Creating a Responsive Space Environment Can the Space Industry Learn from Detroit and Silicon Valley?

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Frank Monzon Dept. of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering University of Florida Fmonzon@ufl.edu Abstract This paper discusses the current philosophy of the automotive and computer industry and offers arguments for how the U.S. should pursue a new paradigm for space systems that includes serviceability. Serviceability is a concept that permeates the automotive and computer industries through modularity in design, production and use, yet is currently not practiced by the space industry. Through this concept of serviceability, reliable, affordable, and sustainable space systems can be realized. Introduction There is a growing problem in current satellite infrastructure in the United States. David Whelan, who works for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), notes the problem of a growing margin between the developments of infrastructure in other sectors relative to the satellite market and a need for further satellite infrastructure development. The past forty years have only produced slow evolving space systems that exhaust their capabilities within ten years (Whelan et al. [1]). By adapting the design and manufacturing methods of Detroit and Silicon Valley it will be possible to double the lifetime of satellites and augment their capabilities to benefit the changing goals of the consumer. Taking a look at how the automotive and computer industries have had drastic changes over the past fifteen years shows how reduction in costs can be achieved from different forms of modularity. A module is a unit whose structural elements are powerfully connected among themselves [but] relatively weakly connected to elements in other units (Arnheiter et al. [2]). Modularity was introduced in the 1990s where we saw a transition from the Fordist philosophy to the Japanese lean method of production (Donnelly et al. [3]). Contrast that with todays satellites that take a long time to design and can rarely be considered modular. Satellites are built with many tasks in mind. The Hubble Space Telescope, for example, was fitted with multiple mission criteria in one design and that was accomplished by sectioning parts of it into modules. It performs many of the scientific experiments that cannot be performed on Earth due to atmospheric effects while at the same time being a test bed for serviceability innovations for the Shuttle. NASA wanted servicing to be as easy as possible and Hubbles modularity helped to accomplish that (Joppin et al. [4]). It is one of the rare instances where modularity was employed and its history can show that it has survived many problems by being serviced and has returned the favor by reaping benefits that are valuable to the human race in understanding the cosmos.

Traditionally satellites are not like Hubble in that they are not made to be serviced, so redundancies are incorporated into their designs. Creativity like this becomes very complex, integrated, and expensive. If a failure were to occur to a given system and methods to circumvent the failure were not possible, millions of dollars could be spent in attempting an impromptu Shuttle mission or funds will end up wasted from abandoning the system altogether. The Shuttle will be phased out by 2010 thus eliminating an important utility in manual servicing. Other avenues must be sought out. The elimination of options and increasing problems occurring in space systems are a motivation for changes in the paradigm of satellite production. Modularity of satellites can eliminate restrictions on size and improve methods of serviceability to greatly increase the life or functionality of a space system. Greater serviceability allows for cost reduction over the life of the system and shorter development times by not having costly redundancies in each space system. System redundancies today tend to be strapped like a web of connections, making them incredibly expensive to design. More options for servicing in the future, in the event of failure, would make repair or life-extension easier than it is today. In this paper I attempt to discuss alternate methods for development of space systems. A survey of production methods of the automotive and computer industry is made to parallel how the aerospace industry can change and adapt to lower costs and lead times. To design with modularity would allow easier serviceability and extend functionality of systems, henceforth effecting production all towards a goal of improving space infrastructure and deployment of future satellite systems. There is a growing concern about the evolving space capabilities of other nations and the potential for their counter-space operations to surpass U.S. capabilities (Maples [5]). Without major improvements to U.S. space systems infrastructure, national security could be threatened and also hinder the status of the U.S. being the leader in space development, utilization, and defense [1]. Detroit & Silicon Valley Set an Example Both the automotive and computer industries have had shifts to modularity but the drivers for each of them were not the same. Each had different motivations that led to a similar end; that of controlling costs. For the automotive industry it was driven by a desire for cost and complexity reduction for products whereas the computer industry was driven by consumers who wanted sustainability and upgrades to their personal computers. Industry has coined these trends modularity in design (MID) and modularity in-use (MIU), respectively, which directly resulted in changes to modularity in production (MIP) (Sako et al. [6]). The automobile has modules made up components like the chassis, power train, and transmission which has allowed for simplification of the production of vehicles on an assembly line. You have seen a push for MID and MIP from the supplier to the consumer which ultimately helps the consumer by allowing them to repair failed components of their vehicles instead of having to purchase an entire new vehicle. There are advantages and disadvantages to products that are highly modular. Sako and Donnelly refer to the advantages and disadvantages: Modularity allows for more variations of products through universal interfaces between modules. The benefit of this is shorter lead times due to the fact that each component may be internally complex but their interfaces are designed to be universal no matter what it connects to. In the perspective of the automotive industry, the

