CHAPTER

6 - THE CONSOLIDATION

OF A CLIENT

STATE

1) THE U.S.-IRAN

CLIENCY

RELAT]ONSHIP,

1953-1963

After the 1953 coup the main U.S. goal country Council from falling under Soviet
I

in Iran was to keep that A National Security

domination.

report approved

in December
I

1953 stated that Iran's Westto the United States. Union

ern orientation According would: to

was of "critic~l this report. thel

importance"
1055

of

Iran to the

Soviet

i) threaten

the security Soviet

of

the Middle

East and Southwestthe "will

ern Asia; to resist" iv) enable "have

ii) increase of

oil resources; U.S. oil

iii) weaken prestige

U.S. allies to

and damage

in the area; and. v)

the Soviets

deny Iranian

to the West; in the creating

serious

psychological

impact elsewhere hands by

free world." a strong and

Iran was to be stable

kept out of SoJiet under

government

the shah and his prime

minister.l

This was to be achieved of the oil dispute which

in three main ways. would enable

First,

a settlement its oil

Iran to

resume

exports

was to

be obtained

at the earliest Council

possible

date.

Toward

this end the National dent secure consortium 1952 by them in

Security by

recommended U.S.

that the presi1n a in late

participation arrangement

the major to that

oil companies by Truman

similar

proposed action then

offering federal

to drop court.

anti-trust Eisenhower

pendingagainst

accepted

this recommendation

PAGE 170
and an Second, agreement with Iran was finally economic government reached was to in August 1954.

a large-scale

aid package to and enable

be made availthe operating

able to the Iranian deficit reforms, stability. recommended. against inherited

it to meet

from Mossadeq viewed a as

institute to

social and economic achieve long-term was Iran

which were Finally, U.S.

necessary

large military aid was

aid package to in

for Iran strengthen

military attacks and

necessary

outside

to improve "only

morale

the military, of power.H2

which was recognized

as the shJh's

real source

MILITARY

AND ECONOMIC

AID

As mentioned

in chapter

5, at least S73 million in the first to over

in economic

aid

was given to the Zahedi Mossadeq's government result overthrow. revenue said

government This amount~d

three weeks one third of

after the as a

to have been lost Table

up to that point roughly

of the

oil blocade.

3 shows that

Sl billion in the over of the in

in U.S. military decade after $1.2 billion government years

and economic

aid grants

were given

to Iran

the coup.

I U.S. 104ns and grants

I

together

totaled

in this period

anq

accounted

for about is even loans

21 percent higher in

expenditures. after

This !percentage the coup.

immediately financed

U.s.

and

grants

1954-1958

33 percent

of government

expenditures, in this period.

about This

the same amount figure;s the end of

accounted for

for by oil revenues 1953-1954.

44 percent

From September to 60 percent,

1953 through since

1954 it is probably to a trickle

closer

u.s.

aid had been reduced

before. Mossadeq

was ousted.3

-table

3 about

here-

This

massive

influx

of aid

came

at a. time when

government

Table

3 - U.S. Aid to Iran and Oil Revenues as Percentages of Iranian Government Expenditures, 1950-1967

--

Year

(a) Government Expenditures 225.9 188.3 149.6 167.6 201.2 285.1 415.3 414.0 506.8 611.6 697.9 --T21.4 893.3 1117.6 1185.6 1248.4 1305.9 1469.3

(b)

U. S. Aid (loans (b) as % and grants) of (a) 11.8 _27.8 44.1 52 .. 5 110.1 90.7 97.7 138.5 157.0 132.0 123.4
~1Li6.8---

(c) U.S. Aid (c) as % (grants only) of (a) 11. 8 27.8 44.1 52.5 110.1 58.7 85.3 115.5 117.0 94.3 123.4 -----g~9 88.5 81. 3 49.4 39.7 71. 9 39.8 5.2 14.8 29.5 31. 3 54.7 20.6 20.5 27.9 23.1 15.4 17.7 1-"3-;-29.9 7.3 4.2 3.2 5.5 2.7

(d) _(d) as % Oil Revenues of (a) 38.5 17.0 19.9 10.6 0 0 0 0 7.4 3.7 77.5 27.2 131. 5 31.7 182.4 44.1 41. 8 211.9 224.9 36.8 244.6 35.0 25-8 2- --3578 286.1 32.0 329.8 29.5 411.4 34.7 440.2 35.3 498.0 38.1 637.4 43.4

1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 19::8 1959 1960 ------r961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967

113.4 103.5 54.7 101.6 175.1 202.4

5.2 14.8 29.5 31. 3 54.7 31. 8 23.5 33.5 31.0 21. 6 17.7 -20~~ 12.7 9.3 4.6 8.1 13.4 13.8

sources:

note:

(a) Julian Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, 1900-1070 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 68, 90-98, 126-127. The values given here include both "ordinary" expenditures and expenditures on the various development plans. Yearly plan expenditures were estimated using the actual outlays Bharier gives for aggregated periods. Bhariers figures were converted into U.S. dollars. (b),. (c) U.S. Department of state, Agency for International Development, unpublished worksheets for U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Washington, 1981). (d) Bharier, pp. 158, 165. These figures were converted from English Pounds at an exchange rate of $2.40 per Pound. All volume figures are given in millions of U.s. dOllars.

