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The New Orleans Levee Failures

Tiffany Cole, Justin Geeslin, Michael Randle, Mitch Rogers


GE 3513-Technical Writing | Section 07
Mississippi State University
April 24, 2009

Abstract

Hurricane Katrina was a devastating natural disaster effecting the Louisiana-Mississippi area, and also
brought to light unsettling evidence about our nation's disaster prevention systems. With a duration of only 7
days, this hurricane would have proven itself to be one of the most costly and one of the top five most deadly
hurricanes in the history of the United States [1]. Could this kind of natural disaster have been avoided and
its impact on the city of New Orleans dampened? How aware was the US government of the probability such
a disaster wreaking havoc on one of the country's most jeweled cities? What type of prevention measures are
being taken today to make sure this doesn't occur again to New Orleans and other parts of our nation? This
paper explores these questions in a search for the truth about our nation's preparation in disaster prevention.

Introduction

New Orleans will never forget the day of August 29, 2005. On this day Hurricane Katrina, entered into
Louisiana as a Category 4 hurricane from the Gulf of Mexico. The city of New Orleans and the greater New
Orleans area were seemingly taken by surprise by such an event. Not only was Hurricane Katrina one of the
most destructive forces of nature ever to sweep our great nation, but it also lent itself in exposing "the worst
engineering catastrophe in US History" [B]. Even with the lives lost and the thousands of dollars in property
damage, history shows us that the New Orleans area is no stranger to destructive, inclement weather.
During the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, "Congress mandated the Corps of Engineers as the Federal
agency responsible for design and construction of flood protection projects, to include those in Greater New
Orleans." [2] Little action was taken by the Corps during this time. Later in 1965, Hurricane Bessy brought
concerns about heavy flood waters in Louisiana from hurricanes to the fore. Because of this the Flood
Control Act of 1965 was created and enacted by Congress. By this act, the creation of a levee system
surrounding the New Orleans area to serve as a primary defense against flood waters would be set in motion.
The levee project upon creation was given an estimated completion time of about 13 years [2].
The New Orleans area has a very unique geography in the way of elevation that makes it very susceptible
to damage by flood waters. The city itself is at a very low sea level and, as shown in Figure 1 below, has a
shape like that of a bowl. This makes the city very prone to destruction involving heavy, long-lasting flood
waters. If history taught us nothing, geography would be enough to show the possibility of danger. It was at
one time popular belief that a disaster though possible was simply improbable. It was in 2005 this erroneous
belief was forever dispelled and this horrific disaster of heavy flooding again resurfaced with a vengeance.

Figure 1. - New Orleans Elevations


The Happening

In late August 2005, Hurricane Katrina affected about 90,000 square miles of US territory along the gulf
coast from Florida to Texas [1]. The most damage in terms of property damage and loss of life happened in
New Orleans, Louisiana [3]. Much of this damage was caused by heavy flooding from the storm. Over 80%
of the city of New Orleans flooded and because of its bowl shape and elevation, much of the water lingered
in the city for weeks atop the streets and abandoned residences [3]. "More than 1.5 million people were
directly affected and more than 800,000 citizens were forced to live outside of their homes – the largest
displacement of people since the great Dust Bowl migrations of the 1930s" [1]. About 30,000 people took
shelter from the storm in the Louisiana Superdome before being further evacuated only weeks later.
Much of the inter-city flooding could have been prevented by an effective dam or levee system. However,
the levee system in place to protect New Orleans, a federally built structure constructed in the mid 1960s,
was not effective in protecting the city from the surging storm. A levee’s purpose is to regulate water levels.
In New Orleans’ case, the levees were supposed to keep the rising waters of Katrina from getting into, and
flooding the town. However, the waters (or storm surge) were so high and consistent that New Orleans
flooded not long after the storm hit.“There were 28 reported levee failures in the first 24 hours and over 50
were reported in the ensuing days” [2]. It was later revealed that not only were the levee walls completely
toppled due to the magnitude of the storm, but some levee walls were penetrated by water allowing the water
to spill into the city. This clearly signals a significant design flaw in the levee wall itself [B].

