PAGE 140 terms under U.S.-sponsored and President discussed in which the U.S. military mission was to operate.

The

International Truman October

B~nk negotiations broke down in March I announcGd that th~ $120 million loan first be contingent came However, on a settlement of the willingin the

would

oil dispute. ness to Majles

U.S. policymakers settlement. they began in

to doubt Mossadeq's after his success

reach a elections

to take a more While

optimistic

view about were

his ability expected deq would

U.

to remain

office.

financial

pressures

ultimately remain

to lead to la collapse,

it was felt that Mossa2-3 months. c!"isis By May or

in power no

for at least another felt a

s.

officiClls

longer

Tudeh-sponsored

coup was

imminent.61

In mid-July QClvClm.Qavam which massive

Mossadeq remained

unexpectedly in office
I

resigned

and was replaced

by

for five tumultuous forced the shah to

days, after reappoint States

demonstrations in the

Mossadeq. had sought

As discussed to bolster returned

previous

section,

the United

Qavam with a to office of their

$10-20

million

aid package. officials made a new it. He

After Mossadeq thorough

U.S. and British policies. Acheson

reevaluations

proposed rejected to act

plan for negotiations then warned ently that

to the British, States

who quickly

the United would

was prepared

independthe

if the British were

not cooperate.

Discussions

between

two allies note. This between

resumed,

culminating by

in the Truman-Churchill Mossadeq. Diplomatic

joint

note was

rejected

relations

Britain

and Iran were

soon broken.

With the

rejection

of the joint

note U.S. officials They which

began

to

search for another their attention to

approach the in the over

to the oil problem. arrangement 1951 Clnd and the within

soon turned had been Th~

consortium fClll of

considered ensuing

briefly

then droPPQd. crisis

discussions

this approach debate

atmosphere government with the

then prevailing ove!" how

led to a quiet the United

the U.S. itself

closely

States

should align

PAGE 141 British position. by the In the end the State Department and the disregarded Chiefs of it

suggestions Staff,

Department

of Justice generally

Joint

choosing

to maintain

pro-British

position

had hitherto

followed.

The consortium fied slightly previous

arrangement

liscussed

in

October

1951 was modiin the

in 1952. Where

ithe

AlOe

had been excluded

formulation,

the new Jlan called Withl

for the AIOC to purchase share

75% of Iran's oil output, uted among payment future were several U.S.

the remaining

to be distrib-

complnies In addition, a $100 million I was to be advanced to Iran by the U.S. government against purchases. to The Briiish were told that of anti-trust upset U.S. companies actions then

oil

reluctant against

particiPatelbecause

pending

them and because countrie~, U.S.

it would

their arrangements the necessary only

with other production because this

producing cutbacks.

who would were the

oppose to be

co~panies to secure ,

included

was necessary Bank.62

$100 million

from the

Export-Import

The views cations proposed of

of the Justice this arrangement

IDepartment on the w4re solicited. that

ahti-trust

implithe

After it

examining

arrangement,

JUstice!conclUded uPOr ...foreign l~ws.63

I

would

constitute thus

"an unreasonable violate federal

restraint anti-trust

commerce" days

and would

Two that

later the

Justice Iran

Department

issued a memo hands could

suggesting

the goal of keeping violating

out of Soviet

be a9hieved

without

anti-trust i.e., by

laws by enabling doing away

Iran to sell its oil on the open market, arrangement The State and,

with the consortiu~

by implication, apparentthe

with the AlOe concession

as We~I.64 It

Department

ly ignored anti-trust mented

this

suggestion.

eventually

chose

to circumvent was finally security

issue when a consorJium 1954 by citinJ

arrangement national

imple-

in August

urgent

concerns.

A second

dispute

arose with

the Joint

Chiefs

of Staff.

Follow-

PAGE 142
ing Mossadeq's Council decided rejection of t~e joint tie note the National Security

to reexamine proposed

u.s.

position United

in the oil dispute. be to prepared prevent to a

The Joint

Chiefs

that the

States

act independently communist thls mlght t~keover.

of Britain In doing

if necessary

in order

so they explicitly U.S. relatlonshlp

recognized

that

jeopardlze

the close opposed

with Britaln. and paper it was not eventually

The state Department included adopted.6S

JhiS recommendation, Council position

in the revised

securily I

The reluctance the British notes became

of the State even more

Department ipparent

to distance

itself from over two The first 20 between apparently Iranian to meet

during in late

discussions November.

issued by

the State

Dep1rtment

note was a transcript Acheson warned and Eden. Eden that

of conve1sations During th,s

I

held on November Acheson

conversation would

the United

States

consider

buying

oil if the

AIOC could

not pur1hase an

sufficient then

quantities being

Iran's financial When a transcript cials, agreed

needs under

agreement

discussed. off;-

of this convlrsation
I

was shown to British statement.

they strongly to retract

protestedlAcheson's

U.S. officials

the statement

and delete

it from the transcript. of taking such

However, actions

they refused in the future

to rule lout the possibility if the need arose.66

The second

note was

a statement

issued to

the press

by the

State Department of whether

on December

7~ This note stated Jhould buy Iranian

that the question oil would be left at

U.S. oil companies themselves oil

to the companies smaller. expressed While it

to Idecide. comp~nies. to the that

It was clearly

directed

independent their

since the majors idea of the U.S. buying

had already Iranian oil.

reluctance

appeared to such would

to indicate

government indication

was not that the

opposed

purchases. provide

this note gave no assistance AIOC

government antl-trust

further

in the form of help on It stated further

matters

or possiblJ

lawsuits.

PAGE 143 that the U.S. government did not think to Iran's purchases by independents Nevertheless, they were manage to

could contribute the British not

significantl~

problems.

were quite in

unhappylwith

this note.

Although did

successful

blocking

its release,

they a

convince which

State Department

officials

to delete

crucial

sentence

declared or

that the Department prevent" emerged toward purchases

"will by U.S.

take no action companies.

to advise, message about the

dissuade, which

The

finally

was consequently purchases

quite ambiguous

U.S. attitude

by U.S. companies.'7

The

consortium evolved

arrangement into the

which

reemerged

in November made by on these

1952 to

gradually Mossadeq dragged

set of proposals Negotiations

Acheson

in December

of that year.

proposals by of

on until early March, After almost British,

when they were finally of discussion, governments pointless. plans

terminated

MossBdeq. the

two years and

the positions had changed

Iranian, Further

uts.
I

very States Mossa-

little.

negotiations

seemed
I

The United to overthrow

had by this time begun to develop deq. The turning thing of which coup which point followed

covert

on August

19, 1953 was It also in the

a decisive set someThird World

in Iran's for

political

evolution. action

a precedent

U.S. covert

still holds

today.

3) THE DOWNFALL

OF THE MOSSADEQ

GOVERNMENT

THE COUP OF AUGUST

19, 1953

After the British

embassy

was closed Office

in October to approach

1952 a decision U.S. officials

was made by the British

Foreign

PAGE 144 about the possibility oust Mossadeq.68 covert of a joint U.S.-British who covert operation to

Christopher

Woodhouse, before

had been

directing was closed,

British

activities

in Tehran

the embassy

was dispatched overthrow. neered

to Washington

with an elaborate for a coordinated support)

plan for Mossadeq's uprising to be enginetwork in

This plan called

(with or without

the shah's

by the British

in Tehran and by pro-British southwestern approached. little Iran. Both Not

tribes

the State

(presumably Department Department

the Bakhtiari) and the CIA

were showed Deputy were of CIA

surpriSingly,lstate at the time. However.

officials

interest

the CIA, particularly Frank Wisner, chief

Director quite

Allen Dulles At

and DeJuty

for Plans

receptive. in the

the same time Kermit Middle

Roosevelt,

operations

East and a grandson with the

of Teddy

Roosevelt,

was approached The British

in London

same plan by top MI6 officials. could be done under Truman, might but be

were told that nothing who was to be

that Eisenhower, more receptive.69

inaugurated

in January,

Further Foreign willing been

meetings

were held

in

Washington officials.

in

December

between

Office

and State

Department

The latter were now Eisenhower had

to discuss

a coup, and the

but wanted

to wait until

inaugurated had

oillnegotiations

then being also

conducted that

with Mossadeq the coup elements, Needless of the

been given

chance.

