Civil Conflict Severity and Commodity Prices: A Nexus Between The Two?

CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE
CIVIL CONFLICT SEVERITY AND COMMODITY PRICES: A NEXUS

BETWEEN THE TWO?
SUBMITTED TO
DEAN GREGORY HESS
BY
CANDACE MICHELLE WILLIAMS
FOR
SENIOR THESIS
FALL 2007 - SPRING 2008
APRIL 28, 2008

2
2
Copyright © 2008 by Candace Michelle Williams

Abstract
A single ethnic conflict can cause millions of direct and indirect deaths, displace
hundreds of thousands of people, spread malaria and HIV/AIDS to neighboring countries,
and depress GDP growth rate for years after the conflict has ended. Although the
probability a country will experience armed conflict has gone down to its lowest since the
1950s, over two-thirds of active conflicts are civil conflicts. Most of the civil conflict
literature is focused on civil war onset. I come up with a theory of conflict severity
measured in battle deaths. I hypothesize world price shocks and price levels of certain
commodities have a positive correlation with conflict severity. Using a dataset of civil
conflicts from 1961-1999 and data about world commodity prices, regime type, and
economic indicators, I test this relationship with OLS and Tobit models globally, in Asia
and Africa, and during the Cold War. I find that grievance variables are significant and
that commodity variables are insignificant and hold little explanatory power.
Table of Contents
The table of contents is empty because none of the paragraph styles selected in the
Document Inspector are used in the document.
List of Tables and Equations
TABLE 1 PREDICTIONS.................................................................................................................................... 26
TABLE 2 GLOBAL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS.................................................................................................... 29
TABLE 3 CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS............................................................................................................30
TABLE 4 AFRICA DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS......................................................................................................31
TABLE 5 ASIA DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS..........................................................................................................32
TABLE 6 COLD WAR DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS............................................................................................... 34
TABLE 7 POST – COLD WAR DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS....................................................................................34
TABLE 8 BASELINE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS.............................................................................................. 37
TABLE 9 PRICE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS..................................................................................................... 38
TABLE 10 PRICE CHANGE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS..................................................................................... 39
TABLE 11 BASELINE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS.......................................................................................... 42
TABLE 12 PRICE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS................................................................................................. 43
TABLE 13 PRICE CHANGE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS.................................................................................. 44
TABLE 14 AFRICA BASELINE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS................................................................................ 48
TABLE 15 AFRICA BASELINE OLS REGRESSIONS - CONTINUED....................................................................... 49
TABLE 16 AFRICA PRICE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS...................................................................................... 50
TABLE 17 AFRICA PRICE CHANGE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS........................................................................ 51
TABLE 18 AFRICA BASELINE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS.............................................................................. 52
TABLE 19 AFRICA BASELINE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS - CONTINUED........................................................ 53
TABLE 20 AFRICA PRICE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS.................................................................................... 54
TABLE 21 AFRICA PRICE CHANGE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS...................................................................... 55
TABLE 22 ASIA BASELINE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS.................................................................................... 59
TABLE 23 ASIA BASELINE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS – CONTINUED.............................................................. 60
TABLE 24 ASIA PRICE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS........................................................................................... 61
TABLE 25 ASIA PRICE CHANGE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS............................................................................. 62
TABLE 26 ASIA BASELINE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS.................................................................................. 63
TABLE 27 ASIA BASELINE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS - CONTINUED............................................................. 64
TABLE 28 ASIA PRICE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS........................................................................................ 65
TABLE 29 ASIA PRICE CHANGE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS.......................................................................... 66
TABLE 30 COLD WAR BASELINE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS.......................................................................... 70
TABLE 31 COLD WAR BASELINE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS - CONTINUED.................................................... 71
TABLE 32 COLD WAR PRICE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS................................................................................ 72
TABLE 33 COLD WAR PRICE CHANGE OLS REGRESSION RESULTS.................................................................. 73
TABLE 34 COLD WAR BASELINE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS........................................................................74
TABLE 35 COLD WAR BASELINE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS - CONTINUED.................................................. 75
TABLE 36 COLD WAR PRICE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS.............................................................................. 76
TABLE 37 COLD WAR PRICE CHANGE TOBIT REGRESSION RESULTS................................................................ 77
Acknowledgements
I WOULD LIKE TO THANK EVERY EDUCATOR WHO BELIEVES MY INTELLECTUAL

