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The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and The Battle of Yalu in September 1894
The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and The Battle of Yalu in September 1894
Sino-Japanese
War
of
1894- 1895
and
the
Battle
of
Yalu
in
September
1894
Min
Jung
Kim
GOVT
451
Professor
Karber
November
27,
2012
Table of Contents
Political Motivation of the War ---------------------------------------------------------5 Overview of the First Sino-Japanese War -------------------------------------------- 9 First Phase of the Sino-Japanese War ------------------------------------------------14 Second Phase of the Sino-Japanese War ---------------------------------------------21 Third Phase of the War at Weihaiwei ------------------------------------------------29 The Battle of the Yalu ------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 Conclusion -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 45 Illustrations Overview Map of the Battles Categorized by Phases ------------------------------ 9 Map of the battles of Pyongyang, Yalu, and Jiuliancheng ------------------------15 Map of the Invasion of Liaodong Peninsula ----------------------------------------21 Chart of the Chinese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River----------36 Chart of the Japanese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River --------38
was fought over two centuries ago. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 started as a conflict over control of the Korean peninsula by China and Japan. Among the wars that were fought in East Asia, this war is not one of the well known. However, the war deserves more attention because it was a significant turning point in the power balance of East Asia for Japan, China, and Korea. Also, this war could serve as a lesson for China that is rising in its power in the international arena once again. In the end of 1800s, even though China was the dominant power, the lax attitude of China led to an unexpected yet overwhelming loss of the war. Therefore, this discussion of the war can remind China to be constantly aware of other countries without nave assumption while it maintains a dominant power status. Furthermore, the Battle of Yalu, which was one of the most significant naval battles that consolidated the naval supremacy of the Japanese, serves as an example of the importance of supremacy of naval power in East Asia. During this period, the Japanese Meiji government focused on modernization and strengthened its military with equipments and trainings from the Western powers. Meanwhile, after the First Opium War of 1839- 1842, the Qing dynasty had weakened drastically in its domestic politics and foreign relations. The Chinese government did not appreciate the foreign intervention, but could not resist their intrusion. Prior to the war, the Western powers did not consider Japan as a rivaling power of China; however, the successful demonstration of the Japanese forces capacity caught the attention of them. Therefore, the Japanese became the first successful developing country, and for the next two centuries, have continued that reputation. On the other hand, the Chinese government, once an indisputable dominant power, was deeply ashamed of the loss of the war,
and had weakened further with its domestic turmoil. This war also influenced the situation in Korea. As the Korean government was suffering from instability with Tonghak Rebellion, the Japanese intensified its control over Korea after the war, to solidify its power status in East Asia. The Sino- Japanese War of 1894-1895 evidently served as a critical turning point in the history of East Asia for all three countries. Chinas loss came as a shock to many observing countries. From the objective perspective, it was obvious that the Chinese forces were better prepared for the war. But Chinas the most critical weakness in this war was its lack of discipline and assumption that it will win the war because it was the dominant power. This lackadaisical attitude could not fight against determined Japanese forces. The Chinese forces lost their battles continuously and sometimes, they retreated even without fighting. The government and officials were not serious about this war as well. Even when they were sending peace envoys after losing battles, the Chinese sent government officials who were not high ranking and indicated that it did not consider the peace negotiation important. Due to these attitudes, the China had to give its dominant power status to Japan. Now, after two centuries had passed, China has risen again in the international arena with its economy and military capacity. At this time, the Sino-Japanese War could be a useful reminder for the Chinese with the opportunity to maintain its dominant power once again. The vital importance of supreme naval power and maritime security remain the same two centuries ago and even now. The Battle of Yalu was the decisive naval battle that allowed the Japanese to gain the momentum of the rest of the war. Also, this battle had received attention of the Western powers because of the Japanese usage of original naval tactics and both
countries modern European technologies. The Japanese knew in the early phase of the war that the one country that dominates the sea route first would gain huge advantage throughout the war. Therefore, the Japanese fought with determination and gained a complete victory. Protecting the maritime security still continue to be a top priority of East Asian countries. It can be demonstrated through the current disputes regarding the South China Sea and the East Sea/Sea of Japan. The Battle of Yalu indicates that the naval supremacy was a concern for the countries security especially in East Asia even two centuries ago. This paper will first discuss the political motivation that sparked the conflict between China and Japan. Then, it will describe the battles during Sino-Japanese War in three phases, and then followed by the peace treaty. Finally, the specific details of the Battle of Yalu will be mentioned. This paper will conclude by analyzing the legacies of China, Japan, and Korea and emphasizing the significance of the war. Political motivation of the First Sino-Japanese War Despite its miniature size of the territory, the Korean Peninsula served as one of the most strategic locations in the Far East. At the end of 19th century, the three major Far Eastern powers, China, Japan, and Russia, considered Korea as a crucial strategic location for their national security. When the Far Eastern powers were interested in securing the Korean Peninsula, controlling the country and its people was not the primary purpose of the Far Eastern powers; instead, it was to utilize this strategic region to protect its own security interests.
As
an
island
nation,
Japan
sought
Korea
for
the
purpose
of
debarkation
point
for
access
to
the
Asian
mainland.1
The
Korean
Peninsula
was
perfect
for
Japan
to
utilize
it
as
its
gateway
to
the
mainland.
Japans
interest
in
Korea
was
due
to
its
goal
of
building
an
outer
defense
perimeter.2
Not
only
Korea
could
have
been
a
strategic
location
for
Japanese
offense,
it
was
also
suitable
for
its
defense.
Additionally,
the
Yellow
Sea
provided
the
maritime
access
to
Peking,
and
through
this
route
Korea
sent
its
large
rice
tribute
and
other
vital
food
supplies.3
Furthermore,
because
the
northern
Korean
Peninsula
bordered
Manchuria,
where
the
most
industrialized
part
of
China
was
located,
Chinas
control
over
this
region
was
also
significant
to
its
national
security.4
Because
of
the
intense
competition
over
this
tiny
territory,
most
countries
desired
to
dominate
the
territory
first,
before
the
other
took
the
initiative.
Because
the
strategic
location
of
the
Korean
Peninsula
was
related
to
the
Far
Eastern
powers
geostrategic
interest,
they
were
even
willing
to
risk
a
military
confrontation
to
win
the
control
over
the
region.
To
prevent
any
one
power
dominating
Korea,
Japan
and
China
signed
the
Treaty
of
Tianjin
on
April
18,
1885.5
This
convention,
negotiated
by
Li
Hongzhang
and
Ito
Hirobumi,
resulted
in
two
parties
accord
on
bilateral
troop
withdrawal,
restriction
on
deploying
military
instructors,
and
aforementioned
notification
of
sending
troops.6
On
paper,
this
treaty
seemed
fair,
but
tensions
still
remained.
Despite
the
agreement
between
two
parties,
1
S.C.M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 Perceptions, Power, and Primacy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 33. 2 Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989 (London: Routledge, 2001), 95. 3 G.A. Ballard, The Influence of the Sea on the Political History of Japan(New York, NY: n.p., 1921), 125. 4 Paine, 34. 5 Paine, 59. 6 Ibid.
the
Treaty
of
Tianjin
indicated
implied
tension
regarding
each
countrys
desire
to
control
the
Korean
territory.
This
delicate
situation
within
the
Northeast
Asia
continued.
Eventually,
ten
years
later,
in
1894,
two
events
exacerbated
the
relations
between
China
and
Japan,
and
hastened
the
war.
The
first
one
was
the
murder
of
Kim
Ok- kyun.
In
1884,
Kim,
a
leader
of
pro-Japanese
faction
in
Korea,
led
an
uprising
against
the
government
but
failed.
Ten
years
later,
a
Korean
assassin
in
Shanghai
murdered
him,
and
his
corpse
was
publicly
displayed
in
Korea
to
warn
the
pro-Japanese
faction.
As
a
response,
many
Japanese
considered
this
act
an
insult
against
them
by
the
Chinese.
Nationalists
groups
in
Japan
started
to
call
for
war
with
China
since
this
incident.7
Another
incident
that
led
to
the
war
was
when
the
Korean
government
asked
for
Chinas
intervention
to
suppress
the
Tonghak
Insurrection
in
the
summer
of
the
same
year.
Tonghaks
not
only
organized
the
anti-foreign
activities,
but
also
initiated
both
a
religious
and
a
social
movement
concerned
with
the
freedom
of
their
religion,
the
improvement
of
peasantry
class,
and
reform
of
the
corrupt
government.
Unable
to
control
this
rebellion,
the
Korean
King
requested
Li
Hongzhang
for
Chinese
military
assistance.
It
was
granted
promptly
through
Chinas
Resident-General
Yuan
Shikai
in
June
1894,
and
it
was
promptly
given.8
Respecting
the
terms
of
the
Treaty
of
Tianjin,
China
immediately
informed
Japan
and
stated
by
stating
that
China
was
sending
troops
to
their
tributary
states
to
assist
them.9
Japan
was
not
pleased
by
this
phrase,
and
because
Japan
had
concluded
that
Chinas
proclamation
of
Korea
as
its
tributary
state
violated
the
treaty,
the
Japanese
government
also
sent
its
troops
to
Korea.
Later
on,
in
accordance
with
the
7 8
treaty,
China
wanted
both
forces
to
withdraw
simultaneously;
however,
Japan
was
adamant
to
take
this
opportunity
to
increase
its
military
presence
in
Korea.
Therefore,
the
Japanese
government
refused
to
withdraw
until
it
reformed
the
Korean
government.10
A
Sino-Japanese
confrontation
seemed
difficult
to
be
avoided,
especially
as
the
Japanese
troops
attacked
the
Korean
royal
palace
on
July
23,
1894
to
enforce
Japanese
version
of
a
governmental
reorganization.11
In
response,
threatened
China
chartered
three
British
steamers:
Kowshing,
Irene,
and
the
Fei
Ching.
