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Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System Author(s): Friedrich Kratochwil Source: World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Oct., 1986), pp. 27-52 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010297 . Accessed: 02/05/2013 15:30
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OF SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES, AND TERRITORIALITY:

An InquiryintotheFormation oftheStateSystem
ByFRIEDRICH KRATOCHWIL*
I. INTRODUCTION

of in the nature and patternsof interactions illuminate differences has beSuch a clarification different domesticand international systems. relationsat a time when forthe analysisof international come important trends. the world systemappears to be characterizedby two conflicting of terriuniversalrecognition On the one hand, we observethe virtually as the organizingprincipleof international politics.On torialsovereignty relations and of transnational because of the the other hand, growth thereis a tendencytoward erosion of the exclusivity interdependencies, This disjunction associated with the traditionalnotion of territoriality. createsdilemmas for between the organizingprinciplesand social reality of thesetensionsand of the varyconflict management.An investigation in different international themselves ing patternsin which theymanifest as well as analyticalinterest. is therefore of historical systems and In thisarticle,I intendto lay thegroundworkforsuch a historical in systems. An examinationof shifts comparativeanalysisof international underthe functionsof boundaries is particularly helpful for a better state sysstandingof the originsand evolutionof the presentterritorial of whether tem. Without intendingto bring back the old controversy such changes can be taken as indicators of eitherthe demise or the revival I is not maintain like property, thatterritoriality, of the territorial state,'
* The researchforthisarticlewas furthered by a grantfromEarl Osborn to the Institute and by seed moneyfromthe MacArthur of War and Peace Studies,Columbia University, to Simone Chambersand Deborah Welch Larson Foundation. I also owe a debtof gratitude William T. R. Fox, JohnRuggie, Nicholas Onuf, and Jack who made helpfulsuggestions. and were kind enough to comment. Snyderread earlierversions on the probableconsequencesof See, forexample, the debate in the late sixtiesfocusing in Europe and Latin America.For a criticalappraisal,see Stanley efforts variousintegration Hoffmann,"Obstinateor Obsolete,The Fate of the Nation State and the Case of Western (Boston:Little,Brown,i968), I77-230. Regionalism Europe," in JosephNye, ed.,International

CHANGES

helpto in thefunction ofboundaries history throughout

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thathave of social arrangements a simpleconcept,but comprisesa variety investigate the to be examined in greaterdetail. For thatpurpose,I first and territorial social organizafunctionof boundaries in nonterritorial fromone formof organizingsotionsand give reasons forthe transition orders,I distincietiesto the other.Second, withinthe class of territorial in a statesystem. guish between empiresand the conceptof territoriality and exchanges beFinally, I will examine changes in the relationships tween internationalsystemsand their environmentby contrastingthe based orders with those based on functionof boundaries in territorially functionalregimes. For purposes of analysis,I shall focuson threetypesof exchangesthat are mediated by boundaries.On themostbasic level thereis theexchange between the unit and its environment.(The concept of environment serves as a residual categoryin that it comprisesall the relevantfactors shifts thathave not been subsumedunder theconceptof unit.)Significant of the enviin the functionof boundaries occur with the differentiation ronment.A second typeof exchange is that between the unit and other exchanges units(inter-unit exchange).The natureand scope of inter-unit is decisivelyinfluencedby the actorwho maintainsthe boundaries of the unit. Consequently,thereis a thirdtypeof exchange-that between the thenatureoftheseexchanges By tracing centerof a unitand itsperiphery. and by analyzing the various interaction effects among them,we can apsocial systems-domestic as well praise the role of boundariesin different as international. and nonterritorial social organizations Section II deals with territorial and the functionof boundaries in each. Within the territorial category, of rightsand acthose systemsthatare based on the mutual recognition are distinguished from"imperial" orders. knowledged common practices is shown by two brief The importanceof these conceptual distinctions which allows us to trace case studies.The first examines Mongol society, the changes in thefunction of boundarieswhen societiesmove froma noto a sedentary(territorial) formof social organimadic (nonterritorial) zation. The second case studyis a comparativeexaminationof imperial of theChinese,Roman, and Britboundaries,exemplified bytherelations ish Empires with outsiderswho were never accorded equal status. By the patterns of interaction in imperialordersand in the state contrasting difwe can show thatthe function of boundaries is significantly system, ferent. In Section III, the conceptualdistinctions developed thus farare used to discuss techniques of conflict managementin the state system.Two are examined in particular. One is themovementof thelocation strategies

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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES

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ofthe of function concerns themanipulation theother of theboundary; associthe bundle of conventionally boundaries rights through untying was or technique The first strategy sovereignty. atedwithfullterritorial of territorial duringtheclassicalbalance-ofadjustments characteristic ofsovereign neutralthrough imposed rights powerperiod;theuntying or buffer states, spheres ofinfluence ofsuzerainties, ization, thecreation in byEuropeanpowers was usedprimarily and so forth, preponderance, in thecolonial world. ordertomanagecompetition ofspecialresponsithecreation ofspheres In Section IV, I investigate ofrevivI arguethat theimpossibility in thecontemporary system. bility was oneofthecontribofinfluence under modern conditions ingspheres toagreeon themeaning thefailure causesofthecoldwar,and that uting In addition, I discuss ofdetente. ofspheres ofabstention led tothedemise imand their and functional regimes transborder resource arrangements relations. fora theory ofinternational plications as to the conclusions in SectionV, I draw somepreliminary Finally, reto international neededin a systems approach powerand parsimony lations.
II.
TERRITORIALITY AND THE SOCIAL FORMATION OF STATES

eitheras classified groupsare often social science, In contemporary builtupontherecogbasedon kinship or as communities communities law within a giventerritory. nition ofmutual toa common rights subject communities maybe emThis distinction between tribal and territorial After all,evennodifficult tomake,however.2 pirically and conceptually madsdo notwanderaimlessly without fixed territory.
The primitive nomadwho dependsforsurvival on whathe can find... mustknowtheterritory in whichhe roams:localesofwaterholes,where certain ofgame,etc.... Thus,each nomadicband grow,thehabits plants its overtheterritory within whichit migrates although establishes rights territories.3 members mayvisit bandsofother

In such nomadiccommunities, over the the rightto move prevails ofmithetitle to a cycle meansin effect to camp,and "ownership right ofallocating Lattimore ofthese forms studied theimplications gration."4
2 On kinship see,e.g.,HenrySumnerMaine,Ancient or "primitive" societies Law (London: JohnMurray,i866); Lewis Henry Morgan,Ancient or Researches Society, in theLines ofHuman Progressfrom Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization (New York: Holt, i877). For a critiqueof thisdichotomy, see RobertLowie, Primitive Society (London: Routledge& Kegan Paul, I949). 3 T. S. Murty, Frontiers, a Changing Concept (New Delhi: Palit & Palit, I978), 50. 4See, e.g., the extensivediscussionof "nomadism" in Owen Lattimore, InnerAsianFrontiers of China (Boston: Beacon Press,I95 ), chap. 4; quote at 66.