DEVELOPMENT AND/OR OCCASIONAL HUMOR IS WORTH THE HASSLE.
Chapter 1
Introduction
The probability a nation will experience armed conflict has decreased to its lowest
since the early 1950s but the rate of civil conflict has increased since World War II
(Eriksson et al 2005). Of the 116 active conflicts between 1989 and 2003, 77% were
intrastate conflicts (Eriksson et al 2005).1 Fearon and Laitin (2003) estimate 16.2 million
direct deaths are attributable to the 127 civil conflicts with more than 1,000 battle deaths
between 1945 and 1999. The World Health Organization estimates civil wars in 1999
caused 269,000 deaths and the loss of 8.44 million disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs)
(World Health Organization 2000 in Ghobarah, Ruth, and Russett). Ghobarah, Ruth, and
Russett (2003) estimate another 8.01 million DALYs were lost in 1999 as an indirect
result of civil wars from the period 1991 – 1997. Intrastate wars differ from interstate
wars in their intensity and brutality: Bennett and Stam (1996) find most interstate wars
last less than 6 months while intrastate wars last for 7 years on average.
Civil wars impede economic growth. Collier (2001) finds during civil wars GDP
per capita decreases by 2.2% annually. The share of subsistence agriculture in GDP
increases. Wars last only one year cause a 2.1% loss of GDP growth per year during the
1 The authors’ dataset labels conflicts as interstate, intrastate, and internationalized intrastate
conflicts.
8
first 5 years of peace. The World Bank (2003) reports incomes are 15% lower during civil
wars and 30% more people live in absolute poverty because of civil wars. 2
Civil conflicts reap intrastate consequences. Murdoch and Sandler (2002) show
civil conflict influences the growth of neighboring states. The World Bank (2003)
estimates the effect to be .5 percentage points. Intrastate conflict has been linked to
conflicts in and between states within the same region (Collier and Hoeffler (now CH)
2002). Arms races, increased military expenditure, disrupted trade, expansion of illicit
trade (e.g., drug and sex trafficking), and the burden of refugees are causes of the
problem. CH (2002) find one of the strongest determinates of the level of military
expenditure is the level of expenditure of a government’s neighbors. Refugees burden
economies and health systems. There were over 5 million refugees as a result of civil
wars in 2003 (The World Bank 2003). Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002) find a
positive correlation between the number of refugees in an asylum country and the number
of malaria cases reported.3 The AIDS pandemic is a consequence of civil wars (The
2 Capital flight, loss of social capital, increased military expenditures (military budgets increase by
at least 50% on average), lost productivity, and the deterioration of rights and institutions are reasons for
the high level of loss.
3 Refugees are not immune to the malaria strains they encounter en route to and inside of asylum
countries. Also, large influxes of refugees into countries that have severely limited health resources limits
the effectiveness of disease control measures.
9
World Bank 2003).4 Illicit trade in civil conflict areas creates problems for neighboring
states.5 Civil wars endanger the lives of many people.
4 The pattern of AIDS in Uganda during the 1980s and 1990s may have changed the sporadic
incidence of the disease into an epidemic.
5 Drug runners rely on the lawlessness of nations enduring civil war to create an optimal
environment for storage and distribution channels. The World Bank (2003) estimates 95% of the global
production of opium and between 70 and 90% of heroin found in Europe come from civil conflict
countries. This drug trade is dangerous for neighboring countries because of the conflict and health
problems associated with the sale and use of drugs.
10
Globalization
Globalization has changed the way economies around the world function.
World exports have grown from $1 trillion a year to $10 trillion per year (World Book
2007).6 The share of exports relative to global output has increased by more than 200%.
Since 2001, export volumes in developing countries have grown at about 8.7% each year,
and import volumes have grown by 9%. The largest growth rates have occurred China,
India, and Brazil, and African countries have seen average export growth rates of 3.5%
per year. Since 1994, there has been a 66.8% decrease in the number of effectively
applied tariffs in developing countries (UNCTAD 2006). As developing nations are
integrated into the world economy, international price shocks have a larger influence on
domestic affairs. In this paper, I ask the question: “How do fluctuations in international
commodity prices influence the severity of civil wars?”. Many papers explore the
economic, social, and political triggers of civil conflict. Few papers address the issue of
civil war severity.
6 In 2000 dollars.
Chapter 2
Literature Review: Greed, Grievance, and Globalization
From the early literature onward, there has been a debate about whether economic
conditions or socioeconomic conditions are the cause of civil wars. Gurr and Lichbach’s
mobilization of discontent model is one of the earliest grievance theories tested in the
literature. In this model, relative deprivation (RD) and constraints placed on rebels by
economic dependency and external support, explain decision-making.7 Since rebels need
to be able to mobilize resources in order to challenge governments, their economic status
and the support they receive from external actors is important to their decision-making.
Gurr and Lichbach (1979) found the rebels’ reliance on violence is partly a product of
regime type: people who live in democratic regimes have peaceful alternatives to
violence.
Although Gurr and Lichbach’s model provides a foundation for conflict studies,
their models do not provide in-depth analysis of how conflict varies between regions and
time-periods. The model does not take the quality of social, economic, and political
institutions into account since RD is a result of how economic growth and status interacts
with institutions that distribute wealth and decision-making power. Critics say Gurr and
7 RD is a sociological phenomenon where a population is unhappy about the status of economic

