China Not A Threat

Planet Debate Deficit Supercommittee September 22
China Not A Threat General

China cant deploy forces beyond its borders until 2015 Armed Forces Journal, June 2009, p. 16
Even so, the study said China could not deploy and sustain even small military units far beyond its borders before 2015. Further, China would not be able to deploy and sustain large forces in combat operations far from China until well into the following decade, the report states .
PLA force projection limited for decades Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
The PLA's force projection capabilities will remain limited over the next decade as the PLA replaces outdated aircraft and maritime vessels and adjusts operational doctrine to encompass new capabilities. These changes will require tailored logistics equipment and training which will take time and money to develop proficiency. Although foreign produced equipment and maintenance parts, as well as the civil sector, may help to fill near-term gaps, continued reliance on non-organic assets will hinder PLA capabilities to sustain large-scale operations over time. (93) A July 2008 press article on the PLAAF states: The Chinese have released photos of a Chengdu J-10 fighter refueling in flight, "so it certainly wants the world to believe that it is equipping its Air Force to project power," said Thomas Kane, author of "Chinese Grand Strategy and Maritime Power." "I keep hearing people talk about the PLAAF beyond Taiwan, but it is all fluff," [a] former U.S. defense official said.
China Doesnt Threaten U.S. Hegemony

China is not trying to counterbalance U.S. global leadership Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. xxi
China does not seek to displace the United States as the predominant global power. Its elites do not currently want China to be a global leader on par with the United Statesa peer competitor. They view their domestic challenges as too great to assume the risks and responsibilities associated with such a role, and they recognize that they lack the material resources to do so. They also fear that such a global role would divert much needed resources from national development and could foster regional backlashes against China. To be sure, Chinese leaders welcome a more multipolar world, one in which multilateralism reigns and U.S. power is constrained. Chinese leaders also want China to be eventually recognized as a great poweralthough that aspiration has very general attributes and is not well defined. Chinese leaders aspire to such a status as external validation of Chinas achievements, but they are also wary of the burdens and costs associated with it.
U.S. will remain the global leader; China cant challenge

Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 216-7 A further consideration is that even as Chinese capabilities and influence grow, the costs of confronting the United States will remain high and the benefits of doing so will remain unclear, if not low. U.S. economic and military power will not remain static over the next 20 years, even if the gap in relative capabilities narrows. And the United States is not likely to take an overtly confrontational strategy toward China, which would fundamentally alter Beijings cost-benefit calculus in its international behavior. The United States will continue to remain important (but not as central as before) to Chinese perceptions of their external security environment and the structure of the international system. Even assuming that the world becomes distinctly more multipolar, the U.S. economy and military will continue to cast a long shadow over Asian and global affairs.
China Not a Threat to the U.S.

Russia and China have not formed an alliance against the U.S. Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. xxi
Some of Chinas foreign policy actions are directed at eroding relative U.S. influence in certain regions and institutions. Russia has been a useful Chinese partner in this effort. However, relations between the two countries remain complex, and they do not currently constitute a united front against the United States.
China wants to integrate with the global community to sustain its growth Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 20
But, first, two overarching beliefs shade Chinas view of its current security environment. One is a widely held belief that Chinas future is inextricably (and increasingly) linked to the international community. Chinese leaders understand that Chinas current growth model combined with the acceleration of globalization have deeply connected China to the international community. Chinas success in accomplishing national revitalization depends on close and continuing interaction with global and regional powers, markets, and institutions. In the words of Chinas 2008 national defense white paper, the future and destiny of China have been increasingly closely connected with the international community. China cannot develop in isolation from the rest of the world, nor can the world enjoy prosperity and stability without China.3 Even in the wake of the global financial crisis in fall 2008 and the resulting rapid declines in Chinese growth, Hu Jintao affirmed during the December 2008 Central Economic Work Conference that the direction of global economic integration for China was correct and should continue.
China wants to avoid military conflict with the U.S. to sustain its own rise Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 35
Third, avoiding conflict and overt geopolitical competition with the United States is critical to Chinas effort to ensure a stable and peaceful security environment; major strategic competition or outright military conflict with the United Statesmore than with any other nationwould significantly disrupt Chinas security environment. Under severe conditions, it could lead China to shift national resources from economic development to military modernizationan outcome not desired by Chinas leaders. Chinese scholars write about the need for space and time for Chinas rise, and stable relations with the United States is critical to both. To be sure, Chinese analysts also recognize that although a stable, if not amicable, relationship with the United States is a necessary condition for its rise, it is by no means a sufficient one.
China Not a Threat to the U.S.

China not confronting the U.S. Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 214-5
Third, China has not adopted a confrontational posture with the United States, despite its discomfort with U.S. unipolar status and the U.S. democracy-promotion agenda. Even during the Bush years, Chinese leaders avoided confrontation with the United States (such as on Iraq in 2003), put effort into stabilizing U.S.-China relations (especially after 9/11), and sought to expand areas of practical cooperation (e.g., North Korea). U.S. and Chinese leaders have broadened their channels of diplomatic exchange. These new channels have resulted in limited changes in Chinese behavior on key international security issues such as North Korea, Iran, Sudan, and Burma. Chinas international behavior reflects a continued recognition that an adversarial relationship with the United States would have a very negative effect on Chinas security environment and on its ability to accomplish both its long-standing and its more immediate objectives. Furthermore, China has not sought to create an anti-U.S. coalition to balance U.S. power. Beijing has pursued bilateral ties with nations close to the United States and also those alienated from Washington. China appears to have quietly rejected such approaches by leaders from Venezuela and Iran. China has been embracing multilateral organizations that include U.S. membership and also those that the United States is not a part of. And, in regional organizations such as the SCO and EAS, China has not sought to dominate them and has deferred its advances when they have been met with resistance from regional states, including U.S. allies.
U.S. defense spending massively exceeds Chinas Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, CATO, The independent, April 13, 2009, p. online
In addition, the gap between U.S. and Chinese defense spending remains vast. The massive U.S. defense spending is equal to almost half the total defense expenditure for the entire world. Although Chinas defense spending has increased by double digits in recent years, this increase followed a period of slack spending and starts from a much lower base level than the gargantuan U.S. defense budget. U.S. yearly spending on defense is $711 billion, whereas Chinas is only 17 percent of that at $122 billion annually.
Chinas deployments dont threaten the U.S. Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office, CATO, The independent, April 13, 2009, p. online
Furthermore, the U.S. military deploys far forward around China; Chinas general military forces do not deploy in the Western Hemisphere and do not threaten the United States. The most important finding in the Pentagons report was that China could not deploy and sustain even small military units far away from its

