [us]
and our nature plural
tends
(fol. 47). Locke's

given
reference
here to deities in the full
tirade against polytheism. No less thought provoking

mankind
is arresting, especially is his tacit happiness
his later
that
suggestion
may
achieve
perfection and
by following
claim
the "light of
nature,"
without general
any
reference
whatsoever to guidance
from Scripture. The

that there
bearing
of
this suggestion
is
reinforced
by
his
is "noth
ing
that can be called the light of nature except reason and
sense"
(fol.
48)
and
that, further, there is "nothing so obscure, so hidden, so remote from all ble sense experience, that the mind, in its infinite capacity and with the
these
possi
aid of
faculties,
cannot reach
by
thought
reasoning"
and
(fol. 48). Unassisted
Locke'
Questions
on the
Law of Nature
of
271
human faculties
things,"
are sufficient to produce
understanding
"the
entire nature of
as we were
informed has
earlier
(fol. 24;
of
emphasis supplied).
The
unaided
human 24). It is
reader
mind can
transcend the sphere

and
with
the natural, and
by
its
own powers
it
"enters heaven itself
fair accuracy inquired
of spirits
(fol.
that Locke here explicate his understanding of reason, for the may recall that in Question I, in discussing "the various names by
essential
which"
the law of nature is signified (fol.
10), he
spoke of the
of
"right
reason"
which some ples
denominate the flow the

it
natural
law
as a
body
"definite
practical princi
from
virtues,"
which
sources of all
rather and
than as a
"faculty
sense. and
of
the
intellect
by
which
articulates
discourse
reason
things"
deduces
arguments
(fol.
11). But, in Question V, he defines
"the ideas
of particular sensible
in precisely the latter furnished by the senses,
It takes
"arranges
and orders the rives
images
of
things derived from the senses, and forms

images"
[and] de
with
from this
source other new

will
(fol. 48). Readers familiar

of
Locke's
makes
Essay
recognize
here basic
If
elements
his
epistemology.
He
it
clear that without can
the proper, mutual

at all.
functioning
were
of sense and
reason,
on
human beings
senses
know nothing
they
forced to depend
even
their
alone,
unassisted
by
reason,
they
could not
rise
to the level of the
pig
or
the ape.
They
would
animals, since the
beasts'
be helpless in competing with many fourfooted senses are more highly developed. Nor could human
reason were not
beings depend
on reason
alone, for if their
furnished
by
their
for thought, they would be lunatics, i.e., they would fashion imaginary, worthless, and even dangerous constructs from figments of their imagination. Or, as Locke suggests, they would be in the situation of an
senses with the materials architect materials.
trying
makes
to construct an edifice without any of the requisite
building
of
Locke
it unequivocally
The
senses raises
clear that
it is the
reciprocal
functioning
sense and reason that elevates
humanity
on
above the ape and the multitude of

entire and
fourfooted
animals.
furnish "the high
course,"
which
"reason
appears that all principles which

"theoretical" "practical,"
primary matter for dis (fol. 50). It lifts up to human beings comprehend, whether they be
heaven"
and
or
are more
derived from the interaction
of sense and rea

where
son.
This distinction is
fully
developed in Locke's Essay,

of a practical
principle.
he
posits
the principle of
contradiction as an example of a an
theoretical principle and the
law
of nature
as
illustration
Most important is
same
Locke's
conclusion on this point:
"reason
.
proceeds
in exactly the
way in
the moral and practical disciplines
(fol. 52).
Having laid down these epistemological foundations, Locke reiterates two of the by now very familiar criteria "which are necessary to the knowledge of any law including of course the law of nature (fol. 52). The first criterion is that for anyone to be "bound by law, he must first know that there is
whatsoever,"
legislator
to
which
he is is rightfully
subject"
(fol. 52). Knowledge
of
272
Interpretation
law
as
natural
law
requires a proof of
the existence of God. The second crite

of us that
rion requires
that the lawgiver "demands
the
conduct of our
life be in
preced
agreement with
his
will"
(fol. 52). Locke then

clear what sense
proceeds
in
view of
his
ing
distinction to
make
and
reason
each
contributes
to a
knowledge The "matter in
of these two criteria.
operations of sense and

motion,"
reason, Locke observes,

such phenomena as
provide us with
data
and
on
reporting
"heat,
in
cold, colors,
the
to
other qualities obvious to

motion"
sense,
to
all of which can
some
way be
referred of
(fol. 53). He
goes on
claim rather more
for the
functioning
the
senses than one might
have
expected
in
view of
his initial description say

on
of
their
limited functions. He
that the
asserts that
it is
possible to
the basis of the senses

order,"
visible world part
is "framed in
with wonderful art and
as
is
mani
fested in
by
such phenomena as another a
"the
procession of
the year and the seasons

might
following
one
upon
fixed
order"
(fol. 53). One

"season,"
have
thought, on the basis of Locke's own criteria, that it is reason, with its capacity for drawing inferences, which leads to the idea of a to the inference
that
sons
seasonal change
is
regular or
orderly,
and
to the conclusion that four sea
may be characterized as a year. On the other hand, it is difficult, on the basis of Locke's characterization of the functioning of the senses in these Ques
tions, to
perhaps
comprehend
how
sense alone could make
the determination that the
visible world
is "framed
order"
with wonderful art and
(fol. 53). Has Locke
intentionally
an
exaggerated
the capacity of sense? Is he perhaps

of
tacitly
suggesting
which
initial flaw in the foundation
the overall demonstration of
this constitutes the

next of
first
portion?
step he turns to the discussion exactly

senses,
weighed
The
Locke's demonstration
of reason
of
raises suspicion of mind
this same sort as
itself. "Once the

which
the machine
this world,
has carefully and has been received from the

motion of sensi
and contemplated
the appearance, order, the array, and
ble things, it progresses from this point to investigate the origin of these things (fol. 53-54). Here Locke is attributing to reason one of the functions, the consideration of previously attributed to sense, while he fails to
. .
"appearances,"
distinguish in this discussion the

mine
precise
way in
which sense and reason
deter
the
"order"
culties of this
makes
array demonstration
operation of
or
of sensible
things,
such as
the seasons. The diffi

now
are compounded
by
the exaggerated claims he
for the
reason,
claims which are
very difficult to it
proceeds
compre con
hend
and which cannot
be
accepted without question.

world,"
Specifically, having
templated "the
machine of
of
this
Locke
reports that
"to inves
tigate the origin
things, what was the cause, who is the author of so a work. For it is certain that it could not have been formed by extraordinary chance and accident into a frame so fitting, so perfect everywhere and wrought
with such skill.
these
From this
[observation] it is
"
. .
a certain conclusion
that there must
exist some powerful and wise creator of all structed this whole world
these
things,
who made and con
(fol. 54).
Locke's Questions
One is forced to ously asserting suggested. He does
able on the
visible wonder whether
on the
Law of Nature
273
that "it
is
certain"
that the world was
it is Locke, the philosopher, who is seri in the sense here

"created"
not mention the alternative position
that is
fully
as reason
basis
of
the data provided

accepted
here,
viz., that of the eternity of the

reputable
universe,
an
hypothesis Locke
by
in
very
philosophers, includ
as a
ing Aristotle,
would
whom
cites as an authority.
Since,
philosopher, he
one
have found it
requisite to argue
support of
his hypothesis,
may
wonder whether
One far
as
cannot
he is speaking here from other than a philosophic perspective. but notice that Locke severely undercuts his own argument, so
on
it depends
the
at
"perfection"
of
"sensible
things,"
for in the immediate
sequel
he describes
length
and with great
one part of creation

perfections of which most
humanity
his
force the striking imperfection of itself. "Man does not find in himself all those
conceive."15
mind can
Man "a
can
easily
conceive of
that
perfect
desirable perfection, knowledge of all
immortality,
things,"
yet, alas, he is
well
mortal.
He
also
lacks "a
as
as
greater power over natural

man could
things"
(fol. 55). Given these
hardly
be
conceived as
imperfections, Locke observes that having created himself, "for it is impossible

. . .
to
imagine
anything
so
hostile
and
existence,
would not at
inimical to itself which, though it could grant itself Without life all other the same time preserve it.
cannot
things, dear, useful, pleasant, blessed, (fol. 55). Inasmuch then as humanity
vain"
be
preserved and are sought
in
cannot
be
understood to
creator other
have
cre
ated
itself, "it necessarily follows

more powerful and
us"
that there exists some

who at
than our
selves,
wiser,
his
pleasure can
bring
us
preserve,
either
and
destroy
ascribes
(fol. 55-56). Is
to the
creator an
one not
forced to In
conclude
into being, from this

or
that Locke
intention hostile to
humanity
that
Locke
ator
views the creator as

not produced
woefully
lacking
in
power?
either
case, the cre

promises.16
has
the
perfect world
Locke's
surface argument
this point of the
However inadequate Locke's demonstration may be, he does not develop argument more fully in this Question. Instead, in the conclud
sketch
ing folios he turns to by reason regarding

argument runs as
"wise"
further the
conjectural
deductions
to have
said
to be drawn
mankind's
duties to the deity. In
compressed
form,
the
follows:
since reason said
is
supposed
recognized some creator would not
"powerful"
and
creator, it is
to follow that such a

creation.
have lacked
ceives that
agile,"
purpose
in any
part of
his
Therefore,
. .
since man
"per
he
possesses a mind which conclude
is
quick
and a
body
too which
is
he
will
that
he
should not
be idle (fol. 59). "From this is

(fol. 59). That
other
"something"
perfectly clear that seems "to be
god wills
him to do
creator
something"
destined"
by
and
the
to be nothing
than the contempla
tion of god's "power
and wisdom
in these works,
most
and then
to
offer and render
[him]
tions
the
creator"
of
worthy glory (fol. 60). In light of Locke's preceding observation creation, one wonders what that honor would be.
argument
laud, honor,
of so great and so on
beneficent
the imperfec
Locke's
thus bears some
superficial
relationship to the traditional,
274
Interpretation
natural
Christian
law teaching, but in
other respects
it
appears at
best to be
pale reflection, or even something of a parody of that tradition. That appear ance is underlined in the two concluding folios of this Question, folios in which Locke suddenly juxtaposes important aspects of the traditional natural law doc trine against a strikingly different position. As we observed earlier, a cardinal
tenet
in the Christian
or
natural
law doctrine,
whether explicated
by
scholars of
Protestant persuasion, concerns the natural inclinations. Thomas Aquinas powerfully develops this tenet and relates it directly to the law of Catholic
length, not only for its importance in concluding our discussions of Question V, but also because it helps one to understand the inextricable connection between Questions V and
nature a
passage which must
in
famous
be
quoted at some
VI. As Thomas tells

since
us:
being good has the meaning of being an end, while being an evil has the contrary meaning, it follows that reason of its nature apprehends the things towards which man has a natural tendency as good objectives, and therefore to be actively
pursued,
shunned. whereas
it
apprehends their contraries as
bad,
and therefore
to be
Related to this
The
that
order
"ends"
notion of
is the idea that:
in
which commands
of our
natural
of the law of nature are arranged corresponds to tendencies. Here there are three stages. There is in man, first, a
with all
tendency
each
towards the good of the nature he has in common

an appetite
substances;
plays a
has
to
and
preserve
its
own natural
being. Natural law here
corresponding part,
is
engaged at this stage to maintain and
defend the
elementary
requirements of
human life.
with
Secondly,
there is in man a bent towards things which accord
his
nature
considered more specifically, that
is, in
terms of what he
has in
common with other which nature
animals; correspondingly those

teaches all animals,
of the
matters are said
to be of natural law
young,
and
for instance, the coupling so forth.

man an appetite
of male and
female,
the
bringing
up
Thirdly,
this
there
is in
for the
good of
his
nature as
rational,
and
is
proper to
him, for instance,
that he should know truths about

whatever this
God
and about
living
in
society.
Correspondingly
. . .
involves is
a matter of natural
law,
for instance, that a man ought to live in civility.
should shun
ignorance, not (Summa, la2ae 94.2)
offend others with whom
he
natural
According to Thomas then, there is an inseparable connection between the inclinations, self-preservation, sociality, and knowing the truth about
on
God
the one
hand,
to,
and
the natural law on the other. At each

"reveal,"
level,
these
inclinations dimensions
about
point
of natural and about
God
the appropriate, corresponding say law. For example, the inclination to "know the truths requires that living in "correspondingly whatever
one might
society"
this
involves is
ways.
a matter of natural
of
law."
Locke's discussions ible have seen,
the natural law echoes

own singular rather
He treats in his
and
Thomas's in clearly discern fashion duties toward the creator as we
he then touches
briefly
on
the other two
main sets of
Locke'
Questions
the
on
the Law of Nature

of civil sense
275
duties. He pointedly does manifestation of a "natural

as
not speak of
inclination"
formation
in the Thomistic
to
society as the form society,
any
careful reader of
reports
man
that
at some point
his Two Treatises of Government is aware. Rather, he in the course of his troubled existence in this world,
and preserve a union of
is "impelled to form
[his] life
. .
with other perceives
men, not
only by driven by
next
the needs and necessities of

a certain natural
life, but [because he

enter
propensity to
society
that] he is "(fol. 61). In the very
folio, Locke flatly denies that the law of nature can be known from any natural inclination, and he suggests, rather, that man sees the necessity to pre
serve
his life
by forming
a union with other
men,
i.e.,
through a convention. In
appears
"propensity"
substituting
for "natural
inclination,"
Locke
to be reject
ing
the term "natural
inclination,"
the long-established philosophic

within which
because it specifically conjures up visions of tradition running from Aristotle through Hooker
to realize unique and significant
word
human beings
are understood
dimensions
is
of
their overall development in the political order. The

than the term
"pro
pensity"
narrower and more neutral
"natural
inclination,"
laden
as
it is
with rich connotations of
human sociality
deriving from
long tradition.
Locke may choose to ignore this tradition and still bring home to his readers his view that human beings, overwhelmed by the dangers posed by living isolated in the
"inconveniences,"
suffering various may exemplify a propensity for preserving their lives through the expedient of joining together for mutual defense. Such a formulation is, of course, perfectly compatible with Locke's
ernment. subsequent
state of nature and
development
of
these themes in his Two Treatises of Gov too strongly the stark differ
ences
At the same time, one between this formulation
cannot emphasize and
that of the Christian natural law teaching, who, as we must

never
as exemplified
by
Thomas
or
Hooker,
forget, hold
that
the
ultimate and
for the
dignity
in
us
human society is to provide "a life fit overarching of man; therefore to supply those defects and imperfections
purpose of
which are
living
singly
to seek communion and
As for the
status of
naturally induced others"(Hooker, Laws, I, 10, sec. 1). fellowship self-preservation, Locke tells us in this Question that
and
solely
by
ourselves,
we are
with
indeed there is
preserve
no need since
for
me
to stress
here to
what
degree
[man] is
obliged to
himself,
he is impelled to this
part of
his duty,
and more
than
impelled, by an inner instinct, and no man has been found who is careless of himself, or capable of disowning himself. In this matter all men are perhaps more attentive than they ought to be. (Fol. 61)
An "inner
instinct"
has
replaced
the "natural
inclination"
of
the Christian tradi

the instinct for
power.
tion, but
shocking
of
the
most
compelling
aspect of
Locke's
statement about
self-preservation
is his intentional
overstatement
here
of
its
binding
who
In
contrast to the quotation that "no man

himself,"
has been found
is
careless
himself
or capable of
numerous
disowning
of men
one will and
discover in the Questions

who
that follow
instances
women
have indeed
"dis-
276
Interpretation
under
owned"
themselves, generally by having committed suicide while influence of doctrines which Locke will shortly characterize as
intentional
contradiction will
the
"insane."
This
be discussed in the
analysis of
Question
X, be
low. It
suffices
here to
observe
that Locke's overstatement of the
unconquerable
with a
instinct for
self-preservation
allegedly may be designed to leave the reader

"instinct"
"reason"
strong impression
of
the primacy of this
over
which
establishes the natural
primary duty law tradition holds.
to pay reverence to the creator, as the
Christian
elements of
The primacy that self-preservation acquires in Question V over the other the Christian natural law doctrine is reasserted by Locke as the
work progresses.
He
claimed nature
of
in V that "all men,
wherever
they
are,
are suffi
ciently
provided
by
for the investigation "some

peoples of
all"
of god
in his
works,"
but he
of
tells us in Question VII
Brazil (fols.
and the
inhabitants
the
the
Bay
of
Soldania
[who]
supposedly one of the law, is thus far from

surprisingly, he
entire adds
natural
worship inclinations pointing to the universal or far from universally
no god at
58, 76). Worship

content of effective. and
of
God,
more
natural
Even
that the
highly
civilized
"Greeks
Romans
and
the
nothing but "atheists under another name. For it is as impossible for many divinities to be, or to be conceived to be, as none. And who increases the number of the gods, destroys divinity"(fol. 77). On the other
were
Pagan
world"
hand, however, Locke

entire
tells us
in that
same
Question that "if there is
law
of
nature which might appear
to be the most sacred among all men, which the
human
race seems
driven to obey
by
a certain natural
instinct
and
its
own
interest,
The
this is surely that of self-preservation"(fol. 74).

apparent
existence of the
thrust of Question V is toward establishing a proof of the deity as the legislator or lawmaker whose very nature calls for
humanity
render
to "contemplate
his
power and wisdom

glory"
and
then to offer and

a pow
and
[him]
the
laud, honor,
emphasis
and
(fol. 60). Nonetheless there is

our most
erfully discordant
in Locke's formulations:
immediate
pressing duty natural law tradition,

garded as
appears to
as
be to ourselves, not to the deity. In the Christian we have repeatedly seen, self-preservation was re
the least exalted of the three natural inclinations.
revise
natural, but
guise of
also as
Under the
or even to reject an
reaffirming the traditional doctrine, Locke appears to important part of the older understanding.
ral
Locke may well have anticipated that his method of demonstrating the natu law would be found to be less than adequate some of his readers. He by
took pains therefore to direct attention, in passing as it were, to two other proofs of the existence of God. Some "have set out to prove from the witness
of
conscience
that there
is
divine
power
and
that
it
presides
over
this
world"(fol. us"(fol. grounds
innate to 57). But Locke quickly and decisively dismisses both arguments on the that "the arguments of neither method derive their entire force from
of god which seems
57). Others
argue
"from that idea
Locke'
Questions
on
the Law of Nature

things"
277
(fol.
our native
faculties,
sense, that
is,
and reason
working
on sensible
57). Sense
doubted
and
reason, working together,

power,
as
can enable us
above,"
to "arrive at a
knowledge
can
of some supreme
has been
shown
of god exists
says
Locke, but "it
be
with reason whether
that idea
in
all men
by
nature"(fol.
57). Locke's
shock
conclusion
those
who were
is perfectly intelligible to us at this point, but it may prone to accept his earlier, blandly reassuring statements
us,"
regarding the deity. In the opening sentence of Question I, for example, he suggested that "god shows himself everywhere present to and that there is
no one much
"who
will not conclude
for himself that

of
god exists. "(fol.
9). But
by
this
later
point
in Question V
the
disputation, Locke finds it

travelers"
useful or
necessary to report bluntly that many god, if "any credence is to be given

"there
exist some races
peoples or nations
have failed to discover divine

all"
to
or explorers who report that power at
in the
world who recognize no
(fols. 57-58). While there

nowhere a race so
are peoples who recognize no so
barbarous,
far
removed
from
all
divinity, "there exists humanity, that it does not

brute beasts in the
take
joy
in the
use of the senses
[and] is
not superior to
reasoning and the faculty of argumentation; [even] granted perhaps that they cultivate but slightly these native faculties with the application of discipline" (fol. 58).
privilege of
Even the
"humanity,"
most
barbarous One
peoples
enjoy
sensual
delights.
They
find their
as well as good
joy, in
the use of the senses. For
is the
pleasant.
should
by
now use
Locke that those but

what of of
peoples who
fail to
them, its seems, the be only mildly surprised to learn from their reason do not discover the deity,
those people who have developed to a high degree their native
faculties
reasoning
and argument
Examples
of such people are not provided
but who, nevertheless, remain atheists? here, but are provided subsequently
Essay,
in the Questions. One may want to call to mind similar examples from Locke's where he tells us that "the Missionaries of China, even the Jesuits them
great
selves, the
Encomiasts
the Sect
of
of
convince us that gion of
the
Chinese, do all to a Man agree and will Litterati, or Learned, keeping to the old Reli
the
Atheist."11
"perhaps"
Party there, are all of them Locke ends Question V by suggesting that he may more comprehensive discussion of man's "duty toward god, his
and
China,
the ruling
return
to a
and
neighbor,
himself,"
and adds that
"perhaps there
will
be
a place elsewhere
to discuss each
in its
turn"
(fol. 61). Nowhere,
of Nature does he ever mentioned, touch in passing
however, in his Questions Concerning the Law fulfill this vague promise, though he does, as was
on additional aspects of
the relationship with the

observations on man's
deity
In
in Question VIII,
or
and
he has
some
interesting
duties,
rights,
as the case
may be, in Question XI.

