CHAPTER

5 - THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF A U.S. CLIENT

STATE,

1951-1954

Chapters policy

3 and Iran

4 discussed

Iranian

domestic the

politics

and U.S.

toward

in the era before on April

appointment

of Mohammed 3 it was

Mossadeq argued of Reza activity

as prime minister

29. 1951. which period

In chapter

that the 1941 Allied Shah ushered in Iran. This the previous in a

invasion 12-year was

ended

the dictatorship political democratic

of intense more

period or

considerably eras.

than either by

subsequent actors.

It was characterized free political the

a plurality

of political and a vocal

relatively willing

in5titutions. established

parliament

to challenge traditional political toward

power

of the royal

court and the of effective

ruling parties

class. Moreover, and a growing in this period

with the emergence of gifted

number

leaders,

the trend

democracy sociemoveof

was becoming

strongly

established of

in Iranian

ty. The intellectual ment were the began It was played century early traced 1900s

and social 3

origins

this democratic

in chapter and to

to the constitutional socio-economic

movement changes

the broad century

which

in the

nineteenth

and accelerated 3 that while since

under foreign

Reza Shah. powers had

also argued a major their

In chapter

role in Iran's affairs role had declined occupation

the early after

nineteenth

substantially during World

1925. except

in the period

of Allied

War II.

Chapter

4 discussed

U.S.

interests was never

and policies substantial

in Iran before in this period,

1951. The U.S. role in Iran

PAGE 112 although deepening it gradually increased with wartime policy occupation and the

Cold War. Before

1951 U.S. rather

toward

Iran was moticoncerns. U.S.

vated primarily policymakers the West

by strategic

than economic

were content

to let Britain

play the leading

role for

in Iran during

this period.

This chapter which led

ties these

themes

together

by examining 1953

the events between the

to a fateful toward

confrontation in Iran and By 1951

in August

movement

democracy

the strategic the democratic the oil

views

held by in

the Eisenhower Iran

Administration. closely bound

movement

had become

up with National

nationalization its main

issue and with Mossadeq proponents. extremely Mossadeq popular

and the

Front, who were

and the mainstream

of the National democratic

Front were More-

in Iran and

had strong

ideals.

over, while

nationalization Front,

was the most prominent goal

issue pursued

by the National tion power 1951 was the in Iran Iran.

a more fundamental of a more of

of this organizadistribution of

achievement At

democratic

the height to be on

Mossadeq's the verge

popularity of

in late a

appeared populist

establishing state,

non-aligned,

(if not truly

democratic)

not unlike

those existing

at the time

in India and Argentina.

The enactment

of the nationalization between adopted

law

in April

1951 set the

stage for a confrontation The Truman this Administration supporting British However, Mossadeq

the National a relatively embargo and

Front and Britain. neutral on position in

dispute,

the British to negotiate with the

Iran but

also

encouraging

the

restraining

British

interventionism. administration toward role

inauguration of a States

of the Eisenhower new U.S. approach played in the Minister a crucial post-coup Zahedi. By

became

the target The United August

Third World in ousting

nationalism. Mossadeq in

1953 and

consolidation h~lping regime,

of power

by the shah and Prime Front and largely

to d~stroy the United

the National States,

install on

an authoritarian consider-

acting

strategic

PAGE 113 dtions, democracy dealt a in Iran. decisive blow to the long-term prospects for

1) IRAN ON THE EVE OF NATIONALIZATION

THE OIL ISSUE

With the collapse in Azerbaijan begin to focus

of

the Soviet-supported in late issues. 1946, Chief

autonomous Iran could among

republics once again the This

and Kurdistan on internal

these was Shah.

status of agreement

the 1933 was widely

oil agreement regarded

negotiated

by Reza

in Iran

as a sellout Knowledgable by

to the British Iranians Mexico of were its

and a surrender well aware of

of Iranian

sovereignty.

the successful oil industry

nationalization

foreign-controlled Mexico

and of the favorable from U.S.

deais which Pres1947 the

and Venezuela Majles

had obtained led to the to

oil companies. in October with

sure in the requiring the

passage renegotiate a

of a bill the

government

agreement

AIOC. After the AlOe announced 1946 and 1947 a special the oil question. Majles

100% increase

in profits

between to study

commission

was established

Secret

negotiations

aimed

at securing 1948.

new agreement negotiating which until

were team

begun with the AlOe presented promptly when a for

in August 25-point

The Iranian

an elaborate rejected.

list of complaints, intermittently signed. but This

the AlOe 1949, called the

Talks

continued was
I

July

Supplemental

Agreement

Agreement

increased

payments

to Iran The

did little

to satisfy

Iranian

list of

demands.

presentation

of the

Supplemental

PAGE 114 Agreement precluded to the Majles caused an immediate adjourned uproar, in which

ratification

before issue

the Majles during

late July. The was

Oil remained

an explosive

the ensuing negotiations

elections. (Hazhir)

prime minister assassinated convened mental in

who had begun by the

the secret

xenophobic

Fedayan-i-Islam. less sympathetic was

The new to

Majles

March

1950 was even In June

the Suppleover to an

Agreement.

the issue

turned studied by

l8-member

oil commission. rejected

The oil commission

the agreement the National

and finallY

it in November,

amid calls

Front and the Tudeh

party

for nationalization.

By late 1950 oil had come to dominate ly after announced the commission that rejected

Iranian

politics. Agreement

ShortARAMCO

the Supplemental a 50-50

it had concluded the first Aloe quickly along similar

profit-sharing to be

arrangement in the

with Saudi Arabia, Middle mental offer), East. The Agreement

such agreement offered lines to

reached

renegotiate doubling In

the Suppleits previous 1951 67

(nearly

but by this dealing

time had waited

too long.