growth and distribution of wealth because they believe they are entitled to higher levels of economic
prosperity. RD is a product of systemic sources of collective deprivation.
12
Lichbach’s estimation techniques lack complexity and that a rational action model is
more appropriate.8 Muller and Weede (1990) find higher Gross National Product (GNP)
and life expectancy decreased the probability of internal armed conflict, and high levels
of government coercion made rebels less likely to pursue war.9 This study raises
questions about how the interactions between economic and political institutions
influence onset.
The CH model adds considerable depth to loot-seeking models and is the most
discussed model in current literature.10 The authors believe civil war erupts when the
incentive for rebellion is sufficiently large relative to the cost of rebellion.11 CH believe
rebels are motivated by greed (loot-seeking) rather than grievance (justice-seeking). Even
if some rebels are motivated by grievance, the costs of rebellion must be taken into
consideration because the rebellion must generate enough revenue to meet goals. The
costs are the labor force and equipment needed to win against the government response.12
8 See Weede (1986)
9 The authors estimated the effects of external interventions, regime repressiveness, political
separatism, and life expectancy.
10 See Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2002, 2007
11 Over a series of a few papers, the CH model is developed using variables that serve as a proxy for
rational choice and relative deprivation indicators: finance, grievance, military advantage, and history. The
rational-action model predicts the likelihood that a civil war will be initiated in a country over a 5-year
period.
12 In On the Economic Causes of Civil War (1998), CH ignore distributional causes because there is
insufficient data about horizontal inequalities. CH include variables to measure the determinants of victory,
the incentive of rebellion, the opportunity costs of rebellion, and cultural distinctness. The determinants of
victory include the ability of the government to defend itself (military capacity, technology, etc). The
incentive for rebellion is the ability of rebels to reward supporters – this comes from the potential revenue
(taxable base) of the government. Population size variables account for times when motivation for
secession is based on distributional issues. The opportunity cost of using labor to rebel instead of work is
captured by the per capita income variable. Cultural distinctness is measured by ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (ELF).
13
CH find per capita income was the most significant variable and had a negative impact on
civil war incidence (2008).13 In Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War, CH
(1999) find the risk of conflict peaks when a country’s share of primary exports is 28%
GDP. Countries with this level of resource endowment face a risk of conflict 4.2 times
larger than countries with no resources. CH analyze grievance variables in Greed and
Grievance in Civil War and note most measures of grievance were unimportant
(2004).14,15 Primary commodity exports are highly significant and have a large positive
impact on war incidence.
The importance of share of primary exports in GDP the CH models indicates
globalization and world commodity prices could impact civil conflict incidence. A major
problem of the CH models is they do not study how economic and political institutions
interact to produce conflict. The papers conflated the initiation and duration of conflict.
This means factors leading to the initiation of civil wars could be confused with factors
that increase the duration of civil wars.
13 At very high level, natural resource endowments begin to decrease the probability of war. At low
and increasing levels, resource endowments increase the risk of war. Analysis of ELF found that
probabilities for conflict were high when there are two major ethnic groups. Highly fractionalized societies
were no more likely to erupt in conflict than homogenous ones.
14 The paper builds on work from Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Collier (2000), and Grossman (1999)
that says that rebellion is a quasi-criminal activity where rebels generate profits from looting resource rents.
Greed is the major incentive. The paper also builds off of work from Hirschleifer (1995, 2001) that says
that groups may wrongly perceive opportunities and grievances (ex: over-exaggerate grievances and
miscalculate the costs of war). Collier and Hoeffler test the greed and misperception paradigm against
political theories of conflict that explain rebellion as a well-grounded movement to change circumstances
that are politically and/or economically unequal. Collier and Hoeffler try to predict the outbreak of civil
conflict using a dataset of conflicts that occurred between 1960 and 1999.
15 In the combined model, primary commodity exports, proxies for forgone earnings (opportunity
costs), population dispersion and social fractionalization (measures of rebel military advantage and
population safety), population, and ethnic dominance are significant. Proxies for availability of finance,
cost of rebellion, military advantage, and population explained most of the variation in the initiation of
ethnic conflicts.
14
Gissinger and Gleditsch’s (1999) study complements CH’s findings on the
importance of exports as a share of GDP. Gissinger and Gleditsch separate the debate
about the impact of globalization on conflict into two sides: structuralist and liberal.
Proponents of the liberal theory believe trade openness decreases internal conflict
because the opportunity costs of violence become higher and citizens favor social and
economic integration. Opponents of this theory believe increased openness destabilizes
governments, intensifies horizontal inequalities, and threatens balanced development. The
liberal theory of globalization mirrors loot-seeking models that portray rebels as rational
actors who want to maximize their economic return from violence. Structuralist views
represent a justice-seeking grievance model that portrays citizens as actors trying to free
themselves from economic deprivation.
According to their analysis, a high level of trade is conducive to peace, but
increased direct foreign investment creates instability.16 Exporters of manufactured goods
are more likely to experience peace. Agricultural economies are more likely to experience
violence when openness increases. This analysis supports the idea that the impacts of
globalization on conflict could be indirect effects. There are characteristics of poor
countries that increase the probability of civil conflict.
Elbadawi (1999) finds new ways to model the interaction between grievance
variables and economic indicators. Elbadawi believes earlier models under represent the
16 The authors use civil war outbreak, rather than onset, to avoid autocorrelation. Dependent
variables include foreign direct investment, trade openness (a country’s imports plus its exports in dollars,
divided by GDP), past civil war and unrest, energy consumption per capita, regime type, and income
inequality (measured as the concentration of income in the top 20% of the population).
15
importance of democracy and ethnic fractionalization.17,18 Eldabawi’s most important
finding is political and economic development decreases the importance ethnic and social
heterogeneity. 19 Eldabawi’s results challenge the notion loot-seeking variables have the
most explanatory power.
Sambanis (2002) adds more clarity to the debate about political institutions and
identity-based wars by asking the question “Do ethnic and nonethnic civil wars have the
same causes?”.20 Sambanis’ nonethnic model shows socioeconomic development
variables are highly significant and negatively associated with war onset. Polity and
ethnic heterogeneity variables are nonsignificant. In the ethnic model, high levels of
democracy are robustly significant and explain more of the variation in conflict than
economic development indicators. Many socioeconomic indicators are nonsignificant.
Ethnic homogeneity and neighborhood effects variables are significant in the ethnic
model. Sambanis’ models show new research must examine the effects of different types
of civil conflict.
17 He believes that economic development is significantly and negatively associated with civil war;
that democracy should reduce the prevalence of war; and that ethnic fragmentation should be significantly
and nonlinearly associated with civil war prevalence (both high and low levels should prevalence because
of coordination costs).
18 Elbadawi uses many of the same variables as Collier and Hoeffler and adds his own. The variables
include real income per capita, education level, degree of urbanization, life expectancy, infant mortality,
primary commodities, and political rights (taken from difference between democracy and autocracy in
Polity studies). Elbadawi uses ELF along with Vanhanen’s ethnic heterogeneity index (takes racial,
linguistic, and religious divisions into account) and other fractionalization measures.
19 Heterogeneity, real income, population, lagged political change, and Polity data on regime type,
are all significant.
20 Sambanis uses socioeconomic development, polity, ethnic heterogeneity, neighbor effects, and
cold war variables.
16
Reynal-Querol and Djankov write a series of papers measuring the impact of
specific economic and political institutions on the onset of civil war. These models show
why controlling for the type of political system as well as the level of democracy gives
models more explanatory power. Reynal-Querol (2002) creates a model for ethnic
conflict using religious fragmentation to explain cleavages.21 Reynal-Querol argues
religiously divided societies are more prone to intense conflict than societies where
conflicting claims are based on interest groups or linguistic divisions.22 Reynal-Querol
finds religious polarization, animist diversity, and the inclusiveness of democracy all
have a considerable impact on internal conflict. This opposes the models of CH that
dismiss ethnic variables and do not control for types of economic and political
institutions. Djankov and Reynal-Querol (2007) analyze the effect of institutions on civil
wars controlling for income per capita. In their model, economic and political institutions
are endogenous and are heavily influenced by their colonial origins.23 Djankov and
Reynal-Querol find the quality of institutions is an important determinant of conflict and
21 This model only applies to ethnic wars not all types of revolutionary conflict.
22 Reynal-Querol takes the inclusiveness as well as the level of democracy into account She uses
Polity III data on the level of democracy, Colomer’s (2000) data that distinguishes different characteristics
of democracies (parliamentary-majoritarian, presidential and semi-presidential, and parliamentary-
proportional representation), Collier and Hoeffler’s (2000) data that proxies the loot of rebellion, and new
data about religious polarization (specifically animist diversity; Reynal-Querol 2001). Reynal-Querol finds
that animist diversity (captures the amount of people who adhere to animist cults in each nation) and
religious polarization has a significant and positive impact on the incidence of ethnic civil war. This is
important because most other measures of religion lump all religions together which Christianity and
ignore the traditions of Latin America and sub-Saharan countries.
23 Data about the average protection against expropriation risk, and the strength and impartiality of
the legal system, proxies the strength of political, legal, and economic institutions comprise dependent
variables.
17
per capita income does not have any significant direct or indirect explanation effect.24
These studies show variables in the justice-seeking model of conflict may influence civil
war onset.
Studies estimating the ability of democratic and economic institutions to attenuate
the impact of economic strain have had mixed results. Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti
(2004) used rainfall totals in Africa as a proxy for economic shock. The authors find
negative growth shocks of 5 points increases the likelihood of internal conflict in Africa
by one-half the next year. The wealth, level of democracy, or ethnic fractionalization of a
nation did not change the impact of negative growth shocks. Bruckner and Ciccone
(2007) get different results when they use international commodity prices to proxy
economic growth shocks. The authors find low growth rates positively impacts the rate of
civil war incidence in autocracies. In democracies, there is not statistically significant
impact of economic growth on civil war. The most obvious difference between the two
studies is how the authors proxy economic growth. International commodity prices and
rainfall totals are highly correlated with economic prosperity in Africa but the impacts of
these measures on civil war differ between economic and political systems.
Goldstone et al (2000) create risk models for state failure and ethnic conflict using
a wide variety of economic and institutional variables.25 In the global model for state
failure, countries with levels of trade openness below the global average where twice as
24 An improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is
associated with a 38-percentage point reduction in the incidence of civil wars.
25 State failure is defined as the partial or complete collapse of state authority.
18
likely to experience failure.26 Infant mortality rates, ethnic discrimination, ethnic
diversity, and history of political violence are other significant variables. In an analysis of
Goldstone et al’s work, King and Zeng (2001) find trade openness is correlated with state
failure, but only in nations having a high degree of openness. The authors believe
Goldstone et al. over-forecast conflict because of outlier countries and autocorrelation.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) find primary exports and measures of trade openness are not
significant. They say previous studies, like those performed by Esty et al. (1998) and CH
find a high level of correlation between trade openness, state failure, and conflict because
countries with low populations tend to have high levels of trade and less civil war. De
Soysa (2002) tried to incorporate institutional variables into the CH model and found
trade openness was negatively correlated with civil war and highly significant.27 Krause
and Suzuki (2005) apply CH and de Soysa’s analysis to postcolonial states in Asia and
SSA. In a comparative marginal impact analysis, the authors find trade openness
decreases the probability of civil conflict in Asia by 66.6% and SSA by 81.8%.28, 29
26 From the World Bank World Development Indicators and Penn World Tables 5.6. Trade openness
is computed as the USD value of a country’s imports, plus exports, divided by GDP. The only
economicvariable that was found to have a high correlation trade openness was road density. The state
failure model for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) found that SSA states were 2.6 times more likely to experience
state failure for each standard deviation they moved forward in trade openness. In the ethnic conflict model,
membership in government organizations replaced the trade openness variable. States with a below average
number of memberships in inter-governmental organizations were 3 times as likely to experience ethnic
conflict.
27 Institutional variables she added to the model include ELF, the percentage of Muslims in a
population, and the number of Christians in a population.
28 The authors calculated marginal impact using the coefficients presented in the probit analysis.
They changed the coefficients holding all others constant at their means. Each change in position of the
logit distribution is translated into a change in probability. This holds from mean – 1 standard deviation to
mean + 1 standard deviation.
29 The fact these studies use a definition of civil war that made incidence rarer, and limited the scope
of their analysis in comparison to previous studies, may have solved the problem of autocorrelation brought
up by King and Zeng (2001).
19
Lacina (2006) provides the most relevant model about civil war severity. Building
upon theories of greed and grievance, Lacina uses cold war, ethnic and religious
polarization, and political institution variables to try to determine what causes the
variance in battle deaths between civil wars. Her most interesting findings were larger
populations do not predict a higher number of deaths; the dummy variable for the cold
war has a very large and significant impact on battle deaths; and high levels of ethnic
polarization and democracy decrease the severity of civil wars.
In an unpublished manuscript, Dube and Vargas (2007) measure the impact of
commodity price shocks on the onset and intensity of civil conflict in Columbia. Using
regional economic data and household surveys, the authors test two hypotheses about the
impact of commodity prices on civil war severity. The authors believe an increase in the
price of labor-intensive commodities reduces conflict because citizens experience greater
returns to employment. An increase in prices of goods that are not labor intensive
increases the severity of conflict because citizens do not see an increase of economic
opportunity. In municipalities where coffee (a labor-intensive good) is a primary export, a
rise in the price of coffee reduced violence disproportionately compared to non-coffee
municipalities. The rise of the price in oil (not labor-intensive) increased the probability
and intensity of conflict in oil municipalities.
This paper will extend the analysis of Lacina and Dube and Vargas. Using a
dataset that includes civil conflicts around the world from 1946 – 2002, I analyze the
impact of fluctuations of international commodity prices on the severity of conflict.

