Dthis and Dthat

Dthis and Dthat: Indexicality Goes beyond That Author(s): Joseph Almog Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophical Studies:
An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 39, No. 4 (May, 1981), pp. 347-381 Published by: Springer Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319462 . Accessed: 27/02/2013 10:04
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JOSEPH ALMOG
DTHIS AND DTHAT: INDEXICALITY GOES BEYOND THAT*

Some Argumentsfor the Indexicality of Natural-kind and Color Termsand ProperNames in Kaplan'sLogic of Demonstratives
(Received7 July, 1980)
0. INTRODUCTION
In this paper,I try to arguethat the class of indexicaltermsin natural 'Now'etc. like 'I', 'Here', language goes beyondthe obvious,pure,indexicals I to show that NATURAL-KINDS Specifically, hope COLOR TERMS, NAMESare indexical.I classifyprevious TERMS,and PROPER relevant workson these subjects into two categories: The first category consistsof workslike Putnam's suggestions regarding natural-kinds terms.Hisinformal ideas and basic conceptions are ones with which I agree,with someminor differences. YET,it seemsto me thatPutnam's worksuffers fromthe lackof, frameworks. Thelack of a conceptual frameproperlogicaland conceptual workis a resultof the lackof an adequate logicalframework. I willargue that in using the main ingredients of classicalChurchian intensional logic and the conceptual framework of Frege-Carnap-Church, consequently Putnam's insightful intuitions may be jeopardized. Thispossibility is twofold:the lack of a properframework may preventPutnam fromdrawing resultsfromhis ideas and preventing a general approach to indexicality in natural language. In addition,somedangerous confusions andresults whichareevencentrary to Putnam's ownconvictions, mayfollow. The secondcategory of worksis typifiedby the Kripke-Kaplan approach to semantics. In this case, the logicaland conceptual frameworks seem to me optimal,but the authorsthemselves do not acceptthe indexicality of theseterms.(Actually, neitherKripke nor Kaplan haveexpressed themselves on the indexicalityof natural-kinds terms and color terms,though they have both rejectedthe indexicality of proper names.At this stagea digressionis calledfor:it seems to methatin theirarguments against the indexicality of names,both have pavedthe way for an indexicaltreatment of names. Paradoxical as it sounds,I hope that the arguments belowwill clearthe air of paradox. Moreover, I havereason to believe thatKaplan (personal commuPhilosophical Studies 39 (1981) 347-381. 0031-8116/81/0394-0347$03.50 Copyright? 1981 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht,Holland,and Boston, U.S.A.
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nication) will not object to the treatment of naturalkinds on the indexical model that he suggestsfor pure indexicals). Workingwithin the Kaplaniansemantics of the logic of demonstratives, my aim is to show how this logical and conceptual frameworkallows an elegant treatment of the three types of terms as indexicals.Then I will argue that the indexicality of proper names may shed some light on a puzzle of Kripke involvingnames in belief contexts. On that basis, I hope to elucidate some of the general characteristics of indexical terms whether they are explicit ('I', 'Here', etc.) indexicals or implicit ones. Finally, I discuss some open problems which seem to me to be of great importance:Whetherthe present treatment can be extended to theoretical terms (like 'electricity' or 'mass'), whether Kaplan'ssemantics should be generalizedto an even more sophisticated intensional logic and whether an indexical semantics entails a sharp divisionbetween meaningsand facts and if so whetherthis shows that indexical semanticspresupposesa logical atomisticmetaphysics. Whatmakes a term indexical? Basically, that its reference may vary across contexts. Yet, all writers seem to think that indexicalsare rigiddesignators.If so, then somethingmust remain fixed. Moreover,indexical sentences seem to have as an interesting subset sentences which are a priori and logically validyet expresscontingent propositions ('I am here now'). So we need a generalsemanticframeworkto cope with these, and other, issues. Kaplan'slogic of demonstrativeshas, as a startingpoint, the observation that semantic values (extensions) assigned to indexical terms are relativeto both a context of use and a possible world. Argumentsfor the complete separationof the context from the world can be multipliedeasily (see below) but it is enough to consider the truth of 'I am Here Now' in all contexts, together with the falsity of the propositions it may express, in altemative worlds. Let K be an expression. [K]C, (I disregard time for the moment) is its semantic value (extension, referent) with respect to c, at world w. c is giving the contextual information on the interpretationof the expression,w is the state-of-facts(the 'circumstance of evaluation'to use Kaplan'sterminology). [K]Cis the CONTENTof K at c. Otherwiseput, this is its (Carnapian) intension, a function from possible circumstances(worlds) to appropriate extensions. Finally, [K] is the CHARACTER of K. The characteris a function from contexts into contents. Let us try this intuitively: extensions relativeto c and w are objects (for names) sets (predicates)or more generally
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and truthvalues(sentences). relations-in-extensions (for n-placepredicates) Otherwise Contents are:objects (for rigid designators. put,constant functions on worlds), individual concepts (non-rigid designators), properties (predicates), arehardto comeby because when and propositions (sentences). Characters Buttake'I':its character no indexicals arearound theycollapse into contents. Thecharacter to it its speaker. is a functiontakinga contextandassigning arerigid,it is of 'Here' to the contextits place,etc. Sinceindexicals assigns is needed.But hardto comeby an example in whichthe wholemechanism of the U.S.A.'. take 'the present president of the U.S.A.'and 'the president The formerhas an unstablecharacter in differentcontexts,differentmen arethe presidents at the worlds of thesecontexts.Thelatteris non-indexical. hasa stablecontent In everycontextits contentis the same.Nowthe former (thatis, it is rigid).Thatis, givena specificcontext,it is goingto denotethe in all possibleworldsaccessiblefrom the world of this same individual worldsmakedifferent content:different context.The latterhas an unstable persons presidents. bizzarefact: in EVERY Oneseemingly context,bothtermsareextensionof the U.S.A.is F iff the ally the same.In this sense'the present president presentof the U.S.A. is F is a logicaltruth,yet puttingit in the scopeof necessity(or an omnitemporality operator like 'always') tums it into a falsehood. This logico-conceptual framework model theories departsfromprevious for intensional logics.Insteadof havinga singleset of worldsas the model andWorlds most crucial we havetwo indexsets:Contexts structure member, (or the Cartesian productof worldsandtimesif we assign truthconditions at a world-moment pair). As we haveseen,thischanges the interpretation function, the truthdefinition, the conceptof logicaltruth.A full surveyof the novelties will take us a lot of space. The readershould consult the works of the originators: Kaplan(1970, 1977, 1978), and Kamp(1967). As far as the literature is concerned,it seems that no attemptwas madeto use this framework to the termsunder discuss discussion here1.
1. THE INDEXICALITY OF NATURAL KINDS TERMS
I start with naturalkind terms becausethey are less controversial (with respectto the suggestion concerning theirindexicality) thanproper names or
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color-terms. Indeed in their case (henceforth, I let NKT for 'naturalkind term') most of the argumentshad alreadybeen providedby Putnam, and to some extent by Kripke. However, although Putnam argues informally for what seems to me the correct theory, the lack of a general frameworkin which these informal arguments could be embedded, generates two types of seriousproblems: (a) repetitive confusions in the use of the terms 'extension', 'intension' and 'meaning'.This is bound to be the case as long as one operates within the old Camapiandichotomy of extension vs intension. The problem is not only formal, as it may seem at a first look. Indeed, the most generalsemantic frameworkoperating with the extension vs intension paradigmis Church's logic of sense and denotation. In this logic there is no place for assignments of semantic values which depend on the context as well as the circumstance of evaluation.Church's logic is built on the Fregeanmodel, in which indexicality can be eliminated. Moreover Church's logic champions the idea that sense determinesextension, the idea which Putnamtries to reject. So the problem is both formal and conceptual. At the formal level, a Churchianlogic would employ a model structure in which only one index set figures: the set of possible worlds (or circumstancesof evaluation)and consequently no place would be left for indexical locutions which require both a context and a world as parametersrelative to which their semantic values (extensions) are given. Moreoversuch a frameworkwould not allow a set-theoreticalcharacterization of the bifurcation of the notion of meaning for indexicals: CHARACTERS as functions from contexts to CONTENTS and CONTENTS as functionsfromcircumstances to extensions.Consequently, it seems impossible to treat Putnam's intuitions within a Frege-Church logical framework. Now, at the conceptual level, another problem emerges: If Putnam is to operate within the intension vs extension framework,he is going to operate within the frameworkwhich is the central target of his attack, namely, a framework which thinks of extensions as being determined by intensions, of no road back from extension to intension, and of intensions (senses) as the objects which a competent speakermust know in communicating. (b) while argumentsin (a) aim to show that negative results may follow from sticking to the Frege-Church paradigm,here I wish to add that positive results may follow from leaving it. More specifically, if Putnam'sideas are embedded in a framework which is receptive to his intuitions, it is very
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that his casecanbe seenin a moregeneral plausible as fittingthe perspective of indexicals. behaviour general semantic Putnam'swell-knownarguments. Consider I'll review, telegraphically, into OURlanguage the NKT 'Water'. The word was introduced by some of the liquid.Now, at that act of reference pointingat the pastat a sample (extension)-fixing, anotherthing was achieved:the determination of the intensionof the term. That is, given that at that dubbing ceremonythe of chemical of theliquid wasH2 nature structure 0, itsintension (theKaplanian 'content')IS H20. That is, in everypossibleworldin whichwe talk about OUR'water', wateris H20? the word Whataboutotherreference-fixing whichmayinvolve ceremonies the English 'water'? well, as the story goes,on another planet,Twin-Earth, speaker dubbedthe liquidthey drink (the one whichfillsthe lakesandrivers) as the story also 'water'.Yet, the two uses don't have the sameintension: with a different goes, their rain and lakes are constitutedof a material chemicalstructure, say XYZ. So their 'water'had as an extensionsome differentstuff with a differentmicrostructure. Note that, Frege-Church in intension is a resultof difference notwithstanding, difference in extension (reference): THERE IS a waybackfromextension to intension! the storymay be improved a bit. Putnam's Actually, original storymakes use of a different possible world.It seemsto me thatin a theoryof reference a clearseparation be keptbetween the contextandthe possible should world. Whatreallymatters hereis the context.Thatis, suppose that as a matter of empiricalfact, people in Oxfordnamedthe stuff that runsin their rivers 'Water' exactly as the peoplein Cambridge did. Both came to theirplaces from Londonin whichthey livedbeforeandin whichthey used 'water' to depict a stuff with an H20 microstructure. Now, it happens,for some geological reason,that the riversin the two cities(Oxford, Cambridge) are filled with two differentmaterials: in Oxfordthe liquid is H20 but in it is XYZ.So we havetwo contextsof use in the actual Cambridge worldin whichthe story is reproduced. Note that we haveherea three-component affair:Oxford-English and Cambridge-English differas to (both) extension and intension.Yet they sharea third component:the method, or rule, to whichthe reference according was fixed. In bothcasesthe peopledubbed a sample the liquidwhichfillstheirlakesand whichwasthe liquidthey drink, rivers andhasa certain perceptual appearance. Putnam,in confusing'meaning' and 'intension', is forcedto say that the
