PAGE 192

royal court itself.47 Corruption

I

came

in

a myriad

of forms

in

Iran. It involved

not only the I royal family and religi~us

I

and wealthy

businessat its also

men but also tribal dll l~v~ls, primary

leaders,

government

employees While

dnd ~VQn peasants in

and

the urban

ungmployed. greed,

motive

most cases was personal political of

I

corruption

served an important allies control to

purpose:

it enabled involved

the shah and his and thus exert many potensystem of

buy the loyalty

the people effect

!

over them. This had the centers linked of

of eliminating creating a vast

tial competing patronage ally all evidence cials which

power and

the roY~1 court As

in a personal above,

way to virtuthere is some

segments

of society.

discussed

that U.S. foreign

aid was used Given the

by the shah and his offisecrecy only involving the tip of these the

for corrupt the cases

purposes. cited

matters, iceberg.

may

have been

A final mechanism employment or

used by tHe membership institutions

shah to coopt in

the opposition

was or and

government-controlled such as the universities and

government-affiliated research political institutes, parties.

the government Because of the

bureaucracies, sheer size of

the legal

the government,

much of the most prestigious sector. children This was particularly of the

e~ployment irue
I

in Iran lay in the public well-educated the core of applicants

for the secular, classes, who formed

upper and middle opposition.

the liberal

and radical positions

As discussed screened

above, by

for government who had

were carefully in opposition service

SAVAK. Those
were

participated

political

activities

either

barred

from public This created in

or given

unsuitable

or temporary to

employment. refrain

powerful political
I

incentives activity.

for students

from engaging watched

Government

employees to be poli-

were closely tically

and similJrly

found

it difficult held

active.

Much the same unions,

situation which often

in many newspapers, ties to the

businesses, government

and labor or were

had direct

run by allies

of the shah.48

PAGE 193 A similar political were mainly role was played which by the various in government-sponsored 1957. These Rather, they parties served with

parties,

firstl
I

appeared

in no

way popular

or representative. and recruitment obligatory of government. organs

as socialization

for the state, hoping

membership into the

being virtually highest levels to

for anyone These

to enter helped to of

parties

coopt opposition these parties or criticize of forcing

the shah in two main ways. openly belong

First, members to other

could not, of course, the shah. Hence

parties

tlhe official Iranians to

parties make

had the effect a clear choice

politically-active and the

between parties

the shah

opposition.

Second, the opposition (Inde-

could nominate an

candidates

for the Majles,

was denied pendent

organizational were,

base for entering permitted

this body.

candidates

however,

to run

for office.) the offi-

Either the shah himself cial parties chance Majles,

or a

trusted

ally always Hence

headed

and selected opposition

thei1

candidates. a

there was little force in the

for the and this

t~ become regained

powerful it

body never

the power

had held under

Mossadeq.49

3) THE SHAH AND THE OPPOSITION

In the years after used his coercive

he was returned and

to power

in

1953, the shah of cooptation to to

apparatus

these mechanisms of

systematically This meant

undermine

all sources

opposition

his rule. but also and even process, of the auton-

not only the liberal threats

and radical

opposition the clergy,

real and potential from the

from the military, upper class.

traditional relations

landed

In

the

state-society

in Iran evolved

from the pluralism relatively

late 1940s and early omous dictatorship

1950s

to the authoritarian,

of the 1960s and 1970s.

PAGE 194 THE NATIONAL FRONT AND THE TUDE~ PARTY

I

I
I

The first targets of the shah were, of course, the liberals and radicals of the Front suffered government National Front and the Tudeh party. The National of the Mossadeq It contin-

a mortal blow with

the overthrow

in 1953 and the subsequent

wave of arrests. names

ued to exist most vocal

under a variety of different opposition

and remained the

shah's reign.

force i~I Iran until the last days of the However, becaus~ and the of its broad popularity the

personal threat it had posed to him in 1953, the shah harassed

National Front more than any other group. The effect of the shah's attacks was the liberal already evident by 1963 opposition led the when the clergy massive rather than which

demonstrations

occurred

in that year.

The shah's main repression. was arrested

instrument

in dealing with

the opposition

was

Virtually in

the entire leadership

of the National

Front

August 1953, and after that

arrest and imprisonand demonstrations raids were made to machines. etc.

ment became a routine matter.50 by the National disrupt

Public meetings and frequent mimeograph

Front were banned sessions,

planning was

seize

Censorship

used to

deny the National

Front a political

public forum. parties made

Rigged elections and the ban on independent it virtually in impossible for the National Qashqai

Front to place candidates Khans were exiled in the

the Majles.