January

proposals including

with the oil issue were by Mossadeq which

submitted called

to tha Majles,

one authored

for nationaliza-

tion. Prime Minister bill and was Following oilfields Mossadeq's proposal a in

Razmara

publicly

opposed

the nationalization

assassinated series of

in early March protracted early April, and

by the Fedayan-i-Islam. violent strikes in the

March and

the oil

committee

approved

nationalization

bill on April

26. On the same day a new for the establishon its divide

was presented

by the British company having

calling

ment of a new British board profits ly from events. of directors

Iranian

representation oil and

which

would

control

Iran's

on a 50-50 basis. the previous Yielding

This proposal

differed

only superficialthe rush of

AlOe offer,

and was

lost in

to popular

pressure,

the shah appointed the

Mossadeq bill

prime minister

on April

29 and

signed

nationalization

into law on May 1.1

PAGE 115 THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE IN 1951

By aligned

May 1951

most

of the

proponents Front.

of nationalization The National attempt an to

had

themselves

with the National

Front had rig the organ-

been organized sixteenth ization Majles

in 1949 to protest elections.

the shah's became

It quickly favoring status in

umbrella

for a variety

of groups

nationalization The main the

and seek-

ing a change grouped in

in the political the National Iran party,

quo.

organizations progressive, Sanjabi, mainly of

Front

1951 were Saleh

nationalist which was left-wing, Mozaffar contained

led by Allahyar early 1940s

and Karim

formed

in the

and was composed the Toilers

anti-Soviet which

intellectuals; stood to the

party,

led by

Baqai, both

left of

the Iran

party and and and

intellectual

and working

class/bazaar

elements; Kashani

the Mojahadin-;-Islam, composed clergy. viduals growing mainly

led by the workers

demagogic

Ayatollah

of bazaar

and merchants

and rank-and-file of indiamong the

The National

Front also attracted affiliation, The main

a large number particularly organizations with

with no organizational urban middle which class. were not

favoring Front

nationalization

aligned

the National

were the Tudeh party and the fanatical

Fedayan-i-Islam.2

The diverse

elements

of the National of Iran's viewed to all

Front

shared

one primary control

goal: the nationalization over Iran's oil independence opment. a more

oil resources. as the main its social elements

British

was widely

obstacle

to Iran's develFront

and as a hindrance for virtually objective pow~r

and economic

However,

of the National

fundamental of

lay behind

the oil issue: royal court

a redisand the The

tribution landowning

political

away from the middle

class toward

the emerging class were because

and lower classes.

court and the landowning tion in the oil dispute and b~cause

linked with the British long-standing opposed

posi-

of their

ties with

the British

th~y had consist~ntl~

full nation-

PAGE 116
alization. attacking These links made power the oil of these a popular issue an groups. ideal medium for

the political

They also gave the tying it to the revo-

oil nationalization democratic lution. movement

movement which

character,

had begun

with the constitutional

While a

redistribution

of political

power was favored of the National of an

in one Front,

form or another there nature, over

by virtually

all elements

were considerable over the extent groups in the it

differences, a redistribution be

mainly

ideological take and and

of power at. The

should

the

should

targeted

liberals

centrists sponded

National

Front

(whose views favored

most closely oriented

corretoward

with

those of Mossadeq) class but did

reforms

the middle

not challenge monarchy party and called

fundamental

institutions economy. were The

such as the constitutional Marxists into in the Toilers factions

or the capitalist in the Iran party for the

split of a

various

which

establishment ideological sought

socialist Kashani's of secular followers

state

modeled

along

particular

lines.

supporters laws

in the Mojahadin-i-Islam

the abolition much like the

and implementation Khomeini

of the Shari'a,

of Ayatollah

in post-revolutionary

Iran.

The various tactics,

groups

in the

National

Front differed of adherence activity. The

further to

over

particularly means

on the question of political Front his committed These around (i .e.,

legal and most loyal to

constitutional elements support of

the National until

those which in within

continued 1953)

Mossadeq

overthrow to working included Mossadeq

were

Western-oriented work of centrists lectuals latter

and were

the frameliberals and

the constitution. grouped of were, closely

both the

and the left-wing

intelthe time

the Toilers for

party and

the Iran party. who had described

Although at one

the most party,

part, Marxists they are best party, despite

supported

the Tudeh

as democratic ~heto~ic

socialists.

Thus the Toilers

its socialist

PAGE 117 and program, monarchy.3 continued to favor retention of the constitutional

Mossadeq

himself

had

spent much of his life to democratic principles. life and a young Exiled

in public Although

service he was

and was deeply a wealthy as a

committed

landowner,

he led an austere politician. As

had a reputation man he in 1906 had been for his

scrupulously in

honest

involved political where ing to Majles

the constitutional

movement. law

activities,

he studied beliefs were

in France

and Switzerland, After returna

his political Iran he deputy.

further

developed. posts

held several

administrative opposed could

and became

In 1925 he publicly that the

the coronation not, under

of Reza

Shah on the grounds tution, retain the

monarch

the constiReza

prime ministership exile.

and the He returned the 1944

war ministry. to public

Shah sent him into internal 1944 as a future Majles deputy

life in all

and authored This would

bill Dutlawing

foreign

oil concessions. oil revenues

bill was designed be used

to guaranpurposes in

tee that Iran's rather than

for domestic Mossadeq policy, reform.

to pacify

the superpowers. neutrality forces,

campaigned

1944 on the issues of control over the armed

in foreign

parliamentary He continued

and electoral

to stress

these basic themes

as prime minister

in 1951-1953.4

While Mossadeq to upholding the

and

his closest

supporters

were

thus committed thE~ same cannot

principles of

of the constitution, the National Front.

be said for all elements and his supporters within about

Ayatollah made no

Kashani

in the

Mojahadin-i-Islam of the

pretenses Kashani

about working openly bragged and

the framework his links to close ties

constitution. of

the killers with sports

Prime Minister gangs which

Razmara5 could be Much the working Makkj, a

maintained

club

hired to stage same can class/bazaar popular

demonstrations

or attack

his opponents. in the

be said for wing of the

Baqai and Toilers

his supporters party, and

for Hossein secretary of

Majles

deputy

from

Abadan

who was

PAGE 118 the government's National Makki Front oil committee. in late Following their defection from the and

1952 and early to

1953 Kashani, and

Baqai,

used

these tactics himself.