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territorial rightsof use forthe social formation of the Mongols.5He followed the change of territorial use fromcommon, tribally owned land administeredby a princeto the establishment of fixedprivateownership throughthe introductionof the monastic rule of Lamaism. The social consequences were startling. The originalMongol tribeswere neverstatic and cobecause disputesover the rightof movementled to the splitting alescence of small clan-like groups. This allowed an exceptional leader like Genghis Khan to gatherintohis tribethosewho, in searchof protecoverlords.Fundamental tion, had fled fromtheirabusive or ineffective in the changes balance of power could be effected throughsuch a gathering of followersby a leader. on the other hand, prevented the The allocation of fixed property, of process of agglomerationand led to the parcelingand repartitioning tribal territory. The emphasis on fixedproperty first introducedby Lamaist monasteriesled to further importantinternalas well as external and forbadethe tribalcustomsemphasized mobility changes. The former in order to adjust the Mongol digging of wells and intensiveagriculture way of lifeto the stepperatherthanto themarginalareas thatcould have sustained a mixed formof economy.Exclusive property titles, however, led to the ascendancy of wealth over mobilityand drew the Mongols closer to China throughtrade. This developmentbroughtthem under the influenceof the Manchus, whose vassals virtuallyall of them bein churchafcame-especially when theChinese intervened successfully fairsand divided northern fromwesternMongols. in the i9th century Most Westerntravelers commentedon thepeaceful characterof the once warlike Mongol people; Chinese officialwritings and Western observersattributedthis developmentto the teachingsof Lamaism. Matterswere more complicated,however: some of the bloodand westernMongols had been conveniently iest wars between northern Lamaism had not onlydivided the Mongols neglectedin theseaccounts.6 and broken their abilityto invade the Chinese Empire, but the settlehad also abolished the mentsfollowingtheintroduction of fixedproperty assetsforraiding the border. mobilitythat had been one of the strategic in thenew sense made a more fixedreThe developmentof territoriality lationshipwith China necessary.Unable to unite and maintain an independent basis of power, the Mongols became suzerains of the Manchu emperors. Similar arrangementscould be found all along the Chinese
see Lattimore(fn. discussionof Lamaism and itsimpacton Mongol affairs, a further and westernMongols,see Gavin 4), 86-97. For an account of the wars among the northern Asia (New York: Delacorte Press,i969), chaps. 7, 9, II, and esp. I7. Hambly, ed., Central
6 For

5 Owen Lattimore,The Mongols ofManchuria(New York: JohnDay, I934).

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a more precisedefinition frontier; only the clash with Russia necessitated again betweenthe suzerainsand Russia. Territoriality of the relationship type of exaltered its meaning as the boundary mediated a different change. The treatyof Peking (i86o) between Russia and Imperial China was an importantstep in this direction.It fixed the boundaryas "following the mountains,great riversand the presentlines of Chinese permanent partof the Sinkiang repickets."This delimitationstilllefta substantial did not decide to gion on the Chinese side, but the Imperial government in the Chinese Empire until i884.7 Even after include Sinkiang formally thatdate, it was stilltreatedas an "outer region" inhabitedby "barbarians" over which largely indirect control was exercised. According to independentof governmental Wheeler, Sinkiang remained substantially controlby Peking until the 1940s.8 The governorsappear to have determined all pertinentinternaland externalpolicies. Thus, although the rule upon Western statesystemimposed a particularmode of territorial China's relationships with itsclientsand the restof the world,the old soboundaryfrom cial formation of China preventedthe new international Local leaders and Russian and Chinese clientsmade servingits function. in spiteof its interof the area to eitherstateproblematic the attribution nationallysettledboundaries.By theend of World War I, the regionwas ruled by various warlords who-as the case of Sheng Shih-tsaishowsto the Soviets than to the National Chinese govwere more sympathetic ernment under Chiang Kai-shek.9 The region was firmlyin Chinese signed betreaties hands onlyafterthe Chinese Revolution.Still,thefirst in the area tween the new China and Moscow protectedSoviet interests companiesin Sinkiang; the bysetting up jointoil- and mineral-exploiting quite Sovietshad a majorityvote.'0Stalin had used thesame arrangement in Eastern Europe in order to cement his political influence effectively over Soviet client states.The arrangementwith China continued until
I955.
7 For a fascinating rule of the local warlordYakub Beg who account of the freewheeling untilhe was defeatedby the attemptedto fendoffRussian,English,and Chinese influence Story (New York: MacChinese generalTso Tsung-tangin i878, see JackChen, TheSinkiang millan,I977), chap. 6. see Surya Sharma,International Boundary Disputesand Interna8 For a general discussion, Wheeler,"Sinkiangand theSoviet and Geoffrey tionalLaw (Bombay: Tripathi,1976), I94 ff, (November-Decemberi963), 57 ff. Union," The China Quarterly 9 See Chen (fn. 7), chaps. 8-io, foran extensive discussionof the fluidand oftenshifting his sympathies fromthe under the rule of Sheng Shih-tsaiwho transferred politicalsituation to Stalin,but in I94i began to persecuteCommunistswith NationalistChinese government in I944. on a defeatof Stalin),onlyto seek a rapprochement Russian leanings(betting 10 63 (i964), 220ofGeography, See P. P. Karan, "The Sino-SovietBorderDispute,"Journal 42, at 22I.

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implications forour inquiry.If The case of the Mongols has significant boundaries are important because of theirrole in mediatingexchanges,a mediated by boundaries will prove closer look at thetypes ofrelationships At the most general level,boundariesare pointsof contactas instructive. well as of separation between a social systemand an environment.As Luhmann remarks: thusallowingtheinternal They reducethepoints withtheenvironment, of various relationswith the environment. Only where conditioning boundaries do exist,relations and environment can inbetweensystem and their creasetheir their differentiation controlled mutabilcomplexity, are permeable they onlymake surethateach ity.Boundaries to causality; causalprocess involves theentire system." The natural boundaryof a mountain crestor a watershedthat separatessocietiesis naturalonlybecause such areas are usually sparselypopof naturalresources. ulated and bereft Thus, exchangesbetweensocieties or political systemsand the environment are minimized, and therefore the potential for conflictis smaller. But even the small number of exchanges with the environment generallydepends upon the social formation of the societiesinvolved.Kingdon Ward remarkedthat a passof 15,000 feet lives is nothing to a Tibetanwho habitually obviously butclimate at i2,000 feet altitude. The Tibetanis notstopped byphysical these. His and no boundary areneededtomakehimrespect barriers, pillars ofthepineforests, the50 frontier is thevergeofthegrassland,thefringe contour indeedyoucometo the inchrainfall beyond whichno saltis (until The barrier butit maybe invisible; sea) or the75% saturated atmosphere. If ranges. is a moreformidable one toa TibetanthantheGreatHimalayan
his mode of life.12 he crosses it he must revolutionise

betweentwo typesof exchanges:sysIt is thusimportant to distinguish and system-other systems. tem-environment, it was As longas thecontacts withthepeopleon theother side wererare, to managerelations witha relatively low levelof understanding. possible as The others were"barbarians," etc.,whichcouldbe classified primitive, becausenotmuchcameofthem.... Longpartofthewild"environment" to higher strata and traders and rangecontacts wereessentially reserved with"strange" objectsand werethusonlystrengthsuppliedthe system and environbetween system ening the awarenessof a deep difference
ment.'3 A Niklas Luhmann, "TerritorialBordersas SystemBoundaries,"in Raimondo Strassoldo and Giovanni delli Zoti, eds., Cooperation in Border Areas(Milan: Franco Angeli, and Conflict
(1932),

Kingdon Ward, "Explorationson the Burma-TibetFrontier,"Geographical Journal8o 465-83,as quoted in J.R.V.Prescott, Boundaries and Frontiers (London: Croom Helm, I 978), I o6. ' Luhmann (fn. II), 238.
12

g982), 235-45, at 236.

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SYSTEMS, BOUNDARIES & TERRITORIALITY

