Portuguese Journal of Social Science Volume 5 Number 2. Intellect Ltd 2006. Article. English language. doi: 10.1386/pjss.5.2.

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Globalization and national identity: Monitoring Greek culture today

Yannis Voulgaris Panteion University Abstract
Among the ESS countries Greece occupies a particular place as it is characterized by a marked orientation towards conservative values, which are weaved around the concept of national and religious homogeneity. This article, firstly, substantiates this particularity through the use of quantitative tools. Then, it focuses on the apparent contradiction between an increasingly open and democratic society on one hand, and the retreat to the primordial elements of national identity, on the other. Trying to interpret this issue, the article examines some of the actual social, political and cultural processes. With regard to the later, the article proposes the idea of a cultural conservatism, which is rooted in the core of the Greek national identity as a by-product of the historical process of its formation during the long XIX century. This core cultural conservatism is materializing from time to time depending on the historical context. Today, this context is provided by the dialectic between globalization and the national identity, as well as the disjunction between State and Nation that this dialectic produces.

Keywords
Greece European social survey comparative politics political culture national identity globalization

In no other country has the public airing of the results of the European Social Survey (ESS1-2002) generated so much interest and discussion as in Greece. It has made the front page of the main national newspapers, and there have been a host of articles and interviews devoted to this topic. There are two reasons for this. The first is that it is the first time Greece has taken part in an international comparative programme of this breadth and weight. The second is that the research results have disproved some of the Greeks basic stereotypes and myths about themselves and other people. One of these is the self-congratulatory stereotype according to which Greeks are open, warm in a Mediterranean way and tolerant, in contrast to Europeans (meaning the rich European countries), who are cold, rational, calculating and self-seeking. The ESS results undercut these perceptions. It is true that as a tool surveys have well-known limitations and that they encourage and magnify stereotyped answers. Nevertheless, the result of this particular survey must come as a shock to public opinion, especially as it coincides with a period of conspicuous success for Greece. (One has only to think of entry to European Monetary Union, the entry of Cyprus into the European Union, Greeces successful European presidency, and the success of the Athens Olympics). Earlier
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Questionnaire Round 1, question D5: How about people of different race or ethnic group from most Greek people? (ESS1-2002).

nationwide studies had, of course, shown the falsity of the stereotypes, with which we patted ourselves on the back as a nation. But the ESS was the first occasion on which there had been direct and rigorous comparison with virtually all other European countries, and the upshot of this comparison was seen as being far from flattering. The data presented in this article is enough to explain why this may be so. However, that is not the real purpose of the article. The intention, rather, is to provide a cultural profile of Greece today as it emerges from the ESS by examining Greek citizens values and some of their typical attitudes as compared with those of the Europeans. Unfortunately, there are very few previous comparable surveys to enable one to trace political and cultural developments. But where it is possible, I try to do it. In the course of the article, I suggest some lines of interpretation intended to link the cultural and political changes in an era of globalization with the actual national conditions, as well as the long-term historical features of the Greek national identity.

Greece as mirrored by Europe

The analysis of values allows us to make a comprehensive comparison of Greece with the other countries of Europe. The survey sets out 21 distinct values, with respondents invited to say how far these describe them. A compression of these 21 values to 10 has been proposed by Schwartz, and it is this compressed list that we shall adopt here (see Schwartz 2003). Figure 1 maps out the countries with respect to the ten values. As is apparent, Greece holds a peculiar and characteristic position that is defined by an orientation towards conservative values (tradition, conformity), security (state security) and values of personal power and achievement. In the case of Greece, the average terms of the original 21 values in the categories above are such that they give a picture of national consensus, with internal differentiation playing a secondary role. Greek attitudes to and perceptions of poor foreigners and economic immigrants are also characteristic of the same orientation. A single (but telling) example regarding attitudes towards people of a different national group and race is sufficient to illustrate this point.1 As can be seen from Figure 2, Greek attitudes are the most negative in Europe. These attitudes are inextricably connected with the fact that, during the 1990s, Greece was transformed from a country that exported labour to one that received immigrants. With the collapse of the Eastern bloc, holes opened up in Greeces northern borders, especially with Albania. It has been calculated that total immigration both legal and illegal accounts for as much as 10 per cent of the countrys population, and that about half of these immigrants are Albanians who have come to Greece in a desperate condition. In terms of stereotypes, this has meant that in Greek eyes they are linked with rising levels of criminality and insecurity. Greece also has highly positive attitudes to religiousness and confidence in the Church (Figure 3). We should not be too hasty to draw conclusions
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Figure 1: Joint map of countries and values.

