CONFIDENTIAL

Abstract
Collated from different intelligence sources and/or military attaches in the diplomatic community in the Philippines, this summary is issued to provide information and guidance to our congressional and gubernatorial principals in the run up to the May 2013 elections.

Part 1: Northern Philippines

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Part 2: Central Philippines Fraud Intelligence Update/Province of Cebu City

Distribution: Limited; Classification: Confidential; Disposition: 1.1 Current leads indicate that the ruling party may had organized a team of nine (9) men to oversee recruitment, training, and selection of special, high-tech election result feeder (ERF) operatives; 1.2 Target Areas: Three chartered cities: CEBU, MANDAUE, and LAPULAPU; Six component cities: DANAO, TALISAY, CARCAR, NAGA, SAN FERNANDO; 1.3 ERF is responsible for tapping into the Internet configuration through which Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines transmit tabulated election results;

1.4 Strategic Objective: Statistically probable, massive victory for favored candidates; 1.5 ERF Methodology:

Option Alfa (inside voting precinct): ERF team may feed repetitiously at random into the PCOS a pre-numbered, duly accomplished ballot whose voting marks were previously programmed for recognition, acceptance, and storage by the machines memory chip and system software. Option Baker (outside voting precinct): With the cooperation and/or participation of the BEI or BEC, and under the guise of a technical glitch (manual feeding jam, for example), the PCOS is turned off at the appointed time for a pre-determined duration. A twin or parallel PCOS system then transmits the tampered vote tally and/or vote summary to the AS/300 mainframe controlling 300 to 500 servers assigned in Cebu province or direct to the central COMELEC headquarters in Manila, whichever is practical; Hideous operation ends when the Statistical Gap (SG) between the actual voter turnout (AVT) and the statistically acceptable voter turnout (SAVT) is reached. Technically, as was done in 2010, SG runs somewhere between 65 percent of the actual number of electors who turned out to cast their ballots and to as high as 95 percent of the total number of registered voters; The trick run may run smooth on (careless), untrained, less tech-savvy election watchers, and may thrive positively in difficulties associated with protests, especially in pinpointing where it was done and by who;

1.6 Information Technology Application: A virtual machine, a mainframe can partition resources in limited environments. Easy to set up, it is capable of controlling up to 5,000 servers without administrative headache. One unit, including software and built-in systems, cost $54,000 at current prices. Providing outstanding security, the internal system-partitioning controls have built-in segregation of duties with multiple layers of security from discovery or breach by hackers. It maintains an excellent internal system control reporting functionality; 1.7 Models under surveillance: IBM AS/300 on the high range; Dell; Hewlett-Packard, Sun/Oracle, and Unix on the midrange;

1.8 Probable Involvements: Names Redacted 1.9 Developments Under Surveillance: [D 1 ] Commission on Elections Commissioner GUS LAGMAN will remain under watch for his ties to ruling party officials linked to an unfolding fraud conspiracy. [D 2 ] Unresolved case between PCOS distributor SMARTMATIC and DOMINION, which owns the machine technology systems used in automating the 2010 synchronized national and local elections. [D 3 ] Software license agreement with Dominion was terminated in May 2012. The agreement allows SMARTMATIC to use Dominion software to operate the PCOS machines, as well as install necessary software upgrades to enhance and address glitches in the system. [D 4 ] Court records indicate that SMARTMATIC has had never denied that it had used Dominion technology. [D 5 ] LAGMAN was quoted in the press as saying that SMARTMATIC should either own the software or have written it themselves. [D 6 ] The brand/trademark and provider of the memory chips being supplied to store information and instructions to the PCOS is also being looked into. [D 7 ] Digital signature of each PCOS; [D8] Composition of the ERF teams, basing and server location. Page 42
Distribution: Limited; Classification: Confidential; Disposition: FYEO

Part 3: Southern Philippines

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