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Whencontacts increase and political and economic interdependencies are recognized, a differentiation arises between inter-system and systemenvironment relations. Exchanges between systems (states) are increasvioingly regulated by normative structures, evenin casesof interstate lence.Thus, a "negative community"-onenot unitedby a common purpose ora vision ofthegoodlife, butonly bycommon practices and the ofrights-comes mutual recognition into existence.'4 Boundaries become lines(although their exactdemarcation mustwaituntilbetter meansof ofremaining geodesy develop) instead zonalfrontiers. The importance of relations center-periphery becomesvisibleand the task of boundary itself. maintenance presents In theEuropeancontext, we see these patterns in thedevelopment of the statesystem and in the emergence of the classicalconception of boundaries that exclusive define zonesofjurisdiction. The Treaty ofthe whichsetup a jointcommission fordeciding wheretheexact Pyrenees, boundary linebetween Spainand Francewouldbe drawn, inaugurated thefirst in themodern official boundary sense(i659).'5 Although similar to determine boundaries wererecorded earlier(e.g.,Philiple attempts in I3I2 to determine of Flanders),'6 Bel's attempt the boundaries the of the timemade such atlargelypersonalistic politicalorganization at delineation was tempts a different matter. Underfeudalrule,loyalty on circumstances, owed,depending to various overlords simultaneously. thelimits oftherealm Thus,although werequitewellknown, there was a tendency toobfuscate theboundaries ofthekingdom. Noblesmadewar on their own and had pretensions on domains in other realms; interventhe tions and counter-interventions weretheorder oftheday,preventing from likeunitary states.'7 kingdoms acting In thecase of theGermanEmpirebefore theThirty Years'War,the lackofcleardemarcation ofa public realm for decision-making purposes withrespect was paralleled status oftheimperial bytheconfused powers to "external to C. V. Wedgwood,a population of affairs." According about "twenty-one milliondependedforitsgovernment on morethan two thousandseparateauthorities," and althoughfree tenantsand
in whichthereis an agreefordenoting a situation '4 I use the term"negativecommunity" discussion, but not on commonpurpose.For further menton common practicesand rights, ofStates(Princeton:PrincetonUniversity and theRelations see TerryNardin, Law, Morality Press,i983). ofconventions '5 For theargument thattheEuropean statesystem dependedupon a variety in Michael rules,see Maurice Keens-Soper,"The Practiceofa StateSystem," and-institutional Donelan, ed., The ReasonofStates(London: George Allen & Unwin, I978), 25-45. i6 Sharma (fn.8), I4oftheModern '7 For further Poggi,TheDevelopment discussionofthispoint,see Gianfranco On theMedieval Press, 1978), and JosephStrayer, CA: StanfordUniversity State (Stanford, Press,I970). University Origins oftheModernState(Princeton:Princeton

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hundred po"overthree there werestill form federations, knights might in Germany."'8 authorities tentially conflicting "peace with preserving charged theEmperor wasnominally Although aggresit against external and justice" in therealmand withdefending ofjustice ofsecurity northeadministration thepreservation sion, neither the within his governmental powers.Nominally, and peace fellclearly couldnot since an emperor oftheEmpire, werein control sevenElectors their without their consent. In addition, be chosennora Diet convened had legalforce withor without The effectivedecrees approval. imperial ofstate however, notonlybytheabsence edicts was limited, nessoftheir privileges that butalso bytheinnumerable institutions to enforce them, Further types of duties.'9 from various legal persons exempted particular
of the imfromjurisdiction peculiaritiesabounded, includingimmunity arisingout of in case of controversies perial court (Reichskammergericht) the executionof laws.2o The different meanings of boundaries in such a political systemthus become clear. The King of Bohemia, although a legitimateelector,was not entitledto participatein the meetingsof the Electors' circlesince his of theEmpire. The Electorof Brandenkingdomlay outsidetheconfines burg was a member of the Empire as a princeof Brandenburg-but, as the rulerof Prussia since i6i8, a vassal of the King of Poland. Similarly, Duke of Lorraine, which was nominallywithinthe Empire, also owed had to the King ofFrance. Thus, even thoughtheHapsburg family fealty secured the imperial crown forgenerationsthroughthe controlof votes nonexistent withintheElectors'circle,theEmperor'spower was virtually except within his own possessions.The approval of the Electors' circle such as theconveningof the Diet had to be soughtforimperialinitiatives and forany new tax, alliance, or declarationof war. The Emperor was leftwithoutany rightto independentactioneven in seriousemergencies. as legislacontrol Fiscaland military was as little in imperial organization each theEmpirehad beendivided intotencircles, tion.For these purposes the withitslocal Diet and electedpresident. Shoulda circlebe attacked, to assist could appeal to thetwoneighboring circles him,and if president two a further the threetogether were stillunableto defendthemselves, thefivecircles be calledin. If thisdid notease thesituation, might might of theDiet to thenask theElectorof Mainz to call theleadingmembers consent whichwas calleda a form ofmeeting without imperial Frankfort,
Years'War,paperbacked. (London: Methuen,I98I), 34ff. C. V. Wedgwood, The Thirty 19 which were the task of parliaments, was originally of thesefreedoms The preservation notbodies forlegislation. largelycomplaintand adjudicativeinstitutions, of theReichskammergericht, see RudolfSmend,Das Reichskammergericht: 20 On thefunction und Verfassung (Aalen, Germany:Scientia,i965). Geschichte
i8

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Ifthis theattacked Deputationstag. meeting agreedthat district neededfurther help,they in turn appealedto theEmperor fora general Diet. By this amazingprocedure it was possible forone-half of theEmpireto be fully engagedin civilor external war before anyonewas boundso muchas to inform theEmperor.21

Onlyexclusive sovereignty made defense and internal administration the primary and increasingly exclusive taskof the central authorities. Thisdevelopment illustrates thecomplexity oftheconcept ofsovereignty. It denotes internal hierarchy as wellas external equality. The similarities and differences between boundaries in a state system and those developingin thefrontier zonesofempires arestriking; they showtheusefulness interofseparating center-periphery relations from those ofinter-system actions and system-environment exchanges. Although theGreatWall of Chinaand theRomanlimes appearto be examples oflinearboundaries, arenotboundaries they in themodern sense. Owen Lattimore points out that
... theconcept of the of a man-made GreatWall ... was morea product kind of statecreatedwithinChina thanof the kindof pressure against China fromthesteppe.Naturally enough, it is themilitary aspectof the its GreatWall thathas commanded mostattention, and thishas distorted historical significance.22

theimmense Considering military strength ofCh'in at theend ofthe periodofthewarring states, theborder changes oftheGreatWall were feudal notvery extensive whencompared to theterritories oftheformer kingdoms that Ch'inhad united, norwas there anyimminent menace by northern barbarians. Mostofthemilitary threats camefrom thestillunliberate ofexterminating thenobility feudal serfs andofconverting policy intopeasants The who owed rent to their overlord and taxesto thestate. nobles couldno longer entitled torent; use serfs as soldiers and wereonly thepeasants couldnow be approached fortaxesand directly bythestate laborwithout theintercession ofthefeudal lord.Withthese conscripted the thecentral audefense of the boundaries became the task of changes, thorities. areasofexboundaries did notoperate to demarcate Imperial clusivejurisdiction on thebasisof sharedpractices and mutualrecognition ofrights, buttokeeptheenvironment theestablishment safe through ofclients and thecontrol oftrade. theRomanEmpireconceived thelimes notas a boundary, Similarly, butas a temporary unlimited thepotentially stopping placewhere expan2t Wedgwood (fn. i 8),
22

of feudalismresultedfromCh'in's deconquered south.The destruction

36. Lattimore(fn.4), 434.

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The politicaland adminission of the Pax Romana had come to a halt.23 or stayedinside it at a trativedomain oftenextended beyond the wal124 considerable distance. Boundaries-i.e., legally relevant distinctionsexisted only in private legal relations,where they governed property rights.The agerpublicus,or public domain, had no boundaries; it ended bymeans ofa legallyrelevant somewhere,but thisend was not specifiable esline. (The expressionused wasfinesesse.)The boundarywas therefore tribesas well as Roman sentiallya floatingzone withinwhich tributary Other were used to keep the peace.25 legions with local barbarianrecruits or subjubarbariantribeswere to be slowlyacculturatedand integrated, gated and suppressed. Caesar's political plan, expressed in his Compolithispersonal notonlyrepresents mentaries26 as wellas in Plutarch,27 ical thinkingbut the policy consensusin Rome-at least until Commoocean." After dus: to conquer the world up to the "earth-surrounding Commodus, these plans came to naught and Rome developed clientrelationshipswith the northernGermanic tribesuntil internaldecay and the crushing defense burdens broughtthe imperial organization to its knees. of such clientrelationships as well as the simiA closer investigation in managing intersocietal affairsin the state syslaritiesand differences ternis now appropriate. III.
BOUNDARIES AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

and boundaries,as well as the exThe distinctionbetween frontiers under conditionsof various social aminationof how boundariesfunction some issues of conis particularly formations, helpfulforunderstanding flict relations.Basically,two classesof techmanagementin international of exchangesmediated by niques were available: managementof thetypes of location of the boundaries.The latand the manipulation boundaries, of the European balance-of-power systemthat atter was characteristic tempted to "preserve the equilibrium in Europe"28through territorial
23 This thesishas been put forwardmost eloquentlyby Paul de Lapradelle, La Frontie're of Lapradelle's modifications 1928). For some important (Paris: Les Editions Internationales, Limes KonRoms,Vortrigedes 6. Internationalen thesis,see Studienzu den Militdrgrenzen (Cologne-Graz: Bdhlau Verlag, i967). gressesin Silddeutschland 24 See, e.g., the extensive in Franz Altheim, discussionof Roman boundaryarrangements no date), II, chaps. 2 and VittorioKlosterman, Niedergang derAltenWelt,2 vols. (Frankfurt:

3-

trans.by JohnWarrington(New York: JuliusCaesar, De bellogallico (Commentaries), Dutton, I953). 27Plutarch, VitaeCaesarum(New York: Heritage Press,I941), chap. 58, sec. 6. 28 This was the formula whichended theWar of in thepreambleto theTreatyof Utrecht, Spanish Succession(I7I3).
26

25Ibid., chap. 4-

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gainsand divisions suchas thedivision ofPolandand theterritorial ad-

justmentsat the Congress of Vienna.29 The formerwas employed most consistently around the edges of the various European empiresthatsubjugated the colonial world. Institutionssuch as buffers, protectorates, spheres of interest(or influence),suzerainties,and neutral zones were commonlyused to impose European rule on more or less recalcitrant "locals" and to manage potentialconflicts with otherexpanding European powers;30as in Europe, the institutions of servitudeand imposed neutralization(ratherthan divisionof territory) also played a role. With the abolitionof the colonial frontiers, manyof the lines formerly marking offspheresof interest became permanentboundariesof successor states;some of thepresentboundarydisputesresultfromsuch spheric agreements.The disputebetweenEthiopia and Somalia, and the IndianChinese boundaryproblemconcerningthe meaningand understandings underlyingthe McMahon line in Tibet (dividingTibet into two spheres but acknowledging the "suzerainty" of China), are cases in point.3' Nevertheless,some parallels or sphericboundaries,such as the 49th parallel in North America, are still in existenceand serve as functioning boundaries at present. Why have some meridians,designed primarily as markersindicating in principleforunchartedterritory, agreements become boundarieswithout engenderingconflict, and why have othersnot? One or more of the following conditions seem to have helped in mitigatingpotential disputes.First,mostof the sphericboundariesstillin existenceare in deserts or polar regions.The maintenanceof such linescan be explained in terms of thecostsof demarcationin an unchartedand hostileenvironment. Seclines persistedwhen a colonial power gained possessionof ond, straight thatwas once marked offas lyingin some otherpowadjacent territory er's sphere of influence.Former sphericdemarcationstherefore became internaladministrative boundaries and only later,throughstate succession, internationalboundaries. The Egypt-Sudan, Tanganyika-Kenya, and Botswana-SouthWest Africabordersare cases in point.The acceptance of the49thparallelas theboundarybetweenCanada and theUnited Stateshas a different advocated thisline in i8i8 on explanation.Jefferson the basis of a putativeagreementbetween the Hudson's Bay Company and French Canada. This proposal was acceptable to England precisely
29 See, e.g., the various compensationschemes of the Congress of Vienna, in Edward Gulick,Europe'sClassicalBalance ofPower(New York: Norton,i967), chap. 9. Dependencies, and Trusteeships discussion,see H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, 3^?For further Peace, I948), chap. i, "The Inter(Washington, DC: Carnegie EndowmentforInternational nationalFrontier." 3' See J.R.V. Prescott, Asia H. J.Collier and D. F. Prescott, Frontiers ofAsia and Southeast Press,1977),chap. i8. (Melbourne: MelbourneUniversity

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becausetheBritish had wanted sincei697, butithad never that boundary won theacceptance oftheFrench. Mostofthetime, however, former demarcation linesmarking off the of Europeanpowerrivalry have beenthecause of complicated spheres For instance, theAnglo-Gerarrangements. the treaty thatestablished mansphere ofinfluence in Africa in i890 specifically forfuture provided in accordance withlocal requirements.32 adjustments Consequently, the boundaries thatemerged between Malawi and Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda,and Kenyaand Tanzania showalterations (or are stillin dispute). The othermethod-the imposition of a specialregime on a zone on thefrontier-has givenriseto patterns ofinteraction thatare quitedifferent fromthosebetween thesovereign of Europe. territorial regimes For example,in the i9th century the Balkansrepresented a "frontier zone" in whichAustrian, Russian, and British influence met, and which could notbe effectively dealtwithbythenominal power,theOttoman Empire.At thattime, Turkeywas not considered a Europeanstate;it as a "civilized" thecommon onlycame to be regarded nation, accepting
practicesand mutuallyrecognized rightsof the European state system, afterthe Crimean War. The Treaty of Adrianople (i829) gave the Tsar, as protector of the Christians, a rightof intervention in certainOttoman possessions,a circumstancethat led to the Crimean War. Later on, the Bosnian crisisof i908 was theresultof theincorporation of thenominally Turkish provincesof Bosnia and Herzegovina intothe AustrianEmpire, althoughAustria had "administered"theseprovincessince i878. is the "sphere of interest," On the lowest level of formalization which is either backed by formal or informalagreementsamong competitor statesalone (when "the locals do not matter"),or by additional arrangementswith the local authorities. As to a sphereof influence, accordingto Lord Curzon, "no exteriorpower but one may reassertitselfin the terso described."33 have therefore ritory Spheresof influence also been called "semi-suzerainties." Other arrangements, such as the institution of a proor (full) suzerainty, tectorate, or condominia,were also developed. The tripartitecondominium between Germany, Britain, and the United States over Samoa, and the Anglo-French arrangements in Sudan and the New Hebrides, are examples of such joint administrations. The term
32

Art. IV, as quoted in K. C. McEwen, International Boundaries of East Africa(Oxford: Clarendon Press, I970), I78 ff.An example is theshift of the boundaryfromthe shoreto the middle of Lake Jipeon the recommendation of a boundarycommissionworkingin I904I906, which modifiedthe originalagreement betweenGermanyand Britain(i893); thisline has become the modernKenya-Tanzania boundary. 33Lord Curzon, Frontiers (Oxford:Clarendon Press,I907), 42.

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ofEuropean thevocabulary tohaveentered appears ofinfluence" "sphere ironic thatthis It is somewhat onlyin thelate i9thcentury. diplomacy in controlling itsdisinterest was usedbyRussiato declare term originally to have assuredLord Claris reported Count Gorchakov Afghanistan. within thesphere outside laycompletely "Afghanistan endonin i869 that herinfluence."34 be calledupontoexercise whichRussiamight theBerlinConference during ofthisdeviceto Africa The application
of

without amongthe colonialpowers;theythusacquiredvastterritories and administraeffective occupation their title through toperfect having Sincetheseareas to their colonialenclaves.35 tionof thevasthinterlands considerable tonobody), belonged nullius (i.e.,they terra weretechnically in theabsenceofa from titles theinchoate conflict couldhavedeveloped multilateral agreement.36 faceda arosewhentheEuropeanpowers problem A slightly different resist penetraforeign on one hand,couldnoteffectively local statethat, one exclusive within absorbed couldnotbe wholly tionbut,on theother, were ofpreponderance" "spheres For suchpurposes, ofinfluence. sphere butalof thecountry, theintegrity nominally preserved they designed; areasor zones.An exbasisforcertain on an exclusive locatedinfluence of I907 Convention is theAnglo-Russian ampleofsuchan arrangement
concerningPersia. Originallythisidea had been floatedby Salisburypreof Persia; the practicalimplicacisely in order to preservethe integrity tion,however,was the divisionof a nominallyindependentstateintoexafterthe I907 clusive spheresof influence.Keal describesPersian affairs convention: theintomaintain their intention had affirmed bothsignatories Although fortradeto ofPersiaand toallowequal facilities and integrity dependence senta in practice. The twopowers thatwas notwhathappened all nations, to would refuse thatthey declaring jointnoteto thePersiangovernment, concesinvolved loansgranting other loansfrom powersifthese sanction orBritish toRussian pocontrary subjects poweror their sionstoanyother
34 Ibid.; see also G. N. Curzon, Russiain Central Asia in i889 and theAnglo-Russian Question (London: Frank Cass, i967), 326 ff. was virtually a valid title discountedin establishing 35Although the principle of contiguity in theIslandofPalmas decision,Lauterpachthas shownthatthereis a sound core to thisdoceds.,International Law, Casesand trine.For thePalmas decision,see Louis Henkin and others, see Hersh Lauterpacht,"SoverMaterials(Minneapolis: West, i980), 256-62.On contiguity, Law 27 (1950), 376-433. Yearbook ofInternational eignty over SubmarineAreas,"British 36 This was the reason forthe Latin Americandoctrine of utipossidetis, which foreclosed to establishtitleto sparsely administered or even unknown parts attempts of othercountries Paul Rohrlich, oftheirrespective territories. For further discussion, see Friedrich Kratochwil, (Lanham, MD: University Press of and Harpreet Mahajan, Peace and DisputedSovereignty America, i985), case studieson the Beagle Channel and Peru-Ecuador.