In
an
unexpected
clash
in
the
Bay
of
Asan,
the
Japanese
force
sunk
Kowshing,
and
this
battle
eventually
led
to
the
Battle
of
Seonghwan
four
days
later.
Finally,
Japan
officially
declared
war
on
China
on
August
1,
1894.12
The
geographical
position
of
Korea
and
the
weak
nature
of
the
Korean
government,
seen
through
the
murder
of
Kim
Ok-Kyun
and
the
incidents
of
the
Tonghak
Insurrection,
made
China
and
Japans
exertion
of
influence
inevitable.
As
the
two
countries
were
adamant
on
securing
the
Korean
Peninsula,
they
were
willing
to
sacrifice
their
troops.
Additionally,
such
a
prompt
escalation
to
the
war
and
well-prepared
military
forces
indicate
that
China
and
Japan
had
considered
the
Sino-Japanese
conflict
unavoidable.
Moreover,
the
defeat
of
Kowshing
alerted
China,
because
the
command
of
the
sea
was
critical
in
this
conflict
when
the
sea
route
offered
the
most
efficient
way
for
communication
and
operations
of
the
war.
The
First
Sino-Japanese
War
was
fought
officially
from
August
1,
1894
to
April
17,
1895.
10
Allen Fung, "Testing the Self-Strengthening: The Chinese Army in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895," Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (October 1996): 1010. 11 Elleman, 97. 12 W.G. Beasley, Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945 (n.p.: Oxford University Press, 1991), 48.
The Chinese Forces When the Sino-Japanese War was officially declared in 1894, many, especially the European powers, expected the Chinese military primacy over Japans capability. In the late 1800s, Japan was radically strengthened by its Meiji Restoration movement, while the Imperial Qing dynasty fought the First Opium War of 1839-1842 and the French-Chinese War of 1884-1885.13 As a result, the Qing dynastys military force had become weak and was continuously beaten in several battles. Eventually, by the last phase of the war in March 1895, Beijing faced direct threat of the Japanese forces, and in the following month, the Chinese government agreed for peace under humiliating conditions.14 As it had been mentioned earlier in the political motivation of the war, Japan far more determined to strengthen its military influence within Korea. China, without previous recognition of Japans ambition, was less prepared for the war. Due to its deteriorating power, the Chinese military was poorly trained and equipped. After the Taiping Rebellion of 1851, the Chinese army was divided into four classes of troops: The Eight Banners (Machus, Mongols, and Chinese army of about 250,000 men), The Green Standard (entirely Chinese army of approximately 500,000 to 600,000 men), The Braves (volunteers), and the Trained Army, which is estimated to be between 50,000 to 100,000 soldiers.15 The aims for the first two groups of troops were to maintain peace and suppress small armies, and they were not ready to fight
13
Guangqiu Xu, "Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)," in China at War: An Encyclopedia, ed. Xiaobing Li (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 11483. 14 Fung, 1010. 15 Zenone Volpicelli, The China-Japan War Complied from Japanese, Chinese, and Foreign Sources (New York, NY: C. Scribner's, 1896), 69-73.
10
battles
yet.16
While
the
Braves
were
completely
voluntary
system
within
the
provinces,
the
Trained
Army
received
drills
in
the
European
style.
However,
these
divided
armies
lacked
unity
because
of
regional
rivalry.
Among
the
forces,
the
Beiyang
Army,
which
included
the
Huai
and
Xiang
armies,
was
the
strongest
at
the
time.
Fortunately,
the
Chinese
navy
was
better
disciplined
than
the
Army,
with
foreign
instructors
such
as
Captain
Lang.
Within
the
Chinese
navy,
there
were
four
squadrons:
the
Beiyang
(also
called
Northern
Squadron),
the
Nanyang
(also
called
Southern
Squadron),
the
Foochow,
and
Canton
Flotillas.17
Among
them
the
Beiyang
Fleet
was
the
most
powerful
not
only
within
China
but
also
in
East
Asia
prior
to
the
first
Sino-Japanese
War.
The
Beiyang
Fleet,
which
was
organized
in
1888
with
the
total
number
of
25
ships,
was
led
by
Admiral
Ding
and
mainly
consisted
of
battleships
imported
from
Germany.
Among
them,
the
most
notable
ships
were
the
Ding
Yuan
and
the
Zhen
Yuan,
each
weighing
7,430
tons.18
The
Beiyang
divisions
were
equipped
with
the
most
modernized
Western-style
weapons
with
the
strict
training
program,
and
in
1893,
the
divisions
had
around
51
battalions
(25,000-30,000
soldiers).19
Despite
the
expectations
of
many,
the
Chinese
forces
seemed
strong
only
on
paper,
because
many
military
divisions
lacked
the
equipment
and
training.
Consequently,
the
Chinese
military
heavily
relied
on
the
Beiyang
division
when
going
into
the
war.
16 17
11
Weakness
within
the
Chinese
military
The
Beiyang
Army
and
Beiyang
Fleet
served
as
the
best
and
the
most
modernized
military
capability
of
China.
However,
there
were
several
weaknesses
that
hampered
the
capacity
of
the
best
equipment.
Many
scholars
argue
for
different
reasons
of
Chinas
failure
in
the
war.
Some
of
the
reasons
are
the
corrupt
Qing
government,
lack
of
military
training
and
the
discipline
of
the
Chinese
army,
and
surprisingly,
the
outnumbered
Chinese
army.
As
the
Qing
government
devoted
more
of
its
budget
on
building
the
Summer
Palace
rather
than
training
its
military,
the
Beiyang
force
was
not
maintained
properly.
After
its
foundation
in
1888,
the
Beiyang
Fleet
did
not
acquire
any
new
warships.
Because
of
a
low
budget
for
the
military,
the
Chinese
soldiers
were
paid
and
treated
poorly.20
The
Chinese
government
was
too
nave
and
overly
confident
with
its
assumption
of
having
the
best
military
capability
in
East
Asian
region.
Another
reason
for
Chinas
failure
accounts
to
the
lack
of
military
training
of
the
Chinese
army.
There
are
several
testimonies
telling
that
some
soldiers
did
not
know
how
to
operate
their
fort
guns
and
the
artillery.21
The
lack
of
training
can
be
traced
back
to
the
lack
of
funding
and
the
disunited
Chinese
army
officers.
Also,
numerous
Chinese
soldiers
were
opium
addicts,
which
did
not
help
strengthening
the
military.22
For
this
reason,
the
Japanese
troops
outnumbered
the
Chinese
army
several
times
because
the
actual
number
of
soldiers
with
fighting
ability
differed
from
the
documentation.23
Because
the
Qing
dynasty
had
maintained
a
dominant
position
in
East
Asia
for
a
long
period
of
time,
it
must
have
not
much
need
to
actually
fight
with
strong
determination
to
destroy
20 21
Xu, "Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)," in China at War: An Encyclopedia,11485. Fung, 1022. 22 Ibid. 23 Fung, 1027.
12
enemies.
One
reason
may
be
that
in
that
region,
there
was
no
country
that
could
match
China
with
its
capacity
and
strength.
When
this
period
of
relaxation
continued
for
a
while,
China
did
not
expect
Japan
to
rise
so
suddenly
with
its
advanced
equipments
and
forces.
The
Japanese
Forces
During
the
Meiji
Restoration,
the
emperor
focused
on
building
a
modern
national
army
and
navy.
To
achieve
this,
the
government
established
military
schools
and
arsenals
and
supported
Japanese
military
officials
to
go
to
Europe
and
study
the
military
strategy
and
tactics.
In
addition,
beginning
from
1872,
national
conscription
was
imposed
and
opportunities
to
join
the
professional
army
were
given
to
the
soldiers.24
The
Japanese
army
had
six
divisions,
including
the
Imperial
Body
Guard.
All
of
them
had
two
brigades
or
four
regiments
of
infantry;
however,
the
artillery,
cavalry,
engineers
and
train
assigned
to
the
division
differed
to
some
extent.25
Additionally,
there
were
two
special
corps,
one
troop
each
specifically
for
the
Island
of
Yeso
and
the
Tsushima.26
During
peacetime,
each
military
unit
of
the
Japanese
army
contained
about
64,300
men.27
The
Japanese
Navy
was
organized
similarly
to
that
of
the
Chinese.
It
also
was
equipped
with
numerous
fast
vessels,
Yoshino
being
the
fastest
one
in
the
world.
Japan
had
three
military
ports
in
Yokosuka,
Kure
and
Sasebo
with
a
squadron
attached
to
each
of
them.
During
the
war,
the
fleet
was
divided
into
smaller
squadron
of
four
vessels.28
Furthermore,
the
Japanese
navy
was
heavily
influenced
by
the
West
as
the
British
Royal
Navy
trained
24 25
Xu, "Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)," in China at War: An Encyclopedia,11490. Volpicelli, 80. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 81. 28 Ibid., 86.
13
them
with
military
skills.
As
a
result,
the
Japanese
eventually
were
able
to
create
its
own
cruisers
and
torpedo
boats.
Most
of
the
Japanese
fleets
ships
were
built
after
1889,
and
the
fastest
one
cruised
at
maximum
speeds
of
over
twenty
knots.29
The
success
of
the
Japanese
Army
during
the
war
is
not
credited
only
to
the
modernized
equipments.
The
Japanese
army
was
far
more
disciplined
and
well
trained.
Most
importantly,
they
were
determined
to
win
this
war.
Even
before
the
declaration
of
the
war,
Japans
ambition
was
evident
when
it
sent
approximately
5,000
Japanese
soldiers
to
the
Korean
Peninsula
in
June
1894.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Chinese
government
had
deployed
1,500
Chinese
soldiers.30
Furthermore,
for
the
Japanese
forces,
individual
soldiers
goal
matched
that
of
the
countrys
ambition
to
win
the
war.
