CONCLUSTON - THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATTONS OF CLTENCY

This study has argued in a cliency tion toward relatively

that the helped

United

States, a

by engaging

Iran

relationship, democracy

undermine

process

of transi-

in Iran and helped client state

install the

an authoritarian, leadership of the 1. In

autonomous

under was

late shah. The concept chapter 2 a theoretical

of cliency framework

introduced

in chapter

was d~veloped domestic in

for investigating Chapter 3

the impact of cliency gave an overview cliency of

on the client's Iranian

politics. the era

politics was begun.

before

the

U.S.-Iran

relationship

In chapter

4 the history in Iran

of U.S.-Iranian

relations

was discussed

and U.S.

interests

in the late 1940s and early

1950s were examined.

The main brunt of the argument 5 and 6. Chapter implications material of 5 detailed

presented

here came

in chapters

the U.s. role in the 1953 coup and the Iranian politics, building on the of

this coup for in chapter

presented provided and his

3. Chapter States used

6 outlined to Iran under

the kinds

assistance

by the United

the cliency

relationship and maintain

the mechanisms dictatorship. together

by the shah section

to consolidate of chapter 6

The last

brought provided

these two themes under

by discussing

how the assistance this process

the cliency

relationship

facilitated

of consolidation.

If the basic argument

of this

study

is accepted,

what

then were

PAGE 212 the long-term U.S. client tics in Iran implications of the policy of establishing for Iran as a poli-

state?

The immediate after

implications and the

domestic

are clear:

Zahedi

shah were

installed and often

in pOWQr brutal

in 1953 a twenty-five ensued.

year period But what of if

of repressive if any, forces

dictQtorship play

role,

did cliency that led to in

ultimately the 1978-79 some manner

in the constellation Furthermore.

social cliency

revolution? to revolution

did contribute conclusions

in Iran, what general

can be

drawn for U.S. policy

elsewhere

in the third world?

1) IMPLICATIONS

FOR IRANIAN POLITICS

By the early autonomous ests of political

1960s,

the state that

in IrQn it

had become

sufficiently the inter-

and authoritarian

could act against regard

any group pressures.

in society

without

for counterveiling events in occurred in

Two profoundly

important First,

1963 which made shah announced discussed of the which after

this eminently plans for a

clear.

January

1963 the As

far-reaching

land reform

program.

in chapter

6, this program class

devastated by breaking to their

the political the feudal

base bonds

dominant,

landowning linked relaxation

had previously the gradual beginning

peasants

landlords.

Second,

of sanctions

against

open political June 1963 hitherto indicated

activity uprisings

in 1960, the shah the harsh which this the

responded measures

to the had

by reimposing The ease with power

which

prevailed. clearly classes

was accomplished

how little actually

vis-a-vis

state the lower and middle

possessed.

In addition to these dramatic events, the state's autonomy from domestic cies political pressures of other had an important areas. Of perhaps bearing greatest on its policoncern was

in a variety

PAGE 213
its economic policy. The shdh's Development Pldns promoted of as

large-scale, agriculture nuclear

capital-intensive and basic

industrialization High-prestige

at the expense projects such

industry.

power plants,

steel mills,

and petrochemical

complexes for for of in

were built under Iran's economic Iran's skilled large

the shah. These conditions. They

projects provided

were poorly-suited little employment numbers recruited

unskilled

workforce

but required most

large

technicians States

and engineers, and Europe. program and

of whom were unemployment

the United

Domestic

was aggravated of agriculurban

by the land reform ture, which

by the general and led

neglect

reduced

rural employment

to massive

migration.

Much of the industrialization These new industries

promoted used

by the shah was small to

export-oriented. proportion satisfy of Iran's

a relatively did

domestically-produced growing and demand imports for

inputs and cheap

little

consumer

goods.

Large

bottlenecks

resulted

grew at a rapid

rate.l

The relative ill-suited well.

autonomy

of the state enabled policies opposition Iran's in a variety from

the of

shah to pursue other areas States, as the

and unpopular occasional to build up

Despite

the United to the Billions

shah sought

armed

forces Union.

point where of dollars

they could credibly were spent on weapons of foreign to provide advisors, training

engage

the Soviet

each year

in the 1970s and tens of thousands were brought sought to Iran

most of them American, and support.2 The

shah also every aspect

to Wester-

nize and secularize had a Western culture, such as anathema withdrew

Iran. Virtually Western

of state policy American polici~s were

orientation. increasingly

culture,

particularly pursued

became

visible.

The shah

land reform and the to the millions orthodox

enfranchisement community.

of women In the

which

Islamic

late 19705 he support

of dollars

in subsidies

which

had helped policy, of

the Shi'ite close

clergy.

Much of the shah's with Israel and

foreign his

such as his the Omani as

relationship against

support was quite

government

the Dhofar

rebellion,

unpopular

PAGE 214 well.

As in the cases discussed tive autonomy economic of the state

1n section in in

2 of chapter

2. the relato pursue neither of the

Iran enabled other areas upper

the shah

policies

and policies

that served nor those cases.

the interests

of the estdblished classes. However. by

classes those

lower and middle policies

unlike

the shah's a need for

were not

dictated Hence

imperatives

such as

import substitution. force the shah had ominous

there were no policies

pressures

of any kind to needs. This

to pursue

that suited for Iranian

Iran's

long-term

implications

politics.