They

suggested other

be directed and that

against Ithe Tudeh undertaken

party and

radical

it be

in cooperation the British.

with Mossadeq. It is indicative on the Mossa-

to say, this very different

idea horrified views held

by the State

Department

one hand and by the CIA and deq and how he should

the British

on the other about

be dealt with.70

Serious shortly

planning

for the was

coup began inaugurated.

in early In a

February meeting of

1953, top

after

Eisenhower

dlplomatic decided

and inteillgence

officials

from both countrles go forward under

it was Roose-

that planning

for thG coup would

PAGE 145 velt, who was to lead the operation. network and made a well-known to British It At this meeting the Rashidian Aramesh were General as prime

agent named Ahmed was also

available

Roosevelt.

decided that Mossadeq

Fazlollah Zahedi would minister, apparently

be supported

to replace

because he was the choice of the shah.71

Zahedi was well

1941 by Fitzroy

known to the British.

He had

been arrested

in

Maclean for hilPing the Germans [orces. Maclean

plan an uprising him

against the Allied occupation as "one of interned in also arrested Palestine

later described

the worst grain hOlders Palestine Ayatollah

I
I

in the

country.n72 of the war.

Zahecli was The British

for the remainder Kashani during the

war and brought him to that these two men

as well.

Many

Iranians believe

became British agents

at this time and that

Kashani later worked cast some

secretly with Zahedi against ~10ssacleq.British documents doubt on this. Ambassador "vain" Minister and "completely in Mossadeq's Shepherd described untrustworthy."73 first cabinet Zahedi

in May 1951 as Interior

While

he was

Zahecli had helped strengthen He had been

the National

Front and worked

for nationalization.

discussed by the British as a possible was never their principal candidate.

coup leader since 1951, but As for Kashani. his father

had been killed by the British and against the British in Ira~
I

he himself had led an uprising

1919.

in

His

speeches

in

the

post-World War II era were rab~dlY anti-British. at various times suspected him of having ties

British officials with the United

States and the Soviet Union.74

Planning

for the

coup,

now given

the

CIA codename traveled

TPAJAX, frequent-

continued after the February meeting. ly to London.

Roosevelt

Beirut, and Tehran where he met

with British offi-

cials and members of the local CIA stations. in Tehran at tercoup as Roosevelt in this time is identified George Cuvier.75 Cuvier in

The CIA station chief memoir Counbut helped

1953 by

Roosevelt's

opposed the coup,

his preparations.

He was replaced

in July

PAGE 146
I

Bill Herman, deputy. As Azerbaijan

who had previously an Associated

served as

Cuvier's Herman had

intelligence covered the with a broad

prelis reporter

crisis in

1946 and had become acquainted ii9ures. Roosevelt

spectrum of Iranian political

and Herman Were

helped in the planning and later in the coup itself by three other station operatl'ves. Two account of tliiese are inexplicably combined in

Roosevelt's third

into a cha acter named Peter Stoneman. as Fred Zimmerman. One

and the was

is identified

Peter Stoneman

brought to Tehran in July 1953 to maintain military stationed officers involved in the coup.

liason with the Iranian He had previously been oper-

in South Korea, where he had directed paramilitary and the othe1 Peter
.irst

ations. Zimmerman
1.te twenties,

stoneman were both in their

on th.ir

l'A

.ssionment.

Two other important CIA figures Black and Roosevelt" longstanding Tehran a "Persia expert," These two were in

in Iran at this time were Roger described but not named by with the had

IWhO is

well-known Iran,

American academics working in

CIA/OSS ties a

apparently In 1950

station on

contrac, basis.

Roger Black

recruited the Iranians who in ~953 worked with Roosevelt's the plot against Mossadeq. T1ese agents, codenamed

team in and

Nerren

~illey, ran a propaganda TPBEDAMN.'7

opera~ion

for the CIA which was codenamed

TPBEDAMN was the political

only majo1 CIA operation

I
I

targeted at Iranian

groups in the early ~950s.78 It

had been set up in 1950 of Razmara) by th~ "PerManville before the and

or 1951 (possibly after th~ assassination sia expert," and was subsequently
I

transferred

to Dick

(another CIA officer 1953 coup. It continued

mentione~

by Roosevelt)

sometime

reportedly

had In annual budget of

$1 million,

to operate for at leJst a year after the 1953 coup.

TPBEDAMN was mainly a propaganda Soviet Union and the

operation

directed against the other small-scale

Tudeh partY,79

However,

PAGE 147 operations toughs given to attempt building were carried out under its aegis as well. Sports Money party. club was An by

were hired

to break

up Tudeh

demonstrations. Pan-Iranist

the right-wing, was up made to

ultra-nationalist the great

counter

influence

of Kashani

a clerical were

organization all carried

around

the mullah Nerren

Falsafi.

These operations who had direct

out through The CIA

and Cilley, or no and that

their OWn contact and its

network

oflagents.

had little

with this netwllrk members presumably ICIA.

(other than through had no direct

Nerren

Cilley),

knowledge

they were being funded taken through directly

by the

Some of the activities just mentioned, However,

underimpacted its

TPBEDAMN,

inclucling those

or indirectly

on the ~ational

Front.

despite

relatively DAMN

large budget,SO

the operations on either significance

carried the Tudeh lay

out under party or

TPBEthe of

had little Front.

real impact Its primary

National agents

1n the

network

it made available

to the TPAJAX

operation.

Nerren and Cilley the CIA who had developed intelligence activities. ment played

were

the only Iranians TPAJAX.

directly

employed

by

a role 1n

By 1953 the

Tehran

station

a wide network on events inside

10f
I

agents

who were used on Soviet

to gather Bloc

~ran and

and Eastern

These

included in

informants

in all levels and

of the governhis closest Eastthese none of to Nerren been in the

bureaucracy,

Mossade1's

cabinet

among and

advisors ern

and assistants, embassies.

in the Tudeh While of

party,

in several by

European was

information

contributed TPAJAX,

agents

undoubtedly an active the

some use in

planning

them played and Cilley,

role

in the operation. brothers and played

In addition Aramesh

Rashidian

(who had roles

loaned to Roosevelt coup.

by the British)

important

Final approval State Department. John Foster

for TPAJAX Present Allen

came

in a meeting meeting

on June

25 at the of State and

at t~is Dulles,

were Secretary

Dulles,

Loy Henderson,

Roosevelt,

PAGE 148 several A top officials the coup, from the Departments basedlin part on of State and Defense. British

plan for

the original

prO:::::~e::ss:::ni~:::,:oacl::J:dt::::~:,me:::~:i:~ in Tehran on
July 19. Since the shah had ~ot yet been told about Roosevelt's plan, arrangements Charles Mason were made tJ contact him. U.S. Air Force Major and Norman in

(this is the pseJdOnym officer to Paris and notify located

used by Roosevelt) Woodhouse's the shah's

Derbyshire, Tehran, to go were

an M!6 sent

WhJ had been to lencourage her brother As~raf'

assistant sister

Ashraf and

to Tehran

of the plan.