perplexing answer to his fifth "arrive at a knowledge of the law
sum:
Locke has
presented us with a most
Question,
the
question of whether reason can
278
Interpretation
through sense
experience."
of nature
He has
answered
the
question
in the
affir
mative, but he has
given us
he has
tor"
shed some
flickering
of
very little to substantiate his answer. At the most, light on the two premises which he suggested "are
the law of
nature,"
necessary to
rior
knowledge "is
(1)
the existence of a
"legisla "supe
to whom
man
rightfully
subject,"
and
(2)
the suggestion that this
power"
wills us
to do certain things.
QUESTION VI
"Can the law
of
Nature become known from the
natural
inclination
of man
kind? It
cannot."
posed
Throughout Question V, Locke points his readers ahead to the decisive issue by Question VI, the issue of the natural inclinations. His handling of this in Question V
appears
matter
to be designed as a guide to and a preparation
for
his shocking,
ral
outright rejection of a
law,
the
view
that
man enjoys
centrally important tenet "a share of the Eternal

proper act and end
. . .
of
Christian
and
natu
Reason,"
hence
has "a
natural
inclination to do
[his]
and
this participa
tion of the eternal
law in the
rational creature
is
called natural
law"(Thomas,
"inclined"
Summa
I-
II, Q90 A2). In

certain
the orthodox view, human beings are

workings
or
directed in
which
point of
directions through the
of
God's
eternal
law
by
they, along with everything else, have been shaped. These inclinations toward the fullest and highest development of human beings, especially
the soul and mind. Created in the image of
God, human beings have

of
the
a
potential
for the
perfection of
the virtues, and this good can be cultivated
by
comprehensive education, one which

ward who
includes the fulfillment

and
the duties to
God,
the
inculcation
of sound
habits,
the like.
Still,
there are those
injunctions
that,
rected
may stray from the paths of righteousness and who may abrogate the of the laws of nature. These exceptional people aside, it can be said
shaped and guided
by
the law
of
nature, human beings

ends which can
are
toward their
their
of
proper actions and
ends,
be
said to
naturally di be truly
inherent in
being. The
manifestations of these natural
inclinations direct
the attention
underlying human nature. This is not to say that the tradition holds that all human beings, everywhere and always, possess full knowledge of the natural law, and it emphatically does not hold that the law of nature is somehow literally embossed or engraved in the form of a detailed code on the souls or minds of individuals. What it does as
thoughtful people to
hold,
Culverwel, for
intrinsic instinctual
example,
puts
it, is
that the principles of the natural law are an
and essential part of
awareness of those principles.
those natural
human nature, and thus that the species has an This awareness finds expression in inclinations to know the truth regarding God, to live in society,
of
and to self-preservation.
It is this innate directedness
the human constitution that Locke denies in
Locke's Questions
on
the
Law of Nature
279
Question VI, though he does not furnish the reasoning behind his denial. What ever his reasons for not amplifying his one-word response in Question VI, the
effect of this response most serious
is
not
only to
reject
this
particular thesis
but to law
cast the
doubts
upon
his
acceptance of the
Christian
of
natural
as previ
ously
scures
understood.
Cumulatively
Locke's treatment
Questions V
and
VI
ob
the traditional classical and Christian
distinction between human beings

understood
and
the other animals. In the traditional view, the other animals are
to be guided simply
ing"
by instinct,
together with some
made possible
through the use of
capacity for "problem solv their senses. Locke's decisive doubts beings
of natural
regarding the traditional ascription to human know the truth regarding God panying
and to elevation and emphasis on
inclinations to his
accom
live in society, together
with
the instinct for self-preservation, lead to the
thought that Locke regards the
human
animal, one
tive
who
differs from
other
adaptation
to the environment.
of
essentially a problem-solving animals essentially in the capacity for effec Be this as it may, by flatly rejecting a most
law tradition, Locke has
of natural opened
being
as
fundamental tenet
way
not
the Christian
natural
the
only to
of
an alternative
understanding
law, but
also to a new
understanding
humanity.
QUESTION VII
"Can the law

not."
of
Nature be known from the
consensus of mankind?
It
can
Question VII is the last

Law
of
of
the six questions
dealing
with
the
issue
of
how the
Locke's
Nature may be known. The statement of the Question response fill twenty folios, which makes this by far the longest
tions. Its basic structure, nonetheless, is
quite simple.
and
of
the Ques
Leaving
aside
for the
Locke's opening, the presented as follows:

moment
structure of
the Question may be graphically
I. Positive Consensus (issues from

a
II. Natural Consensus
compact)
A. Agreement
conduct or
of
behavior
of
A. Tacit Consent
e.g., free
B. Express Consent
B. Agreement
opinion
movement of
e.g.,
establishment of
C. Agreement
principles
of
ambassadors
boundaries among neighboring

nations
1. 2.
speculative principles practical principles
280
Interpretation
mankind,"
The
overall
topic
is "the
consensus of
expressed
variously, as the
above outline suggests;
Locke's discussion
opens with some reflections on con
sensus,
or
human
the
opinion as such.
He
opens with a
harsh
and polemical
denun
god."
ciation of
ancient maxim:
"The
voice of the people
is the
voice of we
The
intensity
of
Locke's opening
polemic exceeds entire
encountered, and
it
sets
the tone
for the
anything that Question.

the
have
yet
The
maxim
itself
was
widely discussed
within
Christian
natural
law tra
dition. Culverwel, for example, devoted an entire chapter of his Elegant and Learned Discourse to this subject. In his view, human beings are guided by the
law
of nature
working through the "though there be

and
natural
inclinations, but he
perceives addi consent of
tional
manifestations of natural who
law through "the

no
. .
harmony
and
joynt
Nations,"
commerce,
nor compact
between them,
yet
they do tacitly
his
most radicall and
spontaneously conspire in a dutiful observation of the fundamental Lawes of Nature"(Discourse, p. 72). Culverwel
supports
position
cero,
and
.
others,
by extensive references to Grotius, Aristotle, Seneca, Ci including Heraclitus, who was "wont to lay down this for a
."(ibid.,
Maxime
Vox Populi, Vox Dei

this point. Far from
p.
74). Culverwel does

nevertheless
not
embrace this maxim without reservations,
but Locke
differs
radi
cally from him God or the law

expresses
on
finding
an expression of
the voice of
populi"
in human consensus, Locke argues that "vox the basest form of mindless partisanship, a demand that stops
of nature against order and
at noth
ing
in its
"conspiracy"
decency. In its
passionate zeal
to seize
kingsome
it wants, the mob "tramples law underfoot and overthrows doms"(fol. 62). The overpowering force of Locke's rhetoric may cause
whatever readers
to pay insufficient attention to one of the more curious

of
elements of
his
the
indictment
gods"(fol. and
the multitude, viz., its alleged

of pagan
despoiling
of
"the temples
of
62). Can the destruction
polytheists, be
reprehensible and
in
violation of
temples, the shrines of idolaters the law of nature? Locke's
answer
may very
well
be yes, for in Question X he finds

this
blameworthy
the fact
that among some people "there exist no temples or altars to the
gods"(fol.
92).
But how does ism

if
one square all
with
his
categorical condemnation of polythe
as atheism toward the end of
yet another atheism cannot
bald
contradiction.
with
Question VII? Locke thereby presents us with If polytheism is a manifestation of atheism, and
the natural
is incompatible
law,
as argued
in Question V, then
consistently Locke does nothing to resolve this contradiction. He thereby opens up at least two divergent lines of interpretation. His criticism of those who despoil "the temples of the hard on the heels, as it is, of the quasigods."
he
criticize or
indict, those
who
have despoiled "the temples
of the
gods,"
theological discussion in
Question V, raises further doubts about the adequacy of that discussion, particularly of its concluding parts in which Locke seems to indicate natural law duties to that singular deity whose had been
"existence"
more or
less
established.
These doubts
are extended
in Question VII,
as we
shall soon see.
Locke'
Questions
on
the Law of Nature
281
Locke
sequel,
opens
up
a related
but
somewhat
different issue in the immediate

were
when
he
goes on to contend that
"surely
this
[despoiling,
etc.] the
voice of
god, it is clearly contrary to that original Fiat by which he created the fabric of this world and brought it into being from nothing"(fol. 62). Creation
from nothing
tribute to the
requires
omnipotence,
deity
whom
he
presented
quality which Locke notably fails to at in Question V. From this point on,
Locke is
somewhat more prone to ascribe omnipotence and omniscience to the
deity, but his failure

stands on
to do so earlier
which are so
these issues
natural
leaves one wondering where he really fundamental to meeting the requirements of

completed, Locke turns to the
matter of
Christian
"positive
law.
skirmishes
With these preliminary

consensus,"
A., "tacit
necessity
ence of a
consent."
touching first on what is designated in An example of this occurs "when some

draws
men
our outline as common
human
ambas-
or advantage
to
it,
such as
the
free
movement of
sadors"(fol.
63). Locke denies that this kind

of
or even
of agreement establishes
the
exist
law (fol.
nature all men

necessity"
implies it, "for the reason that nature, should be friends to one another and join together
by by
to
the law
of
a common
63;
emphasis supplied).
He
adds
that the law of nature "neither
supposes nor permits men to
be
enflamed
by
mutual
enmity,
or
be divided
into hostile
states"(fol.
64).
This is surely an unexpected and radical formulation. First, we must ask how Locke knows that this is a tenet of the natural law; he has not mentioned it
before,
point
much
less demonstrated it. About
all
that one can venture to say at this
is that it differs in
significant respects
from the Christian

natural
natural
law
em
tradition. In Hooker
phasizes the natural
and others
the traditional
law understanding
inclination to form communities,
exclusive communities
which on various occasions and under a
fall into
aspect of
mutual enmity.
variety of circumstances unfortunately Christian natural law doctrine takes account of this
of
human life through its discussion

and unjust wars.
war,
and
the important distinction
Locke simply slides over these issues without comment, and he may thereby be silently dismissing this aspect of the tradi tional understanding. Surely, if his interpretation of natural law on these points
between just
is correct, then it follows that the traditional teaching is erroneous in important respects. That may open the door for our now familiar
enter
several
"objector"
to
the argument
and
to present an
men should
even
more
startling
"unless
alternative.
To
Locke's
together
statement that
"all
be friends to
one another and

...
joined
necessity,"
by
a common
the
war
objector adds:
as some will
have it,
a refers
that in the state of nature

and
perpetual, mutual,
internecine
decried"
is common, and there exists among men (fol. 63). Locke unmistakably
enmity"
here to that
"justly
one"
Hobbes,
who observed
in
an unmentionable war of
book,
one
pause
The Leviathan, that "outside every

this
of civil states
there is always
every
against
to
criticize
(Leviathan, ch. 13). Significantly, Locke does not Hobbian formulation, leaving to the reader the task of
282
Interpretation
between the
one natural
judging
enemies
friends to
"the
another,"
and
law teaching which holds that "all men the Hobbian teaching that all men are
on," pick."
should
be
by
nature
to one another. "Whichever alternative you settle
says
Locke,
choice
is
yours
just take
portion
your
(fol. 63).
The Locke's
crux
of this
of
the discussion of Question VII is
found in
suggestion as
that the many instances
of positive consensus which at
have
been identified
e.g., "the free
gentium
being
nearly The
universal
ambassadors,"
movement of ultimate
(law
of nations).
least the Western nations, among be may properly described as jus source of these conventions is not, ar
advantage"
gues
Locke,
the law of nature, but rather "common
or
utility,
thesis Locke develops
Having
eral
dealt
with
thematically in Question XI. the matter of "positive

"natural
consensus,"
he
addresses the sev
forms
consensus."
of possible
He deals first
with such consensus

life"
(fol. may be observed in "men's conduct and the experience of daily 65). He reiterates his condemnation of the behavior of the many, initiated in his
as
impassioned
prologue to
this
Question,
in
and concludes again
that there is to be
found little
path
evidence of consensus
"taken
majority"
by
the
For that matter, he finds that the leads them into every form of vice and outrageous
conduct.
conduct
(fol. 66). Conduct
or
the action of
men can
hardly
be taken
as a guide
to the law of nature.
He turns then to the

or
second of a
the three forms of natural consensus, opinion

restatement of significant elements of the
belief. He begins
natural
with
brief
Christian
law teachings
"god
which and and
he had
earlier questioned or rejected:

"inscribed"
in
summary, the
views that
"souls"
nature"
have
the principles of
morality in the inner law which their

ceeds to
of
men,
that "men's conscience confesses to that
deny"
vices often
(fols. 67-68). Locke vigorously
pro
demolish this traditional
position
through extended observations de
signed to establish
that nothing, however
disgraceful, "has
thought
not
in
some place
been
sanctioned
by
religion or considered as a virtue and exalted with praises. what men's
This said, it is easy to know

matter,
since
has been concerning this

were
by
actions of this
gods or
sacrificing to their
plied).
kind they thought they (fols. becoming

'heroes'"
worshipping
emphasis
and
In
discussing
"we
the
these radical differences
of religious
68-69; sup belief, Locke ob

to men
not so
serves that
much plied). of the
ought to
believe that
religion
becomes known
(fol.
by
light of nature as by divine Through this last observation, Locke

of the existence of a
revelation"
69;
emphasis
on
sup
and
casts
further doubts
the status
demonstration
deity
as presented
in Question V,
he thereby
undermines the status of those natural
law duties that
men were
alleged to owe to the
deity.
for
a moment
Locke does
not
deny
faith
the enormous, pervasive, and controlling
power of religious question whether
and of
its
connection with public morality,

can
but he does
these phenomena
could
be
understood as manifestations of the
law
of nature.
What then
be their
source?
His
answer:
dominant
opinion.
Locke'
Questions
on
the Law of Nature
283
But
opinion
has
demonstrates
an
widely over the ages and from place to place, as Locke dramatically in the following folios. Indeed, these pages provide
varied
astounding
catalogue of
bizarre beliefs,
as well as an account of savage and
cruel practices
based
on
exotic,
irrational,
and outlandish opinions.
This
curi
ously densed quality

mount
extended account of
human
of
the remainder these
folly differs stylistically from the terse, con of the text of the Questions. The rather casual,
some
narrative style of
folios to
degree
conceals
the comments of para this section. For ex

that the workings of
importance
which
Locke has
scattered throughout earlier contention
ample, he
flatly
contradicts
here his
conscience establish of
the existence of the law of nature. Near the very

prove
one who
beginning
a
the Questions he asserted that "men's exists;

. .
consciences"
"that
law
of
nature
when
that
is, from the fact that 'no

For that
is guilty
wins acquittal
he himself is
evidence
judge.'
verdict which each pronounces upon
him
self
is
that there exists a law of nature. For if the law of nature did not
come about that
exist,
how does it judgment
the conscience
of
those who recognize
the commands of no other

passes
will
law, by
which
they
are either
directed
or
bound,
on
their very life and
conduct"
(fols. 17-18). Later on, Locke

robbers"
provide examples of
"the grasping hands
of
and
the theft and
other crimes committed
by
any fetters
son
conscience"
of
them, as showing that they are not "restrained by (fol. 91). Here in Question VII he supplies the rea
a product of
fashion."
why this is so. Conscience is not autonomous; rather, as Locke shows, it is dominant opinion, or what he termed in the Essay later as the "law
of
Thus,
under
the guidance of "dominant
opinion,"
people commit
atrocities that
are not
"surpass
wild
beasts in their
of
savagery"
(fol. 74). But these
men
Why? "Because they consider by their action, whatever it was, not only permissible but even something praise because it conforms to dominant opinion (fol. 70). This is exactly the
tormented
worthy,"
"the lashes
conscience."
understanding
of conscience
that Locke developed
in his Essay:
may,
I doubt not, but

same
without
being
be
written on
their
Hearts, many Men,

other
by
the
several
way they Moral Rules,
that
come and
to the Knowledge of
convinced of their
things, Obligation. Others

come
to assent to
also
may
on
come
to
be
of the same
Mind, from
their
Education, Company,
Judgment
a
and
Customs
of their
Country;
which
which, Perswasion however got,
will serve to set
Conscience
work,
or
is nothing else, but our own Opinion or Pravity of our own Actions. And if Conscience be
contraries
of the of
Moral Rectitude
Proof
with
innate Principles,
same
may be innate Principles: Since

what others avoid.
some
Men,
the
bent
of
Conscience, prosecute Understanding, Iiii8)

To
reiterate:
(Essay Concerning
Human
early in the Questions that a law of nature could be established from the existence of conscience, but now he finds that con science is nothing more than a reflection of dominant opinion. Since Locke discovers radical divergence of opinion among men on virtually every matter of
Locke
suggested
284
Interpretation
that the "voice of
speaks
importance, it follows
ferent
peoples.
conscience"
differently
used
to dif
Hence the
workings of conscience cannot
be
to establish
the law of nature.
And this important
consideration points
to a matter of
even greater
import,
for
we must ask whether
the alleged disagreement on the most
fundamental
matters
is
universal.
Locke has
nature,
entire
anticipated our question.
In short, is there nothing on which there is agreement? He responds that "if there exists a law of
to be the most sacred among all men, which the
which might appear
human
race seems
driven to obey
by
a certain natural
instinct
and
its
own
interest,
this is surely that of self-preservation,

the primary and
which some establish
for this
reason as
fundamental law
nature"
of
(fols.
74-75;
emphasis
supplied). which vent
Is Locke speaking here of some sort of instinctual response through perhaps through reflexive motions the human organism acts to pre
itself from
being
injured
or
destroyed? For example,
a person
in danger
of
drowning
ganism
involuntarily toward the water's surface. Here the or by the need for oxygen, a need unmediated by conscious reflection. By the same token, the muscle and glands of the stomach function automatically during the process of digestion. Natural processes are at
will struggle
is impelled automatically
work
in both instances;
one might
describe them in
operate
a sense as manifestations of
the operation of "laws of
bly
unless opposed and

which
and inexora They autonomously forces. This overcome by extraordinary is, I think,
when
nature."
the sense in
which
Locke is speaking,
interest."
he
writes
here
of
"a law
of nature
the entire human race seems driven to obey
by
a certain natural
instinct
and
by
or
sane and
If so, then such laws can hardly be transgressed free human beings. If, somehow, such a law were transgressed, the
its
own
effects would
usually be
swift and catastrophic.
The
swimmer who gives as
up his
all,
her
efforts
to secure oxygen will
simply drown. Locke knew,
do
we
that human beings are in
fact
guided almost always and
by
their
natural
instinct for
self-preservation, that
"primary
fundamental law
are some
nature"
of
(fol. 75). Yet
he
and we
also
example, or others
unfortunates, hapless slaves, for in harsh who, circumstances, may abandon the struggle for
know that there
self-preservation and
voluntarily
resign
themselves to death.
Indeed,
the
condi
tions of their lives may be so unbearable that
they
seek
death (cf. Locke, Two

suggested
Treatises, II, 23).