borders before 2015. The report continued that China would not be able to deploy and sustain large units in combat far away from China until well into the decade after that. Instead, the Pentagon concluded that China is modernizing its military for short conflicts around its borders. In other words, Chinas capability to project conventional power is and will remain pathetic far into the future" thus making most of Chinas neighbors relatively safe, and the faraway U.S. very safe, against a Chinese attack.
Planet Debate Deficit Supercommittee September 22 No China threat to U.S. interests, risks exaggerated, and the U.S. security guarantee is strong
Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
AFTER MORE than thirty years of post-Mao economic reforms and average annual economic growth rates of approximately 10 percent, China has begun to develop a new generation of military technologies that significantly advance its strategic capabilities. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is developing a wide range of weaponry that enables it to project power off of the Asian mainland and into new theaters, including the high seas and space. These advances underscore the potential challenge China poses to U.S. security and the importance of paying vigilant attention to the developments in the U.S.-China balance of power. Yet China does not pose a threat to America's vital security interests today, tomorrow or at any time in the near future. Neither alarm nor exaggerated assessments of contemporary China's relative capabilities and the impact of Chinese defense modernization on U.S. security interests in East Asia is needed because, despite China's military advances, it has not developed the necessary technologies to constitute a grave threat. Beijing's strategic advances do not require a major change in Washington's defense or regional security policy, or in U.S. policy toward China. Rather, ongoing American confidence in its capabilities and in the strength of its regional partnerships allows the United States to enjoy both extensive military and diplomatic cooperation with China while it consolidates its regional security interests. The China threat is simply vastly overrated . AMERICA'S VITAL security interests, including in East Asia, are all in the maritime regions. With superior maritime power, the United States can not only dominate regional sea-lanes but also guarantee a favorable balance of power that prevents the emergence of a regional hegemon. And despite China's military advances and its challenge to America's ability to project its power in the region, the United States can be confident in its ability to retain maritime dominance well into the twenty-first century. East Asia possesses plentiful offshore assets that enable the United States to maintain a robust military presence, to contend with a rising China and to maintain a favorable balance of power. The U.S. alliance with Japan and its close strategic partnership with Singapore provide Washington with key naval and air facilities essential to regional power projection. The United States also has developed strategic cooperation with Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Each country possesses significant port facilities that can contribute to U.S. capabilities during periods of heightened tension, whether it be over Taiwan or North Korea. The United States developed and sustained its strategic partnerships with East Asia's maritime countries and maintained the balance of power both during and after the cold war because of its overwhelming naval superiority. America's power-projection capability has assured U.S. strategic partners that they can depend on the United States to deter another great power from attacking them; and, should war ensue, that they would incur minimal costs. This American security guarantee is as robust and credible as ever. The critical factor in assessing the modernization of the PLA's military forces is thus whether China is on the verge of challenging U.S. deterrence and developing war-winning capabilities to such a degree that East Asia's maritime countries would question the value of their strategic alignment with the United States. But, though China's capabilities are increasing, in no way do they challenge U.S. supremacy. America's maritime security is based not only on its superior surface fleet, which enables it to project airpower into distant regions, but also on its subsurface ships, which provide secure "stealth" platforms for retaliatory strikes, and its advanced command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and re-connaissance (C4ISR) capabilities. In each of these areas, China is far from successfully posing any kind of serious immediate challenge.
Current U.S. nuclear readiness sufficient to counter China Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security 6
Planet Debate Deficit Supercommittee September 22 Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
Critics of U.S.-China policy offer little in the way of an alternative. The United States is doing nearly everything Professor Friedberg argues it should do. His one novel proposal is that the United States respond to China's advancing nuclear capability by improving its strategic deep-strike air capability. But it is not plausible that China's limited nuclear arsenal and its minimal deterrent capability has so undermined U.S. retaliatory deterrent capability and nuclear stability that the B-2 stealth bomber will soon be obsolete and that the United States must spend huge sums to develop a more advanced strategic bomber that would provide marginal, if any, additional security.
China Wont Attack the U.S.

Only a 1% risk that China will attack the U.S. Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
China has made progress in developing a narrow range of capabilities, including missiles and submarines, which challenge U.S. surface vessels. But Professor Friedberg's worst-case assessment fails to consider either Chinese vulnerabilities or U.S. strengths. U.S. cyber-warfare capabilities, its long-range conventional missiles and its ability to dominate space-based communications systems make China's offensive capabilities highly vulnerable to American retaliation. Perhaps China could launch a surprise attack, but then what does it do on the third day of the war, after the United States has degraded its communication, reconnaissance, and targeting systems and then engaged China with its superior and secure air and naval capa-bilities? The notion that China might launch a war against the United States is the essence of the "1 percent doctrine" that contributed to many of the George W. Bush administration's costly and ultimately counterproductive international and domestic security policies.
Chinas Naval Modernization Doesnt Threaten the U.S.

