national economy and rampant unemployment are also among important factors behind the wary gradual return

of civil society in the military run Burma. In the last decade, a new type of civil society network across the national border areas has emerged and continues to play a significant role not only in providing necessary services in these areas but provides a new option for building a democratic culture. I term this type of civil society as cross-border civil society. The concept of Burmas cross-border civil society Since the space for free and vibrant civil society inside the country is tightly controlled and suppressed, an alternative public space has been deemed to create outside of the states control. For analyzing cross-border civil society, I look to some theories of social change, particularly, equilibrium theorists who see society based on metatheoretical assumptions such as societies are relatively persistent and stale, possessing widespread value consensus among members (Applebaum 1970:132). Burma is still a traditional county in many ways and one assumption can be made for the slow progress in social transformation is that there is a lack of force to encourage change. Equilibrium theorists see societies as smooth running organisms, highly differentiated, therefore highly complex and change from bottom does not just occur and need supporting force that comes from outside of the system. Applebaum (1970) explains, social systems change, but only with great difficulty; force productive of change will tend to be met by compensating force that offset change. In general, forces for change originate outside the system; change is exogenous, not inevitable aspect of social organization. Values and beliefs, and the institutions in which they are embodied, are extremely durable and tend to prevent changes originating at the bottom from affecting more general structures or the nature of the society itself (132). In the case of Burma, cross-order civil society represents a force for change that comes from outside of the system. After seizing power on 18 September 1988, the regime hunted down and arrested members of opposition groups. Ten of thousands of students and pro-democracy activists fled to border areas controlled by the armed ethnic resistance groups also knows as Liberated Areas (Litner 1990). Burmas modern political history has turned to a new page as the democracy movement has spread out to areas beyond the control of the military regime. The opposition groups will take their cause to arenas far from their country, the international community. Burmas border areas, especially, Thai-Burma border areas is now not only for armed resistance groups, but have become a site for nonviolent political defiant centre. Civil society organizations in the liberated areas have apparently parted with the oppressed. Social organizations are weak and deliberately divided in authoritarian country likes Burma. Trust, outside of the immediate associates is a scarce commodity in such society. Democracy is sustained where social trust is sufficiently nurtured and promoted. Civil society is understood to promote social trust and it ensures that a particular interest of the

public is kept in the hand of the public and the public remains the key protector of their interest (Cox 2000. pp. 92-95). The emergence of cross-border civil society is a new phenomenon amid political and economic intricacy. Cross-border civil society is a movement to establish independent and vibrant civil society and to create non-state space. Cross-border civil society, initially, was a movement responding to humanitarian and emergency needs, and within a decade it has transformed into a social movement with long-tern capacity building activities and advocacy work. Burmese cross-border civil society, in fact, has become a radical movement that has promoted voices and values of the oppressed. While some Burmese cross-border civil society organizations focus on humanitarian work for victims of war, many hold alternative visions for a better society and work toward the emergence of social transformation. Cross-border civil society has taken on the states responsibilities where the state has failed. Informal and non-formal adult education activities in the cross-border society organizations suggest that cross-border civil society activities are a form of bottom-up change movement and facilitate consciousness transformation. I will discuss the emergence of cross-border civil society in details later in this paper. Six types of Burmese civil society Burma now has civil society organizations ranging from those sponsored by the state to those are critical of the military regime and set out to build a democratic society through social and cultural change movements. There are also many traditional and self-help organizations which solely focus on the welfare of local communities. A close examination of civil society in the context of Burma reveals six types of civil society. Four of these six types of civil society organizations are found inside the country while the other two are active in areas outside of the control of the military regime; on the border areas and in other countries. I will briefly discuss these six types of civil society. Type one: compliant civil society The regime recognizes the need for having civil society organizations presented in the country to demonstrate to the world that it has been working toward a democracy. There are Government Organized Non-Government Organizations (GONGOs) created for several purposes including preempting independent civil society, humiliating the opposition, and supporting the military regimes political agendas. Gustaaf Houtman (1999: 144) in his study of mental culture in Burmese political crisis descries sixteen government organized non-Government organizations (GONGOs). These GONGOs organizations are obviously created as pocket organizations to protect the interest of the generals and are used to mobilize supporters and monitor the activities of the opponents of the regime (Kyaw Yin Hling 2004, pp. 406-407). The Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), established in 1993, is the prime example of such organization. The senior general Than Shwe, the head of the ruling military regime, is the founder and patron of the Union Solidarity and Development

