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Reauthorize or Retire The Overseas Private Investment Corporation?, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 78
Reauthorize or Retire The Overseas Private Investment Corporation?, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 78
Reauthorize or Retire The Overseas Private Investment Corporation?, Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 78
Executive Summary
The Overseas Private Investment Corp- few highly profitable industries such as oil
oration is a government agency that provides and gas, financial services, and power.
loans and investment insurance to U.S. com- OPIC activity is also highly concentrated
panies doing business around the world. Its geographically. A handful of troubled
four-year, renewable charter will expire in emerging market economies has received
September 2003. Proponents of OPIC claim 60 percent of OPIC support in the past four
that the agency helps the U.S. economy and years. The agency’s finance and insurance
promotes economic development abroad. for those countries represented only 3 per-
A close look at OPIC activity in the past cent of their total foreign direct investment.
four years undercuts those rationales. OPIC In other countries that are unable to attract
lowers U.S. economic output by transferring foreign investment because they do not
resources from productive uses to politically have the proper policy environment, OPIC
favored ones. OPIC beneficiaries are highly support undermines development by
concentrated in terms of companies and rewarding the lack of policy reform.
industries. The majority of OPIC’s largesse OPIC’s record does not live up to its advo-
goes to a small group of large multinational cates’ rhetoric. Congress should abolish this
corporations and overwhelmingly supports a font of international corporate welfare.
Ian Vásquez is director of the Cato Institute’s Project on Global Economic Liberty and editor of Global
Fortune: The Stumble and Rise of World Capitalism. John Welborn was a research assistant at the
Cato Institute in 2002–2003.
Because OPIC Muñoz announced OPIC’s new commitment
transfers Introduction to U.S. small business, proclaiming 1999 “the
year of small business at OPIC.”4 OPIC was
resources from The Overseas Private Investment Corp- reauthorized in 1999, this time under a four-
productive oration was created by the Foreign Assistance year renewable charter.
Act of 1969. OPIC began operating in 1971, In the four years since OPIC’s last reau-
activities to when it took over the investment guaranty thorization, the agency claims to have refo-
politically favored and promotion activities of the U.S. Agency cused its mission. Where previously the stat-
activities, it for International Development. OPIC now ed emphasis was on making U.S. companies
exists under a four-year, renewable congres- competitive in emerging markets and aiding
reduces U.S. sional charter. That charter will expire in small businesses, OPIC now seeks to refash-
economic output. September 2003. ion itself as a national security–enhancing
OPIC was designed to achieve specific U.S. development agency. Thus Peter Watson, the
domestic and foreign policy objectives by current head of OPIC, recently stressed his
supporting private-sector investment in the agency’s “historical development mission,”
developing world.1 OPIC provides loans, loan especially in “the very regions where instabil-
guaranties, and investment insurance to U.S. ity poses foreign policy and national security
firms doing business around the world. challenges.”5 Indeed, some observers now
At its inception, OPIC was portrayed as a argue that OPIC is too limited in its scope
development agency. In its original form, and should be allowed to provide terrorism
OPIC’s authorizing legislation stated that insurance and lend to foreign companies
OPIC was to “mobilize and facilitate the par- that employ Americans.6
ticipation of United States private capital and Thus, OPIC uses three rationales to justify
skills in the economic and social progress of its operations: (1) OPIC helps the U.S. econo-
less developed friendly countries and areas, my by creating domestic jobs and operates at
thereby complementing the development no net cost to taxpayers; (2) OPIC enables U.S.
assistance objectives of the United States.”2 businesses—in particular, small businesses—to
The rationale for OPIC activities has operate and invest in developing countries;
expanded considerably in the past 30 years. and (3) OPIC encourages growth and corrects
During the 1997 debates on OPIC’s reauthor- for “market failure” in developing countries. A
ization, Ruth Harkin, then president of OPIC, look at OPIC’s record in the four years since its
summarized OPIC’s mission in this way: “To last reauthorization calls those claims into
help American businesses compete in emerg- question.
ing markets; to advance U.S. foreign policy ini-
tiatives and promote free enterprise in devel-
oping countries; to create American jobs and OPIC and the U.S. Economy
American exports; and to operate at no net
cost to American taxpayers.”3 Harkin and oth- OPIC administrators assert that the agency
ers emphasized OPIC’s role in offsetting has generated $65 billion in U.S. exports and
“aggressive” foreign government subsidies to created more than 254,000 American jobs
foreign companies operating in emerging since its inception.7 But such figures are often
markets. Despite intense opposition from a based on claims originating from the very U.S.
wide range of liberals and conservatives, OPIC firms applying for OPIC support. As the
was granted a two-year reauthorization in Congressional Research Service notes:
1997.
