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Warfare and Defence Seminar Summary
Warfare and Defence Seminar Summary
Warfare and Defence Seminar Summary
Welcoming Remarks
Major General Wilson opened his presentation by stating that now, more
than ever, warfare is a thinking person’s game. It is a multi-dimensional, multi-
organizational and multi-cultural construct, characterized by complexity,
ambiguity, volatility and uncertainty.
General Wilson observed the changes in the 21st Century environment,
where the traditional warrior mindset is still attuned to the delivery of “hard
power.” He noted that the mindset must be broadened to include the non-kinetic
“soft power” effects such as civil affairs, information operations, language and
cultural awareness training. He observed that the 21st Century land forces, to be
truly effective, must possess both brains and brawn. It will require major moves
to change the training program
There are a number of factors, cited by British Lieutenant General Sir
John Kiszely, that retard the speed of learning in the military forces. Those
factors include the following: a tendency towards anti-intellectualism within the
military; an inability to accommodate internal and external criticism; the absence
of a military seat of learning; an inability to make necessary change; and a
propensity to confuse activity with progress.
Major General Wilson posed several solutions to the challenges cited.
Overall, a methodology of learning that focuses more on the development of
cognitive skills must be applied in army institutions of learning. The methodology
must focus on the learner and also re-balance training and education. This
entails that Soldiers must be motivated to think about what is being taught and
how it can be applied. Military educators and trainers must develop core
behaviors, such as leadership, physical and mentally toughness, courage,
initiative, teamwork, and compassion.
Armies must also adopt new teaching practices that encourage active and
meaningful development of knowledge. In the 21st Century, Armies must exploit
technology and develop both information mediums and learning mechanisms.
The progression of learning must be improved, in both collective and individual
learning. This means that the Armies must develop a learning organization, one
that actively creates, captures, transfers and mobilizes knowledge to allow it to
adapt to a changing environment. That organization must actively promote and
reward collective learning.
Major General Wilson concluded that armies of the 21st Century must
modify their focus on planning and training for the wars of yesterday. Changes
must be made, but the impetus for the changes can only come from the top.
Colonel Francois Loeuillet
Commander, Land Forces, New Caledonia
Army of France
Colonel Loeuillet began his presentation with a short video about the
French Army in New Caledonia, a French Overseas Territory. As he commenced
with his remarks, the colonel observed that the major challenge for the French
Army today is to safeguard its capability to adapt to current realities while
keeping Soldiers at the heart of the system in which “savoir-ệtre” and
competence is essential. He stated that the 21st Century armed forces must
adapt to current realities of the world. He observed that the center of gravity in
the world is now an urban environment. The new framework that the French land
forces face includes a new environment, new threats, and a challenge to win the
battle that will lead to peace. In these challenges, he proposed that the “strategic
corporal” is the key success or failure. The colonel conceded, however, that
much more than forces is required to master the world today. Modern conflicts
consist of three phases: a decisive phase, stabilization, and normalization.
The requirements for education and training include a constant—that is,
the essence of the combatant; a requirement for impartiality; and autonomy at
the lowest level.
Colonel Loeuillet noted current French Army priorities are spread across
the globe. He stated that there are currently 22,568 members of the French
armed forces deployed throughout the world, including Kuwait, Israel, Georgia,
Kosovo, Bosnia, the Sahara, Chad, Cameroon, Gabon, and several locations.
Men are the keystone of the priorities. The Army underscores a need for realism
in education and training for its leaders.
Within the military culture of the French Army, a leader is a peace builder
loyal to the constitution. He understands complexity, commands in adversity, and
makes decisions. The first part of the officer’s education consists of his basic
education, specialty school basic course (one year), platoon leader time, a five-
month specialty advanced course, and company commander time. The second
part of the officer’s education consists of an operational assignment at a
headquarters, the command and general staff college, followed by another
operational assignment (at a battalion headquarters, part of a project team, etc.).
There must be realism in education and training. Joint education and
training is increasingly important. Urban warfare is also critical to leaders in the
21st Century. The French Army is currently building the CENZUB, a training
facility that will include a training site for basics (section and platoon levels) and
an equipped training site that will represent a small town on an area of one
square kilometer and provides all varieties of urban areas. It will include an
urban real-fire range.
Topic #3
Brigadier General Holey began his remarks with an apt quote from the
Ramayana, one of the Hindu scriptures: “O’ Friend, behold my chariot through
which I am always decidedly victorious. Courage and tenacity are its wheels,
immutable truth and character are its flags. Strength, discrimination, self control
and charity are its horses. Forgiveness, mercy and equanimity are the reins and
devotion to the Lord its charioteer. O’ Friend. Whoever possesses such a chariot
can never be defeated.”