biggest goal was to simplify model construction through MID. This has led to the platform designs for many vehicles we have today. The benefit is that a car can be produced faster through MIP with reduced delivery times, increased flexibility, and allows for manageable inventory. Contrast that with the computer industry where demand came from the customer wanting to update their hardware to the latest and greatest of technology, classified as MIU. This convinced manufacturers to change design and production methods. From the alterations these methods increased operational efficiency. The negative aspects of modularity are presumed to be a fear for a loss of identity in products and outsourcing of production which is thought to yield a loss of control of technology. It is possible to have universal interfaces without losing proprietary internal design value. Today, more and more notebook computers are connecting to many devices through universal serial bus (USB) as serial ports become obsolete. These devices are made by many different companies and perform unique tasks that create value for the manufacturer from the demand of the consumer market. Here we see value is added while attaining universal connectivity. Other options for retaining value can be accomplished through customer service and brand name. These industries are the perfect examples to study in helping to identify where the aerospace industry needs to go. We do not have the mass market for satellites that we would like due to it being cost prohibitive today, but we can make it affordable tomorrow with what the computer and automotive industry have currently accomplished. Modularity Modularity is not new to the satellite industry but it is currently not widely employed throughout system design as it is in automobiles and computers. Early satellite designs were meant to meet specific mission objectives which made the design of each satellite unique. These spacecraft were very tightly integrated and the subsystems were inflexible to changes (Ayer et al. [7]). In the design stages of development, the complexity of a satellite can result in timelines being pushed back and can lead to the technology they are built around becoming obsolete. The costs associated with extended timelines on space systems can be estimated in millions of dollars (Harland et al. [8]). This is in addition to the fact that satellites are limited in size by the maximum payload allowed by current launch vehicles [7]. A design paradigm, as described in the previous paragraph, can lead to large difficulties and repercussions if anomalies occur. Approximately 25% of failures are from design flaws and another 16% are from random part failures [8]. When these failures occur, a spacecraft must be serviced physically or electronically, but in only a few instances has a satellite been serviced by the Space Shuttle. Examples of these instances were with the Hubble Space Telescope and SolarMax [8]. This option is rare and costly to NASA and results in delays of other important science that needs to be facilitated by the Shuttle fleet. Today, if such a servicing mission is not performed, the only option to repair a space system is through software manipulation. If this and hardware redundancies do not accomplish the repair, the mission is considered a failure and millions of dollars are lost [8]. An option that could be considered is a combination of designing for modularity and serviceability. A good comparison to how modularity can work in favor of satellite design is from the computer and automotive industry. They have minimized interdependencies and cleanly decentralized systems through effective modularization (Janicik [9]). By creating subsystems of modules, you can