Chinas naval modernization, including aircraft carrier development, does not threaten the U.S. Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
CHINA IS buying and building a better maritime capability. However, the net effect of China's naval advances on U.S. maritime superiority is negligible. Since the early 1990s--especially later in the decade as the Taiwan conflict escalated and following the 1996 U.S.-China Taiwan Strait confrontation-- Beijing focused its maritime-acquisitions program primarily on the purchase of modern submarines to contribute to an access-denial capability that could limit U.S. operations in a Taiwan contingency . It purchased twelve Kilo-class submarines from Russia and it has developed its own Song-class and Yuan-class models. These highly capable diesel submarines are difficult to detect. In addition, China complemented its submarine capability with a coastal deployment of Russian Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft and over one thousand five hundred Russian surface-to-air missiles. The combined effect of these deployments has been greater Chinese ability to target an American aircraft carrier and an improved ability to deny U.S. ships and aircraft access to Chinese coastal waters. Indeed, American power-projection capabilities in East Asia are more vulnerable now than at any time since the end of the cold war. We can no longer guarantee the security of a carrier. Nevertheless, the U.S. Navy is acutely aware of Chinese advances and is responding with measures to minimize the vulnerability of aircraft carriers. Due to better funding, improved technologies and peacetime surveillance of Chinese submarines, the American carrier strike group's ability to track them and the U.S. Navy's antisubmarine capabilities are constantly improving. The U.S. strike group's counter-electronic-warfare capabilities can also interfere with the PLA Navy's reconnaissance ability. Improved Chinese capabilities complicate U.S. naval operations and require greater caution in operating an aircraft carrier near the Chinese coast, particularly in the case of a conflict over Taiwan. A carrier strike force may well have to follow a less direct route into the area and maintain a greater distance from China's coast to reduce its vulnerability to Chinese capabilities. But such complications to U.S. operations do not significantly degrade Washington's ability to project superior power into maritime theaters. The United States still possesses the only pow-er-projection capability in East Asia. IN ANOTHER attempt to counter U.S. maritime superiority, China has been planning construction of an aircraft carrier since the mid-1980s, and it will soon begin building its first. Contrary to the worst-case assessments of some U.S. observers, a Chinese aircraft carrier will not improve the PLA's naval capability. One or even two Chinese carriers will be insufficient to maintain a constant presence in distant waters. China will need multiple large carriers before it can develop a war-fighting capability. Building many will take decades. In addition, Beijing will have to be able to construct its own advanced aircraft to go on these carriers--rather than depend on imported Russian models and supplies, an intrinsically unreliable source of military power. China will also have to develop state-ofthe-art C4ISR capa-bilities so it can defend its carrier and target U.S. maritime assets. This, too, will be a lengthy process. The PLA Navy will also confront challenging organizational demands as it attempts to put a completed carrier into operation. The requirements for effective management of a carrier and its aircraft are extremely difficult. Any carrier threat from China on this front is decades away . Ultimately, a Chinese carrier may simply become an additional target for U.S. aircraft and cruise missiles. Thus, the unintended effect of China's carrier program may be to augment U.S. maritime security, insofar as it diverts China's defense resources from its more effective submarine-based accessdenial capability. Moreover, the acute vulnerability of a Chinese carrier to U.S. maritime forces and Chinese concern for force protection will likely contribute to greater caution in Beijing's use of its naval forces to challenge U.S. interests. China's deployment of a carrier may contribute to both the strength of the American ability to deter Chinese challenges to the regional order and also to the stability of U.S. strategic partnerships. China's developing naval capabilities have yet to undermine U.S. maritime security, the stability of U.S. maritime partnerships or the regional security order.
China Doesnt Threaten the U.S. in Asia

U.S. has strong alliances in East Asia to counter China Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
THE UNITED States enjoys military superiority in the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, as well as the ability to deter the use of force against maritime states and to defend them during hostilities. U.S. deterrence and war-fighting capabilities have been the decisive factors in developing and sustaining strategic partnerships that are critical to Washington's efforts to maintain a favorable regional balance of power. In recent years, even as China has modernized its military forces and become a global economic power, the United States has consolidated these relationships. The U.S.-Japan alliance remains as important as ever to Japanese security. Tokyo has shown minimal interest in either accommodating Chinese power or developing an independent security capability, despite the constant hand-wringing and doubt in Japan over the U.S. commitment to the country's defense. Southeast Asia, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines continue to improve naval cooperation with the United States, and they have exhibited minimal interest in meeting Chinese territorial demands in the South China Sea.
Despite Chinas modernization, U.S. remains the dominant military power in East Asia Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
Despite impressive Chinese advances, in maritime East Asia the United States retains military superiority and effective deterrence and war-fighting capacities. But just as the United States cannot base policy on an exaggerated assessment of the China threat, it cannot allow strategic complacency to undermine U.S. security. Washington must maintain those capabilities that underpin U.S. strategic part-nerships with the maritime states in China's neighborhood and a favorable regional balance of power. Respect for Beijing's strategic potential requires that U.S. defense policy continues to stress advancement of those capabilities that support American power projection in the western Pacific Ocean, even as the United States prepares for a protracted era of counterinsurgency warfare. Short-term contingencies cannot preclude attention to long-term greatpower competition. If the United States maintains its focus on the multiple sources of maritime supremacy, including carrier-based power projection, subsurface platforms and information technologies, it can continue to engage the rise of China without undermining U.S. security.
Asian allies enhancing military cooperation with the U.S. Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
Professor Friedberg worries that the China threat will undermine American strategic partnerships in East Asia. But even a cursory examination of regional trends reveals that our maritime allies in East Asia are actually enhancing defense cooperation with the U.S. Navy and Air Force. Despite prolonged Japanese anxiety over the American commitment to its defense, U.S.-Japan defense cooperation is better today than at any time during the cold war or the 1990s, and it continues to improve. Similarly, U.S. naval cooperation with Singapore and Malaysia continues to improve, as these countries welcome the U.S. contribution to their security and regional stability. Even the Philippines, despite its resistance to cooperation with its former

colonial power, is improving cooperation with the U.S. Navy. The United States should be confident, rather than alarmed, in its ability to retain its strategic presence in East Asia.
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China Doesnt Threaten the U.S. in Asia