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do not know the meaningof 'water' in their Oxfordians and Cambridgians language, because, as it is probably the actual state of affairs, they don't know that the respectiveliquids are H20 and XYZ. This is the negativeresult which may follow if Putnamsticks to the Frege-Churchintensionallogic. He will commit both a conceptual and a formal mistake. Conceptually,he will miss the thirdcomponent,namely,the levelwhichis sharedby both townsmen, to dub as 'water'anything whichhas certain phenomenal whichis theirreadiness which is a function from properties.Formally,he will confuse the MEANING whichis a function from possible contexts to intensions, and the INTENSION extensions. worldsto appropriate So, let me sketch how the Putnamianpicture fits Kaplan'slogic of demonstratives. At the conceptual level the following should be said: Just as with other indexicals (say 'I'), there is no point in talking about the reference of 'water' without a specification of a context of use. So we have a three-level process: First, there is the characterof 'water'which is a rule which tells one that in a given context of use, one dubs something as 'water'iff that object fills has the phenomenalappearancespecified as follows: liquid, transparent, lakes and rivers,etc. Then, given a specific context, the characterdetermines a specific Content (intension). This is a function which, given a possible world, assignsan appropriatebody of liquid. In the Oxfordiancase it will be an H20 sample, in the Cambridgians case an XYZ sample (actually, because 'water' is a mass noun, its extension will be the sum of all sampleswhich satisfy the intension at the world in question). The readershould not mistake the Content for the reference(extension). It is temptingto do so, because the content is stable, i.e. it is a constant function on possible worlds and hence is the referent. But the collapse of content into referencein the case of rigid designatorsis by no meansan argumentfor the dispensabilityof the content. Indeed though 'H20' and 'the substance scientist Z first analyzed' may be extensionally the same, putting them in the scope of a modal operator revealsthe difference. So far 'water' shows a behaviourwhich is 'isomorphic'to indexicals like 'I', 'Now', etc. But there are more similaritiesto come. First, the Putnamian dillema, according to which English speakers don't know the meanings of their language-words, is given an elegant solution. Englishspeakersfail to graspthe content of the word 'water',this is what the experts are to tell them. Yet, communication is not based on expertise. Communication requires mastery of the linguistic meaning,the rule that allows the speaker,in a given
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context, to assign an intension to a given word. This is the character,and all Englishspeakers masterthe characterof 'water',namely the set of phenomenal markers(this is what Putnam calls 'the stereotype'. Yet his notion is not tied up to the crucialfactor, i.e. that the stereotypemust be a rule which fixes contents (intensions) in contexts of use). This solution of Putnam's dillema shows up in indexical cases per se. Suppose that I say 'Today is my birthday'. Yet I may fail to graspthe content of my utterance,namely, that the 20.6.80 is my (Almog's) birthday. This by no means shows that I am linguisticallyincompetent, if I know that 'my' refers to the one who speaks and 'today' to the day of utterance.I am simply ignorantof the date,just as I may be chemicallyuneducated. Secondly, Putnam's conclusion "meanings are not in the heads", is ambigious. The ambiguity is due to the bifurcationof the Fregeanconcept of Sinn. Meaningsin the sense of contents are not in the heads, indeed in the case of NKT, most of the speakersof Englishdo not have an access to the contents of terms like 'water', 'salt' or 'beach'. However, Meaningsin the sense of characters,are in the heads. They are the linguisticknowledgewhich allows linguistic communication. Moreover they are what behaviour and action attach to. Here too, we find a perfect parallelismwith classical that behaviour indexicals. Indeed Kaplan and Perryhave arguedpersuasively, and action go with character.The following passage from Perry, (1977) is a good representative:
Whenyou and I have beliefs under the common sense 'a bearis about to attackme' we behave similarily.We both roll up in a ball and try to be as still as possible. Different thoughts apprehended,same senses, same behavior.When you and I both apprehend that I am about to be attackedby a bear, we behavedifferently.I roll up in a ball, you run to get help. Samethoughtapprehended, differentsenses,differentbehaviors.
NKT display the same characteristics. The behaviourof the Oxfordiansand Cambridgiansin our story will be tied up to the CHARACTER not the CONTENT. They will have the same psychological states when thinking how not to be thirsty or how to swim properly, though, as a matter of fact, they will drinkdifferent liquids and swim in differentliquids. Thirdly, NKT involve what Kaplan has called 'singularpropositions'. Indeed just like 'I', they bring into the proposition (content, intension of a sentence) the object itself, not the object-under-a-concept. At this stage, I would like to point out a shortcomingin Putnam'spresentation.He says (Putnam, 1975, p. 231) that the indexicality of 'water' can be explained in terms of a scope distinction:
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(Vw)(Vx) x E w, (x is water x is the same liquid as the entity referredto by 'this' in the ACTUALWORLD) This seems to me both wrong and against Putnam's own intuitions. The attempt to explain indexicality and rigidity through scope distinctionsis the Fregean response to the theory of reference of Putnam-Kripke-Kaplan (see Dummett, 1973, p. 128). More recently Dummett countered Kaplan's treatment of 'actual' as an indexical by proposing that 'actual' has always a wide scope, (Dummett, unpublished)). The way to refute this position is to duplicate argumentsgiven by Kaplanand Kripkein the case of indexicals and names, respectively. Indeed just as Kaplan asks his readerto consider: (Kaplan,1977, p. 40) (A) He lives in Princeton,
whether what is said would be true under different circumstances,and just as Kripke(1980, pp. 11-12) regardsrigidityas arisingalreadyin (B) Aristotlewas fond of dogs (to be readtenselessly),
the presentreaderis askedto consider: (C) Wateris missingfrom the state's reservoir,
and contemplate about the truth value of what is said in (C) in different circumstances. The point is that wi-th all three cases, what is relevant to the evaluationin other circumstancesis what is saidhere, not what would have been said had it been uttered there. Yet, no modal operators are involved, so scope distinctions are irrelevant.The only sensible way is to acknowledgethat indexicals, propernames, and NKT bringinto the propositions the extensions (objects, in our case themselves.In the case of NKTlike 'water' or 'tiger' this is more problematic than with indexicals and proper names but for independent reasons: The references are not simple single objects. We may have to worry about divided reference (with mass terms) and sets of individuals(with count nouns) and decide whether the reference is a substance,a nature,an essenceor whathaveyou. Butthis is an independent issue. Similarscepticism can be raisedwith individuals: Are they space-time points? The matter occupying these points? Is the object only the physical body? Yet, independentlyof the answer,we would say: indexicalsand proper names bring their referentsinto the proposition. Similarly,we can say that of
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NKT without having a final metaphysical doctrine as to what are these referents. Fourthly, just as with indexicalsand propernames, we have a new class of analytic sentences which express contingent propositions. 'I am here now' is true in virtue of the languageand I and other speakersknow it a priori.Yet, with a cover on my head (being kidnapped)and with no watch, I may fail to grasp the contingent proposition expressed. 'Waterhas such-and-such phenomenalproperties'(say, transparent,being a liquid, filling rivers,etc.) is a prioritrue because the reference-fixer just stipulatesat the dubbingcontext, just as his fellow does in Kripke'smeter case. Actually, there is a double a prioricity here. 'I am here now' is a priori in virtue of the semanticsof the language.'The bar is Paris= one mater'is a prioriin virtueof specialepistemic relations at the dubbing event. Our 'water' case seems to have both characteristics. The special epistemic relation is secured at the context of the dubbing.But what about the semanticsof the language? Let us look at 'A bachelor is an unmarriedman'. Here too, the one who defined 'bachelor' enjoyed the special epistemic relation. But what about us, speakerswho live generationslater? We seem to enjoy a similarstatus, though, due to the semantics of English and not to the epistemic relation that the word-originator had. But, isn't the case with 'water' the same? To be linguistically competent is to be able to communicatewith your fellow native speakers and display knowledge of linguistic meaning. But this sentence about 'water' is just that!!!, it is the characteror Putnam'sstereotype, that any speakermastersin orderto communicate. Now that some argumentshave been given to supportthe claim that NKT are indexical,we may wonderhow to representthis fact in a formalsemantics of an intensional logic. It seems to me that the crucial observationat this stage is that NKT, as other indexicals,referback to some establishedcontext of use. The back-referenceof indexicals is another way of putting their directly referentialnature. Now, different indexicals refer back to different aspects of the context: 'I' to its speaker, 'Now' to its time, 'here' to its spatial location. Propernames (as I am about to arguebelow) and NKT are more complicated backward-looking mechanisms(to use a happy phrase of Esa Saarinen).Roughly, assumingthe causal theory of reference, NKT refer back to the context in which they were introduced. (I leave out proper names, as I will discuss them in greatdetail later). Pureindexicalsalso have a causal element in their reference conditions. However,it is so obvious that