Mason

Derbyshire French

finally town

who liked

to gamble, agreed promise in

in the to speak

casino

of DeauvilJe. receivinJ would

She reluctantly

to her brother, that the United which

after

an unauthorized

from Mason

States

Jupport

her brother

the style to Ashraf

he was accustomed in Tehran (which

1n the event

that the coup failed. from

arrived

on July 25, had forced

but harrassment ~er into exile)

the Mossadeq her from

government delivering

prevented

the message.

thr:u:~c:~:. a::::::,t:or:::t:1:W:::2k:::~ w:~o ~::e :om::::e:a:~:

Iranian Gendarmerie from 1942 until critidism 1948. SchwartzKopf in the local press. him to sign firmans Zahedi managed to see the shah, amid heavy He told the (or decrees) shah about the CIA plan and as~ed dismissing ter. tion.) himself Mossadeq and apPoin~ing

as the new prime minisunder the constitunot commit to

(This was

the shah's

ledal prerogative the firmans

I

The shah refused to the CIA plan.

to sign

and would

Schwartzkopf Arrandements

then advised

Roosevelt

see the shah personally. dians, who several had access to

were made through Roosevelt and the

the Rashishah met

the court.

times to discuss

the coup plans.s~

Roosevelt's

plan was to

the

shah sign the two firmans

and

PAGE 149 then fly to dismissing the Caspian Mossadeq coast and await developments. The firman After

was to be delivered armored

to him at his home.

the firman was tions in the

delivered city.

units were to take assumed

up key posiwould

It was evidently

that Mossadeq

simply give up the prime ministership gency plans were made.

to Zahedi,

since no contin-

After a brief mixup night of Saturday der of the the

the firlan

was delivered Nematollah

to Mossadeq Nassiri, chief

on the Comman-

August

15 byiCOIOnel

Imperial

Guards secret

anm later a notorious police. Mossadeq had

of SAVAK, of

shah's brutal mission

been warned

Nassiri's

by a ColonellMumtaz, team had been working tore it

apparently with.

one of the offiMossadeq Nassiri denounced arrested.

cers Roosevelt's the firman According shah's. drafted

as a forgery, to some reports

up, and had

the signature

on the firmans that the

was not the firmans were by to

According on a blank

to others

it was clear which

sheet of paper case Mossadeq loyal to

had already

been

signed orders

the shah. In either be invalid. the being Troops

considered

the shah's

Mossadeq

set up roadblocks officers

throughout of were of

city. Opposition loyal to A

deputies, and the

military

suspected of court

Zahedi,

shah's minister made for Zahedi

arrested.

massive

search was

and a

reward

100,000
which

rials was
was to move

offered f01
into the Tehr1n

his arrest.
apparently

The armored
broke up, with

column
some

soldiers Roosevelt's Baghdad

joining team

pro-Mo~sadeq fled the

I

forces. country in

Without panic,

informing first to

the shah

and then to Rome.83

The arrest

of Nassiri

ended

the original

coup attempt. were

Having to

made no contingency improvise evacuation Zahedi ation a new

plans,

Roosevelt Their

and his team

forced

strategy.

first act was to and other key

arrange

for the

of Roosevelt,

Zahedi,

participants.84 to await Qvacu-

was brought by

to the house

of FrQd ZimmQrman He remained there

the U.S. air attache

until Mossadeq

PAGE 150 was finally toppled.

The decision to make plans to evacuate Zahedi and Roosevelt not end the CIA effort to oustlMossadeq. ordinated Nerren and actions were underiaken by

did

Several diverse and uncoRoosevelt's team and by

Cilley (who were

acting almost

independently)

in the

hopo that a 5ucc055ful

coup cot'd bo tciggocod.

The first

was an effort tol publicize

the shah's

dismissal

of

Mossadeq and appointment ways. First, it

of zlhedi. This was that the royal

accomplished

in two be

was decided

firmans should

copied and distributed

to the rews

media and the public. This was house of one of the CIA officers The copies were given governhome

done on Sunday, August 16 in t~e identified by Roosevelt to Nerren and ment had not
I

as Petgr Stoneman. Since

Cilley to distribute.as announced deliVefy

the Mossadeq

of the firman

to Mossadeq's

this was an effective way to mike the shah's replacement deq known. Bill Herman In a second effort brought Kennett Associated Ardeshir.
,

of Mossa-

to publicize of the

the

shah's actions, and Don

LJve
I

New York Times house

Schwind of the Zahedi

'5

pre~s to Stoneman's told

to meet with firmans and

son

Ardeshir
I

them about the

described Mossadeq's his father

attempt tl arrest his father as a coup, since been appointed

I

had legally

prime minister.

Love and

Schwind quickly published

this information.s6

After the shah's Iranian conspirators

actions had been publicized took ste~s to build support Zahedi quickly
I

the American and in the military a

for a Zahedi government. declaration shah.

drew up and distributed

calling for member~ of the armed forces to support the suppliQS werQidistributed forces
by

Military

the U.S.

military

advisory mission to pro-Zahedi were also made to gain the key cities. Messengers forged travQl documQnts

in the Tehran area. Efforts garrisons in other

5ulport of military to Kermanshah

were se t

and Isfahan, using in from CIA head-

which had been brought

PAGE 151 quartQrs in Washington. ThQ QldQr PQtQr StonQman and an AmQrican was

CIA driver went thQ garrison

to KermanshahJ

where Colonel

Teimur Bakhtiar

commander.

Bakhtilr was

sympathetic

and led a column

at

tank. and armored

car. tofard

Tehran In

.upport of

'ahedl.

Although had been

this column did not arrive ousted, news

in TQhran until aftQr Mossadeq was marching in support of

that Bakhtiar immediatllY

Zahedi reached Tehran Mossadeq. garrison Ardeshir commander,

and helped turn the tide against to Isfahan where the acting

Zahedi wa~ sent

Colonel zaJqam, agreed to cooperate.67

As these events Sunday August 16 on the following the

were unfolling,

Nerren and

Cilley arranged

on

to have a lSrgQ crowd march day shouting Tudeh

into central Tehran carrying signs

slogans and

denouncing

shah. This croJd

was organized

through

the usual

sports club leaders and was inJended to rally support for the shah by provoking fears of s Tudeh Jakeover. efforts, This was done independentwithout his knowledge.

ly of Roosevelt's It was financed Sunday night by Manville

ani apparently

in part with $50,000 given to Nerren and Cilley on Fred Zimmerma~, with who was handling This crowd them while Dick dulyapPQarQd on

was sick

jaunJiCQ.

Monday morning and was soon joined by real Tudeh members, apparently money. The unaware that the original combined crowd

who were

crowd had been hired with CIA the Reza Shah mausoleum and

in Tehran.

.'1

at~acked

.t.tue. of the shah and his fathQr

Tudeh

party demonstrations the crowd

continued

on

the following U.s.

day.

Fearing that Henderson send the strations.

would attack on ITUesday

Americans,

Ambassador him to

met with Mossadeq Tehran police into

night and convinced to break up

~he streets

the demonThe

This proved to be a fateful which had unintentionally

decision

for Mossadeq.

Tudeh party,

become one

of Mossadeq's by ordering its

main sources of members off

support by this time, retaliated On W dnesday most of the

the streets.

police turned

PAGE 152 against were not Mossadeq out in and threw their support to Zahedi. Tudeh crowds forces

l~rgQ nUmbQr~

to confront

thQ pro-shah

which marched

on that day.ss

Once the firmans to rally the military

had been iUblicized behind Zahedi,

and steps

had been taken began to The

Roosevelt

and Herman

look for a way to trigger most obvious through ties which close way of doing figure

popllar this

uprisings

against

Mossadeq.

was through

the clergy, The CIA other

preferably had no ties were Shi'ite an

a popular

such as Kashani. had no

station religious

with Kashani, could

and apparently this ~ask. a

accomplish

However, leading asked

the Rashidians in the to

to Ayatollah and

Behbehani1 so

figure them

establishment, anti-Mossadeq done until

ROOSjVelt He

arrange could

demonstration. when weekly

was told that this would be held.

not be

Friday,

prayers

that Mossadeq's . time these demonstratIons Rashidians how he could

Fearing

net would close in around them by the I could be held,s9 Roosevelt asked the contalt Kashani. The Rashidians directed on

him to Aramesh. the morning

Bill Herman

anJ Fred Zimmerman 19.

met with Aramesh

of Wednesday, passed

AUgUft

They g~ve him $10,000, Kashani In

which to

was apparently

on to Kashani. club to~9hS

turn arranged march

h~ve a crowd of sports the center

and bazaar area.

workers

toward days so

of town from the ba~aar American currencJ exchange 50.90 I K~~hani

In the following its way

much of this

had found

into the bazaar

that the black market to the dollar to under

rate had fallen

from over 100 rials

Th~ crowd town.