i884-i885

resulted in a relativelyuncomplicated division of Africa

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Persiaprotested, bothaboutthisand theAnliticaland strategic interest. whereupon Petrograd and London reactedby glo-Russian Agreement, other taking up Persia's cause.37 warning powers against in i945, Duncan arrangements Surveyingthe range of various frontier Hall found the followingrathersurprising(but not exhaustive) set of regimes,trusteeships, and so forth: mandates,international of ...: the mandates(now trusteeships) readingfromsouth to north, rivalries and and Tanganyika; theUganda Protectorate; Ruanda Burundi overAbyssinia; of influence Eritrea, in turnTurkish,Egyptian, spheres rivalries of Britain Italian,and now a projected international trusteeship; in theFaand FranceoverEgyptand thevalleyof theNile culminating condominiums thecondominium oftheSudan;theformer shodaincident; Suez and protectorate over Egypt; the neutralized and demilitarized themandates overTransjordan, Palregime; Canal, withitsinternational and Syria;theprojected international forJeruregime trusteeship estine, in turnTurkishterritory, history of Alexandretta, salem; the checkered As we international and againTurkish territory. regime, League mandate, oftheinternational hisshallsee,thelineofphenomena frontier continues the Balkans,and Anatolia,along the Straits, through torically through thence on to theBalticand evento theArctic.38 states,which allowed the Finally,therewere neutralzones and buffer local inhabitantsconsiderable autonomy. Neutral zones stopped functioningwhen local refugeesor even brigands used the lack of a strong fortheirown purposes.The neutral zone internalor externalauthority of the Gold Coast and Togo between the Britishand German territories had to be abolished in i899 forthatreason. All such areas withoutpolitof terical authority were set aside in modern timeswhen the exclusivity Thus, the neutral zone ritorialrule became more and more important. betweenSaudi Arabia and Kuwait was divided up equally betweenthese statesin i965.39 A good example of a buffer which was createdto stateis Afghanistan, more effectively. Having failed in separate Britishand Russian influence upon the resisting tribes,the British,with I879 to impose a protectorate Russian consent,persuaded the Emir of Afghanistanto accept sovereigntyover Vakhan, therebycreatingthe curious extensionof Afghan of I907 ended the toward China. To a large extent,the treaty territory rivalriesof these European powers in thatarea. In a similar vein, Siam was successfulin defendingits autonomyagainstdirectinterventions by contestover Indochina. becominga "neutral" in the British-French
Dominance(London: Macmillan,i984), 3 I. Rulesand Superpower 37Paul Keal, Unspoken 38 Hall (fn.30), 4439See S. H. Amin,International in theGulf(London: Middle East and and Legal Problems
I24.

North AfricanStudies Press, 198I),

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As in Europe, neutralizationwas contingent upon the agreementof the Great Powers as well as upon the difficulty or costliness of extending the imperial boundaries.40 This was the case when the territory in question was effectively administeredby some sortof government thatcould preventeasy penetration. Otherwise,various clientarrangements had to be developed in order to preventtheexcluded statesfrominvading,orin cases where the borderpeople were poorlyorganized-to preventinternal pressure from colonists,traders,militarycareerists,and others frominvolvingthe imperialstatein further expansionat greatcost. The social formation of the imperialstateis therefore as important as thatof theouter "barbarians"or tribes. We findhistorical examples forsuch imperial expansion due to the activities of tradersand entrepreneurs in the machinationsof Rhodes and Luederitz, who extended Britishand German influence in Africabyforcing theirgovernments to protect theirprivate acquisitions. The debate concerningthe causes of imperialismand the argumentsthat "empire does not pay" are familiar.The acquisition of Texas in the American frontier setting also shows the extensionof influenceoriginallybroughtabout by privateinitiative. The dynamicscreatedby thisclash of internaland externalfactors can be seen in Britain'spolicy in India. In the case of the BritishNorthwest Frontier,London vacillatedbetweena "closed-border"policyand a "forward" policy.The closed-border policyinvolvedstrict patrolsof the border by the British,negotiations limitedto representatives of transborder and Britishinsistence societies, on theright of supervising and controlling transborder This policywas usuallyaccompanied byan otherwise affairs. noninterventionist stance toward tribalaffairs, and punctuatedby occasional punitiveexpeditionswhen thesecurity of BritishIndia was threatened. The forward policy, on the other hand, as exemplifiedby the Sandeman systemof consultationand more active intervention in tribal affairs, offered arbitration and subsidiesin orderto keep the peace while not discouragingcontactsbetweenthe subjectsand the outsiders.4'
IV.
UNSPOKEN RULES, NETWORKS, AND REGIMES

Aftera surveyof a variety of formsby which stateshave triedto modifythe exclusionary natureof territorial and thereby to mansovereignty age theirrelations,the presentworld systemappears to be considerably
40 For a discussionof the problemsinvolved, see CyrilE. Black and others, Neutralization and World Politics(Princeton:Princeton University Press,i968). 41 For a discussion ofBritish policy, see I. Coatman,"The Northwest Frontier Provinceand Trans-BorderCountryunder the New Constitution," Journal of theRoyal Central Asian Societyi8 (JulyI931), 335-48,and C. E. Bruce,"The Sandeman Policyas Applied to theTribal Problemsof Today," Journal oftheRoyal Central AsianSocietyi9 (January I932), 45-67.

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simpler.The emancipationof thecolonial world not onlyabolished most spheresevolved into actual of thesearrangements-except when former boundaries-but sovereignequality and the assertionof absolute territorial rightsgained new salience. Especially in the third world, sovereigntyhas been invoked in order to modifydomesticlegal arrangements and internationalobligationsresultingfromstate succession.Thus, the which affirmation of "PermanentSovereignty overNatural Resources,"42 is anjustifiesnationalizationwithoutthe conventionalcompensation,43 otherway of reasserting independence; thisoftenmeans thatthe domestic through emphasison economyhas to be isolatedfromforeign penetration "bordersof separation."Attempts to establishcodes of conduct,formultinationalcorporations forinstance,must thus be understoodas a means to masterthe problemof loss of controlthatis concomitant to increasing Ecointerdependence. As Krasner has pointedout, theNew International nomic Order is less a distributive bargainingforlargershares of wealth than a struggleforcontrol.44 This struggleis primarily, or at least ostensibly,designed to ensure the sovereignindependenceof the developing countrieswithintheirown territorial confines;at the same time,it is an effort to controlinfluencesthatoriginatebeyond territorial bordersand thathave an impacton national life. tendenciescan be found in Nevertheless,a varietyof contradictory of territopresentinternational life.Thefirstis the universalrecognition arena. rial sovereignty as thedifferentiating principlein theinternational But there is also a second,conflicting trend: the erosion of boundaries ofmoderneconomic life.Thus, throughtheincreasinginterdependencies while political systemsare boundary-maintaining systems,marketsalthoughdependentfortheircreationupon politicalpower and economic that led to Wallernetworks-are not.45 It is preciselythis difference stein'sargumentconcerningthesuccessof European capitalism:thepenof theentireworld became possibleonlyafter theEuropean powetration ers had given up on the creation of a world empire and contented themselveswith economic networks.46
42 See, e.g., United Nations General AssemblyResolution i803 (XVII), i962, U.N. Doc. A/52I7 (i963)43 On this point,see Eduardo Jimenez forthe Nationde Arechaga,"State Responsibility ofInternational Law and New YorkUniversity Journal alization of Foreign-Owned Property," in Richard Falk, FriedrichKratochwil,and Saul Politics ii (Fall I978), 179-95; reprinted Law: A Contemporary Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview, Mendlovitz,eds., International

44Stephen Krasner, "The United Nations and Political Conflict between North and of Global Change South," in Toby TristerGati, ed., The U.S., the U.N., and theManagement Press,i983), 210-26, at 21I-14. (New York: New York University 45This point is made by Raimondo Strassoldo,"Boundaries in Sociological Theory: A Reassessment," in Strassoldoand Delli Zotti (fn. I I). 46 Immanuel Wallerstein, and theOrigins of System: Capitalist Agriculture The ModernWorld in thei6th Century (New York: Academic Press, I976). theEuropean World Economy

I 985).