How does Locke
explain such exceptions to what
he has
is
na
ture's most fundamental

sideration of
law? Perhaps
we can
discover
an answer
through con
of
the several examples he provides

sought
in these Questions
the example
human
beings
who
who
have
death. First, he
or other
gives
of abject subjects
follow their kings
rulers
whether
their actions were voluntary.
into death, but he failed to explain More telling is his second example, that
of suttee:
"Among
the Indians the weak and timid

to
to despise
extinction and
death"
by
their own
female sex is daring enough hasten [to join] their dead husbands through flames, (fol. 75). Locke's vivid account of an act of taken
suttee,
Locke'
Questions
on
the
Law of Nature
285
from
tary
and
contemporary book of travels, suggests that that widow's that it was "with a jubilant heart and joyous
act was volun
express
that she
"expired
happily
in the
midst of
the
flames"
(fol. 76). He
adds
that it would be
with
"tedious"
to continue with such examples. Were he tempted to go on

might
further examples, he
have
given
instances
closer
to home. Rather than
reaching out to faraway India, to describe people who, with "jubilant heart and joyous expressions expire happily in the midst of Locke could
flames,"
have
called
to
his
readers'
attention
the innumerable Christian martyrs
of recent
memory,
men and
preservation
women, Protestant and Catholic alike, who had rejected selfin favor of agonizing deaths at the burning stake as the ultimate
the instinct of
testimony
held
to the firmness of their religious opinions. The strength of powerfully
personal opinions
can, then, sometimes overcome
even
self-
preservation.
In concluding the discussion

Nor is there any
reason
of
suttee, Locke
observes:
to be surprised at the
diversity
of men's opinions on even the
concerning what is right and most fundamental principles, into doubt. These,
although
virtuous given the

and god and the
fact that they disagree

of the
immortality
soul are called
they
are not practical propositions or
laws
of
nature,
must, nevertheless, be necessarily assumed for the existence of the law of nature,
for there
can exist no
law
without a
legislator
and
law
will
have
no
force if there is
no punishment.
(Fol.
76;
emphasis
supplied)
In this
ment
curious
context, Locke has unequivocally

existence of
wonder
stated another critical require

viz.
,
for establishing the

casually,
almost
the law of nature,
the
immortality
of
the soul. One may well

ment so
why he introduces this indispensable require in passing, as it were, and why he failed to state this
natural
essential element of the
Christian
the
law tradition
at the
Questions,
basic
where
elements of was own
himself
and
his
the systematically "scattered and as he has he Why up wont to say, the essential elements of both the traditional teaching arguments, hither and yon throughout the Questions! Whatever the
gave
appearance of
he
beginning of laying down

down,"
his
the
law
of nature.
reason,
we must note
that
nowhere

soul.
even attempt
to
demonstrate the
almost
immortality
of
the
totally
neglected one of
He thereby leaves undemonstrated and those elements which, by his own assertion, is
nature."
indispensable "for
We may
this
point.
the existence of the law of
now review
the
progress of
the argument of the work as a
whole
to
Locke began
by
seeming to subscribe to many of the fundamental

natural
premises of the
traditional, Christian
ever, to raise
of
a series of reservations
law tradition. He proceeded, how regarding many of the fundamental tenets
the traditional doctrine.

of
Leaving
of
aside the
infinitely
adequacy
his demonstration
the existence of
perplexing issue of the the deity, that indispensable

traditional sense,
requirement
"legislator"
without whom natural
law is impossible in the

the
Locke certainly left
unresolved critical aspects of
that the
law
286
Interpretation
be adequately promulgated. He then flatly rejected the fundamental and doctrine that natural law manifests itself through the "natural
of nature
inclinations"
may therefore be known through those inclinations, a further blow to the mulgation of the law, and, moreover, to its naturalness. Now, "serious have been
raised about
pro
doubts"
the
immortality
for
of
the soul, and therefore,
by
implica The
tion,
of
the possibility of those
eternal rewards or punishments which constitute enforcement of
finally
here
the only adequate
sanctions
the natural
law.18
orthodox
was
position which Locke was both evoking and distancing himself from powerfully expressed during Locke's lifetime by one of the great writers of
natural
law
the age,
Bishop
Cumberland. Cumberland
pious and virtuous all are
observed
that
in this
world
"those
who are
truly
while
good,
too often suffer

violent"
many Evils or receive "good
Afflictions,"
"those that
Wicked,
unjust and
things."
The
Bishop
. .
easily
.
concluded
from this that "the Laws

of
of
Nature
and
would
signify but little

which, since
without a
due Administration
are
Rewards
Punishments,
come."19
they
the
so often
fail in this Life,

of
to be made up
of
in that to
It follows that "the

and or
greatest assurance we
have
that grand
Motive to Religion
ther eternally
Virtue,
immortality
in
another
the
Soul,"
renders man
"ei
miserable"
happy
Thus, infliction
punishment,
of the natural
of eternal
misery
on
life, "when this life is the immortal soul was seen as the
sanction
ended."
ultimate
and therefore as an
absolutely necessary
for
enforcement
law.
other point
At only one this issue of the

of animals.

of
again even
touch on
"souls"
immortality
the soul: he speaks in one passage of the
that which necessarily
He thus leaves undemonstrated, indeed, almost totally neglected, demanded his attention if, as many hold, his understand
law lies
within
ing
of natural
the Christian tradition. Nor can this

"oversight"
deficiency
work,
omission.
properly be dismissed as a passing for in none of his subsequent writing did he When something like this point was of Worcester following publication
unmovable of
in his early
or youthful
ever
rectify this critical

attention
called to
Locke's
by
the
Bishop
the
Essay, Locke
of
responded
that: "So
is that truth delivered
by
the
Spirit
truth,
that though the light of
nature gave some obscure

yet was
glimmering,
some uncertain
human
reason could attain alone who
to no clearness, no
and
. .
hopes of a future state, certainty about it, but that it
Jesus Christ
. .
had brought life
immortality
the
to light through
assures us
the gospel
established
this article of revelation, which

made
Scripture
is
and
certain
only
by
revelation."20
That
admission
leaves
law is
Locke in the wholly

of the
following
quandary, however. Knowledge
of the natural
of
rational and not
dependent
on revelation.
But knowledge
immortality
to that there
soul, indispensable to knowledge
of
the natural
law, is
unavailable
reason, but only to revelation. The conclusion

can
inescapably
follows
be
no rational
knowledge
of
the natural law
of which
Locke has been
speaking.
By
the end of
Question VII he
goes even
further in perplexing the issue
of
Locke'
Questions
on the
Law of Nature
287
knowledge
observes
of
the
natural
law
via
of
the
knowledge
and
of
immortality. In VII he
of the soul
that although the issues
"god
of
the
immortality
they
must,
are not practical propositions or
laws
nature,"
"nevertheless, be
would
necessarily assumed for the existence follow that if they are not "practical
"speculative "speculative
matters at
principles."
of the
law
nature"
of
(fol. 76). It
propositions,"
they
must
be
what
he terms
principles
Yet in the concluding paragraph, he informs us that do not bear on our question, nor do they touch on moral
(fols. 80-81). The only way to make sense of Locke's vacilla tion is to posit a dual natural law, for one of which the unknowability of im mortality is fatal, for the other of which it is irrelevant. Locke sheds further light in VII with his relentless rejection
of all candidates
all"
for true knowers

other
of
the natural law. Pagan polytheists are "atheists under an

also condemns
name"
(fol. 77). He
the Jews as violators of the natural

nations are
law
on
the grounds that "to the Jews all other

condemnation
Gentiles
impious"
and
(fol. 77). That
is
a tacit charge that the

natural
Jews
are violators of
the
postulated, but undemonstrated,
law teaching: first, that "all
men should
be friends to Readers
one another and
joined together
necessi
the derivative prohibition against peoples

of the
by a common being "divided into

account of
second,
hostile
states.
Questions
must wonder whether

with
Locke intended his
natural
law
teaching
to be compatible
the
delivered in Genesis 17:6, exceedingly fruitful; and I

of
where
God's covenant, as God informs the Israelites: "I will make thee
thee,
and
Scriptural
will make nations of
kings
shall come out
thee
and all
will give unto
thee,
and
to
thy
seed after
thee, the land
sojournings,
adds that
the land of
Canaan, for
God's
possession."
an
"thy
seed shall possess the gate
everlasting of his
thy Later, God

of
enemies,"
a promise which was

overcame
fulfilled
as the
Israelites,
with
guidance and
assistance,
the
those Christians who "so closely bind themselves if they think that faith ought to be kept with their fellow citizens, they believe that deceit and treachery are permitted toward those (fol. 78). Philosophers fare no better at Locke's hands on this
with
many kings and peoples Locke also finds fault

one
who opposed
their claim to the land of Canaan.
in
society that,
even
outside"
point than
all
do the Jews
or
Christians.
According
to
him,
one must conclude
that
nations, sects,
and peoples of the world are misled
by
erroneous
opinions,
opinions that
as
have effectively blinded them to the true demands of he professes to understand it. Locke is tacitly suggesting that
natural natural
law,
law Fur
cannot
be discovered in the
world of
opinion, especially
religious opinion.
ther, he has already revealed is not innate but taken from

under
to us that "the power of custom and opinion which

source"
some external
is
so enormous that
even
it may
self-
extraordinary
circumstances
detract from
obedience
to that most
fundamental law
preservation.
of nature which man should not transgress:
the law of
among the profoundly important issues Question VII is that of opinion. Wrong opinion may be
To
conclude:
opened
up
by
Locke in
responsible
for
leading
288
Interpretation
either
people,
"murdered"
forcibly or unwittingly, to give up their lives and, in effect, to be by the destructive mores of the community. Thus, in Question VII
the
example of
he has
XI
proffered
the practice of suttee in
India,
and
in Question
we will
find
comparable examples.
"insane."
He
characterizes
the opinions that
lead
to such practices as
massive
issue that
must therefore an
be
confronted
with which
is that
overcoming false and dangerous opinions. It is Locke deals at length in the Questions that lie ahead, as
of
works
issue
well as
in the
major
that he published later.
QUESTION VIII
is."
"Is the law
of nature
binding
in
on men?
It
Question VII
section
concludes
the second
which
major portion of
Locke's Questions, the
dealing
with
the way
the natural law can be known.

of
Question
VIII introduces
with the
a new
section, consisting
three
Questions; it is
concerned
binding
character of picks
the natural law. In the opening
folio,
our
by
now
familiar it
"objector"
up the tacit theme of Questions VI and VII

objector
and makes
explicit
by denying
outright
the very possibility of the Christian natural law.
Having
stated
this heterodox position, the
falls silent,
and
Locke turns
abruptly to
what appears on
the face of it to be a discussion of the meaning of

of
obligation within the
framework
of
traditional natural law.
The opening folio

shall
this Question requires particular attention, for as we
see,
each of
these remaining
Questions
opens with a statement
by
the
"objector"
whose arguments
have
served an
discussion along unexpected paths. Locke made note, in passing, of

and right. serve
important function in moving the The reader may recall that in Question I, distinction between lex
to it
and
Hobbes'
jus, law
might and
He did
not
indicate there
what
use, if any, this distinction
in his
overall
argument, but he
recurs
here in Question VIII
develops it further
as
follows:
who refer the entire
Some have been found

of each
law
of nature to
the
self-preservation
individual
and seek no
deeper foundations for it than

(Fol.
self-love and that

as
instinct
by
which each man cherishes
for his
own
safety
and preservation.
himself, and looks out, so far 82; emphasis supplied)

amounts more
he is able,
The
position outlined
by
Locke here
(jus naturale), than to
a natural
law (lex naturalis)
position.
nearly to a natural right As Locke goes on be the fountain

so much man's and
to say, "if the care and preservation of one's self should
beginning
as
him]"
of
this entire
law,
virtue would seem to
be
not-
duty
[to
his interest
be
and nothing would be right for a man if it were (fol. 82). It follows from this that from this perspective
not so much a
not useful
would
duty
and
debt to
which we are
bound
"keeping by nature,
this law
as a
Locke's Questions
private right and
tage"
on
the
Law of Nature
of]
289
benefit
the
to which we are led
by
[a
sense
our own advan
(fol. 82).
workings of
The
action
instinct
or
"self-love"
of self-interest and
in terms
of
interest,
would
"private
and
right."
Any
naturally lead to failure to act in behalf of
one's own
interest
inevitably
quence reminds one of yet another
automatically be injurious. This conse basic distinction suggested by Locke in
Question I, that between a law which can be transgressed, for example, the Ten Commandments and other requirements of the Christian natural law, and a law
which cannot
be transgressed. Locke's discussion in Question VIII has

the
afforded
us an example of
"instinct"
latter, for again, all of us are said to preserve ourselves by which leads us to seek our "own safety and As we an in have already learned, "everyone feels himself industrious and eager own in Question the "his as Locke said Since, V, promoting
preservation."
preserva
enough"
deity
when
was so unkind as
to create
humanity
mortal, a time will
inevitably
and other
come
death
overtakes each of
us, but
a most powerful
instinct impels
all who
are of sound mind and who are not misled
by
insane doctrines
fatally
destructive opinions, to ward off that fateful moment as long as possible. Now, it is true that observation of the affairs of this world furnishes many examples
of those whose minds are opinions and
deranged
by
what
Locke
"insane"
characterizes as
who,
under
their
influence,
seek a premature
without possible
death. In this sense,
"we
cannot neglect and
break this law
harm [to
ourselves]
(fol. 82). In today's
"self-destruct,"
vernacular we our most
or are at
least
self-destruc
tive,
when we
transgress
fundamental
right.
Transgression here is
tantamount to virtually automatic extinction as a human being, a far cry from the meaning of transgression in the established natural law tradition. Locke
provided us with some examples of this phenomenon
in Question VII
and will
furnish
rather more stark ones

makes no makes
in Question XI.
to the
natural rights alternative.
Locke
sponse natural
direct
response
What
re
he
takes the form of a the
statement about
the obligatoriness of the
law
as conventional as as
natural rights position was unconventional.

Law"
Obligation is defined
magistrate religious
the "Bond of
(Juris) (fol. 83). For
example, the
breaks
may command us to do this, or not to do that. At a higher level, our faith may command us to pay honor and reverence to God, or, if one religious commandment, to pay the penalty willingly. We are obli
our rightful
gated to
obey
superiors,
whether
God, king
or
law. There
is, how
ever,
one
emphasis
especially interesting dimension of this presentation, and that is the Locke places on conscience. He refers more frequently to conscience
Question VIII,
concerned with
in this
natural
portion of
the traditional understanding of

manuscript.
law,
than
as compatible with
he does in any his effective

challenges
other part of
the
One judges this

parts of
rejection of conscience
in those
the
argument where
he
the tradition.
account of obligation
Locke
reiterates
the familiar
traced
by
the Christian
290
Interpretation law theorists, but he

spoken of as
goes somewhat
natural
beyond the
argument provided
in
Question V. God,
and
as the supreme
"omniscient."
legislator, is described
In this
context
as
"best
greatest,"
and
is
God is
said to require
human
who
beings to obey his commands, or alternatively, to pay have received his legitimate donation of authority. The issue
of
obedience
to those
the
obligatoriness of
the
natural
law, it "God,
he
turns out,
and
depends
on
the very issues left unresolved earlier. In a
long,
that
complicated,
inconclusive
demonstration in Question
willed
VIII, he
suggests
the author of this
law,
it to be the his
rale of our conduct and
life,
and
published
it sufficiently
and
that any one

and
could mind
know
to its
it, if he
again
were
turn
of
understanding"(fol.
willing to devote the time 88). Locke thereby
energy,
the
an
restates
issue
promulgation, but
state.
he leaves it in
an undemonstrated and
in
unsatisfactory
ance able
One may
natural
conclude at
this point with considerable assur
that these inconclusive references to promulgation raise virtually insuper
doubts that the
law,
as understood
in the traditional form, has been

suggested
sufficiently
well promulgated.
In Question II Locke
that the quest
for
understanding
of
the natural law might be compared to the intensive excava

of precious metals
tions of miners in search of veins
buried
deep
in the
earth.
He
that, mightily to discover

concluded
while persons of
high intelligence
and goodwill might
labor high
such
odds against success remain
treasure, nature has taken pains to insure formidable. Just so, innumerable people
dedication
of natural are seen
that the
of
intelligence,
for the
out
seriousness,
and
to have failed in their search

made clear through
us
correct
understanding
law,
as
Locke has
the Questions. Question VIII brings this conclusion home to
through
natural
indicating
law.
how undermining that failure is
of
any
obligatoriness
in the
QUESTION IX
"Is the law
of nature
binding
on
brutes? It is
not."
answering this Question in the negative, Locke in agreement with canon law "which regarded the law
By
places
himself squarely
of nature as confined to
the human
race."
"That
animals are not
bound
the
by
this law was taught

p.
by
Selden,
also
and
Culverwel in his
Discourse"
(Essays,
188,
n.2).
This
view
is
developed
and
by
Grotius in his
work
1, 2,
that
by Suarez,
of
whose argument
Law of War and Peace, Book I, is especially illuminating. Suarez argues

"are
On
brutes,
those sensitive creatures, the law of
totally defective in
there the least
the
principal
branches
nature,"
as, for example, in the
acknowledgement and
adumbration of
adoration of a
deity. Where,
. ."in
asks
Suarez, "is
What
divine worship
clare
those animals?
actions
the glory of God; or the firmament, which Bees live in a hive and everything they do is determined
do they take "which de handiwork"?31 shews his

and patterned
by
Locke'
Questions
on the
Law of Nature
and evil.
291
instinct. have
They
cannot
know God
or
the difference between good take

action or
They
it.
on
no will
by
which
they
can choose to
to refrain from
Hence the law

them.
where ever
of nature
in the traditional Christian
sense
is
of
not
binding
This theme is
amplified
by
Culverwel in Chapter 6 Suarez. He freedom

asks us
his
arguments complement those of

a
his Discourse, whether there has
been
herd
of animals
that
manifest
of will.
Tauntingly, he
queries: "You have heard it may be of a chaste Turtle, and did you never hear of a wanton Sparrow? It may be you have read some story of a modest Ele phant, but what say you in the meane time to whole flocks of lascivious
Goats"? Tell me, "Are these creatures guided by free will, do they dresse them selves by the glasse of the Law"? Concluding, he adds that "A Law 'tis founded
in intellectuals
no
...
it
supposes a
"
Noble free-born creature, for
where there
is
liberty,
within
there is no law
(Discourse,
natural even
p.
42). Still,
these
one might respond
that
said
the framework of Christian
law,
creatures can
truly be
to be obeying the Eternal
Law,
though
they
are
not,
and cannot
rightly
be
seen
as,
subject
to the natural law in the that in this the law

respect
manner of man.
Paradox
ically, Locke
tage over
might argue
the brutes have a distinct advan
man.
First,
while
of nature
in the traditional, Christian

not
sense
is
not
binding
on
them, according to
rank
Locke, he does
deny
be
that "Creatures of
the same species and
promiscuously born to
all the same advantages of equal one amongst
Nature,
and the use of
the same
or
faculties,
certain
should also
another without
Subordination
Subjection"
osition suggests that animals
have
(Two Treatises, II, 4). This prop rights. In point of fact, they exercise
rights
in their
endeavors
to preserve themselves. Whatever their

a second advantage over
degree
at
of suc are
cess on this not
count,
they enjoy
man; they,
least,
hindered
and misled
in the
quest
for
self-preservation
by
the
possession of
destructive
suggested
and
insane
opinions. most
repeatedly, the
dangerous opinions, Locke has quietly dangerous may be the various misunderstand
such much of mankind
Of
ings
of
the law of nature, which cripple
in its
quest
for
self-
preservation.
QUESTION X Universal? It
is."
"Is the
The
obligation of
the law of nature
perpetual and
plan of
Question X is relatively
simple:
It
opens with the position of an

of nature.
"objector,"
who with a series
boldly
asserts that there
is
no
law
Locke
responds
of arguments
designed to
"objector"
establish
the
perpetual
and universal
obligation of the natural
law. These
arguments
take the
rejoinder,
point of view of and
the
traditional
cludes the
natural
law. The
makes a
Locke then
con
Question
to the
by
refuting him.
element of agreement
existence of
According
nents of the natural
the only law is found in the
"objector,"
among
propo
those sharply
divergent,
292
Interpretation
opinions"
"various
and manifold
regarding its
content
and obligation.
These
disagreements find their
ultimate expression
in
"conduct"
(fol. 91). Observation

are
of mankind reveals that these radical

restricted
differences in behavior
even
by
no means
to
individuals, but include

no sense of
precepts
"entire nations, among

are
whom
there
conduct"
can
be
observed
law,
no rectitude of
(fol. 91). Even

there are the law
of
where
"some
of the of
of the
law
nature"
of
followed,
manifold
instances
the
most abominable crimes committed against
nature,
crimes of
the sort vividly
illustrated in Question VII:

praised,
and the
Theft is
permitted
among
some peoples and
robbers are not restrained
from
violence and crime
by
grasping hands of fetters of conscience. any

one place there are no
with
Among
this
others there exists no shame
in debauchery; in
temples or altars to the gods, in others these are spattered
human blood. Since
is the case,
race as a
one can
human
rightly doubt that the law of nature is binding upon the whole, unstable and variable [as it is], accustomed to the most
different kinds
of
institutions, driven by
notions which are
clearly
contrary.
(Fols.
91-92)
These arguments,
on several grounds. as posed
by
the
"objector"
to natural
law,
are significant
they say has become familiar in con temporary, Western thought in the formulation of cultural relativism, but there criticizes the absence of polytheism; there are nations is more. The
A large
part of what
"objector"
where one
finds "no temples
gods."
or altars
to the
Does this
suggest that
well as
polytheism would meet the of that singular
demands
of
the natural law
fully
as
the
by deity worship Locke in Question V? No 1 :ss significantly, the basic issue of promulgation is raised yet again, for surely it is the case that from the perspective of traditional
whose existence was
tentatively
established
natural
law "it is
hardly
credible
that the dictates of nature are so
obscure
that
they
are
hidden from
nations"
entire reader
(fol. 92).
what
It is difficult for the he does

nature
to determine
the basis
of
Locke's
response
to these objections might have

not respond
directly
to them.
been, for, as has so often proved to be the case, Rather, he asserts, first, that the law of
universal.
is
perpetual and
then, subsequently, that it is
He leaves it
require,
this
at
that, but the

responses,
points made
by
"objector"
the
deserve, indeed
The in suspension,
number of as
serious
which
Locke does nothing to
provide.
upshot of
is that the
neither
positions advanced
by
the
"objector"
remain
it were,
and
"suspended"
accepted nor refuted objections mains the
by
Locke. A
substantial
these there re
have
accumulated
during
the course of the
Questions,
possibility that we will

constitute a
develop later,
that considered collectively

of
they may
one
coherent,
alternative
that differs radically from the

of
understanding of the law Christian natural law tradition.