During the 1999 reauthorization hearings, Since U.S. firms that are applying for
OPIC president George Muñoz laid out OPIC’s insurance or a guaranty must
agency priorities similar to those cited by demonstrate that they are having a posi-
Harkin, but with one important change. tive, or at least a non-negative, impact on
2
the U.S. economy, they have a strong earn profits during good times but socializes
incentive to provide a positive “spin” on losses if times become difficult.
their activities. Beyond those claims, how- Some people also argue that OPIC strength-
ever, there seems to be no way of verifying ens the U.S. economy by increasing investment
the employment effects of the individual opportunities in developing countries. But
OPIC transactions. . . . From the point of there is little evidence to support that claim.
view of the U.S. economy as a whole, there U.S. direct investment in the developing world
is little theoretical support or empirical has grown considerably in the past decade.
evidence that supports claims that subsi- During that time, OPIC projects have remained
dizing exports or overseas investment a small fraction of total U.S. foreign investment
offers a positive net gain in jobs to the in the developing world (Figure 1). In the four
U.S. economy.8 years since OPIC’s reauthorization, the agency’s
support for investment projects has amounted
Supporters of OPIC also ignore the costs to less than 10 percent of all U.S. direct invest-
that the agency imposes on the economy as a ment in the developing world. The growth in
whole. Because OPIC transfers resources U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) is due to
from productive activities to politically market-oriented reforms in poor countries—a
favored activities, it reduces U.S. economic development entirely unrelated to OPIC. As
It makes little
output. As the CRS observes: Figure 1 shows, the rise in OPIC activity in the sense to maintain
mid-1990s trails the rise in U.S. FDI to the a government
Subsidies for exports shift resources developing world by about 5 years.
within the domestic economy toward agency that helps
the subsidized export sector at the the private sector
expense of other sectors of the economy. Who Really Benefits? earn profits
This shift reduces production and effi-
ciency overall in the economy, because Nearly all OPIC finance and insurance during good
the subsidy spurs a greater movement goes to large corporations, such as Citibank, times but
of the factors of production, primarily Enron, Caterpillar Corporation, and Bechtel.
labor and capital, out of the other sec- (For a list of all OPIC projects in the past four socializes losses if
tors of the economy and into the subsi- years, see the Appendix.) Moreover, OPIC times become
dized export industries than would be largesse is heavily concentrated on a few difficult.
warranted by market conditions. Also, firms. As Table 1 shows, for fiscal years
national income as a whole would be 1999–2002, the top 10 beneficiaries received
reduced since all sectors of the economy more than half of all OPIC support. In FY02,
would be operating sub-optimally: the top 10 recipient firms of OPIC’s nearly
income gains in the subsidized export $1.2 billion largesse used up 87 percent of
sector would be achieved at the expense those resources. It is difficult to believe that
of all other sectors of the economy.9 the corporations on that list, whose com-
bined annual sales are in the hundreds of bil-
Moreover, every OPIC transaction is con- lions of dollars, are unable to come up with
ducted with the full backing of the U.S. govern- sufficient funding for worthwhile invest-
ment, and therefore of U.S. taxpayers. As long ments without taxpayer support. If the
as OPIC-backed projects remain profitable, world’s richest corporations are unwilling to
claims that OPIC operates at “no cost” to tax- assume the full risk of their investments, it
payers are technically accurate. Thus far, OPIC makes little sense to force taxpayers to do so.
appears to have been financially successful. But OPIC administrators highlight the agency’s
its performance argues in favor of privatization. involvement in housing, water, and other light
Indeed, it makes little sense to maintain a gov- infrastructure projects. OPIC’s portfolio, how-
ernment agency that helps the private sector ever, is concentrated in specific capital-inten-
3
Figure 1
U.S. FDI to Developing Countries vs. OPIC Support
25,000 OPIC
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
-5,000
70
75
80
85
90
95
00
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
19
19
19
19
19
19
20
Statistics, June 2003, www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde/viewbase.asp?dbname=cde_dac; and Overseas Private
Investment Corporation Annual Report (Washington: OPIC, various years).
Table 1
Top OPIC Beneficiaries, FY1999–2002
Percentage Cumulative
a
Company Amount of Total Percentage
Source: Overseas Private Investment Corporation Annual Report (Washington: OPIC, various years).
a
Refers to total financing and insurance.
b
Indicates sovereign investments financed by U.S. bondholders.
c
Includes CMS Gas Transmission Company and CMS Oil and Gas (EG) LDC.
4
Figure 2
Distribution of OPIC Funds by Sector, FY1999–2002
Telecommunications
14.22%
Financial service
Power
insurance
14.26%
Source: Overseas Private Investment Corporation Annual Report (Washington: OPIC, various years). 20.26%
5
Figure 3
OPIC Country Distribution, FY1999–2002
Brazil
20.43%
Remaining 60 countries
and regions
39.84%
Argentina
18.14%
Russia
4.23% Turkey
Source: Overseas Private Investment Corporation Annual Venezuela 10.33%
Report (Washington: OPIC, various years).