The pOWerful

mid-1950s, Confederacy

denying the substantial to the National

resources

of the Qashqai Tribal

Front.Sl

Repression

not only made it difficult its public lappeal

for the National

Front to

operate but reduced the mechanisms of of the

as well. The shah also used above Although to undermine this the

cooptation Idescribed National Front.

popularity occurred

cooptation

in a great vari~ty of Ways,

it was the rQform program of

PAGE 195
the early Front. 1960s which had greatest effect on the National

The origins Iran quickly

of this program reached a state

lay in the events of relative

of the mid-1950s. after oil

prosperity about

started

to flow again and about

in late 1954. Rumblings land reform were number

redistributing Also in the began to

this wealth

soon heard.

mid- and late-1950s return from reform.

a growing

of Iranian universities hands

students with

European

and Amerilcan played

I

ideas about National

These factors 1n early

into the

of the

Front, which since 1953. adding

1960

st~ged Kennedy

its first

public

demonstrations inaugurated,

In 1961 the

Administration

was

to the pressure

for reform.

The shah soon realized pressures appointed for reform for

that he

could

harness

and channel In

these

his :own political

benefit.

1961 he tech-

Ali Amini

as prime ~inister.
I

Amini was

a liberal

nocrat with no popular Front. capable forced Having liberal his own Amini launched

following the reform

and

no real ties to the National with help from his very Amini was soon after. from his

program Dr.

minister to resign used

of agriculture,

Hassan

Arsanjani. followed

in July 1962 and Arsanjani Arsanjani

I
I

Amini and

to

steal the

thunder

and radical

critics, of

the shah

now made the reform Revolution." Front in The

program coup de

under the banner

~he "White

Qrace was administered the large demonstrations thousands National arrested Front leaders in

to the National led by Khomeini. these

June 1963, after were killed including and many

Hundreds

demonstrations,

and supporters.

Despite Tudeh party Mossadeq.

the maSSlve emerged It had

arrests
I

which

followed from

the

1953 couP.

the of

relativel~

unscathed organized

the overthrow into adept

long since

itself

clandestine at operating outlawed .

cells and its secretly

leadership the

and cadres

had grown the

during

years

in which

party

was

PAGE 196
However, American members in August military of 1954 the security attache managed I force led by Bakhtiar up with a list This network bodyguard and the of the

to come

the Tudeh military including

network.52

contained and the

over 600 officers, head of army G-2. in 1941-1946 and

Zahedi's

personal

It had been set up during apparently was army designed

the Soviet primarily

occupation to gather

intelligence

on the Iranian

rather

than to carry

out subverof the Tudeh threat to

sive operations.53 party.

This network finish,d

had been the backbone the Tudeh as a

Its destruction

serious

the shah.

The Tudeh party and the Front were emerging the only major

various

manifestations

of the National of Iran's with

legitimate classes.

representatives their

middle

and lower carried out

Hence

destruction

the operations

in 1953 and regime. These

1954 marked operations

the inaugu-

ration of an authoritarian quent combination popular opposition

and the subsekept the However, shah's in the still

of repression effectively

and cooptation under control.

1950s and early threatened

1960s the shah's autocratic sources. The most military

ambitions

were

from other

immediate officers

of these

threats to

came from a series oust the shah.

of ambitious

who attempted

THE MILITARY

The first knowledge. generally rule and In

was General

Zahedi. was
I

Zahedi's chosen

ambitions

were

common it was than

1953 when Zahedi

to lead TPAJAX reign would

assumed

by the CIA that the shah would control of the country

rather be

that effective

in the Zahedi's

hands of Zahedi. ambitions

The shah was evidently When

concerned Dennis

about

from the very beginning.

Wright

was sent to

PAGE 197 Tehran as charge in December

1~53
I
I

to reopen the

British embassy toward Zahedi.

the shah sounded him out about ~he British attitude Throughout 1954 the shah contin~ally
I

asked the British and AmeriThe shah traveled When the issue

can ambassadors

whether

they supported Zahedi. in December

to the United States and Britain of Zahedi's

195~.

tenure in office was not brought up the shah apparent-

ly believed he had received a green light from these two countries to remove Zahedi. He did so in April 1955.s4

Tho 50tond

throat

'rom tho J;litary

eamo

;n March

1958. A group

of reform-minded

officers

led by General Garaneh with Amini and

(the head of army ArsanjaniS5 organThe shah

G-2) and apparently ized a

associated

coup which came

within two

days of succeeding.

somehow got wind of and some of his

the plot and managed to break collaborato~s

I

it uP. Garaneh terms.

were

given

short prison

Amini and Arsanjani were brief~y detained but soon managed to fall back into favor with the shah.

The third threat to the shah from the military iar. As chief of SAVAK, Bakhtiar

came from Bakhtthe second

had become probably

most powerful man in Iran by 1960. The shah was by this time alert to the threat from powerful in early 1961. Bakhtiar subordinates, and managed to fire him

then began

to conspire with other retired He was forced to flee Iran attempt. From exile in to plot 1n by

officers and Iranian political in January

1962, amid

figures.

rumors of

a coup

Europe, Beirut, and Baghdad, against the

1970.

