Parshat Ki Tetzeih

Going To War
Rabbi Ari Kahn
The Parsha opens with the continuation of a topic raised in last week's Parsha -
going to war. We learned last week that before battle, a kohen would speak to the
soldiers, and would call on the inappropriate recruits to return behind the lines, to
the safety of their homes. In this week's Parsha we are told:

When you go forth to war against your enemies and the Lord your God has
delivered them into your hands, and you have taken them captive, and see
among the captives a beautiful woman, and desire her, that you would have
her as your wife: Then you shall bring her home to your house; and she
shall shave her head, and pare her nails. Moreover, she shall take off the
garment of her captivity, and shall remain in your house, and bewail her
father and her mother a full month; and after that you shall go in to her, and
be her husband, and she shall be your wife. And it shall be, if you have no
delight in her, then you shall let her go where she will; but you shall not sell
her at all for money, you shall not treat her as a slave, because you have
humbled her. (21:10-14)

The law is both surprising and perplexing; how can the Torah allow this type of
behavior? Later in the Parsha a number of cases are presented which give us a
glimpse at the higher moral standard which the Torah expects of man.

You shall not watch your brother’s ox or his sheep go astray, and hide
yourself from them; you shall in any case bring them again to your brother.
And if your brother is not near you, or if you know him not, then you shall
bring it to your own house, and it shall be with you until your brother seeks
after it, and you shall restore it to him. In like manner shall you do with his
ass; and so shall you do with his garment; and with every lost thing of your
brother’s which he has lost and you have found, shall you do likewise; you
may not hide yourself. You shall not watch your brother’s ass or his ox fall
down by the way, and hide yourself from them; you shall surely help him to
lift them up again. (22:1-4)

If a bird’s nest chances to be before you in the way in any tree, or on the
ground, whether they are young ones or eggs, and the mother sitting upon
the young, or upon the eggs, you shall not take the mother with the young.
But you shall let the mother go, and take the young to you; that it may be
well with you, and that you may prolong your days.(22:6,7)

How can the same system, which is apparently concerned with the feelings of the
mother bird, which attempts to sensitize man to his exalted station, be insensitive
to the feelings of the captive woman, taken from her people in war?
In a sense, the question is compounded when we consult a passage in the Talmud,
which attempts to explain the propriety of this behavior:

Our Rabbis taught: ... ‘of beautiful countenance’ — the Torah only provided
a concession to the Evil Inclination: It is better for Israel to eat flesh of
[animals] about to die but [ritually] slaughtered, than flesh of dying animals
which have perished. (Talmud Kiddushin 22a)

We see that the Talmud frowns upon this type of behavior; the taking of such a
war captive is considered wrong, and the Torah law represents a concession to
human nature. The warrior, on the battlefield, is swept up in primordial, base
feelings which he has never felt before. The terrible ordeal involved in the taking
of another human life leaves the soldier which such ambivalent feelings about the
value of love, dignity and life itself, that he feels that he must vanquish this
captured woman here and now. The Torah nowhere condones the behavior; in
fact, based on the context, the Rabbis felt that a negative message was being
communicated by the text of this law:

Another comment: Ben ‘Azzai said: Precept draws precept in its train, and
transgression transgression. How [is this to be explained]? As it is written,
'When thou goes forth to battle... and sees among the captives, etc.' (Deut.
XXI, 10 f); God said: ‘Although I have permitted her [the captive woman]
unto you, yet I commanded you,'And she shall shave her head and pare her
nails (ib. 12)' that she may not find favor in your eyes and that you may
send her away.’ But if you will not do so, Scripture continues,'If a man have
a stubborn and rebellious son '(ib. 18), and the result will be,'And if a man
have committed a sin worthy of death' (ib. 22). Thus, transgression draws
transgression in its train. (Midrash Rabbah 6:4)

By framing this behavior as a "concession", the Torah is agreeing that

fundamentally it is wrong, and while the Torah certainly does not encourage this
behavior, neither does it legislate against it. So much of Torah and its laws and
mores are an attempt to bring man to a higher spiritual plane. Why in this specific
instance, do we find a concession to the Evil Inclination? Why not allow
"porkchops" once a month as a "concession"? Furthermore, if this woman is an
incidental victim of this concession, how can we ignore her plight?

One could theorize that despite the allowance in the Torah, this is merely a ploy to
calm the person in the heat of passion. Psychologically, the strategy is wonderful.
This man wants this woman and he wants her now. The Torah says, 'No problem,
but there is one condition - she becomes your wife with all due privileges of that
status.' Perhaps this will help defeat the momentary passion, which is indeed a
moral lapse. On a deeper psychological level, we may posit that this "allowance"
is merely a psychological ploy employed in the hope of manipulating the raging
passion within. We find this idea expressed in the Talmud's discussion regarding
the priest who would bring the scapegoat on Yom Kippur to the desert. The priest
on this divine mission was permitted to eat, and was offered food at various
intervals:
 AT EVERY BOOTH THEY WOULD SAY TO HIM: HERE IS FOOD AND HERE IS
WATER. A Tanna taught: Never did any one [who carried the goat away] find
it necessary to use it, but [the reason of this provision is because] you
cannot compare one who has bread in his basket with one who has no
bread in his basket. (Yoma 67a)

The conclusion of the Talmud is that the very allowance of the food is what gives
the kohen the strength to reject it. A certain moral fortitude emerges from the
concession. Perhaps this is the meaning of the words "kineged yetzer hara" which
translates literally as "against" the evil inclination, and not as we translated
above, as a "concession" to the Evil Inclination.