"objector,"
nature,
Instead
some of
directly
the most
Locke shifts the discussion to confronting the traditional, scholastic doctrines for the remainder of Question
Locke'
Questions
on
the
Law of Nature
293
X. This
not
especially enlightening discussion

doctrines
this is
whether
a
could
simply to
cannot
overlook the radical
with which
easily lead the Question
most readers opened. on
One
say
definitively
tactical,
literary
device
Locke's
part; in any event it is stylistically most curious. In the more traditional section of Question
though complex, scholastic
which are
ever'
X, Locke invokes familiar,

exist some
doctrines. For example, "there

and we are obliged to
say"
things
absolutely prohibited, (ad semper), as the Schoolmen like to develop the familiar distinction between those
which we are
[avoid]
belief
these 'for for

goes
(fol. 95). He
on
to
spheres of
obedience
to obey the law of nature and Under the category of dispositions or attitudes, he discusses the traditional meaning of habitus and those dispositions which we
"obliged
absolutely"
activity in those in which

and
is
conditional.
are required to
hold toward the deity, toward
duty
to parents,
and
toward law.
manifest
He
recounts certain of the
traditionally
prescribed positive
duties: e.g.,
worship of divinity, comforting of neighbors, relief to those in trouble, and giving food to the hungry (fol. 95). At the conclusion of this discussion, Locke
asserts
that he has
now established
that the requirements of the
natural
law
are
"perpetual."
Once again,
evaluated
we must remind ourselves that
he has
not established
this contention but merely presented selected portions of the traditional

without
teaching
having
them.
In
the
no part of the presentation
does Locke
meet
the crucial issues raised
by
regarding those many nations whose beliefs and practices lead to bizarre violations of the natural law. Despite the fact that he draws our attention
to such
natural at
phenomena
"objector"
throughout the
Questions, he insists repeatedly

If this in
were
that the
law is
universal and perpetual. greater part of mankind
so, then
one must wonder ages
why has not been
least the
all countries and
throughout the
and
aware of these prescriptions of the natural
law
followed them.
Locke
that: It
admits that
he, too, has
wondered about
this very thing, for he grants
seems to me to
follow
as
necessarily from the
nature of
man, if
he be
a man,
which are
that he is bound to love and reverence god, and to
perform other
duties
in conformity with a rational nature that is, to observe the law of nature follows from the nature of a triangle, if it be a triangle, that its three angles
equal to two right angles.
as
it
are
(Fols.
100-101)
he
goes on to
In
a masterpiece of understatement
men"
very many certain, that nothing

not
who
"are ignorant
of
reply that "there possibly exist both these truths which are so clear, so
(fol. 101). We may
add
can
be but
[obvious]"
more
rather an
that it that
is is
men,"
merely
of as
"many
the clear and
overwhelming
portion of mankind
ignorant
stem,
certain
truths of
mathematics.
Nor does this ignorance

or even their
Locke is
wont to of
suggest, from their

matter
"indolence"
lack
of
acuteness.
The fact
the
is that very few human beings have the time,
294
Interpretation
or
inclination,
tics,
even
the opportunity to devote themselves to the study of mathema
possess
they may be very active in the various pursuits of life and high intelligence to boot. For the most part, human beings everywhere
though
and always are
generally
or
fully
occupied with service
the necessities of raising a
family,
earning
living,
rendering
of
to others, either
obligation. respect to
What is true
the pursuit of mathematics
voluntarily or under some is patently more true with
the possibility of people
devoting
themselves to the systematic study
of natural
law. Proper study of the latter, as we know from Locke's own testi mony, requires even more intelligence and assiduous effort, to say nothing of recall Locke's vivid the requisite leisure, than does the study of mathematics
comparison of
the labor of those who work to

under
discover the
natural
law
and
the
miners who
dig laboriously, deep
the earth,
for hidden treasures. Locke
has effectively admitted in Question X that the basic principles of the natural law have not been adequately promulgated. This helps to explain both the
widespread
ignorance
of these principles and
the unending and bizarre viola that principles of a natural
tions of them
by
entire nations.
This does
not mean
Locke has constantly indicated throughout these Questions, that the traditional natural law is not innate, and that men are not drawn to it by natural inclinations, then the quest for its source
not exist.
law do
If it is true, however,
as
will
be extraordinarily difficult. The
quest
for the
principles
of natural
law
requires a most remarkable effort on the part of
extraordinarily
able searchers
princi
for truth. Lest these

ples of
conclusions cause men
to doubt the existence of the
the
natural
law
or
to give up the quest in despair
Locke
reassures
them at this point that the law does indeed exist, and can be discovered:
It is necessary
everywhere on at
that all men endowed with a rational nature

are
that
is,
all men
bound
least
some men,
by this law, so by the same title
that
if the law
of nature should
be
binding
it
must
clearly be
binding
on all as well.
The
mode of their
law depends,
of things.
not on a will which
coming to know it the same, their nature the same, for this is fluid and changeable, but on the eternal order
(Fols.
99-100)
same vein
Locke be
so?
argues
further in the
that "this
natural
abrogated since men cannot alter this
law
(legem)"
right (jus) will never (fol. 101). Why is this
Because, "in my immutable, and some duties,

necessity"
opinion,"
he says, "some states of things seem to be which cannot be otherwise, seem to have arisen
goes
(jus)"
out of
(fol.
explain much more
100). In his concluding Question, Locke fully what he understands by "this natural right
and
on
to
which
"will
never
be
abrogated"
the basis of the
"obligation"
which stems
from it,
eternal
which obligation
things."
order of
equal among all Once this is understood, it case
"is
men"
and which stems

will
from "the
be
seen that
Locke does in fact

and universal,
hold it to be the but it

will
that the natural law is perpetual, that the natural law
"eternal,"
also
be
seen
of which
he is speaking is
of a
radically different
character
from that
understood
by
the tradition.
Locke'
Questions
on
the Law of Nature
295
QUESTION XI
"Does the
private
interest
of each
individual
constitute
the
foundation
of
the
law
of nature?
It does
not."
Locke's final Question

natural
again
begins
"objector"
with
an
to the traditional
law, in this case by Carneades, an ancient sceptic. Question XI thus differs from other Questions in that Locke here identifies by name one of those
"objectors"
whose arguments
have
played such an
important
disputation toward its

to Locke's
certain of should not
conclusion.
substantial part of
part in moving this Question XI is devoted
rebuttal of
Carneades
and
to the untenable conclusions drawn

apparent
by
his
misguided
followers. The
simplicity
of this
Question
blind the
reader to the complexities of
arguments, for it is here that
he cares to say positively about his understanding of natural law. Carneades contended, among other things, that either there is "no natural law or, "were such a law to exist, it would constitute the height of
Locke cautiously reveals to the attentive reader as much as
(jus),"
folly"
to
others
follow it, "since a person who takes into consideration what is of benefit to does injury to himself (fol. 105). Locke does not pause at this point to
with
dispute
and
Carneades. Quite the contrary; he

eloquence"
praises
which
his "acute leaves
intelligence,"
the "powerful
of
his argument,
"nothing intact,
Carneades virtually nothing Having himself unchallenged, Locke, speaking as a representative of and on behalf of "the saner part of which possesses "some sense of humanity and
argument of
mankind,"
unshaken"
(fol. 105).
left the
some concern neades who

which
for
society,"
denounces
and repudiates
those followers
of mind
of
Car
of
lacked "the
virtues and
those endowments
by
the
help
they
could pave
for themselves the way to honors

subversives
wealth"
and
(fol. 106).
These malcontents, parasites, or attack on the natural law for their

social
Carneades'
eagerly
seized upon
rejected
selfish purposes.
They
any
notion of
hierarchy
based
on
merit.
They
rejected political rule and attacked as
unjust all equal
existing governments, because under them they had not achieved wealth and honor. They therefore "clamored that the yoke of [all] author be his
shaken
ity
vindicated"
should
off,
and natural
liberty
and
(fol. 106). Inflamed
by
their radically
ligence,"
egalitarian
partisanship,
lacking
Carneades'
"acute intel
un
professed
followers failed to
observe that
in their fervor they
wittingly based their position on a natural law that all men are born free, they enjoy "natural
equal.
individual."
or natural right
liberty,"
foundation,
viz.,
and
they
are, above all,
of each
It follows, they contend, that laws should be determined "by the interest Locke pauses to refute their erroneous conclusion, but their
at
argument,
purposes.
which
least
as
it is
presented
It
enables
him to
pull
by him, is craftily utilized for his own together and bring into focus many basic issues
in the Questions. He does this
be traced
carefully. quite
have thus far been
unconnected
skillfully
through a number of steps which must
First, he
296
Interpretation
sketches
in
some of the additional consequences of
the
natural
law
understand more
ing
do
held
by
the followers of
shortsighted
Carneades,
who,
as
than selfish,
not realize
that that
anarchic state of
ideologues seeking their "natural
it seems, are nothing own immediate good. in

which
They
liberty"
"all
society"
is destroyed
would
and within which each
individual hopes to enjoy his "full

and
right,"
overwhelming dangers. Poor, benighted enthusiasts that they are, they think that once the "yoke of govern has been shaken off the interests of each individual will be assured. be
one characterized
by
enormous
ment"
What they fail to

among
see
is that
under such
conditions
"the
commerce of men
themselves"
cannot
other
be anything
things of this
of
other
than
. .
"fraud,
violence, enmity,
rapine, bloodshed and
kind
(fol. 1 15).
whom
Or,
as we
know
from
decried"
"justly
Locke
contemporary
goes on
Locke's
he scarcely
mentions
by
name, life
under such conditions would
short."
and
to say that
men
be "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish living under these conditions "under
the law of
nature"
thus understood,
also
as
"are,
as
they
say, in
war"
a state of
(fol.
Locke himself has explicitly remarked in say, and, Question VII, it is precisely in "the state of nature [that] war is common, and among men there exists a perpetual, mutual, and internecine He then demonstrates why this would necessarily be the case. As Hobbes explicitly
said
enmity"
115). As
"they"
(fol. 63).
earlier, and,
of
as
Locke subsequently
a condition
says
in his
typically
guarded
fashion,
the "state
war"
typifies the state of nature. (Le
viathan, ch.
13;
cf.
Two Treatises, II, 123-27). It is

own
in
which each
individual fair "the

and
would
be free to determine his is

good
advantage, "for
and
no one can
be
just
assessor of what
for
another,"
therefore,
says
Locke,
state of
[our]
question now comes

useful
to this: whether what each private indi

occasion
vidual
judges to be
conforms
to himself and to his own affairs as the
arises,
to the law of nature
(fol. 108).
By
the phrase, "as the
arises,"
occasion
understand
individual
living
within
Locke to be characterizing the attempts of each this situation to satisfy his needs as he perceives them, he
regards as
and therefore to attempt to secure what
those immediate
benefits,
self-
goods,
or advantages which
he
at
that moment regards as necessary for his
preservation
or to
satisfy
such
other
instincts, drives,
would
appetites as
he feels.
Under
such
circumstances, "each
individual"
possess the greatest possible
this
supply of is the case, it is necessary that as as possible is left for another (fol. 114). This would follow from the fact as alleged by Locke, that
little'
be bound to grasp "and to things useful to him. And, so long as

. .
The human
race
has only
one
patrimony
and this
is
always the same and
it is
not
increased in
proportion to the number of
births. Nature has been

and use of men.
generous with a
products are
fixed
abundance of things
for the benefit

a
And her
deliberately
random,
distributed in
fixed
manner and
number, [and are]
not produced at
nor
do they increase
with the need or avarice of men.
(Fol.
112)
But exactly how does Locke regard nature to have been to man? What kind of generosity is it that provides only a "fixed regardless
abundance"
"generous"
Locke's Questions
of
on
the Law of Nature
297
on
the growth
and size of
the population? It is just this sort of
"generosity"
the part of nature that insures death through

population
starvation of animals when
their
increases beyond
of nature
a certain point
in
a natural of
state,
and
the "fixed
abundance"
is
strained
beyond the limits

chapters on
the food
supply.
It
was
some
thirty
years
later in his famous
of Government that Locke

dance"
provided
are
in
perfect
fully by nature, but these rudimentary suggestions in his Questions harmony with the fuller development of his views. (Two Trea
explained more
property in the Two Treatises his understanding of the "abun
tises, II, V). The state of the question, then, is as follows: those who have maintained that human beings live in a condition under which they act to secure
their
interests "as
arises"
the occasion
and
that the pursuit of individual

of
interest
pro
under such conditions constitutes
"the foundation
not
the law of
nature,"
pound
fatally
contradictory solutions,
problem of
"they"
only
to the problem of natural
law,
is
but
also
to the
the very maintenance of human life on earth. It
manifest, as both
and
Locke have indicated, that

to avoid
under such conditions
individuals
tion
of
would not
be
able
deadly
competition,
even the competi
"a
war."
state of
The resulting question, then, is whether there is a way to avoid the conflict which occurs when individuals act simply in terms of that "self-love and that
instinct
by
which each man cherishes own
himself,
and
and
looks out,
so
far
as
he is
able, for his

self
safety
and
preservation;
inasmuch
as everyone
feels him
self-
industrious
and eager enough
in his
own preservation
(fol. 82). The
actions of
individuals based
on the principle of
securing their immediate

and
interest lead them into

terized
conflict with one
another,
life is accordingly
things,"
charac
by "violence,
enmity, rapine, bloodshed
and other
as observed
before.
"Everyone feels himself industrious

tion,"
and eager enough
in his
own preserva
yet
the individual's attempts to secure it may

a solution
contribute
to his destruc
which
tion. Is there
to this problem within the framework from
Locke is
now
arguing?
It
seems
there
is. Human beings
are
not, from this
perspective,
with
men
seen as
to
be
"naturally
put
induced to
seek communion and
fellowship
others,"
Hooker
desire
sociable
it (i.e., to have "a natural inclination, whereby all life and fellowship"). Nonetheless, the overpowering dan
existence and the
gers
would
inherent in solitary be subject in the

through
as
suffering to
which
human beings impel

each
pursuit of their short-term advantage
"to
a
form
union
and to preserve a union of

which men seek suggested
his life
men"
with other
(fol. 61). This is
to
preserve and
to secure their
lives, liberty,
Locke
and
property,
that
is
in
some
detail in Question XI,
where
observes
we
do
not want
to be
understood
to claim that the
common right
(jus)
of men and
the
private
interest
of each
individual defense
are things opposed to one another,
for the
Were
law it
of nature
is the
greatest
of the private
not observed, no one could possess
his
own
property of property or labor for his
the individual.
own
298
Interpretation
whomever considers and weighs
benefit. Thus, to
men's advantage of men's
properly the human
race and
customs, it
the
will appear certain
that
nothing is law
as conducive to the common
individual, nothing
so protective of the
safety
and
security
of
possessions, as the observance of the
of nature.
(Fols.
107-8;
emphasis
supplied.)
Here is
an
understanding "form
of
the law of nature that affords

protection of property.
primary
emphasis
to individual interest and the achieved, if

each will
This
protection can
with other
be
his life
men."
Once
and
such a union
has been
formed,
specific
laws designed to
protect person
property may be enacted, and magistrates can be ish violators of these laws. Then and only then
against predators. of a social
appointed who
will
may
pun
there be security
Although Locke does
not speak
specifically in the Questions
contract, or discuss the mechanism of consent
by
which such a
be formed, it is difficult to imagine what alternative social arrange ment could be implied by the foregoing quotation. However that may be, it is within such a that the mature Locke saw "the private property of the
union might
"union"
individual"
to
be preserved,
as we
know from his Two Treatises of Govern