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This expansion, however,did not eliminatedifferentiation of center and periphery, which sometimesmade it necessary to extenddirectpolitical controlinto the penetratedareas. The establishment of colonial rule became necessarywhen theoriginalinformal betweenthe loagreements cal rulersand theirEuropean counterparts brokedown.47 Thus, farfrom provingthe automaticand unproblematic natureof economic expansion, the historyof European imperialism,especiallyin its rush into Africa, proves the importanceof political underpinnings forthe functioning of unbounded economic exchanges. A thirdidentifiable traitis the resultof the power differentials among nations and the tensions between bounded political systemsand unbounded exchangessuch as economic,ideological,or informational transactions. The issues of dependency,propaganda, and transborderdata flowscome to mind. Thus, problemsnecessitating carefulconflict managementhave not disappeared while manyof the old techniquesof modifying the functions of boundariesforsuch purposesare no longer available. In short,although the systemis based on sovereignterritoriality, new conceptionsmodifying thisexclusiveregimehave evolved thatmake the management of the international systempossible withoutviolating authoritative prescriptions. Three typesof new managementdevices have evolved: theyare usually subsumed under the term "rules of the game."48These devices are: of responsibility, and functionalregimes.Of spheres spheres of abstention, these,only functionalregimesare clearlylegal in characterin that they on treaties and usuallyrely, among otherthings, (bilateralor multilateral) create and of thereby explicit rights obligations.Spheres responsibility mix legal rightswith the unilateralarrogationof competence-which, if respectedat all, gives rise only to a norm with the characterof an "unspoken rule." Spheres of abstentionare the least formalarrangements. They are susceptibleto breakdowns as demonstrated by the short-lived detentebetween the United Statesand the Soviet Union in the seventies.
SPHERES OF RESPONSIBILITY

or territoSpheres of responsibility may be definedeitherfunctionally rially.The functionaldefinition shaped the role of the Great Powers (a
47 This is theargument in John Gallagherand Ronald Robinson, "The ImperialismofFree Trade," EconomicHistory Review,2d series,6 (I953), I-I5. 48 For a more extensive discussionof the "rulesof thegame" in thepostwarera, see Friedrich Kratochwil,International Order and ForeignPolicy(Boulder,CO: Westview,1978). See also Richard A. Falk, "The Interplay of Westphaliaand CharterConceptionsof the InternationalLegal Order," in CyrilE. Black and RichardA. Falk, eds., The Futureof theInternationalLegal Order,I (Princeton:PrincetonUniversity Press, i969), chap. 2. Falk is one of thefew "process-oriented" international lawyerswho would be inclinedto grantsome quasiauthoritative statusto "rules of thegame."

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ofVienna).It designated after theCongress rolethat cameintoexistence that weretohavea sayin matinterests-those powers withsystem-wide ofthesystem. to themanagement ters pertaining questions primarily management ofpolitics, In theclassicconception to attempts involvedthe issue of balancesof power.But Metternich's ofthe constitution theinternal to include ofsecurity stretch themeaning to accedeto such of Verona), and England'sreluctance states (Congress sysfunctional that thepurely showed oftheConcert,49 an understanding ofa GreatPowerwereprobspecification oftheresponsibilities tem-wide sovereignty oflegitimate (i) varying conceptions lematic fortworeasons: and (2) thereand liberalparticipants, amongtheconservative existed geographic significant GreatPowersshowed interests ofvarious spective as thepredominant concept, ofinterest reemerged Gradually, spheres in in theBalkans. Russiaand Austria between As theclashes mostclearly involved "internal" politconflict increasingly thisregion demonstrated, (the division and incorporation or territorial ical groups(Pan-Slavism) and a new underdecreased becauseof nationalism flexibility system's in A rational balancing as the"survival ofpolitics ofthefittest." standing scores that had tobe settled. ofterritorial thuscreated terms adjustments an acthetaskofrestoring couldfulfill Territorial no longer adjustments
ceptable statusquo forall.50 as the difficult became increasingly Bosnian crisisof i908). Incorporation discontinuities.

at theend of surfaced ofa specialsphere of responsibility The notion interthestructure ofthepostwar discussed WorldWarII, whentheAllies idea Roosevelt's In this itis worth mentioning connection, national order. community international ofthe"four charged bythegeneral policemen" idea with"enforcing respective areas,and Churchill's thepeace"in their
The arrangements.5' of a world organizationas a frameworkforregional

conunderstandings to cometo substantive ofthegreatpowers inability accepted mutually or their responsibilities either their collective cerning in certain not onlythatthesenoregions demonstrates preponderance elements. tions wereimprecise, conflicting butalso that they contained The Western of order neverreinternational conceptions thefuture and theregionsolvedthetension theprinciples ofuniversalism between

49See Henry A. Kissinger,AWorld Restored (New York: Gosset& Dunlap, i964), chap. I5. 5? On thispoint, see FriedrichKratochwil,"On the Notion of Interest in International Relations,"International Organization 36 (Winteri98i-82), I-30. 51 For a discussionof Roosevelt'splan fora world organization afterthe war, see Willard Range,Franklin Delano Roosevelt's WorldOrder(Athens:University of Georgia Press, I959). For the variousincompatible conceptions emergingfromthe interactions beforeand during theSan FranciscoConference, see Thomas Campbell,Masquerade Peace (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press,I973).

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alistbias exhibited byChurchill and evensometimes byRoosevelt. The U.N. was based,from thebeginning, on an uneasy compromise between theclaimof universal competence to deal withall matters ofpeace and security (even withrespect to non-members)-as the Security Council was entrusted with theenforcement ofpeace-and theclaimtocollective thetwomain self-defense thatspawnedregional alliances.52 In addition, theSovietUnionand theUnitedStates, antagonists, did nothavea common understanding of thelegitimacy and limits of Great-Power influencein their respective spheres. For thisreason, informal agreementssuchas Churchill's proposal on apportioning influence in theBalkanson the basis of either exclusive or sharedzones of preponderance-were doomedto fail.53 The U.S. refused to recognize suchdeals,buteven if had beenaccepted, they theSoviet conception ofinterest was so extensive that itcametomeanthevirtual exclusion ofall foreign influence, or even constitutional limitations. Insteadof exerting powerthrough alliances and informal of his client means,Stalin'smistrust governments-espeshowedinterest ciallywhenthey in Western economic recovery plansled toan absolute Gleichschaltung oftheSoviet satellites.54 In thisway,we can establish thesimilarities and differences between themanagement devices ofthei9th century and ofmodern times. First, there in thechangefrom appearsto be a similarity themoreuniversal ofa functionally defined conception forpeaceand general responsibility to a moresolidly defined security territorial ofinfluence. Whatis sphere is therapidity withwhichthis in thepostwar surprising occurred change era.Variousforms oftheEuropeanConcert had functioned (admittedly with different ofsuccess) degrees for several butthedrastic generations,55 shift in thepostwar era tookonlya fewyears. This remarkably quick whichwas accompanied notbymutualaccommodation butinchange, steadled totheexacerbation ofcold-war was causedbythelack tensions, ofcommonly that couldguideand setlimits totheexaccepted practices A secondcomparison between thedevelopments in the i9thcentury and thoseof the20thshowsan inverse Metternich's historical sequence. extensive ofAustria's interest failed towinacceptinterpretation security
52 This point is further elaboratedin Thomas Franck,"Who Killed Article2.4?"American Law 7I (April I 977), 224-47. Journal ofInternational 53 For an extensive treatment ofChurchill'sproposal,see HerbertFeis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin (Princeton:Princeton University Press,i966), 447-5I. 54For a discussionof Stalin'spoliciesin EasternEurope, see Zbigniew Brzezinski,The SovietBloc (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,I97 ). 55For a discussionof the European Concert,see RichardRosecrance, Actionand Reaction in World Politics(Boston: Little,Brown, i963). 56 For a further development of thistheme,see Kratochwil(fn.48), throughout.