Figure 2: Attitudes towards foreigners of different ethnic group and race per country.

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Figure 3: Religiousness and religious practices.

here. The religious feeling of Greeks is, first and foremost, an assertion of national identity rather than a statement of a metaphysical faith. In answering the question Are you Greek orthodox? it was more or less as though respondents were answering I am Greek. The reason for this can be found in the way national consciousness came into being in the last years of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Greeks relationship with their religion is quite secularized and, in any event, religious belief is far less binding than that of Roman Catholicism or Protestantism. The declaration of belief entails neither strict rules of conduct nor moral imperatives. Nevertheless, the result of the ESS shows an intensification of religious belief and observance. Compared to the corresponding figures for 1989, they indicate an increase in frequency of church-going and prayer. In 1985 only 12 per cent of respondents said that they went to church every Sunday or more than once a week, and the percentage was effectively the same in 1989. But the 2003 survey shows that it had gone up to 27.2 per cent (daily, more than once a week, and once a week). In 1989, 41.6 per cent of respondents said they prayed every day, and 36 per cent said they prayed rarely or never. In the 2003 survey, the corresponding figures were 47 per cent and 14.5 per cent (NCSR 1985, 1989, 1990, 1996; Greek Review of Social Research 1996). The Greek Church, as an institution, scored high on positive ratings, even during the leftist years of the 1980s, when its cooperation with the Colonels dictatorship (19671974) was still fresh in peoples memory. This meant that up until
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The classic question about interest in politics shows a marked decline from 1985 to the present (see NCSR 1985, 1989, 1990, 1996, ESS1-2002).

Figure 4: National homogeneity. the 1990s, the bishops and clergy had to be extremely discreet about their political activities, and had to concentrate on their church duties. But with the ideological avalanche that followed the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and with the eruption of nationalism and ethnic conflicts in the Balkans (an eruption that also affected Greece), the Church was once more able to play an active political role that centred upon preserving national identity and the traditions of our land. The ESS data should be viewed in this new political context. Also very typical has been the importance attached by Greek citizens to national homogeneity based on tradition and religion. Figure 4 shows, once again, that there is a difference between Greece and most other European countries. Lack of space makes it impossible to extend this analysis, but the picture is clear. We need simply to add the great casualties like politics and its institutions and procedures.

Politics and parties: The great casualties

The ESS has confirmed that the crisis of politics and political institutions and of citizen mistrust of political parties and their leaderships is panEuropean in extent. However, the effects vary from country to country, depending on the importance and the function politics has in organizing social life as a whole, and determining social relations in each. In this sense, politics in Greece has always had and continues to retain a very pronounced significance. Thus, the demise of politics and of the ideological-political formations in post-dictatorship Greece a phenomenon that emerged during the mid-1980s and which continues struck at the organizational nerve-centre of the citizens ideological, moral and cognitive perceptions of society and the world as a whole.2 It was a decline that affected the link between official Greece and the lifeworld of Greek people, a role of strong educational values that, for most of the twentieth century, had been specifically played by the great political formations and parties.
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Questionnaire Round 1, question E24: To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to always obey laws and regulations? (ESS1-2002).