Without
secure
ment.
The
and
aggregate strength of
the collectivity makes it possible to secure "the
possessions."
safety beings
security
perish,
of men's
property, human
can
will
and
in the
anarchic
"state
nature"
of
there
be
no
security
of property. can
Therefore human beings

there be any justice.
must create society. as
Nor, in
the "state of
nature,"
For,
Locke
asks:
"what justice [can there
be]
where
each each
there is no property or private ownership, or what property where is allowed, not only to possess what belongs to him, but the property of individual is what he possesses, what is useful to (fol. 116). Indi
him?"
viduals must
sion
arises,"
They
ensue
can
be deterred from seizing what they will from others, as "the occa from acting solely in terms of their immediate, short-term interest. be deterred, if they come to understand that deadly struggles will
so
from
acting,
and
secondly, if
they
comprehend
that
they
should
"form
life
men."
with other
The
conditions of peace which
such a union makes possible would then protect the while
encouraging
and
fostering
the growth of this property,

pursue what
existing property of each, for it is under such later

came
circumstances that one could
effectively
to be termed
within
"self-interest
a
understood,"
rightly
of
i.e.,
a person's
long-term advantage,
"peaceful
union"
fellow
citizens.
Locke does
other
not anywhere
in these Questions but those familiar
comment on with
the institutional
or
details
may
of
this
"union,"
his Two Treatises of Gov do supply

great clas
ernment
of
appreciate the extent to which
he laid down here the foundations

the Law of Nature
that work. So far as the Questions
Concerning
law
the foundations for the Two Treatises of

sic rests on an
Government,
then
Locke's
understanding
part of
of natural
or natural right
that differs radically
from the
principles of
In the early
traditional, Christian natural law. Question XI Locke has vigorously
attacked what
he takes
Locke's Questions
to be the their
point
on
the
Law of Nature
299
dangerous
consequences
drawn
by
the followers of Carneades from

premises.
"individualism"
but
more
without
negating their
One
can
by
this
begin to discern
clearly the main aspects of Locke's alternative to law tradition. The basis least two
of
the
traditional, Christian
natural or
natural
this new, natural
law (or
right) doctrine is the
protection of person and property. at

major respects
This
of
basis,
underlying principle, differs in

of man's
from that
all with about
the traditional natural law position. The latter is concerned above
the
fulfillment
and
threefold
natural
inclinations:
knowing
of
the truth
God
achieving may be developed in society, and self-preservation. The complete realization of these natural inclinations is possible, as we have seen, only if human beings
meet
union with
Him, full development
those human virtues
which
their threefold obligations.
Duties
or responsibilities are
imposed
on
them
every level and in every sphere of life by natural law. In the alternative perspective that has gradually emerged in Locke's Ques tions, every human being is seen to possess, simply by virtue of being human,
at
certain
inalienable
natural
rights, and each individual is therefore said to

the
be
bom free
erty,"
Thus, assuring every human being his or her rights to life, liberty, and estate, i.e., to "prop in the inclusive sense in which Locke generally uses that word. As we
and equal. or political problem of
human
is that
have
seen
thus far in Question

of
XI, he has
property
or
stated
that
natural
law
constitutes
"the
greatest
defense
the private property of the individual. Were
it
not
observed,
no one could possess
his
own
labor for his

natural
benefit"
own
(fol. 107).
At the
same
the "private
common
interest"
time, in Locke's alternative of the individual is
law
or natural right
teaching,
to the
not understood to
be
opposed
right.
mean
Does this underlying

this
that the "interest of each individual is the
foundation"
or
the
principle of
"the law
of
of nature"?
That
cannot
be, for Locke denies

try
to
directly
in the title
elusive
this Question. We must then continue to

principle.
discover the
underlying
Locke
assists us
by
principles of morals
observing that "the champions of the doctrine seek the and the rale of life from the natural appetites and inclina
tions of men, rather than from the obligation of the

moral
law,
as
if
what were who
best in
terms is that for which most men
strive"
(fol. 116). Those
formulated the foundations
of the modern natural
law
or natural right
originally doctrine
terms"
held,
on
the
basis
that
of what
they
observed, that what is "best in moral
is
decidedly
extent
not
for
which most
human beings do in
who
practice strive.
To that
they
agreed with
Machiavelli,
had
suggested
in The Prince that
Was something like what almost all men actively seek is "money and this the view of Hobbes, when he alleged that human beings naturally war
against each other seem that
on the
glory."
in their
of
pursuit of
gain, safety, and
reputation?
It
would
basis
tion
or
the
principle
this understanding of human nature, the firm founda or basis of modern natural right is found in the natural
"drives"
appetites, the fundamental instincts
and
the
of men.
If human beings
300
Interpretation
to
are not
destroy
one another and
in the
process of
satisfying these appetites, prop
erty
must
be protected,
this protection requires civil society, as we
have
seen.
The
solution proffered
here to the basis

or
problems
inherent in the
view
that "selfrather
preservation"
provides the
the foundation for natural law
is the
unexpected suggestion
that public happiness and the
happiness
of
the
individual
that
are, somehow,
Locke
places
inextricably linked. In this extremely heavy emphasis in

of material
connection, it is
not
by
chance
Question XI
on
property, especially
on private
property, for in his view,
public
happiness
to
or welfare requires a
considerable
degree
abundance,
indeed,
"prosperity."
With these observations, dation or the basis of the happiness

property.
consists
one moves closer

natural
identifying
law,
which can
precisely the foun be expressed as follows:
in the
enjoyment of one's natural
rights to life,
underlies
liberty,
and
The human
"instinct"
for
self-preservation
these
rights.
has the basis, the foundation from which the law of nature may be derived. For the natural law, as understood from this perspective, is derived Here
one
from the right finds
of self-preservation and
is
constituted
by
those prudential
princi
ples which must guide

a classic account
human beings if they are to preserve themselves. One of the derivation of the laws of nature from the right of
of nature mandates
nature
in
Hobbes'
Leviathan: the first law
"seek
peace and
follow
it."
Question XI, Locke presents us with a fascinating minidisputation between the Defenders of the traditional, Christian natural law, and
remainder of
In the
those upstart Objectors who have manifested their presence throughout the
Questions. These Objectors have,

great tradition
nature. a
have seen, repeatedly challenged the by asserting radically different understanding of the law of To the entrenched Defenders of the venerable tradition, the argument of
as we
on
"
.
the
Objectors is anathema, and they denounce it away with "all justice, friendship, generosity
.
the grounds that it

"life"
would
do
and
itself (fol. 115).

human
Not so, ceed from duct. You
respond a
the Objectors. You argue in this fashion because you pro

nature and of
con
must
manifestly unrealistic view of human lower your gaze from the heavens
are, creatures
who act
and understand of self-interest.
human be
ings
tions
as
they really
in terms
You
should
"seek the
principles and the rale of
life from the

for"
natural appetites and as
inclina
moral
of men rather
than the obligation of the
law,
the
if
what
is best in
terms is the object
most men strive
(fol. 116).
of
How very
would result
base,
in
complain the
Defenders
you
tradition;
kinds
of
what you advocate

vice"
"throwing
we seek
Rubbish,
placing stood. What
retort the
Objectors;
intention. What
it at
long
last on
(fol. 112). have failed completely to understand our is to establish a rational basis for the law of nature by
solid
the window open to all
foundations,
is
not
"vice,"
on
property,
broadly
under
we seek
to encourage
as you
allege, but
rather
the
Locke's Questions
protection of
on
the Law of Nature
301
and
"the
individual,"
private
property
of
the
will
for it is in "the safety
possessions"
security
of
of men's
that there
be found "the for
common advantage
individual."
the
Oh, lost
morality
rowed and
souls,
sigh
the
Defenders;
we mourn
you.
In seeking to law
place
nar
on what you
deem
a realistic
foundation,
you
have
hopelessly
lowered its
standards.
Our understanding
of natural
provides a
basis for interest
virtues
far
more exalted
than the mere maintenance of peace and the
protection of property.
You
of
protecting
your
nothing but the elimination of conflict in the beloved For our part, we hold that
seek
"property."
the virtues themselves are not in conflict with one

men
another nor
do they
compel part stand
[to conflict], they kindle and mutually foster one another. Justice on my does not destroy the fairness of another, nor does the munificence of a prince
in the way
his subjects; a father's sanctity does not corrupt his children, nor can the austerity of Cato result in making Cicero less severe. The duties of life do not conflict with one another, nor do they arm men against one
of the
generosity
of
another.
(Fols.
114-115)
the Objectors. Of course
men are
True,
not
no
doubt, but utterly trivial, reply
generally led into conflict through acts of fairness and generosity, or by living lives of personal purity and austerity, but your illustrations miss the
point.
The
virtues
that you have just given as examples in your argument are which, one would to
peaceful and
precisely those
relationships.
sorts of personal attributes
everywhere acknowledged to
be
conducive
think, are almost harmonious human

in
ques
How
so?
Well, because,
limited.
above
all, the
goods or virtues are
tion are not

and could
by
nature
well
My
personal
interests
surely
not
harmed
very fair and generous, and, who, through personal austerity, make limited spoken of here conflict with one demands on others. The particular
who are
"duties"
be furthered
by
the presence in the community of people
another, because
they
are
limitless in
It is
principle. you
Easily
defense
these
said, snap back the
Defenders, but
we who
have
no rightful claim
to the
of
any
genuine virtues.
have
provided
the
foundations for
many virtues,
and
the greatest virtues,
which consist
only in
[their
our
helping
others at
stars and
our own expense.
By
virtues of this
kind heroes did from
were once elevated
to the
included in the
roll of
the gods.
They
not purchase
all
place
virtue of monies piled

generosity.
up
and acquired
sources, but
by
toil,
in] by by dangers, by
heaven
They
did
not pursue their own private

race.
gain, but the public interest and
that of the entire
human
(Fol.
109)
cited
"heroes"
Among
the examples of
such
by
the Defenders are
Hercules,
. . .
Marcus Curtius ("who for the

to prevent Rome from
sake of
being
his country lept into a yawning abyss buried by her own internal threats, entered the
302
Interpretation
alive"),
earth when still might
prosper,
and
Fabricius, who willingly chose poverty so that Rome Cicero, who sacrificed his life to defend the institutions of
Challengers, by
set
Rome (fol. 110).
Very
our
well, insist the

not yours.
these very
examples you
have
proved
case,
You have
forth these
others
"heroes"
examples of virtue and you
beckon
antiquity as to follow in their footsteps. But this blinded
of pagan
is because
amined
you
have been utterly
confused and
by
the force
you
of unex
traditions,
of these
by dangerously
examples,
and
misleading
opinions.
Were
to ponder the
would
meaning
to analyze them critically,
you
find
them worthy of
example of the
great
blame,
and
not praise. of
What
should one conclude
from the
O.M.,"
famous labors
Hercules,
that bastard son of the promiscuous
Jupiter, "Deum gods, Zeus, king the murderer of his own chil Pantheon. As Roman in the Best and Greatest, dren, Hercules could well have been said to have "declared war on nature
of the
the Greek
counterpart of
herself
aside,
monsters"
rather
than on
(fol. 110). Hercules how instructive
and
was
his lawless father
one should consider as a
in
general
the behavior of the
Olympian gods, taken

mortals.
whole, as models for the moral guidance of mere

perished on the
Hercules
should
have
felon's
cross and earned eternal
ignominy
Still
rather than
immortality.
suggest
Challengers, are your accounts of such Roman as Marcus Curtius, Fabricius, and Cicero. They are praised because they sacrificed their interests, even their lives, on behalf of the state. But what a state! Did not Rome become the epitome of imperialism, of injus tice, and of inhuman cruelty? One can hardly fail to recall that in Question VII,
more
instructive,
the
"heroes"
Locke
spoke of the
Romans themselves, "who for the

entire
are
held up
as
having
acquire
displayed for them
examples of virtue selves
world,
[but] how did they
honors, triumphs, glory, and an immortal memory for their own name, if from robbery and rapine by which they laid the entire world to waste? What else is that great so celebrated among them with so many panegyrics,
not
'virtue'
what else
larceny,'
is it, I ask, but

says
violence and wrong.
'Thieves involved in
private
Cato,
'spend their lives in
chains and
purple'"
gold and earth
(fols. 71-72). In
wanton
order
to enrich
fetters; itself, Rome
public
thieves in
soaked the
in blood. Through its
conquests, it
armies.
enslaved all
those peoples who
were within reach of
its conquering
It
seized alien peoples and nations
for its
terized
own selfish
purposes,
and much of what
it
aggrandized was
destroyed
or
otherwise wasted'.
by
the
own name
The history of imperial Rome might well have been charac Challengers, very much in the fashion that it was by Locke in his in Some Thoughts Concerning Education:
Renown that is bestowed Butchers
of
the
are
Honour but the
and
on
Conquerours (who for

mislead
the
most part
great
Mankind) farther
growing Youth,
who
by
this
means come to think
Heroick
of
Slaughter the laudable Business of Mankind, and the Vertues. By these Steps unnatural Cruelty is planted in us; and
most
what
Locke'
Questions
on
the Law of Nature
303
Humanity
which
abhorrs, Custom reconciles and recommends to us,
by laying
be
a
it in
the way to Honour.
in it
self
Thus, by Fashion and Opinion, that neither is, nor can be any. (Sec. 116)
comes to
Pleasure,
More specifically, it would seem that, according to the jectors, Rome was a state that was neither founded on, nor
ples of
position of
the Ob
ruled
by
the princi
the law of nature,
properly
understood.
Thus its
"heroes"
statesmen and
citizenry
were the victims of
ously misdirected. Curtius is specifically

that
wrong opinion Of the examples
and their conduct was of
Roman
hopelessly, danger furnished here, Marcus
"insane."
characterized as
a chasm opened
"unfruitful"
by throwing
himself into
by
Fool that he was, he believed an earthquake, he could over

as
come nature.
That remarkably
action, based
it
was on a
fanciful
and groundless religious
opinion,
was
as
little
rational as
that of those poor
Indian
widows who commit suttee.
stupidly
us
sacrificed
his
personal good
As for the brave Fabricius, he joyfully but for "for low and filthy This brings
vice."
to the great Cicero. At the height

threw
of
his
powers and
accomplishments, he
recklessly
the public
away the rewards of private life in the vain attempt to improve
life
of
hopelessly
effort and was
himself
corrupted
of the
state,
as well as
Rome. He lost everything in this feckless in the process, for he violated the legal code the law of nature, through his part in the extra-legal
corrupt
execution of
Catiline's
conspirators.
Of the four
examples of
Roman
Catiline is
praised.
with
Why? Was it because it
best fashion
of
the precepts of
in Question XI, only he alone, who, "imbued in the nature, preferred his own [interest] to the head
presented was plow
"heroes"
the world, nor feared
driving
his hostile
some
into the
walls of
Rome herself,
provided
he
could expect
from this
harvest for himself (fol. 111)? Ca
tiline
evidently acting on the basis of that view put forth earlier by an Objector when he held that "self love and that instinct by which each man
was
cherishes
himself is the
sound principle of
was generalized
by
certain
teachers
of modern natural
human action, a principle which right as follows: "if there
exists a
law
of
nature,
which might appear
to be the most sacred among all
men,
which
the entire human race seems driven to obey
by
a certain natural
instinct
74-75).
and
its
own
interest,
this is surely that of self-preservation, which some the primary

and
establish
for this
reason as
fundamental law
nature"
of
(fols.
With this
tion
of
praise of
Catiline,
the Objectors
bring
to
an end
the mini-disputa
Question XI,
and we must comment on some aspects of
it
by
way
of
concluding
our own commentary.
The
unqualified praise of
Catiline,
together
with the unmitigated criticism of
Cicero
and the other
Roman
"heroes,"
is in
triguing. It bears
and
all
the
marks of
intentional
overstatement.
If this is the case,

rhetoric
self-
I believe that it
is,
a possible explanation
for Locke's hyperbolic

quotation observes
may be found in the sentence that follows our last interest and self-preservation. In this sentence, Locke
regarding that "such is the
304
Interpretation
[which is
not
power of custom and opinion
innate but taken from
some external
source]
adopted
from the
conduct of
daily
life that it
arms men even against
themselves, and brings them to lay death with the same eagerness with
eted and emphasized materials
violent
hands
upon
themselves and pursue

it"
which others
flee from
(fol.
75; brack
deleted
by
power of
misleading opinion and may lead to self-destruction in the fashion of the Roman tion XL Mankind will not and cannot discover its true interests
and
incorrect
Locke from MS. B). In short, the blinds people to their true interests
"heroes"
of
Ques
until and unless
the
obstacles presented not
by
misleading
custom and opinion are
overcome, but
Powerfully entrenched, long-established opinion, likely e.g., the traditional, Christian natural law teaching, may be likened to a mighty fortress, one that cannot be successfully stormed and reduced by dispassionate
this is
to
be
easy.
reason alone.
The
enemies of such opinion must also
bring
to bear the piercing
battering
massive
rams of a rhetoric which
is
at once are
both
powerful and
insidious, if the
battle
defenses
of such a
fortress
to be breached. to a close our analysis of the
With these
observations we must
bring
between the dissident, radical Objectors and the Defenders of a venerable tradi tion. Perhaps the dispute between them is ultimately unresolvable, being prem
ised,
tify
as
it is,
on
and of
the
sources of genuine
very different understandings of human nature, of the deity, knowledge. My own intention has been to iden
taken
throughout the manuscript the disparate and disconnected elements of the
alternate position whole
by
the
"Objectors"
which
is
more or
less
presented as a
in Question XI. I have assiduously

"strange"
refrained
from
insisting
that Locke
is
a proponent of a
or novel natural right and
teaching
that could all too
readily be identified
character and genesis.
denounced
"Hobbist,"
as
essentially
both in its
to Locke's
Such
a contention would ran
directly
counter
intention
and
be very
un-Lockean
indeed.
1664."
All that
we can
manuscript of
properly say in conclusion is that when Locke completed the his Questions, he signed it, "Thus thought John Locke,
Exactly what his thoughts really were with respect to these Questions Concern ing the Law of Nature must be determined by each and every reader for him
self.
We
must
leave it
at that
if
we are
to serve the
function
of a
true friend.
NOTES
1. Cf.
Wolfgang
von
Leyden,
"Introduction"
to John
Locke, Essays
on
the
Law of Nature
(Oxford, 1954), 313-76; Robert Horwitz,
"Introduction,"
John Locke: Questions
Law of Nature, eds. Robert Horwitz, Jenny S. Clay and Diskin Clay (Ithaca, N.Y., 1990), p. 47. References in this text to the Essays are to the Von Leyden translation. References to the Questions are to Locke's folio pages as identified by Horwitz, et al. 2. In Ms. B. it appears to have been Locke himself, not his who numbered the
amanuensis,
Concerning
the
Questions serially
Question VIII. (For details about the manuscripts and their history, see Questions, pp. 28-33.) Locke included in his numbering those Questions to which he gave oneword responses: III, VI, and IX, as well as those to which he afforded longer answers: I, II, IV, V,
as as
far
Locke'
Questions
on
the Law of Nature

"pattern"
305
in the
VII, VIII, X,
single
and
XI. This is
could
be
seen to suggest
the possibility of some sort of
arrangement of
the Questions in which two Questions with extended answers are followed
which
by
Question
answered
in
one word.
Taking
that Question VI is at the center of the entire series of

groups of
strictly spatial perspective, one observes Questions and that it is flanked by two
five
one
questions.
Within
each of
these two groups, Questions III and IX (which are an
swered
by
comment.
respectively central. I simply observe this phenomenon in passing without Whether Locke intended to arrange his Questions in this or any other pattern is a matter
word)
are
on which
there does not appear to be any external evidence for making a judgment. 3. Fol. 11. See Essays, p. 111. The reference is to Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 14. 4. Nathaniel Culverwel, An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature (Toronto, 1971), p. 34.
5. John
Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Iiii8.
6. [John Milner], An Account of Mr. Locks Religion (London, 1700). 7. Fol. 18, quoting Summa Theologiae, la2ae 93.4, as paraphrased by Richard Hooker, Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity (Oxford, 1888), I, 3, sec. 1. 8. Thus I think the
result of
Of the
the
inquiry
as a
in Question I to be follows: "On the
much
less definitive than does Von

that some
Leyden,
the
who summarized the
Question be
assumption
divine
being
presides over world of
the world as a whole
fact
living
beings
are seen to
by the 'argument governed by divine laws

proved
. .
from
design,'
since nature and
certain
fixed
rules of conduct
must
apply to the life of man in particular. These rules are the law of nature, and such a law, should not be called the dictate of reason: for (a) [is] to be distinguished from natural right and it is the decree of the divine will issuing commands and prohibitions, and (b) it is implanted in
men's
hearts
by
God
so
that reason can only discover and interpret

of
terms."
it"
(Essays,
p.
95).
comment
9. Locke may be signalling his readers regarding "scrupulousness in my choice of tradition,

and
his innovativeness in Question II in his
By
completely
divorcing
"Revelation''
from
then adding it as
fourth "mode
knowledge,"
of
albeit one which
he then
flatly
rejects and refuses to of tradition.
treat, Locke radically transforms the traditional framework for the discussion
edition of
10. Cf. Von Leyden's
the Questions. He has been followed in his dismissal of the
very brief Questions by most interpreters of the work. 11. John Locke, The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes (London, 1824), III, 48. 12. Cf. Horwitz, pp. 2-3, 6-8, 36-39, and references therein.
"Introduction,"
13. Cf.
Elizabeth S. Haldane, Descartes: His Life and Times (London, 1905), p. 368. in the thought 14. Fol. 38; cf. above, in the discussion of Question III, the role of the
e.g.
"fall"
of
Culverwel.
15. Fol. 54. In the
same sentence
Locke
also contradicts
himself in
to be anything but intentional regarding the possibility ourselves,

not
of a causa sui.
a way that is too "We do not owe our
manifest
origin
to
acknowledge
only because nothing might be (sit) the cause of itself for if we are willing to god this axiom does not prevent us from believing that there exists something which
else"
does
not come from something 16. Relevant here is Locke's
(fol. 54).
the attributes of
account of
deity,
as revealed
thus far in this
Question. Reason, according to Locke, suggests that humanity was created by some superior power. However, nowhere in this Question, nor indeed thus far in the entire work, has this superior power been described as either omniscient or omnipotent. Instead, Locke has consistently used
"wiser"
"stronger''
such words as
or
when
speaking
the
of the
deity. Whatever
of
else
intended
by
his
modest characterization
of
attributes
the
deity, he
seems
Locke may have thereby to be
emphasizing his difference from Sacred Scripture as regards the attributes of the deity. This is also consistent with the fact that in Question V he does not speak of the deity as having created the heavens and earth out of nothing, although in a strikingly different context in a subsequent Ques
tion
he does just
and
this.
Finally, it
should
be
emphasized
that Locke maintains