7.03%
citizens of developing countries rarely benefit Bank’s list of heavily indebted poor coun-
and are made often worse off. tries. It is telling that 95 percent of the long-
To be sure, not all OPIC investments are as term debt of those countries, mostly in
questionable as those cited above. But subsi- Africa, is public or publicly guarantied. In
dizing almost any investment risk is an exceed- other words, almost all of the debt problem
ingly poor way to promote development. It is in those countries has been caused by foreign
frequently asserted, for example, that OPIC aid agencies and government-backed finance
corrects for market failure by directing invest- schemes, of which OPIC is a part. When it
ment where the private sector is unwilling to comes to activist government promotion of
provide finance or insurance. Yet there are development, including backing of the pri-
often good reasons for such behavior. By with- vate sector, the hazards of government failure
holding or offering funds, the market is pro- loom large.
viding important signals about a country’s The geographic distribution of OPIC sup-
When it comes investment environment. By contrast, OPIC port, which is concentrated in a handful of
to activist finance and insurance can be seen as a reward countries, also calls into question OPIC’s sup-
government to host country governments for not imple- posed development mission. Since OPIC’s
menting the kind of policies that will genuine- last reauthorization, 60 percent of OPIC sup-
promotion of ly attract capital and lead to self-sustaining port has gone to companies operating in
development, the growth. Countries have less incentive to under- Brazil, Argentina, Turkey, Venezuela, and
take necessary reform when they can attract Russia (Figure 3). During that time, the top
hazards of investment subsidized by the U.S. government. three beneficiaries—Brazil, Turkey, and
government In the worst cases, risky investments and Argentina—have each experienced severe eco-
failure loom delayed reform result in a buildup of unsus- nomic strain or crisis in which debt misman-
tainable debt. That is exactly the problem agement has played a prominent role. In all
large. exhibited by the 42 nations on the World three cases the International Monetary Fund
6
Table 2
OPIC vs. Total FDI in Top Five OPIC Countries, 1999–2002
Total FDI, OPIC Finance and OPIC Funds as
Country 1999–2002 Insurance, 1999–2002a Percentage of Total FDI
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Data Services, August 2003, http://www.eiu.com.
Note: FDI figures for Argentina and Venezuela for 2002 are estimates.
a
Refers to total OPIC finance and insurance awarded to companies operating in that country.
7
Country Company Description Amount ($) Support
8
Country Company Description Amount ($) Support
TOTAL 4,004,726,597
9
Country Company Description Amount ($) Support
33 GHANA International Foundation for Education Microlending facility for small 1,000,000 Finance
& Self-Help businesses
34 ZIMBABWE K & S International, Inc./Sheffield Toothpaste manufacturing facility 1,000,000 Finance
Laboratories, a Div. of Faria, Ltd.
35 HUNGARY Rami Zohar Franchise of fast food restaurants 900,000 Finance
36 CENTRAL AMERICA Ganzcorp Investments Inc. Vehicle emission & safety testing 765,000 Insurance
facilities
37 RUSSIA Abamedia, L.P. Electronic catalog/website for 632,800 Finance
motion pictures
38 COSTA RICA Ervin E. Portman Medical device manufacturing 360,000 Finance
and distribution facility
39 PANAMA Rick Anderson Franchise of Mail Boxes Etc. 115,200 Finance
40 ETHIOPIA Norwest Mine Services, Inc. Feasibility study 7,200 Insurance
TOTAL 2,081,435,591
10
Country Company Description Amount ($) Support
TOTAL 1,596,695,371
11
Country Company Description Amount ($) Support
TOTAL 1,187,677,771
Sources: Overseas Private Investment Corporation Annual Reports: 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 (Washington: OPIC).
12
Century (Washington: Institute for International
Economics, 2003).
Notes
1. U.S. General Accounting Office, “Issues 7. Watson.
Related to the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation’s Reauthorization,” GAO/NSAID- 8. James K. Jackson, “OPIC: Employment and
97230, September 1997. Other Economic Effects,” Congressional Research
Service Report for Congress, May 23, 1997, p. 6.
2. 22 U.S.C. § 2191.
9. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ruth Harkin, OPIC, Statement before the
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy 10. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Annual
and Trade of the House Committee on International Report, 2000 (Washington: OPIC, 2000).
Relations, March 18, 1997.
11. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Annual
4. George Muñoz, OPIC, Statement before the Report, 2002 (Washington: OPIC, 2003).
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy
and Trade of the House Committee on International 12. Ibid.
Relations, April 14, 1999.
13. Ibid.
5. Peter Watson, OPIC, Statement before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export 14. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Annual
Financing and Related Programs of the House Com- Report, 2000.
mittee on Appropriations, March 26, 2003.
15. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Annual
6. Theodore Moran, Reforming OPIC for the 21st Report, 2001(Washington: OPIC, n.d.).
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