China not trying to push the U.S. out of Asia Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 215-6
Fourth, in Asia, China is not actively trying to break up U.S. alliances. It is not offering U.S. allies security assurances and military cooperation as a replacement to their security arrangements with the United States. Indeed, military diplomacy and defense cooperation is perhaps the smallest part of Chinas bilateral diplomacy with Asian nations. China is not promoting itself as an alternative security partner to the United States. Rather, it has focused on growing economic cooperation and reassuring U.S. allies by participating in regional institutions and committing to their norms of behavior, at least for now . Since the beginning of this decade, more Chinese strategists recognize thatofficial rhetoric asideU.S. security commitments play a stabilizing role in Asia.
China not trying to confront the U.S. in Asia Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdfp. 208
This does not mean that there are not competitive aspects of Chinas foreign policy that challenge U.S. security interests. Some of Chinas international behaviors are directed at eroding U.S. influence in specific regions and in certain institutions. The most competitive aspects of Chinas foreign policy are evident in the Asia-Pacific region. China is not currently trying to push the United States out of this region. Chinese leaders recognize the dangers and likely failure of such an approach, and some recognize the stability provided by U.S. alliances. Rather, China is trying to increase its power and influence relative to the United States. A core Chinese objective is to hinder the U.S. ability to constrain China; that is, China seeks to maximize its freedom of action and leverage as means of countering perceived U.S. efforts to limit Chinese choices. China seeks political influence to increase the costs, for the United States and its allies, of constraining China. Thus, China is challenging the United States by trying to reduce its relative influence, but it does not seek to confront the United States by trying to expel it. As noted above, China is pursuing this approach by deepening economic interactions with Asian nations, joining multilateral organizations to shape regional agendas, expanding bilateral interactions to shape these nations preferences, and generally reassuring countries on its periphery about Chinas intentions and capabilities. In this sense, Chinas approach is more gravitational than confrontationalpulling nations toward China (to bind them) rather than pushing them away from the United States or each other.
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China Naval Modernization Answers

China cant run the ships without Russians on board, and they wont be there during combat Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/ Every piece of equipment [on China's Sovremenny-class destroyers] from hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) technologies to guns, sonar, communications, electronic countermeasures (ECM) and missiles are totally new to the PLAN. ... [For these ships,] China is dependent on Russian advisers for training, operations and maintenance. These ships largely remain in the Russian support cocoon in Dinghai rather than at a fleet base. ... Isolation from other ships and crews hurts fleet integration and coordinated operations. ... It is no coincidence that the Sovremnyi and Kilo submarine home bases are in an enclave of Russian support in an isolated area near the Eastern Fleet headquarters at Ningbo. It is unlikely that Russian advisers would be onboard during actual combat operations against Taiwan and U.S. Navy air, surface and subsurface threats. PLAN officers and crew are not expected to be able to handle operations when under fire, sustaining hits and suffering system degradation or loss. This could include problems in night or rough weather environment as well. Because all of the combat systems, except for three noted, are modern Russian equipments, China has minimal capability even to repair peacetime losses in port. ... China cant maintain its equipment Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
What kind of record is provided by prior Chinese built warships with imported Russian and Western technology? These include sensors, fire control, weapons and communications as well as HM&E. The Chinese new-construction DDGs are a mix of local designed and manufactured systems, foreign imports with production rights, illegally copied import equipment and illegal examples with no local production capability at all. The latter two represent serious training and maintenance problems. Unfortunately for the PLAN, some of them are in the highest mission-critical areas. For example, the DDGs being built have a rapid-fire Gatling gun close-in weapon system that looks like the Dutch Goalkeeper system. Signaal and the Dutch government deny exporting the equipment or production rights to China. This key weapon responsible for downing incoming cruise missiles is probably lacking documentation and training because it must be illegally obtained. (109)
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Chinese Military Modernization Answers

Many obstacles to Chinese military modernization Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
But China's post-cold-war defense research program has not exclusively focused in this area. Since America's use of high-technology, precision-guided weaponry in the Gulf War, China has actively researched a broad spectrum of advanced military and dual-use civilian technologies. The PLA is now introducing many of these technologies into new weapons systems that are transforming the PLA's asymmetric military capability. Should these advances significantly enhance the PLA's ability to degrade U.S. operations, they could transform the U.S.-China strategic balance and have a far-reaching impact on regional alignments and the great-power security order. But similar to the evaluation of China's aircraft-carrier capability, a balanced assessment of the country's military-modernization program requires attention to the obstacles to Beijing's developing and effectively operating these technologies. There are also the clear vulnerabilities of these technologies to U.S. weaponry. And even more so, the United States can adjust its operations in response to new PLA capabilities--we are not a stagnant military. OF FOREMOST concern to many observers is Chinese research and development of a mobile antiship ballistic missile (ASBM) with a range of over one thousand five hundred kilometers. If land-based ballistic missiles could target, accurately track and then penetrate the defenses of U.S. surface ships, that would dramatically degrade U.S. power-projection capabilities in maritime theaters. As an access-denial weapon, a Chinese ASBM force has the potential to preclude U.S. naval operations in much of the western Pacific and the South China Sea, undermining the U.S. ability to protect its strategic partners throughout the region. But it would be unwise to underestimate the obstacles China faces in developing ASBMs and to exaggerate the strategic implications of such a capability.1 Detection of a small moving target on a large ocean, such as a carrier, remains highly challenging. Following detection, real-time tracking of a moving carrier is necessary for accurate targeting--this is an additional major technological obstacle. Finally, penetrating the ship's defenses would be extremely difficult. U.S. carrier strike forces can include defenses against ASBMs, such as electronic countermeasures; low-technology, cost-effective decoys that interfere with the missile's tracking capability; and basic camouflage techniques, including "fog machines." Such potential U.S. countermeasures have created considerable uncertainty and a wide-ranging debate among Chinese specialists on the feasibility of this project. Of course, none of these technological obstacles is necessarily insurmountable, and China is devoting considerable resources to building an ASBM force. The PLA may eventually develop the necessary ASBM surveillance and targeting capabilities to enable it to significantly degrade U.S. surface-ship capabilities. But China has yet to carry out its first successful public test of an ASBM. Following the first such test, China will require a protracted period of additional research and testing to develop an ASBM capability effective in real-world conditions. And even if China could eventually construct a functioning ASBM system it would face considerable obstacles to achieving wartime effectiveness. Though a mobile and concealed Chinese land-based ASBM would be difficult to destroy before launch, it is dependent on its surveillance systems. China's ground-based radar that would support maritime reconnaissance and the tracking of a U.S. carrier as well as Chinese air-defense systems would be easily detectable and degraded with U.S. air-launched missiles. Chinese leaders would have only minimal confidence after destroying the first aircraft carrier that the United States would not target China's land-based radar facilities immediately thereafter. China's surveillance, tracking and targeting systems are also dependent on its satellite capability, and here too Chinese capabilities would be vulnerable to a U.S. attack--far more vulnerable than U.S. satellites would be to one from China.2 Once China employed its ASBM capability, its antiship capability would likely be short-lived and it would have a limited impact on U.S. power-projection capability and on the course and outcome of hostilities. Thus, the argument that China is on the verge of developing and deploying a transformative asymmetric force rests on unrealistic worst-case estimates that do not reflect the limits of current Chinese capabilities; the intrinsic difficulty of designing and producing high-technology, experimental weapons systems; and the vulnerability of an ASBM system to U.S. countermeasures. China's ASBM program is not a "silver bullet" that will magically transform the U.S. deterrent posture in the region or undermine American alliances.
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Chinese Military Modernization Answers