20
Chapter 3
Theory
I explore the determinants of battle severity conditional on a country suffering a
civil war. My central question is “What makes a year of conflict deadly?”. I attempt to
proxy the effects of the decision-making paradigm of potential rebels, rebels engaged in
conflict, and states in my model. Aside from political and economic variables common in
the literature, I include variables about world commodity prices.
Economic Development and Global Integration
Models in the onset literature show that impoverished states are more likely to
have civil conflicts than richer states. There are many reasons why the strength of a
state’s economic institutions could influence the severity of conflict. Economic variables
may proxy state strength and the incentives states have to use violence to protect wealth.
States with a high Gross Domestic Product (GDP) not only have more resources to fight
internal wars (i.e., more military capacity) but can invest in new technologies that
minimize civilian deaths. Also, richer states have resources to launch social programs to
help citizens deal with the dangers of war (e.g., evacuation and shelter programs).
22
Alternatively, states may have more incentives to use violence to protect against
challengers trying to control these resources.
Economic growth also influences the opportunity costs and incentives of rebels.
In countries with stable economies or high levels of growth, rebels may have an incentive
to gain control of these resources. Although rebels in states with a high GDP or high rates
of GDP growth may have incentives to fight for resources, economic strength could also
provide opportunity costs. Potential rebels may be afraid to violently engage a state with
the resources to fight back with armed forces. In strong economies with education
opportunities, jobs, and other means of accumulating wealth, there is a large opportunity
cost to engage in violence rather than stay in school or keep earning a wage from a job.
I use measures of income inequality, oil dependence, and primary commodity
dependence to control for the impact of economic opportunity. Income inequality
(INCINEQ) is a Gini coefficient indicating the level of wealth and income distribution.30
Poor distribution of wealth may give citizens incentives to join rebel groups in an effort
to control resources. Groups with control of wealth may align with the government to
protect the power structure. This could decrease conflict severity. The ratio of primary
commodity exports to GDP (PRIMCOMM) is a proxy for the abundance of natural
resources. The level of this variable may change the incentives rebels have to take control
of political and economic institutions. Depending on how resource rents are distributed
amongst the population, a high ratio of primary commodity exports to GDP could provide
more resources for the government to arm for conflict, or opportunity costs for citizens
30 The Gini coefficient is reported in income shares per quintile.