According
to
accounts
of
several
writers
such
as
F.W.
Eastlake
and
Y.A.
Yamada,
Japanese
solders
were
very
brave
and
were
not
afraid
to
risk
their
lives
to
win
each
battle.31
In
contrary
to
the
Chinese
forces,
which
were
not
motivated
to
face
the
battle,
the
Japanese
trained
hard
with
systematic
drills,
patriotism,
and
commitment
for
the
victory
of
this
war.
First
Phase
of
the
Sino-Japanese
War
The
Sino-Japanese
War
can
be
divided
into
three
phases
of
battle,
followed
by
a
period
for
peace
negotiation.
The
first
phase
of
the
war
is
when
the
Japanese
drove
out
the
Chinese
forces
from
Korea,
then
the
second
phase
is
when
after
the
Japanese
troops
had
gained
access
to
the
Chinese
territory
through
the
Yalu
River
and
invaded
Manchuria.
Finally,
in
the
third
phase,
the
Japanese
fought
the
Chinese
at
Weihaiwei,
and
this
battle
marks
29 30
14
the last major battle of the war. Then, in April 1985, after few more minor battles, Treaty of Shimonoseki was ratified.
32
The
Battle
of
Pyongyang
During
the
first
phase,
which
includes
the
Battle
of
Pyongyang,
the
Battle
of
Yalu,
and
the
Battle
of
Jiuliancheng,
Japan
gained
complete
control
over
the
Korean
Peninsula.
The
first
two
battles
that
took
place
within
a
three-day
period
in
mid-September
of
1894
carry
more
significance
because
they
determined
the
momentum
of
the
entire
war.
Some
consider
the
Battle
of
Jiuliancheng
as
part
of
Japans
invasion
of
China,
but
this
battle,
which
took
place
near
the
Yalu
River,
finally
confirmed
that
the
Chinese
forces
were
no
longer
capable
to
exert
military
forces
in
Korea.
The
Chinese
forces
failure
to
32
Paine, "Battle of Pyongyang and Yalu," map, in The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, 164.
15
dominate
Korea
in
this
period
opened
the
door
to
the
Japanese
invasion
in
Manchuria.
Prior
to
the
official
declaration
of
the
war,
the
two
countries
military
forces
were
already
present
in
the
Korean
Peninsula.
For
the
Chinese
forces,
most
of
them
were
stationed
near
Pyongyang
already,
and
they
held
the
objective
advantage
because
the
Chinese
forces
had
ample
time
to
reinforce
the
existing
walled
stronghold,
from
early
August
to
mid-September.33
To
prepare
for
the
battle
at
Pyongyang,
four
Chinese
generals
represented
infantry,
artillery,
and
Manchu
cavalry,
total
of
approximately
13,000
troops
dispersed
to
27
forts.34
At
the
very
beginning
of
the
war,
Pyongyang
was
a
strategic
location
because
it
was
on
the
way
to
the
Chinese
mainland.
Conquering
Pyongyang
was
necessary
for
the
Japanese
to
gain
land
access
to
China.
Four
Japanese
columns
arrived
in
Pyongyang
in
early
September
1894.
Under
the
overall
command
of
General
Yamagata,
the
Japanese
drafted
a
strategy
to
make
the
frontal
attack
from
the
south,
as
the
Main
Division
assaulted
from
the
southwest
at
4:30
A.M.
on
15
September
1894.35
The
Wonson
column,
led
by
Colonel
Tadashi,
was
responsible
for
intercepting
the
enemy
when
it
fled
to
the
northeast.
This
strategy
was
very
successful
and
the
Chinese
surrendered
later
on
the
same
day.
36
Even
before
the
war,
the
Chinese
army
in
Northern
Korea
was
very
ill
prepared.
The
four
Chinese
commanders
only
focused
on
his
army
and
did
not
coordinate
with
others,
without
a
strategic
plan
to
fight
the
Japanese.
In
addition,
because
of
the
armys
lack
of
discipline
and
training,
soldiers
did
not
even
know
how
to
properly
handle
the
ammunition.
It
was
reported
that
33 34
16
total
losses
for
the
Chinese
estimate
around
2,000
while
the
Japanese
lost
698.37
With
the
fatal
defeat
on
its
part,
Chinese
army
retreated
further
to
Manchuria
to
defend
its
empire.
The
Battle
of
Pyongyang,
especially
the
defeat
of
the
great
Chinese
army
in
a
day,
was
significant
to
the
Sino-Japanese
War
because
it
was
the
first
major
land
war
between
the
two
powers.
Through
this
battle,
Japan
sparked
the
signal
of
its
rise
as
a
new
power
in
East
Asia,
and
demonstrated
its
military
supremacy
over
China.
It
was
also
the
first
battle
that
the
Japanese
utilized
its
hard-trained
and
modernized
weapons
and
troops,
and
was
very
successful.
Prior
to
the
battle
of
Pyongyang,
in
Korea,
the
resentment
of
the
Koreas
had
intensified
since
the
Japanese
imposed
forced
reforms
on
the
Korean
government
and
they
sought
support
from
other
countries,
especially
from
China.
However,
this
battles
defeat
implied
that
the
aid
was
not
coming
anymore
to
Korea.
Furthermore,
in
order
to
utilize
easier
access,
the
Japanese
forces
impeded
the
Korean
Peninsula
to
furnish
supplies
to
the
military
facilities.
For
Koreans,
the
Chinese
loss
of
this
issue
signaled
the
deteriorated
condition
for
the
people.
The
Japanese
forces
were
not
satisfied
with
the
victory
at
Pyongyang;
their
ambition
was
greater
than
what
anyone
else
had
expected.
For
the
Chinese,
the
loss
of
Pyongyang
failed
to
alarm
the
army
and
the
government.
They
did
lose
Pyongyang,
but
still
was
able
to
retreat
to
Manchuria.
Therefore,
the
complacency
continued
in
the
next
battles
as
well.
The
Battle
of
Yalu
On
September
17,
1894,
the
day
after
the
Battle
of
Pyongyang,
the
second
major
battle
took
place.
As
part
of
the
first
phase
of
the
Sino-
37
Ibid., 101.
17
Japanese
War,
the
Battle
of
Yalu
occurred
at
the
strategic
location
at
the
river
that
forms
the
boundary
between
the
Chinese
empire
and
Korea.
It
carries
significance
as
one
of
the
first
modern
navy
battles.
In
the
early
1890s,
the
capability
of
Chinas
navy
was
greater
than
that
of
the
Japanese
navy.
While
the
Chinese
navy
was
ranked
eighth
in
the
world,
with
65
ships,
the
Japanese
navy
was
ranked
eleventh
with
only
32
ships.38
Furthermore,
Chinas
Beiyang
fleet
was
one
of
the
most
advanced
with
the
Ding
Yuan
and
the
Zhen
Yuan
as
the
most
notable
ships.39
On
the
other
hand,
Japan
did
not
have
any
significant
naval
ships
known.
Therefore,
it
was
easier
to
assume
the
Chinese
victory
in
this
naval
battle.
However,
the
Battle
of
Yalu
proved
the
supremacy
of
Japanese
navy
and
of
its
naval
tactics.
The
battle
only
lasted
for
about
four
and
a
half
hours
but
by
the
end
of
this
military
encounter,
the
Japanese
fleet
successfully
sank
four
Chinese
shipsthe
Zhao
Yang,
Yang
Wei,
Zhi
Yuan,
and
the
Kong
Yuanand
caused
over
1000
Chinese
causalities.40
Further
details
of
the
battle
will
be
described
in
the
latter
part
of
the
paper.
As
a
result
of
this
significant
naval
battle,
the
Chinese
experienced
a
crushing
defeat
and
the
Japanese
took
command
of
the
sea,
which
enabled
the
Japanese
to
facilitate
all
of
their
future
operations
by
allowing
the
Japanese
army
to
land
wherever
they
wished.41
Furthermore,
Japan,
as
an
island-nation,
it
was
important
for
it
to
command
the
sea
to
achieve
regional
supremacy
because
preserving
the
sea
routes
for
supplies
and
trade
routes
were
vital
for
Japan.
During
the
course
of
the
Sino-Japanese
War,
because
Japan
had
controlled
the
sea
route,
the
troops
could
maneuver
more
efficiently.
38 39
18
The
Battle
of
Jiuliancheng
The
Japanese
forces
still
were
not
satisfied
at
the
winning
the
two
major
battles
and
they
decided
to
attack
the
Chinese
headquarters
at
Jiuliancheng
in
late
October
1894.42
This
town
guarded
the
Yalu
River
and
it
also
was
the
last
defensive
stand
for
the
Chinese.
Because
the
river
defined
the
border
between
Manchuria
and
Korea,
the
loss
of
this
battle
would
signal
the
final
battle
in
the
Korean
Peninsula.
The
northern
side
of
the
river
was
called
the
town
of
Jiuliancheng,
and
the
southern
side
was
Wi-ju.43
However,
instead
of
fighting
to
death
to
protect
the
fort,
the
Chinese
army
retreated
to
defensive
positions
to
Mukden
and
fairly
easily
allowed
the
Japanese
to
step
into
Manchuria.
By
the
20th
of
October,
General
Yamagata,
who
had
received
military
training
from
Germany,
led
the
3rd
and
5th
Division
of
the
Japanese
army
to
Wi-ju,
the
Korean
side
of
the
Yalu
River.44
On
the
Chinese
side,
General
Song
Jiang
commanded
approximately
25,000
men,
which
were
divided
into
50
camps
along
the
border
at
the
river.45
On
the
evening
of
October
24th
1894,
Yamagata
ordered
Sato
to
lead
a
small
flanking
force
across
the
Yalu;
the
army
planned
to
attack
the
Chinese
force
from
the
rear.
The
remaining
army,
in
the
morning
of
October
25th,
built
a
metal
bridge
across
the
river
by
4
A.M.