U.S. has many options to counter Chinese modernization Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
Moreover, U.S. maritime war-fighting capability is not limited to its surface fleet, and it would be foolish to underestimate the vast array of systems the United States has at its disposal. U.S. nuclear-powered guidedmissile submarines (SSGNs) contain 154 western-Pacific-based Tomahawk cruise missiles that can target critical Chinese assets and penetrate Chinese coastal waters with minimal fear of detection. U.S. SSGNs provide the United States with a powerful sea-based retaliatory capability and a persuasive and credible deterrent. Should China make progress on its ASBM force, the United States can deploy additional counterattack and offensive weaponry on subsurface platforms, thereby negating any new Chinese capabilities.
China cant effectively utilize UAVs Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
China has been carrying out extensive research into unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Chinese UAVs could provide the PLA with an advanced reconnaissance and weapons-delivery capability. But the Chinese military lacks a secure platform for launching the UAVs. Chinese surface vessels would not be a secure UAV platform; they would be as vulnerable to a U.S. attack as a Chinese aircraft carrier. Chinese land-based UAVs would lack the range to target distant U.S. ships. Moreover, the UAV's surveillance technologies would all suffer from the same vulnerabilities as the ASBM surveillance technologies. Without the full array of secure C4ISR capabilities and a secure maritime capability, UAVs cannot significantly contribute to China's effort to challenge U.S. maritime superiority.
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China Naval Modernization Answers No Aircraft Threat

Several years until China has an aircraft carrier Breaking News from globeandmail.com, April 21, 2009, p. online
But the display of force, which is to include the first public showing of China's nuclear submarine fleet, will also serve notice that the country has arrived as a global naval power. It's a moment of obvious pride for this nation of 1.3 billion people, and one of quiet concern for some of its neighbours. Beijing also has recently confirmed that it is moving toward developing its first aircraft carrier, though that milestone is likely several years away.
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China Not A Threat A2: Aircraft Carriers

U.S. carriers more powerful and China wont build until 2020 Space & Missile Defense Report, February 16, 2009 China is planning to build at least two nuclear powered aircraft carriers, according to a report in the Asahi Shimbun newspaper in Tokyo. The only plus for the United States here is that construction might not begin until 2020 on the carriers that would be based on designs for the discontinued Russian Ulanovsk Class carriers displacing about 60,000 tons, though China will begin building two conventionally powered aircraft carriers this year. (The U.S. Nimitz Class nuclear powered carriers displace about 78,000 tons empty and 101,000 tons loaded.) China doesnt have any fighters to take off from the aircraft carriers Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
Although an operational carrier is unlikely to be commissioned soon, a source within the Chinese shipbuilding industry has confirmed that the PLAN is planning to convert the ex-Soviet navy carrier Varyag into a training carrier. The 67,500 ton vessel, bought from Ukraine for USD20 million in 1997, has been docked at the Dalian Shipyard for refurbishment since 2002. If the PLAN manages to overcome the technical difficulties involved in fitting the vessel with a new propulsion system and the necessary take-off and landing systems, Varyag will serve as a capable platform for the PLAN's future shipborne flight training programme, pending the introduction of the first operational Chinese aircraft carriers perhaps by 2020. Another major obstacle faced by the PLAN is the lack of suitable aircraft. In the past, PLAN pilots have reportedly undertaken short-range take-off and landing using the indigenous J-8 fighter on a simulated carrier deck but the aircraft's poor aerodynamic performance makes it impossible for real shipborne operations. The third-generation indigenous J-10 and J-11 fighters are potential candidates but both require substantial structural modifications before they can take off and land on the carrier deck.
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Nuclear Modernization Has Not Created Sub Threats

Nuclear modernization has not resulted in increased sub patrols Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
Twenty-five years after it launched its first ballistic missiles submarine, Xia (Type 092), China has yet to conduct its first deterrent patrol. The new information confirms that neither the Xia, nor the two new Jinclass (Type 094) ballistic missile submarines--the first of which was launched in 2004--have ever conducted a deterrent patrol. ... Implications Despite the rebound in general purpose submarine patrols, dramatic reports from recent years about Chinese submarines operating inside Japanese territorial waters or surfacing close to U.S. aircraft carriers have been largely absent in 2007. The meaning of the patrol rebound is yet unclear. After all, it follows a complete absence of submarine patrols in 2005, the fourth year since 1981 that China's submarine fleet did not conduct any patrols despite introduction of several new classes of more advanced submarines for greater reach. That modernization has (not yet) manifested itself in the form of a clear increase in submarine patrols.
Lack of patrols means Chinese subs are only for coastal defense Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
Yet for the Chinese submarine force overall, six patrols do not provide very much operational experience for more than 50 submarines and their crews. If China did plan a more extended reach for its submarine force, one might expect the patrol rate to continue to increase in the next couple of years. Only the future will tell. But the operational experience from the 55 patrols conducted by the entire submarine force between 1981 and the end of 2007 suggests that China's submarine force--at least for now--remains a coastal defense force. (45)
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China Space Threat Answers