org~nizQd

by

m~rch~d

towdrd

the

cQntQr

of
t -

i
It was jOlned who had along become the Iway by army and pollce dijillUSioned unl~s and by or were onlookers an~ered with Mossadeq days.

by the Tudeh

demonstrations

of the previous

Govern-

mont offico buildings, Tudoh "1d

offices of several pro-Mossadeq

pro-Moss.doq nowsp.pors, .nd tho

parties were attacked. Mossadeq

PAGE 153

:::~::: ator::::5t'::'th:r~:d1:i::rt:O ~:::rm:P t:h::t:::Wdit~n:

source who was close to Mossadeq taKQJvQr at the time told me that of MossadQq. fQaring a TudQh and rQcognizing thQ strQngth the opposition, simply gave up

J91
army detachment station. loyal Zahedi to Zahedi

On

Wednesday and

morning the

an

attacKed hiding Hearing

seized

TQhran

radio

was still this time. a

in

the basement denunciations crowd. of

of Fr1d Zimmerman's Mossadeq over

house at

the radio over to

and seeing

large pro-shah

Roosevelt Genefal

rushed

Zahedi's

hideout.

On the way he encountered force. several Guilanshah tanks.

Guilanshah, to were

commander Zahedi's

of the air with

followed

Roosevelt

hideout

Zahedi

and GUiJanshah

soon

joined

by several and unit and

other tank detachments, others. Together with

led by Icolonels Oveissi, the pro-shah seized

Khajeh-Nouri, this

demonstrators.

(reportedly then marched ensued in

containing

35 tankJ)

the army headquarters There a nine-hour The walls

on M05sadeq's some

risidence.

battle around

which

300 peolle

were killed.

Mossadeq's crowd

house were destroyed with tank and artillery fire. The - I stormed the house and Mossadeq escaped over the garden wall. to Zahedi the nJxt day.92

He surrendered

THE POST-COUP

CONSOLIDATION

OF POWER

The arrest

of Mossadeq

did

sition to Zahedi's continuQd Mossadeq's Fatemi, in Tehran closest

takeover. and

I Inot entirely eliminate public oppoI Sporadic outbursts and demonstrations provincial towns. A number of

in outJYing

associates, and

including in

Foreign

Minister months

Hossein to

went

into hiding supporters.

the following party

tried

rally Mossadeq's

T e Tudeh

continued

to operate

PAGE 154 clandestinely. the pro-MossBdeq Iran around Qashqai Zahedi's Perhaps the most tribl, serious which threat to Zahadl came from

Qashqai

was based

in south-central the an coup the attack on

the city

of shirJz. from

Immediately to

after

khans forces.

withdrew

Tehran

consider

After an initial

meeting

they told

CIA station

:::::er:i':. ::::o.e::::be: 1h:: d::::::: t::::ns:o.::s o:::::~ 'hiraz a.d threatened to in10de the city unless Mossadeq was
released taged a Qashqai. from prison. number The of Tudeh party members planes in the used air force to watch the sabothe surveillanle around being

standoff

IShiraz continued withdrew

until their

end of

September,

when the Qashqai

apparently

forces.93

In the weeks and months neutralize Riahi what remained

after

the coup Zahedi

moved

quickly

to

of tfe opposition.

Mossadeq

and General given soon

(his army chief terms. well and Hossein

of staff1 were arrested Mos~ othel. National terms

and eventually leaders sent into particularly were

short prison arrested exile. critic as

Front or

glven Fatemi,

P1lson ,hO had raiarded

internal bitter by

Only

been a

of the shah and was

as a communist executed. Mossadeq's

sympathizar Kashani,

the U.S. embassy and Makki, even kept newspapers the coup who on a

staff, was eventually had each contributed short leash to

Baqai, were

downfall,

(Kayhan and because they

leading Tehran by Zahedi. The two I . Ettelalat) were brlefly closed down after
Mossadeq. Frequent sweeps 1200

had supported

we.e mode for Tudeh suspects, j;th

of October. the Tudeh networks ministry education

being arrested by the end

and of

in ~he air force, the court system, I were ~ncovered and large quantities were

Tudeh arms and Tudeh and cases

literature

the National

by the demonstrations seized. All I least two Front Iwere broken up_ In at forces to break up demon-

CIA officers worked with Izahedi'S

in the fall of 1953.94

strations

By the time Mossadeq

was overthrown

the 011 blocade

had been

in

PAGE 155 place for mented by over two years. Mossadeq, The had Despite the austerity measures imple-

Iran's fOJieign exchange

holdings at

had nearly

been depleted. the blocade

Iranian go ernment estimated cost it roJghlv $200

the time that Mossadeq had

million.

appealed to Eisenhower

in May 1953 for economic aid, but was flat-

ly rejected. Now, after the coip, U.S. aid was suddenly available. Five million dollars was immed,atelY minister of finance, by the CIA. given to Ali Amini. Zahedi's followed up

This was allegedly

with another $2-3 million, On September

1 Eisenhower

Whidh Zahedi oppr1ved

is said to have pocketed.

a $23 million point 4 aid grant in aid was approved.

for Iran. Five days later anotier $45 million

This brought the total to at least $73 million in the first three weeks after the coup, more than i a third of the revenue lost due to the oil blocade under Mossadeq told Henderson immediately in that
1

Several days after the coup Zahedi if aid were not oil blocade not

u fall to communism Iran woul~,1

forthcoming. Mossadeq

Given

the importance fact

of the

undermining

and the

that oil

sales were

resumed until November sion.

95

1954, tJis seems to be a reasonable

conclu-

4) IMPLICATIONS

FOR IRAN'S DOMHSTIC POLITICS

This chapter has argued that on the basis of strategic the overthrow of
I

the United States, acting largely played a crucial led by role in Mohamed

cons~derations,

the Nationa!

Front government

Mossadeq.

It is useful to view occurring in two

the U.S. involvement distinct phases,

in Mossadeq's to

overthrow as

corresponding

the periods in which prQSidQntl

Truman and EisenhowQr

hQld officQ.

Under Truman the United States facilitated and refused to grant a large contributed to Iran's economi

the British oil blocade These acts SQnSQ

jd package to Mossadeq. deterioration and

in this

PAGE 156 played a minor role in undermi er, Truman also blocked ing the Mossadeq government. Howev-

British efforts

to overthrbw

Mossadeq. it

Despite his support for the British position

in the oil dispute

is clear that Truman had no desire to remove Mossadeq Given his tolerance of MossadJq and Mossadeq's

from office. to an

commitment

independent and non-aligned

IrJn1 it is also clear that Truman had

no interest in turning Iran inJo a client state.

Tho do facto docision

to maJo

Iran

a U.S. cliont

did not occur the

until Eisenhower was inaUgUratJd.

This was done by engineering him with the pro-shah overthrow was

overthrow of Mossadeq and rePIJcing ment headed obviously. operation military by Zahedi. MossadJq'S

governquite

achieved,

through covert U.S. lintervention in the form of the CIA codenamed and TPAJAX. Other cliency aid a1d assistance instruments1 to Iran's including security

economic

forces. also played important noles in establishing client.

Iran as a U.S.

There can be no throwing Mossadeq. first month in CIA. Although

doubt that the U.S. Planning

role was

crucial

in over-

T01

the coup began during Eisenhower's financed by the

office. The coup was directed and it was carried Jut agents concJived

in a very haphazard and implemented of tho firmans, the

manner, the such crucial tho onlistuse of fake

CIA team dotails

and its

of tho coup as tho pUblication

ment of the

garrisons at ISfal]an and Kermanshah.

Tudeh crowds to heighten ization of the

fears of a Tudeh takeover,

and the organ-

crowd which stirmed Mossadeq's

t

house. While these in panic and

events were unfolding Zahedi, the

the sha~ had fled the country was hiding

prime minister-designate.

from Mossadeq's

forces in a CIA safe house. Af~er as will be discussed assistance in the

the coup U.S. economic aid and, extensive

U.S.

n Ixt chapter,

security

played a crucial role in consolidating

the dictatorship

which replaced Mossadeq.