Then,
the
troops
positioned
themselves
on
the
north
bank
by
the
sunrise.
This
battle
was
fought
for
a
short
period
of
timeby
noon,
the
Chinese
forces
called
for
retreat
and
the
Japanese
took
control
of
the
Chinese
fort
in
Jiuliancheng.
46
During
this
battle,
the
Japanese
lost
one
officer
and
32
men,
and
three
officers
and
108
men
were
wounded;
however,
they
killed
495
42 43
Elleman, 104. Volpicelli, 188. 44 Volpicelli, 187. 45 Elleman, 104. 46 Ibid., 105.
19
Chinese
for
the
record.
Scholars
assume
that
many
more
must
have
drowned
in
the
Yalu
River.47
The
Japanese
also
confiscated
66
cannon,
35,000
shells,
3,300
rifles,
more
than
3
million
rounds
of
ammunition,
and
food
supplies.48
This
battle
finalized
the
Japans
control
of
the
Korean
Peninsula.
After
the
defeat
at
the
previous
two
battles,
the
Chinese
army
was
unlikely
to
gain
back
the
territory.
However,
when
the
Japanese
won
this
battle,
it
was
evident
that
the
influencing
Korea
was
out
of
the
question
for
the
Chinese.
Protecting
the
mainlands
territory
became
the
first
priority.
The
Japanese
had
gained
access
route
to
Manchuria,
which
further
advantaged
them
in
the
coming
battles
of
the
war.
The
first
phase
of
the
Sino-Japanese
War
indicated
several
aspects
in
the
Northeast
Asian
region:
significance
of
modernization
and
the
beginning
of
the
rise
of
a
new
power
in
the
region,
which
was
represented
by
the
Japanese
ambition
and
Chinese
lackadaisical
attitude.
Prior
to
the
war,
Japan
seemed
less
modernized
in
its
military
and
level
of
strategical
intelligence.
However,
only
with
few
years
of
modernization
period
through
the
Meiji
government,
the
Japanese
successfully
equipped
itself
with
high- technology
weapons
and
learned
military
tactics
from
the
European
countries.
The
Battle
of
Yalu
was
especially
noteworthy
as
the
first
modern
naval
warfare
in
Asia.
Additionally,
the
Chinese
defeat
at
Pyongyang
and
Yalu
was
not
suspected
by
anyone
around
the
world
and
several
foreign
presses
covered
the
war
at
the
front
pages.49
The
Chinese
loss
at
Jiuliancheng
opened
the
gate
for
the
Japanese
to
continue
to
march
and
threaten
Beijing.
With
the
surprise
of
the
Japanese
military
supremacy,
the
period
of
Chinese
disgrace
had
begun.
47 48
20
Map 3 Map of the campaignLiaodong Peninsula (Jinzhou, Dalian), Port Arthur, Ximucheng and 50 Haicheng
The Japanese forces successfully crossed the Yalu River and advanced
to
Manchuria,
the
northeastern
region
of
China.
The
second
phase
of
the
wars
main
objective
was
the
invasion
of
Liaodong
Peninsula.
To
achieve
this,
the
Japanese
and
Chinese
fought
the
battle
at
Jinzhou
and
Dalian,
the
Battle
of
Port
Arthur,
and
at
further
inland
of
the
Liaodong
Peninsula,
which
includes
the
battles
at
Ximucheng,
Haicheng,
Kangwasae,
Kaiping,
Niuzhuang,
Yingkou,
and
Tianzhuangtai.
Although
the
Chinese
conducted
major
offensive
during
few
battles
in
this
phase,
their
strength
was
incomparable
to
50
Paine, "Battle of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei," map, in The Sino-Japanese War of 1894- 1895, 196.
21
that
of
the
Japanese.
The
Chinese
troops
weakness
and
dispirit
still
continued
in
this
phase
and
the
Japanese
forces,
which
were
always
overly
prepared,
took
over
key
strategic
regions
without
many
casualties.
Invasion
of
Southern
Liaodong
Peninsula
(Jinzhou
and
Dalian)
The
Japanese
strategys
primary
focus
was
to
take
Jinzhou,
which
was
the
most
important
fortified
town
in
the
region.
The
area
commanded
the
neck
of
the
Liaodong
Peninsula
and
was
located
at
a
major
transportation
intersection.
In
order
to
take
control
of
Port
Arthur,
located
at
south
of
Liaodong,
command
of
Jinzhou
was
vital.
After
the
Battle
of
Jiuliancheng,
there
were
sporadic
battles
on
both
4
and
5
November
1894.
The
Japanese
forces
were
systematically
divided
into
three
columns.
Part
of
the
First
Army
was
responsible
for
moving
south
through
Manchuria
toward
the
Liaodong
Peninsula,
and
the
Second
Army
was
to
come
by
sea
to
the
Liaodong
Peninsula
to
take
Port
Arthur.
Finally,
the
rest
of
the
First
Army
was
to
impart
from
Korea
toward
Mukden.51
The
Japanese
army
was
seriously
determined
to
take
control
of
the
Chinese
territory
at
a
swift
pace.
During
that
time,
the
Second
Army
under
Major
General
Nogi
Maresuke
attacked
Jinzhou
the
next
morning,
on
November
6th.
By
9
A.M.,
thirty-six
Japanese
artillery
pieces
shelled
the
city,
and
within
one
hour,
the
Chinese
forces
retreated.
By
10:30
A.M.,
the
Japanese
bombed
the
city
gates
of
Jinzhou
and
entered
the
city.
Because
the
Chinese
forces
knew
the
significance
of
this
loss,
General
Song
led
an
army
of
8,000
to
take
the
Jinzhou
fort
back
on
November
21st,
1894.
52
However,
his
troops
were
defeated
once
again.
Part
of
the
Japanese
First
Army
achieved
its
mission
successfully.
51 52
22
They
could
have
remarked
that
this
battle
was
unparalleled
in
military
history,
but
the
battle
next
days
surpassed
that.
Two
days
after
the
fall
of
Jinzhou,
the
Japanese
Navy
now
joined
the
effort
of
the
Japanese
army
to
invade
the
city
of
Dalian.
Located
further
south
from
Jinzhou,
Dalian
served
as
a
strategic
port
in
Liaodong
Peninsula.
The
Japanese
made
elaborate
preparation
with
three
detachments,
each
consisting
of
a
regiment
of
infantry,
were
ordered
to
advance
to
various
ports.
Soldiers
even
swore
that
they
would
rather
die
than
to
go
back
without
taking
this
territory.53
However,
the
Japanese
forces
did
not
even
have
to
fight
for
the
anchorage
because
the
Chinese
had
already
fled
to
Port
Arthur.54
While
they
were
fleeing,
the
Chinese
had
left
behind
significant
amount
of
munitions
and
supplies.
According
to
one
report,
the
Japanese
captured
large
stores
of
military
supplies,
including
621
rifles,
129
guns,
over
33
million
rounds
of
small-arms
ammunition,
and
nearly
2.5
million
rounds
of
cannon
shells.55
This
incident
at
Dalian
once
again
proved
how
the
Chinese
military
was
still
not
prepared
to
fight
the
Japanese
army
and
rather
prioritized
individuals
gains
than
their
country.
The
Japanese
invasion
of
Liaodong
Peninsula
was
all
geared
to
the
takeover
of
Port
Arthur,
and
the
fall
of
Dalian
left
Port
Arthur
completely
surrounded.
The
Battle
of
Port
Arthur
At
this
point
of
the
war,
the
Chinese
troops
lax
attitude
regarding
the
war
seemed
pretty
obvious.
The
harbormaster
of
Port
Arthur,
Captain
Calder,
reported
that
Chinese
soldiers
were
wandering
in
mobs
and
destroying
everything
that
was
in
their
view.
Apparently,
Chinese
troops
53 54
23
started
looting
Port
Arthur
even
before
the
Japanese
attack.56
While
the
Chinese
army
was
not
prepared
much,
the
attack
began
on
November
21st.
Japanese
Field
Marshal
Oyama
led
the
attack
had
three
goals
in
mind
to
achieve
at
Port
Arthur:
first
to
take
the
forts
located
to
the
west
of
the
main
fortress,
to
attack
Songshushan
stronghold,
then
to
destroy
seven
fortifications
on
two
different
hills.
In
a
little
bit
more
than
a
half-day,
the
Japanese
forces
took
over
a
total
of
eleven
inland
fortifications.
To
achieve
this,
the
Japanese
only
used
40
cannon,
composed
of
mountain,
siege,
and
field
guns.57
In
terms
of
casualties,
only
18
Japanese
soldiers
were
killed
while
the
Chinese
lost
over
a
thousand.58
This
tragic
result
for
the
Chinese
can
be
traced
back
to
their
fundamental
error
and
weakness
of
only
preparing
with
the
first-class
war
material,
but
without
proper
discipline
and
training
of
the
soldiers.
Although
the
Chinese
fired
their
guns
willingly,
they
did
not
employ
much
infantry
fire.59
Also
very
oddly
one
of
the
Chinas
most
modern
battleships,
the
Beiyang
Squadron
had
arrived
at
Port
Arthur
in
early
November
but
was
ordered
to
return
to
Weihaiwei.
Even
worse
situation
occurred
when
the
Zhen
Yuan,
one
of
Chinas
large
battleships
that
which
Japan
did
not
have
any
counterpart,
was
damaged
while
entering
the
Weihaiwei
harbor.
Responsible
for
this
damage,
Commodore
Lin
Taizeng
took
a
lethal
overdose
of
opium
and
committed
suicide.60
By
the
fall
of
the
strategically
important
Port
Arthur,
the
Japanese
gained
the
best
dockyard
in
the
Far
East
and
a
naval
base
at
the
enemys
front
gate.