PAGE 171 spending was increased dramatically in an effort to solidify the

tures grew by an 16 percent for 1954 or 1956-1962 erie, and

average

of 23 percent While reliable of

per year figures government (military,

in 1954-1958

and

in 1959-1963. 1955, about

are not available expenditures police, in

27 percent

were for the security presumably also

forces

Gendarm-

SAVAK),

with about

12 and

33 percent

torship. played shah's a

It is major

evident role

that,

particularly
I

in the

1950s,

U.S. aid of the

in develdping

these

as cornerstones

regime.

Just under half of the value Iran in the decade aid after

of

U.S. loans and grants was for military

given

to

the coup

assistance.

U.S. military to other major Equipment provided. stationed thousand United

to Iran was similar in

in character during

to that given this period. aircraft was was

U.S. allies

the third world to

ranging A

from ammunition Assistanqe

tanks and jet Group

Military

Advisory

(MAAG) unit army. sent

in Iran Iranian

to train and advise soldiers

the Iranian were

Over six to the

<mFu1rStthlYer officers)

States

for training. Pact and

under the Baghdad member military of these matters

I CENTO.

military The United

cooperation States

occurred

was not a full in the a

organizations which Although

but

was heavily under their

involved auspices

took place

through

liason office. ilating States, the new

the Iranian

military

was slow

in assimUnited In 1961 that

equipment

and tactics by

provided

by the

it had improved Hubert

substantially

the late 1950s. Iranian

u.s.
U.s.

Senator

Humphrey

was told by an and

general

aid had been very helpful with the civilian

that the army "was now capable

of coping

population."s

PAGE 172 The total grants)

1967 U.s.

value of U.S. economic was $944.1

aid to Iran (both million.

loans and

in 1950-1967 aid to

Before 1950 and after amounting to less

Iran was almost for both periods

$200.4

negligible. together. was in

than $25 million given loans.

Of the $944.1 million export-import bank

in 1950-1967,

million used

These loans are generally country,

to finance

U.S. exports to

the recipient

and must be repaid in full (with interest).

1ies

Hence thei r ma in value rary periods of

in leasing the reci pi ent through temposcarcity, such as the period

foreign eXChJnge
1954 when

before November tional market.

Ir1n's oil was

kept off

the interna-

Loans of this slrt can although

thus be quite useful to the social impact is

--

recipient

government,

their domestic

felt only indirectly.

Of the million

remaining

$743.7

million

In

u.s.

economic

aid, $183.1

came

in the form of Food

$610.6

for Peace (or P.l. 480) aid, and foreign aid appropri-

the remaining

million

in ordinary

ations. Most, although for the purchase cooking earmarked

not all. of the Food for Peace aid was used commodities dry such as wheat, butter,
$34 million

of basic food grains, and

oil, feed

milk. Some purposes,

was

for economic improvements

development
I

including

highway

construction, other public on military

to Jhe Mehrabad P1ojects.

Airport

in Tehran, and were spent to expand in

infrastructure construction
($4.7

Smaller amounts and loans

$58.5

($~.9 million)

private enterprise ordinary imports. commodity

million).

In addition, was used that

million

foreign aid Adding

appropriations

to finance part not used

sugar for

this and

subtracting

imports, some $197 million on food supplies.

in U.S. aid during 1950-1967

was spent directly

About one third appropriations

of the $610.6 million

in

ordinary

foreign aid

came in the form of

loans, and the rest as grants. million, used or about 23 percent) to underwrite

The largest portion of this ($139.3 was for budget support, which is

directly

PAGE 173 government spending. Another ]108.1 million projects (or 17 percent) was port. and projects
I

spent on public infr~structure railroad construction.

" 1Ud i C1nc 1ng

such ~s highway. development an d

1 oans

Spendi g on economic
. d'uSLry, 1n

"1' .. I agr1cu Lure, m1n1ng,

ta

ran ' s 46

development

bank)

took anothe~

$83.9 million.

The remaining

PQrcQnt of foreign aid appropriations of smaller areas. Social progr1ms

was spread across a Variety hous-

such as haalth, education, $37.3 million. and motor

---

ing, and

disaster such as

relief

accolunted for machinery,

Non-food took

.commodities $69 million.

textiles,

vehicles

Public administnation

and public

safety assistance below) accounted in support of or cannot be

(including the police training

program described

for $10.8 million. the missions which easily identified.6

The remainder was either spent carried ouJ the above activities

While the

U.S. aid program

in Iran

appears on paper

to have

been comprehensive
of frequent

and well-ba anced

ond cont1overs:.

it was, in fact, the subject

House subcommittee
50

criticism

exom-

ined this program tered spent. that it Funding

in 1957 and ~ound that it was be ~etermined "to have

I

poorly adminisfunds had been of the

could not

how aid

levels appearJd

been picked out

air." with no apparent to Iran in

1953 and nor economic

regard ~or Iran's economic

1954

needs. Aid given technical

of keep-

wJs described
but on

as "neither
od hoc method

ossistonce

develo~ment

ing the Iranian

economy afloa~." high level

The subcommittee

criticised

not

only the relatively s~ecific projects as

10f

budget support given to Iran but it stopped short of charging

well. AI~hough

that U.S. aid had been used report contained clear

i~ a corrupt manner. the subcommittee that U.S. aid had been used by

infere~ces

the Iranian government

for dom4stic political

porposes.7

Further evidence corrupt purposss by

that the U.S. aid program the shah appeared

in Iran was used for an article in

in 1965 when

The Nation charged that U.S. aid had been used to finance payments

PAGE 174
of over members publi5h~d $40 million of the to top ]ranian and American After th~ this m~tt~r officials article was and was

shah's

inne1 circle. into

~ S~n~t~

inv~5tia~~ion was threJtened

abruptly strong

halted and The Nation evidence

with a lawsuit. were never

While

was presented, to believe

the c,arges

proved.'