Association (USDA) which claims to have more than twenty-two million members around the country. The USDAs true objectives are to weaken the opposition groups, pre-empt any potential political challenge to the regime, and to use its members in supporting the governments propaganda. The USDA recruits its members, by offering incentives and by force, in education, business, and civil service sectors, and from the opposition groups (NDD 2006, pp.18-19). Type-two: the opposition groups I define the opposition groups such as the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, the ethnic political forces, students and monks as the second type of civil society group. As mentioned earlier the opposition groups in Burma have been marginalized and excluded from politics and there is no space to act overtly in political space (ICG 2001, p.13). The opposition groups have sought to carve out some space for independent actions and instead many have chosen to engage in social welfare, community health, education and religious activities to keep their organizations alive. For instance, the National League for Democracy, the largest opposition group in the country, donated rice to people during the rice price crisis in 2002, and many of its members engage in social welfare work such as healthcare and HIV/Aids prevention activities (Phyu Phyu Thin, Feb 2010). Although fear of torture and lengthy imprisonment starkly limits their activities, political parties continue to be the most important civil society actors. Type-three: traditional and local organizations Type-three civil society group comes in the form of traditional, social, religious and cultural organizations and local self-help groups. In this type of civil society, I include not only cultural and religious based groups but also intellectuals, performers and artists. The deepening economic crisis, dropping living standards and the states failure to meet the basic needs of local communities are important factors for traditional and local selfhelp groups to become more active in the last decade. As traditional organizations they play an important role in not only preserving the culture and customs but also maintaining social cohesion in local communities. They organize cultural celebration, social welfare service and other activities for the needs of the poor. The regime tolerates local welfare activities, particularly, in ethnic minority areas because they fulfill basic welfare needs that are not met by the state (ICG 2001 and Ni Ni Aung 2006). The selfhelp organizations in urban areas focus on provisioning of education and basic healthcare while the non-Burman ethnic communities in ceasefires areas focus on food security, income generation and acute intervention in basic healthcare and education support (Lorch 2006). The military regime keeps close eyes on activities of these local civil society groups and never hesitates to intervene whenever it believes the organization began to have too much influence in the community. Any local self-help organization becomes popular or receives popular support of the people they are at risk of being overtaken by the government organization or push out of the business. For instance, a local self-help organization, called Byamso A-thin, that provides ambulance and medical services for a nominal charge to the poor in Mandalay became more popular than the governments

Maternal and Child Care Association, witch provided similar services to the public. The organization was threatened to be taken over by the authority (Kyaw Yin Hling 2004, p. 407). In 2003, the Free Funeral Service Society (FFSS) for the poor, a well known local based social welfare association in Rangoon was briefly banned from working for refusing to be incorporated with the government agency (Htain Linn 2003, p. 26-27). Civil society inside Burma is, however, restricted in its ability to effectively function and promote participation of the grassroots. Mutebi (2001) observes that civil society organizations in Burma have been given little room to move and by themselves can hardly secure the level of consensus that is required to engender and consolidate broad based reforms in governance and governance culture (178). Type four: International NGOs International INGOs does play a role in the development of civil society network in Burma. The presence of the INGOs in Burma serves two ends. For the regime, having the INGOs in the country means improving its image as a government that being open and corporative, as well as gaining foreign currency coming into the country through the INGOs workers and project activities. However, the INGOs ability to work affectively is in question (Human Right Watch April 2010). The INGOs have mainly engaged in the field of humanitarian services and supported development projects in partnership with local organizations. Although some local projects have been working closely with INGOs at the ground level, there are several challenges INGOs face. Local civil society organisations are generally restrained in their ability to work with INGOs and the regime tolerates no criticism (Human Right Watch April 2010). Type-five: cross-border civil society movement The lack of political progress and the deepening economic crisis and dropping living standards in Burma have forced Burmese criticizes to search for alternative ways of making living in their neighboring countries. Millions of people have left their country in search of jobs and most have gone to Thailand. The cease-fire initiatives arrangements between the armed ethnic groups and the military in the 1990s have reduced armed conflicts in many ethnic areas in frontier, but in reality the cease-fire initiatives have not improved the lives of the people in these areas. The absence of war, however, provides opportunities for some local self-help groups and community based organizations to emerge in areas where communities have been devastated by civil war for several decades. These civil society networks in cease-fire zones have worked closely with Burmese civil society organizations based in Thailand. I term this cross-border civil society. The organizations in this type of civil society engage in humanitarian assistance, capacity building, advocacy work and social change. Here civil society groups have their own vision of a better society and undertaken advocacy work for democratic change. I will discuss more details on the emergence of cross-border civil society later in this paper. Type-six: Burmese advocate groups in overseas I term the Burmese opposition groups and advocate organizations based in democratic countries such as the USA, UK, EU and Australia as the sixth type of civil society. Many