How it Happened

After the impact of Katrina, there were five investigations carried out. Corps of Engineers were federally
ordered to study and provide detail on the disaster. Two major independent studies were conducted by the
University of California at Berkeley ant the Louisiana State University. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and the insurance industry conducted two minor studies. The conclusions of all studies
agreed on the failure of engineering mechanisms.

“The failed mechanisms engineers investigated included overtopping of levees and floodwalls by the storm
surge, consequential undermining of flood wall foundations or other weakening by water of the wall
foundations, and the storm surge pressures exceeding the strength of the floodwalls”[2].
“A preliminary report by the American Society of Civil Engineers in an independent investigation
concluded that the flooding in the southern neighborhood was caused by the soil of the levees giving
way, not by water overtopping the flood walls. Soil borings in the area of the 17th Street Canal breach
showed a layer of peat starting at about 30 feet (9.1 m) below the surface, and ranging from about 5
feet (1.5 m) to 20 feet (6.1 m) thick. Peat is an accumulation of partially decayed vegetation matter.
The peat is from the remains of the swamp on which the low areas of New Orleans (near Lake
Ponchartrain) were built. The shear strength of this peat was found to be very low and it had a high
water content. According to Robert Bea, a geotechnical engineer from the University of California,
Berkeley, the peat made the floodwall very vulnerable to the stresses of a large flood. "At 17th Street,
the soil moved laterally, pushing entire wall sections with it. As Katrina's storm surge filled the canal,
water pressure rose in the soil underneath the wall and in the peat layer. Water moved through the soil
underneath the base of the wall. When the rising pressure and moving water overcame the soil's
strength, it suddenly shifted, taking surrounding material – and the wall – with it””[2].

“The peat layer appears to be about 1,000 feet (300 m) wide. It is not clear if it had been properly
taken into account when the levees were built. The floodwalls consist of a concrete cap on a sheet pile
base driven 19.56 feet deep at 17th Street Canal. A deeper piling would have anchored the flood wall
in much stronger soil. In some cases the walls and levees dropped feet because of the low density peat
and water pressures. This allowed the waters to flow over the walls and levees. The low density peat
also allowed the water to flow under the walls and levees. With all this water going under and over
the walls the pumps were unable to keep up”[2].

In 1965, was the beginning of construction on the levees and the flood walls. Since only a handful of
hurricanes of Category Four or Five have ever touched land in the United States Gulf of Mexico, government
officials, architects, and engineers decided to settle for Category Three standards to save money. During the
construction period money was insufficient at times so some of the standards set for height and depth were
not met. After Katrina had destroyed sections of the flood wall on the 17th Street Canal it was discovered that
the sheet piling was only driven 10 feet(3.05m) into the ground when the standards were 19.6 feet(5.97m).
The pump stations along the levees were equipped with pumps that could only withstand half of the flow rate
need to uphold standards. Due to the fact that the greater part of construction of the levees and walls was
done almost 45 years ago the erosion factor was never considered. Over the10 years leading up to Katrina
much of the erosion problem was fixed, but there was a lot of erosion under the water level that was never
attended to. The concrete walls are only as strong as the weakest part and 45 years of erosion will make some
parts very weak.

The basic design of the I-Wall levees was also flawed. In Figure 2 there is no H-Pile to support the levee. The
H-Pile is labeled with a four in Figure 3. Without the H-pile the levees in Katrina were pushed over by the
massive storm surge. The H-Pile would give horizontal support to the wall and allow the Sheet Pile to hold
better in the low density soil. In the late 1990s the H-Pile was made mandatory. Many of the levees had the
H-Pile added to them but this took time and money so some were left without it on the day of Katrina. When
all of these problems and setbacks are in place and one adds a hurricane like Katrina a disaster is bound to
happen.