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the causalfactorsseem to becomeinteresting namesand only with proper NKT.Indeed,all the denotations of pureindexicals stand,in a context,in a causal relation to the userof the indexicals. I agreethat thereis a difference in the relation betweenthe reference of of 'now'(andsurely'actually') andthe reference 'you' andthe speaker and the speaker. In the lattercase the causation is not whatwe understand by causation betweeneventsin the physical world,as somesort of (physically real)signalsending. sensewhichabstracts Yet, in a moregeneral frompurely the presenttime and the actualworldare epistemically physicalrelations, presentfor the the speaker2. The pointto noticeis thatwithpureindexicals the causalfactor does not appearat the semantic level but ratherat the epistemic level. Thus in givingthe semanticvalues of indexicals,their are so prominent references and immediate in the context (they form the of speaker, context,if it is ann-tuple thatwe don'tneedto make audience...) use of the special epistemic-causal factor,thoughin considering propositional attitudesinvolving embedded sentences with indexicals one mustmakeuse of these epistemicrelations(as Kaplanhimself,who is very reluctant to introducecausal factors into his semantics, admittedin his John Locke see Kaplan lectures, (unpublished)). Yet, withNKTthe causal factorbecomes at the semantic levelbecause crucial NKTlookbackward to a contextwhich is not the presentone, but only one with whichthe presentone is causally connected. In Kaplan's logic of demonstratives, indexicals get semantic values relative to two parameters: contextandcircumstance, withthe circumstance beingan ordered pairof timeandworld:
[I] c, (t, .) = S (c) ,
[NOWpjC,(t,w)=I iff [pIc,t0 (c),w) 1 [ACTUALLY (p]c, (t, w) = 1 iff [UP] c, (t, wo (c)) = 1
Where S, to andwo are functions takingthe contextas argument andgiving its speaker, time and world(respectively) as values.(I omit indexing of the structure which has a set of contexts,worldsand times as members. See Kaplan (1978).) But now, in the case of NKTwe have seen that reference is not to the presentcontext,but to the contextof the dubbing. In the formal semantics of intensionallogic, one operatorwith greatergenerality than 'now' or had been suggested. 'actually' It wasthoughtof in the contextof tenselogic,
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whereone wantsto refernot only to the presentmoment, but possiblyto anyprevious moment introduced as in: earlier, Monroe nowthathe didn't Anyonewhomet onceMerlyin regrets kissherthen. With'then'performing the function.Yet, 'then'refersbackto someearlier point to be found in the linguistictext in question.(For 'then' and its see Vlach(1973).) What we needis a twin of 'then'whichrefers semantics backto the contextof the dubbing. Thebeststrategy to followseemsto me the following: we add a functorB. Its syntactic To Kaplan's role is to (1978) language form substance termsout of substance terms(NKTaretakenas substanceso thatif k is a substance terms) term,B(k) is alsoa substance-term.3 Now, semantically we add to our structure4a three-place functionf having as its arguments: (1) a context; term(mentioned, (2) a substance not used); (3) a history, taking the substanceterm and the context and giving, fromthat context,the historyof uses of that termbackto the first starting we can thinkof the historyas a set contextin whichit was used(formally, of contextswith an ordering alongtime achieved by the earlier-than relation on the timesof thesecontexts). Nowwe get the clause:
[B(k)] c, w = [k] c, wo (f (c, 'k h))-
Thus we always get the value of 'k' at the actual world of the context of the dubbing(the first use of 'k').5
It should be noted that h connects, by means of a causalrelation, not WORLDS. CONTEXTS This seemsto me as it shouldbe, because the causation is betweensuccessive USES(or eventsof use)in contexts(by their speakers). Onlywhen,using f, we reachthe dubbing context,we thenapply w0 to get the referent of the termat the worldof thatcontext. A finalremark is required to clarifya footnoteof Putnam (1973, p. 710, fn. 2). Facedwith the indexicality of 'water', Putnam askswhether, just as 'I' and 'now' behave,'Water' has the sameMEANING acrosscontexts.He seemsto imply that one facesherean (exclusive) disjunctive choice:either say 'yes',but then giveup the ideathatmeaning determines the extension or
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else think that difference in extension is ipso facto a difference in meaning and then give up the idea that meaningsare concepts, mental states of some kind. Putnam goes on to suggest that the word 'water' could (in its use on Twin-earth)change phonetically to 'quaxel'.Then we would have our 'water' and their 'quaxel' with the same meaningthough with different extensions and that is unintuitiveto Putnam. My answer to Putnam is twofold. There are really two issues at stake in his argument:one concerned with the alleged disjunctivechoice, the other with 'quaxel'. Putnam's stand on the first issue seems to me to be the result of his ambigious notion of 'meaning' and the fact that he operates within an intensionallogic of the Churchian type. Putnam uses 'meaning' both as 'intension' and as 'linguistic (character) meaning' and that is the reason for the confusion. In the conceptually clear frameworkof Kaplan'slogic of demonstratives,we are not faced with any choice whatsover. 'Yes' is our answerto Putnam'squestion: 'Water' has the same MEANING(in the sense of CHARACTER). That is, in every context (or on Twin-earthfor that matter) 'Water'means the same as long as in that context, its intension (content) was fixed by 'the stuff which fills rivers, lakes...'. This by no means implies that I don't agree that difference in extensions implies difference in meanings,in the sense of CONTENTS. After all, that is my point on NKT as bringingobjects (not Sinns) into propositions. Finally, we don't have to disassociatemeanings(characters)from concepts: they are the concepts. In this way we avoid two disastrous consequences which may be forced on Putnam: (a) How is it that people in different contexts, our Oxfordians and Cambridgians,communicate on 'water'? The answeris: they have the same character-meaning. That'swhat Putnamhimself is suggestingin anotherplace: in discussionand communicationwhat matters is the stereotype. (b) How is it that linguistic meaningis not in the head of the speaker, doesn't he know his language?Answer: He does, because the characteris in his head, though, of course, he may be ignorantof the content (the character's value at a context). Now, as to the 'quaxel' case, I find here Putnam'sremarkpuzzling. The little, almost unnoticed, switch he suggests,the phonetic changefrom 'water' to 'quaxel', is what the fuss is about!! The problem arisesat all only while keeping with the same word, while changing the context. That is also the case with pure indexicals and, I am going to argue,with proper names too.
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Once you introduce a new word, the whole case changes. Suppose that on Twin-earth people use 'Pou' as one of their words. The question whether 'Pou' there means what 'You' meanshere is perfectly intelligible.The answer will be in the affirmativeif 'Pou' has the same character:in every context, it assignsto the context its audience. The case of 'quaxel' is perfectly parallel. But this is a different issue from the one involving'you' (and 'water').In the latter case, as the story goes, people used it on Twin-Earth (or in Oxford and Cambridge)with the same characteras ours, they are after all speakersof English. They didn't dub on Twin-Earth,using 'water', a stuff which they describedas 'The metal from which rings and bracelets are made'. Had they done so, they would have changed the meaningof 'water'. So it seems that Putnam mistakes two levels of meaning:in one (the quaxel case) we have the same character meaning, but different intensions (contents). In the other, charactersare taken as possible denotationsthemselves,and a word may have different characters as values('Chair'could mean what 'Poet' actually means). In the present paper I do not deal with the second, higher,level of meaning, only with the first (see, however, conclusion(b) in the last section).
2. THE INDEXICALITY OF COLOR-TERMS
Both Kripke and Kaplannoted the rigidityof color-terms(henceforth,CLT). Kripke (1972, fn. 66 and fn. 71) suggeststhat 'yellow' is a rigiddesignatorof a property of physical objects. Kaplan(1973, fn. 31) suggeststhat 'red' is a rigid designator of the color red. Putnam (1970) mentions in passing the similarityof CLTto NKTin their semanticproperties.I'll try to explore these points. Let us accept that the essences of colors are their wavelengths,or if one prefers a particle-description, the type of photons (that is, the energy they carry) emitted when the color is produced. We may settle for a less metaphysically loaded formulation by quantifying over all physically possible worlds and saying that in all of them a color C has the same wavelength (bearing in mind Kripke's point: there may be no more to essence than physical necessity). But now, consider the following two short stories from D. Kaplanand D. Scott, respectively: Story A - Suppose we are so fed up with the young people of today (especially students of the philosophy of languagewho seem to think they know everything) that we decide to trick them. So, whenever they ask us
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abouta redobject,we say: 'thisgreenobjectis suchandsuch...'. something So the new generation describes all redthingsas 'green'. Thisuseentersinto of science-fiction, the language. we (the trickygeneraNow, by someprocess tion) comebackto life after200 years.What ourold happens? (we preserved linguistic knowledge) Story B - Supposethat unknownto us, thereis a screwin the backof ourheads,whichallows, the waywe process just aswithcolorTV,to change colors.Then comessomemalicious witch andturnsthe screwa bit around, so that everything to us green seemsto us yellow,so thatwhen whichseemed we wakeup we aretremendously worried aboutourforestsandparks. Whatis the moral?It seemsthat we face the 'water'case again.Take Kaplan's story. Thereis no disputeover FACTS betweenus (in 200 years time)andthecurrent then.It is not only anextensional generation agreement. It is even an intensional the intension agreement: (content)of their'green' is the same intensionof our 'red'. The disagreement is over MEANING. Actuallya real disagreement emerges only when we completethe story a bit: by someaccident they use 'red'to referto (our)green objects andmoreoverwe assume the truthof the (analytic) sentence 'nothing canbe green and redallover'. Thesituation is this:Our'green' andtheir'red'agree in meaning (character) but also in contentandreference. The character we share is 'theproperty of physicalobjectswhichproduces in us the sensation no causal S'. (actually, theoryof perception should be assumed. Thedescription couldbe: 'thesense data with a characteristic S'. This point is due to M. Davies). Sameness of contentis explained in causal terms: bothterms(their'green', our'red') refer backto the contextin whichtheywereintroduced. Hence their'green' comes to havean intension (the wavelength) whichis different fromour 'green', yet identicalwith our 'red'.Since they are rigid,they bringthe samecolorin any possible world,so they agreeon extensions too (granted the factsin the respective contextsarethe same.Thislendssomeplausibility to the viewthat 'Red'is rigidiff it names the colorred,not if it names the classof redthings, as some of its present members may tum theircolor).Now, their'red'and our 'green' showthe samerelations. Yet, their 'red'andour 'red'(andtheir 'green'and our 'green') differwith respectto character, content(intension) and extension.The full detailscan be captured in the suggested extension of Kaplan's logicof Demonstratives:
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[B(RED)]c, w = [RED]c, wo, (f(c,'RED', h)) [B(GREEN)]c, w = [GREEN]c, wo (f (c, 'GREEN', h))
[B(RED)] C', = [RED] C', wo (f(c, 'GREEN',h)) [B(GREEN)]c, w = [GREEN]c, wo (f(c, 'RED',/h))
we cansimply Alternatively say:

[B(RED)] c, w = [B(GREEN)] c, w [B(GREEN)] c', w = [B(RED)] c, w
of fact,that: Now,assuming, as a matter

[B(GREEN)]c, w * [B(RED)]c, w
Weget
[B(RED)]c, w * [B(RED)]Jc w [B(GREEN)J c, w # [B(GREEN)]c', w
the meaningor being Again, as with NKT and pure indexicals, grasping linguistically competent,does not meanthat one is having an accessto the content. The linguisticmeaningis associatedwith the reference-fixing phenomenal while the content consists of a physicalmicroproperties, structure now knownto most English analysis, It is an easymatter, speakers. to duplicate thePutnamian 'water' case.TheTwinearthian (orourCambridgian) shouldsimplyfix the referent of a colorhe encounters useof certain making phenomenal appearances, while thecolor(though onthe 'surface'phenomenally identical to, say,red)hasa different Weneednot assume wavelength. thatthe phenomenal identityis due to the color. Wemay assume that atmospheric conditionsor specialspectacles that all the usersunknowingly use or still some hidden Scottianscrew turnedsomewhere in our head, are at work. The familiar nicetiesof the Kaplanian show up here logic of indexicals too: sentenceswhich are a-priori true, true in everycontext (thoughnot every world), yet the propositionsthey express in contexts-of-use are An example:'Yellowis the property contingent. of physical objectswhich provokesa sensation S' (or 'Yellowis the sense-datum with property S').
3. THE INDEXICALITY OF PROPER NAMES
In the appendicesof his (1973) Kaplanposes the followingHomework
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problem: Given that tokens of 'An is so clever' in the mouths of Plato and Jackie could differ in truth-valueand that tokens of 'I am so clever' in the mouths of Plato's Aristotle and Jackie's Aristotle could differ in truth value, Kaplan poses the following question as the homework problem: "Do the pairs of twins (of the types 'Ariis so clever'and 'I am so clever')differ in the same way?" (1973, p. 496). In this section I'll try to answerthis homeworkproblem.Manyphilosophers who were interested in the special referentialproperties of proper names toyed with the idea that they are indexicals.Most importantto my discussion is the attitude of Kaplan and Kripke, because it is in the generalsemantic frameworkwhich they providedthat I want to examine the question. In the main text of 'Namingand Necessity' Kripkeassumesthat each name has a unique bearer. However, in the introduction to this essay (Kripke, 1980) he remarksabout the relevanceof the existence of many objects with the same name to the question of rigidity.Apparently,Kripkeanswersobjections which regardedthis fact as a refutation of the rigidity thesis. Let me, right from the start, disassociatemyself from these positions. My intentions run to the opposite. However, intentions aside, let us agree that if proper names are indexicals then either a weak or a strong positive relation holds between their being indexicals and their rigidity: the weak thesis is that if names are indexicals this is COMPATIBLE with their being rigid, that is, if independent arguments support their rigidity (such as Kripke's), their indexicality will not block the rigidity thesis. The strong thesis is that the indexicality of proper names automatically guaranteestheir rigidity. I use the vague phrase 'automatically' because, actually, the strong thesis bifurcates into two sub-theses.The first, which I shall call the strong thesis, is: if names are indexicals then they are rigid, because all indexicalshave a stable content (rigidity). Underthis view all indexicalsare rigid,though by no means is it suggestedthat the converseholds. Thus it is assumedthat there are independent reasons(other than rigidity)for names to be indexicaland, since they are, they are also rigid. However, had these reasons fail to exist (as Kripkeand Kaplanactuallythink), nameswould still be rigid. The second thesis, I shall call the Ultra-strong thesis: a term is rigid iff it is indexical. Hence the indexicality of names is the best guaranteefor their rigidity. Accordingto this conception all rigidterms are indexicals.By 'terms' I refer to naturallanguagewords, not variables(actually, I think that variables too satisfy this ultra-strongthesis if treatedeither on the propername model
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or the demonstrativemodel. However, consideration of formal languagesis beyond the scope of the paper. For the same reasonI will not argueabout the propertiesof numerals).In a way, the argumentsin this paper try to sustain the ultra-strongthesis, but I still have some hesitation between it and the strongthesis (see howeverthe next section). In any case I hope that this hesitation of mine between the strong and ultra-strongtheses will put the arguments below in the right perspective, eliminating any suspicion that my argumentsfor the indexicality of names show that I belong to the unfaithful.On the contrary,it may show that I am more orthodox than the pope. Besides this point, Kripke does not present any argument against the indexicality of names, although the suggests that we regard names like 'Aristotle'to be homonymous. However,he adds two furtherpoints which do anything but disassociatehim from the strong thesis: First he suggeststhat (1980, p.9)
In practice it is usual to suppose that what is meant in a particular use of a sentence (containing a name, J. A.) is understood from the context. In the present instance ('Aristotlewas fond of dogs', J. A.), that context made it clear that it was the conventional use of 'Aristotle'for the greatphilosopher that was in question.
Secondly, Kripkesays (1980, p. 9):