Chinese space capabilities exaggerated Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
BEIJING'S PROGRESS on its other high-technology programs is equally unsure and does not threaten U.S. security. China is making advances in its satellite program, which can contribute to its ability to target U.S. ships. But alarmists exaggerate China's capabilities and underestimate U.S. superiority in space technologies and U.S. ability to degrade Chinese satellite capabilities. China's antisatellite program is also developing, but its limited targeting capability and American redundancy in satellites minimize China's ability to destroy America's satellite communications systems.
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China Cyberwarfare Answers

Chinas cyber warfare developments exaggerated Robert S. Ross is a professor of political science at Boston College, an associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University and a fellow of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The National Interest, September- October 2009, Here Be Dragons, http://www.nationalinterest.org/
Beijing is also developing cyber-warfare techniques, but exaggerated assessments of this capability fail to evaluate China's own emerging vulnerability to such attacks. Cyber-warfare technologies and skills are readily accessible and U.S. advanced munitions are increasingly dependent on high-technology communication and surveillance technologies. The United States is thus vulnerable to cyber attacks, and a Chinese cyber offensive against the United States could influence U.S. operations in the western Pacific. Nonetheless, the reciprocal effect of Washington's cyber-warfare capability on Beijing's ability to wage hightechnology warfare is equally significant. The same advanced Chinese technologies and weaponry that pessimists argue present a major threat to U.S. security, including ASBMs, are highly dependent on advanced communication and surveillance technologies that are par-ticularly vulnerable to U.S. cyber attacks. And once the United States degrades the PLA's advanced communication technologies, China would lose its hightechnology asymmetric capability that so alarms America's pessimists, and it would be very susceptible to a wide range of superior U.S. sea-based forces, even if the United States suffered from an effective Chinese cyber attack.
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China Not Counterbalancing the U.S.

China not counterbalancing the U.S. Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 56
To be sure, countercontainment is not the primary objective in Chinese global diplomacy or in Asia. If it were, Chinese diplomacy would likely be far more confrontational with the United States and its regional allies; for example, China would actively try to pull and prod U.S. allies away from the United States by proffering China as an alternative security partner. Rather, Chinese diplomacy has focused on economic opportunism and expanding its multilateral cooperation. In particular, it has been seeking to create
new and expand existing multilateral organizations in which the United States has a limited role but also as a way to develop a regional order in East Asia in which U.S. influence is diluted. And China seeks to do this gradually so as not to appear to directly oppose the United States or its allies. Thus, countercontainment is a distinct Chinese objective, but it does not manifest
itself in a confrontational set of policies that emphasize defense cooperation and zero-sum interactions. This objective may receive greater expression in the future if U.S.-China relations become more competitive, if Chinas regional influence grows, and if Beijing sees itself as less dependent on stable relations with Washington.
Chinas partnerships are not designed to counterbalance the U.S. Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 87
To varying degrees, China
has used its strategic partnerships with major powers, such as with Russia, France, and the EU, to broaden its economic relationships, to foster the development of other power centers in global politics, and to seek support for its vision of a multipolar global order. These major power partnerships do not amount to building an anti-U.S. coalition to balance against U.S. power. However, these partnerships allow China greater
options and help it to foster an environment that could be used to constrain U.S. unilateral actions, especially if that power is directed at Chinese interests.30 There is no overtly anti-U.S. element in such Chinese diplomacy , but Chinas discomfort with perceived U.S. unilateralism is one of the drivers of its strategic partnerships. These themes and motivations were readily apparent in the 2003 EU-China Joint Statement, which founded that strategic partnership during a period of trans-Atlantic tension, as well as in the Russia-China Joint Communiqu and the SCOs summit statement in July 2005. Chinas strategic partnerships with these major powers are bounded by two considerations that limit their potential to be potent mechanisms for balancing U.S. power. First, Chinas
interests with all of these major powers, especially Russia and India, both converge and divergeon different issues and to different degrees. There is no single, dominant political or strategic logic to any of these strategic partnerships that could serve as the basis for collectively and consistently countervailing U.S. power. Indeed, most of Chinas strategic partners are not interested in creating a de facto coalition to balance U.S. powe r, with the possible exception of Russia. These nations have numerous interests in positive relations with the United States . Also,
although there are many cooperative dimensions to Chinas strategic partnerships, they are also fraught with tensions on both economic and security questions. For example, Russia and China may have common interests related to constraining U.S.
influence globally and in Central Asia, but they diverge on economic issues and security questions revolving around access to Central Asian energy supplies and Chinese influence in Russias Far East .31
Also, for China, Russia has shown itself to be an unreliable partner in the past. Chinas unwillingness in summer 2008 to endorse the Russian position on the independence of the Georgian enclaves exemplifies the limits of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership. A second major consideration is that, historically, China has not favored or relied on alliances (or even strong bilateral partnerships) in its diplomacy. Chinas historic disposition in favor of independence and against relying on alliances calls into question the extent to which it can or will rely on them now. Although China has formed alliances in the past (e.g., the ChinaSoviet Union alliance of the 1950s), it was never entirely comfortable with them. Beijing prefers, instead, greater autonomy to maximize its leverage and maneuverability.32 This enduring predisposition is evident in the intensifying concerns among Chinese elites about the economic and security vulnerabilities that have resulted from Chinas global interdependence and the globalization of national security challenges.33 Chinas historical predispositions were further confirmed in 2001 when Russia shifted away from its emerging anti-U.S. cooperation with China and turned back toward greater rapprochement with the United States, even before 9/11. Specifically, Russia abandoned China in their joint opposition to U.S. missile defense policies. These events, thus, suggest a third possible constraint on the scope of
Chinas strategic partnerships: Most major powers have more interests at stake in their relations with the United States than with China. Some states may not be willing to jeopardize their ties with the United States to coordinate with China in an effort, implicit or explicit, to constrain the United States.
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China Not Counterbalancing the U.S.