PAGE 157
The oil blocade and the o~her economic sanctions imposed on

Iran by Britain downfall. of

clearly helped prepare the

way for Mossadeq's many

The economic deteriolation supporters, contributed

that followed alienated among the middle

Mossadeq's

palticularlY to the

class.

This undoubtedly the National

defection

of key leaders from

Front and to the

willingness

of the Tehran crowds to was overthrown.

throw their support to Zahedi on the day Mossadeq

While Mossadeq's

the

British

blocadl

thus play.d emphasized

crucial

rol.

in

downfall,

it Shouldjbe

that the U.S. role in both in removthe type had

the coup which brought Mossade

down

was decisive,

ing him from office and, more importantly, of regime which succeeded slipped considerably absence of a of Mossadeq's popularity Italy or Kashani. by by his.

in determining

Although Mossadeq's

popularity

AUgUSt 1953, a royalist COup

perhaps the could have regained countries

was, in the

U.S. interventiol' decline. Mossadeq arranging

least likely outcome his earlier Japan or such as

oil sJles to

such as

by striking a deal It is also possible

Jith domestic

power brokers

that Mossadeq's the nationalist t another

pri~e ministership movement such could hav~ as Kashani,

and his position as leader of been transferred Baqai, Daftari, or peacefully

figure, the

even Qavam. Probably

most likely alterna-

tive in the absence of a U.S. intervention takeover. In any event, zaJedi and

would have been a Tudeh royalist forces he

the

~::sp:::: ::~~e:::

::w::g::::J:::I:~pu~::
it

:~::or:an:::dt:~s

::~::

power without U.S. help remained

is 1ifficUIt
I
I

to see how they could have outside assistance.

in power for long witHout

substantial

It should also be emphasized itself was approached available not of

that

the British role in the COup The British had originally

great impoJltance.

U.S. policymakers

with a plan for the coup and had made network. The

to the CIA team part of their intelligence plan was tho oughly rewritten,

original British

however,

and in

PAGE 158
any case the plan finally events which use, notably actually in adoPied provided little guidance for the

took place.

The British with

network

was of some Kashani However, Tudeh to the

arranging

c~ntact

Ayatollah house. the fake th;s could

provide success

the crowd which of Nerren and

marched Cilley

on Mossadeq's in producing that

crowd

which appeared accomplished

on August

17 suggests

have been

in other ways.

The conclusion

that the Uni1ed

States

played

a crucial What,

role in

overthrow; ng Mossadeq the consequences in the domestic

thus ap lears ;nescapable. intervention by Zahedi and

then, were role

of the U.S. of power

its subsequent

consolidation politics?

and the shah

for Iran's

As outlined leader Front. period sition

in the first

pa1t of this chapter, organization known

Mossadeq

was the

of a popular, The National

democratid

as the National of a oppoMa;los support

Front wasJ founded ativity to and

in 1949

at the apex to coordinate sixtoonth bases of

of intense to tho

political shah's

in Iran rig tho

attom" tac~ics,

elections. placod it

Its ideology, squaroly in

social of tho

the tr1dition organizations

1906 constitutional in the National

WIi bh

movement.

The political across

included

Fron t range d exception included of

lreI th e en t"

d po I"1 t"lca I spec t rum an, certain active pro-British

th e

the Tudeh

party and

elements, The main

every major

organization

in this period.

issue addressed question.

by the Nationa~ equally

Front was the oil nationalization and closely bound up with

However,

imiortant

this issue was the goal of in Iran.

a 10re equitable
I

distribution

of power

Moss.d

thus tho Id.~ of .n o i io hi.h popuclosely and tied to eJerged the traditions during a of Iran's of demo-

list in character, cratic movement, activity

which

period

fervent order

political

to lead the struggle

for a new political

PAGE 159 in Iran. place By removing Mossadeq led from office and installing the United ln his states

a dictatorship

by General and ended appeared

Zahedi

destroyed tion to

this organization democracy, which

the prospects

for a transi-

to have begun it enabled regard

under Mossadeq. the shah to rule popular polidemoto be

This had two main consequences. for the next twenty-five Second, years

First,

without

for

tical pressures. cratic filled leadership by radical in

it d~stroyed

much of

the liberal, was later

in Iran, crelting elements

a vacuum

which

of Joth the left and the right. of this study, which these

As will

be discussed had important

the conclusio~

consequenCes in Iran

implications

for the events

took place

in 1978 and 1979.

PAGE 160 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 5 Persian Oil (London: Lawrence and Wishart,

1) L. P. Elwell-Sutton, 1955), pp. 158-215.

2) Rich~rd Cott~m, Nation~lism in Iran (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964) pp. 264-265; Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 250-261; T. Cuyler Young, "The Social Support of Current Iranian Policy," Middle East Journal, Vol. 6, No.3, Spring 1952, pp. 125-143; Shah~ough Akhaui, Rgliqion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), pp. 60-69. I 3) Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, P'1265. pp. 188-192, 256-257;

4) Chapour Bakhtiar, Me Fidelete (Paris: Albin Michel, 1982), pp. 50-51: Elwell-Sutton, Persian 10iL pp , 110-111; Abrahamian, l.ran Between Two Revolutions, p. 189; The New York Times, May 5, 1951. 11: 4. 5) The New York Times, May 25, 1951, 13:1.

6) U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research, Mossadeg's Current Position in the Internal Iranian Situation, OIR No. 5676, Oct. 26, 1951; "Outline of the Secretary of state's View." 4 Nov. 1951, FO/37l/9l608: "Record of an Interview with Mr. Acheson on 31st July." 31 July, 1952, FO/371/98691; U.S. Department of state, Office of Intelligence and Research, Mossadeq and the Current Iranian Elections, IR No. 5735, Jan. 10, 1952; Central Intelligence Agency, Prospects For Survival of Mossadeq Reqime in Iran, SE-33, 14 Oct. 1952; "Assessment of the State of Public Opinion." 4 September 1951, FO/371/91463. For typical press coverage of Mossadeq see: The Times (London). August 22. 1951. p. 7 and The New York Times, November 25, 1951, IV, 6:6. 7) Abrahamian, Iran Between Twd Revolutions, pp. 318-319; Central Intelligence Agency, Probable Developments in Iran in 1952 in the Absence of an Oil Settlement, NIE 46, 4 February, 1952. 8) U.S. Department of State, dffice of Intelligence and Research, Mossadeg and the Current Irani~n Elections, IR No. 5735, 10 January.1952. p.6; YoUngIIThe]Social Support of Current Iranian Policy."
I

9) U.S.Department of State, O~lfice of Intelligence and Research, Mossadeg and the Current Iranian Elections, pp. 6-7, Mossadeq as Leader of a Potential Popular l~lovEment in Iran, aIR No. 5272, 9 June 1950. p. 2, and Iran's Political and Economic Prospects Through 1953. OIR No. 6126, 9 January, 1953. pp. 11-12; Sephehr Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), pp. 186, 188. 10) Central
1.

Intelligence

Agency,

Probable

Developments

in Iran, p.

11) Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil, Chs. 16, 17; Alan W. Ford, The Anolo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952 (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1954). pp. 51-177. Useful chronologies of this period appear in Ford, pp. 273-283 and U50M-Iran, Review of U.S. Technical Assistance and Economic Aid to Tran, 1951-1957, Vol. 1 (Washington: AID Library, n.d.), pp. 5 43 .

PAGE 161 12) Elw~ll-Sutton, P~rsidn Oil, pp. 259-269, 272-273; G~org~ ~kGhee, Envoy to the f'H ddle IWorld (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), eh. 31; Dean Acheson, Priesent at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), pp. 509-511.1 13) This is discussed in the next section. Eden, Fl!ll

14) ~lcGhee, Envov to the MiddlJ World, p , 403; Anthony Circle (Boston: Houghton Miffliln, 1960), p. 223. 15) Elwell-Sutton, 16) "Anglo-U.S. Persian Oiln pp. 273-279. 1952,

Discussions,~

~1 August,

FO/371/98693.

17) Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oi~, pp. 281-289; Roy M. Melbourne. "America and Iran in Perspecti~e: 1953 and 1980," Foreign Service Journal, April 1980, pp. 13-15; interview with Melbourne (Chapel Hill, N.C., February 1, 1984), 18) This description is based on interviews with numerous Iranian political figures and British and American intelligence and diplomatic officials. Descriptions 9f the British network vary substantially from source to source',1 For example, some people maintain that it declined greatly in tHe 1940s while others hold that it was still quite active in the Ilate 1950s. Documentary evidence on the British net is fragmentar~, but gives some indication of its depth. See, for example, "Les ryollies Imperiales," 18 March, 1952, FO/248/15~1. This js a report fjled by the Brjtish Charge in Tehran and a top British inte~ligence officer on the shah's most intimate views, as recounted ~y his confidant Ernst Perron. See also Cottam, Nationalism in ]ran, pp. 235-236 on the freemason organization and "Action in th~ Persian Situation Advocated by M. Keiven," 3 July, 1951, FO/37~/91461, for a list of pro-British Iranian political figures. 19) "Record FO/37l/91525. of Interdepartm

i
I

ntal

Meeting,"

20

March,

1951.

20) "Reasons for Decline in In~luence of Mussadiq," 14 June, 1951, FO/371/91460; "Assesses the General State of Affairs in Persia," 28 May, 1951, FO/371/91542. I 21) Acheson, Present at the Crdation, p. 507.

22) "Records Conversation wiJh Miss lambton," 15 June, 1951. FO/371/91548; "AIOC and ~ationalization," 1 May 1951, FO/371/9l530; Christopher Mon~ague Woodhouse, Something Ventured (london: Granada, 1982)' p , 107'.

23) "Notes of a FO/37l/9!55.5. 24) "Discusses FO/371191550.

Meeting the

to

Discuss in

Persia,"

28 21

June. June,

1951. 1951.

Position:

Persia,"

25) "American Assistance to ~he Persian Oil Dispute," 2 July, 1951, FO/371191559; "perSia aliI Dispute: Views of l"Ir. Horace Emery," 12 July, 1951, F0/37l/91570i "Persia Oil Dispute," 21 June, 1951, FO/371/91565. 26) "Reports Conversation wit the Shah on 30th June," 2 July, 1951, FO/371/91461; "Reports on Conversation with the Shah," 16 July, 1951, FO/37l/91462; "Record of a Luncheon Party Given by the Shah," 5 August 1951, FO/371/91577. 27) "Encloses FO/371/915M. Short Account of Talks," 1 Sept~=mber 1951,

PAGE 28) "View that HMG'Shouid 1951, FO/371/91582. Refr I in From Any statement,"

162

26 August,

29) The Hew York Times, AU9U1t 27, 1951, 12:2 and September 3, 1951, 1:6; "Conversation with the Shah on 29 August," 30 August, 1951, FO/371/91583; "Approach to a New Persian Government," B September 1951, FO/371/91590; 1Change of Government," 4 September, 1951. FO/371/91587; "Suggests Lines to be Taken to Prevent Complete Nationalization," 5 S~ptember, 1951. FO/371/91587. 30) "Reports Persians Trying I to Recruit August, 1951. FO/371/91579; JExports to 1951, FO/371/98634; "Financial Restrictions ber, 1951, FO/371/91491. 31) "Departmental Comments." 1 I November, New York Times, September 10, ~951, 1:7. Oil Technicians," 20 Persia." 17 December. on Persia." 12 Septem1951, FO/371/91614j The

32) "Assessment of the state I of Public Opinion," 1951, FO/371/91463; "Notes by tihe Lord Privy Seal," 1951, F0/371/91590. I

4 September, 22 September,

33) "Discusses the Shah's Preference in Regards to a Prime Minister to Succeed Mossadeq," 31 ~Ugust, 1951, FO/371/91462; "Record of a Conversation with the S~ah on 17th Sept.," 18 September, 1951. FO/371/91463; "The Lord Privy Seal Has Asked For Information," 25 September, 19~1, FO/371/91591; "Lord Privy Seal's Views," 21 September, 1951, FOAI371/91591. 34) "Change of Government," 14 September, 1951, FO/37l/9l463; "Discussions Concerning the Pe~sian Field at the Bipartite Talks," 11 September, 1951, FO/371/91412. 35) "Text of FO/371/91589. State Departme~t's Views," 21 September, 1951,

36) "Text of Reply from President Truman," 26 September, 1951, FO/371/91591; "Persian Oil Di5pute." 28 September, 1951, FO/371/91592; "Draft Telegram to Tehran," 27 September, 1951, FO/371/91592; "Record of a Con~ersation with the American Ambassador." 1 October, 1951. FO/371/~1596. 37) "Comments FO/371/91613. Increasina 1951. on Qavam's Proposals," 20 November, 1951,

38) U.S. Department

Communist

of State, qffice of Intelligence and Research, Threat in Iran. OIR No. 5716. November 23, I persia-Stlte Department's Views," 17 April,

39) "Next Steps in 1952, FO/371/98688.

40) "Persian Oil Dispute: Views of Miss Lambton," 2 November, 1951, FO/371/91609; "Political IAspects of the Persian Situation." 23 November, 1951, FO/371/91465; "Next Steps in Persia." 7 A~ril, 1952, FO/371/98687; "General SJmmary of the Persian Internal Situation," 26 January, 1952, FO/1371/98684; "The Text of the Joint Appraisal by the British and United States Embassies in Tehran," 9 May, 1952, FO/371/98689; "Not~ on the Financial Difficulties and Prospects of the Iran Government," 26 Julv, 1952, F0/371/98625. 41) "U.S. Financial Aid to Per5ia." 18 July. "Qavam's Request for Financial Aid and Early Oil Settlement," 21 July, 1952, FO/371/98691. 1952. FO/371/98690; Negotiations for an Situation

42) "Anglo-U.S. Discussions About the Persian Internal and the Oil Question," 29 July, 1952, FO/371/98691.

PAGE 163 43) "Anglo-U.S. Discussions on the Persian 1952, FO/371/98691; npoljtjcal Developments 1952, C(52) 275. Situation," jn Persja," 29 July, 5 August,

44) "U.S.-U.K. Approach to Dr. Mussadiq," 31 July, 1952, FO/371/98691; "Internal Affai~s and Oil Negotiations." 27 July, 1952, FO/371/98691; "U.S. Ambassador's Reappraisal of the Internal Situation," 2 August, 1952, Fd/371/98692; "Reply to Acheson," 9 August, 1952, FO/371/9869l;" nglo-U.S. Discussions," 11 August, 1952, FO/371/98693. 45) "U.S. Proposals for a Joint August. 1952, FO/371/98693. 46) National With Respect Approach to Dr. Mussadiq." the United 12

Security Council, The Position of to Iran, NSC 107, March 14, 1951. Talks," 10 April 1951,

States

47) nWashington

FO/371/91470.

48) Yonah Alexander and Allan ~anes (eds.), The United States and Iran: A Documentary History qFrederick. MD: UniVersity Publications of America, 1980), pp. ~15-217; The New York Times, May 22, 1951, 24:4 and May 24, 1951. 13:1; "Records Conversation With U.S. Ambassador," 1 June, 1951, FO~371/91540; "Reports Discussion with Mr. Acheson," 17 May, 1951, FO/371/91535; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 506. 49) "Comments on FO/371/91545; "Reports Grady's Interference," 6 Discussion with Mr. Acheson." June, 1951, FO/371/91535.

