International Society for Iranian Studies

Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran: Anti-Sunni Activities during the Reign of Tahmasp I Author(s): Rosemary Stanfield Johnson Source: Iranian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 1/4, Religion and Society in Islamic Iran during the PreModern Era (1994), pp. 123-133 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. on behalf of International Society for Iranian Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4310889 . Accessed: 28/03/2013 07:58
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Iranian Studies, volume 27, numbers 1-4, 1994

RosemaryStanfieldJohnson

Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran: Anti-Sunni during the Reign of Tahmasp I

Activities

It has traditionallybeen taughtthat Iran,a Sunni polity for many centuries, was converted to Twelver Shi'ism virtually overnight when the armies backing the Safavid house took power in 907/1501. In recent years scholars have begun to question the mannerand rapidityof the process of conversion, what it meant to be "Shi'i" or "Sunni"in sixteenth-centuryIran, and what, if anything, can be said about Safavid Sunnism. It has been noted that Sunnism in Iran was phased out only gradually. For example, there are references in the Persian chronicles to persecutionof Sunnis as late as 1017/1608.1 Some sources suggest that Sunni influence persisted at the court of Shah Tahmasp and name prominentSunnis during his reign.2 As late as the second decade of the eighteenthcentury,the conquerorof Isfahan,Mahmud Afghan, attempted to alter the balance of population in the city by relocating 5,000 Sunni families from Hamadan.3 Certain studies have dealt with Shi'iSunni sectarianismin connection with Safavid-Ottoman and Safavid-Uzbekconflicts; others have called attentionto the difficult process of transforming the basis of Iran's legal institutions from Sunni to Twelver Shi'ite jurisprudence.4 Little has been done, however, on the question of Sunnism within Iran's borders

1. Said Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam (Chicago, 1984), 11921. 2. See the primary source consulted for this paper, Mirza Makhdum Sharifi, alNawaqid li-bunyan al-rawdfid (British*Museum, Or. 7991), f. 172b. See also Burhdn al-futuh (British Museum Library,Or. 1884), ff. 193b-194a. 3. Petros de Sarkis Gilanentz, The Chronicle of Petros de Sarkis Gilanentz, tr. Caro Owen Minasian (Lisbon: 1959), 35. 4. Bianca Scarcia-Amoretti, "Una polemica religiosa tra ulama' di Mashad a ulama' uzbechi nell anno 977/1588-89," Annali Instituto (Universitare) Orientale di Napoli (1964): 647-71; Elke Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik gegen die Safawiden im 16 Jahrhundertnach arabischen Handschriften(Freiburg:Schwarz, 1970); Adel Allouche, The Origins and Development of the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict, 906-962/15001555 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1983); John Walsh, "The Revolt of Alqas Mirza," Weiner Zeitschriftfur die Kunde den Morgenlandes 68 (1976): 61-78; Martin Dickson, "Shah Tahmasb and the Uzbeks (the-Duel for Khurasanwith 'Ubayd Khan), 930-946/1524-1540" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1958), 192-3; B. ScarciaAmoretti, "Religion in the Timurid and Safavid Periods," in The CambridgeHistory of Iran, 6 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 6:610-55.

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124 StanfieldJohnson duringthe Safavidperiod.5 This study deals with Sunnism in the last years of Tahmasp's reign, relying primarily on the Iranian religious scholar Mirza Makhdum Sharifi (d. 995/1587).6 Sharifi, who claimed to be Sunni, enteredSafavid politics in about 975-76/1568-69 when he moved from Fars province to the Safavid capital of Qazvin at the insistence of his father,then serving as vizier underTahmasp. For the next seven years, until the death of Tahmaspin 984/1576, Sharifi taughtand preachedin Qazvin and other Iraniancities and, by his own account, was even appointedqa-dial-quddt of Fars.7 When Isma'il II came to power in 984/1576, he appointedSharifi as sadr. Tahmasp and Isma'il representeddivergent political views. The much-studied Tahmasp accomplished a great deal for Twelver Shi'ism in his fifty-two year reign. His son Isma'il, however, attemptedto reverse those gains, if not explicitly in favor of Sunnism, at least by weakening the prerogatives of Shi'i religious authority. Unlike his father, Isma'il ruled for a brief period, lasting only fourteen months and ending with his mysterious death in November 985/1577. Of various reactive policies that characterizedhis reign, Isma'il's anti-clerical initiatives have most drawnthe attentionof the Persianchroniclers.8 Some of these writershave attributed Isma'il's political actions to the influence of Sharifi, whom they have charged with, among other things, converting the shah to Sunnism. Certainly, Sharifi himself attributedmany of Isma'il's policies to his own influence. In his writings, he went so far as to state that as sadr, he had been the "sultan's [i.e., Isma'il's] sultan."9 After Isma'il's death in 985/1577, Sharifi, who had been imprisonedtwice as a Sunni instigator at the insistence of the Qizilbash amirs, was released through the intercession of high government officials and barely escaped Iran with his life. He subsequentlysettled in Ottomanterritorywhere he wrote his polemical works. He died in Mecca in 995/1587.