Additionally,
some
foreigners
were
inclined
to
disbelieve
the
56 57
24
Japanese
accounts,
but
their
surmises
were
refuted
by
the
Japanese
victory
at
Port
Arthur.61
On
the
Chinese
side,
Peking
finally
began
to
notice
how
imminent
the
danger
was
and
had
tried
to
propose
a
peace
mission.
But
instead
of
sending
the
legitimate
government
officials,
the
Chinese
government
sent
Mr.
Detring,
the
Commissioner
of
Customs
at
Tietsin,
and
Viceroy
Li-Hung-Chang
with
a
letter
that
had
some
reference
to
an
Imperial
edict
about
the
peace.
Of
course,
the
Japanese
government
refused
to
start
peace
negotiations
with
that
envoy.62
This
envoy
represented
how
the
Qing
dynasty
regarded
the
Meiji
government
as
a
country
that
did
not
deserve
the
Chinese
governments
complete
attention.
Furthermore,
this
also
indicated
the
difference
between
the
incumbent
dominant
power
of
China
and
a
newly
rising
power
of
Japan.
While
the
attempt
for
peace
treaty
took
place,
the
Japanese
forces
rejected
and
were
busy
preparing
to
conquer
the
Northeast
China.
Further
Advancement
into
the
Liaodong
Peninsula
An
enormous
victory
at
Port
Arthur
was
celebrated
by
the
Japanese
but
only
for
a
short
period
of
time.
They
immediately
began
their
preparation
for
another
campaign
to
make
their
way
towards
Peking
through
Manchuria.
The
Japanese
invasion
of
Manchuria
took
place
from
the
battle
of
Ximucheng
on
December
12,
1894
to
the
final
battle
at
Tianzhuangtai
on
March
1895.
The
Japanese
forces
strategy
was
to
split
in
early
December,
and
the
northern
wing
being
responsible
for
Ximucheng,
Haicheng,
and
Niuzhang,
while
the
southern
fought
at
Yingkou.
If
their
plan
had
succeeded,
then
the
61 62
25
Japanese
would
consolidate
their
control
in
the
Liaodong
along
with
Manchuria.63
The
Chinese
also
divided
their
forces
during
the
fights
in
Manchuria
into
three
armies.
The
northernmost
army
was
stationed
at
Liaoyang
to
defend
Mukden
from
the
east
and
from
the
south.
Another
army
was
headquartered
at
the
port
of
Niuzhuang
and
the
town
of
Haicheng.
Niuzhuang
was
the
only
Manchurian
port
in
the
valley
of
Hun
and
Liao
Rivers.
Finally,
a
third
army
was
at
Kaiping
under
General
Songs
command.64
While
the
Japanese
set
their
first
objective
as
Haicheng,
they
first
fought
at
Ximucheng
on
December
12,
1894.
Ximucheng
was
a
town
that
was
on
the
road
to
Haicheng,
and
about
10,000
Chinese
forces
fought
the
battle.
However,
once
again,
the
Japanese
had
taken
the
town
without
much
difficulty
as
well.
Reported
losses
indicated
104
Chinese
casualties
and
only
seven
Japanese.65
Without
challenge,
the
Japanese
marched
to
Haicheng.
It
was
very
significant
to
the
Japanese
because
they
could
pressure
the
Chinese
forces
to
further
west.
Also,
the
Japanese
could
restore
the
land
communications
between
their
First
Army
in
eastern
Manchuria
and
Second
Army,
which
was
moving
northward
up
the
Liaodong
Peninsula.66
Haicheng
was
fortified
by
9,000
Chinese
droops
with
20-foot
thick
walls
around
the
city.
On
December
13,
the
Japanese
began
to
attack,
and
by
noon,
the
Chinese
retreated
to
Niuzhuang.
Again,
the
number
of
casualties
emulated
the
previous
pattern:
over
a
hundred
Chinese
casualties
and
only
four
minor
injuries
of
the
63 64
26
Japanese.
As
a
result,
the
Chineses
line
of
defense
was
destroyed
and
General
Song
was
also
separated
from
his
troop.
The
Chinese
forces
repeatedly
attempted
to
retake
the
city,
but
they
had
failed
with
huge
losses.67
Throughout
the
course
of
the
war,
the
Japanese
forces
repetitively
achieved
a
complete
victory
over
the
Chinese
forces.
However,
there
was
one
battle
that
the
Chinese
was
successful
in
inflicting
on
the
Japanese
First
Army.
It
was
during
the
Battle
of
Kangwasae
on
December
18,
1894.68
At
this
battle,
the
Japanese
was
advancing
uphill
thats
covered
in
two
feet
of
snow.
During
this
time,
the
Chinese
mercilessly
fired
upon
them.
By
the
end
of
the
battle,
the
Japanese
reported
over
200
casualties
and
15
officers
killed
or
wounded.69
Nevertheless,
the
Japanese
defeated
the
town
at
the
end,
and
prevented
General
Song
from
communicating
with
Liaoyang
and
other
armies
in
the
north.70
This
battle
had
been
the
only
major
Chinese
offensive
of
the
war.
However,
they
still
succumbed
to
the
Japanese
army
and
retreated
further
to
the
west,
just
as
the
Japanese
intended.
The
Japanese
Second
Army
also
made
its
way
to
Manchuria,
specifically
to
the
town
of
Kaiping.
This
medium-sized
town
was
equipped
with
a
large
castle
and
30-feet-high
city
walls.
Additionally,
Chinese
garrisons
with
ten
guns,
manned
by
5,000
men
with
500
cavalry
were
defending
the
city.
Under
the
command
of
Major-General
Nogi
Maresuke,
the
Japanese
forces
advanced
to
Kaiping
on
January
10,
1895.
During
this
battle,
the
Chinese
used
a
traditional
strategical
preparation
using
the
stream
next
to
the
city.
They
manipulated
the
water
in
the
stream
so
that
it
would
freeze
67 68
Elleman, 109. F. Warrington Eastlake and Yamada Yoshiaki, Heroic Japan: A History of the War between China and Japan (London: S.Low,Marston & Co., 1897), 246. 69 Elleman, 109. 70 Paine, 224.
27
at
a
sharp
angle
to
make
it
difficult
for
the
Japanese
to
cross.
This
clever
strategy
caused
notable
casualties
to
the
Japanese
with
53
killed
and
296
wounded.71
Even
though
this
ancient
strategy
might
have
increased
Japanese
casualties,
this
might
have
been
more
effective
in
earlier
days.
Nonetheless
of
the
ice
tactic,
the
Japanese
conquered
Kaiping.
Finally,
the
Japanese
had
conquered
both
Haicheng
and
Kaiping.
Since
the
Japanese
forces
had
broken
the
continuous
defense
line
of
the
Chinese,
they
now
had
to
connect
the
communication
line
among
their
armies.
The
next
target
was
Niuzhuang,
Yingkou,
and
finally
Tianzhuangtai.
The
Japanese
First
Army
fought
the
Battle
of
Niuzhuang
on
March
4,
1895.
This
battle
was
one
of
the
most
difficult
for
the
Japanese.
The
Chinese
had
formed
double
line
of
breastworks.
After
the
battle
that
lasted
entire
day,
the
Japanese
ended
up
with
242
casualties.
However,
the
Chinese
reported
estimated
1,884
casualties.
Furthermore,
the
Japanese
took
700
Chinese
prisoners,
confiscated
21
field
and
mountain
guns,
2,138
rifles,
and
more
than
1.5
million
rounds
of
ammunition.72
While
the
First
Army
achieved
a
great
success,
although
with
some
damage,
the
Second
Army
conquered
Yingkou
without
a
single
fight
on
March
6,
1895.
It
was
because
the
Chinese,
again,
retreated
from
the
well- fortified
city
during
the
night.
As
it
happened
previously,
the
Japanese
again
gained
what
the
Chinese
had
left
behind:
45
cannon
and
180
rifles,
along
with
ample
supplies
of
food.73
After
the
two
battles
in
early
March,
the
First
and
Second
Japanese
Army
had
joined
each
other.
Fall
of
Jinzhou,
Dalian,
Port
Arthur,
Ximucheng,
Haicheng,
Kangwasae,
Kaiping,
Niuzhuang,
and
Yingkou
allowed
the
Japanese
to
form
their
control
over
the
western
coast
of
71 72
28
the
Liaodong
Peninsula
that
stretches
to
Haicheng.
This
major
achievement
of
the
war
advantaged
Japan
to
threaten
an
attack
on
the
Great
Wall
eventually.
One
last
battle
consolidated
the
Japanese
control
over
the
Liaodong
Peninsula:
the
Battle
of
Tianzhuangtai
on
March
9,
1895.
Tianzhuangtai
was
the
port
city
on
the
Liao
River
and
controlled
river
traffic
to
Yingkou
and
Niuzhuang.
During
the
short
four-hour
battle,
the
Japanese
utilized
97
guns
against
the
Chinese
defenders,
who
only
had
20
guns.74
The
loss
of
the
geo- strategic
region
of
the
Liaodong
Peninsula,
which
used
to
station
Chinese
naval
bases
and
several
ports
that
offered
Manchuria
sea
routes,
was
significant
to
the
security
of
the
mainland
of
China.
Most
of
the
battles
in
this
phase
were
fought
in
the
harsh
winter
of
Manchuria.
The
Chinese
forces
and
foreign
observers
both
expected
that
the
Manchurias
winter
weather
would
deter
the
Japanese
forces.
However,
that
kind
of
negligent
attitude
destined
the
major
loss
of
the
Chinese.
The
Japanese
always
had
a
strategic
plan,
and
on
top
of
that,
was
equipped
with
the
strongest
weapon
of
patriotism.
On
the
other
hand,
the
Chinese
troops
always
chose
to
retreat
to
save
their
lives,
sometimes
even
without
fighting,
as
it
happened
in
the
Battle
of
Yingkou.