eliminate size restrictions on satellites and create a base design where multiple models can be created off one platform, similar to automobile design. This gives more options into the utility of satellites that work in groups and can save money because all designs are based off a particular platform. It is in the authors opinion that having different versions of a satellite based on one platform allows one to reduce the complexity of necessary requirements of any particular unit, which can reduce the chances of failure, the amount of systems interdependent on each other, and the development costs to the company. This is similar reasoning why we choose to have two engines instead of four on a plane; less equipment that can fail. With complexity eliminated and the need for extra redundancies removed, this reduces the production cost. In the event of failure, the cost to replace the satellite is minimized and a replacement satellite can be read in orbit and launched relatively easily [9]. Minimizing complexity in a given system can help reduce the statistic of design flaw failures. An example of the utility of group systems can be seen in formation flight. The first autonomous formation flying mission was the Earth Orbiter-1 (EO-1) mission in 1996. With its success NASA has created a list of formation flight missions that it wants to create in the near future. Environmental or defense reconnaissance projects will stand to benefit greatly from modularity because a lower cost from standard platform designs allows for arrays of spacecraft to be built that can provide higher resolution imagery and interferometry, while shrinking the necessary size of the spacecraft and spreading the complexity of the system out over the entire network (Leinter et al. [10]). Another problem facing systems today is the long lead times in producing a product because of the specificity of any particular design. Some systems can be so complex that they take a third of ones career to finally materialize and by the time they are launched technologies that were cutting edge may be out of date and additional time may be spent updating components that are obsolete. In a modular design, sections of the system are standardized into different units, based on utility, that are brought together to work as an ensemble. If a component of one module fails, then that particular module can be circumvented by replacement or replenishment. Through the Shuttle Expendable Rocket for Payload Augmentation (SHERPA) program, the replacement may already be on-orbit waiting to be used by maneuvering into position or it may be launched into orbit from Earth (Carlson et al. [11]). The new part would use a Plugand-Sense design [to] enable the system to detect the presence of attached modules, communicate module use instructions, and confirm both physical properties and geometric orientation of the module (Rogers et al. [12]). When designing satellites they should be compatible with industry-wide standards for compatibility of module servicers, while attaching without affecting the satellites attitude in space [1]. Incorporating internal changes to designs as previously mentioned, opens up more options for serviceability and the extending of space systems lives to account for any foreseeable advances in technology. The largest benefits of these criteria changes are that they could save millions of dollars to the industry and vastly reduce decision and reaction time for situations that are critical to any parties who are dependent on the services the systems provide.

Serviceability The development of refueling aircraft mid-flight gave the U.S. a truly global military reach. There is no reason these actions, through modularity, cannot also be applied to space systems. Currently, on-orbit technology is ten to fifteen years behind the state of the art. The option to service a given space system today is practically nonexistent. If we could replenish or repair a space system we could extend its life further than todays standards. Servicing allows for new and extending capabilities from ready refueling infrastructure. An idea from DARPA, called the Orbital Express program, would have servicing modules already waiting in orbit to run to the rescue of an ailing spacecraft [1]. The Air Force currently has a vision for Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) to deal with changing technologies and support needs in satellites (Doggrell [13]). ORS can be accomplished through changes which would affect design, production, and serviceability of future space systems. A second program from DARPA named Response Access, Small Cargo, and Affordable Launch (RASCAL), will offer launch capability to LEO within 24 hours. Combining these two programs with DARPAS SCOUT program, which answers the logistical and production challenges essential to its implementation, creates a rapid access servicing infrastructure. SCOUTs goals are to have servicing units that have modular architecture which allow for multiple mission goals that include: satellite inspection and monitoring, near-field situational awareness, tactical communications activities, and technology demonstration. Other objectives are to have high payload mass and power fractions, long shelf-life, rapid call-up for launch and initialization on orbit, and easy manufacturability [12]. So now not only are you designing systems through modularity, but also having them repaired through servicers that are modular in design. Future satellites should be designed to accommodate for servicers, through universal interfaces, without their attitudes in space being affected. Regular upgrades to space systems, through refueling, will allow for extended maneuverability which is high in demand especially in the field of imaging where spacecraft need to be in places other than their most fuel efficient orbits [1]. In the past, serviceability from the Space Shuttle has allowed the return of failed components to Earth to study and find solutions to fix future unexpected problems and allow scientists to be more prepared for possible future incidents [4]. From this we can plan for what failures or components will be exhausted. We can design the servicers to accommodate for most of those contingencies and save a satellite from an early death. Requirements to any servicer should include: allowance of transfer of fluid consumables, hardware upgrades, and remove-and-replace versus a plug-and-stay strategy for hardware upgrades [1]. Modularity of a design will allow for these requirements of refueling or adding replacement modules to circumvent failed components. Germany already has a servicing option called Geosynch Spacecraft Life Extension System (SLES) that started in 2005 that will extend the life of spacecraft up to ten years (Lenorovitz [14]). The U.S. needs a shift in its industry philosophies to bring about innovations like this because without them we will fall behind as the leader of space innovation. One must keep a business plan in mind when creating new production methods for space systems. RASCAL has the chance to become a leading-edge system for the serviceability of space infrastructure, but without educating industry leaders, no one will take the leap necessary to create the proof of new methodologies.