5. Shohreh Golsorkhi's "Ismail II and Mirza Makhdum Sharifi: An Interlude in Safavid History" in International Journal of Middle East Studies 26 (1994): 477-88 reflects a growing interest in this topic. 6. Other late-sixteenth-centurypolemicists against the Safavids are studied by Eberhard, Osmanische Polemik. 7. Al-Nawa-qid, ff. 94b, 118b. 8. IskandarBig Munshi gives the most comprehensive account of Isma'il's policies in his Thr-kh-i 'alam-dra-yi 'Abbast, ed. I. Afshar, 2 vols. (Tehran, 1971), 213-18. Another source is Afushtah Natanzi, Nuqawa-t al-athdr (Tehran, 1971), 38-42. See also the Shi'i biographical dictionaries of Mirza 'Abdallah al-Isbahani, Riyad al'ulama' wa hiyad alfudala', ed. A. Husayni, 6 vols. (Qum, 1980), 2:73 and Muhammad Baqir al-Khwansari,Rawddt al-jannat ft ahwal al-'ulama' wa al-saidat, 8 vols. (Tehran, 1971), 2:322-3. 9. Al-Nawaqid, f. 118b.

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Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran 125 Sharifi's polemic entitled al-Nawdqid li-bunydn al-rawafid was written in Arabic, completed in 987/1580, and dedicated to the OttomanSultan MuradIII (1003/1595). Currently,it is still in unpublished manuscriptform.10 The author's biases, his desire to appearimportantin the eyes of his peers, and his attempts to please his Ottomanpatrons make it difficult to ascertainhis motives. Nevertheless, read with caution, his work lends itself to analysis. It deals with events at court and in Qazvin in the last years of Tahmasp's reign, covers the reign of Isma'il II, and serves as a useful source for the development of Shi'ite authorityof the period. Nawdqid is a strongly worded polemic and shares the characteristics of its genre, chief among which is hostility towards opposing views. In Sharifi's case his rivals are the Safavid shahs Isma'il I (r. 90730/1501-24) and Tahmasp (r. 930-984/1524-76), their Qizilbash military supporters,and Twelver Shi'i beliefs and theirpromoters. In his account of the Sunnis of Qazvin, Sharifi relies heavily on his own experiences at court and in the city. These include encounters with the leading religious scholars of his day, 'Abd al-'Al al-Karakiand Husayn al-Karaki,son and grandson,respectively, of the renowned 'Ali al-Karakiwho served the Safavid governmentfrom 913-14/1508 until his death in 940/1534. Karaki's influence on Isma'il I and Tahmasp is well known.1' The fame of the senior Karaki's successors, though not as great, was significant nonetheless. In court circles these figures formed the nucleus aroundwhich political activity revolved, to the extent that they were recognized as religious authorities by Tahmasp. Consequently, they often became the focal point for praise or criticism from their peers, Shi'i or Sunni. Sharifi also had run-ins with the shah's spies, the tabarrd'iyan, whom he viewed as the shah's instruments for implementing policies directedagainstthe Sunni community. During the last twenty years of his reign, from 962/1555 to 984/1576, Tahmasp intensified the Shi'ification of the capital and came to terms with his own faith. He called this turningpoint in his life a "sincererepentance."Tahmasp'ssincere repentancecoincided with a numberof events in his realm, internationalas well as domestic. On the international front, he had just signed the Treaty of Amasyah with the Ottomans, establishing peace between the two countries. Domestically, he had moved his capital from Tabriz southeast to Qazvin,12and had removed his son Isma'il, an influentialmilitary figure among the Qizilbash,
10. The manuscriptconsulted here is British Museum Or. 7991. 11. Modem scholarship on 'Ali al-Karaki includes Arjomand, Shadow of God; W. Madelung, "Shi'i Discussion on the Legality of the Khardj"in R. Peters, ed., Proceedings of the Ninth Congress of the Union Europeennes des Arabisants et Islamisants (Leiden, 1981); H. Modarressi Tabataba'i, Kharaj in Islamic Law (London, 1983), 47-59; idem, An Introduction to Shi'i Law (London, 1984), 50-51. N. Calder's unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Structure of Authority in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence" (1980), was unavailable to me. 12. For a discussion of the dating of the transferof the Safavid capital from Tabriz to Qazvin see Michel Mazzaoui, "From Tabriz to Qazvin to Isfahan: Three Phases of Safavid History," in Zeitschrift der deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, supp. III, I.XIX (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977), 514-19.