Even
with
the
continuous
victories,
the
Japanese
army
never
loosened
their
discipline
and
always
followed
their
strategic
plan
with
clear
objectives.
Very
contrastingly,
the
Chinese
army
lacked
in
discipline
and
training.
Although
they
were
equipped
with
modern
weapons,
their
mindsets
and
physical
abilities
were
not
prepared
for
the
battles.
As
the
new
rising
power
in
the
Asian
Pacific
region,
the
Japanese
forces
did
not
cease
even
after
the
complete
takeover
of
the
Liaodong
74
Ibid.
29
Peninsula.
Instead,
they
moved
onto
the
third
and
final
concluding
phase
of
the
war
at
Weihaiwei.
Third
Phase
of
the
War
at
Weihaiwei
The
final
Japanese
offensive
of
the
war,
the
Battle
of
Weihaiwei,
took
place
in
Shandong
Province,
and
signaled
the
concluding
remark
of
the
First
Sino-Japanese
War.
Unlike
many
previous
battles
during
this
war,
the
Battle
of
Weihaiwei
occurred
over
a
period
of
approximately
thirty
days.
For
the
Chinese,
the
defense
of
Weihaiwei
was
critical
to
their
security,
because
if
the
port
fell,
they
would
be
opening
two
port
gates
to
the
enemy.
If
that
happens,
the
threat
to
Beijing
would
be
seriously
imminent.
The
Japanese
troops
priority
after
the
fall
of
Port
Arthur
was
the
naval
base
at
Weihaiwei.
While
the
First
and
Second
Army
were
fighting
their
way
through
Manchuria,
most
of
the
Sixth
Division
under
the
command
of
Marshal
Oyama
was
deployed
at
the
Yellow
Sea
to
Shandong
Province.
The
main
objective
of
the
capture
of
Weihaiwei
was
to
destroy
the
Chinese
fleet
inside
the
Weihaiwei
naval
base.75
If
the
Japanese
successfully
achieve
that
mission,
then
they
would
become
the
dominating
navy
in
the
Far
East.
The
Japanese
realized
the
importance
of
sea
power,
and
knew
that
without
command
of
the
sea,
Japan
could
not
have
deployed
its
troops
freely.
There
were
several
reasons
that
the
Japanese
forces
aimed
to
conquer
Weihaiwei.
As
the
second
strongest
naval
base
in
China,
it
was
conveniently
located
near
Dalian
Bay.
Also,
the
port
sheltered
the
Beiyang
fleet,
which
the
Japanese
feared
the
most.76
It
was
obvious
that
the
Japanese
considered
the
capture
of
Weihaiwei
very
significant.
75 76
30
Marshal Count Oyama led the part of the Second and Sixth Division of the Second Army to a port located on the eastern side of the Shandong Peninsula on January 19, 1895. They planned to approach the Chinese base at Weihaiwei from their back. On January 26, 1895, Oyamas army was divided into two columns and captured all the forts southeast of Weihaiwei.77 Even though the Chinese had thought that they were well prepared for the defense of Weihaiwei, their forts fell in a relatively short time. That might have been a reason for the Chinese troops retreat on February 2. When the Japanese army entered Weihaiwei, they found none of the garrison in the town.78 Therefore, the entire forts surrounding Weihaiwei came under the Japanese control. Meanwhile, on the sea, the British man-of-war Severn delivered a letter from Admiral Ito to Chinese Admiral Ding to surrender before the war.79 The Japanese fleets major goal was to demolish the Beiyang fleet, which still consisted 15 ships, with 13 torpedo boats.80 Unlike most of the army soldiers, the 4,000 sailors on the fleet were well disciplined and considered a truly valuable force to the Chinese.81 Although the Japanese fleet lingered around the outside of harbor for about a week, Chinese ships did not come out to fight and chose to defend the port instead. Eventually, on February 5th and 6th, the Japanese torpedo boats snuck into the harbor and succeeded at damaging the Ding Yuan and sinking the Lai Yuan, the Wei Yuan, and the Bao Hua.82 The major damage of the Beiyang fleet already indicated
77 78
Elleman, 111. Ibid. 79 Volpicelli, 273. 80 Elleman, 112. 81 Volpicelli, 276. 82 Elleman, 112.
31
the
outcome
of
this
war
and
proved
the
Japanese
navys
supremacy
over
the
fleet
that
was
once
hailed
as
the
most
modern
one
in
the
Far
East.
The
final
assault
by
the
Japanese
began
on
February
7,
1895.
For
the
next
five
days,
the
Japanese
forces
cruelly
bombarded
the
remaining
forts
and
ships
in
the
harbor.
To
fully
crush
the
Beiyang
fleet,
the
Japanese
navy
did
not
let
go
of
the
fleeing
thirteen
torpedo
boats.
They
hunted
down
to
the
last
minute
and
either
destroyed
or
captured
all
except
two
of
them.
Finally
on
February
12,
1895,
Admiral
Ding
made
a
judgment
that
the
situation
at
Weihaiwei
was
not
recoverable.
He
formally
surrendered.
Later
that
day,
to
atone
for
their
failure
at
the
battle,
Ding
and
two
other
officers
committed
suicide.
83
Up
until
this
point
of
Chinese
surrender,
the
Japanese
forces
never
once
relaxed
despite
the
repeated
victory
in
battles
in
the
Sino-Japanese
War
of
1894.
The
suicide
of
Admiral
Ding
must
have
left
the
Japanese
a
deep
impression.
The
Japanese
considered
his
suicide
an
honorable
ending
and
they
returned
few
ships
with
his
body
while
they
lowered
their
flags
and
fired
their
guns
to
honor
the
Admiral.84
After
the
surrender
of
the
Beiyang
fleet
and
Admiral
Dings
suicide,
the
Japanese
concerned
about
what
to
do
with
the
remaining
Chinese
fleets.
The
Japanese
forces
did
not
want
to
leave
any
possibility
that
might
threaten
Japanese
naval
supremacy
in
the
future.
Through
the
further
military
campaign
at
Taiwan,
Japan
successfully
acquired
Taiwan
as
a
result.85
Both
the
Chinese
and
the
Japanese
realized
that
the
time
for
a
peace
agreement
had
come.
83 84
32
This
final
battle
was
a
repetition
of
what
had
happened
throughout
the
entire
war
between
the
Chinese
and
the
Japanese.
As
always,
the
Japanese
were
well
prepared
with
high
spirit
while
the
Chinese
were
scared
and
did
not
even
dare
to
face
the
Japanese.
Although
the
Chinese
fully
realized
the
criticality
of
Weihaiwei,
the
undisciplined
soldiers
were
busy
preserving
their
lives.
Also,
this
battle
proved
the
Japanese
determination
to
achieve
and
maintain
the
military
supremacy.
Furthermore,
when
the
Japanese
completely
destroyed
the
Beiyang
fleet,
it
represented
that
Japan
knew
of
the
importance
of
naval
supremacy
in
the
Far
East.
Japans
geographical
characteristic
as
an
island
and
the
Yellow
Sea
that
allowed
access
to
both
Korea
and
Japan
both
provide
reasons
for
why
the
Japan
valued
the
naval
power
very
much.
Even
if
they
wanted
to
attack
the
mainland
of
China
or
the
Korean
Peninsula,
the
most
efficient
way
to
supply
the
necessary
resources
was
the
sea
route.
Therefore,
uninterrupted
sea
route
for
Japan
was
essential
for
it
to
be
a
leading
power
in
that
region.
Peace
Negotiation:
Treaty
of
Shimonoseki
After
the
war
progressed
with
repeated
Chinese
defeat,
officials
in
China
acknowledged
that
the
country
had
to
sue
for
peace.
Otherwise,
the
Japanese
army
would
easily
march
into
Beijing.
Therefore,
on
March
20,
1895,
Japanese
Admiral
Ito
and
Mutsu
met
with
Viceroy
Li
at
Shimonoseki.
In
the
draft
treaty
that
was
presented
on
April
1,
China
had
to
accept
the
Korean
independence
and
pay
for
reparation.
In
addition,
China
had
to
promise
a
commercial
treaty
to
let
Japanese
ships
to
conduct
business
on
the
Yangzi
River,
open
up
four
more
ports
for
foreign
trade,
and
to
establish
factories
in
those
ports.86
Finally,
China
was
also
required
to
cede
the
Liaodong
86
33
Peninsula,
Taiwan,
and
the
Pescadores
islands.
Viceroy
Li
strongly
protested
against
these
terms.
In
response,
Ito
and
Mutsu
agreed
to
narrow
down
the
boundary
of
the
Liaodong
Peninsula
and
to
reduce
the
reparation
by
a
third.
Other
than
those
slight
changes,
the
Treaty
of
Shimonoseki,
which
was
signed
on
April
17,
1895,
was
not
much
different
from
the
original
draft.87
The
treaty
confirmed
Japan
as
a
definite
new
regional
power
in
East
Asia,
with
almost
equal
terms
with
the
Western
powers.
The
consequences
also
indicated
the
waning
power
of
the
Qing
dynasty.
For
the
imperial
China
to
accept
its
degradation
was
an
unspeakable
insult
to
them.
For
the
Western
countries,
they
now
had
to
acknowledge
this
reverse
of
powers
in
East
Asia.
The
supremacy
of
Japanese
military
tactics
and
training
impressed
them.
At
the
same
time,
because
that
supremacy
came
from
Japans
acceptance
of
a
Western-style
military,
it
also
implied
that
modernization
and
industrialization
were
necessary
for
the
advancement
of
a
country.
The
Battle
of
the
Yalu
Timeline
of
the
battle
10:50
A.M.the
Japanese
first
reported
smoke
on
the
horizon
11:40
A.M.the
Chinese
fleet
came
in
sight
and
Admiral
Ito
ordered
his
vessels
to
prepare
12:05
P.M.Vice
Admiral
Ito
ordered
the
fleet
to
close
with
the
Chinese
12:50
P.M.The
Japanese
Principal
Squadron
crossed
in
front
of
the
Chinese
formation
and
began
to
maneuver
around
behind
it.
