I negate and value morality since its a guide to action, Protecting communal identity of an agent is key to morality.

Steinberger:
(Peter J. Steinberger, Hegel on Crime and Punishment, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 77, No. 4 (Dec., 1983), pp. 858-870)
For Hegel, punishment is the dialectical overcoming of crime. Thus, as one would expect, the theory of crime and punishment can only be understood in terms of the Hegelian dialectic. More specifically,

it

is to the dialectical unfolding of the Notion of Right that we must turn our immediate attention. In the Hegelian system, the word "Right" refers to the entire normative structure of social life; as such, it includes what we generally think of as the morality of interpersonal relations, civil rights and liberties, the law, and the legitimate bases of political authority. The purpose of the Philosophy of Right is to trace the logical and immanent development of Right in the world, and to uncover thereby the underlying interrelatedness of all social norms, from the simplest to the most sublime. This is a difficult task, for Right, as the complex gamut of normative social principles, must be approached gradually, in a peacemeal fashion. The simplest norms must be isolated and identified first, before other, logically necessary principles are added. Each such addition, of course, complicates and enriches the Notion of Right; the task of the political philosopher is to trace these various cumulative additions and to show that each builds upon and is logically compatible with, and yet at the same time subsumes and envelopes, its predecessors. The first stage in the development of Right is described in the section on Abstract Right and essentially involves the rights of persons to own property. That is, at this initial

stage the sole nor- mative principle of social life has to do with prop- erty rights; one has a right to own property, and it is wrong to violate someone else's right. Now, for Hegel this right to own property is im- portant-it is the most basic norm-because of its role in the development of freedom. In this sense, it offers a precise example of what Taylor (1975, p. 83) calls "the principle of necessary embodi- ment." For Hegel, the Will, which is a defining characteristic of persons, is itself by definition free (5).5 Hence, if there are persons, there must be freedom. But this freedom can be "actual- ized," it can make its appearance in the world, only when the Will knows itself to be free. Prop- erty helps make this self-knowledge possible. For the actual possession of property-its seizure, its use, its alienation-permits the Will to observe the effects of its freedom in something external, something "out there." The Will, knowing the object of its activity to be its property, can thus reflect from the property back into itself, thereby confirming to itself its own power or freedom. Property is thus the necessary embodiment of the Will's freedom (41, 43). But again the posses- sion of a free Will is itself said to be a defining characteristic of persons. Hence, it follows simply and directly that there can be no persons unless there is property. If there are to be persons, i.e., repositories of free will, then each such person must have a right to own at least some property.

Since morality necessitates a social identity, the standard is respecting social identity. Retribution is necessary since it holds the agent as part of the moral community. Oldenquist 1:
What I am suggesting is that retributive

well-functioning cases, within a moral community in which there is a constant readiness to blame or criticize free riders, those who fail to do their fair share, or are exploitative or threatening. This is the

criminal justice and the sense of mutual responsibility found in moral communities are two modes of a common moral sentiment. Crimes are simply extreme

essence of retribution:[is] holding one another accountable. It is not peculiar to crime, but is manifested everywhere in society in our mutual accountability for meeting community expectations. If accountability is an essential feature of community, and criminal punishment concerns its
dramatic extreme, there are implications or social control. There is a continuity from mild moral offenses the law leaves alone to serious crimes. The morally important feature of this continuum traditionally has been a delinquent's degree of disgrace. Fining,

jailing, or executing someone need have nothing to do with punishment. Punishment is essentially a moral notion and has no necessary connection with violence or deprivation of freedom. It is, ideally, putting someone in disgrace and the eliciting of repentance. If we just fine someone, we merely impose a cost; if we just take him out in the yard and shoot him, we are simply disposing of a problem, as we do with a disease or a mad dog. But, if we try to elicit a confession and contrition, we are seeking a moral transaction with a fellow human being with whom we share at least some principles.
This may be one reason why regimes whose moral foundations are the most dubious often try the hardest to elicit confessions from prisoners and thus give themselves the appearance of moral legitimacy. It might be objected that harm, in the form of fines, jail, or execution, is essential to punishment. This is right if one also accepts disgrace and ostracism (and the fear of them) as forms of harm. They can, after all, be feared and hated more than a fine or beating. Nonetheless,

it is a mistake simply to put disgrace and ostracism on a list of

harms. It is the same mistake J.

S. Mill made in treating the "internal sanction" of conscience as merely a pain, like toothache; for disgrace and

the threat of ostracism, in addition to being harms, are moral notions essential to punishment and are what make punishment a moral transaction.

You can harm a mad dog but you cannot punish it because you cannot disgrace it, and you cannot disgrace it because it does not share your moral community Not only does retribution serve as a link of moral communalism to the victims but also is the cohesion of society itself. Other methods alienate criminals destroying their communal identity. Oldenquist 2: Putting crime in a completely separate category from misdeeds we blame without the aid of the law leads us to demoralize crime, which is more clearly a mistake than the decriminalization of immorality: when criminals are not seen simply as great violators of the mutual moral expectations in our daily social intercourse, but instead are viewed as mere harmful agents, they are removed from our moral community. They are removed because of a philosophical mistake that alienates them more than they were before. Retribution consequently is intrinsic to the cohesion of a moral community. This does not imply we should be constantly censorious or rant at one another; it is that we risk disapproval, or withdrawal of trust
or privileges, when we disappoint normal expectations of cooperation, loyalty, and doing our fair share.