General Holey recalled that India has fought in four wars in the past 50
years and is presently engaged in a War against Terrorism. He noted, however,
that most terrorist in the Indian sub-continent are not “suicide” terrorists, but are
trans-national terrorists. Opponents of the Indian government primarily use
hand-held weapons and engage in few pitched battles. They employ hit and run
tactics and have an intimate knowledge of the ground. Following their attacks,
they attempt to merge with the local population. General Holey recounted a few
examples of terrorism in the Indian nation and described the involvement of the
Indian military. Traditionally, the point at which the Indian Army becomes
involved in low intensity conflict (such as proxy wars, insurgencies, and border
skirmishes) is where it is perceived to be the instrument of last resort.
Some of the emerging challenges in the 21st Century environment include
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their likely exploitation by
terrorists; asymmetric threats including cyber and information warfare
techniques; and trans-national signatures in future terrorist attacks. In meeting
and countering the threat in India, the Army drew upon legal provisions that
recognized the primacy of civil authority. The Indian government formulated a
national strategy that addressed the strategic center of gravity (the population)
and then an end-state or conflict resolution. It also put forth a national initiative
that created a secure environment and isolated the conflict zone. It addressed
local aspirations and implemented a public information and perception
management program.
Brigadier General Holey noted that some of the causes for the instability in
the internal security environment were fundamentalism and extremism in certain
parts of India; politico-socio-economic instability; and ideological, ethnic, and
linguistic differences. The catalyst of this violence has been interference by
neighboring states and an initial inept handling of the situation when violence first
occurred.
In countering the threat, the General observed, the Army must conduct its
operations with an “iron fist with a velvet glove.” There must be clearly defined
rules of engagement, avoiding collateral damage and human rights violations. A
comprehensive surrender policy must be developed and adhered to. In general,
fighting irregular warfare in India consists of small team operations (two to three
person teams).
Brigadier General Holey concluded that the Indian Army had many
success stories in its irregular warfare experience. There is a current
groundswell for peace and the general stance of locals in problem areas towards
the Army is favorable. A large number of “overground” workers have been
neutralized, a success largely attributed to the various Army civic action projects.
Brigadier General Rashid began his presentation with a short video of the
Malaysian Army capabilities and involvement in operations. He opened his
remarks by noting that since 11 September 2001, there has been an evolution in
the global strategic landscape. He observed that Malaysia does not face such
threats of terrorism, although the ability of terrorist organizations to globally
network has compelled the Malaysian government to heighten its vigilance. The
Army learned many of the lessons learned from the time of the Emergency
[1948-1960].
Officially, the Malaysian Army has not adopted the term “Irregular Warfare”
and believes that many countries are still deliberating on the actual definition of
this warfare. On 25 September 2005, the U.S. Special Operations Command
conducted an Irregular Warfare Workshop in Malaysia.
The Malaysian Army conducted a series of combined operations with
neighboring Thailand from 1974 until 1985. The operations included the
numerous joint border posts manned by both the Malaysia Army and the Thais in
the form of coordinated patrol. Combined operations conducted between the
Malaysian Army and the Royal Thai Army resulted in 118 communist terrorists
killed, 20 communist terrorists. Operations conducted with the Indonesian Army
and resulted in two communist terrorists captured. More importantly, this latter
operation resulted in the forces being able to dislodge the infrastructure
established by the Communist Party along the Malaysian-Indonesian border.
General Rashid recounted that the combined operations experience with
the Royal Thai Army and Indonesia saw the deployment of no less than five
battalions from each Army, divided into platoon-sized elements that each secured
assigned sub-sectors. Each element proved to be independent, self-sustained,
and exceptionally versatile in their mission performance.
When operating in a coalition environment, it is important to establish
command and control; identify the primary language of the operation; identify the
threat; establish SOPs (Standard Operating Procedures); and address the matter
of logistics. Irregular warfare typically requires the deployment of small units
(platoons and sections) undertaking a large number of functions with their
assigned Areas of Operations.
Irregular warfare, given the complexities of coalition operations, poses
many challenges to commanders. The nature of such warfare requires small unit
leaders to act quickly decisively. Small unit leaders must understand their
mission, the threat, rules of engagement, and then observe the rule of law. They
must be aware of the demographics of their environment and identify all the
important actors in the area of operations. In addition to observing these factors,
small unit leaders must work with the media, gather intelligence, and continue to
put Soldiers first.
Brigadier General Rashid stated that to overcome all these challenges
facing the small unit leader requires training, training, and more training.
Emphasis must be given to individual training. Training will foster the right
attitude and behavior of small unit Soldiers, particularly when faced with the local
population. He concluded that globalization and technological developments
have added much in the means toward achieving their endstate. The small unit
leader must maintain the legitimacy of his cause and that of his force. He must
also ensure the cohesiveness of friendly forces within the coalition. The greatest
danger to the mission may not be the insurgents, but the uncertainty, complexity,
and ambiguity inherent to irregular warfare. Small unit leaders must therefore be
adaptable, knowledgeable, flexible, and decisive all at the same time.
Special Session