help undermine

eventually

over-

throw Mossadeq

In addition mainstream political never

to their

democratic

proclivities,

Mossadeq

and the

of the National force in Iran at a hard

Front were also by far the most popular the time. Mossadeq's core of some all outside States Majles opposition

grew

beyond

fifteen

conservative, including admitted

pro-British

deputies. in

Virtually

observers, and Britain,

top policymakers to the popularity ular. Throughout

both the United

of the National the tenure of

Front and of M05Sadeq the Truman

in particthe him

administration and viewed

State Department as the most State

recognized

Mossadeq's

popularity

effective study

barrier in in the

to a communist
1952

takeover

in Iran. A that

Department

early

expressed its

concerns to

Mossadeq's doubtful

popularity

army made

loyalty

the shah Much the as "the "popular to

in the event of a were held political Even in the force

shah-Mossadeq

power

struggle. Mossadeq of his

same views dominant prestige." unseat

CIA, who described in Iran~ while because making

the British,

continual

efforts

him, were forced views about

to admit Mossadeq press.6

to Mossadeq's were

"personal

populariin both the

ty." Similar British

also expressed

and the American

Although National enjoyed

Mossadeq

was clearly prominent

the

most popular ln this

figure

in the

Front,

other

figures

organiZation and Makki basis of

considerable

popularity extensive

as well. popular

Kashani, support

Baqai, on the

were able

to mobilize

both their personal The defection of

appeal

and their

ties to sports from the

club leaders. Front weakHowever, in power (in

these

key leaders by reducing

National

ened it to some degree the ability after their of Mossadeq defection

its base of support. Front to remain coup

and the and to

National survive

repeated

attempts

PAGE 119 which these men were deeply involved) indicates Mossadeq's great Of the Khalil (who

popularity National Maleki.

and his

fundamental

role in the loyal

organization. to Mossadeq.

Front figures leader

who remained wing

of the intellectual to form the Third Iran party also

of the Toilers

party

split with Baqai leaders support. of the

Force

in late 1952), considerable

and the public

enjoyed

Aside from the National ization which ity in while

Front,

the only other

political

organ-

can be said to have enjoyed time was the was making Tudeh

any broad-based party. The

popularparty,

Iran at this still outlawed,

Tudah

a strong

recovery

from the defeat cells in all and 1952

it had suffered the major published placed

in late 1946. which of

It had well-disciplined through CIA front

cities. a

operated

organizations in early

variety

newspapers. in Tehran

estimates

Tudeh

membership

at 8,000,

with three

to four

times as many ly penetrated

sympathizers. several

In addition,

the Tudeh

had successfulwithnetwork

government

departments installing

and. apparently an elaborate to where

out the knowledge in the popular Iranian among

of the CIA,

was

army.

The Tudeh in

party

continued

be extremely it was able

the oil workers

the southwest.

to stage massive

demonstrations.7

Although

the main orientation middle class.

of

the National

Front was toward support from

Iran's emerging the urban primarily

it enjoyed

considerable working party.

lower class and the through Kashani

industrial

class

as well, of

and the Toilers the working frequent

The popularity

the National liberal

Front among led

class and conflict

its essentially with the Tudeh ruling

policies

it into

party, which class."e

denounced

it as "the last hope of the decadent some similar of violent goals

Although

the two shared notably in a

and collabin 1n

orated at times. July 1952 which which

series

demonstrations a brief period

returned

Mossadeq

to power after the National

he had been replaced

by Qavam,

Front government

PAGE 120 frequently control. harrassed the Tudeh and was several State careful Department Front for to keep studies it under at the

Oddly

enough, Mossadeq The

time portrayed and anti-Tudeh. remained

and the National support

as anti-communist the National the party Front for

lack of Tudeh point of

a major

self-criticism

within

years after Mossacleq's overthrow.9

Aside from the Tudeh Front before

party,

the only opposition Baqai,

to the National came from and

the defection group

of Kashani, of wealthy

and Makki

a loosely-organized top military sive in this the National icant popular seats by candidates small

landowners, shah

businessmen, was quite

officers. period, Front.

Although

the young

indeci-

he invariably This traditional but managed

sided with ruling to

this group against had no signifof Majles for the to its elite in

elite

support, votes

retain

a number to vote

buying

and encouraging by (led of their by

peasants In

designated faction

landowners. Jamal

addition the ruling

Majles

Emami),

controlled

the upper house

parliament,

had strong apparatus,

influence

the royal court and in parts closely National with the British. Front

of the security

and worked

The conflicts amounted and

between to a

this group and the between on

consequently

confrontation

the popular

branch

of parliament

the crowds the senate, on

in the streets and parts

the one hand, military various (all

and the royal court, backed the by

of the its

the British)

the other.

Despite

strengths,

CIA saw little

chance making

of this group

coming

to power or staying alist sentiments

in power without

concessions

to nation-

and using

authorltarian

tactics.10

2) THE ANGLO-IRANIAN

OIL CRISIS,

1951-1952

PAGE 121 THE ANGLO-IRANIAN OIL NEGOTIATIONS

After the 1951, control the

nationalization primary British

bill was signed objective was to

into law on retain

May

1.

effective

over the production this goal

and marketing

of Iran's

oil. In order minimal

to achieve concessions provided

the British

were willing

to make

on price and accept

the principle their

of nationalization, position of control. with

that this would was

not jeopardize both through

This objective the Iranian

pursued

direct to

negotiations

government

and through Court

appeals

the UN, Security The British of economic groups also

Council sought

and the

International

of Justice. a series

to pressure

Iran by instituting

embar-

goes against Mossadeq

it and conspiring Beyond for

with opposition both

to remove and the became

from office. Bank

this,

the United .and

States

International involved

Reconstruction

Development

in attempts

to mediate

the dispute.

After the enactment the British on the

of the nationalization to the International position since was was

law the first Court

act of

was to appeal

for a ruling was not fact. an

oil dispute. to rule

Iran's

that the court in

competent Iranian

on the matter

the AlOe was,

company

and the dispute

thus a domestic

issue. At the This team the principroduce and

same time proposed ple of market

the AlOe sent a on June 19 that, in

negotiating exchange

team to Tehran. for recognizing be hired to

nationalization, Iran's oil little

the AlOe should

on a 50-50

profit-sharing British

basis. offer

This proposal

differed

from

the previous

and was rejected slowdown and took

by Iran. The

AlOe meanwhile tankers

began a production oil at the

steps to prevent These actions which reduced

from loading evolved

port of Abadan. oil blocade,

gradually production

into a full-fledged nothing

to virtually

by the end of July. would

The other major

oil companies.

fearing

that nationalization

PAGE 122 undermine erated tanker crucial. their own positions the AIOC. to market in Since other producing countries, coop-

fully with capacity On July

only the oil Court

majors their

had sufficient was

Iran's

cooperation

5 the International

recommended

that both judgement issue it was

sides return

to the status

quo as of May 1, but withheld in the case. the court

on the question was finally

of its competence

This latter ruled that

settled

in July 1952 when

'

not competent

to rule.

With the began to control

collapse

of the

June round of The Iranian Britain

negotiations began

tensions to take into

escalate

rapidly.

government sent several the

over the oilfields Gulf.

and

warships

the Persian President

In an attempt

to resolve

deepening

crisis

Truman

sent Averell

Harriman

to Tehran

to try to mediate

the dispute.