While this explanation certainly gives insight into the psychological dynamic, the
question posed earlier about the plight of the captured woman remains. Moreover,
deeper understanding of the entire scenario will present yet more difficulties: The
section of the captive woman applies only to non-obligatory battles, but in cases
of Milchemet Mitzva- obligatory battles- no such laws exist. Rashi commented on
the very first verse of the Parsha:

'When you go forth to war against your enemies': the verse refers to an
optional battle.

In reference to optional battles, we are told that not all eligible males are
expected to participate. In last week's Parsha we saw an entire list of those who
receive dispensations, among them the individual who is afraid.

"What man is there who has built a new house, and has not dedicated it?
Let him go and return to his house, lest he die in the battle, and another
man dedicates it. And what man is he who has planted a vineyard, and has
not yet eaten of it? Let him also go and return to his house, lest he die in
the battle, and another man eats of it. And what man is there who has
betrothed a wife, and has not taken her? Let him go and return to his
house, lest he die in the battle, and another man takes her. And the officers
shall speak further to the people, and they shall say, What man is there who
is fearful and fainthearted? Let him go and return to his house, lest his
brothers’ heart faint as well as his heart." (20:5-8)

The Mishna presents various opinions regarding the source of this person's fear:

R. Akiva says: ‘fearful and fainthearted' is to be understood literally viz., he

is unable to stand in the battle-ranks and see a drawn sword. Rabbi Yossi
Hagalili says: ...[this] alludes to one who is afraid because of the
transgressions he had committed; ...R. Yossi says: a high priest who married
a widow, an ordinary priest who married a divorcee or haluzah, a lay
Israelite who married an illegitimate or netinah, and the daughter of an
Israelite who married an illegitimate or a natin.. (Mishna Sota 44a)
The Talmud explains the difference between the opinions of Rabbi Yossi and Rabbi
Yossi haGalili as follows:

What is the difference between Rabbi Yossi, and Rabbi Yossi haGalili?— The
issue between them is the transgression of a Rabbinical ordinance. With
whom does the following teaching accord: He who speaks between
[donning] one phylactery and the other has committed a transgression and
returns home under the war-regulations. With whom [does it accord]? With
Rabbi Yossi haGalili. (Sota 44b)

The transgression seems quite minor. If even such individuals did not participate
in battle, those who remained in the ranks and actually went to battle were on an
even higher, more exalted spiritual level. And this is the person for whom we fear,
lest his Evil Inclination dominate him! The Talmud's statement, which sets such
high moral standards for soldiers, deserves a closer look. The point of the passage
was to illustrate a violation of Rabbinic law, but why was this particular example
chosen above all others? In fact, why was any illustration of the point necessary,
if the abstract form-- "he who violates Rabbinic law"--is so clear?

The individual who speaks between donning the Tefilin on the arm and the Tefilin
for the head essentially creates a separation between two things which should be
unified: the arm, symbolizing physical strength, and the head, the intellect. To
knowingly engage in battle required personal merit, but more importantly,
required a unified world-view. A person who separates the two aspects of human
nature, and sees his strength and mind working toward independent goals, could
not be a soldier in this army.1 What Rabbi Yossi ha Galili was looking for were
soldiers possessed of a very specific moral/philosophical character.2

If this is the case, we should be more than a little surprised that any concession to
the Evil Inclination was necessary on such a person's behalf; additionally, our
question regarding the plight of the captive woman remains unanswered. A third
question revolves around the teaching cited above which draws a line from this
captor/captive-husband/wife relationship to the resultant rebellious son. If such a
cause-and-effect were foreseeable, why would the Torah condone the union?

The association with the rebellious son may be the key to a deeper understanding
of the teaching regarding the captive woman. We are told that a rebellious son is
to be executed, not for what he has done but for what he will do.

1
This philosophy is encapsulated in the verse: (D'varim 8:17) And you say in your heart, My power and the might of my
hand has gotten me this wealth.
2
A similar reaching is reported in the name of Rav Yitzchak Breuer,(among others) in his explanation of a passage in
Avot: R. Shimon said: When one, walking on the road, reviewing [what he has learnt], breaks off from his learning and
says, ‘How fine is this tree!’ [or] ‘How fine is this newly ploughed field!’ Scripture accounts it to him as if he had
incurred guilt [expiable] by his life.
The problem, according to Rav Breuer, was stopping his learning, implying that in his worldview there are two different
realms, the Divine and the aesthetic, as if the natural world is removed from the Divine, from G-d. The correct approach
would be the appreciation of nature within his religious worldview. The problem of this man is the compartmentalization
of the G-dly and the natural. [Thanks to Rav Mordichai Machlis for this teaching]
 Mishnah. A ‘stubborn and rebellious son’ is tried on account of his ultimate
destiny: let him die innocent and let him not die guilty. (Sanhedrin 71b)
Mishnah. [The thief] who burrows his way in is judged on account of its
probable outcome. (Sanhedrin 72a)
Mishnah. The following must be saved [from sinning] even at the cost of
their lives: he who pursues after his neighbor to slay him (Sanhedrin 73a)

These three laws, of which the rebellious son is the archetype, all have a common
moral argument: We are to consider the outcome, and take action with an eye
toward the future.