the question (whether names are rigid, J. A.) is entirely unaffectedby the presenceor of (1) ((1) = Aristotlewas fond of dogs, J. A.). absencein the languageof otherreadings For each such particular readingseparately, we can ask whetherwhatis expressedwould be true of a counterfactualsituation iff some fixed individualhas the appropriate property.
This is perfectly in line with indexicals. To ask whether 'I' is rigid or not is vacuous. We take 'I', set it in a context, and then ask whetherin that context its content is stable, whether in every world (circumstance)it has the same referent. WhatKripke describesin the case of names is the heart of the twodimensional semantics of indexicals. There is no direct route from the linguistic symbol to the referent (be it an object for a name, or a truth-value for a sentence). We have two steps: First we get what is said (Kaplan'sterm. Kripke's term is: what is expressed) and then of it, ask whether it holds in other worlds (in case we have a sentence at hand) or whether it is the same object in other worlds (in case we have a name). To use Kaplanian terminology, modal propertiesare operatorson CONTENTS which is exactly Kripke's point with respect to rigidity. Thus as far as this representsthe Kripkean view, it seems to me that his formulation of his position with
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namesfits to the last pointthe indexical respectto 'ambiguous' paradigm. Thus,I wouldsay, Kripke's positionis at leastto adhere to the weakthesis, in his viewwhich that thereis nothing thoughit seemsto me safe to suggest thesis.6 blocksthe strong As for Kaplan, he devotesthe wholelast sectionof his treatise (1977) to to propernames.Basically, Kaplanholds a positionwhichis very similar Kripke'sstand. Kaplansuggests and that that namesare reallyambiguous thoughthe context has a rolein theirsemantics, it is unlikethe role it has withpureindexicals, but rather asits rolewithambigious words or like 'bank' 'ball'. Kaplan regards propernamesas havingboth a stablecontent and a stablecharacter. seemsto holdthe following Kaplan methodological position names involve a (Kaplan,Personalcommunication): subtle causal Proper theoryof reference. to him, complicates This,according theirsemantics. He of indexicals agrees that,whiletreating in propositional occurrences attitudes' to the epistemic factorthatexists(theirdenotations stand contexts,reference in a certaincausalrelation to the speaker) in causal chains maybe necessary. Yet, in formulating their semantics withoutconsideration of propositional theirtreatment free of any epistemological attitudes, can remain factorthat causalchainsbringin. Proper namesareunlikeindexicals in that eventheir simple semantics(that is, without propositional attitudes)requirecausal chains.Therefore his adviceis to proceed to the of indexicals. first semantics Yet he thinksthat, evenafterthe proper of sucha semantics, development on the indexical names should not be treated proper modelbecause the causal chains would bring in epistemological issues into the simple (without attitudes) semantics. on Kaplan's At this stage, I would first like to remark methodological intended to the motto. My remark is be in samespiritas the one I made beforediscussing i.e. showthatI operate WITHIN their Kripke, methodological conceptionsand that WITHINthese conceptionsone may develop an alternative viewon the indexicality of names. I fully agreewith Kaplan's 'order of theoretization' and I thinkthat the of indexicals settingof a semantics created a verypowerful formalandconin whichdiscussion of further ceptualframework referring expressions should takeplace(afterall,thisis whatI try to do in thispaper). Secondly,I agreethat propernamespresentvery delicateissueswhich of the original requirea stretching indexical semantics. This,in itself, is not them on the indexicals-model andI thinkthatto thatKaplan against treating
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would agree. The crucialissue, is what kind of extensionwill the new issues be. If it is not goingto be 'contaminated' by epistemological semantics relative to valueassignments but will ratherremainat the levelof semantic then I think Kaplan will be in full methodological contextualparameters, For instance,if nameswereto be treatedas somesort of backagreement. thiswouldbe (on the modelof 'now'and'actually'), wardlookingoperators stand. methodological in fullagreement withKaplan's on that muchcan be learned suggestion Thirdly,I fully acceptKaplan's of propositional themis absence of singular termsby studying the semantics the in studying strategy attitudes.This attitudewas the motto of Kripke's of names:first Kripke(1972, 1971) set their simplesemantics, behaviour canbe accommodated whether attitudes propositional andonly theninquired 1978). (Kripke, It does not makereference The presentpaperfollowsthe samestrategy. is made Theonlyplacein which reference to epistemic contextswhatsoever. to epistemic contexts(see below)is whereit seemsto me that my indexical of namesthrowsa bit of lighton a Kripkean puzzleaboutbelief conception semantic. is purely the discussion names. Otherwise, involving Fourthly,it seems to me that Kaplanthinks that a causaltheory of imcompatible proper namesandNKT)is somehow (for indexicals, reference
with a pure semantics of indexicals. It is here that I want to expressdisagree-
It seemsto me thatcausal incompatibility. ment.I do not acceptthismutual just as context-structures chainshave both epistemicand semanticaspects, have both epistemicand pure indexicalsemantics) (the heart of Kaplan's it seemsthat by now semanticaspects.Let me startwith the latterbecause agreement on (1977)) I canwinaneasier Kaplanian (thoughnot in the earlier roleof context-structures semantic that issue.Both sidesagreeon the crucial of pureindexicals. of a contexthasa vital in the semantics But the structure attitudes' epistemicrole when one moves to the sphereof propositional contextswith indexicals in their scope.Indeedthe fact that the embedded of a neighborhood rolein settingthe context has a structure playsa crucial 'here','Now' of 'you', of The denotations or sayings. indexical beliefs logic
and 'actually' occur in neighborhoods of the speaker of the context: the
on thishere. andmodalneighborhoods (I willnot elaborate temporal spatial, I tried to makesenseof the neighborhood model-theoretic ideain a formal By now of theseindexicals, see my (unpublished)). study of the properties and 1980) seemsto admitsucha role for communication Kaplan (personal
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the context-structure in epistemic contexts. I would like to argue that a similartwo-tier nature is exemplified by causal chains. It is agreedthat they play a very importantepistemic role in the context of propositionalattitudes, or even if it is controversial,it is at least less controversial,from a Kaplanian point of view, than the purely semanticaspect I am about to referto. That causal chains have a purely referential role, independent of any knowledge or belief of the user, is an old hat by now, at least in the KripkePutnam quarters. Kripke's discussion of 'Godel' and 'Feynmann' is aimed at this point and Putnam's semantics of NKT and theoretical terms like 'electricity' and 'temperature' uses this assumption about causal chains all along. Otherwise, how would Putnam and B. Franklinrefer to the same thing by using 'electricity' where their respective beliefs about the nature of electricity are extremely different? I think that the operator (or to be more accurate, functor) B introduced in Sections 1-2, shows how causal chains can play a purely semantic role in giving a formaltruth-definition.That is if they are argumentsof a function which shifts back a parameterof the truth-definition,why should they be less acceptable, semantically, than argumentsof functions which shift back the evaluation to the present moment, world, speaker,etc. Of course, they are much more complicatedand the shifting-back functionis moresophisticated. But this is only due to the presentnon-rigorous idea of causality,which is a separateissue. The fact that the notion of a world is more vaguethan that of an instant and the latter is vaguer than the notion of speaker,does not block assignmentsof semantic values which depend on the retrievalof the presentmoment or presentworld. With these ideas in mind I will sketch how to treat proper names as indexicals. But first, why treat them this way? First of all, they don't seem to be ambiguousin the way lexical ambiguityis. Lexicalambiguityis bound to be finite. This is not only empirically testable but also a theoretical adequacy condition on the notion of lexical ambiguity,for well-knownarguments concerning the connection between finite representability and learnability: we can't allow an infinite number of semanticprimitivesin a natural languageof a finite user. Now, take the familiar modality 'it is necessarily the case...'. Suppose someone thinks that it has no single meaning (used here as a non-technical term). That is, it sometimes means physical necessity, sometimes deontic necessity, etc. As long as the number of readingsis finite, all that can be
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arguedis that this operatoris ambiguous(for finite n, if it has n readings,it is n-way ambiguous). But if someone were to propose that in any context what the operatordoes is to quantify over all worlds admittedby the context as relevant, granting that the topic of the context determineswhich worlds go in, then this operator would be an indexical, because the number of readingswould be, in principle,infinite. This will not create infimitelymany semantic primitives. 'Necessarily'will be assigned a charactersuch that in every context, its content is the set of worlds relevantat that context. This would make it as indexicalas any pure indexical. Are proper names different? I think they are not. Is there any limit on the number of objects to be called 'Aristotle'?Well, in a way, there is, namely, the number of objects in the universe.Yet 'I' fares the same!!. If there are an infinite numberof individuals(infinity of whatevercardinality,but 80 will do), then 'I' and 'Aristotle' may have infinite references. If the universeis finite, they can name only finitely many objects. So far so good for names as indexicals. Yet the point just made is not only idealizatory, it is, as a matter of fact, false in a way. The reason is this: The referencesof 'I' can only be agents who can speak (use a language). I don't mean to say that stones and lions could not have been such agents(though I don't believe that they could, it would have violated their essences). My point is simply independent of what could have been the case. Herewe are, some thousands years after languagehad been invented, with a potential of a few millions of speakers, and we have indexicals not from yesterday!! Now, even if we exclude numbers,sets, propositions,moments and worlds from being denotations of names, it is easily seen that the numberof objects which could have been dubbed is far greater. Here, of course, what could have been named is relevantbecause there is nothing in the essence of objects of the kind we consider to make them non-nameable. So it seems that names fare even better than pure indexicals as indexicals, if this was supposedto be an argumentfor regarding them as ambiguous. With certain names runningwith a very high frequency (Jones, Smith) or else, first names which really exemplify an almost uncontrollableproliferation, only the context-of-use can make clear what is said and thus clear the way to ask of IT, whetherIT could have been so-and-so. Given a semantic value assignment, we first assign a content (in the context). To achieve that we must locate the object referredto by the name. Thus, when we face an occurrenceof a name, however deeply embeddedin a
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large sentence, it will refer back through the causal chain to the original context-of-dubbing. There we must check the current state of facts (the actualworld of that context) and see which object has got the name. Under the present suggestion the causal chain is not as mysterious as it seems: the chain starts at the present context and picks up all contexts in which uses of the name occurred.Now each context has a time, since use of languageoccurs in space-time. In the model theory of indexicals, we have a function to, mappingthe context to its time. So if we have the list of all these contexts, we also have their respectivetimes. Now the set of times is ordered. Without going into details, let's assume that time is integral and to the right. This leaves linearly ordered to the past (that is non-branching the ordering of the future open. I linearizethe past, in order to avoid complications, but as far as I know, no argumentsfrom the tense-logicalanalysis of natural languages seem to contradict this assumption. Time is integral because we have indexicals like 'yesterday'and 'tomorrow'in the language). sense7) back This orderinggives us a nice chain (in the formal-mathematical to the first context. All this is incorporatedin the B-operator: [B(Aristotle)]c, w = [Aristotle]c, wo (f(c,