There

;5
by

also reason Ir~nian

that some U.S. military

aid was pocketed

military

officers.9

SECURITY

ASSISTANCE

Fir~~~' training

;::~~:t:ec:::::ta:::C:Jl~r::reca::o:~:::YW::h and equipment and quite I by the United diversd. in a In states.

t::e:;:;:~:: provided

The training

was extensive a U.S. certain the

at least one case capacity.

it involved Second, a

advisor amount

who worked

top command information services. latter

of intelligence Iranian seCUri,y

was As

exchanged will be

between

U.S. and security

discussed

below,

assistance

of JhiS

kind was not extensive,

and hence

;s of l;m;tod

;mport]nce

;n this study.

Large-scale began

U.s. training

aJd advice weeks

for Iran's of Mossadeq's missions since

security

forces As

in September

1953, within four U.S.

overthrow.

discussed

in chapter

advisory

had been working the early intelligence training 1940s. (or Qg

with the Iranian However, G-2),12 ~ In other

military than

and Gendarmerie to

assistance were noJ

I

military

these missions September

involved

in security who had years

1953 a U'S'J Ea t

Army officer for several work

been working and who had a as a a new

with the CIA background military security in

in the Middle police His and

detJctive

was sent and

to Iran command

attache. force.

missioJ

was to organize

the main

task of which

was to seek out and elimi-

PAGE 175 nate all threats to the shah.13 These were expected from the Tudeh tary officers party. However~ challenges to the to come malnly shah from miliFront were

and even from remnants of the Hational I I also regarded as possible sources of threat.

This security force was organized iar and three army colonels. It did

around General Teimur Bakhtnot, at this time, have a

well-defined given a

organizational it

structure, opeiated
I
I

and apparently

was not even

name. Rather,

informally

and clandestinely,

acting independently tus and reporting

of the otHer branches of the security apparaU.S. attache, who himself had on the milicommand of number of In

directly to Ithe the shah.14

direct access to tary governorship Bakhtiar existing in

It was built primarily put under the

of Tehran (which was 1953), but drew facilities,

December

resources from a

government

both military

and civilian.

addition to commanding Bakhtiar and the three

this orJanization, colonJls

I

the U.S. attache trained tactics. the opera-

in

basic intelligence methods,

These included surveillence tion of etc. intelligence

and

interrogation organizational

networks,

security measures, efficient security

This organization

was the first modern, evolved

force to operate

in Iran. It eventually

into the notorious

secret police force SAVAK, which served as a primary pillar of the shah's dictatorship. T u d e h ne twor k w h lCh Its main rlchievement was ha d b een qrganlze I . d' In th e to break up a large arme d f orces. Th' IS

operation will be described

in some detail below.

SAVAK1S director.

was established The shah

in 1957

with Bakhtiar creating

as its SAVAK.

first First,

had two main goals in

he wanted to establish an efficient provide the kind of securit such a~

security apparatus needed

which could an

structure his. The

to maintain

unpopular dictatorship rolled up In September as the

Tudeh military

network figures bodyand

1954 had included such high-ranking and the prime minister's

head of army G-2

personal

guard. The discovery

of this network revealed the incompetence

PAGE 176 inadequacy of the existing restructuring to create which sec]lritY of these forces forces and convinced was necessary. the shah Second.

that a major

the shah decided and competition which crQatQd were

SAV~K

in part to eliminate between the various security. which had

the overlap

existed for

organizations SAVAK was

responsible from

maintaining

primarily

thQ organization

by Bakhtiar

and the U.S. militJry from other

attache. of

However.

it also

incor-

po rated personnel apparatus. methods It

branches operating

the existing

security

soon developed gave

procedures

and recruiting character.

which

it a very dj.stinct and

independent

After

Bakhtiar's

associati

In

with the States

U.S. military

attache

ended he was sent to the United organiZations be adapted SAVAK was sent and examine to suit formally

to study the U.S. security and institutions 1957, shortly might after was

how Jheir methods

I

conditionJ establiShe" and

in

Iran.

In

a team train

of five CIA SAVAK.

officers

to Iran

to organize in

This team operations, the members

included and of this

specialists

intelligen~e Accordi1g it provid~d to hoJ sta~es on U.S. to

analysis, one of

counter-intelligence. team. the assistance up the SAVAK While

included to set

"everything up

from setting

library

counter-intelligence assistance to

files."16 SAVAK. FBI.

the United

provided

extensive

it was not modeled In fact,

institutions

such as the CIA or domestic and foreign agencies

U.S. advice be handled

to Ithe shah that b~

I

operations

should

distinct

and

independent

(like the FBI and CIA) was rejlcted.