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126 StanfieldJohnson from courtand political life and imprisonedhim in the fortressof Qahqaha.13 As a partof his personalreformTahmaspturnedto the furtherstrengtheningof Twelver Shi'i institutions,forbiddingart forms such as poetry and music which did not in some way praise 'Ali and the Twelve Imams. He also closed down tavernsand brothelsand institutedothersocial restrictions. Such actions suggest that Tahmaspwas attemptingfurtherto consolidatehis rule underorthodoxy. In so doing, the shah made his new capital city subjectto increasedsurveillanceby his propagandizing agents. Prior to the Safavid revolution of 907/1501, Qazvin, like most of Iran's cities, had for the most part been Sunni.14 In the sixteenth century, Sharifi reportson the changing spectrumof religion in Iran's cities, including Kashan,Shiraz and Qazvin:
. . . Indeed, most of her [i.e., Kashan's] population are steadfast believers in

as theyareof thebeliefsof ahl al-sunnawa al-jamd'a Godandthe hereafter of the Asha'ri (school), or otherwiseHanafis,except for a few, and they the invasionof Kashan] despitethe were not afraidof the Qizilbash[during mostof theirwealth... fact thatthey. killedmanyof themandexpropriated and I do not thinkthereis anyone [who is not Sunni]amongthe populaor in the two townsa leagueawayfromKashan, tionsof Arran andBaydgul, or 'Aliabad,or Saruabad and theirsuburbs and most distant or in Buzabad [one finds] points. And not morethanseven leaguesfrom there(Kashan), everyone ardentin Sunnismand steadfastin Islam. But you should not of Shiimaginethe existenceof pure [i.e., Sunni]beliefs in the population cities. Rather, andthe restof our well-known raz andQazvinandHamadan those whose Shi'i beliefs are moreextreme thereare amongthe inhabitants of Astarabad andKashan.15 thanthoseof the populations Sharifi's writings suggest, therefore,that duringthe post-revolutionary period in Iran many cities, still Sunni, were in transition. He admonishes his educated reader not to expect to find Sunnism in those cities where he ordinarilywould have expected to find it; nor should he necessarily expect to find the prevalence of Shi'ism in cities noted for Shi'i beliefs. In his account, Sharifi conveys a contrastingperspective to that of the pro-Shi'i Safavid chroniclers. Where the historians often write of the de facto preeminence of the Twelver faith in Iran, SharifidescribesQazvin, Shirazand Hamadanas Sunni cities in which therewas a significant,and no doubt growing and increasinglyvigorous, Shi'i presence.

13. Sharaf al-Din Yazdi. Zafarnama, ed. Maulawi Muhammad Ilahdad, 2 vols. (Calcutta, 1887-88), 1:337. According to Yazdi, Qahqahawas located between Abivard and Qalat in Khurasan. 14. Hamd Allah Mustawfi. Nuzhat al-quluib, ed. and trans. G. LeStrange, 2 vols. (London: 1915-19), 2:63. According to Mustawfi, writing in the fourteenth century, Qazvin was "free of heresy and mostly true to the Sunni path," with a population "extremely bigoted" on the side of Sunnism, predominantlyof the Shafi'i school, but including Hanafis and Shi'is. 15. Al-Nawdqid, f. 129a.