Harriman

was greeted

in Tehran

on July 15 with bloody After two weeks

riots, apparently

sponsored

by the Tudeh

party.

Harriman finally succeeded in arranging a formula to reopen direct

negotiations. dispatched A British mIssIon under Richard plan' Stokes on August from was 13.

to Tehran again and

and presented differed

an 8-point in

This proposal British offers

little

substance

previous

was eventually to Stokes

rejected. on August

Mossadeq 22. Stokes

then delivindignantly

ered a counter-proposal rejected this proposal

and returned

to london

the next day.

Upon Stokes' announcement

return

the British the Mossadeq

Foreign

Office

made an ominous the

accusing

government

of violating that

terms of Harriman's pursue waited the issue until

negotiating further at

formula the

and stating

it would Mossadeq and from then

International

Court.

September

5 for a

reply to his technicians resumed

counterproposal be expelled Britain

then announced the oilfields announced

that all British unless Britain

would

negotiations.

that negotiations a settlement

had been cancelled with the Mossadeq

and that

it saw no

hope of reaching

government.ll

PAGE 123 With direct the failure negotiations of the Stokes mission, Britain strategy abandoned designed The of a

and adopted

a three-track

to pressure

Iran into a settlement of this strategy

on more favorable involved

terms.

first component

the implementation

plan to remove Mossadeq over the previous Iranian political

from office.

This plan had been developed with to certain pro-British coordinated

months

in conjunction It appears

figures.

have been

with a large military in response British together

buildup

made by the British The second economic were

in mid-September component sanctions of the which,

to Mossadeq's called

ultimatium. for further itself,

strategy

with the oil blocade opinion increasingly

designed

to turn domestwo compo-

tic public

against

Mossadeq.

These

nents will be. discussed

in greater

detail

in the next section.

The third component to mobilize the world

of the British against To he the would

strategy

involved an

an attempt appeal to

opinion Council. that a

Mossadeq great

through

UN Security

dismay

of the lead the

British, Iranian and strito water by

Mossadeq

announced Through

personally of great

delegation.

combination rhetoric, and

showmanship

dent anti-imperialist down having tional United the British debate Court. States

Mossadeq then

was able first to block

resolution

it entirely

postponed Mossadeq by meeting

until after made further

the decision gains during

of the Internahis stay in the top U.S. and for an his new

with President

Truman

and other

officials. got Truman

He impressed to agree

them with his willingness a $120 million in late November in the Majles.

to negotiate loan package

to consider to Iran confidence states,

Iran. Mosssdeq overwhelming victories elections.l~

returned vote of

and received Buoyed called by for

in the

United

he immediately

Elections Churchill. members

were also

held

in Britain

in

late Octob9r,

bringing As

Eden, and

a new Conservative cabinet, Churchill

government

to power.

of the shadow

and Eden had been deeply

PAGE 124 involved in the British They were, tories plans of the previous staunch summer to overthrow

Mossadeq.13 empire,

of course, they had

defenders

of the British in opposing oil

and as

no difficulty

nationalization ly made

or Third World to Acheson being held

nationalism that he was

in general.

Eden quickin the which Acheson

it clear then

not interested with Mossadeq, about. He told

discussions

in Washington optimistic

U.S. policymakers that "no agreement Acheson's Mossadeq.14 view

were quite would

be better

than a bad the

one." and disputed alternative to

than

communism

was

only

From this point trying series to

revive

on the United the stalled

States

took the

leading

role in backed a

negotiations.

It strongly the first pursued

of proposals during

by the International stay in

Bank,

of which further

was made

Mossadeq's to Tehran. between

New York and called

after his return division called

This proposal the Bank, company

for a three-way and Iran. It also staff) this

of profits

the AlOe, (with

for a

neutral

operating and

some British

to operate idea but revised further tation

the oilfields left the

the refinery. further

Mossadeq

rejected

door open for several times

negotiations.

The Bank making

its

offer

in the following

months,

concessions in the

on price

and on the issue of British company. However, of

represen-

proposed

operating

none of these of

proposals

made more

than nominal

recognition

the principle

nationalization, ations

and were

thus rejected an

by Iran. and

The Bank negotiwere indefinitely

eventually on March

reached

impasse,

suspended

16.15

With complete

the collapse

of

these

efforts

negotiations

came to

halt. No further

high-level Court

talks were held until had ruled in favor

August

1952, after

the International

of Iran on for

the issue of its competence a brief, tumultuous of period

and after

Mossadeq

had left office events

in late July.

The latter United

touched which

off a frenzy

activity

on the part of the

States,

PAGE 125 feared Press an imminent communist coup. states On August 11 the Associated to press resulted for a in the by

reported change of a

that the United in British

was "prepared This effort which

radical release

policies."16

joint U.S.-British

proposal,

was co-signed

Churchill

and Truman.

The Churchill-Truman sation to be submitted the pre-nationalization negotiations British between the

joint to the status

note called

for the issue of compenCourt on the basis of

International quo and

for a resumption In exchange oil

of direct

AIOC and Iran. would

for this the would

economic

sanctions

be lifted, United

production

be resumed diate cash ignored the

by the AIOC, and the grant of $10 million

States

would

make an immeentirely of but

to Iran. This and called this

proposal for

the fact

of nationalization did not reject

the return outright, and

AIOC. Mossadeq

proposal

rather discussed British series

it for two weeks ambassadors.

with his cabinet On September 16

with the a

and American

he announced

of counterproposals with Britain attitude rejected

and made a veiled would be broken

threat unless These 14.

that diplomatit took a more

ic relations constructive were flatly Mossadeq

toward

the dispute.

counterproposals Two days later would be

by the British

on October relations

announced

that diplomatic

with Britain

suspended.