U.S. assistance both

to SAVAK

inqluded

training

for SAVAK

personnel. to SAVAK

in Iran and in the United IStates. The training consisted of standar, services courses throughout

given

personnel

made available the world.

by the CIA cours-

to "friendly"

security

These

es are qu'te s'm'lar to the

at bases trained in such as Ft. Meade, the fundamentals

b1s,e tra'n'ng g'ven to CIA personnel

Jin Maryland. of spycraft, SAVAK such as personnel were surveillance,

PAGE 177 interrogation, and personal security. Despite frequent accusations in torture techSAVAK employees their In this training context were

to the contrary. niques by were

SAVAK personn~~

were not trained often argue that area.) However. torture.

the CIA. (CIA peOPI, adept in this to

already

included different

courses forms

on how of torture

resist

were discussed.17

CIA officers

certainly aware of the CIA officer reportedly

use of torture by SAVAK. and toured

I

at least one SAVAK

SAVAK

torture chambers.18

personnel were also tional Police

trained and

i1 the United States ~he International were run by allegedly

at the InternaPolice Services Agency for CIA

Academy

School. These International sponsorship.19

training centers Development.

the U.S. with

covert

In

addition

to

the

CIA t'laining

and

advisory

mission

that

workQd with SAVAK, thQre was aliso a certain amount of cooperation between the two agencies ligence information third countries on intelligence collection. material Some intelrelating to some

was exchanged, the Soviet relating to in scope.

primarily

such as

Union. There

was also

exchange of information was much more limited

domestic matters,

though this to the For

The information

provided

CIA by SAVAK

was generally

regarded to be of

dubious value.

its part, the CIA was reluctan, I for fear that mid-1960s

to provide SAVAK with information exposed. In any case, by the had

its sources would be

SAVAK had become quite

sophisticated

and presumably

better sources than the CIA. who stopped using agents in Iran.20

by this time had almost entirely While very little information

relating to domestic matters was frequently policies. discussed matters

thus exchanged,

the two services coordinated

of common

concern and

One other area icantly to Iran's

in which the United security

States contributed was through a

signifpolice

capabilities

training and advisory mission administered

,by the U.S. Agency for

PAGE 178 International Development. This mission, which was begun in the

summer of 1954 and continued es~~blished

Po 1 r ce ,

a] least through the end of 1965, was ~nd ~dvice

"C

to

provide tr~ini~g

for Iran's
lS

National ca 11 e d
f or

Th e

or r.. q t ne 1 agreemen"j cover r.na in the areas of hdadqUarters

.h i

.. mr es i on

assistance

and

field organization, communiand inv05-

personnel practices,
cations, training,

records, Jotor
man~gomont,

vehicle maintenance,
idontification,

traffic

tigative procedures. mission

While mucH of the assistance

provided

by this

involved routine POlie, work and some of its activi These ies

thus i5 of little interconsiderable in riot domestic control, and

est here, political assistance Patrolmen's

were of

importance. in

included training !the

,

restructuring

National

Police

Academy

School, the establishment connections to

of a nationwide

police radio

network with

~he international

Interpol network,
lobs."

and tho dovo10p.ont

of fingorplint

and photographic

'I
'I
I

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S.-IRANIAN

JELATIONS

The relationship very close but discussed above, the

1953 coup

between t~e United

I

States and

Iran remained As

passed through Iseveral phases in

'I

thi s peri od ,

the main goa~ of was to stabi llze shah a~d statediin

I

U.S. policy toward Iran around

Iran after central goal, Council

a strong This

government which

led

by the

his prime

minister.

was explicitly in

the National for

Security

report approved of the oil

December

1,53, called

an early resolution and economic of aid

dispute

and larg~-scale
I

military

programs. apparatus

It also under

called for the establishment the command:1 of aU. S.

a new security attache Front and and

mi Iitary

small-scale

covert U.S.

openlations against

National

Tudeh targets in the fall of 1953 (as described

in chapter 5).

rAGE 179 By the end of 1954 this goal had largely begun to flow again. The liberal been achieved. had grown Oil had docile

opposition

and the Tudeh party had been dealt a decisive of its military policymakers was regarded control over network. The picture became

blow with the rollup for U.S.

even brighter in April

when as a the

the shah dismissed

I

Zahedi

1955. This

sign that the shah was at countrY

last ready to assume to In stamp out

corruption,

which

arid act decisivelY I had grown rimpant under Zahedi.

late April

~:::e_:::leU'~~su:::::::n brought against under control. the continuing through

i:hiJ~hr::d The proJlem threat

::::::d

t;:t :::3 t:::atbe:: the regime

now was to reinforce subversion. and

Jf Soviet

This was to be aid and

accomplished further

continued

military

economic

strengthening

of the security

apparatus.22

This new maintain station Iranian in

U.S. confidence

in the 1n

shah and the

in his of

ability the

to CIA

control Tehran

was reflected at this time. scaled

activities U.S.

Covert

operations

against

targets

were

back greatly

by the end of 1954. Both the two principal U.S.

the TPBEDAMN agents used

operation

(which had

provided

in the overthrow

of Mossadeq) against The

and the small

operations

undertaken

in the fall of 1953

the National number

Front and the used for after

Tudeh party were ended. routine 1953. in

Similarly,

of agents

intelligence-gatherinJ The new atmosphere dictated

in Iran declined I of s~ability and growing

I

steadily

U.S. confidence intervening thought by CIA

the shah

a new

lapproach.

Rather

than

directly

in Iran's affairs,

U.S. policymakers

increasingly

in terms of enabling giving station directed him aid busied and itself

the shah to provide building up his

for his

own security forces. The

security

more and more with Union and Afghanistan in Tehran.23

cross-border and with

operations penetrations

at the Soviet

of the Eastern

Bloc embassies

In the late 1950s and early

19605 two additional

factors

began

PAGE 180 to emerge which ities in Iran. described above, security force its liason disrupt U.S. had the effect of further First, due lar~ely to the SAVAK was beCllming at this time. It curtailing U.S. activ-

training and assistance effective as a on

increasingly

was therefore and more

less able to

dependent

with the

United States

detect and in 1957 in

intelligence-gathering

activities.