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Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran 127 Of the several anecdotes in Nawaqid, one that suggests the persistence of Sunnism in Qazvin in Sharifi's time is the account of the activities of a court poet underTahmasp. Sharifi introducesus to this poet, a certain Hayrati,who made the Sunni schism of Qazvin the subject of his work dedicated to Tahmasp.16 According to one source, Hayratiwas considered to be the "leading poet of his time."17 He gained the favor of Tahmaspand a place of honor among the poets at the Safavid court throughhis verses in praise of 'Ali and the other Imams.'8 Mirza Sharaf,as Hayratiis mentionedalong with Sharifi's maternalgrandfather, a favoredpoet.19 Sharifi reports how, due to the poet's ill repute in his own town of Marv or Herat,20 Hayratihad fled to the "King of the Qizilbash"(Tahmasp)in Qazvin in order to avoid being burned alive in his hometown.21 Hayrati was just as unpopular among Qazvini Sunnis as he had been among his peers at home. One likely reason for this was his reputation for extorting money from Sunnis.22 Hayrati himself laments his fate in Qazvin: "I am despised in the environs of Qazvin, just as 'Umar was in the environs of Kashan."23

16. Ibid., f. 125b. 17. Hasan Big, Ahsan al-tawa-rikh,trans. and ed. C. N. Seddon as A Chronicle of the Early Safawis Being the Ahsanu't-tawarikhof Hasan Rumlu, 2 vols. (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1931-34), 1:385; Munshi, 'Alam-arar-yi 'Abbasi 1:178. Hayrati has also been cited in various Western sources, including E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1902-24), 4:170-71; Jan Rypka. History of Iranian Literature (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1968), 298; Arjomand, Shadow of God, 166. According to Hasan Big, Hayrati died in 961/1553-54 (Ahsan al-tawarikh 1:385). Sec also "Hamasa sara'i dar Iran," in Nashriya-yi danishkada-yi adabiyat-i Tabriz 3, no. 8 (1329 Sh./1950): 39, cited in Rypka, Iranian Literature, 298. According to Husayn Nakhjavani, Hayrati died in 970/1562-63. 18. Tahmasp had insisted that all poets in search of patronage must write religious poetry. See Munshi, 'Alam-acrd-yi 'Abba.si 1:178. 19. Mirza Sharaf was the maternal grandfatherof Sharifi and son of the two-time vizier of Tahmasp, Qadi Jahan. Hasan Big noted that when Tahmasp withdrew from worldly life, Mirza Sharaf's presence at court became infrequentand he lacked interest in attending on Tahmasp (Ahsan al-tawarikh, 178, 416). 20. Tun (Khurasan),according to Nakhjavani. See Rypka, Iranian Literature, 298. 21. Al-Nawaqid, f. 125b. See also Rypka, Iranian Literature, 298. According to Nakhjavani,he had been assured of protection by Tahmasp, which saved him from the consequences of his libelous writings. His religious odes included the Kitdb-i mu'jizat and a numberof panegyrics. 22. Ibid., f. 125b. 23. Al-Nawaqid, ff. 128a-b. Hayrati is referring to the annual ritual desecration of 'Umar in effigy by the people of Kashan, a practice in which 'Umar's assassin, Abu Lu'lu', was celebrated as a defender of the religion and which, therefore, identified the inhabitants as Shi'i. According to Sharifi, Abu Lu'lu' fled to Kashan after the deed and became so influential among the local population that a shrine was erected in his honor when he died. Abu Lu'lu' was nicknamed"Baba Shuja' al-Din," and the annual celebration of his victim's death (26 Dhu'l-Hijja) was observed at his tomb outside the city of Kashan. In this celebration, an effigy of the caliph was filled about the