Bakhtiar apparently was killed in that he was

a

continued

shah. Bakhtiar little doubt

hunting actually

accident executed

There is

SAVAK.S6

PAGE 198 THE LANDOWNING ARISTOCRACY AND THE CLERGY

The reform

program

of the early soJrces

19605 also enabled of potential clergy.

the shah to to his of of

strike at the two remaining rule: the landed the landowning the peasantry feudal estates, upper class

opposition

class and the lay in its

Much of the power the up votes

ability

to deliver By breaking

in the Majles

e~ections.

the large

the shah severed

the peasant-landlord largely process

relationship In fact, By

and rendered the land decreeing at

the landowning program

class

powerless.57 one step

reform

took this estatbs for

further.

that the large price the

should

be sold to the government peasants rather than

a reasonable

resale

to the

simply

expropriated,

shahi in effect Since

converted

the landowning

aristocracy

into a new bourgeo?sie. through the

the state took a leading Plans, this new bour-

role in the economy geoisie

Development

was subordinate

to the I state and hence

to the shah.

The reforms confrontation clergy had

of the early between the

1960s also

signaled

the emergence clergy. estates

of a The as an

shar and the conservative relied

I

traditionally source

on large

endowed

important seriously number of

of revenue. the power reforms the

B~ breaking of the
I

up these in

estates

the shah A

undercut other most with

clergy the

this regard. Revolution, conflicted

enacted

under

White women,

including directly

notably

enfranchisement

of

Shi rite doctrine on Iranian

and threatened It was,

to Undermine in fact,

the

hold of the clergy of land reform demonstrations

society.

the issues the

and the enfranchisement in 1963 led by ~homeini.58

of women

that sparked

Although of arrests

the clergy which

were

hJrt by these measures

and by the wave there was a of

followed which

limit to the damage

the 1963 demonstrations, I the shah could inflict on

it. Short

----~--

PAGE 199 d~stroying ~v~ry mosqu~ in the in Iran and arr~sting hundreds of thousands). as a political all of the mullahs simply
A

(who numbered possible

it was force.

not

to eliminate to the

the clergy

further

impediment between Iraq. The throughout religious In

shah in this regard was Shi'ite community relations and

the close that in

relationship neighboring

the Iranian

shah had very bad much leaders

with the

Iraqi gov~rnment to help

of his reign, ~nd such as Khomeini of thi s

the latter were eager who posed a threat wi 11 be assume argued

to the shah. that these of the

the conclusi on factors

stludY it to

unique

enabled upheaval

the clergy

the leadership

revolutionary

that em~rged

in the late 1970s.

Since the landowning ical ruling heirarchy class, had

aristocracy the

and the top layer of the clerbackbone of Iran's traditional to act the

formed

these measures no opposition

enabled from

the shah henceforth upp~r of class.

with virtually coup of 1953

Iran's

Wher~

and the subsequent

repression

the National

Front

and th~ Tud~h party had marked ian regime, the r~lative With the bloody the land reform autonomy

th~ ~stablishment

of an authoritar1960s signaled classes. the

program

of the early

of the shah's of

state from the upper in January

inauguration

this program

1963 and

suppression

of the June 1963 riots, of opposition to

the shah had eliminated his rule by the end of

all immediate

sources

1963. The process tiv~ly autonomous

of transition cli~nt

toward

an authoritarian

and rela-

state had been completed.

4) CLIENCY AND DICTATORSHIP

IN IRAN

This chapt~r to secure measures

has outlined

the steps

taken

by the United

states

Iran as a client used by the

state and the repressive

and cooptativ~ It is

shah to neutralize

his opposition.

PAGE 200
I

important now to clarify the themes. By summarizing lishment of the basic the shah's argument of

nelationship
I

between these two basic to the estab-

how U.~. policy contributed dictatorship,

I I

this

section recapitulates designed to

this

~tudy:
I I

that policies

promote stability tar'ao'_m

in a client dountry can instead promote authori-

aod r.,.t' aotooom1"

The single most important aJpect of

I

U.S. policy toward Iran in to overthrow Mossadeq. The

this regard was the CIA-led implications discussed at overthrow removed of this

o~eration
I I

operatio~

for Iran's domestic

politics were 5. The

some length in the and

last section of chapter of arrests which and destroyed

of Mossadeq the National

t~e wave

followed it as an

Front from

power

effective political

force. In its

place was installed a dictatorFront had emerged movement in

ship led by Zahedi and the shah. The National the late 1940s as the inheritdr of the

democratic

which

first appeared with the con st t tu t t one I uprising tieth century. class which Shah. coup of It was the political emerge in Mossadeq and
I

of the early twenof the new middle under Reza

embodiment

began to

the 1920s

and 1930s

By destroying

the Hational

Front, the CIA-led to democracy and

1953 cut short a the political

process of transition aspir~tions

I I

frustrated

of this new class.