Second,

the United States began to install electronic Iran. These devices were of cnitical

listening

devices

importance

after the Soviet

Union launched Sputnik because Ithey were more reliable than satellites and high-altitude were close comparable enough to aircra~t
I

and

because no other U.S. allies launch sites for to provide of

the Central ASlan A

facilities.24

formal agreement U.S.

the basing

these devices was never concluded. quently very reluctant to undertake

, ,
I

policymakers

were conse-

operations

in Iran which might

anger the shah and lead him to ,withdraw their basing privileges.

These factors gence-gathering mid-1962 the CIA

led to a and other

futther curtailment political

of

U.S. in

intelliIran. By

activities

training mission in 1957-1959

with SAVAK

had been

greatly

scaled back. Where by the specific equipment. a liason

it had been very activities

broad in scope, to very

early 1960s its training projects, usually

,

were limited

~nvolving
I

sophisticated connection was to the Tudeh

electronic into joint

In its place the CLA-SAVAK mission whose mainly to be

had evolved carry out

primary purpose directed at

operations,

party. However, time and Similarly, no the

SAVAK officials joint operations close personal

fit

had become of this kind

very obstinate actually

by this

occurred.25

relationships

which had earlier been of great benewere now replaced by were now routinely

to both American and Iranian participants distant relationships. ICIA officers

more

followed

in Iran and their telephones

were bugged. occurred it

To the extent was now done

that foreign training

of SAVAJ officers

by Israelis, often in Israel.

PAGE 181 For similar and the Tehran CIA station the early 1960s as well. of U.S. embassy officials in with

became more highly circumscribed one round of meetings

Except for

Front figUrJs in 1962 and 1963, contact between i the embassy and the Iranian OP1ositioh was forbidden by successive U.S. ambassadors, CIA station, having relying almost newspapers) apparently after complaints by the shah. The

prominent National

dropped m]lst of its agents, was on

1

by this time (such as until

exclusivelY

SAVAK and
6

overt sources

for intelligence.

This

situation

persisted

1977, when growing unrest led ~o a decision

I

to renew contacts with

the opposition.

This is the ma~n reason why the Iranian revolution so mudh by surprise.27
I

caught U.S. policymakers

The one

area of U.S.-IraniJn

relations which was

not greatly

scaled back in program. As

the early 1960J was the military

and economic aid aid to

shown in table 3, I U.S. military

and economic

Iran remained at high levels t~rough ly shifted from of grants Iranian to 11ans gover~ment
I

1967. although and declined

it increasingnoticably This aid as a was the had

percentage reportedly

expenditures. the shah

used in

1961 to pressure
I

into appointing

reformist Ali

Amini as

prime Iminister.28

U.s. policymakers

been aware of the need for social and economic some time.29 However, it was not until

reforms in Iran for of the approach

the inauguration different

Kennedy Administration,

with
I

ts dramatically

to the third world, that pressure on the shah.

I

for reforms was finally exerted

This pressure was remarkably of agriculture Dr. Hassan

effective.

Amini and his minister wide-ranging literacy discussed it the

Arsanjani
I

instituted a

series

of reforms,

including

land

reform,

health and
be

programs,

the enfranchisement

df women.
I

etc. As will

below. the shah

took this pro~ram to and the "S~ah-peoPle

be his own. calling revolution."

"white revolution" the reform program

Having made the shah was

into a cor lerstone of his regime

PAGE 182
I

ablQ to dismiss can pressures. off. At Persian

ronounced

thQ pro-AmericJn

Amini and prQQmpt

furthQr

Amerito drop of

At the same tide U.S. aid levels continued marking the 2500th in 1971

the lavish ceremonies monarchy

further

anniversary

held

at per1epolis

the shah

publicly

U.S. aid.

.1
With

U.S.-Iranian

relations

by t1is time had come full circle. lilitary and economic the

the 1953 coup and large-scale rity assistance in role

As

aid and secuhad

the following in rescJing

years,

United StatQs

played a crucial
poworful

the shah and making

strong and as

him into a
Iran grew in

dictator.

the Sha, became

importance

to the United states

I

the U.S.-Iran

cliency

relationship instruments ended almost disap-

changed dramatically such as entirelY. intervention, The

in characJer. aid, and which

The flow of cliency security assistance

leverage

laid had

provided

gradually

peared. After 1963 considered here.

and cQrtai~lY

by 1971 Iran could

no longer be term is used

a U.S. client

in the sense in which this

I I
I

2) THE FOUNDATIONS

OF DTCTATORSHIP
I

THE SECURITY

FORCES

As in any other dictatorship, authoritarian creation components: forces. The regime was the its

the

primary

pillar of the shah's Before the main

security

apparatus.30 had

of SAVAK,

seCU;~ity apparatus Police, inc uded civilian

had three and

the National armed forces replaced the

the Gendarmerie, the military administration

the armed of

governorship

Tehran, which

when martial

PAGE 183 law was declared in 1953. The military governorship was in turn attache

the main organization

which Ba~htiar and the U.S. military th~ pr~d~c~ssor

I I

dr~w upon in ~stablishing

to SAVAK.