China not trying to counterbalance the U.S. Evan S. Medeiros, RAND Corporation, August 2009, Chinas International Behavior: Opportunity, Activism, and Diversification, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf, p. 208-9
China does not seek to displace the United States as the global superpower . Chinese leaders do not want China to be a global power on par with the United Statesa peer competitor. They view their domestic challenges as too great to assume the burdens associated with such a role, and they recognize that they lack currently the material resources to be able to project and sustain military and economic power all over the world. They also fear that playing such a role could deplete much needed resources and might foster a backlash against China. For Chinese leaders, trying to play such a role would represent a major break from Dengist orthodoxy on
foreign affairsa significant but not insurmountable political barrier to a major change in strategy. Such a course correction would likely only come about in reaction to a dramatic shift in Chinas external security environmentone that precipitated a complete reassessment by Chinas top leaders. In addition, if China were seeking to become a global competitor to the United States, its behavior would look far different than it does, as discussed below.
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U.S.-China War Answers

Economic interdependence prevents conflict
Susan Shirk, served as deputy assistant secretary for China at the U.S. State Department from 1997 2000.CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER, 2007, p. 249 China started recycling the huge amount of foreign currency reserves it earned from exports
and foreign investment to buy up U.S. government debt. The primary motive is economicU.S. government securities are considered the safest place to keep foreign currency holdingsbut the political benefit of linking the two economies surely has not escaped China's decision makers. The two sides need each other nowas one Chinese writer put it, they have become economic "Siamese twins."" According to one 2005 Chinese estimate, China bought U.S. treasury bonds with over percent of its massive economy Chinese capital flows to America allowed American consumers to enjoy low interest rates and high levels of consumption. Yet reliance on China to keep our economy afloat triggers the anxiety that one day China could pull the plug. The day after the Democratic Party won control over both houses of Congress in No vember 2006, the head of China's central bank said that the bank in tended to diversify more of its Si trillion reserves into currencies other than dollars. The value of the dollar tumbled as international investors sold their dollars."' The timing may have been coincidental, but it was a vivid reminder that American prosperity and global influence increas ingly depend on decisions made in Beijing...
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Taiwan War Answers

Political barriers block a Chinese invasion of Taiwan Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
Regarding the option of an amphibious invasion, DOD states furtherthat: The PLA currently is capable of accomplishing various amphibious operations short of a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. With few overt military preparations beyond seasonally routine amphibious training, China could launch an invasion of a small Taiwan-held island such as Pratas or Itu Aba. Such a limited invasion of a lightly defended island could demonstrate military capability and political resolve, would achieve tangible territorial gain, and could be portrayed as showing some measure of restraint. However, such an operation includes significant--if not prohibitive--political risk as it could galvanize the Taiwan populace and generate international opposition.
An invasion of Taiwan would overwhelm Chinas military capabilities Ronald ORourke, Congressional Research Service, July 17, 2009, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities--Background and Issues for Congress, http://opencrs.com/document/RL33153/
Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of the most complicated and logistics-intensive, and therefore difficult, military maneuvers. Success depends upon air and sea supremacy in the vicinity of the operation, rapid buildup of supplies and sustainment on shore, and an uninterrupted flow of support thereafter. An invasion of Taiwan would strain the capabilities of China's untested armed forces and would almost certainly invite international intervention. These stresses, combined with the combat attrition of China's forces, the complex tasks of urban warfare and counterinsurgency--assuming a successful landing and breakout--make an amphibious invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk for China's leaders. Modest targeted investments by Taiwan to harden infrastructure and strengthen defensive capabilities could have measurable effects on decreasing Beijing's ability to achieve its objectives.
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U.S.-China Arms Control Answers