A final attempt States in November

to reach a settlement 1952. Negotiations 1953 between

was begun

by the United in Janu-

were held and

in Tehran

ary and February Loy Henderson. ny staffed be formed submitted immediate dragged by

Mossadeq

the U.S.

ambassador, compa-

The United American,

States British,

proposed

that a purchasing unspecified

and other

nationals issue be and that an talks

to market

Iran's

oil, that Court

the compensation for arbitration,

to th~ International $100 million

U.S. loan be 20, when

extended

to Iran. These ended

on until March

they were finally company

by Mossaresem-

deq. In calling

for a purchasing

the U.S. proposal

PAGE 126 bled previous inconsistent ~mbassy U.S. and British with the efforts, of which Iran had rejected The as

principle in

nationalization. negotiations good Taith. became ATter

U.S.

p~rsonnel

involved

these in

convinced

that Mossadeq ations

was not bargaining Henderson

the negotiheld by from

collapsed

soon came around would

to the view

his two top assistants office. abandoned

that Mossadeq

have to be removed and Britain

From this point serious

on the United with

States

entirely and

negotiations a covert

the Mossadeq it.17

government

began to implement

plan to overthrow

BRITISH

INTERVENTION

IN IRANIAN

POLITICS

By 1951

Britain

had been

involved

in Iran's aspects

domestic of this

affairs involve-

for well over a century. ment were Britain's sive economic government conjunction the Mossadeq involvement agents,

The most visible military

frequent

interventions

and its extenthe British coercion in

interests

in Iran. During military power efforts

the oil crisis and economlC described

used both

with the diplomatic government. in Iran at and

above

to weaken

An equally this time influence

important was the

aspect

of Britain's network of

elaborate

informers,

peddlers

it had developed the

through to

the years. further

This network Mossadeq

was employed and to press

during

oil crisis

weaken

for his replacement

by a more

compliant,

pro-British

government.

The British the Freemason

network lodge,

in Iran had long which counted

been coordinated its members

through many of

among

Iran's

top politicians, early family. 1950s a

military

officers, of

and businessmen. the British net

In the was the in mili-

1940s and Rashidian

key element

The Rashidians during World

had made

a huge fortune

tary construction

War II

with help from the British.

PAGE 127 They subsequently seeking and British served favors with as a primary contact between point for Iranians embassy Another

and as a liason whom they

the British poker.

the shah,

regularly net was

played a group

important pro-British faction British figures, crowds

element

of the

British These

of prominent,

politicians. by Jamal to a

included

Sayyid

lia and the Majles two groups the

headed had

Emami.

In addition

to these of

access

broad assortment influence

journalists, opinion and

bazaar organize

and mullahs

who could

and gangs of sports

club toughs

on their

behalf.ls

Operating against

through

this

network,

the

British

began

to

work

nationalization in the months

even before before

it became

law. Their

principal

objective

the nationalization "with which

bill was signed could

was to bring to power a be conducted on the reasonably."

government

negotiations through

This was to be achieved Sayyid

pressure The shah

shah to appoint

lia as prime minister.19 and was reportedly nominated

was apparently the matter the

agreeable

to this,

discussing for was

with Sayyid

lia when on

the MajIes 28,

Mossadeq

prime ministership the British

April

1951. efforts

After Mossadeq to install

appointed

continued

their

Sayyid

Zia. This goal by the British

was pursued ambassador

despite

strong

reservations

expressed and by

in Tehran Department

(Sir Francis in the Foreign

Shepherd) Office.2o

the head of the Eastern

With the appointment in motion the These

of Mossadeq efforts

as prime minister described by a in heavy to

Britain

set

diplomatic were

the

previous round Cyprus in of in

section.

accompanied brigade

saber-rattling. mid-May and

A paratroop

was dispatched sent to to announce

the cruiser

Mauritius

was

Abadan that

June.

These actions

led the National "signal and

Front

the first In london formulate

shot fired would British long-term PI~n5 for

the start academic of

of World advisors

War 111."21 began to

policymakers plans covart

in anticipation action

a breakdown s~nction5

in negotiations. w~ra di5CU5S~d.

and aconomic

PAGE 128
Christopher Montague Woodhouse, an MI6 officer who had to Tehran played a

key role in the GreeK Civil War, was dispatched dinate covert activities with the British

to coor-

net. Efforts

to install a break

Sayyid Zia were apparently in the negotiations.22

put on

the back burner

pending

The first Soon after, the Foreign shah

round of opposition Office

oil negotiations leaders Churchill joint

collapsed and Eden

in

late June. to press to the bringing

began approach

to seek a This

U.S.-British in

to remove

Mossadeq. Plans

meant,

their words, had already

about "a COUp."23 oped. one."24 enough, time in The removal He

for covert

action

been develnumber

of Mossadeq to be

was viewed replaced

as "objective with Sayyid

was presumably Maclean

lia. Oddly at this to the

Fitzroy

and several

other MPs participated on behalf of a bid

a protracted Office by

lobbying

effort

Foreign Office "we

Qavam

for the prime other

ministership.

The Foreign

responded

that "certain on

plans

are now under way" and apparently referring to

have our

money

another

horse,"

Sayyid Zia.25 to replace

Pressures

were evidently

brought

to bear on the shah July, first opposing He the

Mossadeq.

He vacillated a joint

throughout Sayyid

the plan and then favoring changed Harriman his mind again

Zia-Qavam were

dovernment. under

when

negotiations

resumed

and Stokes

missions.26

The Stokes serious effort

mission

appears to

in retrospect negotiate

to have been the last When this offenOf the

British failed,

effort

with Mossadeq.

Britain

immediately designed

mounted

a multi-pronged office. forcQs

sive against many attempts

Mossadeq

to remove

him from

undertaken during

by domestic

or foreign

to oVerthe is

throw Mossadeq one which

his tenure

as prime

minister

(including and

finally

succeeded),

this was

the most

determined

most deservedly

described

as a coup attempt.

Soon after

the Iranian

team

rejected

his proposals,

Stokes

met

PAGE 129 with the shah and implored ten several days later by him to dismiss the permanent that Mossadeq referred to Mossadeq.27 A memo writin the

undersecretary be brought in

For~ign

Offlc~

rQcommended This memo

down as soon were

as possible. "indirect aging was

actions

Iran which noted

and behind

the scenes," to to

and pointedly in the

"an encourThis his by

growth

of opposition a reference the

(Mossadeq) efforts and block Shepherd

Majles."28 Emami and confidence up

presumably to a

by Jamal votes of

faction

disrupt

Majles

preventing appeal Sayyid Foreign

quorum.

Ambassador strong

followed

on Stokes' 29 that the

to the shah with a Zia be Office brought in

recommendation Mossadeq.

on August

to replace

Meanwhile,

was busy developing Mossadeq's included

an elaborate whom it

set of guidelines presumed a modus resumption would be

for dealing

with

successor,

Sayyid Zia. These (which Sayyid shipments Minister and of Zia

a large AlOe loan and to) calling for a

vivendi of oil The

had agreed of

a return

the AlOe

under a different speculated

name.