of these groups members are made up of Burmese democracy activists and refugees who have taken political asylum in those countries. After the 1988 nation-wide democracy uprising was brutally crushed, a large number of members of opposition, political activists and students fled to Thai-Burma border and later migrated to many third countries, largely to Western democratic countries. In third countries, they continue to be active and seek to promote political change in Burma through the mean of international pressure on the Burmese military regime. In the 1990s, more than forty such groups emerged in North America, Europe, Australia and Asia (Kyaw Yin Hling 2004, p. 408) and many have mobilized their supporters and governments to put pressure on the Burmese regime. A Burmese civil society organization called the Free Burma Coalition (FBC) based in the U.S is an excellent example how effective these overseas based Burmese civil society organizations can put pressure on the regime in Burma. Formed in 1995 by a Burmese graduate student, Zar Ni, from the University of Wisconsin-Madison with an aim to force international corporations operating in Burma out of the country, the FBC had launched very successful political cyber campaigns. Making good use of cyber space, Zar Ni and his associates managed to build alliances with various student organizations, community groups and human rights organizations around America. By 2001, the FBC had forced more than fifty major international corporations, including Compaq, Pepsi, Eddie Bauer, Kodak, and Hewlett-Packard out of Burma. Building on the idea of Ethical Investment, the FBC had influenced on several local and state government polices. Many cities in the US passed Purchasing Laws that banned or restricted contracts on companies that are doing business in Burma. Governments in the United States and EU counties imposed economic sanction on Burma (Kyaw Yin Hling 2004, pp. 412-413). Burmese communities and support groups in Australia adopted a similar strategy. Several city councils including Marrickville of New South Wale and Belmore council of Victoria have passed selective purchasing laws to prevent money flowing into the hands of Burmese regime (authors own campaign experiences in the 1990s to 2006).

The emergence of cross-border civil society

The emergence of cross-border civil society is a new phenomenon in the history of modern Burma and is an upshot of more than fifty years civil war, ruthless political oppression and the isolation policy of the Burmese socialist regime (1962-1988). There are several factors that underpin the emergence of cross-border civil society including the deepening economic crisis and declining living standards, the regimes dogmatic political ideas and oppression, the withdrawal of support for armed insurgent groups from the excold war patrons, namely China and Thailand, in the late1980s and 90s led to the decline in the strength of armed resistance groups (South 2004, p. 245), the states failure to meet the basic needs of local communities and ceasefire arrangements between armed ethnic groups and the army in the 1990s. CBOs and local self-help groups have emerged in frontier areas and they have quickly built close relationship with Burmese civil society organizations based in Thailand, and in less than a decade, Burmese cross-border civil society has turned into a site of democracy struggle.