23
(i.e., citizens would rather receive resource rents from nonviolent political and economic
participation). In some nations, large resource rents help the development of legitimate
political systems and economies. OIL is a dummy variable takes the value of 1 for oil
exporting nations and 0 for nations that do not export oil. Like PRIMCOMM, OIL is a
proxy for the impact of resource rents on conflict severity. Oil is a special commodity
because of its high value compared to its costs of production. Rebels may be more
interested in engaging in conflict if they know they could profit from this resource.
Measures of openness may also be significant. Studies about civil war onset have
shown poor countries are more prone to conflict. Relatively poor countries with high
levels of economic openness may be prone to exploitation, expropriation, and other
negative consequences of trade. On the other hand, countries integrated into the world
economy may face pressure from countries and international institutions to use military
techniques that do not disrupt trade. I use a measure of natural openness (OPENNESS)
developed by Eldabawi and Hegre to test the impact of global integration on battle
deaths.31 This variable aggregates the effects of language, geographic remoteness, and
population to show how open a country is to trade.
Political Institutions
Models in the onset literature show regime type and level of democracy influence
the onset of civil war. The level of democracy may influence the severity of civil war.
31 This variable aggregates the effects of language, geographic remoteness, and population to show
how open a country is to trade.
24
Democratically elected leaders who are beholden to voters and are subject to institutional
controls may be more likely to shield citizens from conflict by trying to negotiate with
rebels. Also, these governments might use warfare methods that minimize civilian
casualties. I use the Polity score (POLITYSCORE) of nations to measure the impact of
the level of democracy.32
The Cold War
International politics may influence internal wars. During the Cold War, the
superpowers provided support or assistance to states and rebel groups who where fighting
strategically or ideologically important conflicts. Conflicts that took place during the
Cold War could be deadlier because of this external support. Alternatively, nations still
intervene in conflicts even though the Cold War is over. COLDWAR is a dummy variable
that takes a value of 1 if a conflict took place before 1991 and 0 if a conflict took place
after 1991.
Social Cohesion
There is no consensus about whether or not the ethnic composition of a nation
increases or decreases the probability of war onset. In the presence of war, high levels of
ethnic heterogeneity may decrease the severity of conflict because it is hard for large
segments of the population to join a conflict based on ethnic lines. On the other hand,
32 The index uses a 24 point scale. Countries with scores between -10 to -6 are “autocracies”;
“anocracies” have a score of -5 to +5 and use the special values -66, -77, and -88; and “democracies” have
a score from +6 to +10.
25
heterogeneity may proxy ethnic tensions. I use ethno-linguistic fractionalization index
(ETHFRAC) to proxy tension.