Figure 2. - [4]
Figure 3. - [4]

The Future Plans

The rebuilding of the levees after Hurricane Katrina’s destruction will be a never ending process. There
will always be more and more that needs to be done and improved to help keep New Orleans from
experiencing the flooding that was present after Katrina. The design and construction of New Orleans’ flood
protection is the responsibility of the Flood Control Act of 1965 and US Army Corps of Engineers. [6] It is an
estimated $100 billion to fix the levee and make it stand against a category 5 hurricane. “Craig E. Colten, a
professor of geography and anthropology at Louisiana State University, said that what could protect against
even a Category 5 storm today ‘might not stand up to the worst kind of storm in 50 or 100 years.’ ” [5] There
have been about $2 billion spent on the rebuilding of the levee. Only 225 miles have been repaired and 17
new pump stations while several current pump stations remodeled. There was one improvement with the
making of the levees less in danger of flooding over the top. “Wherever feasible, the Corps of Engineers
replaced "I-walls" [concrete barriers anchored to the levee by a steel sheet pile-driven into the ground] with
"T-walls," which are rooted into a concrete base and anchored by multiple steel beams.” [7]

Even though it will be four years this August, the reconstruction and future plan for the levees is not
complete. One of the future plans for the levees is to make the levee walls taller than they were pre-Katrina.
One problem that faces the builders of the levees is not just a hurricane. The movements of the ground and
water erosion of normal rains cause the levees to “self-destruct”. This ground movement will cause major
issues if it is not dealt with before the new levees are built because the new levees will not truly be better
than the old levees. Part of the reconstruction of the levees is making the Sheet Pile lengths go deeper into the
ground under the levees. Sheet Pile lengths being deeper in the ground, on top of making the above ground
portion of the levee taller, will help to control water. There will also be the construction of a barrier where the
Industrial Canal intersects with Lake Pontchartrain.

Part of the reconstruction process that will continue to take long periods of time and will face delays is the
bringing in of dirt and clay from elsewhere. “The Corps uses the industry standard for classifying soils for
engineering purposes when considering the suitability of materials for levee construction. That standard is
American Society of Testing and Materials 2487D of the Unified Soil Classification System” [8]. The
continued testing of the materials throughout the construction phase will take time and money. Although the
amount of money spent to do these test could raise to rather large amounts, it should be worth in the end to
ensure that only the best materials were used in the construction.

Another improvement that is included in the future plans is the implementation of pumps with a higher
capacity than were in place pre-Katrina. Part of this improvement is not going to be the actually
implementation of the new pumps, but keeping good records on the functionality of the new pumps. It was
evident that the pumps that were in place before Katrina were not functioning properly. There will most
likely never be enough pumps that are big enough to support the amount of water that Katrina brought in on
landfall. The pumps are located at certain pumping stations. One improvement being done at the existing
pumping stations is making them more flood resistance because many of the pumping stations that were
operational when Hurricane Katrina made landfall were flooded to the point where they were no longer
operational.

Although there is no guaranteed protection, many of these future improvements will help matters. The main
problem that continues to face the builders to this day is the ability to get the funding needed to make these
improvements. This problem will always be there even when it is in terms of maintaining the levees and
pump to proper functionality. “By Sep 07, the Corps will have completed all Congressionally-authorized
improvements as well as Hurricane Katrina-related repairs to the southeast Louisiana hurricane protection
system. The system will provide protection from storm-induced flood waters resulting from a hurricane with
maximum wind speeds of between 90 and 115 miles per hour, which would be substantially smaller than
Katrina. These protection levels are the highest the Corps has been authorized to provide by Congress” [8].
Even if this September of 2007 deadline was met, this does not put the levees at the level of protection
needed to protect New Orleans and surrounding areas from future problems that were made evident after
Hurricane Katrina.
References

[1] http://www.dhs.gov/xfoia/archives/gc_1157649340100.shtm
[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_levee_failures_in_Greater_New_Orleans
[3] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hurricane_Katrina
[4] http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5300344

[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/national/nationalspecial/30levee.html?_r=1
[6] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reconstruction_of_New_Orleans
[7] http://neworleans.about.com/od/governmentcivicissues/a/levees.htm
[8]
http://www.mvn.usace.army.mil/tfh/Fact%20Sheets/Louisiana%20levees%20and%20hurricane%20protectio
n%20system.htm
[9] http://www.katrinadestruction.com/images/v/hurricane/pump+and+repair.html

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