We all know how television took advantage of this crisis in party politics to insinuate itself into these same functions, but as a novel link, television has proved to be all too neurotic, fickle and excitable. Its effects have been contradictory, to say the least, and very much less coherent than party credos, if not actually conducive to disintegration. This is a phenomenon that has taken on particularly worrying proportions in Greece. Independent television was introduced in Greece only in 1989, and despite the low quality of its offering, the survey shows that Greek citizens spend a lot of time watching it in order to keep them informed. The loss of politics multiple functions is compensated in two directions downwards by the primordial structures of solidarity (family and friends) that has always been of crucial significance in Greece, and upwards by recourse to non-representative state institutions, or the Church or the police. In the survey, we Greeks have one of the most positive responses to the question about always obey[ing] law and order.3 Not only does this bring us into conflict with the ghost of Antigone, it goes entirely against everyday Greek behaviour. Greeks would laugh if told that they had been proclaimed European champions for faithful observance of the law (we need to only think of tax returns and driving habits!). But this split consciousness, this contrast of moral rectitude and actual behaviour cannot be dismissed as mere mendacity. A truth lurks within the response expresses a sense of insecurity the need for a more stable framework of daily life.

Some general cultural trends

The picture painted by the surveys data only makes sense when incorporated into a broader interpretative scheme that can encapsulate the periods main features by bringing attitudes, perceptions and values into relation with major political dilemmas and socio-economic developments. It is within this general context that citizens stereotypes, deeper perceptions and collective representations operate (whether we are speaking of a country or of various different social groups). What are the dominant features today? It is hard to tell for Greece as much as for Europe as a whole as there is a markedly unstable amalgam where experience, symbols, perceptions and emotions that are derived from three major developments are all enmeshed. The first of these developments is the neo-conservative and neo-liberal atmosphere. This has shed the aggressiveness of the 1980s, but even in its milder form it remains active at the symbolic level, fashioning a common sense, and all the more so because it feeds on the policies of globalizations central institutions (see Almeida 1988). The second development is the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall. As well as dramatically weakening the potency of the great ideologies, this event has also affected the patterns of thought and values that the majority of citizens (above all in Greece and southern Europe) used in order to read international politics and to evaluate events. The third development consists of the new conditions set by the first years of the new millennium, such as economic recession, 9/11, the international
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crisis and the war in Iraq, the contradictions of globalization and the constant appeal to security measures. Thus we have come from the aggressive egotism, cynical assertion of self, hedonism and conspicuous consumption of neo-liberalism at its height, to a mild individualism that is, nevertheless, not averse to sharing in primordial collective credos mainly via insecurity and fear of the other. The rise of fundamentalist phenomena (for instance in the United States) is a possibility not to be discounted. The pursuit of individual autonomy proceeds in parallel to peoples acceptance of extreme security measures, which are often detrimental to personal freedom. On occasions, also, insecurity boosts choices that are typical of the extreme right. Macho behaviour has given way to the feminization of the workforce and society, but there are strong signs that gender and family relations are becoming more conservative. The need for meaning and for more substantial social relations is no longer to be found in the great ideologies and conflicts, but the need continues to exist and seeks its fulfilment in the everyday life of interpersonal relationships and in the assurance of the coherence of our own biography.