'Aristotle', h)
Different values of c may give rise to different semanticvaluesof 'Aristotle', though, of course, for a given c it is rigid. So names have a stable content (rigidity) but an unstable character.Yet, they lack descriptivemeanings,so phenomenon: theircharacter is hardto follow. However,wedo havethe familiar an a priori character which expresses a contingent proposition, 'Aristotle' refersto Aristotle. This sentence is true in all contexts: in any context, it (the propositionit expresses at THAT context) is true in the actualworld of that context. However, each of these propositions is contingent. It is worth noting that this sentence is a specialcase of TarskiT-sentences: 'snow is white' is true iff snow is white Its a-prioricity, though contingency, has been studied by R. Thomason (unpublished). So the homework response is: the cases may differ with respect to epistemologicalissues, and I do think that indexicals have a vital role in the explanation of the languageof thought (Kaplan'sterm for direct discourse). Yet, at the semantic level, proper names seem to fit the indexical paradigm.
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but they areall due to the different Thereare certainsemantic differences, type of back-reference, a difference whichis fullycaptured by the respective for the language. in the truth-definition clauses of propernamesto a puzzle I shall now try to applythe indexicality I must qualifythe remarks below introduced by Kripke(1978). However, areasidefromthe issuesdiscusin fourimportant ways:First,theseremarks Their sed in the paperandin this senseverytentative. reasonableness stands or fallsindependently of any otherpointmadehere.Secondly, thisis by no cancopewithproposimeansan attemptto claimthat the presentapproach of the vexing tionalattitudes contexts.I amfullyaware whicharise questions with the Kaplanian in these contexts and hence stick to my agreement methodology mentioned above. Thirdly, these remarksshould not be to morethana tiny bit of the issuesraised construed as applying by Kripke's in I intendto referonly to one specificissueof the manyinvolved analysis. do not implythatthereis this puzzle.Last,but not least,my critical remarks no puzzle. Undercertainqualifications (which follow, if I am right),the puzzle,asKripke says,is a puzzle. wholivesin Paris. is a Frenchman Let me sketchin shortthe puzzle.Pierre He hearsfromhis Frenchfriends marvelous descriptions abouta distant city, that 'Londres est jolie' (note that calledin French'Londres'. So he believes Kripke'spuzzle refersonly to de-dictocontexts). LaterPierremoves to Londonandgets a housein an ugly partof the town.Learning English from his friends (in the 'directmethod'to use Kripke's he now assents phrase) to 'London is ugly'.Kripke to the effectthatPierre offersconvincing arguments didn'tchangehis mind and (undera certainlogicalidealization) he is not logicallyincompetent: had it been a questionof logic for him, he would dissentfromthe conjunction of the beliefs.FromthisKripke draws the truth of: Pierrebelievesthat Londonis prettyand Londonis not pretty. In doingso he relieson two principles: on reflection, If a normal to (DISQUOTATION) English speaker, assents p, thenhe believes thatp. If a sentenceof one language (TRANSLATION) expresses a truth in that language, then any translation of it into any other language also expresses a truth (in that other language).
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Since my remarksdo not criticizethese principlesand since I accept Kripke's justification of their reasonableness, I shallnot discussthem. Now Kripkehas a version of the puzzle which applies without the use of the principle of translation and within one language, English. Our subject, Peter, learns that a certain man who is describedto him as a famous Pianist is called 'Paderewski', so he assentstoo: Paderewski is a famouspianist Later, in a different circle, he learns that someone called 'Paderewski' is a famous Polish statesman.Peter does not think that statemencan be talented musicians.So he assentstoo: Paderewski is not a famous pianist. Here too I accept Kripke'sargumentsto the effect that no changeof mind or lack of logical acumenare the reasonsof the puzzle. I think that the two cases present different problems. Their difference is not due to the translation process. To exhibit this, I'll cast Pierre'scase in English, and then I'll discussthe originalstory. Acceptingtranslationand disquotation, none of the argumentswhich Kripkeconsiders as possiblerefutations apply to my criticism. The problem seems to me of a differentnature: given a perfect translation, the name in question (I refer to a unique one since translation is non-problematicfor my argument),call it 'Lond', is an indexical. In the case of Pierre,the name DENOTEStwo different objects in two different contexts-of-use(mind you, in both contexts it is rigid!,that is, given a context, the content of 'Lond' at that context is stable). In the Parisiancontext it denotes one object, call it A and in the Londoniancontext it denotes an object B. What are the relationsbetweenA andB? It is hard to tell from the story. There are two extreme cases. One is that of 'Aristotle' with Plato's 'successor' and the ship magnate as our A and B. The other extreme case is identity. Our A and B are by no means identical!! On the most plausible reconstruction of Kripke'sstory, A is, say, the area of Hyde park, Chelsea, Belgraviaand Kensington.B, for instance, may be one of the polluted, constantly under smog, industrialareas.It would be very charitable to allow even, A n B * 0 (while requiringstill A = B) because in Kripke's story, in Parishis friends tell him about those famous tourist sites (without having been to any of the areas of B, because then Pierrewould hesitate to attribute pulchritude) while in London, Kripke himself asserts that Paul
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never leaves his neighborhood. So it seems more reasonableto requirethat A n B = 0, though I'll arguebasing myself on the charitablealternative.(The reason I stress this point is that the issue depends on which attribute is at stake. Attributions of Pulchritudeare made with respectto a generalimpression, few neighborhoods won't count. With other properties it would be would much easier to be charitable,because a singleor few counterexamples sufflce.) Now then, A and B are not the same objects and since names are rigid, 'Lond' will have a different content in the two respectivecontexts. All this rests upon (ironically?)Kripkeanarguments: (x)(y)(x Togetherwith:
(x) El (x = x)
y A Fx D * Fy)
gives us: (x)(y)(x =y D E x =y) and in our case (that) O x y, which is exactly like saying that 'Lond' in one context, and 'Lond'in the other, have different contents. No reference to translation was made. To be sure, consider an English boy Tom who was bom in one of the places in B, say somewherein Surrey Docks. Growingup in his neighborhoodhe never crossed the Thamesto the north. Now, echoing Holywoodianmovies, one day someone arrivesin a big American car in Tom's neighborhoodand chooses him to become an actor. Tom moves to Holywood and becomes a famous star. After some years he arrivesin a city which seems to him very pretty. From his hotel he looks the name of the place from his Chelseaneighbors at Hyde park, etc. Learning he assentsto the negationof what he assentedin his childhood. That'sKripke position. My explanation is that the name denotes in the different contexts a different entity. These examplescan be multipliedfor namesof countries,rivers,mountains. (Think for instance of someone seeing the Everest from two different sides. Then it seems that 'Everest'may very well be indexical. Those who use it as they leamed it from those who denoted its Chinese side denote a different object than those who leamed it from the Indian villagerson the other side. Of course the two objects may overlapto some extent, they are spatiallyvery
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near, etc. but they are still different objects.) This situationis bound to arise with namingsof objects whose boundariesare large enough to allow subsets which either partially overlap or do not overlap at all. Most of the objects we name are such problematicentities but with one exception: livingbeings like animalsand humanbeings. Thus in constructingsuchpuzzles we should be very cautious to secureone denotation acrossall contexts. So, as it stands,Kripke'spuzzle seems to me to be in trouble with the indexicality of 'Lond' (provided my argument is sound). The question now is: what about individualslike human beings? Ignoring again translation issues, let us concentrate on the Paderewskicase. Here things can't be explained in this easy way. Whenthe name applies,IF it applies, it capturesthe whole. Herewe don't have causalchainsgoing back to two different objects. But wait!! the last two sentencesare too loose. It IS true that 'Paderewski' capturesa whole person and it IS true that in the two cases in which Peter got the name, if he were to follow the intentions of those from whom he got it, his uses (in the two cases) could be traced by two causal chains to the same object. But did Peter follow in both cases the intentions of those from whom he got the name? I claim that, in the second case, he DIDN't. Peterdecided, in a way, to introduce the name with a different referentialintention. Thus he really got himself involved in a dubbing,decidingthat 'Paderewski' is not going to be connected with the original object which it named. Of course, this is different from cases in which I say: Let'scall the Governorof California "Bozo" Let me presenta case in which the deviationfrom the originalintentions is itself intentional. Suppose that I have heard from people about a famous philosopher called 'Jaakko Hintikka' and I read his works. So I assent to: Hintikkais a famousphilosopher. But now I come to Californiaand Kaplantakes me into some motel on the way to San Diego. There in the bar someone plays a guitar and sings rock songs. Kaplan tells me: 'That's a Hippie musiciancalled 'Hintikka'.But, of course, he is tricking me because the guy on the platform is a friend of Kaplan,John Smith, who happensto sing there. Of course, I don't know that. But I say to myself: 'one thing is for sure, Hintikka is not a famous philosopher'. In saying this I don't dissent from my previous assertion, I simply fail to connect the two cases8. So do I believe that Hintikkais both a
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famous philosopher and that he is not a famous philosopher?The natural reaction: of course, I don't. By the second use of 'Hintikka'I really just follow Kaplan's tricky intensions which just generated a new dubbing. So to use Kripke's own terminology in a different place, (Kripke, 1977), the second use of 'Hintikka' can be accounted for in the following way: my conjoined beliefs are contradictory only with respect to the SEMANTIC referent of the second 'Hintikka'. But no contradiction arises if we interpret my use as a speaker(Almog's)reference. Back to the Paderewskicase, it seems to me that here too the second use is of speakerreference.Herethere is no intention to make a false introduction and the failure to follow the intentions of those from whom I got the name is clearly unintentional. But as a matter of fact, I don't follow their intentions. There is a very perplexing question here: should I only refer to the reference that the speakers from whom I got the name intended to refer to, or should I intend myself to refer to what their intentions referred too? I don't have an answerto this question. However,an independentpoint can be made in the Paderewskicase: The existence of the conflicting intentions (to referto what the community refers,vs to have a speaker'sreference) is not always under control and speakerreferencesmay be generatedwithout pre-meditation.Now, only if one could guaranteethat the semanticreference dominates,he would havea point in not regarding the two uses of 'Paderewski' as an indexical. If speaker references are generated without premeditation, propernames become indexicals againstour will!! (this seems to be the case with G. Evans' 'Madgascar'). This is not the only reason that names become indexicals, for in many other cases there is an intention to generatea new speaker reference (when I call my baby 'Pablo'to honor Picasso). But still this is an important subset of cases where names which did not vary across become indexicals. CONTEXTS, If I am rightabout 'Paderewski', this can be accounted for by the semantics of B. In the second context of use, the function f taking the history of uses will go backto Peter'sown dubbing,not the originaldubbingof the statesman9.