It

is obviously analysis

beyond

the scope

of this

study

to give

detailed writers

of the origins

of the Iranian ability of

revolution. the Shi'ite

Most clergy

have focused latent

on the unique unrest.3

to mobilize communist was too States rule.5

popular

Defenders

of the shah speak of of modernization the United to his

subversion rapid.4

and suggest the

that

the pace

Ironically. of

shah himself unrest and

accused

and Britain

fomenting

opposition

Regardless revolution.

of

where

blame

is

ultimately

laid for

the Iranian at the oil

there

can be no doubt

that popular

revulsion that

shah's policies resources continued would

played

a key role. Despite by the

reports

Iran's

be depleted

end of the century. military

the shah and

to spend heavily industrial after among grew

on sophisticated projects. began These

equipment

high-prestige dramatically Corruption royal enjoyed notably

expenditures in the and

increased late 19605. of the

oil prices high

to rise

government

officials and

members

family

rampant.

The shah

his close

associates most which rates.

an increasingly by the lavish

extravagant Persepolis

lifestyle. celebrations despite the

symbolized of 1971,

reportedly very little

cost S100 million.6 of Iran's wealth

However. reached

high growth

impoverished

majority.

PAGE 215
The slums of 19705. Income Tehran and other major worsened cities became bloated in the

inequality

and

the literacy

rate remained

under 50 percent.7

Ironically, 19705, despite quadrupling of

Iran's the

economic

situation

became

worse after

1n the late 1973. The

great

influx of oil revenues in that year led

oil prices

the shah to

draw up

overly-ambitious of the armed

plans for economic By 1976 large

development deficits and

and modernization forced the shah to

forces.

implement capital economic

stringent

austerity

measures

even borrow plans in

in foreign severe

markets.

The shah's and

elaborate

spending

caused

bottleneCKs

a substantial

increase led

the inflation of peas-

rate. The continued ants to migrate

neglect

of agriculture and forced

millions

to the cities

Iran to

import growing

quantities

of food.

These among

economic lower

problems

were a

fundamental in the absence

cause

of

unrest Beyond forms human which

Iran's

and middle

classes

late 19705.6 of meaningful frequent

these economic of political abuses

problems,

the continued and the the

participation further against

increasingly liberal

rights

alienated

opposition, trends

began to agitate zation

the shah. The growing outraged

of Westerniand led

and secularization to become

the more devout vocal.

muslims

the clergy

increasingly

Ultimately, ly "led"

neither

the liberal revolution.

opposition

nor the clergy of

real-

the Iranian

The inheritors among

the National as was

Front were poorly-organized indicated clergy by their subsequent

and divided failure

themselves,

to prevent The

the conservative clergy was also firey

from

assuming and

complete divided.

control. Ayatollah

poorly-organized speeches prominent and

Khomeini,

whose

role in of

the 1963 demonstrations the clerical years. opposition,

made him had

the most inside which

member

not been Party,

Iran for almost

fifteen

The Islamic

Republican

PAGE 216 now holds power in Iran, was not even formed until after the revolution.

The liberal opposition circulating petitions

did serve

to catalyze

the opposition in

by

and organizing The clergy,

demonstrations

the years of

before the revolution. Shi 'a Islam in the mosques

by virture

of the importance afforded

Iranian culture and the protection

it by

(which the shah's certain

forces could not easily penetrate), segments of Iranian society, notably base of

was able to mobilize the urbanized

peasants

who later formed

the main social neither

the post-revolutionary al opposition lution.

Islamic regime. However,

the liberfor a revoanti-shah upheaval was

nor the clergy had in any sense prepared only in the fall of 1978 that the

It was

demonstrations rather

took on the appearance popular unrest.

of a revolutionary The Iranian

than simply

revolution

truly praetorian:

it was an outburst

from the very belly of Iran, which

guided but not led by the clergy and the liberal opposition, expiated the ~hah but had neither to replace him with a the foresight that was

nor the leadership more just and

regime

forward-looking.

2) IMPLICATIONS

FOR U.S. INTERESTS

A fundamental make that

reason for engaging stable.

Iran

as a U.S. client was to if cliency autonomous in turn played a

country more role in

However,

significant

making the state more

and authorset the stage

itraian in Iran, for revolution, client created a

and if these consequences then the

policy of establishing for

Iran as

a U.S. while

serious paradox

U.S. policymakers:

cliency had undoubtedly its long-term

made Iran more stable in

the short term, not only

result was quite the opposite.

Furthermore,

PAGE 217 was Iran suddenly was virulently unstable after twenty-five years that appeared of cliency. it

anti-American beneficial

as well. for U.S.

A policy

in the 19505 by the end

and 1960s seemed

interests

of 1979 to have been extremely

short-sighted.

If such there ways without

a paradox In which

IS inherent

In cliency

relationships.

are goals

the patron

can achieve

the same general Three

producing

these

undesirable

consequences?

possibil-

ities come to mind.