If this is so, our quandary is resolved. We are told that taking a captive woman
could lead to having a rebellious son. This idea is logical; taking a woman with
alien values into one's home would certainly have an adverse effect. The child of
such a woman will be a child raised by a mother who adheres to a radically
different belief system. The child's rebelliousness against Judaism is
understandable, predictable. This child was reared with intellectual dissonance, by
virtue of being taught different ideas from his mother and father. It easy to see
how such an upbringing would produce a confused child, who suffers from
spiritual angst.

There is, of course, a second possibility. What if this woman actually comes to
reject her pagan past, and accepts the tenets of Judaism? The Torah commands
that she be given 30 days in order to separate herself from her father and mother,
as is explained in the Talmud:

"R. Akiba said: ‘Her father and her mother’ refer to idolatry" (Yevamot 48b)

This woman receives a "crash course" in Judaism. During the prescribed 30 days
she is to separate from her idolatrous past. Again, this "experiment" could
possibly meet with success, and the Torah makes allowances for that possibility.

Rav Elchanan Wasserman, in his Kovetz Maamarim (p. 11), raises an intriguing
question which is related to our present query: How can the Torah expect a 12
year old girl or 13 year old boy to be capable of belief in, or knowledge of G-d,
when some of the greatest philosophers in the world, who possess keen, trained
minds, have stumbled terribly in pursuit of intellectual truth? Rav Elchanan
answered quite simply, that knowledge of G-d is not as difficult as we might think:
Were it not for the Evil Inclination, all mankind would be able to clearly see and
understand truth. It is not the belief in G-d per se which people find difficult.
Rather, the implications of this belief are what make it difficult. If the
ramifications of belief were removed or disconnected from belief itself, belief
would indeed be attainable by all those who seek truth, even the 12-year-old.

The captive woman was raised in the pagan world, a world filled with fear and
superstition, a world which worshipped power. When this woman sees that the
soldiers of her people were vanquished and her gods therefore proven impotent, a
startling discovery may occur to her: The pagan worldview is false. She will then
be open to learn about the Jewish idea of G-d. If this happens, this woman may
become a great believer, perhaps even something of a fanatic, a response which
is often characteristic of those who change belief systems.

We may now view this law's creation as an antidote to the Evil Inclination in a new
light: It is structured to weed out the Evil Inclination in both the conquerors and
the conquered, the "husband" and the "wife"! If the captive woman undergoes
this metamorphosis, we may say that the logic is the same as in the case of the
rebellious son. We are expected to look to the future, anticipating the results
before setting the chain of events into action. Arguably, the strongest supporter of
such a policy would be the changed woman herself, no longer a victim, rather a
newly enlightened person who has emerged from the dark pagan world. In the
event that a rebellious son results, we know that the experiment failed and we
need not wait any longer to take action.

This idea may be implied in the Zohar:

"A beautiful woman" - a beautiful soul. (Zohar Chadash Ki Tezeh)

The woman who successfully makes the transition possesses a beautiful soul, but
needs some help in order to liberate herself from the psychological chains of
paganism. Now we may understand why only the individual with an integrated
world view, one who does not create artificial barriers between the physical and
the spiritual, may go to battle.3 When he sees this beautiful woman, he sees a
beautiful soul. The question must be asked: Is it his Evil Inclination or his Good
Inclination, which has deemed her beautiful? The integrated person sees her
outward beauty, but knows that it is the soul which is really important. However,
he may be led astray by his own tendency not to distinguish between the physical
and spiritual; he may actually be guilty of self-deception, hence the possibility of a
rebellious son.

The Or HaChaim Hakadosh explains the idea of the captive woman as follows:

"The foundation of the idea, and its mystical secret, is as follows: Our sages
have taught us, that by virtue of the sin of Adam, some precious souls were
captured by the "other side" and these are the souls of converts. Go and
see how many great people have come from other nations; Ruth,… Sh'maya
and Avtalyon, Onkolus and many others. (Or HaChaim 21:11)

In a sense, there is poetic justice in his words: These souls were captured by the
"other side" [a euphemism for the Evil Inclination] as a result of the apostasy of
Adam. Now, in battle, we are given permission to bring these souls back, in
defiance of the "other side," in defiance of the Evil Inclination. Such a battle is not
simple. Success or failure will have severe ramifications. A family life either
elevated or destroyed hangs in the balance. Only brave, holy soldiers may take
part in this battle, those without sin, spiritually integrated, spiritually elevated.
3
As indicated by the Mishna cited in the note above: the one who does not distinguish between the spiritual and the
physical.