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128 StanfieldJohnson Hayratiblamed his misery in Qazvin on the Sunnis. In a literaryact of revenge, he composed a qasida in which he satirized the Sunnis of the capital.24 Hayrati'sverse depicts the sectarianedge and tension in Qazvin and suggests that a numberof influentialand wealthy Sunnis lived there in the late sixteenth century. What might Tahmasp'sattitudetowardthe Sunnis of his realm have been in the face of such wealth and prestige? Sharifi's writings point to a numberof royal policies meant to pressure the population into accepting the new ideology. These policies includedreducingtaxes in districtsthat could prove that they had always had a commitment to 'Ali or Twelver Shi'ism, that is, before the Safavids came to power; interveningin traditionalworshipin mosques; and dignifying royal propagandist and espionage corps. The tax policy of Tahmaspis explained by Sharifi. In the case of Qazvin, a certain 'Ala al-Malik Mar'ashi put into evidence a book entitled Tadwin-i tdrikh-i Qazvin by the thirteenthcenturyImam Raf'i.25 He recited to the shah from this book the story of a man from Zahra, one of the districts of Qazvin, named 'Umran who was beaten by a baker because of his name. When the man protestedthathe was 'Umran,not 'Umar,the bakerrespondedthat "thereis still evil in it, because 'Umran is 'Umar with the alif and nuzn pilfered from 'Uthman." Mar'ashithus proves that Shi'ism was favored in Qazvin, "and,as a result, the shah lightened the fiscal burdens (itlacqatal-diwaniya) and sultanic levies (mutawajjihat al-sultniya)" on the city's inhabitants.26, To further demonstratehis favor, the shah invested in constructionprojects in the area of Qazvin, as in other areas that produced evidence of a commitment to Twelver
waist with bunches of grapes, hoisted, and shaken to the beat of kettledrumsand other instruments while the faithful cursed and vilified him. Finally, someone ran the effigy through at the waist with a sword and the party drank the dripping grape juice, proclaiming "We are thirsty for the blood of 'Umar." 24. The poem was reproduced in full by Hasan Big (Ahsan al-tawarikh 1:185) and has been translated by Browne (Literary History, 4:170-71): "The time has come when the pivotless sphere, like the earth, should rest under thy shadow, 0 Shadow of God! 0 King! It is a period of nine months that this helpless one hath remained in Qazwin ruined, weary, wounded and wretched. I found the practices of the Sunnis in humble and noble alike. I saw the signs of schism in small and great. Poor and rich with washed feet at the Tombs; hands clasped in the mosques to right and to left. In the time of a King like thee to clasp the hands in prayer is an underhandaction, 0 King of lofty lineage. ..." 25. See C. Brockelman Geschichte der Arabischen Literatur, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1943-49), Supplementbanden, 3 vols. (Leiden, 1937-42), 1:399. Raf'i died in 623/1226. 26. Al-Nawaqid, f.129a. ltlaqdt al-diwadnya are requisitions from the diwdn; mutawajjihdt are taxes levied in addition to the original assessment. See Ann Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 430, 435. See also Yusuf b. Ahmad b. Ibrahim al-Bahrani, Lu'lu'at al-bahrayn ft al-ijdzat wa tardjim rijdl al-hadith, ed. S. M. Sadiq (Najaf, 1386/1966), 153. Bahrani recounts that 'Ali al-Karaki ordered that dissenting members of the ulama be taxed "in order that they not lead others astray."

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Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran 129 Shi'ism. According to Sharifi, "such was not the case for those districts known for the straightpath [i.e., Sunnism]."27 Another of Tahmasp's methods for suppressingthe profession.of Sunnism was to intervene in the area of worship. Sharifi describes how the shah interrupted the Friday prayer in all mosques connected with the Sunni community and replaced prayerwith ritualcursing.28To do this, the shah employed two methods. The first called for a Shi'i preacherto lead the faithful in ritual cursing.29 The preacherbegan by ascending the pulpit of the great mosque to begin the vilification of all those who were considered enemies of 'Ali: the Companions beginning with Abu Bakr and the rest of the ash'ara al-mubasharabi'l-janna.A0Next the preachervilified the wives of the prophet, 'A'isha and Hafsa, the rest of the Companions, greater and lesser, and the four Sunni imams.31 The congregational prayer was omitted.32 This practice, Sharifi states without providing a
27. Al-Nawaqid, f. 129b. 28. Ibid., f. 107b. 29. See Munshi, 'Alam-drd-yi 'Abbdsi 1:150. The preacher mentioned was Astarabadi the khati-b. He is probably the same person as Mir Sayyid 'Ali, who also served as muhtasib al-mamalik. Later, during the reign of Isma'il II, the Astarabadisayyids were particularlysingled out for persecution ('Alam-dra-yi 'Abbasi 1:215). 30. I.e., "the Ten who [according to Sunnis] are blessed with paradise." These, with some variation, are Abu Bakr, 'Umar, 'Uthman, 'Ali b. Abu Talib, Sa'd b. Abu Waqqas, Talha, Zubayr, 'Abd al-Rahmanb. 'Awf, Sa'd b. Zayd and Abu 'Ubaydab. alJarrah. Since 'Ali is one of the blessed, the repudiation would have excluded him. When, in a politically charged incident, Sharifi was called on to vilify these individuals, it was to repudiatenine of the ten (al-Nawaqid, f. 107b). 31. Hanafi, Shafi'i, Hanbali, Maliki. Sharifi asserts that "from the dawn of Islam to the present, Shi'is were weak and debased, but did not put into effect, until the present, the cursing of the Companions in the assemblies, gatherings and mosques" (alNawdqid, f. 152a). 32. Al-Nawdqid, f. 105b. Holding the Friday prayer and congregational meeting during the Occultation was a prominent issue among Twelver Shi'is during this period. In a Sunni state, ruling on the suspension of the Friday prayer may have served the Twelver ideological position against the Sunnis. After the Safavid revolution, suspension of such an importantMuslim gathering was viewed by some Shi'i leaders as detrimental to the propagation of faith and Shi'ification of Muslim institutions. Who should lead the prayer during the Occultation was the principal theological and juridical question. The deputy of the Imam was the obvious answer, but with the passing of the four special deputies (the last of whom died in 329/939) who was left to serve as deputy? The likely candidate was the mujtahid. Hence, the problem of the Friday prayer was largely a matter of mujtahid authority. In rulings for or against conducting the Friday prayer and congregational meeting, a mujtahid was, in effect, stating his position on the limits of mujtahid authority. Some mujtahids held that the mujtahid's power should be limited and, therefore, that the Friday prayer should be suspended during the Occultation. Others believed that the Friday prayer should be conducted, but with a mujtahid present. In the latter case the question arose of whether the mujtahid was to be considered the deputy of the Imam. Various opinions circulated, and, during the years of the hegemony of the three al-Karakis, 'Ali, 'Abd al-'Al and Sayyid Husayn, between the years of 913-14/1508 and 1001/1593-94 (the year Sayyid Husayn died), the matter of the Friday prayer appears to have been unsettled.