1:00
P.M.the
Japanese
First
Flying
Squadron
swerved
from
its
original
plan
to
go
through
the
center
of
Chinese
fleet
to
pass
by
the
right
wing
of
the
enemy;
the
Principal
Squadron
followed
the
First
Flying
Squadron
1:55
P.M.Hiyei
was
in
flames
and
Akagi
went
for
assistance
2:23
P.M.the
Main
Squadron
passed
the
Zhao
Yang
and
sank
the
vessel
3:30
P.M.the
Ze
Yuan
was
sunk
and
the
Japanese
directed
attention
to
the
Zhi
Yuan
4:48
P.M.With
the
repeated
attack
of
the
Flying
Squadron,
Zhi
Yuan
sunk
87
Beasley, 57.
34
The
Battle
of
the
Yalu
had
received
much
attention
from
other
countries
for
its
significance
as
the
first
major
naval
battle
between
ironclad
ships
armed
with
quick
fire
guns
and
torpedoes.
Additionally,
the
Japanese
navys
very
original
naval
tactics,
which
adapted
the
high
speed
and
heavy
armament
in
quick-firing
guns,
were
praised.
In
addition,
the
victory
at
this
battle
allowed
Japanese
advantage
throughout
the
war,
and
signaled
the
rise
of
a
new
power.
On
September
17,
1894,
two
seemingly
equal
naval
forces
encountered
in
the
Yellow
Sea.
Admiral
Ding
was
leading
the
Chinese
fleet,
Vice-Admiral
Ito,
the
Japanese
fleet.
The
result
of
this
naval
battle
greatly
influenced
the
future
course
of
the
war;
this
battle
proved
Japans
military
superiority
and
Chinas
collapse
overwhelmingly.
At
that
point,
the
Japanese
were
then
able
to
land
their
armies
whenever
and
wherever
they
wanted.
The
Chinese
Navy
In
the
Asia
Pacific
region
in
the
late
1800s,
the
Chinese
fleet
was
considered
to
be
equipped
with
the
most
modernized
ships.
The
Ding
Yuan
and
the
Zhen
Yuan
were
the
most
notable
ships;
they
were
German-built
battleships,
each
weighing
7,430
tons.
These
ships
had
a
14-inch
armored
belt
and
four
12-inch
Krupp
cannon
apiece.
Other
than
those
two
ships,
there
also
were
the
Lai
Yuan,
Bing
Yuan,
and
Jing
Yuan
weighing
2,800
tons.
The
Yang
Wei
and
Zhao
Yang
were
Armstrong
ram
cruisers,
and
the
Zhi
Yuan
was
a
2,355
ton
steel
cruiser.
Along
with
a
large
section
of
smaller
and
older
ships,
the
Chinese
fleets
tonnage
was
larger
than
the
Japaneses,
but
much
slower.88
The
Chinese
Navy
adopted
a
unified
formation.
Admiral
Ding
decided
to
arrange
the
ten
ships
into
a
wedge-shape
formation.
So,
the
two
ironclad
88
Elleman, 102.
35
worships, the Ding Yuan and the Zhen Yuan were located in the center, while the Lai Yuan, Jing Yuan, Yang Wei, and Zhao Yang were on the right, and the Kong Yuan, Zhi Yuan, Guang Jia, and Ze Yuan were on the left. This formation was strategically adopted to maximize firepower; however, it drastically reduced the maneuverability of the fleet. 89 Chart of the Chinese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River90
The
Japanese
Navy
The
Japanese
took
a
different
approach.
Contrast
to
the
Chinese,
the
Japanese
concentrated
on
faster
speed
and
greater
mobility
of
the
fleet.
The
Japanese
fleet
was
divided
into
two
groups
at
the
Yellow
Sea:
the
First
Flying
89 90
Ibid., 103. Hilary A. Herbert, Chinese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River, chart (n.p.: The North American Review, 1894).
36
Squadron under Rear-Admiral Tsuboi Kozo and the Principal Squadron under Vice-Admiral Ito. As one may see from the chart, the First Flying Squadron consisted of the Yoshino, Takachiho, Akitsushima, and the Naniwa. Among them, the Yoshino was considered the best as it was not only the 4,140-ton steel cruiser, equipped with quick-firing guns and five fixed torpedo boats, but also the fastest ship when it was built at twenty-three knots. In the Principal Squadron were the Chiyoda, Itsukushima, Hashidate, Hiyei, Fuso, and the Matshushima. The Matshushima, Itsukushima, and Hashidate were the most modernized vessels. They were French-built coastal defense ships. Each was 4,277 tons and carried thirty-two Canet guns. In addition to these two squadrons, there were two other older Japanese ships involved in the war. They were the gunboat Akagi and the converted cruiser Saikyo Maru.91 When the two navies were compared, they seemed to have been evenly matched. The Chineses advantage lied in armor and heavy guns, that of the Japanese in speed and quick-firing guns. Moreover, majority of the Chinese fleet were built before 1887, and the Japanese since 1890. The difference also was in the formation of the ships. The Chinese placed weaker ships on each side of the strongest ships. This kind of formation proved vulnerable because the Japanese knew where the Chinese fleets weak point was. Admiral Ito attacked that very weakness when he veered the Flying Squadron to the right side of the formation and demolished the Chinese navy.
91
Elleman., 102.
37
Diagram 1 This diagram describes the formation of the Chinese and the Japanese navy. Darkened triangles represent the Chinese navy in a unified formation. White triangles represent the Japanese navy divided into two: Red lines are the course of the Flying Squadron and blue lines are the course of the Principal Squadron.92
Chart of the Japanese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River 93
92 93
Hilary A. Herbert, Battle of the Yalu Course, chart (n.p.: The North American Review, 1894). Hilary A. Herbert, Japanese Ships Engaged in the Action off the Yalu River, chart (n.p.: The North American Review, 1894).
38
Description of the battle During the battle of Pyongyang, the Japanese navy had been busy preparing for a naval war in the Yellow Sea. On the 16th, the 1st Flying Squadron advanced to Haiyang Island to keep an eye on the enemys movements. The Chinese navy was also expecting the Japanese fleet. The whole fleet was disembarked by the 16th near the Yalu River.94 On the morning of the September 17th, the weather was clear but clouds of smoke started to fill the air as both fleet were burning coal.95 Around 12 P.M., Vice Admiral Ito ordered the First Flying Squadron to move closer to the Chinese at full speed toward the center of the Chinese formation, where the strongest ships were located. But later on, the squadron swerved to the right side of the Chinese formation to go behind it. On the other hand, the Japanese Principal Squadron crossed the Chinese fleet and followed the First Flying Squadron around 12:50 P.M. This kind of maneuvering was possible due to the fast speed and mobility of the Japanese ships. Admiral Itos objective for this move was to take a full advantage of the fleets superior speed and to encircle the Chinese. During this course, the Japanese ships maintained certain distance from the large vessels while firing at smaller Chinese vessels.96 The Japanese navy first focused on the right side of the Chinese formation. During the movement of the Japanese vessels, the Chinese ship, Yang Wei caught fire.
94 95
Volpicelli, 165. Richard N.J. Wright, The Chinese Steam Navy 1862-1945 (London: Chatham, 2000), 90. 96 Volpicelli, 169.
39
Diagram 2 This diagram describes the Japanese fleets movement towards the Chinese navy, skewed to the right of the Chinese unified formation. Because of the fast mobility of the Japanese ships, they were successful at setting Yang Wei on fire.97
Then,
the
Principal
Squadron
concentrated
its
artillery
on
the
second
ship
of
the
right
wing,
the
Zhao
Yang.
The
Japanese
were
successful
at
this
as
well.
While
the
fast
vessels
were
contributing
to
the
achievements
of
the
war,
the
slower
ships
suffered
damage
from
the
Chinese.
For
example,
the
Hiyei
could
not
keep
up
with
the
Main
Squadron
and
was
obliged
to
escape
the
approaching
Chinese
fleet.
This
occurred
around
1:55
P.M.
Meanwhile,
the
Flying
Squadron
was
starboarding
to
catch
up
with
the
Main
Squadron.98
At
the
Hiyeis
danger,
the
Akagi
went
for
assistance.
However,
the
Chinese
ship,
Lai
Yuan
pursued
after
it.
Although
the
Akagi
was
a
smaller
97 98
40
ship, a shot from it damaged the Lai Yuan. Nonetheless, both Hiyei and the Akagi were in distress.
Diagram 3 This diagram describes the attack on Zhao Yang by the Japanese and the attack on Hiyei by the Chinese.99
Admiral
Ito
altered
the
course
of
the
Flying
Squadron
to
the
opposite
direction
at
the
sight
of
the
Hiyei
and
the
Akagi
to
protect
those
ships.
Thankfully,
those
weaker
vessels
escaped
from
the
battle
due
to
the
help
of
the
Flying
Squadron.
Meanwhile,
the
Principal
Squadron
approached
the
rear
of
the
Chinese
fleet
and
made
a
full
circle
around
the
Chinese
fleet.
At
2:23
P.M.,
the
Principal
Squadron
sank
the
Zhao
Yang.100
99 100
41
Diagram 4 The loop in the red line represents the alteration of the Flying Squadrons course to save the Hiyei and the Akagi. The diagram also shows the sinking of the Zhao Yang.101
Then
came
the
most
dramatic
moment
of
the
war,
when
the
two
flagships
exchanged
fire:
the
Matsushima
from
the
Japanese
side
and
the
Zhen
Yuan
from
the
Chinese.