Within weeks of

the coup tHe United states

I

provided

Iran with the CIA, in

at least $73 million through the and through ordinary foreign aid

Point Four aid program, channels. This was

followed

the next decade with an additional $200-3UO million in

$900 million

in aid grants and for about 21

loans. which together accounted by the

I

percent of expenditures Beh~een August 1953

Iranian government 1954

of

in that period. for

and

November
I

U.S.

aid accounted

roughly 60 percent

of the expehditures
111

the Zahedi government.

Given the chaos in Iran support for the

thi slperi od . the absence of any popular

1

Zahedi 90vernment

and the efforts made

by it to

restore order and solidify

its domestic position,

this aid program

PAGE 201
can only be regarded as havingl played a major role dic~atorship.
I I

in the estab-

lishment of the shah-Zahedi

While U.S. aid declined expenditures in the

somewhat
I I

as a percentage it continued

of government to play an

followin~
I

decade,

important role in the shah's cohsolidation aid was used to finance of the

6f power. Most of this projects and forces. the Inaswere

economic development
I

modernization

shah's mi~itary
I

and security

much as these development fundamental way made pillars of

projects and the security apparatus U.S.

the sha~'s dictatorship.

I

aid in this of this Iran also

an important contribu~ion Moreover, the

I I

to the consolidation aid programs in

dictatorship.

U.S.

included substantial contributed not

technicall advice the financing

and training. of the

Hence they

only to

main institutions to the particas

used by the shah ular form they

to consolidate took and

I

his rule but also

their efficiency
,

~nd effectiveness

political

instruments.

Finally,'
I

there is some evidence

that U.S. influence

aid to Iran was used by the sha~ to extend his political through patronage and corruption.

For the purposes of this stu8y the single most important aspect of the U.S. aid program in Iran after the 1953 coup was the

assistance

given to

the shah's security forces. with the mission of

This began immemilitary

diately after attache and forces

the coup continued

the U.S.

into the: early 19605. The this program divided from

shah's security and the

evolved under apparatus and

a poorly-organized National Police,

ineffective Gendarmerie, organization become the

among the

military

intelligence

to the

modern,

efficient

centralized single It

under SAVAK. By the early 1960s SAVAK had important

I

most

pillar

of

the

shah's organizaand

dictatorship. tions and

penetrated their

and
I

disrupted of To the

opposition

undermined

b~ses
I

support by

coopting

demobilizing

their constituenci~s.

extent that U.S. trainmade them more

ing and assistance

for SAVAK ahd its predecessors

PAGE 202
I

effective, importBnt

this aspect of U.S. bolicy

I

toward Iran had obvious and politics.

implications

for its domestic

There

can be

little doubt

that the

actions just

summarized played a of the

which took place under the U.s.I-Iran cliency relationship significant role in the estBblishment
I I

Bnd

consolidation

shah's dictatorship. mentioned which also

However, ~ variety contribu~ed

I

of other factors

can be The

to

dictatorship

in Iran.

British oil blocade ened Mossadeq's Iran's base

created

severe economic problems the

which weak-

of support. Conversely, after November

rapid growth of the shah served to finance coopt

oil wealth

1954 helped

development unr9st.

programs and

other projects
I

which

Iran did

not have a Ibng-standing emergin~ modern

I

democratic

tradition. social and the

Although there political entrenched orientation mosaic

was an

middle class, level of

conditions power of

such as :the the lando~ning

low

literacy, the

aristocracy,

pro-Soviet

of the Tudeh party, the broad appeal of Islam, and the and ethnic loyalties hindered prospects for

of tribal in Iran.

democracy

If other factors thus contributed

I

to dictatorship

in IrBn, CBn how

it be said that the role does cliency compare

of cl~ency was crucial?

I

Furthermore,

in importance

to these other causal factors?

The evidence presented cates that cliency dictatorship tion that

did

in this Bnd the

I

previous

chapter

indiof

playa

crucial role in the establishment

in Iran.

The CIA planned

and carried out the operaAlthough Iranians were

removed Mossadeq

fr~m office. they were

inv()lved in this operation, which implemented country it.

subordinBte unfolded

to the CIA team

As the operation

the shah fled the safe house. The downmay

in panic and

Zahedi took refuge in a CIA also made ~ contribution arguedl in chapter

I I I I

British oil blocade fall. However,

fallen

to Mossadeq's 5, while

as was

Mossadeq

well have

in ~he absence

of a CIA coup,

the dictatorship

PAGE 203 that emerged under Zah~di dnd the U.S. shah was economic until states probably the least

likely alternative government resumed. afloat

to Mossadeq. for fifteen

aid kept the Zahedi oil was exports instrum~ntal were in

months

The conclusion the shah's

that the United dictatorship

installing

thus appears

inescapable.

shah was firmly aid and security assistance

~stablished
I

in power.