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130 StanfieldJohnson date, had been carriedout "fromthatday to our day."33 The shah instituteda second measuredesigned to encouragethe public cursingof the enemies of 'Ali. He assembled a group of seven tabarrad'iydn with voices "as loud as buffaloes" to curse in the midst of the people.34 A tabarra'i was an agent of the shah. He was "one who disavows himself of something or someone."35 In this case, the disavowers were given a list of ninety individuals to denounce publicly. These ninety were selected by the shah himself, and their names inserted into the sermon.36 The list started with Harun al-Rashid and ended with 'Abd al-RahmanJami.37 At the end of the chain of the accursed,the people would answer in unison: bish bad kam mabad ("May it be more, not less!"). The tabbara'iya-n also attendedthe gatheringsof the shah at court, and after the ritual cursing was completed the shah filled their mouths with silver coins.38 According to Sharifi, this litany of Sunni names recited in the public ritualcurse was known by the term "jarr al-qitar." Sharifi defines this expression for the readerwho, he says, probablyhas not heard it before. It means the "cursingof all the pious of the religion" in a continuousand successive fashion.39 The tabarra'became a convenientmethodfor publiclydenouncingthe enemies of the regime. Sharifisays thatwhen God deliveredhim from Iranafterthe deathof Isma'il II, his own name was addedto the end of the list.

33. Al-Nawaqid, ff. 125a, 152a; Hasan Big, Ahsan al-tawarikh, 61; Munshi. 'Alamdra--yi 'Abbast 1:155-7. The individual credited with bringing about the revival of the Friday prayer is Baha' al-Din 'Amili. For a chronology of 'Amili's career see Devin Stewart, "A Biographical Note on Baha' al-Din al-'Amili (d. 1030/1621)," Journal of the American Oriental Society 3, no. 3 (1991): 563-71. 34. Al-Nawa-qid,f. 105b. 35. In India, the sectarianmeaning of the term tabarra' continued into modem times. In one example, a disavowal statement appearedon an animal: "A white-haired goat belonging to a Sunni was got hold of by some Shias and the Tabarra was stamped on its back. The tail of the goat was twisted in a manner causing pain to the goat which ran about the town. Finally it was caught by the police and taken to the thana (police station) where it was found that the writing on the goat's back could not be easily removed. It appearsthat the Sunni owner refused to take the 'polluted' goat back" (J. N Hollister, The Shi'a of India [New Delhi, 1979], 5). 36. Al-Nawdqid, ff. 105b-106a. 37. The repudiation of Jami the poet (d. 898/1492) and the desecration of his grave by order of Tahmasp allegedly brought Qadi Jahanto the defense of the poet's reputation. Qadi Jahan produced verses by Jami praising 'Ali and the shah reinstated the poet to a position of dignity. See Dickson, "Shah Tahmasb and the Uzbeks," 190. Declaring one's love for 'Ali was the perfect antidote to the charge of heresy against Twelver Shi'ism in this period; otherwise one could be considered a ndsib, a hater of 'Ali. To be charged as a nasib could threatenone's life (al-Nawaqid, f. 92b). 38. Ibid., f. 106a. 39. Ibid., f. 107b. See E. W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, repr. of 1863 ed.). One meaning is "dragging a train of camels."