The first Iranian that

is to escalate critics Iran" by

the cliency of the Carter failing

relationship. Administration appropriate charges

After

the

revolution.

charged assistwere made The idea could

it had "lost

to provide Similar

ance to the with respect behind these

shah In his hour to the charges afloat Somoza

of need. dictatorship

in ~icaragua. in

was that

the governments States had and

question

have been kept cient assistance perhaps a

if the United form of

given

them suffiaid. or

in the

military While

economic

military

intervention.

it is possible

that U.S. that have

assistance anything

could have saved these short of a prolonged This kind

governments,

it is doubtful occupation would would

U.S. military

been adequate. extremely

of "Vietnam

solution"

have been

unpopular It

in the United not.

States.

and hence have

very difficult prospects

to implement.

would

in any case, in these

improved

for a transition

to democracy

countries.

second

possibility altogether. States

is

to

cease

involvement kind

in

cliency

relationships

Isolationism today that

of this

is so unpopu-

lar in the United tical alternative United without Panama. strong States

it can be ruled out as a pracinterests could not acquired by the

to cliency.

The global era simply

in the postwar such as

be maintained and

kQY clients FurthermorQ, democratic

South

KorQa.

thQ PhiliPPinQs. measures

in the absence institutions,

of concrete simply

to build cliency

abrogating

PAGE 218 relationships collapse the one process with countries such under as these praetorian could lead to the

of their governments which toppled

onslaughts

such as

the shah. is clearly

A more deliberate preferable.

and peaceful

of transition

A third possibility the leverage inherent

which in

may

hold more promise and economic to

involves aid and

using other the

military a cliency and

transfers client was, in

occurring

under

relationship

pressure

government

for social for

political period

reforms.

This approach 1960s in

fact, pursued

a brief

in the early pressure

Iran when the Kennedy to enact certain

Administration Leverage

exerted of

on the shah used to

reforms.9 government

this kind can be of power,

force the client countering

to stop abuses

thus directly It can

some of the undesirable democratic

consequences institutions as

of cliency.

also be used to promote tative parties

such as represenreforms enhance such the

and free elections, education

well as social which can

as literacy long-term

and public

programs

prospects

for democracy.

Using the leverage ship to promote achieve

inherently

available

in a cliency may enable

relationto

political

liberalization that led to

the patron

the particular the long-term problems may

goals

its involvement

without two

producing potential

instability arise which

that may result. can serve to

However,

limit

the degree First, the

of leverage patron basing to

available

to the patron dependent

in this regard.

may be heavily

on the client importance client it.lO

for services

such as

rights which are of vital these services, patron to the

to it. By threatening effectively in block

withdraw

can

attempts political nationalist

by the

pressure

Second, may

promoting

liberalization, sentiments relationship While

this

kind of pressure country

also promote are opposed to

in the client

which

the cliency

or in other ways conflict using leverage to promote

with the interliberalization it

ests of the patron.

1n this way can thus present

delicate

tradeoffs

for the patron,

PAGE 219

may nevertheless
long-tQrm

be the only alternative

of cliQncy which

to the kind of disastrous

occurrQcl in Iran.

conSQqUQnCQS

PAGE 220
FOOTNOTES TO THE CONCLUSION see st. and

1) For critical analyses of the shah's economic policies Robert Graham. Iran: The Illusion of Power (Haw York: Martin's, 1980), chs. 1, 3; Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship

Development

(Harmondsworth:

Penguin,

1979), chs. 5, 6; Abol Hassan

Du Futur et Misere." Petrole et Violence

Banisadr. "Developpement de la Consommation in Paul Vieilla and Abol-Hassan Banisadr. (Paris: Anthropos. 1974), pp. 69-135.

2)

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Militarv Sales to Iran, Committee Print, 9~th Congress, 2nd 5ession, July

1976.
3) For example see Michael M. J. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dis8ute to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1980); varlOUS articles in Nikki R. Keddie (ad.). ReliQion and Politics in Iran (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1983); and Theda Skocpol. "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution." Theorv and Society. Vol. 11, No.3, May 1982, PP. 265-283. 4) See Cliffs: for example Ashraf Pahlevi. Faces Prentice-HalL 1980). ch. 8. Reza Pahlevi, pp. 14, 23. Answer in a (New Mirror York: (Englewood Stein and

5) Mohammad Day, 1980),

to History

6) The New York Times, 7) Ervand Revolution,"

October

12, 1971, 39:2. of the Iranian

Abrahamian. "Structural Caus9s MERIP, No. 87, May 1980, pp. 21-26.

8) For excellent discussions of the economic causes of the Iranian revolution see Graham. Iran: The Illusion of Power, and Robert E. Looney, Economic Origins of the Iranian Revolution (New York:

Pergamon,

1982).

9) See footnote 28 of chapter 6. above. Many people believe that the shah embraced land reform and the other measures enacted under the White Revolution in order to deflect such pressure. 10) For a discussion of this problem see Robert Big Influence of Small Allies." Foreiqn Policy, O. Keohane, "The No.1, 1971, pp.

163-181.