U.s. economic though perhaps oil

p~ayed

an important. Although

not crucial. revenues of

role in keeping surpassed magnitude value

him there.

Iran's

yearly

first

U.S. aid until

receipts when

in 1956. they remained they finally 3). Hence exceeded U.S. aid

comparable

1962

twice the dollar continued projects to

of U.S. aid

(see table

be an

important mechanisms

source of

of funding

for development the early made it

and other

cooptation security of

through

19605. U.S. training them cannot more effective be

for the shah's as instruments

forces

certainly However. not

repression.

said with any certainty in this regard without

I

that they could

have been

effective aid was

U.S. assistance. the shah factors

H~nc~ while in

u.S.

important

in maintaining domestic

in power

the late

1950s and early at this time.

19605.

also worked

in his favor

How does cliency helped Iranian to promote politics

compare

in importance in Iran?
I

to

other

factors

which on

dictatorship 1n

Of the many

influences

the earlyimportpnce

and mid-1950s. to bring about

only three

were

novel and of SUfficient change

such a dramatic the renewal

in the type of regime: in late 1954.

the British

oil embargo.

of oil exports relationship.

and the establishment

of the cliency

As

discussed

in chapter to

5,

while

the British of Mossadeq. in his which

oil

blocade any of a a

undoubtedly number result.

contributed leaders

the downfall
have

of other By

could

emerged TPAJAX

place

as

contrast,

the CIA

operation

inaugura~ed

PAGE 204 the cliency deq relationship but also was undertaken to ~nstall a not only to remove Mossaparticular regime under

from power

Zahedi

and the shah. Hence whil~

I

the oil blocade way lead

helped

undermine

M05sadeq,

it did

not in any direct

I I

to the establishment

of a dictatorship.

Similarly, certainly

the influx

of

pil

revenues his until

after

November

1954

helped

the shah cons6lidate not reach was ousted. high: levels

I

dictatorship.

However, months

this income did after Mossadeq

some eighteen

Byl this
I

time the National crushed

Front and U.S.

0

the Tudeh party had been thoroughly

I

(with substantial Thus whi La his regime,

ass; stance) revenues of this

and the the

shah was

fi rmly

in power.

i1

helped process

shah furth~r taren

I I

to consolidate place

much

had already

by the tim~

they became

available.

Other tradition

factors,

such

as Iran's

comparatively conditions

weak

democratic above, factors from the

and the social and po~itical to dictatorship the early 1950~. i

I

mentioned these

also contributed were not net" in establishing emergence sentat ive economic 1950s

in

Iran.

However,

They did not power and

stop Mossadeq prevented

himself

firmly

had not

in the

1940s of democratic a free: press.

I

institutions Moreover,

such as reprethe social and

part i es and development

which

occurred
I

in Iran Mossadeq bases

in the 19405 and early era can only have

and

the experience

of

the

strengthened

the social and political factors of

for democracy

in Iran. way to

Hence while these the establishment

may have contributed dictatorship,

in a general they

the shah's role.

can only have

played a background

The question factors as

of

whether

cli~ncy

was more

important

than other be answered of Iraniit appears

a cause of dictatorbhip through However,

in Iran can only

definitively an politics.

a detailedl analysis on the basis

I I

of the dynamics discussion

of this

PAGE 205
I I

to

have

played here.

more

impor~ant
I

role

than any were

other the

factor

m~ntioned

If this

is true,
I

what then

long-term relationin the

implications

of the policy will

of ergaging

Iran in a cliency issue

ship? This question conclusion

be the principal

addressed

of this study.

PAGE 206 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 6 1) National Security Council, United States Policy NSC-175, December 21, 1953, pp.1 1-2,7.
I

Toward Iran,

2) Ibid., pp. 3-7 and Annex: pp. 21-22. On the rescinding of anti-trust action to secure par~icipation by the U.S. majors, see John M. Blair, The Control of Oil (New York: Pantheon, 1976), pp. 43-47, 71-76. Authori zati on tOIwai ve anti -trust proceed; ngs came under the Defense Production Abt of 1950, which had been used in 1951 and 1952 to help restruc~ure world oil supplies after the British oil blocade was i mp osad., See chapter 5, footnote 50. 3) The figures given here were calculated from those shown in the table. Note that both military fnd economic aid are given in table 3, and that transfers from thel CIA are excluded. In addition to the $7-8 million given by the ~IA shortly after the coup, another SI million is said to have been given one year later to fund a lavish celebration held by thel shah. The aid given in the weeks after the coup was allocated ov~r a period of months, so its full value is not reflected in the f~gures given in the table for 1953. Since the government expenditur~ data given here includes military spend; ng, it is appropri ah~ tOI compare it wi th U. S. mi 1itary and economic aid summed together. I
I

4) These figures were calculat~d from the data given in table 3 and from data on wholesale pricbs and the distribution of government expenditures given in Bhar~er, Economic Development in Iran,
pp ,

46-47,

67-68.