ertionof influence.56

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WORLD POLITICS

led toa moremoderate ofdomestic anceand then quickly interpretation challenges to theinternational order;Sovietinsistence on an implausibly extensive security interest initially led to hostility and thebreakdown of interactions, but ultimately to a defactoaccommodation. A measureof of ideological preponderance was addedtotheclassical notion ofa sphere influence: regimes basedon ideologies that do notagreewiththatofthe regional greatpowercan be changed or suppressed. The similarities betweentheU.S. assertion ofprimacy in theWestern hemisphere (including American interference withnonconformist regimes) and Sovietbein theEastern havior blochavebeennoted. Moreover, bothpowers have extensive or doctrines fortheir rationales as Franck developed purposes, and Weisbandhavepointed out.57 Differences also exist.The accommodation thatoccurred in thelate sixties and early seventies was notbackedbyexplicit agreements, and the rulesofthegamethat haveemerged in regard tospheres ofinfluence resemble"unspoken"rules.This last pointconstitutes a significant dissimilarity between theEuropeanstatesystem and themoderninternationalsystem. In theold conception, was usually a sphere ofinfluence or interest the result ofbilateral, explicit agreements. This hadtwoconsequences: (i) the and created enforceable agreements rights amongthecontracting parties; a regime Becauseagreements (2) they imposed uponthelocalinhabitants. terin international law cannot bindnonparticipating third parties (pacta as full tiisnecprosunt necnocent), thenonrecognition ofthelocalpowers forsuchlegal subjects of international law was formerly a precondition as theuniWiththeacceptance ofterritorial arrangements. sovereignty versalorganizing in present international relations, the legal principle ofsuchagreements suchunderis notpossible. expression Consequently, can haveonlythestatus oftacit or unspoken as Keal has standings rules,
called them.58 Such rules generally emerge through unilateral calculations (which take verbal as well as nonverbalcues into account); theirroot lies in the coincidence of the perceptionof a common interest. Unilateral calculation occurs on the basis of expectationsabout the other'sreactionto the self'saction: A's expectation ofB willinclude an estimation ofB'sexpectations ofA.This two of replication, it mustbe noted, is notan interaction between process workout butrather a process in one state in whichdecision-makers states,
57 Thomas Franck and Edward Weisband, Word Politics:VerbalStrategy AmongtheSuperpowers(New York: OxfordUniversity Press,I972). 58 Keal (fn.37), part I.

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of their believeto abouttheworld;a worldthey theconsequences beliefs states, also working outtheconsequences include decision-makers in other oftheir whichare so formed are theexpectations beliefs. The expectations ofone state, states.59 butthey refer to other Although expectationsthatprove correctin a numberof instancesattain a certain stabilityand provide some guidance for futuredecision compliance with theseunspoken rules will making in similarsituations, is sufbe unproblematic onlywhen the perceptionof a common interest ficiently strong.Obviously,thiswill be the case in instancesin which the of situationresemblesa game of coordination-i.e., when the interests the interacting partiesare neitheropposed nor mixed.60 To that extent, Hume's example of two men coming to a "tacit" agreementabout how to row a boat is instructive, as a common interestcan be assumed.6' If statesperceive the situationas resemblinga Prisoners'Dilemma, however-i.e., when mixed motivesare given and the incentives to defectare to shoreup largerthan thoseto cooperate-rules and normsthatattempt agthe cooperativesolutionwill be endangered.This problemis further gravated by the imprecisionof the tacitrule. Since it is not based on explicit verbal agreementsand thus secured by the meanings of ordinary of motivesforactionsand language,62 but only on unilateralimputations is weak; no explicitdiscourse othernonverbalacts,itsinstitutionalization about the tacit rule is possible,and therefore neitherscope nor applicabilityto certaincontexts can be discussed.
SPHERES OF ABSTENTION

In the foregoingconsiderationsI referredto spheres of abstention, which were eithertacitly agreed upon by the superpowersor created by Such arrangethe United Nations through "preventivediplomacy."63 of U.N. troopswas mentsbroke down in theCongo when theinterjection identified with the policygoals of a particularfactionthatpossessed outside sympathies. As soon as thequestionarose forwhatpurposestheU.N. minimal controlof troops were being used-aside from reestablishing
60 These thoughts "Rules, Norms,Valare more fullydeveloped in FriedrichKratochwil, (forthcoming). RechtsundSozialphilosophie Archivfar ues and the Limits of Rationality," 61 David Hume, Treatise Book III, OfMorals,inHume's Moraland Politon Human Nature, ed. Henry Aiken (Darien, CT: Hafner,I970), 59 ff. ical Philosophy, 62 that"a treaty see Article3I of the Vienna Conventionwhichestablishes In thiscontext, meaningto be givento the in good faithin accordancewiththe ordinary shall be interpreted and in thelightofitsobjectand purpose."See also Jimenez of thetreaty in theircontext terms de Arechaga, "InternationalLaw in the Past Third of a Century,"I59 Recueil des Cours (1978),42-48. 4thed. 63 For a good discussion intoPloughshares, see Inis Claude, Swords of thistechnique, (New York: Random House, i984), chap. I4.

59Ibid., 50.

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thesituation-the idea ofpreventive diplomacy failed. The opposition of theSovietUnionand itsrefusal (together with France)topayfortheoperation led to a financial crisis of theworldorganization whichclearly and narrowly circumscribed future activities ofthiskind. The tacitunderstanding amongthesuperpowers to leavemostof the worldto its own devicescame to naughtduringthe Ford developing administration and contributed to the demiseof detente. significantly The arrangement was susceptible tosubversion because oftheperception ofrelatively largegainsfor limited involvements, intheweak particularly ofAfrica. states In addition, intervention byproxy toen(Cuba) appeared able theintervening todisclaim party responsibility. Finally, detente itself was problematic. It was basedon therecognition of theSovietUnion as an equal worldpower, buttheUnitedStatesincreasingly tried tode-link theSoviet-American understandings concerningnuclear parity and armscontrol from thesubstantive consensus concerning certain regions. For example, attempts by the SovietUnion to propose a jointundertaking in theMiddleEastand thereby totransform detente intoan entente wererebuffed bytheUnitedStatesthrough the and opposedbytheU.S.S.R. incertain areas(detente and economic help), butit was invoked bytheKremlin and negated bytheWhiteHouse in others (condominia). Negativeunderstandings are weak-aside from theextreme case of mutualassured destruction or,as Hobbeswouldhavecalledit,the"fear of violent death."Theyare subject to defeating considerations precisely becausean agreement ofabstention is often tooambiguous aboutthelimitsofallowableinfluence. theperception Furthermore, ofmutual interest is notshored up by"rights" that demonstrate to theparticipants thetangible quidproquo incasesofconflict and insulate an issuefrom theoverall A "right" ofsocialinteraction.65 patterns that implies one is no longer dependent upontheopponent's approval and goodwill in all circumstances.
FUNCTIONAL REGIMES

drasticmeasure of a nuclearalert.64 "Linkage" was advocated bythe U.S.