4. SOME GENERAL
CHARACTERISTICS
It is worth to consider some general characteristicswhich came up in the previousdiscussionof NKT, CLTand propernames.
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A. A TipartiteTheory The paradigm of the extensionalist, one who would favora regimentation of naturallanguage into some variantof first-order logic and who would eliminate as sensible anylocutionwhichrequires a stronger expressive power, is a ONE-level theoryof truth.Thatis, recursion is madeas in Tarski's semantics for quantificational The satisfaction languages. for sequences predicate of objectsandthe truth-predicate arenot relativized to any parameter (like world,contextor model).In a wayDavidson's a ONE-level programis semantics. The paradigm of the intensionalist, Church's intensional logic,the logic of the conceptionsof Frege-Carnap-Church, is a TWO-level semantics. Extensionsare differentiated from intensions, the latterare thoughtof as functionswhichhave as theirvaluesthe former. Meaning is identified with intensions:an individual concept for a singularterm, a propertyfor a predicate (or to be more general, an n-placerelationinintension for an nplace predicate)and a proposition for a sentence.The Truth-definition is relativized to a model, or its intuitivedescendant, a possibleworld.One shouldbe cautious at this stage:Thedefinition of truthrelative to a modelis typical of the early work on applied(to natural language) modeltheory. Laterversionsare more sophisticated: Kripkeand Montague arguedfor a truth-definition relativeto worlds,not models.Still later, truth-definitions have been givenrelativeto a pointof reference. But as the elegantsystems of Scott and Montague show, the Fregeanparadigm still prevails even in point-of-reference theories.Then came the third man, the contextualist, whoseparadigm is a THREE-level semantics. To be fair,not allof thosewho suggested to generalize the truth-in-a-world paradigm into truth-with-respectto-several-indices (thusintroducing many-dimensional intensional logic)were interested in a theoryof meaning of a natural language. Being interested here in the latter,we can regard the originsof the contextualist positionin the formalworks of Kamp(1967) and Montague (1970). Kampnotes, in the context of tenselogic,the necessityto makethe truth-definition relative to a momentof utterance as well as another momentof evaluation. Montague a departure suggests from the Fregean paradigm due to INDEXICALS: We ought to have extensions,sensesand meanings. Sensesarethe old Fregean intensions: functionsfrom worldsto appropriate extensions, but meanings arenewelements: they arefunctions fromCONTEXTS to senses. The full breakthrough is achievedin Kaplan's logic of Demonstratives
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(Kaplan1970, 1971) where the model theory has two index sets in the for the language anda set of WORLDS) structure (a set of CONTEXTS and This allowedus to havea wherecontext and world are sharplyseparated. conceptualadvance:a fully workedout TRIPARTITE theoryof meaning andcharacters arecombined. where extensions, contents (intensions) of NKT,CLTand propernamesis In the presentpaper,the treatment framework.Thus, one framed to fit this general logico-conceptual namesareindexicals could claimthat NKT,CLTandproper independently of the Kaplanian framework. But it seemsto me that amongthe existing this framework is extremelynaturalfor one theoriesof formalsemantics, who likes to assimilate NKT,CLT,and propernamesto otherindexicals.
B. Back-reference
Previousstudiesof indexicalshave established their functionas backward lookingoperators whether in tenselogic('now','Then'), modallogic('Actually') or with individual constantslike 'here','You'and 'I'. (To be sure,the indexicalslike 'here'and 'You' and 'I' can also be treatedas sentential Wemay havea positional operators. logicin whichpropositions maybe true in places,that is, it is true 'in London(thatit rains)' butit is false'in Rome (that it rains)'. Moreover, we mayhavean Egocentric logicin whichpropositions are trueat things,'I am in Oxford'is trueat Scottbut falseat Kaplan. Undersucha conception the proposition is nothingbut the predicate (Being in Oxford)very muchlike Quine'ssuggestion on how to explainvariables away (Quine, 1966). Howeverthere are some ontologicalreasonsnot to followthis way. While one is reluctant to quantifyovertimesandworlds in the objectlanguage, quantification overindividuals and positionsseemsthe of quantification). backbone to the view suggested According in the presentpaper,NKT,CLTand propernames are also back-reference meachanisms. Whatis uniquewith them is the sort of backreference that they introduce, namely,to the context of the dubbing, a property whichis captured uniformly for all three typesof termsby theB-operator.
C. Knowing the Meaningvs Knowing the Content
who regarded Carnap, meaningas intension,used the phrase:'to GRASP
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JOSEPH ALMOG
the intension. But we have seen that countless examples can be given, with pure indexicals,as to the failureto graspthe content (intension). This by no means jeopardizesthe speaker'sfull masteringand knowledge of the linguistic meaning: being a visitor in New York at any stage of your drivingin the streets you know, a priori,that 'I am here' is true, yet it is very probablethat without a local friend in the car you may loose trackof where you are. At a University party to which everyone comes with a mask, you may utter to your noisy neighbor: 'you are a bastard'not knowingthat he is the chairmanof the department. I tried to argue that such cases can be duplicated for NKT, CLT and proper names. If my argumentsare sound, one may grasp(and actuallydoes it) the characterof these terms, yet fail to know their content at the context of use. D. Analytic vs Synthetic and Necessaryvs Contingent By now, the contingent a prioriandthe necessarya posterioriarevery famous. It should be noticed that it is a direct product of the formal semanticsin which I have discussedNKT, CLT, and proper names. Indeed, Kaplan'slogic of demonstratives has these peculiar (he calls them 'crazy') properties accordingto which a logical truth may be contingent ('I am here now') and using his DTHAT-functor one may get sentences which in one context expresses the necessarilyfalse proposition, while in the other, the necessary true proposition. These special propertiesof the three-leveltheory show up very forcefully in the cases I examined. In addition to the examplesdiscussed under each category, note that the famous 'Hesperusis Phosphorous'is such a peculiarsentence: in one context it may expressthe necessaryfalse proposition, in anotherthe necessarytrue proposition.10
5. SOME OPEN PROBLEMS AND FURTHER
AVENUES
I would like to end by pointing out some open problemsand furtheravenues of research.I will not discuss the question how to fit propositionalattitudes into this framework,becausethis problemhas been discussedby many others and I refer the readerto them (see Van Fraassen(1979) and his references).
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A. TheoreticalTerms Putnam(1973a), workingwithin the frameworkof his NKT theory, suggested can be explained on that theoretical terms like 'electricity' or 'temperature' the NKT model. If this is so, then the present argumentson NKT and their embeddingin a Kaplaniansemanticsusing our B.operatormay be extended. Yet, it seems to me that the extension is by no means trivial.First, It seems to me that certain delicate points ought to be made: We should distinguish measureablephysical properties from non-measureable ones ('electricity' is very different in that respect from 'Color'that Quarkshave). We should be very careful and decide whether our meta-language has the object language as a fragmentor is an invariant meta-language. Finally, we should be sensitive to the question of definability:a certaintheoreticalterm T1 may be definable in theory S by means of a term T2 while in S' the opposite may be true. This would make causalchainseven harderto trace. Secondly, some argumentsgiven by Field (1973) to the effect that certain terms have an undeterminedreference should be faced. It is important to note that Field's argumentsare not Kuhnian:He claimsthat AS A MATTER OF FACT one cannot decide which reference a theoretical term can be assigned. Thirdly, at a first look it seems that an indexicalview of theoreticalterms fits much more the Kuhnianapproachthan the realist'sapproach.If 'Mass' has two different meaningsin Newtonian mechanicsand in specialrelativity, then maybe 'mass' has a referenceonly in the context of a certain theory? But is this really true? In what sense of 'meaning'does 'mass'have different meanings in these theories? If what varies is content, then Kuhnians are defeated by realists. If the charactervaries, the Kuhnians are on the safe side. All this deservesa very detailed analysis.
B. Characters as PossibleDenotations Throughout my discussion I suggestedthat in the case of 'water' 'red', etc., the meaning (character) itself is invariant. This really makes these terms indexical: in different uses, 'I' has the same character but different contents. But why not think of the case of 'water', for instance, as analogous to a change of characterof 'I', that is, as if 'I' could mean what 'you' actually
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JOSEPH ALMOG
means? Suppose that the twin-earthianshave fixed the referenceof 'water' to be what is in our world called 'gold' and that, while fixing this reference, they said: 'The substancewhich makes our rings,jewels, etc. is to be called "water"'. Then, I think, we should have claimed that 'water' changed its CHARACTER.On the other hand it seems that in our cases it didn't. So the question here, is where is the boundary?If such cases (as the water-gold) were admitted we would have to think of a FOUR-leveltheory of meaning. would not be the last station. They would be themselvesVALUES Characters of certain functions. These functions would take words and assign them characters.Let us call the argumentsof these functions, dictionaries.Then a word may appearin variouspossible dictionaries.This capturesthe idea that a word may in principle have any meaning whatsoever. Let us call these functions, somewhat in an old-fashioned manner, interpretations. Thus a word may have: an extension, an intension, a character,and an interpretation. As things stand, all words have an unstable interpretation.This is a bit too anarchic.We could constrain interpretationsby letting all logical constants have a constant interpretation. This still leaves an enormous field for all other words. Even if that field is constrainedby syntactic conditions ('Kaplan'can't mean what the verb 'Run'means)we are still left with endless possibilities. a world Truthdefinitionswill now be givenrelativeto THREEparameters: (state-of-facts), a context and a dictionnary. All in all, this is not as bizzare as it seems. Indeed at a certain stage in the model-theoreticstudies of modal logic, a very similar suggestion had been made. Previous to this suggestion models and worlds were taken to be the same (this goes back to Carnap). But then truth-definitionswere changed so that something (a symbol or a combination of symbols) was given a value in a model (or interpretation)at a world. Now, these languagesdon't have indexicals so no mention of the context was made. But otherwise we have here the idea that one parameter (the world) is to inform us about the facts and another (the interpretation) about the meaningsof symbols. Whether an extension of the present day three-levelstheory to such a generalizedframeworkis worthwhile seems to me to be an open question. C. Meaningvs Fact and LogicalAtomism At one point of his discussion of indexicals, Stalnaker suggests that the
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379
separationof the context from the possible world may echo a logical atomist's position. He then quotes the following from the Tractatus(Stalnaker,1978):
(2.0211) If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would dependon whetheranotherpropositionwas true.
Further search in Wittgenstein'sbook allowed me to find more striking (alleged)anticipations:

(4.061) It must not be overlookedthat a propositionhasa sensethatis independent of the facts: otherwise one can easily suppose that true and false are relationsof equalstatusbetweensignsand what they signify.
and furthermore:
(4.064) Every propositionmust alreadyhave a sense: it cannot be given sense by affirmation.Indeedits sense is just whatis affirmed.And the sameapplies to negation,etc.
(emphasis is in the original. Recall that 'propositions'are our 'sentences'). Further suspicion of a possible connection with logical atomism arises from the way in which M. Cresswell has built his three-level contextual semantics by basing it on a logical atomistic construction of individuals, propositionsand worlds (Cresswell,1972). As I see the issue, two questions are at stake: (1) Is it really true that the Kaplanianframework,the three-leveltheory, necessitates a complete differentiation between meaning and facts? I think this question should be taken in two separateways: one with respect to the standardKaplaniantripartitetheory which was used all along this paper,the other with respect to a possible generalizationof this frameworkaccording to the line outlined in (b) of this section. (2) Suppose that a Kaplanianframeworknecessitates a meaning vs fact distinction. Now, the question is whether this has any bearing on logical atomism. The issue seems to me of great importance.This importancetranscends the possibility of tracing an ancestor to present day semantics(as a matter of historical interest). Indeed, the importance seems to me so great because the issue touches the hard core of all existing quantifiedintensional logics. By that I mean that existing quantifiedintensionallogics have put very little structureinto the set of individualsand the set of possibleworlds. This may be very intuitive for logical reasons, but it may be the bottleneck of these logics. The reason is that in the context of their semantics,only a nonrigorousdiscussioncanbe carriedout when issues like 'whatis an individual?',
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JOSEPH
ALMOG
'whatis a proposition?' and'whatis a possible-world?' 'whatis a property?', it may offer a way to (formally) are raised.If logicalatomismis relevant andpossible worlds.It is hard structure individuals, properties, propositions, to denythatsucha possibility canbe a realtourde forcefortheselogics.
Merton College,Oxford University
NOTES
* I am extremely greatful to David Kaplan'sendless generosityand help. Very many and very long discussionswith him have helped me, I hope, to make my way through his sophisticatedlogic of Demonstratives. I also wish to expressdeep gratitudeto Dana Scott and Hans Kamp for sharpcriticism of my views on the semanticsof indexicals. I An exception is a forthcomingwork by Davies and Humberstone.However,their to the same issuesexcept for a short touch of naturalkind work is not really referring terms and color terms. Moreover,their work is not really about indexicality. In the model and a non-designated betweena designated traditionof K. Fine, they differentiate model thus blurring the context-worlddistinction which is the cornerstoneof the presentapproach.Finally, they work out their suggestions in a Davidsonian framework and not in an intensional-logic-semantics, which as I explain in the text, is bound to be for these locutions. an inferiorframework 2 Here I am indebted to Kaplanfor his notion of 'Epistemic presence,which, he tells me, is due in turn to K. Donnellan. I We can let NKT denote specialkind of predicatesas in Thomason(1969), and then DefineB, as takinga term of categorye andyieldinga term of categorye. I See the model structureof Kaplan'ssemantics(1978). It seems to me that a better model theory for such a languagewith much more structureon the index sets (of the structure)can be given.I tried to developsucha model theory in my (unpublished). Some technicalremarks: (a) I disregard time for simplicity'ssake.The full clauseis:
[B(k)Ic, (t, w) = [kIc, (to (f(c, 'k', h)), wo (f(c, 'k', h)))-
(b) Just as in Kaplan'slogic, I omit structureindexingin givingthe semanticvalue. But of course, the value assignmentis structurerelative. A full presentationof the structure would take too much space,see Kaplan(1978). (c) A historyis a CHAIN,actuallya MAXIMAL chain.That is: a. (\tt)C(tt')(t = tV (t <t' Vt> t')) fort, t'eh. b. if s C T, ands satisfies(a) then h C s D h = s. T itself (the set of times) is non-branching in the past. Whetherit is linearor not in futureis of no importance here. 6 See fn. 11 in his (1980). Formally,a maximalchainon the set of times;see fn. 5 (c). 8 This story relies on a similarstory of Kaplan(personalcommunication) inventedfor other reasons(havingto do with the behaviorof indexicalsin epistemiccontexts). I I hope to show, in future work, how my remarkson Kripke's puzzle can accountfor some of Kaplan's belief puzzleswith indexicalsinsteadof propernames.
10
This is due to Stalnaker.
DTHIS AND DTHAT BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Almog, J.: (unpublished)'A preliminary attempt at a formal semanticsfor an indexical intensionallanguage.' Church,A.: 1951, 'A formulationof the logic of sense and denotation',in Henle, P., Kallen, H., and Langer,S. (eds.), Structure,Methodand Meaning:Essaysin Honor of H. Sheffer(LiberalArts, N.Y.). Cresswell,M. J.: 1972, 'The world is everythingthat is the case', Australian J. of Phil. 50,pp. 1-13. Dummett,M.: 1973, Frege:The Philosophyof Language (Duckworth). Dummett,M.: (unpublished)'Commentson D. Kaplan'sJohn Locke lectures'(Oxford, 1980). Field, H.: 1973, 'Theorychangeand indeterminacy of reference',J. of Philosophy70, pp. 462-80. Kamp, H.: 1967, The Treatmentof 'Now' as 1-place Sentential Operator(Multilith, UCLA). Kaplan,D.: 1970, 'Dthat', in Cole, P. (ed.), Syntax and Semantics,Vol. 9 (Academic Press). Kaplan,D.: 1971, 'Thelogic of demonstratives' (UCLAunpublished). Kaplan,D.: 1973, 'BobandTed andCarolandAlice',in Hintikkaet al. (eds.), Approaches to Naturallanguage (Reidel,Dordrecht). Draft2 (UCLAunpublished). Kaplan,D.: 1977, Demonstratives, Kaplan,D.: 1978, 'Thelogic of demonstratives', J. Phil.Logic 7, pp. 81-98. Kaplan, D.: 1980, 'TheJohn Lockelectures(OxfordMay-June 1980, unpublished). Kripke, S.: 1971, 'Identity and necessity', in Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation (N.Y. Press). Kripke,S.: 1972, 'Namingand necessity', in Davidsonand Harman(eds.), Semantics of NaturalLanguage (Reidel, Dordrecht). Kripke,S.: 1977, 'Speaker's referenceand semanticreference','MidwestStudiesin the Philosophyof Language' ll, pp. 255-76. Kripke,S.: 1978, 'A puzzle about belief, in Margalit, A. (ed.), Meaning and Use (Reidel, Dordrecht). Kripke,S.: 1980, Namingand Necessity(Blackwell,Oxford). Montague, R.: 1970, 'Universal grammar', Theoria36, pp. 373-98. Perry,J.: 1977, 'Fregeon demonstratives', Phil.Review86. Putnam,H.: 1970, 'Is semanticspossible?',in Putnam(1975a). Putnam,H.: 1973, 'Meaning and reference',J. of Philosophy70, pp. 699-711. Putnam,H.: 1973a, 'Explanation andreference',in Putnam(1975a). Putnam,H.: 1975, 'Themeaningof "meaning"', in Putnam(1975a). Putnam, H.: 1975a, Philosophicalpapers: Mind, Languageand Reality (Cambridge
U.P.).
Quine, W.V.: 1966, 'Variablesexplained away', in Selected Logical Papers(Random House, 1966). Stalnaker,R.: 1978, 'Assertion', in Cole,P. (ed.), SyntaxandSemantics, Vol. 9 (Academic Press). Thomason,R.: 1969, 'Species,determinates and naturalkinds',Nods 3, pp. 95-101. Thomason, R.: (unpublished), 'Some methodologicalremarkson semantics',Manuscript 1976 (Pittsburgh University). van Fraassen,B. C.: 1979, 'Propositional attitudes in weak pragmatics', Studia Logica 38, pp. 365-74. Vlach, F.: 1973, 'Now and then: A study in tense anaphora' (UCLAdissertation).

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Dthis and Dthat: Indexicality Goes beyond That Author(s): Joseph Almog Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophical Studies:

DTHIS AND DTHAT: INDEXICALITY GOES BEYOND THAT*

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

we cansimply Alternatively say:

of fact,that: Now,assuming, as a matter

In the appendicesof his (1973) Kaplanposes the followingHomework

DTHIS AND DTHAT

Secondly, Kripkesays (1980, p. 9):

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

who regarded Carnap, meaningas intension,used the phrase:'to GRASP

5. SOME OPEN PROBLEMS AND FURTHER

DTHIS AND DTHAT

DTHIS AND DTHAT

Further search in Wittgenstein'sbook allowed me to find more striking (alleged)anticipations:

This is due to Stalnaker.

DTHIS AND DTHAT BIBLIOGRAPHY

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