Some suggested interpretations

The confusion and instability of general trends in Greece is particularly pronounced. The country looks as though it is going through a phase in which the dynamics of an even more open and democratic society coexists, and yet it is in conflict with the retreat to the primordial elements of national identity. On the one hand, Greeces geopolitical horizons are expanding, its distance from developed Europe is shrinking and its actual and symbolic frontiers are becoming more open; on the other, a large section of society is reacting by turning inwards, developing communal reflexes and searching for homogeneity on the basis of national religious identity when faced with otherness. It is the second of these two faces that is most evident in the survey, for such is the nature of the tool. Yet the results must be seen in their sociopolitical context. It is a fact that at the start of the twenty-first century, Greece like other countries of southern Europe has achieved important goals. It has political stability to a degree not seen in the previous century. It has strong alliances and a strong currency. It has entered the turbulent post-bipolar world in the safest manner imaginable. Those same Greeks, who in the survey retreat to the ethnic-communitarian particular, are living in an increasingly cosmopolitan environment. They consume multinationally, they travel abroad often and in large numbers, and in the summer months they play host to millions of tourists from all over the world. They share in global mass culture. Even many of them speak a foreign language. They have unloaded the nasty jobs to the very same immigrants they say they fear, and so on and so forth. But this upgrading of Greece does not seem to be accompanied with a sense of security, whether in the psychological, cognitive or socio-economic sense. Social psychology teaches us that at times of great transformation there develops a predisposition to resist change and to stick with the
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This approach owes much to the anthropological studies on Greece (see Campbell 1964) and to the political culture studies inspired by Almonds and Verbas classic work on Civic Culture (see Pollis 1977). The following generation of Greek political culture studies distanced itself from this approach (see, e.g., Diamandouros 1983; Demertzis 1990, 1996).

world we know. Indeed, when big ideas are missing this leads to visions that make the future more familiar. It should not be surprising that citizens feel threatened by society itself, and not just by foreigners. This general context does not, however, explain exactly what form this particular negative dialectic takes or why Greece is experiencing it in such an intense and defensive manner. How could we interpret this phenomenon? To start with, we must avoid repeating unsuitable interpretative schemes for instance, the evolutionary structuralistfunctionalist approach to the analysis of Greek and southern European (political) culture.4 As is well known, this approach stemmed from modernization theory and its presupposition was a linear evolution from underdevelopment to development in the context of the Parsonian system. A backward Greece (or a backward southern Europe) was seeking to catch up with the West. As it went along, traditional cultural values and perceptions will have given place to the contemporary values of self-fulfilment and universalism. This approach has been notoriously superseded for a variety of empirical and theoretical reasons, which we have no space to refer to here. As mentioned above, transformations in developed societies are generating perceptions and provoking reactions, not even excluding fundamentalist phenomena. This fact is confirmed by the frequent manifestations of far-right populist nationalism. Hence, a different approach is needed, one that is non-evolutionary and sensitive to interaction with broader contexts, as globalization processes complicate the relationship between national and supranational, creating hybrid cultural forms and the interweaving of old and new of underdevelopment and development (Appadurai 1996; Jameson and Masao 1998; Featherstone 1990; Held and McGrew 2001). These methodological notes are useful for the cultural trends in Greece today. As the main interpretative key is, in my opinion, a cultural dialectic between the process of globalization and Europeanization on the one hand and national culture on the other. This dialectic expresses itself not only by means of readjustments, acceptance of globalized myths and symbols, consent to the countrys prospects in Europe, but also resistance, insecurity and phobias about change in our Lebensraum. The persistent invocation by one section of Greek society of the trinity of traditional values motherland, religion and family is not just a continuation or a residue of traditionalism; it is a phenomenon driven by the globalized digital capitalism. Thats why there is a very broad consensus about a united Europe a national resolve that the future of Greece is in Europe (all the more so because, to quote our national slogan, Greece gave the West the lights of civilization). On the other hand, people try to reassure themselves by evoking representations of nation, religion and communitarianism that present no threat either actual or intended to the countrys prospects. Why do the Greeks adopt such a highly defensive attitude? We might put it down to a series of social, political and cultural factors. Prominent among the social factors is the aftermath of the disorderly mass influx of
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immigrants during the 1990s. It is known that xenophobic attitudes come to the fore much more acutely when the experience is recent. There is a second, less evident factor: broad social strata that have experienced rapid upward social mobility within barely a single generation now feel an increasing precariousness. Many indicators persuade us that, along with unease about consolidating their newly-won status, there are obstacles blocking the path of this upward mobility. This refers mainly to the middle classes who are called upon to pay an ever higher price for reproducing their status and passing it on as a legacy to their children. It is unfortunate that public opinion polls in Greece have been unable to make use of income or job variables to give a trustworthy picture of socio-economic stratification. Educational level is, here as elsewhere, a more reliable variable for socioeconomic stratification, but this makes it impossible for us to make a strict distinction between socio-economic status and cultural capital. Still, the data shows that insecurity and shutting off in the face of change is due to cultural as well as socio-economic factors which is why it is so widespread. Political factors also have an importance of their own. Taken as a whole, the trajectory of Greek society is towards conservatism. This can quite clearly be seen by comparing the data from the 1980s (although these are not comparable with any exactness) with the recent survey data.5 The picture presented by the survey highlights the transformation of a strongly politicized, left-wing anti-imperialist climate with a tendency to mobilize and participate that had prevailed in the past. The decisive factor has certainly been the retreat of leftist perceptions. The powerful culture of the Greek anti-imperialist left, and the anti-American feeling so prevalent in Greek society, is hostile to globalization, especially globalization that is hegemonized by the United States. At the same time there has been a shift in the priorities of the right-wing ideologies. As soon as it ceased to have a stake in the fight against Communism, traditional Greek conservatism began distancing itself from its post-war adherence to the West and the United States, with nationalism and religiousness becoming more dominant in its ideology (Voulgaris 2001, 2004; Clogg 1983, 1993). Another structural cause should also be taken into account, as has been argued, globalization entails some disjunction between the state and the nation, both are permeated by global flows, but these are either different, or of different intensity, in each case. In Greece (and countries like Greece), this disjunction would appear to make the obligation for adjustment different in degree. The state ought to adjust itself promptly if it does not want to put its power, its geopolitical security and its ability to carry out its essential functions at risk. The nation (in the sense of national identity), on the other hand, can afford to adjust itself more slowly, or even resist. Potentially, the nation can undermine the state. So far, the resistance of nationhood seems to have manifested itself in ways that have not required the state to readjust itself.6 Lastly, we come to the cultural factors the deepest cultural stereotypes. These are of decisive importance. As I have already suggested, we
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There is a perceptible shift to the right, as shown on the leftright citizen self-placement scale (see NCSR 1985, 1989, 1990, 1996, ESS1-2002). (While the earlier surveys employ ten-point scales, the ESS (2003) uses 11-point scales, with the result that exact comparisons are difficult to make. Nevertheless, the trend is clear.) In presenting the ESS1-2002 to a Greek audience, I attempted to summarize the conclusion in the comment that Greece has made more progress than the Greeks.