I
I

The National Police had beerl created unified, nationwide structure for law

by Reza Shah to provide a enforcement in the larger was to carry and

cities and towns of Iran. Its out routine police duties

primary responsibility such as criminal

investigation

apprehension. handled

However,

it also Ihad
I

a secret police division which matters. The main

domestic of

security the secret

arid intelligence IPolice was

responsibility subversive late 1940s

to monitor

and disrupt In the

elements

which pos~d

a threat to

the regime. the

and early 1950s th1s

meant primarily

Tudeh party intelli-

and the Fedayan-i-Islam. gence capabilities

The secret police had no foreign

I

as such. liJe much of the government corrupt and inefficient.

I I

bureaucraIt was no

cy at the time it was extremely match for the in preventing well-disciplineq assassination
I I

Tudeh party and attempts against

was not effective the shah and his

prime ministers.

The

Gendarmerie

was

the

~ural
I

counterpart

of

the

National

Police. It operated the border :patrol. policed the small towns and villages, track and shared responsi1bility with
I

the

army for

keeping

of the

tribes. The

Ge~darmerie
I

had

a small

intelligence

section whose primary function ras to maintain itself. infiltrations all. Its main The Gend~rmerie also

security within the cross-border

handled

into Iran, to the extent role in providing

I

that these were handled at security was its activ-

domestic

ities regarding the tribes.

I

Before the maintaining the martial lished

creation of

SAVAK the

primary responsibility

for

domestic law

security

lay with the armed forces, and the new

including

administration and the

security force estabattache. The army

under Bakhtiar

U.S. military

PAGE 184 itself played an important deeply involved role in maintaining order. It had been

in the overthrJ1w of Mossadeq

I

and in the widespread operations against began to

arrests which followed the tribes

the coup. It conducted ~he guerrilla

and later against

19605.

bands which

emerge in the late down large Khomeini. when it

In 1963 the army was led by in a little-known the ensuing fear

called out to put clergyman named Even might

demonstrations Hundreds

were killed in

confrontation. military

remained

the barracks,

that the

intervene contributed ation which prevailed forces were closely

to the a1mosPhere under the shah.

I

of intimidation The activities

and alienof the armed

supervised

by the shah, organizations.

and were coordinated

with those of the other security

As mentioned competition

above, SAVAK
I

was organized

in part

to end

the

and redundancy

which the system of overlapping process actually

securiseems to

ty forces entailed. have begun Bakhtiar and from both the of military bility for tions.
G-2

This cons9lidation
I

with the establish~ent the U.S. military military

of the organization attache.

head~d by drew

This organization

and the secret police. to have entirely activities

With the exception taken over responsi-

G-2

it appears

domestic was

intelligence only

from

these organizain domestic

peripherally
I

involved

intelligence,

being mainly concerned

with security

in the military in neighboring

itself and with the activities :of countries. still The National Police. the

the armed forces Gendarmerie. maintaining an enforcement

and the military security. whereas for

played important

roles in in

domestic

However,

they acted primarily organization

capacity,

Bakhtiar's domQstic

and later SAVAK assumed

responsibility

intelligence

mattQrs.

The manner out the task tWQnty-five

in which SAVAK a~d ite immediate of maintaining security changed

predecessor considerably

carried in the of

years

after Mossadeq

was overthrown.

One source

this change lay in the evolution

of SAVAK from a corrupt,

compar-

PAGE 185 atively backward became organization something to a modern, efficient security of this United above. A

force which kind States second in the in

01 a

model

for organizations by the

third world.31

1he key

role played

this process of change roles

of evo~ution in SAV~K's

has been described

source

mode of operation

resulted

from

to the changing extension, to lead it.

it was c~lled different

on to play by the shah and. by of the men appointed

from the

personalities

The founder who remained for plotting

and first

direltor

of SAVAK was

Teimur

Bakhtiar,

in that position to overthrow

until March 1961 when he was exiled I t~e shah. After the 1953 coup and in the process security leader of consolidating force under the was

throughout

the 19505 the shah Jas

I

his authoritarian command crucial violent much of a

regime. and

An efficient dJtermined

ruthless

like Bakhtiar

to this process man,32 and the

of conJolidation. organ~zation little!is

I

Bakhtiar

was a crude and a character 1n the 1950s SAVAK of of the people

he led

took on 5AVAK

like his. Although no doubt

written

about

there can be 19705, if

that

it :was

as brutal

as the

perhaps in

somewhat the period

l~ss effective.
I

Thousands

were arrested

of being members were executed edly several tortured in

after August 1953, mostly on charges I of the outla1ed Tudeh party. At least 94 people this period,33 higher. At
I

and the true least some

figure

was undoubthave been for

times

are said to

to death.

Bdkhtiar's
I

security

forcQ was

rQsponsiblQ

the breakup closely parties

of the Tudeh mili~ary all other

network

in September Opposition political

1954 and political activity

monitored were

political

groups.

illegal at this

time, and overt

was impossible.

Bakhtiar Pakravan, stood chief.

was succeeded a highly

as

head of of

SAVAK

by General

Hassan who

cultured to hi

~an
I

considerable

intellect

in marked

contrast

predecessor

and successor

as 5AVAK

The choice

of Pakravan,

who had previously

been Bakhtiar's

PAGE 186 deputy, came at almost the same

I

time that the reformist

Ali Amini

was appointed restrained ically, Guards shah to

Prime Minister.