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Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran 131 It appearsfrom Sharifi's Nawa-qidthat the tabarra-'iya-n were a strong presence in the community and a symbol of the eye of the royal master, who was the source of their authority. Unlike the prohibitionof the Friday prayer,which, as a theological matter, requiredthe opinion of the mujtahid, the shah's employment of the tabarrc'iya-nas an organizedgroup needed no jurisprudential sanction. They were probablyfunded by the shah himself.40 Under Isma'il II, however, when sectarianhostility flared up, the tabarra'iyadn would be on the losing end of royal privilege. Extortion, intimidationand harassmentwere other methods by which Tahmasp curbed Sunnism. Sharifi recounts that one day a man was broughtbound to the shah by a tabarranil on the charge that he had attendedthe Friday.prayer. The man, who Sharifi says was a Sunni, protestedthat when the tabarra'i attempted to extort something from him (probablymoney) and failed, he accused the man of being Sunni and attending the Friday prayer, which was illegal.41 To this, the shah answeredthathe wantedtwo witnesses who would vouch for the beliefs of the accused. Sharifi stepped forward and testified to the man's belief in Shi'ism. This, he says, he did in the true meaning of "partisanof 'Ali," that is, in defense of 'Ali as one of four rightly-guidedleadersof the Islamic community. The shah, he tells us, laughed, knowing Sharifi was Sunni, and asked for the other witness. One of the Safavid princes, who had been paid to protect the man accused of Sunnism, then stepped forward in the man's defense. Finally, the shah orderedthe accused man beaten and his clothes given to the tabarran'who had broughthim in. The shah added that the sentence was handedout to maintain fear of the tabarrad'iydn.42 Sharifi states that a protectionfee (ajr al-himaya or ujra al-hiracsa) was a necessity for all those who were, as he put it, "weak among the Sunnis" of Iran.43 By paying the protection fee, a Sunni could buy testimony to his Shi'ism by a Shi'i. Although Sharifi does not specify exactly what is meant by "weak" Sunnis in need of protection,presumablyhe is referringto those without wealth and prestige. In his own case, possession of both made it possible for him to avoid harassment. Interestingly,it appearsthat, even in the case of the average person, the severity of a felony had to be proven in order for him to be prosecuted for Sunnism. The shah's good-humoredacceptance of the word of Sharifi and the prince suggests a certainlevel of toleranceon Tahmasp's part,albeit at the price of embarrassmentand intimidation. In fact, he may have even considered it
40. Perhapsfurtherresearch will reveal whether it was Isma'il I or Tahmasp who created the tabarra' corps. It would seem that it was Isma'il I, who institutedthe practice of the ritual curse. 41. Al-Nawaqid, f. 107a. In the above passage, a charge of attending the Friday prayer implies the continued existence of this ritual, despite Tahmasp's prohibition. Sharifi does .not explain whether the Sunnis continued to hold the Friday prayer illegally, but this passage would suggest that they did. 42. Ibid. 43. Ibid.