an
in the Questions that it

of
is exclusively sense,
works,
plus reason
not revelation
that leads to
understanding
the
deity, his
the duties that he is
said to require of man.
17. Locke, Essay Worcester, p. 486.
Concerning
Human Understanding, Iiv8; Learned
Reply
to
Bishop
of
306
Interpretation
references gathered
18. Cf.
n.
in Leo
Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago, 1954),
p.
204,
49.
19. James Tyrell, A
Brief Disquisition
Rev. Dr.
Method Laid Down in
the
Cumberland'
of the Law of Nature, According to the Principles and s Latin Treatise on the Subject (London,
1692),
p.
132.
20. Locke, Second Reply to the Bishop of Worcester in Works, III, 489. 21. Cf. Francisco Suarez, On Laws and God the Lawgiver (Oxford, 1944), II, xvii, 3-7.
Looking
1990s
at
Carl Schmitt from the Vantage Point
of
the
John H. Herz
Emeritus
City
College
and
the
Graduate Center of the
City University
of New York
The
the
following
remarks are
based
Political.'
When I
was asked
rereading Carl Schmitt's The Concept of to contribute some impressions gained from
on
this rereading to a
recent conference on
Carl Schmitt I
of
accepted with
alacrity,
because it
seemed to me that and affected
it
might
be
interest to
over
show
how
one who
had
been impressed
the
of
by
Schmitt's theories
sixty
years ago
one of
few
still
surviving
would assess
Schmitt from the
vantage point of the end
the century.
The German 1920s
were an era of great
surprising that the ideas of one of Germany's

political
intellectual excitement, and it is not leading intellectuals in the field of
theory impressed
and,
more referred
many, especially among the young interested in the generally, in the great political issues of the times.
theory,"
social sciences
When I just
specify.
to "political
must correct myself
or, rather,
In
pre-Nazi
Germany
there was no political science as we know
it
today. One
would study Staatsrecht or Volkerrecht, that is, international law. Schmitt's official position, for instance, was that
constitutional or of professor
of
of constitutional and
international law in the he taught.
respective
faculties
jurispru
dence
at the
universities where with
legal norms,
the state somehow

of
Theoretically speaking, first came the disappearing behind them. In Hans Kel(reine Rechtslehre), for instance, the order. Thus it made a tremendous
some extent
sen's, my teacher's, "pure theory

state was considered
law"
identical
as
with
the legal
impression
when
Schmitt,
its
Max Weber to
the
had done before him,
established, the
or re-established,
state as power
political as
having
own existence
holder creating the law, and especially in crisis situations of exis

such as
tential threats to
organized groups.
Formulations
defining
the sovereign
as the one who controls the state of
necessity (Wer iiber den Ausnahmezustand

war conditions of
verfugt),
ties
seemed
to
fit in
with
the
who
near-civil-
the early twen
in Germany,
when
asking
fought
whom and who controlled a constant
interpretation,
Spring 1992,
Vol. 19, No. 3
308
Interpretation
emergency
was
state of
a more vital question
than asking which
party
was
backing winning On rereading The Concept of the Political I was struck by what now seem to me the chief characteristics of Schmitt's concepts: extremism, vagueness, and
an election or
one or another government coalition. an
Hobbes'
anthropology that, individualism
as
Leo Strauss has
pointed
out,2
in
contrast even
to
renders
the individual the subject of the political collec
tivity, i.e., the state. The merit of Schmitt's approach to the political, as Gio vanni Sartori has put it, lies in "the uncovering, when the chips are down, of
what
the
routine of
normalcy
covers
up."3
Its
extremism
is in confining the
political to
the extreme existential conflict situation of external or
internal, i.e.,
or
civil war, a conflict situation moral-ideological causes and not to

be."
from
which
Schmitt
even excludes economic or
conflicts, reducing it to the existential "to be
Which
war
situation,
which
tremism but
political
also
the vagueness
as
enemy is Schmitt aiming at? Not only his ex of his concepts is revealed when he defines the
"the
as one who
enemy
"the
other," stranger,"
is "in
an
specially
intense way, existentially something different and intends "to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore fought in
order p.
alien,"
adversary who must be repulsed or

(The Concept of the
to preserve one's own
form
existence"
of
27). Subsequently, in his Nomos der Erde, the enemy is not so defined (at least as far as the members of the jus publicum Euroexistentially paeum, i.e., of the European territorial state system, are concerned); but in The
Political,
Concept,
one
the enemy is the foe

or
who
has to be fought
"form
of
and
destroyed in
But Schmitt
as
order
for
to survive, physically
in
existence."
one's
gives no
examples.
Did he think
enemies"?
of
World War I,
a
with
Britain
and
France
Germany's
"hereditary
Schmitt's
As
friend
of
mine, Eugene
Anschel,
who was one of
students
in the
following
heroes heroes
schel
the economist
twenties, relates in his Werner Sombart, distinguished Helden

middle
memoirs,4
und
Schmitt, Handler,
and
merchants, or,
better,
shopkeepers, clearly referring to Germanic
as opposed
to British (or possibly also
American)
merchants; but An
believes that the latter, denigrating characterization also referred to Jews. And here, the definitions in his Concept noted above indeed assume a more
sinister character. political
If
one
at
Catholicism
the time of the
looks for domestic foes (Schmitt occasionally refers to Kulturkampf and to the Socialists at the
cannot
time cf their outlawry
ing
and
Bismarck in this respect), one that German anti-Semites defined the Jew as the
by
help
the
remember
"alien,"
"other,"
one
who, despite
all efforts at
integration,
would always of
be
an outsider
hostile to,
anti-
endangering, the German- Aryan way

or not
life. Whether Schmitt
was an
Semite
(before 1933 he probably belonged to those among whose best friends or, in his case, whose best colleagues were Jews), nobody faced with such enemy definitions could escape a hidden, code- word type of reference. Whether Schmitt intended it "World
Jewry"
or
not, it fitted
a racial
policy that
considered Nordic-
as
the existential enemy of all races, and
especially the
Looking
at
Carl Schmitt
309
Germanic one, an enemy who, therefore, had to be exterminated. When Hitler, ("I decided to in Mein Kampf, said, "Ich aber beschloss, Politiker zu become in Schmitt
a
werden"
politician"), he
meant
by
politician and politics
agreement with
Schmitt's
concept of the political.
something essentially To be sure, prior to 1933

see
was not a of
Nazi; he
even was opposed to
Hitlerism (on this
below).
But the trend
build up
his concepts, whether intended or not, could well be used to racist doctrine underlying policies of persecuting and, eventually,
once put
exterminating an existential enemy. As Heine have said, "Ich bin die Tat von Deinen from
your
ideas").5
it, Hitler
might well
Gedanken"
("I
am
the deed that sprang

or extremist
So
much
for Schmitt's
vague
extremism
vagueness.
Just
one more word on
is,
as
I mentioned,
a collectivist one protect
his anthropology, his basic view of man. It where, differing from Hobbes who estab
the individual is supposed to sacri
lishes Leviathan to
the
individual,
fice,
if
need
be, his life for the

a
community.
One is
reminded of
wrote
Bert Brecht's
Der Ja-Sager,
complete a
"yes"
play
written about asked
the time Schmitt
his Concept. There,

can
one member of a
group is
to sacrifice his
life,
the
only way the group
task that will save the lives of many. He is not forced but eventually to his doom. This was heroism as seen from the Left. While Schmitt
says
surely for its
would not
have
promoted such class-struggle
collectivism, it
explains
the
occasional emergence of a own political
leftist Schmittism using Schmitt's power emphasis purposes (exactly as a Hegelian Left used Hegelian dialec its
tic for its purposes, although the Schmittian Left so far has not produced
Karl Marx).
II
One
major criticism one might
level
against
Schmitt's definition
of
the polit
ical is its exclusivism, narrowly limiting the political to the friend-enemy situa tion of existential survival. On the face of it, this excludes from the realm of the political all normal political activities and policies, economic policies, labor industrial policies, now environmental policies, you name them, as institutions and processes connected with them, such as political parties, judiciaries, and so forth, at least as long as they ments,
and
well as parlia are not
the
political
involved in
existential conflict.
Now Schmitt's concepts, like
all
concepts, are
products of conceptualization.
Everybody
is free to define
and
conceptualize,
coming more in agreement

monly
or
less
"reality."
close
to
But Schmitt's
conceptualizations are not
"common"
with
conceptualizations.
They
do
not
fit
what
is
com
comprised under
"political
reality,"
and
"political,"
thus Schmitt's political
realism
that of conflict and enmity. It only one aspect of the the realm of compromise and cooperation, and plays or at least down, neglects, this way is hardly useful for a political analysis of most modern industrial states
comprises
and their more or
less liberal-democratic
societies.
The American
constitution
310
and
Interpretation
type of
governance seem
to be farthest
removed
from Schmittian concep
tualizations.
With its
separation of
powers, checks and
balances, independent
indi
system pushes con of government
"enmity,"
judiciaries watching
vidual and
over
broad
realms of
the state's noninterference with
centrated executive power
group rights, its federalism, and so forth, this away from the normal functioning
of
toward true emergency situations. Even the vital decision about
that
is,
the declaration
war, is denied the
executive.
An
existential war
in the
is, one placing the survival of the union in jeopardy, happened only once in the history of the United States, and even in the Civil War (where the question was the admittance to society of the alleged racial
Schmittian sense, that
stranger, the
take was the
exception
Negro),
the only emergency measure Lincoln was compelled to

suspension of not
temporary
habeas
corpus.
Thus the
of
state of the
has been the exception,

of modern
only in the
even
but in that
and other more
modern,
France, Britain, i.e., developed industrial

parliaments are
history Germany (the

nations.
the United
States
Federal
Republic)
Schmitt's
concepts are
applicable
to Third World countries, where democratic processes like
elections and
institutions like
frequently
his
meaningless
fig
leaves
concealing the real power holders. If

we
don't take Schmitt too
literally
and extend
called
concepts of
the political
em
to the normal sphere of what

phasis on
is commonly
on
politics,
however, his
decision making can prove ex factor, conflict, tremely valuable. To give just one example, taken from recent arguments con cerning the jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court: An allegedly objective interpretation of a document like the American Constitution (of terms
the power
on
like "due lights
process,"
"liberty,"
"equal
protection of
the
law")
valid
under
Schmittian it tends to
criti
reveals
its political, that is, value-setting character,

or more conservative values.
whether
ward more cism of
liberal
Equally
is Schmitt's
the parliamentary system considered as a

will yield
forum for discussion that is
eventually
"the
truth."
Here, however,
cal extremism
we encounter
the limits
of
the Schmittian approach. He
inclined to interpret into
non-Schmittian
theories and policies the same polemi
that characterizes his own. Thus he interprets all liberalism as
antistate, authority-negating,
movement.6
basically
anarchic or
integral-pacifist doctrine
liberal theorists
and
perfectability of man or his natural freedom and equality, but it certainly does not apply to those whose aims are liberal in a broad sense but who, like the fathers of the American Constitution,
ments or
This may be true for some assume the basic goodness that
more radical
and move
are pragmatists, well
knowing
that a parliament,
tool for getting at some truth,
constitutes an arena
for instance, far from being a for the peaceful settlement of

to
of
holding the executive accountable, for preparing an opposition possibly becoming the next government (thus providing for that "alternation
issues,
for
power"
that marks a democratic system). Even
in the international arena,
where
Looking
the power
at
Carl Schmitt
31 1
factor is strongest,
a power
what one
may
call a pragmatic pacifism
has been
not a
the norm, with warlike policies the exception. Hans

Utopian
Morgenthau, surely
and considered
normal
idealist but
realist,
gave
his
magnum
opus, Politics among
Nations,
foreign
the subtitle The Struggle for Power
and
Peace
diplo
macy, not settlement of conflicts

affairs.7
by force, i.e.,
war, the
conduct of
This way one way between the

pian
arrives at what poles of a
may be called a realist liberalism that is mid Hobbesian or Schmittian power realism and a Uto
idealism. It is
equidistant
from advocacy of,

and
or
being
resigned
to,
authori
tarian or totalitarian power concentration and corresponding power politics, and
from
anarchistic
individualism
integral
pacifism.
While it
recognizes
and
the
presence of
the power and conflict factor in all human relations,

mitigate power and
surely in
politics, it tries to
power even
to oppose the ever-present abuses of

executive arbitrariness or
(whether
police
brutality
or
judicial partiality,
the
tyranny
needed
of an
overweening majority) through the liberal-democratic
institutions
and processes mentioned
before, remembering Jefferson's "eternal
vigilance"
for the
the
political realism of
freedom. I myself, starting from a Hobbesian, Machiavellian, or Schmittian variety, in the

preservation of a
late 1930s began to
develop
theory
of what
called
"realist
liberalism,"
summed up in a book that appeared much later, in 1951, Political Realism and Political Idealism. Such idealist realism, or, if you want, realist idealism, in
my opinion is the only way to incorporate what is valuable Carl Schmitt into minimally decent and civilized politics.
and
important in
Ill
As far
this
as
Schmitt's impact
a
on actual political
developments is concerned,
perhaps
jurist."
impact, from
even more so
liberal-democratic viewpoint, has been nefarious, before 1933 than after he became Hitler's "crown has to
To
understand this one

caused
keep
in
mind
the
fundamental
where, in
weakness of
Weimar
the au
by
the continuation, after the establishment of the

of
Republic,
contrast
of
thoritarian tradition
em
Germany, its Sonderweg

had rulership in
return
to the West-
countries, the
middle classes
remained satisfied with feudal-militarist-
nationalist-conservative
This had
shaped the attitudes of the entire
for security in the economic German elite, including the intellec in business
sphere.8
tuals in the academe. Authoritarian

government and
union
attitudes pervaded
the German elites, in

and trade-
judiciary,
schools and universities, even absence of
organizations, and, in the
determined reform,
continued
into
the Weimar Republic. One who, like me, the utterly

well as
conservative-nationalist
spirit
up in the 1920s, can attest to that imbued most of the teachers as

grew
the young brought up in that
system.9
It
rendered most of
them
con-
312
Interpretation
institutions
and proc
temptuous or at least suspicious of the new democratic
esses,
such as political
parties, elections,
parliaments
(derisively
referred to as
Schwdtzbuden, talking
It
can colleagues
shops),
etc.
easily be seen that Schmitt, sharing this tradition with most of his (those among constitutional lawyers who supported the new system,
like Anschutz, Kelsen, Heller, were few and far between), contributed to the weakening of the Weimar system. This was not only through his teaching and his writings (where his unceasing attack upon parliamentarism could not fail to have its impact), but
above all
in his
political activities.
Two
of
them emerge as
particularly significant. One was his defense of the conservative-authoritarian Papen cabinet before the Supreme Court in the affair of the Preussenschlag,
when
the Reich
of their
government
had
undertaken
to
deprive
republican-democratic
and
forces
last bastion, the
state government of
Prussia
its
control over
the Prussian police. The court decided in favor of the

that
Reich,
thus
destroying
of power a
last bastion.
well-known
Schmitt's
attempt
to prevent the Nazi
assumption
President, alleged "guardian of the dictator, temporary similarly reflected his belief in the effects
through making the Reich
constitution,
of concentrated a
emergency
dictator,"
power.
as should
Schmitt probably distinguished from a
meant
Hindenburg
to
be
"commissarial
dictator.10
"sovereign"
and permanent
He
have known that Germans
were not
likely
to allow a
temporary dictator
ship to return powers to democratic government after the emergency was over, and I doubt whether he would even have favored such a return. As it was, the
presidential system
longed to the
As far
as
gravediggers of
simply led to the Nazi-totalitarian Weimar democracy.

post-
one.
Thus Schmitt be
Schmitt's
he
1933
attitudes are
concerned, the
much-discussed
anti-Semi
question of whether
was an opportunist when
openly turning to
tism, to defending Hitler's random killings of SA leaders and assorted generals in the Rohm affair, etc., may be left Even had he become a convinced Nazi (and, as I have pointed out, he might have used some ideas from his
open."
Concept of
attempt
Political for that purpose), this would not have excused his to legitimize the Rohm killings through a Hobbesian potestas facit
the
legem argument, because Hitler, as also later in the holocaust case, did not even claim that the law forbidding murder was no longer valid. Schmitt's writ ings on international law between 1933 and 1938, little noticed even by sub
sequent
Schmittians,
which
analyzed
in the
1930s,12
would seem to reveal with
opportunism. un-Schmittian
One essay, Nationalsozialismus

natural-rights
and
und
Volkerrecht,
served
its
quite
natural-law
approach,
to
underpin
Hitler's deceptive "peace advocating German

with
policy,"13
while an abrupt turn
toward
power
politics,
regional
the
served to
revealing subtitle legitimize Hitler's first
hegemony (Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung, mit Interventionsverbot fur raumfremde Mdchte)

conquest outside the
after
"Germanic"
realm, the
takeover of what remained of
Czechoslovakia
Munich.
Looking
Why,
after
at
Carl Schmitt
313
1945
when
it
was no
longer dangerous, did Schmitt
never return
to these activities (not to mention apologize for them)?

never analyze
Why, indeed, did he
in any depth the
new
politics, like the
nuclear weapon and
factors in politics, especially in world the change from the traditional, multipar
superpower system of
"existential"
tite nation-state system to the

mies?14
bipolar
ene revealed things

more's
With the brilliance
of
his
earlier analyses
he
might
have
succeeding
pity.
generations of social scientists were never able
to. The
the
NOTES
1. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick, NJ,
1976). 2. Leo Strauss, "Comments
cept
on
Carl Schmitt's Der
Begriff des Politischen,

as
trans, in The Con
of the Political, pp. 8 Iff. What Strauss reveals contrast to Hoboes requires the individual "to sacrifice
Schmitt's "warlike in
war
morality"
(p. 95) in
life"
(p. 35).
3. Giovanni Sartori, "The Essence of the Political in Carl Theoretical Politics, 1, No.l (Jan. 1989), 63ff. (p. 68). At the time of this writing I read in Isaiah Berlin's essay "Joseph de Fascism" Maistre and the Origins of (The New York Review of Books, Sept. 27, Oct. 11, Oct. 25, 1990): "His [i.e., de
Schmitt,"
Maistre's]
genius consists of
the depth
and
accuracy
of
his insight into the
darker, less
much else
Schmitt
as
(Oct. 25, p. 64). Like said in this essay on de Maistre's ideas, this fits Carl Schmitt. One might almost define de Maistre sans Pope.
potent social and political Volker-
regarded, but
factors in
behavior"
4. Eugene Anschel, The World of A German Jew (private printing, 1990), p. 85. 5. One might almost quote Schmitt himself to that effect when he ends his book
rechtliche
Grossraumordnung
the sentence: "The
mit
Interventions
law"
verbot
fiir
raumfremde
1939)
cal
with
Fuhrer's deed has lent the idea
of our
Machte (Berlin-Vienna, Reich political reality, histori

provides a series of
truth, and a great future of international 6. "Liberal thought evades or ignores

for
(my
translation).
state
and politics";
"liberalism
controlling the state's and government's 7. To be sure, Morgenthau, like other "political such with Schmitt's anthropology of considering man as basically
methods and
hindering
power"
(The Concept,
"evil,"
p. 70). agrees
realists,"
as
Reinhold Niebuhr,
"dangerous,"
i.e.,
and
draws
from this overly

man's
power-political conclusions. characterization of
myself
believe that, in
"evil"
view of
the complexity of
oversimplification.
nature, any
his
"good"
nature as
or
dilemma"
suffers
from
I have based my own political realism on the human groupings, especially those which, like
them.
On this
see
my Political Realism
and
faces politically organized nation-states so far, have no higher authority above Political Idealism, A Study in Theories and Realities
"security
that
(Chicago, 1951).
8. The
the West
one
Sonderweg
interpretation
of modern
German
history
in
contrast
an
interpretation that
emphasizes
of
Prussia-Germany's
authoritarian attitudes and structures
to the liberal-democratic ones
(Britain, France,
not see
the United
States,
etc.)
is
contested.
I believe it is
justified,
and, in
provided
does
its
cause
German liberal
in the 1860s.
movements suffered
in any "innate German national in the nineteenth century,

of
character"
but in the three defeats that
after
1815, in 1848,
Prussia,
9. For my personal impressions my autobiography, Vom Uberleben
German
ein
schools and universities entstand can
in the Weimar
period see
power of
Wie
Weltbild
(Dusseldorf, 1984). The

seen
the monarchical, or quasi-monarchical,
leadership
idea
be
from the fact that
even
Max
Weber, surely
sive
strong
critic of
William IPs
regime and
Bismarck's impact for the

new
on an all-too-submis
German
middle
class, favored
a plebiscitarian
democracy
republic, with a popu
larly
elected president as counterweight against parliament and parties
an attitude not too remote
314
Interpretation
with
from Carl Schmitt's. Compare

cultural
cal
this the
Sonderweg
eines
of one prominent member of
the
German
elite, Thomas Mann. In his Betrachtungen