Fuel and Power might

optimistically Britain

that these

arrangements tion.29

just enable

to avoid

full nationaliza-

These behind-the-scenes economic blocade sanctions of Iranian

efforts

were accompanied British by military

by a series presence.

of The

and an expanded oil organized had by

the Aloe this time allies

with help reduced

from the oil

other major exports August the

oil companies

Iran's

to a trickle. to discourage

Britain's their

European

were asked

in late with on or

citizens

from seeking The

employment announced

newly-formed 6 that

Iranian it would oil

oil company.

Aloe

September individual drawn up British

take legal action Iranian quickly

against

any company Plans

buying in early

from the and

government. implemented

were

September

to embargo equipment, for other a

exports

to Iran OT could

iron, steel, be resold

011 processing

sugar, and goods which currency financial conversion

for dollars. on September imposed,

Privileges 10 and

were

cancelled were

restrictions

subsQquently

violating

PAGE 130 memorandum of understanding destroyers which Britain had signed with Iran.

Four British

arrived

in the Persian British

Gulf on September land and air forces described attempt above, on the

5. Plans were also made to in the region. these efforts Together constituted

strengthen

with

the covert

actions

a serious

and concerted

part of the British

government

to overthrow

Mossadeq.3o

Ambassador early September prompted suspended

Shepherd by

took

these

efforts to the that

one

step further Office had

in

sending

a message

Foreign

which been

its September and

6 statement saw no

negotiations

that Britain

hope of reaching was "designed Zia,"

an agreement to encourage to accuse that

with Mossadeq. the opposition the British the shah opposition of

This statement, group headed trying a

which

by Sayyid

led Mossadeq Shepherd

to overthrow

him.31

reported

favored

change

of government of overthrowing

and suggested Mossadeq.

that the views about

was on the verge disputed

These

were heatedly

by Stokes,

who argued get us 31

that "mucking In

with discredited shah had

old men ...will on August 17

nowhere."32

fact the Qavam could to not

told Shepherd

that he preferred that Mossadeq to have

Sayyid Zia, and on September be replaced British at that time.

he stated appears

Shepherd

been the only Deputy two

official

who felt the of State

shah would

dismiss argued

Mossadeq.

Undersecretary alternatives Mossadeq expelled

Sir Roger

Makins

that only

could come from the policy fall (which he doubted> The

pushed or

by Shepherd:

either be Not

would from

the British soon

would

Abadan.33

latter

occurred. to Poland.

surprisingly,

Shepherd

was soon named ambassador

After the September the shah to of these dismiss activities that Sayyid

6 announcement

Shepherd states

continued quickly When

to press got wind Harriman Shepherd

Mossadeq. and

The United

protested

vigorously.

suggest~d was merely

Zia was "not capabl~ Sayyid U.S.

of governing,"

told not to mention replace Mossadeq.34

Zia by name policymakers

when pressing felt Mossadeq

the shah to

PAGE 131 was "anxious r~ceive to reach an agreement," Rather and suggested that Britain th2 Britafter must

an Iranian

delegation.35

than negotiatQ, on Mossadeq. that British

ish decided Mossadeq's

to step up their September 20

pressure

Shortly workers

announcement

leave Abadan, note to Truman against support "gravely Iran.

Prime Minister suggesting Truman

Atlee apparently

addressed

a personal

that he was considering that stated the United that the course

the USQ of force States United would States not was

responded

this. A

second message about

concerned"

the present After British held

of events,

and again in

recommended the Persian off Abadan, Security of being U.S.

negotiations.

troops

were positioned in

Gulf and warships the British rather cabinet

firing

practice

the river to the "tired

decided forcQ. States,"

to take the matter Although they were

Council lectured

than USQ

by the United force

it appears to

that lack of their

support

helped

the

British

moderate

policies.36

Mossadeq Tehran in

triumphed

in

the Security stronger a than

Council ever.

and returned quite

to

late November,

It was

clear

that the British would remain

had suffered for

serious

setback

and that Mossadeq Two major changes First, they

in power

some timQ as a result

to comQ. of

occurred while appear

in British

policy

these

failures. Mossadeq,

they continued

to look for a way of the U.S. arguement His name

ousting

to have accepted to assume after

that Sayyid

lia was too in Brit-

discredited

power.

is rarely mentioned of Sayyid

ish documents began to back up his Power

this period.

Instead for

lia the British Qavam stepped and State for by

Qavam as a replacement efforts, that he and the be put

Mossadeq. Minister

lobbying suggested

British "in

of Fuel

funds."37 are pinning

The U.S. their of

Department

believed

that "the British

hopes

a settlement Qavam."38 Busheri,

of the oil issue

on the replacement Mossadeq, were

Mossadeq

Other candidates Mossadeq's The Minister

to succeed of Roads, in

such as

Javad also made at

subsequently policy

discussed.39

second major

change

British

PAGE 132 this United time was States. a greater This was effort most to coordinate evident in a policy series with of the joint

appraisals

made by the two embassies

in the following

months.

The British in the position left winter

continued and

to develop of 1952.

covert

plans his

to oust Mossadeq strong appear domestic to have As

spring

However,

and the absence with no in

of a

suitable to

alternative

them

opportunity

implement the British Mossadeq Iran's

these also

plans. took August

discussed interest Their main

the previous

section, with weaken

little 1951.

in oil

negotiations was to

after

strategy

economy

by maintaining

the oil blocade Mossadeq's run out unrest,

and the other for

economic

sanctions

they had imposed. were expected to

options

countering He would

this strategy thereafter face

in mid-1952. which would

growing

domestic on

lead either

to

his fall or to negotiations

more favorable

terms.40

In July 1952 Mossadeq dispute Majles with the then elected tumultuous Front

suddenly

resigned

as prime minister armed forces.

in a The

shah OVer Qavam days,

control

of the him. Qavam violent forced

to replace after

remained

in office by

for five

which party

demonstrations the

the National and reappoint

and the Tudeh

shah to relent of activity what it

Mossadeq. States

This episode and Britain.

set off a flurry Hoping

by both the United regarded quickly agreed formal as made "in a more

to stabilize the state

cooperative offer with

government, economic aid

Department The British

plans to principle" for

to Qavam. and Qavam

these

plans,

even made

request

aid to

the U.S.

embassy.41

However,

before

anything

could

be done

to help

Qavam Mossadeq

was triumphantly

swept back

into office.