50) National Security Council, National Security Problems Concerning Free World Petroleum Demands and Potential Supplies, NCS 138, December 8, 1952, pp. 9-10; Fe~'eidun Fesharaki, Development of the Iranian Ojl Industrv (New York: Praeger, 1976), p. 17. 51) "Reports Interviews With FO/371/91551; Acheson. Present che50n and McGhee," 25 June, at the Creation. pp. 507-508. 1951,

52) "Records Mr. Harriman's View," 30 August 1951, FO/371/91584; "Two Points Made by Mr. Rountree," 25 September, 1951, FO/371/91472; "Message from S. of 5.," 10 September, 1951, FO/371/91463; "Encloses Short Account of Talks," 1 September, 1951, FO/371/91584; "Reports a Long Talk with Mr. McGhee," 21 September. 1951, FO/371/91589; "Text of State Department's Views," 21 September, 1951, FO/371/91589; "Persian Oil Dispute," 28 September, 1951, FO/371/91592. I 53) Acheson, 54) Alexander Present at the Craation, The U~ited p. 510. and Iran, pP. 223-224.

and Hanes,

states

55) National Security Council, The Anqlo-Iranian Problem. NSC 117, October 18, 1951; "Record of Talks," 4 October, 1951, FO/371/91S9S; nTelegram from Washington," 2S October, 1951, FO/371/91607; "American Proposdl that the Royal Dutch/Shell Group Should Take Over and Operatd the Abadan Refinery Considered Impractical," 6 November, 1951,i FO/371/91610. 56) "Outline of the Secretary of State's View," 4 November, 1951, FO/371/91608; "Political Aspedts of the Persian Situation," 23 November, 1951, FO/371/91465; "Joint Anglo-American Appreciation on the Persian Situation," 19 November, 1951, FO/371/91472. 57) The New York Times, Decem~er 7, 1951, 1:2 and 3:5, December 10, 1951, 4:5, DQcember 15, 1951, 2:4, and DecembQr 30, 1951, 8:7; "Advises AmGrican Opinion." 19 D~cember. 1951, FO/371/91618.

PAGE 164 58) "Joint Anglo/American Appreciation~" 22 FO/37l/98608; "Joint Anglo/U.S. Appr~cjatjon," 2 FO/371/986 08. 59) "Joint Anglo/American Appreciation," January, February, 1952, 1952,

FO/371/98608.

60) "Anglo-U.S. Talks in london-Situation in Persia," 14 February, 1952, FO/37l/98608; U.S. Department of state, Bulletin, February 11, 1952, pp , 217-218. 61) The New York Times, January 11, 1952, 3:7: January 13, 1952, 1:6, January 21, 1952. 1:3. February 11. 1952. 1:7. February 16, 1952, 1:5, March 21, 1952, 3:5, and March 29, 1952. 2:8; Alexander and Nanes, The United States and Iran, pp. 237-241; "Persian Oil Situation," 16 April~ 1952, FO/371/98688; "Next Steps in PersiaState Department's Views," 17 April, 1952, FO/371/98688; "The Text of the Joint Appraisal," 9 May, 1952, FO/37l/98689: "The Joint Appraisal by U.S. and U.K. Embassies in Tehran," 15 May, 1952, FO/371/98689; U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence and Research, Iran: An Estimate of Possible Political Develo ments aIR No. 5861, May 16, 1952. 62) U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, The International Petroleum Cartel, The Iranian Consortium, and U.S. National Securi~vt 93rd Congress. 2nd Session, February 21, 1974. pp. 17-21; "IOil Dispute- Conversations with Mr. Acheson," 9 October, 1952, FO/371/98700; 'V~1r. Acheson's Suggestions for Settling thelOil Dispute," 9 October. 1952,
FO/371/98700.

63) U.S. Congress, 64) Ibid.,

The International I

Petroleum

Cartel,

p. 20.

pp. 22-23.

65) Walter S. Poole, The Histo~y of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joi nt Chi efs of Staff and Haiti anal Pol icy, Vol. IV, 1950-1952 (Historical Division, Joint s~cretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, December, 1979)~ p. 365. The British somehow got wind of the National Security Council deliberations over this issue and were horrified. See HAmendment to ~J'r. Byroade's Record," 24 November, 1952, FO/371/98703. 66) Ibid. "Note by f'1r. Byroad ," 23 November, 1952, FO/371/98703. The note of state

67) "Amendment to Mr. Byroade's Record," FO/371/98703. finally released is published in U.S. Department Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 703, De ember IS, 1952. p , 946.

68) Much of the information presented in this section was obtained in interviews with former U.S. officials and Iranian political figures who prefer to remain anonymous. At their request I have omitted references to information which they provided. The events surrounding the 1953 coup are still highly controversial, and a number of inconsistencies emerged during these interviews. Only information which was corroborated by other sources or was clearly consistent with the general picture which emerged has been included here.
I

69) Woodhouse, Something Ventur~dz pp. 117-120; Kermit Roosevelt, Countercoup (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), pp. 107-108. The latter source, while giving a good overview of the CIA operation, is seriouslY flawed on many details. See reviews of this book by Richard Cottam. in Iranian Studies, Vol. XIV, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn 1981, pp. 269-2 2. and by Thomas Powers, in Th~ Nation, April 12, 1980, pp. 437-440. Woodhouse's account of the coup itself follows Roosevelt's very closely, even repeating several of Roosevelt's errors. This indicates how little the British were actually involved after the initial stage of the plot.

PAGE 165 For an attempt to identify some of the MI6 officials who are given pseudonyms in Roosevelt's account see The Guardian (Manchester), July 28,1980, p , 11. 70) Woodhouse, Somethino Ventured, pp. 121-122.

71) Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp. 120-124. In his account Roosevelt inexplicably confuses the Rashidian brothers with the two principal U.S. agents in Iran. The latter are referred to as the Bosco brothers, while the Rashidians are called Hossey and Gaffron (who are sai d not to be related). No1t only cH'e the names confused, but in Some places the actual roles played by the two sets of agents are misidentified as well. I 72) Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern Approaches (London: Jonathan Cape, 1950), p. 266. ~ 73) "Conversation with General Zahedi," 31 May, 1951, FO/248/1514. 74) "Describes Current Poli ical Situation," 20 April. 1951. F0/371/91456; "Oil Situation." 24 May. 1951. F0/371/91536; "Assesses the Persian Situation." FO/371/91461; "Political Developments in Persia," C(52) 275;1 Akhavi, Reliqion and Politics in Contemporary Iran, p. 67; "P~rsian Oil Dispute: Views of Miss Lambton," 2 November, 1951, FO/371/91609; "KashBni is Known to Have Recently Had Dealings with the Russians," 10 September, 1951, FO/371191587. 75) Roosevelt uses pseudonyms for the major characters in his book. In most cases it is possible to match the pseudonyms and physical descriptions he gives with those of the CIA people operating under cover in the embassy. Roosevelt's pseudonyms will be used here in order to protect the identities of the people involved. 76) Roosevelt, Countercoup, p. confused in Roosevelt's account. 128. These ~wo are frequen~ly

77) Nerren and Cilley are the Iranians Roosevelt mistakenly identifies as the B05coe brothers. See footnote 71, above. Nerren and Cilley were brothers-in-law. Nelrren had been an editor for a major Iranian newspaper in the late 19405, at which time he had become acquainted with Bill Herman, the CIA station chief in August 1953. 78) Another operation undertaken by the CIA at this time was a "stay-behind" network designed to provide arms for an Iranian resistance movement in the event of a Soviet invasion. This operation was run through the Armenian independence movement in Iran by CIA officers not involved ir TPAJAX. The arms caches planted under this operation were even~ually seized by the Tudeh party, who had apparently infiltrated both the CIA station and the Armenian movement. The CIA also had at least one deep-cover operative assigned to infiltrate student groups at the University of Tehran, as well as numerous plants in the Tudeh party and the government bureaucracy. 79) The main propaganda activity undertaken through TPBEDAMN was an ongoing program in which anti-Soviet and anti-Tudeh stories were planted in the Iranian press. A number of books written in the West were translated into Farsi and distributed under this program. Its most dramatic effort was the production of a falsified autobiography of the well-known Iranian poet Lahuti, apparently written by the "Pers~a expert." In this book Lahuti, a Tudeh member living in the Soviet Union at that time, gives a very bleak description of his life there. After it appeared Lahuti denounced the forged autobiography over Soviet radio.