5) Quoted in David Horowitz, Frbm Yalta to Vietnam CHarmondsworth, Penguin, 1967). p , i86. On th~![ distribution of U.S. aid to Iran see the source referred to inltable 3. Other i nformat ion ci ted here is from U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, Comm4ttee Print, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, July 1976; Thomas 1'1. ; Ricks, "U.S. Military Missions to Iran: The Political Economy pf Military Assistance," Iranian Studies, Vol. XII, Nos. 3-4, Summer-Autumn 1979, pp. 163-193; U.S. Department of Defense, SBcurity Assistance Agency, Fiscal Year Series 1980, (Washington, 1981), p. 83. 6) Data presented herB on the U.S. economic aid programs is from AID Affairs Office, American Embassy Tehran, U.S. Economic Assistance to Iran at a Glance, FY 1950-FY 1967 (W~shington: AID Library, date illegible) and U.S. AID Mission to Iran, A.I.D. Economic Assistance to Iran, 1~50-1965 (Washington: AID Library, 1966). The latter source givesl good descriptions of the various aid programs carried out in Iran.
I

7) The text of this House Subcommittee report is reprinted in Yonah Alexander and Allan Nan~s (eds.), The United States and Iran: A Documentarv Historv (~rederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1980), pp. 295-298. 8) Fred J. Cook, "The Billion-Dollar Mystery," The Nation, April 12, 1965. A careful analysis of this controversy appears in Mark Hulbert, Interlock (New York: Richardson and Snyder, 1982), ch. 2. 9) Confidential 13, below. interview with: the I source mentioned in footnote

10) Unless otherwise noted, thel material presented in this section was obtain~d in interviews with two former CIA officers and a former U.S. military officer whb worked closely with the CIA. The military officer and one of the CIA officers headed or participated in the two major secur ty assistance missions described

PAGE 207
here. All three requested anon~mity. The material they provided was corroborated wherever poss~ble with other sources. In the course of my research, nothing has emerged to contradict any information provided by these sources on this or other matters. 11) For the purposes of this study, the terms "security forces," "security services," etc. re~er to government organizations involved in intelligence activities pertaining to the security of the state. These activities include both passive fUnctions such as intelligence analysis and surv~illance and active functions such as i n+ar t, i ti Such org<:lniz&tions are frequently referred to as I"the secret pol ice." Speci fi ca Llv excluded here are the milita~y services (other than military intelligence) and police forces' engaged in routine matters such as criminal investigation, traffic' control, etc.
r-o ca+i o n , ar-r-c s and a s s.a s s n a on ,

12) It can did occur. been vG!ry network in

be assumed that some training for military intelligence However. if this training did occur it could not have effective, since th~ Tudeh party plac~d an elaborate the armed forces. This is described below.

13) In interviewing this office~, it became apparent that neither he nor his superiors made a re~l distinction between the shah and the state, i.e., the security pf the shah and of the state were regarded as one and the same. ~hjs seems to have been typical of the approach of U.S. policymakers elt the time toward Iran. Their view was that the shah should b~ brought back to power and that a stable client state should be b~ilt around him. Thi~ view not only ignored the separation of powe~ mandated in Iran's constitution but also was oblivious to the shah's weak personality (at the time) and the rift between the shah and Zahedi, which had already emerged. The latter issue is discussed further below. 14) Although this organization ~volved into SAVAK, it operated at this time more like the Special. Bureau, which was later created by the shah to watch over all the ~ecurity services, including SAVAK.
I

is an acronym for Saz~an-i-Etela'at va Amniat-j-Keshvar, the National Intelligence and S~curity Organization.
I

15) SAVAK

16) Confidential

interview.

June 30, 1983.

,

17) Confidential interview, March 26, 1984. A Nazi training manual on torture was reportedly used in this context. See "The SAVAK-CIA Connection," The Nation, March 1, 1980, p . 229.
18) The New York Times, January 7, 1979, 3:1. In defending CIA acceptance of torture by SAVAK and other "friendly" security services, the U5Uell CIA response is that discouraging its use is a matter for diplomats rather than intelligence prof~ssionals.