In the and

aftermath again were held

of the Qavam reevaluated in Washington

episode their

both ~he policies

United toward

S~ates Iran.

Britain

Discussions

on July 29 between

the British

PAGE 133 ambassador ods of and Assistant stopping Iran Secretary from of State down Henry the be Byroade drain." on methByroade and be was with

"going

suggested

that "most

unorthodox

methods"

might

necessary, should

"was perfectly examined."4l instructed his British tives power. embassy to Loy

willing

that the possibility the

of a coup

Henderson,

U.S. ambassador reappraisal a review of the of

in Tehran, situation

prepare

a joint

counterpart, and

including ways of

possible

alternato

to Mossadeq

bringing charge

these alternatives who headed to

George Middleton, after

the British

the Tehran London hands. that No

the removal

of Shepherd,

reported

only a coup could outstanding Fazlollah

stop Iran from falling had yet come

into communist

candidate

forward,

although

General A year

Zahedi

was described

as available finally

and adequate.43 Mossadeq.

later Zahedi

led the coup which

toppled

While

these discussions

were going prompted for a new

on Ambassador

Henderson

sent

a cable from Tehran which to press the British

Secretary round

of State of

Dean Acheson with immeshould replied that soon

negotiations States would

Mossadeq. diately

Acheson

suggested

that grant

the United

extend

a $10 million oil and

to Iran and that Britain The British

buy some Iranian that

resume

negotiations.

in their view Mossadeq in the Iranian against

should

not be helped.

They argued it might

morale

army was

improving

and that sharply

intervene mistic

Mossadeq.

This conflicted

with a pessiby Middleton. this time. that

report

on army morale

made a few days earlier in Washington was low Tudeh.

Henderson's He also

reappraisal

arrived

.at about

reported removal

that army might Eden

morale the

and suggested On August Acheson

Mossadeq's Foreign

benefit

9 British again inter-

Secretary

addressed was

a note to and that Press

stating soon

that the army's vene. Two days that the United in British British

morale

improving

it might a story

later the Associated States was "prepared Iran."44

ran

indicating change

to press The

for a radical

policies

toward

next day Acheson the United States

told the could not

ambassador

in Washington

that

PAGE 134
accept the British policy position toward and reserved the right to pursue an

independent

Iran.45

The British point. to

talk

of a military between

coup apparently states

ceased

at this soon led was is no

Discussions

the United

and Britain

the drafting

of the

Truman-Churchill

joint

note, which While there

pres~nted reason

to Mossadeq

and eventually

rejected. did anything it is

to believe

that the British Iran

more than contemevident that the

plate a coup against United states

in this period, to restrain

sought again

the British

in this regard

as they had in September

1951.

Mossadeq's decision

rejection

of

the joint

note was soon with Britain. government

followed

by a of

to break

diplomatic

relations

Deprived

both diplomatic operations United

contact

with the Iranian

and a base of to rely on the

inside

Iran, the British

were now forced

States

to resolve

the oil crisis.

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE ANGLO-IRANIAN

OIL NEGOTIATIONS

As discussed

in

chapter

4, U.S. strategic

and economic Arabia

interthan on by

ests in the Middle Iran in the years U.S. companies,

East were focused after World Iran's War

more on Saudi

II. Saudi

oil was controlled

while

oil was controlled

by the British. strategy,

Although it was for its

Iran played not covered defense

a key role under

in the U.S. containment Doctrine

the Truman to the

and responsibility In 1950 U.S.

was left

British interest

military.

policymakers nal situation while

began to take greater deteriorated aid was

in Iran as its interHowever, changes

and as the Cold War deepened. somewhat, Iran. no fundamental

economic

increased toward

were made

in U.S. policy

PAGE 135

u.s.
policy similar

policy in

in the Middle 1950s. Soviet

East The

was closely United in States

linked with British and Britain held

the early

views about to keeping policies

intentions

the area and were firmly sphere of influence. by the shared Joint

committed military for

it in the

Western

were

consequently The United

formulated States and also

two allies Britain's

regional

defense.

interest

in keeping

down oil prices oil. A glut

maintaining

U.S.-British and preskept

--

control

over the region's

in the oil market

sure from the producing the two powers These ties led states

countries

to raise production on each other's

levels

from encroaching

oil concessions. the United to

to a high level of cooperation and made it difficult

between

and Britain themselves

for u.S. policymakers

distance

significantly

from the British.

Nevertheless, had supported earlier and was

some

differences

did

emerge.

The

United several

States years

the anti-colonial sympathetic

movement

in India

to the nationalist

movement

in Iran,

which was vehemently more worried threat in than

anti-British. British

U.S. policymakers counterparts about

were clearly the communist company U.s. to

their

Iran. Also, were

since the

AlOe was a British its plight than were

officials reach a

less concerned

about

and more willing the British. interests,

settlement

at its expense supportive differences

While these

U.S. policy was ultimately factors led to important

of British on a number

of key issues.

u.s. policymakers ation steam. in Iran as

became

increasingly

concerned movement

about to

the situpick up that

the nationalization National

began

In March

1951 the

Security carries should in

Council with

concluded

"failure

to reach

(an oil agreement) that no opportunity our

it such undesir-

able consequences both governments dations increased table

be lost to impart to Recommenbe

sense of urgQncy that military be and

this matter." aid

were made

economic

to Iran

and that the British In April

pressed

for an "early were urged

and equian

settlement."46

the British

to accept

PAGE 136
arrangement assuring the key recognizing the principle of nationalization to but

effective was to

British

control. service" to

According Iranian

U.S. officials while to

pay "lip

nationalism were

safeguarding accept share Middle

British

interests. of profits, upset other

The British

pressed

a 50-50 division for Iran East.47 would

but were warned pricing

that a larger in the

arrangements

After States dispute.

the national'2ation publicly On sought to

law

went

into effect as

the

United in the

portray

itself

neutral for

May 18 the State between Britain

Department It that

called urged

a negotiated

settlement threats

and Iran.

both sides to avoid not get involved General Omar if

and intimidation

and stated

it would

in the specifics Bradley fighting that announced

of a settlement. that

Several would of

days later not become State

u.s.

troops

involved

broke out.