'AVAK
I

is said to have been much more was apparently by Khomeini's said to have the 1963 the shah stopped.34 Iron-

under Pakravan. who

Tor~ure

Pakravan, soon after

was executed is

Revolutionary convinced the In

the revolution, life

spare Khomeini's

after

demonstrations. became

part because that Pakravan 1965 after

of these demonstrations, was too lenient.35

I

convinced in January

Pakravan

was dismissed

Prime Minister

Hassan

Ali Mansour

was assassinated.

I
Pakravan's Nassiri, Hassiri who successor had been as SAVAK as chief head of was General Nematollah Police. serving the National

was a loyal Iranian

servant

to the shah. The two Academy. Nassiri

had been classhad delivered the

mates at the firman

Military

dismissing

Mossadeq Mossadeq,

in August Under
I

1953 and after SAVAK

the coup had a world-

personally wide

arrested

Nassiri

gained

reputation was

for brutality

and efficiency, 1979,

Not surprisingly, generals who

Nassiri

executed

in February

one of four

were the first victims

of the post-revolutionary

regime.36

SAVAK was a complete tic and foreign of life matters

intelligence and having

service, access

handling

both domesall aspects mployees, agents and

to virtually 3000

in Iran.

It had

appJoximately some

full-time part-time central

and, according informers.37 divided into

to one source,

3 million a a

SAVAK had

three main parts: departments,

organization monitoring The for

nine general

branch

for

activities general overall security, equipment, overt three:

in Tehran, departments command, SAVAK

and branches comsisted foreign

for the various with

provinces.

of units

responsibility

intelligence-gathering, matters, support

domestic personnel and and

security,

tech~ical
I

overt

intelligence The

sources, of

counter-espionage, these was

operations. domestic

most notorious

department

security,

PAGE 187 In 1971 divided department three had 300 full-time employees and was and

into four sections. It had separate its

Section branches

one handled covering

operations

investigations. the Nationa!

the Tudeh

party,

Front and

associated

parties,

students

and other

Iranians living abroad,

and the though clergy. Section

the Arab and Baluch minorities,

two seems functionally to have rather

the Kurds,
duties, It had

had similar than by group. workers

it was organized dealing

branches the

with the press, partids, minist~ies, peop~es'

I

the tribes, universities

and farmers, the

official

political and the

and schools, whose

legislative was "to

houses

and one branch discontent."3s and

function three by

eliminate

Section records

managed

the elaborate three.

system

of archives

kept

department es for

Section

four handled

enforcement. and

It had branchspecial

censorship, and judicial

indoctrination matters,

training, interrogation.

operations,

including

Department

three also and

contained

independent as well

branches

for trans-

lation,finance, independent direction Evin

military branch.

matters,

as an additional, were under the

judicial

Most

of Iran's

prisons

of department in Tehran,

three. which

The one exception was operated

was the dreaded eight (and

Prison

by department closely

(counter-espionage). perhaps covering workers, commanded)

Finally, Tehran

department S1VAK,
I

three worked had party, bazaar,

which Tudeh

separate

branches the

the National

Front'lthe
I

the clergy,

the universities,

and Ithe Tehran units.

as well as sepa-

rate investigation

and surveillance

SAVAK was of

an extremely

sophisticated ranged

and

effective the crudest

instrument forms of

repression. to

Its tactics carefully

from

violence designed

orchestrated

psychological and promote

operations to the

to disrupt

the opposition

loyalty

shah.

The charges

of torture

by S~VAK

are well-known

and need not be

PAGE

188

d~tail~d h~re.39 Torture was widespread was the ultimate with

1n Iran under the shah. It

recourse of the shah's security forces in dealing of the opposition. intimidation It which, also helped to

obstinate members climate of

create a than any

fear and

probablY more oppo-

oth~r tactic employed

I

by the regime,

discourag~d

sition to the shah.

Despite

th~ central

role dlayed

by torture

under the groups. SAVAK

shah, Arbi-

which served to break down andJundermine trary arrest and imprisonmen

I
I

opposition

were

commonplace.

officers act as

were empowered

under the 19571bi II and arrest and

establishi ns SAVAK to detain suspects.

military magistrates charge in

The usual

such cases was or

"fo~ming or belonging having a collectivist

to organizations ideology," which

opposed to the monarchy was illegal under

the Iranian penal code.

Amnesty International

reported in 1976 that there were tical prisoners 1n Iran. Trials

between 25,000 and 100,000 polifor political Investigations Defendants were prisoners were

conducted

under military

tribunals.
SAVAK.
I I

for the prosepermitted to

cution were

carried out by

choose lawyers from short lists consisting of retired militarV

prepared officers.

by the tribunal, Defense lawyers

usually had no

more than ten days to prepare out juries and usually or cross-examine

their cases. Trials were held withDefendants had no right to call knew of no such Interna-

in camera.

witnesses.

AJnesty International
I

cases in which defendants

were laCQUitted. In 1975 Amnesty

tional stated that "no country 'i n the human rights than Iran."40

world has a worse record in

SAVAK also had much subtler networks of informers were to speak critically about
50

ways of promoting widespread

conformity.

Its

that Iranians were afraid even in their own homes. three,

the regime

Using the elaborate all applications (including

filing system

maintained

by department

for employmen~

in government-run many private

organizations organizations

the universities)

and in

-.