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Cross-order civil society organizations are found to be active in Burmas border areas with Thailand, Bangladesh, India and China. This paper will focus on cross-border civil society networks on the Thai-Burma border and in Thailand. The nature of Thai -Burma cross-border relationships Thailand and Burma share a 2401-kilometer long border lines marked by a range of mountains and rivers, in many places, isolated, rugged and richly forested (Lang 2002, pp.137-138). For more than half a century, the border areas was characterized by civil war, unofficial border trade (black market), narcotic businesses, refugee camps, and mass economic migration. In the 1970s and 80s, the successive Thai governments saw the border areas with Burma as the Buffer Zone that prevented the spread of communist force from Northern Burma into Thailand (Lintner 1994, pp. 240-244). Armed ethnic insurgence groups effectively controlled most border areas until recent decade. Facing economic decline, the people have largely relied on imported domestic products smuggled through border trading routes from neighboring countries. The BSPPs isolation policy in the 9170s and 80s made the border trading unofficial (black-market) and had worsened the already corrupted practices among the government officials. The armed ethnic groups also relied on tariff collected from business activities at the border crossing points to sustain their armed campaign against the Tatmadaw or the Burmese army (Litner 1994; Smith 1991). In the 1990s, the military regime stroke ceasefire deals with several armed ethnic groups. As a result, arm conflict in some areas has been reduced. The Burmese and Thai governments have subsequently developed economic cooperation strategies and created trading and industrial zones near the border lines. Border trading between the two countries has transformed from black-market activities to official trade zones. Ceasefire arrangements and the emergence of social space in ethnic frontier areas The end of the cold war has a dramatic effect on the strength of Burmeses armed ethnic insurgency. The end of cold-war in the 1980s means no more threat of communist expansion and the Thai government began to see border trading with Burma as an opportunity for economic growth. Armed ethnic insurgent groups based along the ThaiBurma border once enjoyed the support of the Thai government were under the pressure to engage cease-fire talks with the Burmese military regime. Many ethnic armed groups simply did not have choice but to strike cease-fire deals with the military regime. At the same time, in the north-eastern Burma, once the most powerful enemy of the military regime, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) and its army, which has been active since 1948, faced a new challenge to sustain its more than ten thousand troops as China, once was the strong supporter of the Burma communist party, changed its policy and has emphasized on the growth of trading on the Sino-Burma border. As a result of policies changed in these countries, armed ethnic resistance groups in Burma found it harder to mobilize their troops, obtain necessary arms and ammunition supplies and generate income to finance their organizations as they no longer have total control over the border

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trading. In the1990s, a series of cease-fire arrangements between different ethnic armed groups and the military regime was made. Some fifteen armed ethnic organizations have agreed ceasefire deals with the military regime. (http://www.irrawaddy.org/research_show.php?art_id=444 (accessed 21/4/10) The decline in the strength of the armed resistance among ethnic groups and the ceasefire agreements in the 1990s have opened up opportunities for younger generation of the resistance force to turn to civil society as a way to continue their struggle for democracy. Observers of Burmas ceasefire arrangements between the government and armed ethnic groups have concluded that political nature of ceasefire may be highly ambivalent and the terms of the agreements were varied depending of the size and strength of the group, but the ceasefire agreements have led to the emergence or enlargement of the space for civil society (Smith 1999 pp. 37-49; Purcell 1999, p. 89ff; South 2004, p. 233). Following a half-century long civil war, ethnic minority-populated areas of Burma face serious humanitarian tragedy. Needs are especially acute in food and livelihood security, basic healthcare and civilian protection (South 2004, p. 237). Some ceasefire groups have been able to negotiate a small degree of autonomy and organize community development activities in areas they control (Toe Zaw Latt, 2005; South 2004). Community based organizations and self-help groups have quickly emerged in those areas. The development of civil society networks in ceasefire areas needs to be understood in the broader context of the enormous underdevelopment that these war-torn communities face. It might not be the regimes best interest to invest proper resources in the reconstruction of ethnic areas, but by allowing the armed resistant groups run the task of administration and development in the territory they control prevents them from calling off the ceasefire arrangements (ICG 2001, p. 23). The ceasefire arrangements, in reality, have not benefited the locals and brought sustainable peace. Major displacement of civilian populations has continued to occur after ceasefire deals in several parts of ethnic minority areas. South (2007:56) describes the state-society conflict-induced displacement which occurred after ceasefire arrangements and by and large due to military development activities such as land confiscation by the Tatmadaw for infrastructural development. Families and communities in many areas lose their businesses and livelihoods as a result of excessive and unplanned resource extraction such as logging, mining, and infrastructure development. The Burma armys expansion into previously contested areas also causes population displacement as the army would seize land and displace communities to secure militarily strategic positions (South 2004, p. 239). Facing limited availability of productive land, extreme poverty and food security local population choose to look for jobs in Thailand. The economic crisis and Burmese migrant workers in Thailand For more than two decades, since 1988, the Burmese economy and living standards have continuously declined. Million of unemployed Burmese have illegally quitted Burma and migrated to neighboring countries for work. In recent decade, Thailand has become the largest home of Burmese nationalities outside of Burma. The creation of industrial zones