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132 StanfieldJohnson politically unwise to move too severely against wealthy Sunnis. Sharifi describes one of his own encounterswith the tabarra`iya-n.Sharifi, who had a reputationfor being an excellent and according to his Shi'i biographer44 very popularpreacher,tells his reader that his preachingin Qazvin made Tahmasp fearful. This was because his sermonstook on a political aspect in thathe preachedfor Sunnism covertly, and the Sunni communityof Qazvin recognized this and flocked to him. Hence the shah wanted to imprison him. Tahmasp's advisers, however, warned that it would ruin his name if he prevented Sharifi from awakening the desire of the people for the afterlife. The only solution, therefore,was to devise a plan to stop Sharifi. According to Sharifi, the shah's advisers pointed out that the crowd aroundSharifi was Sunni first and foremost, and then ignorantShi'is who were unawareof what he was doing. They advised the shah that he should order Sharifi to vilify the Companionsfrom the pulpit. That would turnthe Sunni communityaway from him and they would attackand kill him and the shah would not be culpable.45 One of the influential court scholars,Afdal Tarka,a friend and colleague though a Shi'ite, warnedSharifi of his danger and advised him to stop preaching.46Sharifi took his friend's advice and stopped his sermons, but the people importunedthe shah to allow him to continue. At that point, Tahmasp sent for Sharifi and admonishedhim, saying, "You stopped preaching,and now the people thinkbadly of us. We did not prohibit you from that activity, but now I am being held responsible for what should be your responsibility."47 According to Sharifi, when the Sunni community heardwhat the shah said, they forced him to returnto his preaching,and he did so unawareof the shah's plan to requirethe ritualcurse. In his discussion of what happenednext, Sharifi boasts about how he outwitted the agents of the government. When he next mountedthe pulpit andpraisedGod and prayed for the Prophetand his family, a tabarrd' told him not to finish his sermon without cursing nine of the mubasharln (excluding 'Ali). Although Sharifi was surroundedby a large crowd of Sunnis with only a few Qizilbash all presentwere frightenedand did not dare oppose the supportingthe tabarra-'ii, shah's agents.48 Sharifi explains that God had mercy on him and told him to tell the prayer callers and the others situated at the foot of the pulpit to shout "imin" when he called out the curse. Taking advantageof the din created by the criers, Sharifi called on God to curse the cursers instead of cursing the mubdsharin himself.
'Abbdsi 1:148-9. 44. Munshi, 'Alam-drCi-yi 45. Al-Nawdqid, f. lOOa. 46. See Afdal's biography in Munshi, 'Alam-a-ra-yi'Abbcsi 1:155. Afdal was qadi al-mu'askar under Tahmaspjointly with Mir 'Ala al-Mulk Mar'ashi and was also appointed mudarris at court. He was the one Shi'i scholar permitted to come and go freely during the reign of Tahmasp's successor, Isma'il II. He died in 991/1583-84. See also Qadi Nur Allah Shushtari Majaflis al-mu'minin, ed. S. A. Kitabchi, 2 vols. (Tehran, 1986), 2:53. 47. Al-Nawdqid, f. 107a. 48. Ibid.

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Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran 133 He then recited the entire litany of the accursed. The result was that the criers, presumablyShi'is, believed he had become Shi'i and the "Muslims,"that is, the Sunnis, forgave him.49 Sharifino doubt exaggeratedhis own importancein this anecdote,for it is doubtful his activities were threateningto the government. Nevertheless, this account supportsthe conjecturethatTahmaspwanted to avoid sectarianflare-ups. Additionally, it suggests that Tahmasp believed it necessary to loosen the reins on the tabarra-'yan from time to time, enhancing their role as overseers of the ritual curse. In this case, disruptingthe activities of a Sunni preacherwould have suited that intent. In conclusion, Sharifi's account suggests that in this period, the Sunni community of Qazvin was one that Shah Tahmasp took into considerationwhen making policy. That Tahmaspturnedstrongly to the propagationof Shi'ism during the last twenty years of his reign, utilizing the tabarra'i corps and institutingor continuing earlier policies to promote loyalty to the state ideology at public gatherings, points to a political and social need to do so. Further,keeping the lid on sectarianflare-ups was one of Tahmasp's concerns. This would have applied to any kind of sectarian conflict, as partisan strife was common in Iran throughout the Islamic period. Often adherents of different sects sharing the same quarter constructedtheirown bazaarsand shrines. When conflict brokeout, it was often rooted in social institutions,but took on the appearanceof sectarian differences.50Hence this featureof Iraniansociety must be viewed as partof the general context from within to view the Shi'i-Sunni divide. From this vantage point, it is less likely that one would describe the sectarian tension of this period, as a whole, as "Shi'i-Sunni" or as the product of the Safavid revolution. Even with this qualification, however, it appears that political activity which took on the appearanceof sectarianismwas a partof partisantension underTahmasp. As for Sharifi's own position in the government,he enjoyed great mobility owing to family prestige, his own education and political achievements that raised him to the higher echelons of the society he criticized. Munshi's assessment of Sharifi's religious bent and the response it evoked goes to the heart of the matter: "He exceeded proper[i.e., tolerable]bounds in his profession of Sunnism.''51 In otherwords, he rebelled againstthe ruling order. So long as a Sunni practiced his faith with political restraint,it appearsthat he was toleratedby the state. RosemaryStanfieldJohnson,Departmentof History, New York University

49. Ibid., f. 100b. 50. For a discussion of partisan conflict in Iranian society, see Hossein Mirjafari, "The Haydari-Ni'matiCon'flictsin Iran,"Iranian Studies 12 (1979):135-62. 51. 'Alam-arar-yi'Abbdsi 1:148-9.

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