PAGE 166

80) By comparison, the Rashidians 10,000 English pounds per month by Somethinq Ventured, p. 118.

reportedly were only given the British. See Woodhouse,

81) Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp. 3-19. Participation in the coup by the pro-British tribes had eVid~ntlY been ruled out by this time. It is not entirely clear what the plan consisted of at this point. There were plans for the deploy ent in and around Tehran of loyalist military units. However, when the coup actually began n6ne of these units acted. There were apparently no contingency plans to cover unforseen circumstances. In fact, the coup was carried out haphazardly, with no prearranged plan.
82) Ibid., chs. l'le~" York Times,

9-10; Woodhouse, Somethinq Ventured, p. 126; The July 27, 1953, 14:2; and August 9, 1953, 1'f:zX Roosevelt places the Ashraf and Schwartzkopf visits several weeks earlier than they actually too1k place, and says that the Ashraf meeting took place in Switzerland (pp. 145-149). A popular myth holds that Ashraf, Allen DUllesl' Henderson, and, by some accounts, Richard Helms (later the Director of Central Intelligence) met in Switzerland in early August to f-oordinate plans for the coup. This erroneous story a~parentl originates in Richard and Gla?ys. Ha. r~ness, "The MYS~erl0us DOIngs 0 CIA," The Saturday Evenlna Pos~, November 6,1954, pp. 66-68. Oddly enough, the information presented in this article came from the CIA itself, which apparently sought to publicize its a~ti-communist activities on the eve of the 195tt mid-term elections. On the day 01' the coup, Pravda correctly identified Schwartzko f's mission and charged that U.S. agents in Ira~ had engineered he coup. See The New York Times! August 19, 195~, 3:1.
II

Roosevelt, ~ountercouPt pp. 169-175. The New York Times, August 17, 1953, 1:4, August 18, 1953, 1:7; and August 19, 1953, 6:3,4. Colonel Mumtaz was late~ "literally torn to pieces" by a pro-Zahedi crowd. See The New ~ork Times, August 20, 1953, 1:8. t'lossadeqpubl icly denounced thel fi r man s as forgeri es at hi s tri al. One former CIA officer who par~icipated in the coup claims that the firmans were forged by th[e CIA "Persia expert.." The shah's ultimate destination was apparently London. See The New York Times, August 19, 1953, 1:3-4.
83) 84) Not all of the participants

were to be evacuated. At least one CIA employee without diplomatil cover was to be left behind, as were several of the Iranian of~icers involved. The account given here differs substantially fro~ that given by Roosevelt. It was pieced together primarily from ~nterviews with several of the key participants. The main points were confirmed independently by at least two sources. I

Stoneman involve~ here was the younger of the two. Nerren and Ci lley were employedl by the CIA stati on at that time in a large propaganda operation (see footnotes 77 and 79, above), so t~ey were ideally suited to d~stribute the firmans. One participant claims that Herren and C~lley wanted to end their involvement in TPAJAX at this po i n t] but l>Jere persuaded to remain by Roosevelt, who threatened to klill them. It is not clear whether both firmans were copied. If 50, then at least the one dismissing Mossadeq must have been retypedl and Torged, since the original had already been delivered. Roose~elt says that they!:::!.!:..g retyped (Countercoulb. p. 178), but doef5n't explain how the shah's signature was put on the copies. Another source believes that only the firman appointing Zahedi was co~ied and distributed.
86) See

85) The Peter

The New York Times, A~9Ust 17, 1953, 1:4. The interview with Ardeshir Zahedi is described in Kennett love, HThe American Role in the Pahlevi Restoratioh On 19 August 1953" (unpublished manuscript, The Allen Dulles Pa~ers, Princeton University Library, 1960), pp. 31-32. Love imp1ie that only the firman appointing

PAGE 167 Zah~di was copi~d. He firman at th~ Park Hotel distribut~d copi~s of th~

87) The New York Times, August 19, 1953, 1:3-4; U.S. Senate, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Mutual Security Act of 195~, Hearinqs, 33rd Congr~ss, 2nd Session, April 3, 1954, pP. 503-504, 509; Ardeshir Zahedi, Fiv~ Decisive Davg, AUGust 14-18. 1952 (unpublished manuscript, n.d.). The latter source, graciously made available to me by the author, is an English translation of a serialized memoir originally p~blished in Ettela'at. It differs substantially from the accountsi of Roosevelt and love referred to above, and from the accounts I pbtained in interviews. Many Iranians view Zahedi's account as acpurate, and hence discount the role played by the CIA in the overthrOL<lof Mossadeq. Zahedi d~scrib~s an ~laborat~ plan formulated by his father after the arrest of Nassiri ~o establish an independent state called "free Iran" in the mouhtainous region around Kermanshah. This state was to be fortified kith loyal army and air force units (including several air force p~anes) and used as a base to gain control over he country. Plans ~ere apparently also made to sabotage key oil and rail insta[lations in Tehran to creat~ a diversion to aid the escape 6f Zah~di's group from Tehran to Kermanshah. While a number of blans were discussed by the Americans and Iranians involved in the coup, none of the CIA sources I interviewed could recall such alplan. 88) The New York Times, August, 8, 1953, 1:7; Loy Henderson Interview, Columbia University Oral ~istory Research Offic.e, 1972, pp. 15-18. Henderson had arrived in Tehran from Beirut on Monday, August 17. After the 1953 cou the Tudeh party reevaluated its role in th~se events and concluded that it should have been more supportive of Mossadeq. See Se~ehr Zabih, The Comm0nist Movement in Iran (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 220 and elseL-lhere. Some observersl have suggested to me that the Tudeh's disengagement on Tuesda~ night followed its discovery that the original Tudeh crowds had been planted. 89) By Wednesday hous~ where Zahedi Mossadeq's abents had appar~ntly located the was hiding, and were preparing to seize him.

90) Love, "The Ameri can Role I in the Pahlevi Restorat; on," pp. 40-41. Roosevelt claims to have used less than $100,000 for the entire operation (countercoup,~ p. 166), but other participants claim the figure was much higher. The exact figure is unimportant, sinc~ crowds caul d b~ hired in Tehran for almost nothing. Most of the money pa~d out during this operation was presumably pocketed by Nerren and Cilley and their associates. 91) Zabih, The Mossadeg Era, p. 121; interview with Ahmad Anvari (London, November 12, 1983). A similar view was related by Hosseim Fatemi to Zabih (see. bid., p. 133). 92) Roosevelt, Countercoup, pp.i 176-197; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp. 279-280; The New York Times, August 20, 1953, 1:6. Oveissi was later known a~ "the butcher of Tehran" for his role in the bloody events of the fall of 1978. He was assassinated in Paris in February 1984~ 93) The New York Times, Augusrt 22, 1:4, August 23, 1953, 9:1, Sept mbar 28, 1953, 8:1,2. 1953, 1:8, August 24, 1953, 26, 1953, 2:1, and September

94) Ibid., December 16, 1953, 1~:1, August 28, 1953, 4:2, October 27, 1953, 6:3, September 11, 1953, 8:3, August 25, 1953, 1:5, and September 26. 1953, 2:1. In onel operation, the alder Peter Stoneman is said to have helped Iran/an General Dadsetan crush a dissident movement which had begun to develop in the Tehran bazaar. See

PAGE

168

Love, "The American Role in the Pahlevi Restoration," p. 37. In another, Stoneman and Fred Zimmerman managed to plant microphones in a TudQh party safQ house and overhear plans for a demonstration. This information was given to Zahedi, who had the demonstration broken up. Although the safe house later turned out to be the location of the presses USQd for a major Tudeh newspaper, Bill Herman refused to approve funding to continue this operation. 95) The New York Times, September 30, 1953, 8:3; Alexander and Nanes. The United States and Iran, pp. 232-235, 250-251, 253-254; Jebhe, National Movement of Iran (London), August 20, 1983, ~. 9; Henderson to Dulles, Diplomatid Post Records, No. 497, August 27, 1953.