"The SAVAK-CIA Connection,"' pp. 229-230. On U.S. police training for third world allies see Michael T. Klare, SupplYing Repression (NeL" York: The Field' Foundation, 1977).
19)

20) By the mid-1960s, the main covert source of CIA intelligence on Iran came from intercepted radio transmissions of the Iranian military and SAVAK. Since much of the communications equipment used by these services had been provided by the United States, the codes used to encipher informat1ion were available. to the CIA. One source claimed that 100 percent of the transmissions of the armed forces and 80 percent of the ~ran5mi55ion5 of SAVAK were intercepted. Not only could informa~ion from these sources not be made available to SAVAK for securi tYI rc:~asons, but it WClS, in any case, material which had originally come from SAVAK and was thus not of any use. '
, ,

PAGE 208 21) See USOM-Iran, Review of U.S. Technical Assistance and Economic Aid to Iran, 1951-1957, Vol.12 (Washington: AID Library, n.d.), pp. 483-486; "Completion of To~r Report of Albert G. Varrelman," June 26, 1956, "Completion of Tbur Report of Mr. Frank A. Jessup," July 7, 1959, "Completion of To~r Report, Mr. Michael G. McCann." September 29, 1959, and "End of Tour Report, Public Safety Advisor," June 12. 1961. all from the AID Library in Washington. 22) Rountree to the Department of State, April 25, 1955 (Carter White Paper). This report and bthers referenced in this way are contained in a large study of U.S. policy toward Iran compiled by the Carter Administration d~ring tha hostagQ crisis. This collection is available through the Department of State under the Freedom of Information Act. 23) Descriptions of CIA oper~tions given here obtained in confidential inter~iews with several ipants. : and below were of the partic-

2~) One indication of the imp~rtance of these devices is that after the Iranian revolution the Carter Administration was forced to make arrangements to install similar facilities in northwestern China. The price of this deal was presumably diplomatic recognition. See James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1982), pp. 19~-201. 25) Joint operations directedl at the Soviet Union did occur, however. Because of the very nature of these operations, the CIA had no choice but to inform and: includQ SAVAK. SAVAK mainly plaYQd a support role in these operations, providing transportation. cover for agents, etc. In return the CIA provided SAVAK with the information obtained 1n thes~ operations that was of direct concern to Iran. I
I

....

26) By the late 19605 the pri~ary CIA source for Iran was the radio intercepts described in footnote 20, above. This included intercepts from SAVAK transmissions. While this information was inadvertently provided by SAVAK, its content was obviously not deliberately slanted for its American audience. 27) Carter White Paper, Section III.D.I. "Contacts with Opposition Elements;" The Washington Post, October 26, 1980, pp. 1. 18, 19. The Post article is part of informative series entitled "The Fall of the Shah."

ar
I

28) In 1977 the shah told a r~porter that President Kennedy had used $35 million in economic a~d to pressure him into appointing Amini. See Fereydoun Hoveyda, I The Fall of the Shah (New York: Wyndham Books. 1979), p. 5~. I

29) See, for example, Kitchen to Rountree, May 17. 1956 (Carter White Paper). There were also debates within the CIA on the need for reform. Several former CIA officers told me that they pushed for reforms in the 1950s. At least two resigned from the Agency over this issue. Further evidence of CIA ambivalence about reforms came in its response to the 1958 coup attempt by Colonel Garaneh. Garaneh was a nationalist and favored reforms, not unlike Gamel Abdel Nasser in Egypt. The CIA station in Tehran was aware of his plot and did not warn the shah about it. One officer in the station at the time told me that he had been in favor of a coup by Garan~h. I 30) Except where referenced I ; n the footnotes, the materi al presented in this section was obtained in interviews with the sources described in footnote lb, above.

PAGE 209 Secret Police 31) Thomas Plate and Andrea Darvi, Doubleday, 1981), use SAVAK as their primary example world secret police organization. 32) It was rumored that Bakhtiar prisoners. This was related to me England, September 17, 1983), I
I

(New York: of a third

kept a bear to maul his by Peter Avery (Cambridge,

33) William J. Butler and Georg~s levasseur, Human Rights and the Leoal System in Iran (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1976), pp . 7-8.
1
1

34) Chapour Bakhtiar,

82.

Ma Fidelite
i

(Paris: Albin Michel,

1982), p. PrinceIran

35) Marvin lonis,

ton University
36)

The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton: Press, 1971), p.185.

Ibid. Mouvement de la Relsistance Nationale Iranienne, PlaidOlre Pour les Droits de I'Homme (Paris, 1982), p. 14.
I

37)

October 14, 19741. Thi s fi gure is probably an exaggeration. However, it tYPifie~h the almost omnipotent reputation SAVAK came to possess, and whic, it no doubt cultivated. The best single description of SAVAK's prganization is given in National Front of Iran, "A Portion of the Secrets of the Security Organization (SAVAK)," (unpublished man~script, May 1971). This source is used for most of the descriptioh of SAVAK given here.
NeLoJ5LoJeek,

38) Ibid. ,

p ,

9.