The third devicefor important international managing relations in the state modern is that system offunctional regimes. reBasically, functional gimes"unbundle"the packageof rights inherent in territorial soverFunctionalism eignty. has therefore sometimes beenadvocated as an al64 For an extensive discussionof detenteand the reasonsforits failure, see Coral Bell, The DiplomacyofDetente:The Kissinger Era (London: MartinRobertson, 1977). 65 Luhmann makes the point thatrights are means by whichconflicts can be limitedand resolvedwithoutendangeringthe overall relationship. See Niklas Luhmann, Soziologieder 2d ed. (Opladen, Germany:Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975) II, 29-33. Auftldrung,

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ternative organizational principle for international life. Functional regimes,it was hoped, would not onlydowngrade the importanceof nationalboundaries,but could, throughtheexpansionof transboundary coIn addition, some recent operativenetworks,lead to "peace in parts."66 developmentsseem to indicate thatthe traditional package of territorial rightsis being modified.Several new arrangements have emerged from the Law of the Sea drafttreaty(UNCLOS III) by which competingresource uses can be accommodated withoutthe all-or-nothing regulation in seof territoriality. Only in thisfashioncould the competinginterests curity, resource management, access (navigational rights), pollution abatement, and freedomof researchof thenew "whole" called "oceans"67 be guaranteed.The creationofan ExclusiveEconomic Zone, thenew definitionof the continental of international of archipelagicreshelf, straits, gimes, and of provisosforresourcerecovery fromthe deep sea through the InternationalSeabed Authority all show such features.68 Similarly,a variety of specificresourceregimeswithinthe framework createdby the Antarctic issuesbetweenthose avoided theterritorial Treaty has carefully countriesclaiming certainsectorsand those not claiming any territory, and between stateswhose claims overlap (e.g., Argentina,Chile, and the One of themostremarkablesuccessesof the AntarcUnited Kingdom).69 ticregimeis itsdemilitarization and denuclearization backed bya unique inspectionsystem. Whether resourceregimeswill be similarly successfulin holding terclaims at is ritorial bay questionable. Since the AntarcticTreaty is valid only until i99i, it may merelyhave delayed futureconflicts. Even were the presenttreaty membersto preferthe continuation of the presentregime, theymight be forcedto stake out territorial claims because nonmembers might not recognize the presentregimead infinitum. The attemptsof the thirdworld to declare Antarcticaa "Common Heritage of Mankind" may produce the same situationas thatof the presentLaw of the Sea drafttreaty in relationto the originalconceptof a common heritage: thatidea was relegatedto minorimportance, and UNCLOS III resulted in one of the greatest enclosuremovementsin history by strengthening rather than reducing the expansion of territorialjurisdiction. Furthermore,in view of the second thoughtsof many industrialstates
66See Joseph Nye, Peace in Parts:Integration and Conflict in RegionalOrganization (Boston: Little,Brown, I97I). 67 A discussion oftheemergence ofnew "wholes" on thebasisofnew knowledgeis in Ernst Haas, "Is therea Hole in the Whole?" International 29 (Summer I975), 327-77. Organization 68 For a textof the UNCLOS III DraftConvention, see International Legal Materials, XXI (November i982), i26i-I354. 69 An extensive discussionof the Antarctic regimecan be foundin F. M. Auburn,Antarctic Law and Politics(London: C. Hurst & Co., i982).

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thenonratification ofthethird world, aspirations abouttheredistributive is boundto create industrial states bysomeimportant ofthelatter treaty ofoceanuse.70 fora comprehensive regulation difficulties to draw,but ofthese arenotdifficult short considerations The lessons logicdepends on the Sincefunctional disheartening. they are somewhat to keeptheissuearea depoliticized, willingness ofall participants it can change.The success conditions whentheframing comeunderpressure largely appearsto have resulted regime, forexample, of the Antarctic from themarwiththetreaty, ofthesuperpowers from thesatisfaction importance of the area, froman uneasytrucebetween ginal strategic lanstates overbyambiguous treaty (papered claimant and nonclaimant of status oftheworld totheprivileged theacquiescence guage),and from Even ifwe assumethatthestrategic thetreaty's consultative members.7' ofbothsuperpowers their to conability consensus remains unchanged, authority to exclude tinuealongthesame linesmaydependupontheir is tomaketerritorial others from decision One wayofdoingthis making. claimsand bury thecommon heritage idea onceand forall. deand upgrading, updating regimes alsoneedcontinuous Functional ofinofnewissueareasand therealization pending upontheemergence resources ofmineral The discovery of various regimes. teraction effects a regime a matter forsuch for example, madenegotiations in Antarctica, will have on theother of urgency. theeffect thatmining Furthermore, faunaand thelivingresources and theAntarctica regimes (particularly necessary. regulation floraregimes) will make stringent environmental necontinuous of regulations notonlynecessitates Such a proliferation ofprocedures butalsotheinstitutionalization and cooperation, gotiations conflicts. The advanin order to managetheinevitable to settle disputes in thisreof territorial sovereignty principle tage of theall-or-nothing in the that, is notmerely itssimplicity, buttheimplicit presumption spect unit-and the theterritorial faceofnewly only teremerging problems, clear matters. Thus, although ritorial unit-has the rightto regulate interalso simplify create boundaries they others, problems byexcluding to be thepreappearat present national life.In thepolitical arena,they constitutional fortheexistence ofnational rule, condition independence, and reinforcing significant by creating and responsible government oftransactions ofworldsociety. breaks within thestream
70 For an assessment of UNCLOS III in termsof thecommonheritageprinciple, see Falk and others(fn.43), chap. 9. 7 Consultative membersare thoseentitled to make rules(on thebasisof unanimity) forthe Antarctic. They are theoriginalpartiesto theAntarctica Treaty,plus thoseadmittedlateron thebasisofsignificant research in thearea. For a further discussion, see Kratochwiland others (fn.36), case studyon the Arcticand Antarctica, IO-14.

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V. CONCLUSION

than to structuraltheoriesof international relations73 that perspective72 emphasize the unintendedconsequencesof the actors'choices. Although
72

I haveaddressed theproblem ofthefunction ofboundaries in territorialand nonterritorial socialorders for historical as wellas for theoretical reasons. The historical interest is rooted in theneed fora better underofthose standing changes that led totheemergence oftheEuropeanstate system in thei7thcentury, after thedemiseofthemedieval empire. The theoretical interest concerns theappraisalof thepresent worldsystem. This system is characterized byconflicting trends in theuniversal recognition ofterritoriality as theorganizing principle in international politics and bytheobservable countertrend ofincreasing interdependencies that territorial undermine exclusivity. In thepresent I investigated three of exchanges that approach, types determine the function of boundaries. By systematically examining the exchanges thattake place between a unitand itsenvironment, the exchanges amongunits, and theexchanges between a unit'scenter and its periphery-aswell as theirvariousinteraction effects-I developeda parsimonious explanation ofsystems characteristics in a wide variety of territorial and nonterritorial socialsystems. The heuristic powerof this was further to relate approach evidenced byitsability thecharacteristics of systems to modes of conflict management by meansof boundaries. Two techniqueswere discussed:the movement of the locationof a and thechanging function ofboundaries aboutbyalboundary, brought was certain of exchanges. The first lowingor excluding types strategy characteristic oftheEuropeanbalance ofpower and itsterritorial adjustments. The secondwas usedpredominantly in thecolonial where world, ofinfluence orpreponderance, as wellas buffer spheres becamethe states, standard devices for conflict withother managing Europeanpowers. thesehistorical I discussed ofcremodern Beyond examples, attempts and formulating tacit rulesin orderto manage atingfunctional regimes uses of resources I also examined interests. the conflicting and political or rather robustness, thereasons for thelimitations and thelackofeffecofthesetechniques. tiveness, Some difficulty is createdby attempts to place thisapproachin the oftheoretical widercontext efforts ininternational it relations. However, is apparentthat this inquiryis more indebted to a system-of-action

Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action(New York: Free Press, i968); see also Niklas Luhmann,Soziale Systeme (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,i984). 73See, e.g.,KennethWaltz, Theory Politics ofInternational (Reading,MA: Addison-Wesley, I979).

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structural theories explainan important aspectof interactions in an anarchical environment, they failtosuggest further avenues for research beyondtheoriginal market analogy and utility-maximizing actions under constraints. It is herethattheadvantages ofa morehistorically oriented approachbecomeapparent. on the changing of By focusing function boundaries rather thanon theconfiguration and number ofactors or the of their "rationality" actions, thepresent fora richer approach provides and moredetailedtreatment of thehistorical material whilepreserving and explanatory parsimony power.

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