"unpolitical"
Man),
the term
had
meant almost
Unpolitischen (Reflections of an Unpoliti the opposite, Mann coming close to Schmitt's

polemical
concept of the political, what with
Western
sonified
"civilizational"
his strongly authoritarian attitude and its anarchistic-Utopian individualism (subsequently,

a
thrust against
per
and
unforgettably,
by
the Settembrini of his Magic Mountain). But
tics and nationalism

policies of the
had wrought, Mann turned into
then, realizing what German power poli defender of the pragmatic liberal-democratic
the elite
Weimar Republic. Had
more members of
(especially
the educational one)
followed his example, the Republic's fate might have been a different one. 10. On Schmitt's distinction between kommissarische and souverdne dictatorship
Diktatur: Von den Anfdngen des
modernen
see
his Die
Souverdnitdtsgedankens bis
activities see
zum proletarischen Klas-
senkampf (1921). More generally Hindenburg as presidential dictator
on
pro
Schmitt's
tern, etc.)
and
for the Reich (Princeton, 1983), chaps. 6-8, 2d ed. (Westport, CT, 1989), chap. 4. 11. On the
"opportunism"
in 1932 (his ideas on setting up von Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt, Theorist George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception,
debate
see
George Schwab, "Carl Schmitt, Political
Opportunist?",
in Intellect (Feb. 1975), pp. 334-37 and my reply in ibid. (May-June 1975), pp. 482f. Regretfully, I must still consider applicable to the Schmitt of the Nazi period an anecdote about Richard Strauss,
related what
in my reply to Schwab: When Arturo Toscanini, stout anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi, was asked he thought of Strauss (who had allowed himself to be made the head of the Nazi-controlled
Reich Culture Chamber, just as Schmitt had allowed himself to be appointed "Prussian State Coun by Goring), he answered, "Before Strauss the composer I take off my hat; before Strauss,
cillor"
the man, I put it on
again."
12. Eduard Bristler (John H. Herz), Die Volkerrechtslehre des Nationalsozialismus (Zurich, 1938). I had to use a pseudonym to protect my family then still living in Germany. The book, of course, was immediately suppressed by Nazi censorship and thus could be neither read nor dis
cussed
in
Germany
and
Austria (annexed in 1938)
until after
1945.
13. See Bristler, pp.118-21; also on Schmitt cf. pp.76, 78, 83f., 149. With all his adaptations to Nazi concepts and verbiage, Schmitt occasionally still tried to make use of his basic approach,
sometimes
in
almost
absurdly
orders)
exaggerated makes
fashion,
as when
his konkrete Ordnungsdenken

Nations"
(thinking
different
in terms
made
of concrete
him
consider the
"Geneva League leaves (the
of
organization each time an
important
member enters or
entrance of the
Soviet Union
seventh League"). A listing of Schmitt's widely scattered international-law writings of 1933-38 may be found in Bristler, p. 223. On Schmitt's international law in the Nazi period see also Detlev Vagts, "International Law in the Third American Journal of Interna tional Law, 84, No. 3 (July 1990), 661-714.
it "the
the period
Reich,"
of Schmitt will have to face the question of why he neglected developments after 1945 and, even in his one major postwar work, Nomos der Erde, in his illustrations and exemplifications hardly ever goes beyond the events of World War I and its
14.
Any
future biographer
decisive
world
aftermath.
He
remains as
if
obsessed with things
rules of sea warfare, to
defeat
Germany
through a "hunger
like the British attempt, in alleged violation of the blockade" (never mind that Germany,
too, had violated these rules in its unrestricted submarine warfare. As one Briton remarked at the time, Britannia rules the waves, Germany waives the rules.). The war seemed to him to inaugurate
to Schmitt, had characterized Europaeum. (That war was hardly that during most of those centuries I have tried to show in my contribution to George Schwab, ed., Ideology and Foreign Policy, A Global Perspective [New York, 1978], "Power Politics and Ideology? The Nazi pp. 14ff. See pp.28- 30.) Germany's defeat in World War I seems to have been the traumatic event in Schmitt's emotional life. That of all nations the "nation
the end of the era of "limited

"limited"
war"
(gehegter
Krieg) that, according
the relations of territorial states under the jus publicum
Experience,"
of
shopkeepers"
him,
although the author of
of war as
being
of must have seemed the height of injustice to The Concept of the Political, who had defined the existential decision beyond morality, jenseits von gut und bose, could never openly have admitted to
had defeated the "nation
heroes"
such moral evaluation.
Book Reviews
Richard
Kraut, Aristotle on the Human Good (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). 379 pp., $37.50.
Aristide Tessitore
Assumption College
Richard Kraut's Aristotle

takes
on
the Human
Good is
of
an ambitious
book. Kraut
issue
with
two influential
view of of
interpretations
and
the Nicomachean Ethics:

which
(1)
The
"intellectualist"
Cooper
the
Nussbaum,
maintains
takes
its bearings
or neces
from the concluding book

contemplative
Ethics,
that happiness consists in
activity
simpliciter and
that happiness
has
no
intrinsic
sary connection to the Ackrill and Hardie is
practice of moral virtue. grounded
(2) The
"inclusivist"
position of
in Aristotle's
argument
in Book 1
and asserts
of which
that happiness consists in a composite of different goods, only one

contemplation.
of
is
Participants on both sides of the divide agree in questioning the Aristotle's consistency teaching in the Ethics as a whole. Kraut's book seeks to settle this longstanding debate about Aristotle's teaching on human happi
ness.
Kraut
about the
maintains that the
Ethics is free
explains that
of
internal
conflict
in its teaching
good ways of answer
human
good.
He
Aristotle
offers
"two
answering the question, 'What is
happiness?'"
(p. 5). The best

reason
is that
(eth-
happiness
second
consists answer
in the
best
virtuous activity of theoretical is that happiness consists in virtuous
(theoria). The
practical
ike),
the exercise of virtues such as courage, magnanimity, and
activity justice. The
conflict
between these two life

presupposes
philosophic
is only the development

answers
apparent.
On the
one
hand,
the
and practice of the ethical virtues

"intellectualizes"
(p.
6,
see chaps.
3-4)
and, on the other, Aristotle
practical
virtues"
virtues, regarding them as "approximations of the theoretical

chap. well.
(p. 7,
see
6). In both cases, the The

solely in
proper
function
of
human beings is to
use reason
common core which unites

consists
happiness
excellent
which
Aristotle's twofold teaching is that human reasoning activity (pp. 7, 324). This pro
vides the single standard

evaluated.
by
the whole range of
human
actions
is to be
All
other goods are or should

weight at all
they
possess
or
"no direct
in
be desirable only as means to this end; determining how close a person is to

Ackrill'
happiness
misery"
(p. 261).
s inclusivist interpretation Kraut is especially concerned to take on Aristotle's ethical teaching because of its influence on the current generation scholars
of of
(pp. 210-311). Ackrill
argues
that happiness is a
composite of all
interpretation,
Spring 1992,
Vol. 19, No. 3
316
goods
Interpretation
desirable in themselves
and
that this all-inclusive good is better than any
one of
its
components
no matter
how
valuable
that
component
problem with
this view, as Kraut sees
it, is
it
that either
may be. The it waters down Aris
totle's insistence that happiness be identified
with virtuous
activity
and partic
ularly the
virtuous
activity
of
reason,
or
requires one
cannot
to conclude that Aris
totle's apparently inclusivist
argument
in Book 1
be
reconciled with
his
identification
of
happiness
and contemplation
in Book 10.
argues
Against the first

totle consistently
consequence of
Ackrill's position, Kraut
that Aris
maintains
the absolute priority of the
intellectual life. Al
though a life devoted to
theory
requires other goods as well
(e.g.,
ethical vir
tue, friends, financial resources, etc.),

appropriate
and
although
it may
sometimes
be
to cut back on one's theoretical activity

person
for the
sake of
others, the
in the best activity of contemplation. Kraut writes, "His formula, as I understand it, is that the more contemplation, the better one's life; there is no such thing as a human being who has studied
fully happy
is
one who engages
philosophy too
much
for his
good"
own
(p. 27). Kraut
returns
often,
and
in
Aristotle's teaching, to the priority which way that preserves the sharp he assigns to intellectual virtue. For those not in a position to philosophize, it is
edge of
still possible to
virtue. made
develop
to
intellectual like
excellence
through the practice of

virtuous person
moral
Indeed, Kraut
argues that the a
ethically
is
sometimes
by Aristotle
sound
philosopher,
devoting
reasoning in templation (p. 325).

of practical
way that
parallels a philosopher's
himself to the activity devotion to con
With
respect
to the second consequence of Ackrill's position, the apparent

and
discrepancy
Aristotle's
and a
between Books 1
10, Kraut
provides a
use of
the "for the sake of relation in these
razor-sharp analysis of books (pp. 200-210)
helpful distinction between

part of
imperfect,
perfect,
weaves
and most perfect virtue
(pp. 237-51). In this

of
the
book, Kraut
together a careful critique

elucidation of an
Ackrill's inclusivist reading Kraut's thesis is
position with
a passage-by-passage of
alternative
which preserves the
immediately
more
the internal coherence of
unity appealing both because it attempts to preserve the Ethics and, in its resistance to an easier inclusivist
a
Aristotle's
argument as a whole.
interpretation, it is
of
faithful to
literal reading
the
of
the text. The plausibility

with which
Kraut's thesis
presents
considerably by rival interpretations and seeks to

gains
the text.
whelmed
If Kraut's
general
argument
painstaking care adjudicate differences is at times in danger
he
by
of
appealing to
being
over
by detailed
exegeses of particular
passages, this textual scrutiny, to

also a preci
gether with
great strength of the sion
his exemplary effort to give alternative readings their due, is book. Kraut's writing is characterized by clarity and
approach to the
throughout.
If Kraut's
not
completely devoid
sensitive
ciently
Ethics is in many ways refreshingly sensible, it is An initial weakness is that he is insuffi to the particular way in which Aristotle develops his teachings,
of problems.
especially in his
political writings.
Aristotle
often
only gradually discloses his
Book Reviews
317
meaning through successive arguments, each of which qualifies what has pre ceded it. The "organic of Aristotle's argument in the Ethics has been
character"
noted
by
other scholars
(e.g., Strauss, Jaffa, Faulkner)
and requires
attentive-
ness
both to the immediate
context within which an argument appears and to
the
particular place which an argument occupies within
the succession of argu
ments
that comprise the whole. Kraut tends to underestimate the
importance
of
this dimension
of the Ethics; he easily lifts passages out of their context, as if simply detachable from their position in the book as a whole. In doing so, he abstracts from the pedagogical effect which the particular order of argument might be expected to have on readers, and sometimes mistakenly
they
were
identifies An
and
one stage of an argument with
Aristotle's
own position.
example of
the former problem can be seen
forth between Book 1, Chapters 5 and the course of his argument, he gives little weight to the
these
passages
in the way Kraut moves back and Book 10, Chapters 7-8. In 7,
specific position which
study.
acknowledge the
occupy beginning incomplete but foundational

at
the
and end of
Aristotle's
Kraut does
argument
character of
Aristotle's
in Book 1 (pp. 3, 323), but this does not prevent him from beginning his study with Aristotle's conclusion in Book 10 (chap. 1) and then working back to
Aristotle's nothing
totle's
"foundational"
argument
in Book 1 (chap. 6). Although there is it is

symptomatic of
intrinsically
to neglect
tendency
A
wrong an important
with
this procedure,
pedagogical
Kraut's
feature
of the
book,
that
is, Aris
leads his
gradual effort serious
to educate the ethical sensibilities of his readers.

of this
view
more
consequence
approach
is that it
sometimes
Kraut to
misrepresent
Aristotle's
by tying
argument.
This
problem
is
exemplified
in the
it too closely to use Kraut makes
one stage of
of passages cannot
from the Politics to
support
his thesis, in itself sensible, that Aristotle
in the modern sense of the term. Kraut cites properly be regarded as an Aristotle's arguments about justifiable ostracism (Pol. 3, 13) and sharing rule in the best regime (Pol. 7, 14) to counter the charge that Aristotle is an egoist (pp. 90-103). On the basis
teaches both the possibility
of
"egoist"
these passages Kraut concludes that Aristotle

goods
of
conflicting
(and is therefore
egoist"
not a
"benign
egoist")
and
particular
the priority individual (not
of
the common political good over the good of any

or reflect
"combative"
"pure
either).
Although these
adequate
aware of
claims of
understanding
the
surely his argument in the Politics

character of
part of
Aristotle's teaching,
reveals that
more
he
was also
problematic
ostracism
these teachings.
Aristotle's teaching
about
justifiable
his teaching on minates in the

over
kingship
argument
in Book 3, Chapter 13 must be taken together with in Book 3, Chapters 13-17. This latter teaching cul
that the
one
truly
as
superior
the
common political
good, insofar
the
political good
individual takes priority is understood to [nn.
involve
allow
some
kind
of shared rale of
(Pol. 1284b25-34; 1288al5-29). (Kraut does

to
Aristotle's treatment
kingship
influence his
weight
view of ostracism
19, 20, 23], but he does
not give
it the full
that it warrants.)
regime
Similarly,
Aristotle begins his discussion
of shared rule
in the best
by
pointing to
318-
Interpretation
character of
the flawed
answered
any investigation
of
the best regime
which
has
not
first
the question about the most
choiceworthy life (1323al4-17). The
consideration which stitutes a
lengthy
follows takes up precisely this question and, as such, con preface (7, 1-3) to Aristotle's teaching on the best regime (7,
striking
about
4 ff.). What is
most
Aristotle's
consideration of
the most
choice-
worthy life in the present context is that he leaves the question w/zresolved. Nevertheless, Aristotle devotes the remainder of his study to an outline of the best regime, one that recommends the rotation of offices among equals. Aristotle does does
argue
acknowledge
the possibility of
of power.
justifiable ostracism,
and
he
for
an equal
sharing
However,
the contexts within which
these arguments arise reveal that these assertions cannot be identified in an

unqualified
way
with
Aristotle's
own
view.
Kraut's
use of these
passages,
about
among others, inadvertently political justice. Kraut restricts Aristotle's teaching to standing of justice, one that favors equality (see also
narrows appreciation of
the scope of Aristotle's
teaching
one particular under pp.
98-99). A fuller
to
Aristotle's
argument suggests
that he
is
bringing
light the
essentially cially in Book 3) and then, without retracting this radical perspective, offering in the books that follow some practical guidance for those who are primarily
responsible
problematic character of all understandings of political
justice (espe
for the
and
welfare of
the city.
concerns
second
briefer
criticism
one of the
strengths
of
Kraut's
book. His
virtue
attempt to reconcile
go
may
Aristotle's teaching on moral and intellectual further than Aristotle himself. That Aristotle seeks to harmonize
ethical and
theoretical virtue and that he places theoretical virtue at the
top
of
hierarchy is indisputable. But this teaching does not require, nor does Aris totle insist, that moral and intellectual excellence are in every respect reconcil able. Indeed, Aristotle's text reflects an awareness of the problematic character
this
relationship between intellectual and moral excellence while, at the same it makes the best possible case for their compatibility. Kraut's attempt to time, dissolve this tension seems to impose a greater precision on the study of ethics than Aristotle would accept (cf. 1094b 12-27).
of
the
Despite
these problems,
Aristotle
of a
on
the
Human Good
marshals considerable
scholarly Ethics. Indeed,

lar discussions
tual virtue (pp.
vigor
in
support
sensible and nor
neither
cate and nuanced character of

which are
my summary Kraut's
appealing interpretation of the criticisms do full justice to the intri

His study
contains
writing.
many
particu
insightful. In
addition to
those already mentioned, I
would call attention
to his treatment of the
kinship
between
moral and
intellec
55-62),
the "real
self
(pp.
128-31),
the relationship between
philosophy
and
friendship
defense
(pp.
170-75),
the uselessness of contemplation (pp.
192-96),
and
the
of practical virtue
(pp. 322-34). More significantly,

perhaps
Kraut's book draws
our attention to
important,
the
most
important,
to
issues. It has
the
further
merit of
requiring
the reader to return in a serious and
rigorous way to the text itself. As such, Kraut's book is bound influence; it both merits and rewards serious study.
have
an
lames W.
Ceaser,
Liberal
Democracy
and
Political Science (Baltimore: The

pp.,
Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990), 242
$29.95.
Will Morrisey
Liberal
constitutionalism makes an
independent
and
institutionalized
such
politi politi
cal science possible. cal scientists cannot
If liberal sensibly
constitutionalism
pretend
is the only
must not
regime,
to
to neutrality
with respect
its
perpetua
tion. To preserve their own

grounds of
independence, they
forget the
political
independence.
to
There believed
are several ways
forget this. Since the late

free their
work
relative.'
nineteenth
century many
which
political scientists
have
and
aspired to
from
'values,'
they
unre-
'subjective'
'culturally
This
'value-free'
political science retire are
remains embedded placed
by
in academia, but many of its practitioners now like-minded scholars. The younger political scientists
frankly
'normative.'
Coming
in many
varieties
neo-Marxists and
feminists may be
for 'a
new com
the most numerous
almost all
may be described
fairly
is
as socialists or left-
liberals. From their

science.'
ranks come academic politicians who caucus with
political
mit
Armed
political,"
the slogan,
"Everything
they
what
'causes.'
themselves,
the
and attempt
to commit the universities, to partisan

more
In
reaction call
to this partisanship, the

'politicization'
traditional scholars deplore
they
of the
freedom to be
phere on some nerable to the apolitical
uncommitted.
university and call for the continued academic Their effort deserves admiration; given the atmos
even courageous.
campuses, it is
pet
But traditionalists
remain vul
partisans'
terrier of an argument: There's no such
thing
as an
university;
you cannot not
choose;
you're either of
doing
liberate
students
from the insidious tentacles

or you're not. new
banality
something to that discipline the
bourgeois order,
The
old
Left
used
to dismiss all others as 'ob
jectively
pro-fascist'; the
Left does
much
the same
thing
while
avoiding
strident
objectivist or scientistic
language. This
gives
makes new-left agitation no

more moralistic
less
than its predecessor, but tionalists

polemic
it
decidedly
sound.
Tradi
try
to explain that there's more to life than manichean action and

'theory,'
who
calling itself decries his opponent's

real
but they
finally
resemble
the political candidate
'simplistic'
stand as
Perhaps
life
will
will come
to
his
rescue eventually.
You know he's going to lose. And perhaps academic

of
traditionalists
embattled
not
be
of
remembered as
honorable Catos
minority
the future. Perhaps that minority
will
pedagogy by some win, if fortune does
favor
some new enthusiasm.