39) See, for example, Reza Baraheni, The Crowned Cannibals (New York: Vintage Books. 1977); ~he Iran Committee, Torture and R~si5tanC(;! in IrCln (dClt(;! Clt1dl plClce of publication unknown); Committee Against Repression in Iran, Iran: The Shah's Empire of Repression (London, 1976). chi. 7; Ali-Reza Nobari (ed.), Iran Erupts <Stanford; Iran-America Documentation Group, 1978), ch.~ See also the references cited i~ footnote 40. Amnesty Internatlonal, Annual Report, 1974-1975, p. 8; Amnesty International, Amnestv International Briefina: Iran (November 1976)' pp . 2-5; Butler and Levasseur, Human Rights and the legal 5vstem in Iran.
(0)
1

41) For example, in January 1978 an article appeared in a Tehran newspaper alleging that Ayatollah Khomeini was a homosexual, that his mother had been a profe5~ional dancer, etc. Although this article apparently originated in the Ministry of Information, it is typical of the disinformation directed by the regime against its opponents. It is also alleged that the Baraheni book cited in footnote 39 was disseminated by SAVAK in an effort to heighten popular fears about the fate of" di ssi dents in SAVAK hands.
1

This description of SAVAK tactics was obtained in part in interviews with Hedayat Matin-Daftari (Paris. November 2. 1983) and Abdul-Karim lahij; (Paris, October 26, 1983).
42)

44) Jahangir Amuzegar and M. A~i Fekrat, Iran; Economic Development under Dualistic Conditions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 40, 43; Bhar~er, Economic Development in Iranl pp , 39, 45, 135, 186, 227.
I I

45) These fi gures are Trom the,1 sources ci ted 44, and from ibid., pp. 26. 60.1

-Footnotes 43 and

PAGE 210
I

46) Eric J. Hooglund, land and Revolution in Iran, tin: University of Texas Press,1 1982), chs.4-6.
I

1960-1980

(Aus-

47) In 1977 corruption in "a haunch of meat thrown to the brother of Iran's doun Hoveyda, The Fall of 144-146.

the r~yal family had made Iran much like to an army of starving rats," according prime minister at the time. See Fereythe Shah, p. 136, and also pp. 90-93 and

48) This material was obtained in the interviews mentioned in footnote 42 and with Hormoz rekmat (Paris, November 6, 1983), Nasser Pakdaman (Paris, October 31, 1983), and Homayoun Keshevarz (Paris, November 2, 1983). I
I

49) A useful, but brief, description of these parties is given in George lenc2owski, "Political Process and Institutions in Iran: The Second Pahlevi Kingship," ih Lenczowski (ed.), Iran Under the Paklevis (Stanford: Hoover Inst'itution Press, 1978), pp. 452-454. See also Zonis, The Political E~ite of Iran, p. 86-90. 50) Chapour Bakhtiar, who emerged after 1953 to become an important National Front leader, claims to have kept a special suitcase packed for prison. See Ma Fidelite, p. 92. This book gives a fairly good inside account of the measures taken by the shah toward the National Front.
I

51) Lois Beck, "Iran and the Qa~hqai Tribal Confederacy," ard Tapper (ed.), The Confljc~ of Tribe and State in Afqhanistan (london: Croon Helml, 1983), p . 302.
I

in RichIran and

52) It is unclear whether th~ list was found accidentally or during the course of investigations by this security force. A number of knowledgable sources have told me that it was found when the police arrested someone in a traffic accident. However, the military attache involved told me that it had been uncovered in the course of an extensive anti-Tudeh operation. 53) This was the conclusion of the CIA at the time. The CIA had had some idea that there Was a Tudeh net in the military, and Bssumed that its main purpose was to stage a coup on orders from Moscow. Fear that the Tudah might so act was the main reason the CIA decided to implement TPAJA~. However, in subsequent years when it became apparent that the Tu~eh was deeply split and that the military network was primarily engaged in intelligence-gathering, CIA analysts realized in retrospect that their fears of an imminent Tudeh coup had been mistaken. This was related to me by one of the sources mentioned in footnote 10, above. 5~) Interview 1983), with Dennis Wright (Haddenham, p. 362; England, Zonis, November 14,

55) Cottam, Nationalism Elite of Iran, p. 54. 56) Ibid., pp. 47-52.

in Iran,

The

Political

57) Hoaglund,

land and Revolution

in Iran, p. 78. in Contemporarv 1980), ch. 4. Iran

58) Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics (Albany: state University of New York Press,