Production Mass production is the manufacturing of large amounts of standardized products through assembly lines. Today this is done through machinery that reduces labor costs and increases the rate of production. A high initial capital investment is necessary to implement mass production but the benefits are that it reduces time wasted by retrieving and preparing many parts and limits unwanted variation from part to part. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) did a study on development practices for space systems and one of the recommendations it made was to have the Department Of Defense employ evolutionary approaches that pursue incremental increases in capability. This is exactly what is needed in the aerospace industry; a new approach to manufacturing that allows for progressive upgrades through serviceability and not giant technological leaps that will be cost prohibitive due to congressional budget restrictions (Levin [15]). A modular-based servicing satellite will be easier and cheaper to produce than a unique integrated space system. By simplifying the tasks required by a given space system into modules and reducing the complexity in manufacturing, you allow the producers operations to be lean (Buchholz [16]). The computer industry has been able to decrease the time and cost of making their products by using a plug-and-play philosophy. Computers are manufactured in modules. Things like hard drive, memory, and video cards are all intended to plug into a motherboard and be easily interchangeable for upgrading. In the authors opinion, most people do not see the automobile as easily upgradeable as the personal computer, due to the technical aspects of vehicles, but they are designed for ease of assembly and repair. For example, with skilled labor, exterior panels of cars are easily replaced when damaged and internal components can be exchanged when they fail. The satellite bus is the main component of any given space system that can be standardized for production. If we are going to have lower costs to affect the number of units produced, it can be done starting with the bus. To benefit from economies of scale the way the personal computer does, as much capability as possible should be designed into a standard bus. CHIPSat, developed by SpaceDev, was able to use lightweight, low-power subsystems to achieve full 3-axis stabilization and pointing capability using 30 Watts to the payload. This was self-contained in about sixteen kilograms of satellite bus hardware. This is proof that lightweight, low-power subsystems with true standard interfaces are possible. For a system to be a responsive space asset, it must be readily available with standard interfaces and common protocols. A system will lose its responsive status if it requires intensive operator interaction [9]. By incorporating modularity into designs, a simplified production process saves the investor and company precious time and money. Time is a valuable asset and determines the inflow of money and profit to the company. Production is not just about simplifying the process through modularity, it is about the necessity of a safe reliable developing infrastructure that can evolve off of itself. Conclusion There is risk in anything new we venture out to do. Failures can and will happen. They are necessary to learn the directions we must take to be successful. Failures never look good for a company, but by having the ability to mass produce modular satellites, to account for any type

of failure, would allow for the error to not be a catastrophe to the project, company, or insurer, but a relatively short setback to a program. Limiting delays and overrunning costs will be achieved easier in the future than it is today and can bring an innovative project to fruition in shorter time periods (Eleazer [17]). Utilizing the ideas discussed in this paper falls in line with NASAs Faster, Better, Cheaper philosophy. Faster Meet the schedule and improve performance. Better Satisfy the project goals. Cheaper Complete the project within a fixed competitive price (Smithies et al. [18]). There is a fear of moving forward with innovation where the current paradigm for space systems has not changed in the past fifty years. Aerospace is a conservative industry. Why change something that has adequately worked for so long? The philosophy has worked, but it can be work better than it does today if it accepts the necessity and understanding for change. The main point is that change is past due. Other countries are racing ahead with their space programs and developing a state of the art infrastructure for the 21st century. The U.S. must now follow suit, but must lead the world in this development. In a world today that is as unstable as it has ever been since the height of the cold war, the U.S. must not give up its role as head of the world superpowers. Our infrastructure must be capable and adaptable to what might be needed in the 21st century for telecommunication, military reconnaissance and communication, and science discovery.

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