struck
"I have been

made
by
today in the
name of
how many of the criticisms of liberal democracy justice have lost connection with a systematic treat-
interpretation,
Spring 1992,
Vol. 19, No. 3
320
Interpretation
systems"
ment of political
or
regimes, writes lames W. Ceaser. "It
is
political meta word with
science"
philosophy
phors of
'rigid'
without political
(p. 4). Fascinated
by
change,
by
used
flow, resentful of structure (when was the last time you heard the descriptively, not pejoratively?), political scientists moralize
The
protections afforded
out recourse to regime theory.
by
liberal
democracy
lull its beneficiaries into
undue
optimism;
protectedness comes
to seem a given,
something easily preserved even if the structure of liberalism gets kicked down. Ceaser seeks to interest political scientists in what had been the core of their
own
science, emphasizing,
perhaps
tactfully,
not so much the need of political
scientists
for liberal
democracy
kind.
as the need of
liberal
democracy
for
political
science of a certain
Beginning
writers
with
the
basics, Ceaser describes American liberal democracy

ideas"
"incompatible"
as
the combination of two "sets
of
supposed
by
political
before Americans
combined
them (pp.
8-9). Constitutionalism
the
protection of pend upon
had seemed to de rights, limited and deliberative government provided the great the social foundation estates, as argued in the by Locke
and
writings of such philosophers as as
Montesquieu
contrast,
and of such statesmen
John Adams
and a
Gouverneur Morris.
By
popular rale or
democracy
repub
crucial
"emerged from
different tradition": "It hearkened back to democratic

and
lics idea
such as of
Athens
Florence,
although
the
modern variant added

rights"
the
feared
that
equality demagogues
of people
founded in
natural
(p. 9). Constitutionalists

constitutionalism
would overthrow a
democratic
in the
name of
democracy; democrats feared that
pretended constitutionalists would
corrupt the government and

zen virtue upon which problem
finally
the people
decent
government
themselves, destroying the citi depends. The founders solved this

on the principle of natural
by devising
all
a constitutionalism
"founded
equality"
equally to direct force

or
"the revolutionary idea that certain basic rights attached in principle (p. 13). The practical principle of representation, not
individuals"
'participatory'
democracy, defends
rale of
the theoretical principle of
natural
equal rights
by
reinforcing the
law
and
deliberation instead
of
the rule of
and passion. agrees with such scholars as
Ceaser
Thomas G. West
the
need
and
David Epstein,
who argue that

education.
The Federalist does

notes
address^
for
citizen virtue and civic contain
But he
that The Federalist does not
"anything
re
citize
motely approaching a systematic exploration of the (p. 15, italics added). For this, scholars turn to other The Federalist
"the first
concerns
question
of
writings of
the founders.
not
primarily
the
American
national
government,
American governments,
major political
and not government as such.
Alexis de Tocqueville,
philosopher, inside
democracy," 'friend'
or outside of
America,
to actually
observe and
major
study liberal theorists who can be

with
and also called a

of
"one
of
the select group of
regime"
this
(p. 16),
concerns
himself
understanding how American

on the
mores
well as
interact
with
American insti
tutions and
laws
local
and
state, as
the national level.
Book Reviews
The
or
. . .
321
mores that support liberal democracy are not always either simply liberal simply republican. Nor are the methods for inculcating its mores always derivative from either republican or liberal [constitutional] models. The analysis of
liberal democracy,
where
it does
not require a new
vocabulary altogether,
order to avoid
calls
for
a most careful use of part with the whole.
liberal
or republican terms
in
confusing
one
(P.
18)
(Richard Hofstadter, Martin Diamond in democracy as "a kind of self-regulating
axiom some of
Although
some scholars
his
writings) describe liberal Ceaser leans toward the
equili
that the price of
liberty
mores
is
eternal vigilance or
"constant
order
superintendence"
(pp. 19-20). Certain

even
must
be
cultivated
not
in
to maintain liberal
efforts
democracy,
in
if this
cultivation seen
does
involve
the
"extraordinary
of
formation"
character
in the small, "virtuous

requires more
republics'
the Antifederalists (p. 22).

compound character of
on
The complex, litical

the dual
liberal
democracy
"po
knowledge"
the part of the citizens than
other regimes
(p. 22).
Further,
(now
nature of
this compound tends to produce educated citizens

either
who prefer
one element of called
the regime over the other. We are usually

'democrats'
'liberals'
'conservatives')
or
or
(now
called
'liberals'). Partisan infight
ing
"leaves little time
liberal
whole"
democracy
as a
energy for investigating the question of the needs of (p. 23). Liberal democracy elevates its opponents
world"
because "to the very highest positions of honor in the intellectual persons do "speak passionately for one of the regime's own basic
such
princ
may be defined as the inflation of one principle into a system; Ceaser candidly writes that he does not want "to turn political but rather to turn political science away science into an ideological
(p. 23, italics
added).
Ideology
instrument"
from
such misuse without
turning it
toward the
illusion
'value-free'
of
political
science
(pp. 24-25). A
nonideological
but
principled political science can
be
friend
tive.
of
liberal
democracy
how this
independent
and critical
without
being
destruc
Tocqueville
shows
can
be done. He is
"'our'
philos
political
despite
being
Frenchman: the
philosopher of our
'hard'
age,
and
who understands
'soft'
the
choices our age presents
between despotisms
and
liberal de
mocracy; the
philosopher of our
regime, "the political theorist
par excellence of
liberal democracy"; the philosopher of our nation, who wrote about Americans in order to describe liberal democracy (p. 26). Oddly, Tocqueville has "few
remaining "the coffee-table ence; he is displayed in polite company
work,
adherents,"
philosopher of
"
.
American
puts
political sci
(p. 28). Ceaser

of
Tocqueville to
character or
"explor[ing]
liberal
Tocqueville's understanding
the underlying
structure of within this
democracy
(p. 29).
the
and of
the
role
he
envisaged
for
political science
regime"
Beginning
alternatives
with
form
of our
government, Tocqueville
finds
the realistic
cause the citizens themselves are at
for America to be democratic tyranny and democratic liberty. Be liberty to define the happiness they pursue,
322
and
Interpretation
because they are fallible, Citizens can choose
but
serious mistakes
in theory
Religions
and practice can
be
'soft'
made. rights
despotism in the
pursuit not of equal natural
of equal conditions and entitlements.
and educational
insti
tutions can be captured

resist or assist explanation ple's
by
this materialist
egalitarianism.
Political
care
scientists can
this
tendency; they
can resist
it
by "tak[ing]
that the idea of
that governs their conception of knowledge does

possess"
not
diminish
peo
belief in the freedom they (p. 32). Political scientists should ex in terms, enabling citizens to see the likely conse causality quences of proposed policies without bringing them to some form of fatalism.
'if-then'
press
Fatalism tempts intellectuals in liberal

the formal division economics);
democracy
has been
because they
see
beyond
of government and politics
they
see
that while society
from society (religion, culture, in the direct

'depoliticized'
sense, it
ety,'
nonetheless
has important implications
and consequences.
Intellectuals
often react to this
also vate
by attempting to how showing society considers "the legal or formal

to the
'lay
bare'
the realities of 'bourgeois soci
'determines'
the political structures.

separation
Tocqueville
the pri
between the
But he "does
public and not
realms"
be
"secondary
design."
derivative."
and
take the
step
of
dismissing
practiced
rest on
formal liberal
some more sinister
merely fictitious or as a cover for In this he practices "the kind of political science
principle as
by
Aristotle
Montesquieu"
and
(p. 34). Both (p. 36).
government and
society
"a deeper
(p. 34),
a
foundation"
(p. 33),
"prior
and more
fundamental
arrange
ment"
"certain
culture"
political
Real freedom
requires an actual power
in society to
resist the state and a will
among the
not
citizens to
limit
government and protect rights.
The
power and will
do
miraculously
appear as a consequence of the mere act of assertion of an
abstract principle;
they
is
must
be
promoted.
How to
achieve the
human
qualities and
the social arrangements that
work over
time to support the
formal
principle of
limited
government
one of
the major questions for political science. (Pp.
35-36)
of
political
Political science, Ceaser argues, should be part culture, "inserting itself into the society
reason"
of
the
"tutelary
power"
the to
on the strength of an appeal who
(p. 37),
an appeal
of
directed primarily to those

not
actually
govern soci also
ety,
set
the tone
society
only
or even
mostly
extent
will
public
officials, but
clergy, poets, scientists,

unable"
and others.
"To the
that political
science modes
is
of
to
do this, "other
thinking"
modes of
(p. 39). These

of
thinking
mocracy.
most
likely
will not
lead to
an adequate
understanding
liberal de
Tocquevillian
political science
does:
on
Political
science as an enterprise
working
behalf
of
liberal
induce the leaders
democracy
seeks to
of each major area of
the
society to
consider the
a
their activity to maintaining the regime; political science is
relationship of perpetual gadfly for

a
liberal democracy. As reasoning that
a part of
liberal education, it
aims to
inculcate
way
of
makes students conscious of the connections of private activities

a research or academic
to
the maintenance of a regime. As
enterprise, it seeks to
Book Reviews
supply
agenda some of the general answers to to this question, or at
323
any
rate
to set an
for their discussion in different

and
contexts.
(Pp. 39-40)
various regimes
Just
as
Aristotle
Montesquieu
some
could
accurately describe
while
thoughtfully preferring
to others, so Tocqueville can describe the

can
existing and potential forms democracy ring liberal democracy to the others. Ceaser century exerting
zation,
next considers political science.
power
take in the modern world, prefer
traditional political science in contrast to
twentieth-
Twentieth-century
unit of
political
science calls the act of social organi
"the irreducible
politics"
in the family, the
and the state
(p. 42). Traditional
political science refuses to concentrate
its
attention
with
formal
regime.
and
primarily on efficient and material causes; it concerns itself more final causes with regimes, and particularly (for Aristotle) the In
addition
best
scientist studies three
to considering the best regime, the traditional political interrelated subjects: historical sociology (the analysis of
"place": the
science
character of a of regime
people, its stage

types and of
of
development);
general political
(analysis
what maintains or undermines
them);
and analysis of specific regimes
in
a specific context
(e.g., American
politics,
Iranian
politics).
Historical sociology
concerns
a people's physical and
environment, its
and
mores or
(the "most
important"
factor[p.45]), its laws

Taken together, these
situation";
with as
institutions,
its
history
formative
action"
experiences.
constitute
legislator faces in
(p. 46).
a given
such
"the dominant reality a it "does not fully bind human

genius an
"Proceeding
due
and
regard
for the
[of
nation] is
major part of political

ethics"
prudence,
it in turn has
development"
important
bearing
on
political
(p. 47). Although Montesquieu "at times
comes close to
sug
of nations, with no room gesting a total, autonomous science of for genuine freedom (p. 219, n.25), Tocqueville does not go so far. Tocque ville's view more
statesman who
nearly resembles that of Charles de Gaulle, who "realized all the possible in taking his part in the
speaks of a
inevitable"
(La
France
et son armee
[Paris: Librairie Plon, 1938],

of who
p. 57). ways
General ety dominated

"elusive"
political science concerns
regimes, those
"of ordering
'abstract'
a soci
and
expressed
in terms
rales, according to what

passion"
end or
principle,
by
what sentiment or
(p. 52). More

general
and more
than historical sociology (p. 53),
political
science
does
not
predict so much as
bilities"
it
enables
its
students to understand
"the full
range of possi
in
political
life (p. 56).

any
regime
The
effort to maintain
involves
discovering
and
cultivating,
not
the
specificities toward which
it inclines
but the
for these
are often what
leads to its
benefit
destruction
or
degradation
specificities that promote
it. Liberal
can
democracy,
from
as one of the more complex and on a number of
heterogeneous regimes,
drawing
different
regime principles.
calculations
important to learn from
the calm and
orderly
It has something of interest of modem
324
Interpretation liberalism,
the
virtue or communitarianism of small
commercial
republics, and the
sense of
individual
pride of
European
aristocracy.
(P. 56)
Liberal
democracy
needs statesmen who
honor
and citizens who will respond
risk their lives, fortunes, and sacred to such statesmen. No one simple regime
political science will under
can appeal
to all of those goods; a comprehensive their feasible
stand the simple regimes and
combinations. regimes
Particular
place,
political
science, the study of alternative
in
specific soci
today
and
suffers
distortion. The
overappreciation of applied political
historical
ology
the depreciation of general
science make
it impossible to becomes
a
abstract
lessons from the past, to

Extreme
'theory'
generalize
intelligently.
all
'Abstract'
sort of curse-word.
particularism
is
history
and no real
theory;
most
of that "stress[es] is a recently its the idea of [cultural] differences just when the differences are becoming less (p. 64). By refusing to take abstractions pronounced, at least in the undermines prudence and makes it impossible to un seriously,
West"
'hermeneutics'
'hermeneutics'
'deconstruction'
derstand
concrete changes clearly.
Radical historicism The
makes real
history
in
comprehensible to
historians
and citizens alike.
world
becomes impossible
to understand
and
or
to change.
History
takes the direction opposite to that expected

schools
of
desired
science
by historicists. The many behaviorism, 'rational

democracy"
twentieth-century
etc.
political
choice,'
the 'new
normativism,'
fail to
"maintain liberal
(p. 93) because they

structure,
relativism
share
the
usual
historicist
emphasis on change
political principles. ance of
instead
of
instead
of stable moral and
Even those
political philosophers who give some appear
taking rights seriously end in moral relativism and political irrelevance. (Of John Rawls and Robert Nozick Ceaser remarks tersely, their "books are all
about add
justice, but hardly
regimes"
ever about real political
[p. 96]. He
might
that
or
finally they
aren't about real you
justice either, only
preferences and asser
tions
'values'.) When
Traditional
ignore
regimes and assert your
will, you end in

each regime's
utopianism.
political
scientists,
judging
policies
by
standards and each regime
by
the higher standard, namely, the fulfillment of

a regime will not
development"
human nature, stance be the

human
understand same as
that "what sustains

promotes
what
human
in every in simply (p. 98).
Therefore, "the
cerns"
regimes"
maintenance of political
themselves necessary for

world of moral con
survival and
development
moral realism
"exacts
a price
in the
(p. 99). This
does
not appeal to the self-assertive Utopians

regime
among contemporary historicists. But because

constructs"
types are
not
"arbitrary
the
(p. 104)
.
Utopians wish
. .
they
were
contemporary
tower"
political scien
tists "have retreated
deeply
into the
ivory
(p.
106), eschewing
and
traditional "interest in
training
students
for
careers"
practical work
instead "re
the
scientists"
producing 'new making in
political
(p. 107).
this
Robert Dahl's becomes

a
exemplifies
normativism.'
In his
hands,
from
"project
of creative
myth-
which standards
outside the
American tradition
are smuggled
in
Book Reviews
and elevated
325
aside,
to the highest
status"
(pp.118, 122). Brushing institutions

in
consciousness
Dahl hopes for "a

order"
progressive growth
to the point at
which we
can transcend conflict
by embracing the wanner unity "a flight from the realism of the greatest part
republic"
of a more egalitarian of our
tradition and a
rejection of
the sterner qualities of the human spirit that
have helped to build

the
and sustain our constitutional
(pp. 141-42).
so
Tocqueville
modern age not
contended
that America had

measure
far "met the
challenge of
despite, but in large
because of, the
minimal
influence
contemporary doctrines of political thought and the absence of intellectuals (p. 144). The doctrines of rationalism and traditionalism, asso to spread
of
them"
ciated
in Tocqueville's
day
with
the French Revolution and the

undermined
writings
of
Edmund
Burke,
respectively, both
the conviction that human be
ings
there
can
was
effectively deliberate and choose with respect to public policies. But an exceptionally important choice to make: "not between the old
order and
democracy
but between democratic despotisms
and
liberal democ
racies"
(p. 153).
the
Traditionalists had led despotic tendencies

critique, but he
methods
way in
identifying
and
of modem philosophe thought.
exposing the homogenizing Tocqueville accepted their
and
rejected their ultimate standards and philosophe
for combating
upheld theoretical reason at
doubted the efficacy of their ideas. Unlike the traditionalists, Tocqueville the same time that he attacked the reason of his in
different
contemporaries, and he defended the intellect at the same time that he attacked the
modem
intellectual. His
critique of rationalism was thus carried out aim than that
spirit and with a
different
found in traditionalist thought. (P. 156)

of
Because "political
structures and
ing
specific
ideas
of
or
beliefs
than
institutions do far less in the way they do in forming mental

habits"
embody "the char
acter or
way
thinking
that prevails
in
society"
Tocqueville
promoted a
political science that would work not through some new
ideology (thinking
from
ideas to the particulars) but from particular policies and local institutions up to general ideas and national institutions (p. 157). Political partic
general
ipation
on the
local level, "within the

of
citizens' experience,"
own
rewards
"the
mode of
reasoning
the
pragmatic
form
rationalism"
of
(pp. 161-62). Such
activity will also give local governments the strength to serve as intermediary institutions between individuals and the national government. Citizens will de velop "a sense of their power to defend their rights"; Tocqueville's "final stand ard is not the natural in the organic sense, but rather nature and natural right as
discovered
"and its
by
human
world"
reflection on
the
first
of all
in its
particulars of
possibilities"
Federalist
cal
and
(p. 162). This evidently "combinefs] the antifederalist (and Jeffersonian) traditions in American
the concerns
also combined
the
politi
with
thought"
(p. 164). Tocqueville

religion"
"rationalist
liberalism"
the "traditional
without which
"despair
paralysis
and
modern
or
"dangerous
revolu-
pseudo-religions"
(especially
"the
mind-set of
the
intellectual
326
Interpretation
. . .
tionary
bled
who
infused
politics with repressed spiritual
feelings")
would
take
hold (pp. 166-67). He insisted that

rationalism
genuine religion could coexist with a
hum
an
or
better,
a reason
that no longer contorts
itself into
"ism."
Entering
ligentsia;
than
its third century, the American

ten or
regime now
has
a powerful
intel
communications media are more centralized
they
were
twenty
years
(though probably less so ago); jurisprudence "has become a battle

contend"
field
on which
various philosophical
schools
and, "in the
name of "far-
rights"
promoting
through an
activist
judiciary,
government
collapse of
exercises
reaching authority in doctrine of

power
society"
(p. 172). With "the

national
any
meaningful
federalism"
American
our
government commands centralized
unprecedented most
in
a
history
(p. 173).
that
Doctrines
praises
of
historical inev
itability,
racy's
recently
"new
historicism"
liberal
democracy
only
to undermine it unintentionally,
"fatalism"
posit a
that "erodes liberal democ

difference"
foundation in the
view
that human actions can make a
Of these dangers, Ceaser particularly deplores the assaults United States Constitution made by scholars and judges who are in
(p.
ways
175).'
on
the
various
disciples
of
Woodrow
Wilson,
the American statesman who combined

advantages
of
Hegelianism
and
democracy. Ceaser describes the
traditional
American constitutionalism, ably defending it against partisans of parliamen tarian abrogation of the balance of powers. In doing so Ceaser gives his readers
an example of a
Tocquevillian justice.
and
political
science at work
in the
service of an
Aristotelian
sense of
In Liberal
Democracy
liberal
Political Science James W. Ceaser in

It is
speaks as a
political scientist to political
scientists, showing how

modernity. a
civic education can also of uncommon
form
part of a
education
book
clarity
and common sense
for
a profession
in
need of
both.
NOTE
Specifically, Ceaser
History?"
End
of
(The National
of the choice
fatalism for
supposed
telling and succinct critique of Francis Fukuyama's article "The Interest, No. 16 [Summer 1989], 3-18). In addition to his criticism by Fukuyama, Ceaser observes that Fukuyama "obscures the fundamental
offers a
modern
times that
soft
Tocqueville
presented
between
a regime of political
liberty
and a new
which
kind
of regime
(a
despotism) in
abandoned
which people might
believe themselves free, but in
in
reality they
would p.
have
the conditions in society that could promote significant human
action"
(Ceaser,
175).
social research
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Spring

The Education of Cyrus

Theodore A. Sumb Robert Horwitz

Michael Zuckert 307 John H. Herz

Carl Schmitt from the Vantage

European Editors Editors

Manuscript Editor Subscriptions

telephone. Please send three clear

by Eastern Composition, Inc., Binghamton, N.Y. 13905

The Education of Cyrus

Belfagor: Machiavelli's Short

John Locke's Questions

Michael Zuckert John H. Herz

Carl Schmitt from the Vantage

Book Reviews Aristide Tessitore

The Education of Cyrus

problem which engenders

the human situation as one

to disorder does not lead Xenophon to

the art of ruling, one who can rule human beings as

other men rule animals.

Persian army, founded

the limits of the known world

(1.1.4; 8.6.21). Xenophon's opening

considers the problem of rule to

political problem and problem of rule with universal state.

Xenophon identifies the

durability of regimes be hasty indeed

to conclude that Xenophon

to be identical with the problem of

is essentially the problem of obtaining would seem to be a necessary but not

durability, which To use a formula, peace

considers the solution of appear open

but it does just

that Xenophon is presenting Cyrus as the best political

Xenophon, however, does

says rather and

all men with

and no one tried to

that "he was able to awaken in all so

and education with a

to understanding how he was able to

the soul of the

political man par excellence.

life, including his death

Nathan Tarcov for

comments on this paper and

that enabled me to write

Vol. 19, No. 3

Xenophon leads, for Xenophon,

emphasizing the origin

to indicate that the best

political man must

the scene but has a

will consist not

generating be mixed from

thought behind them.

with certain passions

trained or not in youth and

certain opinions acquired

the art of ruling at a very early age

(1.4.9; 1.4.12-15). The

to be a misnomer, serves as a rather

the fundamental importance of