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must take into account a kind of cultural conservatism that lurks in the very marrow of Greek national identity. This cultural conservatism, which has a strong whiff of populism and nationalism, came into being during the formation of the modern Greek state and nation. As a result of the Greeks victory in the 1921, War of Independence from the Ottoman Empire, which was itself inspired by the French Revolution, Greece became a national state earlier than many other European states (see Panagiotopoulos 2004). The achievement of integrated nationhood was, however, a long drawn-out process, which only ended in 1922 with the drawing of what were effectively the same boundaries as the present ones. This had been a century of several different irredentist hopes that arose at the same time as the Ottoman Empire entered its long death-throes, which came into conflict with the nationalist hopes of the other Balkan countries. By the mid-nineteenth century, romantic nationalism determined the conceptions of nationhood and of folk ways. It did not cancel out the original Enlightenment mentality that was crystallized in the institutions of parliamentary democracy despite clientelistic deformations. What romantic nationalism now produced was a non-historical perception of the nation, stressing the ethnic nature of the nation rather than the civic, and its integrative rather than liberal function. This effect was magnified by the fact that throughout these 100 years the ethnic state was virtually detached from the liberal state at various times the nation would act as if it was a powerful autonomous lever intent on urging a weak state into fulfilling irredentist aspirations. Geopolitically speaking, the historical conditions meant that this ethnic nationalism often found itself in a relationship of attraction towards, or repulsion from the West (although Greece never considered the east as a real alternative). The decisive circumstance in this respect was that the fulfilment of national hopes was dependent on the goodwill of Europes Great Powers and on the outcome of their rivalries concerning the Ottoman Empire. The Greeks developed an intensely ambivalent attitude towards the Great Powers. Not only had they a sense of grievance about their national right not being acknowledged, they were only too well aware that none of their claims would ever be realized without the support of one or other of the Powers. The twin images of the person with a grievance and the weakling when confronted with foreigners also produced a number of popular stereotypes and deepened even more the chasm that divided Orthodox Greece from the Catholic or Protestant West. This cultural conservatism is steadily reproducing itself. It is reviving and acquiring special forms of expression depending on what political or social circumstances it encounters. It can legitimize the political authority or delegitimize it. It may be the ally of the enlightenment traditions (as evidenced by the national struggle against fascism) or it may be their foe. In any event, it plays a key role in selecting and reshaping memory and tradition. It is present and cuts across the culture of all three historical