PAGE 189
were carefully screened by SAVAK. Applicants who had opposed the

regime or were even related only kept out of sensitive mQaningful QmploymQnt

to someone positions

who had opposed

it were not denied used to tight in

in this way but often process was

altogether.

A similar

deny passports Iran. However,

to dissidents.

Censorship

was extremely

SAVAK took censdrship informa~ion increase 5AVAK

I I

one step further dQsignQd both to

by publishthe own

ing and di55Qminating opposi ti on operations.41 and to Another

discrQdit its

popular was

fears

about

1actic

to create regime

organizations to coopt regime's for Human An unsucfor

which were mildly and channel

critical and

of ~he ga~her

shah's

in order on the

dissent

information

critics.

Such organizations an organization was made

Rights and cessful

inJluded the Iranian Society I for, Iranian intellectuals. to establish a similar

attempt

organization

lawyers.42

MECHANISMS OF COOPTATION
I
I

The

shah

balanced approach

thes~

I
I

repressive

capabilities

in

carrot-and-stick designed

with a series
I

of inducements

and reforms from

to buy support

for hi~

regime and deflect which

criticism

the opposition. fell in

These measures,

were only partly designed and

successful, financed by

three main categories: corruption,

reforms

the government, such as

and corporatist and

political of the

institutions government

the official

parties

branches

bureaucracy.

After the 1953 coup the shah realize crucial that social reforms and

and his American economic

advisors

came to be was

development development government

would effort

if the regime was to launched. As

last. A major
I

consequently

mentioned

above,

sp9nding

PAGE 190 increased percent by an average 1959-1963. of 23 percent The percentage per year of in 1954-1958 and 16 in government expenditures in 1954 (cover-

which want for to 39 percent ing 1949-1955)

aconomic in 1962.43 called

davalormant
!

rosa from 13

pgrC8nt Plan

Where

the First Development not actually Plan (1956-1962) increasa

for (but ~id the Second a 448

spend)

21 billion for 94.5 for

rials for development, billion. This includad

called

percent

in spending a

agricultural increase percent for

programs

over the First

Plan levels,

520 percent and 217 programs.

transportation

and communications, for industry Iran's

and 220

increases

(respectively)

~nd social

These efforts

were quite

succes~ful.
I

GNP grew at an annual employment grew by and

rate of 7-8 percent 19 percent

in 1955-196b. The
hi

Manufacturing of houses

in 1956-1960. schools

umber

and primary

secondary

grew by 10.8 percent The production it had been

I

and 47 percent

(respectivewas 48

ly) in 1955-1960. percent higher

of

livestock

in 1955-1959 five years.44

than

in the previous

Devalopment 1960s. of

efforts

continJ 8d

at a

similar

paca

in

tha early rate held

Real government

9.4 percent

expenditures grew at an average annual I in 1962-1967 'Iand spending for development of government rlanned
I
I

steady at just under 40 percent period. Plan Avarage yearly outlays

expenditures the Third higher than

in this

under

Davalopment under the (754 at an in

(1962-1967) Plan, and annual with

were almost the

three

tlmes

Second

largest: increases

being

in

industry

percent) averag~

social

services

(~84 percent).

Real GNP grew

rate of 8.7 perc~nt grew by 37 percent. and

in 1960-1967. The number the number remained

and amployment of houses

manufacturing 10.7 percent While

grew by almost same by 4.6

in 1960-1965. livestock

of at

schools about the

doubled. levels. percent

production

domestic

per capita

agricultural
I

production

grew

in 1960-1967.45

I
I I I

In reforms

January which

1963

the

shah ~nnounced

plans

for

a series

of

came to ba known ls the White

Ravolution.

By identi-

PAGE 191
fying his sought to and thus regime portray deflect The White forests so closely himself as wrth a pro~ram of reforms modernizing liberal plans and the shah monarch radical

a progress1ve, from the

criticism Revolutio

opposition. zation of

and water

included

for the nationalito introduce to establish

rrsources,

legislation programs The jewel

profit-sharing health, of the program.

in private and

indistry,

and

education,

develop~ent howevbr,

corps.

in the crown land reform

White Revolution,

was a large-scale

The land tenure im~nt to social prominent

system

in Iran had long been development.

a serious

imped-

and economic

land reform

had been a

political land begun

issue for y~a.s,

and ih. shah had n b un a in the of a early much 1950s. The

limited program however. 1n

redistribution in the early

rrogram 1r6~S was ~eTorm every

larger

scale, ended been

By the time the land 1971 virtually estates

program village

was officially in Iran elite, largely had

September

affected.

The massive sources

if the landowning power, were

and hence

their primary Ninety-two receive land

of POlitiral of the

dismantled. eligible to

percent

prasant

sharecroppers

under the reforms

program cannot

eventually

did. While

the grand one

scale of these

b~ denied,

the program laborers were

contained

-"""

major

oversight:

the landless

I agricultural peasantry

who consti-

tuted almost ly excluded the

half of the Iraniar from the program the breakup

not only completecases, forced off The poli-

b~t were,

in most

land with

ofl the large

I
I

feudal

estates.46

profound

consequences

of the land reform at some length

program

for Iranian

tics will be discussed of this study.

below and

in the conclusion

secand mechanism
While

of

ca~Ptatlon
under

used

by

the

shah was

corruption.

corruption th

(fo. ob.iou Iranian

a.on.l,

f.
I

the shah;s that

hard to document it
p

no doubt

at.d ih. in the

political

process

and rhat much

of it originated