At
about
3
P.M.,
the
Chinese
ship
fired
at
the
Matsushima
from
its
12-2
inch
guns
and
caused
extensive
damage
and
many
casualties,
up
to
49
officers
and
men.102
This
allowed
the
Chinese
battleships
a
temporary
respire,
and
they
were
running
low
on
ammunitions.103
While
the
Principal
Squadron
withdrew
from
the
scene,
both
the
Ding
Yuan
and
the
Zhen
Yuan
immediately
followed
after
them
and
fired.
Because
of
this
cooperation,
both
the
flagships
were
not
entirely
destroyed.
However,
after
the
Japanese
had
gone
some
distance,
the
Principal
Squadron
turned
around
101 102
Hilary A. Herbert, Battle of the Yalu Course, chart. Wright, 93. 103 Ibid., 94.
42
and
poured
the
most
destructive
fire
of
the
battle.
Later,
at
about
3:30P.M,
the
Kong
Yuan
was
sunk.104
Furthermore,
when
the
Chinese
vessels
were
in
the
midst
of
great
disorder,
the
Flying
Squadron
attacked
the
Zhi
Yuan
at
4:48
P.M.
The
battle
finally
came
to
a
concluding
point
around
5
P.M.
As
dusk
was
approaching,
both
sides
were
extremely
exhausted
from
the
battle.
Also,
the
Japanese
did
not
want
to
fight
In
such
a
decisive
encounter
of
the
Sino-Japanese
War
of
1894-1895,
the
Chinese
lost
four
battleships,
the
Yang
Wei,
Zhao
Yang,
Kong
Yuan,
and
the
Zhi
Yuan,
while
the
Japanese
only
received
damage
for
two
vessels,
the
Matsushima
and
the
Hiyei.
The
damage
on
the
Matsushima
was
the
greatest
due
to
the
attack
of
the
12-2
inch
guns
hit.
In
terms
of
casualties,
the
Chinese
lost
about
1000
men,
the
Japanese,
about
300
men.105
Significance
of
the
battle
There
were
several
battles
that
occurred
during
the
entire
Sino- Japanese
War
of
1894-1895.
Among
many
of
them,
the
battle
of
Yalu
is
worth
the
attention
for
several
reasons.
First,
it
was
the
first
naval
that
introduced
modified
naval
warfare
with
modern
equipments
and
original
naval
tactics.
Then,
it
determined
the
overall
advantage
of
the
Japanese
for
the
entire
war.
Finally,
it
signified
and
consolidated
the
rise
of
a
new
power
in
the
Far
East.
Not
only
this
fight
was
one
of
the
first
naval
battles
using
ironclad
ships
equipped
with
quick-firing
guns
and
torpedoes,
it
also
provided
the
example
of
an
original
naval
tactics.
Because
of
the
battle
at
the
Yalu,
even
the
Americans
concluded
that
victory
of
the
future
naval
battles
would
104 105
43
depend
on
swift
mobility
of
fleets
with
powerful
guns
that
fire
from
long
range.106
The
Japanese
navy
possessed
those
two
features
and
successfully
won
the
fight
against
the
Chinese
navy,
which
ranked
higher
than
the
Japanese
prior
to
the
war.
The
ancient
form
of
naval
battle
had
been
series
of
engagements
between
the
opposing
vessels
firing
at
each
other
until
the
other
surrendered.107
However,
Admiral
Itos
strategy
of
utilizing
the
modern
navies
with
high-speed
ships
and
heavy
armaments
adapted
new
forms
of
naval
tactics.
When
one
looks
at
the
map
of
the
Northeast
Asia,
where
China,
Korea,
and
Japan
are
located,
it
would
be
evident
to
notice
the
importance
of
sea
route
for
all
three
countries.
Especially
for
Japan,
the
prior
domination
of
the
Yellow
Sea
was
vital
for
its
strategies
during
the
war.
Therefore,
the
Japanese
fought
with
determination
and
this
naval
battles
result
impacted
the
whole
war.
Without
the
victory
at
the
Yalu,
the
Japanese
campaign
in
China
might
have
faced
severe
difficulties.
The
swift
delivery
of
resources
and
movement
of
their
military
personnel
were
critical
for
facilitating
the
battles
the
Japanese
fought
in
a
foreign
land.
The
most
efficient
method
was
through
the
sea
route.
Well
aware
of
this
significance,
the
Japanese
attacked
the
Yalu
right
after
the
battle
at
Pyongyang.
This
naval
battle
opened
up
the
gate
for
invasion
of
China
in
the
future
course
of
the
war.
Japans
uninterrupted
string
of
victories
on
the
land
at
the
battle
of
Pyongyang,
in
addition
to
the
victory
over
the
highly
considered
Beiyang
Squadron,
turned
heads
in
Europe.108
Because
the
Great
Qing
Empire
had
been
the
dominant
power
in
the
Far
East
for
several
decades,
the
public
generally
did
not
expect
the
loss
of
the
Chinese
navy.
Even
though
the
106 107
44
Japanese
had
been
building
its
navy
with
foreign
countrys
ships
and
training
programs,
it
was
the
first
time
that
the
Japanese
navy
actually
exercised
its
power
and
compared
the
capacity
with
that
of
the
Chinese.
The
victory
at
this
naval
war
at
Yalu
proved
that
the
Qing
dynasty
was
weakening
dramatically
and
the
new
power
was
prepared
to
replace
the
dominance.
Conclusion
This
revolutionary
war
in
East
Asia
reversed
the
order
of
power
and
surprised
all.
Not
only
the
war
provided
a
turning
point
in
the
power
balance
and
a
lesson
to
the
once-again
risen
power
of
China,
the
war
also
left
significant
footprints
in
the
East
Asian
history.
The
consequences
of
the
war
were
very
influential
in
different
aspects
within
China,
Japan,
and
Korea.
Eventually,
the
Sino-Japanese
War
of
1894-1895
left
legacy
in
a
territorial,
political,
and
military
aspect.
Through
the
Treaty
of
Shimonoseki,
Japan
acquired
Taiwan
as
its
first
colony.
Additionally,
prior
to
and
in
the
course
of
the
war,
Japan
had
gained
control
of
the
Korean
government.
This
acquirement
had
served
as
a
stepping-stone
to
the
Japanese
Imperialism.
Therefore,
in
1904,
the
Russo- Japanese
War
occurred
when
the
Japanese
wanted
to
resist
Russian
presence
in
northeast
China.109
Because
the
Japanese
had
a
chance
to
test
and
demonstrate
their
superior
capacity
against
the
strongest
nation
in
the
Far
East,
they
now
knew
that
they
were
capable
of
conquering
other
nations.
In
China,
the
political
consequence
of
the
war
was
immense.
The
defeat
of
the
great
Qing
dynasty
to
a
small
island
nation
was
a
shameful
insult
to
the
Chinese
and
the
government
focused
on
strengthening
the
domestic
situation.
Because
the
result
of
the
war
proclaimed
the
corrupted
109
45
Qing
governments
weakness,
many
officials
demanded
reformation
within
China
as
well.
As
a
result,
the
government
conducted
the
Hundred
Days
Reform
of
1898,
led
by
Kang
Youwei
and
Liang
Qichao.
Ultimately,
the
movement
led
to
the
fall
of
Qing
dynasty
and
the
establishment
of
a
republic
in
China
in
1912.110
After
the
war,
China
realized
that
it
was
going
to
a
wrong
direction
due
to
corruption
and
complacency,
and
tried
to
revert
the
direction
of
the
power
balance.
However,
it
was
not
successful
for
the
next
few
centuries,
as
it
had
closed
the
door
to
foreign
intervention.
On
the
other
hand,
Japan
continued
its
growth
in
power
in
the
international
arena
and
even
shouldered
with
other
western
powers.
This
war
of
1894
changed
the
path
for
the
two
countries.
Koreas
situation
even
before
the
war
was
not
favorable,
but
it
deteriorated
after
the
war.
One
of
the
origins
of
the
Sino-Japanese
War
traces
back
to
the
Tonghak
Rebellion
led
by
a
group
of
peasants
against
the
corrupted
government.
Because
the
government
could
not
handle
this
rebellion,
it
called
for
foreign
assistant,
and
this
sparked
the
war
between
China
and
Japan.
During
the
war
for
Japan,
Korea
was
a
necessary
territory
to
easily
access
the
Mainland
China.
Furthermore,
Japan
needed
Korea
to
serve
as
both
defensive
and
offensive
territory.
With
the
strengthening
Japanese
power
in
the
region,
especially
proven
by
its
victory
of
the
war,
the
Korean
government
was
heavily
influenced
by
the
Japanese
for
the
next
several
decades.
Finally
in
a
militaristic
sense,
the
foreign
navies
used
the
Battle
of
Yalu
to
study
the
Japanese
original
naval
tactics.
The
Battle
of
Yalu
emphasized
the
vital
importance
of
naval
powers
especially
in
East
Asia
and
introduced
the
naval
warfare
with
the
most
modern
equipments
provided
by
European
110
Ibid.
46
powers. As a result, it proved that the mobility and speed were decisive factors in modernized naval battles. The unified formation with heavy ships and armaments, which was the tactic that the Chinese used during the Yalu battle, was not efficient anymore. It was a transitory period when the Sino-Japanese War took place in 1895. The war introduced a new dominant power and dismissed a previous status-quo power. After two centuries had passed, another transitory period had come. While Japan is facing standstill growth rate in economy, China is progressing by expeditious rate that it is almost threatening to others. At this critical period for China when it had become the dominant power in East Asia again, it can be worthwhile for it refer back to the lesson of the Sino- Japanese War. The most critical and reoccurring problems for the Chinese forces during this critical moment was its complacent attitude as a status quo power. Without proper discipline and training, the Chinese forces postulated that victory would come just because of their current status and military equipments. However, their hope completely shattered when the Japanese fought with both state-of-art equipments and patriotism. As a result, Japan succeeded at taking the place of Qing dynasty and reversed the power balance in East Asia. The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 carries its significance not only in the East Asian history but also in current affairs.
47
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