26
Commodity Prices
The fluctuation of world commodity prices may influence conflict severity for
many different reasons. If the commodity is a food staple, increases in price may give
potential rebels an incentive to overthrow the government. Price increases of cash crops
may give potential rebels the incentive to engage in farming rather than violence.
Alternatively, price increases for commodities that are not labor-intensive may aggravate
inequalities because fewer citizens can engage in the industry and reap the benefits.
I use world price information for coffee, cotton, rice, maize, sugar, and wheat.
Sugar, maize, wheat, and rice are the top farmed crops in the world. I chose coffee and
cotton because these crops are popular in growing regions that tend to have conflict. All
of these crops are cash crops. This is important for analysis because a cash crop is grown
to be sold on the market instead of for subsistence (some crops are used for both
purposes). Four of the six crops are an important food staple around the world. COFFPR,
COTTPR, RICEPR, MAIZEPR, SUGARPR, and WHEATPR are the world prices of
goods. COFFPRCHG, COTTPRCHG, RICEPRCHG, MAIZEPRCHG, SUGARPRCHG,
and WHEATPRCHG are vectors with the percentage change in price from the previous
year.
Additional Variables
Additional factors I include to control for country-level factors influencing the
severity of conflict include LNAREA, LNPOP, a n d P E A C E D U R AT I O N .
PEACEDURATION is the number of months of peace endured by a nation previous to