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Greek political formations: right, centre and left. This is how it managed to write itself both into the nationalist ideology used by the right to govern the country from its victory after the 1949 civil war until the fall of the military dictatorship in 1974, and into the discourse of national liberation during occupation by the Axis powers from 1941 to 1944. It was a part of the anti-imperialist discourse of the left and the centre-left during the first years following the fall of the junta, and it was also part of the increasingly nationalistic conservatism of the 1990s, as shown in the handling of the question of the Macedonia issue. This presence across the board explains why today there is a consensus about ethnic and populist conceptions. But there is also the other side of the coin to look at. Today, more than ever before, these stereotypes and this xenophobia can never provide a mass basis for reactionary movements and forces. Expressions of religiousness can never bring a political army to the support of any public figure whether from inside or outside the church who mean to exploit them. In Greece, extremist movements of this sort have never existed. Nor does it seem remotely likely that Greece will tolerate serious far-right movements of the kind that are cropping up in several other European countries. To put it another way, democratic politics makes it possible to cope with the friction and the breaches between a dynamic, extrovert democratic tendency and an ethnic and populist entrenchment that pushes in the opposite direction. Indeed, this is what emerges from the survey. Greek citizens have always put their hopes on politics, democracy, participation and solidarity or communal philanthropy.7

Questionnaire Round 1, questions E16, B32 and E22: How important is politics in your life?; On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Greece?; and To be a good citizen, how important would you say it is for a person to support people who are worse off than themselves?, respectively (ESS1-2002).

Greece and Europe: Convergence or divergence?

So what does this picture of Greece ultimately show? Is it an idiosyncratic place that goes to the very limits of being essentially different? Is there convergence or divergence? As we have seen above, much of the data show a tendency to be different in a way that is not very flattering in terms of tolerance and autonomy. Certainly, we must reckon with the effects of the nations difficult course through history, but this course has taken place within Europe and its direction was from the periphery towards the central core. It would be quite wrong to interpret the things that make Greece different in the terms of Samuel Huntingtons clash of civilizations scheme. On the contrary, and in order to conclude briefly, I shall sum up my argument by with the following words: By and large, from the mideighteenth century onwards, Greece has managed to join in all the great encounters of history, and the great transformations taking place in the group of advanced European countries. Putting it another way, Greece is travelling on the best train the world has had so far, anyway. But it has always been a passenger in the last carriage; it has always arrived late and got on the train at the last moment.

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Suggested citation
Voulgaris, Y. (2006), Globalization and national identity: Monitoring Greek culture today, Portuguese Journal of Social Science 5: 2, pp. 141153, doi: 10.1386/pjss.5.2.141/1

Contributor details
Voulgaris Yannis is the associate professor of Political Sociology at Panteion University of Athens. He is the National Coordinator of European Social Survey for Greece (1st and 2nd round). His main research interests are contemporary Greek politics and society, comparative politics of Southern Europe, globalization as the new great transformation. Contact: Voulgaris Yannis, Panteion University, Department of Political Science and History, Sigrou Avenue 136, 176 71 Athens, Greece. http//www.panteion.gr E-mail: ivoul@panteion.gr

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