On May 24 Secretary would

Acheson

pledged internal States U.S. use of British at the

the United Privately pressure said

States

not intervene were

in Iran's

affairs. opposed

the British on the

told that the a change grave

United

shah for

of go~ernment. concern" the

officials force in

they would

view "with very

Iran, except complained attitude

under

limited

conditions.48 and "annoyed

officials American

that they were "bothered" indifference."49

of relative

While the

U.S. policymakers they quietly the world

pressed began

both sides to

for an early a

end to for

dispute,

formulate of oil to

strategy

restructuring impending leum

1055

distribution production. On

make up

for the Petroof

of Iran's (composed

June 3 the Foreign from

Committee State, would

of officials adopted provide a

the Departments

Defense, companies supplies This

and Commerce) voluntarily disrupted

plan under which oil to U.s.

U.S. oil whose

allies

had been

by the cutoff some 46

of Iranian million

production. of oil

plan ultimately to affected

provided countries

barrels

products

in the first year

of the blocade,

PAGE 137 which actions amounted to 20% of Iran's the total 1950 production. Production would These

were carried ensure

out under

Defense

Act of 1950 be available they had the helped to

in order to

that adequate

oil supplies

in the event of an outbreak effect of strengthening Iran's economy

of hostilities. oil

However,

Britain's

blocade

and hence

undermine

and weaken

the Mossadeq

government.50

As the fi.rst round of oil United efforts states maintained

negotiations

broke

down

in June,

the

its neutral

posture After

but stepped

up its

to mediate

the oil dispute.

Iran rejected Secretary

the Britof State their quite to as

ish proposals George McGhee opposition alarmed

on June 19 Acheson met with British to

and Assistant

officials

and again

expressed was

to efforts

unseat

Mossadeq.

Acheson

at the breakdown ambassador Harriman but

in negotiations

and on July 4 proposed be sent to Tehran large-scale

the British a mediator. strations, ations effort

that Averell

Harriman

was greeted

in Tehran

with

demon-

soon managed aegis failed,

to arrange Stokes credits Britain

a resumption mission. Harriman

of negotithis

under the ultimately

of the Acheson between

Although

with preventing

an outbreak

of hostilities

and Iran.S1

With the collapse ment the The United cials felt capable believed told covert either of elaborate states

of the Stokes plans described

mission above

Britain to

began

to impleMossadeq. U.S. offifigure

overthrow efforts.

continued

to oppose

these

that Mossadeq getting an

was the

only Iranian through

political

agreement

the Majles. Mossadeq. disturbed

They also Harriman at their that aid to to

that the shah was unwilling officials on that behalf he was

to replace d~eply Zia.

British

activities the United

of Sayyid

He suggested economic

States

or Britain

should

offer

Mossadeq.

Other U.S. officials Even after to leave to

repeatedly

pressured

the British

resume negotiations. ~ritish continued workers were

the September the oilfields

20 announcement the United

that States 26

to oppose

plans

overthrow

M05sadeq.

On September

PAGE 138 Pr~sid~nt that Truman s~nt a m~ssag~ States urged would a to Prim~ Minist~r not support of the use Atl~~ stating by the

the United He also

of Torce On

Britain. following

resumption decided

negotiations.s~

day Atlee's

cabinet

not to use force and Although Acheson

instead initialchance

s~nt the matter ly opposed of success,

to the Security

Council.

this move on the grounds U.S. policymakers

that Britain became

had little

quickly

involved

in the ensuin New

ing delib~rations.53 York and Washington matters.

Talks were

also h~ld

with Mos5ad~q proposal

on the International

Bank

and other

The grav~ crisis

which

had ~merg~d shift

by the end of S~pt~mb~r

led

to a subtle but important ish position Staff towards British on the a

in U.S. policy On October stated

away from the BritJoint Chiefs of

oil issue. memo which States in

10 the

approved

that and

"Iran's

orientation of the

the United position

peacetime

maintenance

in the Middle of supporting

East now transcend British as oil interests official

in importance in Iran."s4 by the to the

the desirability

This memo was subsequently National Security Council.

adopted

U.S. policy

At th~ same view was

time a new approach pursued with

oil dispute

reflecting suggested Iran's of

this

the British. be estabas a

U.S. officials lished

that a multinational oil. Royal Dutch/Shell

consortium

to market leader

was suggested

possible companies ment

this consortium. A

and there was modification later,

talk that U.S. of this arrange-

might also participate. adopted three

was finally

years

after

Britain

was

expelled

from Iran and Mossadeq were

was overthrown.

However,

in Octo-

ber 1951 the British more favorable this approach. accepted it.55

still hoping Hence

to oust Mossadeq

and gain a for have

settlement. In any case

they had little

enthusiasm would

it is doubtful

that Mossadeq

Throughout efforts

November

1951 the United Mossadeq, arguing

States

continued

to oppose

to overthrow

that the

only alternative

PAGE 139 to him would be a communist to unseat takeover. Mossadeq Although the British continA

ued their efforts joint appraisal that "the Kingdom

they shared

this concern.

made by the two mutual

embassies

on November United

19 stated

immediate,

and overriding prevent

states-United falling into Tudeh

objective hands.H56

in Iran is to These fears

that country when

communist

increased

large-scale Opposition

demonstrations occupied expelled ment. Soviet the

broke Majles

out in building,

early and a lies

December.

deputies was

New York Times and insults about

reporter

from Iran for writing circulated

the govern-

Rumors

that Mossadeq announced

was about

to sell oil to the only

Union. Mossadeq

that aid from the West would basis.57

be accepted

on an unconditional

U.S. policymakers report in mid-January within

were greatly

disturbed

at

these

events.

of 1952 expressed days. By the

the fear

that Iran might U.S. offi-

collapse

thirty

end of the month the possibility British "fallen by

cials viewed would that turn to their

as. "highly the Soviet American propaganda"

probable" Union

that Mossadeq officials completely felt for

for aid.ss had

counterparts

CMossadeq's)

and were "obsessed that economlC on January 21

their

over-riding imminent, 4 aid on the

fear of communism."s9 the United program in States

Feeling

collapse

was

announced be

that the point Discussions

Iran would

greatly had

expanded.60 begun

International with renewed

Bank plan. which vigor.

in October.

were pressed

Unrest

continued Majles

in Iran in the elections

first

few months

of 1952. riots

The in

seventeenth early Deputy

were accompanied shot

by bloody

February.

The

Fedayan-i-Islam Hossein Fatemi

and seriously

wounded

Prime Minister

and threatened

to kill Mossa-

deq. The
In late charging erupted

Tudeh party continued

January Mossadeq in ordered

to stage

violent demonstrations.
consulates affairs. refused A closed. dispute the

all British internal

interference with the United

Iran's

States

when Mossadeq

to accept