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and official trading centers along the Thai-Burma border areas following the Economic Cooperation Strategy (ECS) agreed on in November 2003 in Pagan city in Burma has paved ways for Burmese to look for jobs in Thailand. The development of a Thai industrial zone in Mae Sot opposite the Burmese town, Myawaddy, is designed to attract Burmese migrant workers. Mae Sot is particularly attractive location since Burmese migrant workers can just cross the Thai-Burma Friendship Bridge over the Mae Nam Moi River (Lubeigt 2007, p. 172). Other than Mae Sot region, Burmese migrant workers are also found to be concentrated in the Bangkok areas, especially in the areas of MahachaiSamut Prakan, Chiang Mai and Tachilek- Mae Sai in the North, and Kawtaung-Ranong areas in The South. There are a total of 16 official points of entry along the border between Burma and Thailand (TBBC 2008). The number of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand was estimated to be more than two million in 2005 representing more than 11 per-cent of the total workforce of Burma (Lubeigt 2007, p.168; Lang and Banki 2007 and TBBC 2008). The reality of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand, however, tells many different shocking stories. For Thai business owners, Burmese workers are generally illegal, passive, and easy to handle and bully. Since Burmese workers are illegal they do not demand for the amelioration of working conditions although most of them face exploitation, discrimination and unfair dismissal. Burmese workers are often not provided with housing and proper medical care, and their working hours are extended at will, often up to sixteen hours a day (Lubeigt 2007, p.175). Other than exploitation and recrimination, Burmese in Thailand are also vulnerable to transmittable diseases such as HIV/Aids, tuberculosis and water-born diseases since they live and work in poor and unhealthy conditions. In the mean time, the number of children of Burmese migrant workers in Thailand has grown and most children do not have access to basic education. Beginning in the years of 2000, Burmese NGOs in Thailand began to provide basic education and healthcare for migrant workers and their families. In the last decade, this movement has growth from humanitarian and emergency focus to a long-term capacity building for a sustainable democracy movement. Burmese exiles, refugees in Thailand and cross-border civil society Apart from the growing number of migrant workers in Thailand, there are Burmese refugees and political exiles taking sanctuary in Thailand. More than half a century civil war in Burma has left behind several hundred thousand refugees living in neighboring countries. More than 150 000 Burmese are now living in refugee camps in Thailand (Lang and Banki 2007and TBBC June 2008). The ceasefire agreements between the Burmese army and the armed ethnic groups have not stopped the flow of refugees as the Burmese military regime has continued waging war against those ethnic armed groups that have not entered a ceasefire agreement with the regime. Several hundred Burmese political exiles who escaped persecution have also taken sanctuary in Thailand. Burmese political exiles, democracy activists and younger

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generation of resistance groups in Thailand have played an important role in Burmas cross-border civil society since they see working in civil society activities is an alternative way to arm struggle for democracy in Burma. Their ambition for a democratic Burma has helped cross-border civil society transformed from humanitarian-focus services in to a site of social change movements. Informal adult education or teaching and learning democracy in crossborder civil society There are formal educational programs such as schools and non-formal training programs for skills development, capacity building and campaign activities in cross-border civil society. These programs, one way or the other, provide necessary information and contribute to democracy development. However, to understand teaching and learning democracy that occurs among migrant workers who normally do not have time to engage in these training programs, we have to look beyond formal education and training programs. Teaching and learning among Burmese migrant workers in Thailand occur in their everyday experiences. I draw on adult education theories to explore teaching and learning democracy among Burmese migrant workers in Thailand. I am interested in the way peoples consciousness is being challenged and how they develop critical consciousness. My field study of adult migrant workers experiences reveals that civil society actors such as community activists and health workers challenge not only the regimes hegemony but generate their own knowledge and re-create knowledge. Well known adult educators like Paulo Freire, John Dewey, Myle Horton, John Holst, Mick Newman, Mark Smith and Griff Foley acknowledge the important of learning in social action and informal learning aspect of social movements. Learning in action mainly occurs in peoples everyday experience. Floey (1999) explains that peoples everyday experience reproduces ways of thinking and acting which support the, often oppressive, status quo, but. This same experience also produces recognitions which enable people to critique and challenge the existing order (pp. 3-4). Cross-border civil society is a social sphere and the organizations in this arena are based on voluntary and free association for the common interest or the best interest of the relevant community. The idea that civil society is (or must be) free from the states control is in itself educational and hegemonic ideological project (Holst 2002, p.57). A close examination of educational work of Burmese in Thailand in different areas including a community library project for migrant workers, a clandestine Human Rights training program for grassroots community workers, social and informal learning activities at a migrant learning centre health workers, and an environmental training for Burmese reveals that some people have experienced a shift in their consciousness. These people had very little or no political background. Many of them became involved in their work by accidence. Many of these people knew little about Burmese politics and never participated in collective action before.

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