China wont engage in arms control with the U.S. Christopher P. Twomey co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Arms Control Today, January 2009 - February 2009, p. 17
The Chinese are not currently interested in discussing traditional bilateral arms control agreements for two reasons: doing so suggests an equating of the contemporary Chinese-U.S. relationship with the Cold War standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U.S. arsenal remains much larger than China's.
China wont engage in arms control with the U.S. Christopher P. Twomey co-directs the Center for Contemporary Conflict and is an assistant professor in the Department of National Security Affairs, both at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, Arms Control Today, January 2009 - February 2009, p. 17
There is no simple solution for this set of problems. The differences in national interests held by Beijing and Washington are not likely to be materially affected by Barack Obama's inauguration as president. That said, the unilateralist and anti-institutional approach to arms control that characterized the Bush admin-istration is likely to wane. The Chinese are not currently interested in discussing traditional bilateral arms control agreements for two reasons: doing so suggests an equating of the contemporary Chinese-U.S. relationship with the Cold War standoff between the Soviet Union and the United States and the U.S. arsenal remains much larger than China's. Yet, it is wrong to expect such views to hold in perpetuity. Beijing's emphasis on ambiguity about its arsenal, which is incompatible with serious ne-gotiations over arms control, is not a cultural predisposition toward "strategic deception" any more than was the Soviet Union's early Cold War emphasis on secrecy. Instead, these are rational strategies when nuclear arsenals are small. Intrusive verification eventually became conceivable even to hard-line Soviet leaders. Certainly, economic exhaustion contributed to that change, but so too did fundamental changes in Soviet threat perceptions.4 Although the former seems unlikely in China in the near term, the latter is something that might be fomented. The further development of those U.S.-Russian arms control discussions will have critical implications for China. If follow-on agreements to START and SORT include further quantitative reductions, as is likely, they will again move the U.S. arsenal toward an important rhetorical threshold that China has used to justify its own stance on bilateral arms control. This poses risks and opportunities. The opportunity to bring the other nuclear powers to the table, even informally, as the Russian-U.S. discussions progress would be a useful vehicle to elicit China's interest in serious moves in this area. The risk of enticing China to engage in an arsenal buildup to U.S. levels is not one that should be overstated. At the geostrategic level as well as in operational doctrine as it is understood, China's approach to nuclear strategy has emphasized elements that would be inconsistent with a large buildup: coun-ter-value rather than counter-force or war-fighting doctrines, a historical to-lerance of much lower arsenal sizes given a perception of the limited utility of nuclear forces, and, explicitly, avoidance of a strategic arms race. The United States can actively reduce these risks further. Deepening engagement on nuclear and nuclear-related strategic issues would be constructive in this regard. Bilateral confidence measures between China and the United States could be discussed, particularly in the area of declaratory policy. The Chinese have often asked why the United States is unwilling to offer a no-first-use pledge. A blanket no-first-use pledge might undermine U.S. credibility in other regions. Yet, a pledge narrowly confined to the Chinese-U.S. arena would seem to have fewer costs. What benefits would the United States garner from such a pledge from Beijing? Similarly, would Beijing view posi- tively a definitive statement that the United States accepts the existence of a Chinese secure second-strike capability? For what might the United States hope in return? These questions remain unanswered.
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Various Counterplans
CP Transparency measures
Jeffrey Lewis, New America Foundation, Nonproliferation Review, July 2009, p. 197-209
Chinese leaders continue to seek such assurances, as evidenced by the continuing interest in securing a bilateral no-first-use pledge from the United States. He Yafei, in the 2008 bilateral talks with Rood, again expressed China's interest in having the United States pledge not to use nuclear weapons first against China. (China sought such an assurance in the 1990s, resulting in the so-called non-targeting agreement signed by President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin.) Chinese leaders, in return, might propose additional transparency measures to assure the United States that China seeks only a minimal deterrent and will not attempt to move toward numerical parity with the United States as it continues to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. This would contribute to what Chinese officials have called mutual strategic trust. There are those in the United States who would believe U.S. security is best maintained by acquiring the ability to negate China's deterrent through technological superiority and to dissuade competition through overwhelming numerical advantage. An alternative view, however, is that keeping China's modernization within the confines of minimum deterrence and a doctrine of no-first-use is manifestly in the interest of the United States and requires a political commitment that reflects the simple reality that no U.S. president is likely to attempt a disarming first strike against another nuclear-armed power. No matter which view one takes, China's possession of the minimum means of reprisaland how that deterrent evolvesis now the central issue for the future of both countries' nuclear forces. At best, an effort by Washington to engage China more deeply on disarmament issues will require bureaucracies in both Washington and Beijing to more thoroughly consider the ramifications for stability of their respective strategic force modernizations. At the very least, opening such a dialogue can reduce the possibility of accidents, miscalculations, or misunderstandings.
Extensive human authentication prevents unauthorized use Larry Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, Chinas Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf
Second Artillery, Hu Jintao spoke to an assemblage of people that included Xiang Shouzhi, first commander of the organization, and a number of previous leaders. Hu was present in the combined capacity of President of China, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, and Chairman of the Communist Party CMC. 96 In Jiefangjun Bao, articles have referred to the PLAN headquarters as the Navys tongshuaibu, and to the CMC as the tongshuaibu.97 Thus, while it is possible that the reference to a valid firing order means that it comes from the commander of the Second Artillery, the consensus among American scholars who follow the PLA closely is that in the context of nuclear and missile-firing orders, tongshuaibu refers to the CMC. This is the highest and most centralized level of military leadership in the Chinese Communist Party. 98 In the photo of Hu Jintao that appeared in Jiefangjun Bao depicting his 40th Anniversary speech to the leaders of the Second Artillery, Hu was wearing a PLA uniform without insignia or rank. Moreover, to confirm that the tongshuaibu is the CMC, in another account of Hu Jintaos speech published by Xinhua News Service, Hu is quoted as saying The Second Artillery Corps is a Second Artillery command orders are centralized, encoded and protected, and require human authentication. PLA military writers eschew completely automated command and control systems. There is a very strong emphasis on the need for a man in the loop even in modern, information age warfare. One writer specializing in command and control issues makes the point that no matter how advanced a computer is used in a command and control system, it will never substitute for the strength and utility of the human brain.100 The implications of this insistence on a man in the loop for nuclear firing orders is that the PLA will likely reject calls for automated protective action links in its doctrine.
Civilians control Chinese nuclear weapons now 25
26
Larry Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, Chinas Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf
This is important to follow because the CMC of the Chinese Communist Party ultimately has the finger on Chinas nuclear trigger, and technologically oriented civilians today, not former leaders of the PLA, control the CMC.
China may miscalculate U.S. good will, triggering war Larry Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, Chinas Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf
Examining the doctrinal text, Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan (A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory) provided more information on Chinas nuclear doctrine, force deployment, command and control, and survivability measures than has been available in the past. Combining the examination of authoritative doctrinal text with materials from the Chinese press and those obtained through the Open Source Center helped to confirm the authenticity of the doctrinal text and provided supporting evidence for judgments about the nature of Chinas strategic rocket forces, their organization, readiness levels, and their control. Another critical factor in the nuclear threat equation faced in the United States is the calculation by the CMC that China is able to absorb nuclear strikes with less catastrophic effects that the United States. This judgment is a function of Chinas historical military culture, geography, and an intentional state-directed policy of civil defense and risk distribution.111 For the United States, this means that Chinese leaders may miscalculate American will a and mistakenly take risky actions.
The decision by Beijing Larry Wortzel, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007, Chinas Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control, and Campaign Planning, https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB776.pdf
Internal debate in China over NFU policy Finally, the debate inside China over the viability of its no first use policy is real. At present, older veterans of the Foreign Ministry and the PLA insist that the policy stay unchanged. However, younger scholars, soldiers, and diplomats will keep up the pressure to pull back from this policy, which requires continued attention and strategic dialogue with Chinas policy community.
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Planet Debate Deficit Supercommittee September 22