Scribd Logo
Upload

Welcome to Scribd!

  • "RFE and The Hungarian Revolt of 1956" by Johanna Granville

    Uploaded by

    Johanna Granville
    4K views29 pages
    This article will provide a more complete account of the impact of Radio Free Europe’s broadcasts on Soviet decision making during the crisis, drawing on documents released from Russian, Hungarian, and U.S. archives in recent years. It will be argued that early balloon and leaflet operations during reformist Imre Nagy’s first term as Hungarian prime minister (1953-1955) - namely “Operation Focus” - both antagonized Nagy and spawned a stern neutralism (later, hostility) toward him among US diplomats and RFE broadcasters during the crisis. This, in turn, caused Soviet leaders to doubt Nagy’s managerial skills, fear the power vacuum in Hungary, and conclude that a second military invasion was necessary. Specifically, one can conclude that RFE’s broadcasting was a key causal factor in the Soviet crackdown for at least three distinct, but interrelated, reasons: 1) the broadcasts contributed to Moscow’s lack of faith in Nagy’s ability to control the situation; 2) they aroused Soviet fears of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact long before Nagy himself announced it; and 3) the broadcasts contributed to the disbandment of the Hungarian security police (ÁVH), thus convincing Soviet (and Hungarian) communist leaders that Soviet troops were needed to fill the security vacuum in Hungary.

    Original Title

    "RFE and the Hungarian Revolt of 1956" by Johanna Granville

    Copyright

    © Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)

    Available Formats

    DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd

    Did you find this document useful?

    Is this content inappropriate?

    Report this Document
    This article will provide a more complete account of the impact of Radio Free Europe’s broadcasts on Soviet decision making during the crisis, drawing on documents released from Russian, Hungarian, and U.S. archives in recent years. It will be argued that early balloon and leaflet operations during reformist Imre Nagy’s first term as Hungarian prime minister (1953-1955) - namely “Operation Focus” - both antagonized Nagy and spawned a stern neutralism (later, hostility) toward him among US diplomats and RFE broadcasters during the crisis. This, in turn, caused Soviet leaders to doubt Nagy’s managerial skills, fear the power vacuum in Hungary, and conclude that a second military invasion was necessary. Specifically, one can conclude that RFE’s broadcasting was a key causal factor in the Soviet crackdown for at least three distinct, but interrelated, reasons: 1) the broadcasts contributed to Moscow’s lack of faith in Nagy’s ability to control the situation; 2) they aroused Soviet fears of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact long before Nagy himself announced it; and 3) the broadcasts contributed to the disbandment of the Hungarian security police (ÁVH), thus convincing Soviet (and Hungarian) communist leaders that Soviet troops were needed to fill the security vacuum in Hungary.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as doc, pdf, or txt
    4K views29 pages

    "RFE and The Hungarian Revolt of 1956" by Johanna Granville

    Uploaded by

    Johanna Granville
    This article will provide a more complete account of the impact of Radio Free Europe’s broadcasts on Soviet decision making during the crisis, drawing on documents released from Russian, Hungarian, and U.S. archives in recent years. It will be argued that early balloon and leaflet operations during reformist Imre Nagy’s first term as Hungarian prime minister (1953-1955) - namely “Operation Focus” - both antagonized Nagy and spawned a stern neutralism (later, hostility) toward him among US diplomats and RFE broadcasters during the crisis. This, in turn, caused Soviet leaders to doubt Nagy’s managerial skills, fear the power vacuum in Hungary, and conclude that a second military invasion was necessary. Specifically, one can conclude that RFE’s broadcasting was a key causal factor in the Soviet crackdown for at least three distinct, but interrelated, reasons: 1) the broadcasts contributed to Moscow’s lack of faith in Nagy’s ability to control the situation; 2) they aroused Soviet fears of Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact long before Nagy himself announced it; and 3) the broadcasts contributed to the disbandment of the Hungarian security police (ÁVH), thus convincing Soviet (and Hungarian) communist leaders that Soviet troops were needed to fill the security vacuum in Hungary.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as DOC, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    Download as doc, pdf, or txt
    of 29

    Copyright: Johanna Granville, "Caught With Jam on Our Fingers”: Radio Free Europe

    and the Hungarian Revolution in 1956,” Diplomatic History, vol. 29, no. 5 (2005): pp. 811-839.

    You might also like