27
that year of conflict. This is included to capture the effects of previous conflicts on
conflict severity. LNPOP is the natural log of the population and LNAREA is the natural
log of the area of a country. These variables control for the population size and dispersion
effects.
Specific Predictions
Aside from a global model, I cluster data by region and time period to see how
models vary. For the global model, I predict nations with low levels of economic
opportunity will experience more battle deaths because rebels recruit from a population
experiencing collective deprivation. This means INCINEQ should have a positive
correlation to severity and GDPGROWTH should have a negative correlation. I am
unsure about the impact of natural resource rents on severity (OIL and PRIMCOMM).
Nations with stronger democracies (a high POLITYSCORE) will experience less battle
deaths. Also, ethnically homogenous societies will see less severe wars. In poor countries
where civil wars usually take place, heterogeneity is a likely proxy for ethnic tension. The
ETHFRAC coefficient should be positive. The Cold War should have a positive
correlation to battle deaths because of external support provided to many rebels and
governments. OPENNESS should have a positive correlation to battle deaths because
international trade may increase horizontal inequalities in poor countries. I predict battles
will be more intense because of the effects from previous years of battles. Both rebel
groups and governments will have already armed themselves, sought external funding
and support for war, and trained a military force. If there are negative economic impacts
28
of the war like decreased GDP and GDP growth, there may be more incentives for
citizens to join the conflict. PEACE should have a negative correlation to severity.
Population should have a positive correlation to severity because countries with higher
populations have more potential rebels. Population may also proxy resource scarcity and
how difficult it is for governments to enforce rules and deliver services (i.e., it is harder to
enforce rules amongst a large population than a small population). LNAREA should have
a negative relationship to severity because if the difficulties associated with waging a
military campaign across large land areas and because of population dispersion.
I hypothesize prices and price shocks of wheat and rice will have a positive
correlation to war severity. Price changes of these commodities should also influence
battle severity. Maize, rice, and wheat provide the majority of calories in many countries.
I believe the effects of having a primary food staple’s price increase will outweigh the
labor benefits. A higher percentage of maize and wheat yields are traded (compared to
rice). MAIZEPR, MAIZEPRCHG, WHEATPR, and WHEATPRCHG should have a
positive correlation to LNDEATHS.
I predict Cold War battle years will be deadlier than those in the post-Cold War
era and there will be differences between the Cold War and global models. OPENNESS
might have a higher correlation to battle deaths during the Cold War because of
intervention by superpowers. I am unsure how the regional models will differ from each
other and the global model. Table 1 summarizes my predictions for this paper.
29
Table 1 Predictions
Predicted Reasoning
Sign
COLDWAR + External assistance during the COLD War exacerbated

conflicts.
ETHFRAC + Heterogeneous societies have more ethnic tensions.

GDPGROWTH - High levels of economic opportunity provide incentives to
participate in institutions.
INCINEQ + Low levels of opportunity provide incentives to fight.

LNAREA - Difficulties of waging military campaigns across
distances.
LNPOP + More potential rebels. Scarcity of resources is an

incentive to fight.
MAIZEPR + Food staple effects outweigh increases in economic

opportunity.
MAIZEPRCHG + Food staple effects outweigh increases in economic

opportunity.
OPENNESS + Poor countries are more likely to reap negative

consequences from trade (unbalanced political
institutions, horizontal inequalities, exploitation, etc).
PEACE - Battle years are more intense if they proceed other battle
years.
POLITYSCORE - Democratic regimes are more likely to use nonviolent

means to pacify rebels.
WHEATPR + Food staple effects outweigh increases in economic

opportunity.
WHEATPRCHG + Food staple effects outweigh increases in economic

opportunity.
30
Chapter 4
Empirical Analysis
The Model
In this paper, I rely on Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Tobit regression
analysis to test my theory. I estimate several OLS regression specifications of the form:
Equation 1 OLS specification
And Tobit regressions specifications of the form:
Equation 2 Tobit specification
y*i is the natural log of battle deaths, xi is a vector of individual characteristics (discussed
in detail below), and εi and ui are error terms.
I develop global models and then restrict the data to observations occurring in
African and Asian countries. Finally, I model Cold War era severity.
The Data
My dataset has observations from 1961 to 1999. The data for the dependent
variable comes from data compiled by Lacina and Gleditsch (2005). The country-specific
32
yearly data comes from the FAOSTAT data retrieval system, the Penn World Tables, the
Polity IV Index, and a dataset compiled by Elbadawi and Hegre (2008). Commodity price
information comes from the Pfaffenzeller, Newbold, and Rayner (2007) update of the
Grilli and Yang Commodity Price Dataset. See the data appendix for more information
about each variable.
Descriptive Statistics
Global Model
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for key variables as well as price variables.
Column (1) lists variable names and columns two through eight report summary
statistics. The dependent variable, battle severity, is measured in terms of the natural log
of battle deaths (LNDEATHS). Unlike other analysis, my dependent variable is a measure
of battle deaths by year and country, rather than a total of all deaths over the span of a
conflict. I believe disaggregating the battle deaths variable allows for more observations
and the ability to analyze the impact of variables from year to year (i.e., some years of
conflict may be deadlier than others).33
In my dataset, the number of battle deaths ranges from 2.56 and 11.29 (13 and
80,000 deaths) and has a mean of 6.17 (2,856 deaths). The correlation coefficients
presented in Table 3 reveal interesting relationships between the variables. As
hypothesized, COLDWAR, INCINEQ, ETHFRAC, and OPENNESS are positively
33 Lacina and Gleditsch define battle deaths are a direct result of injury from a “contested
incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two
parties, of which at least one is the government of a state” (2005).
33
correlated with LNDEATHS, and GDPGROWTH, POLITYSCORE, PEACE, and
LNAREA are negatively correlated to LNDEATHS. Unlike my prediction, LNPOP has a
negative correlation to LNDEATHS. The correlations of prices and price shocks
challenge my hypothesis: MAIZEPRCHG is negatively correlated to LNDEATHS.
WHEATPR is not correlated to LNDEATHS. Like my prediction, MAIZEPR and
WHEATPRCHG have a positive correlation.
Table 2 Global Descriptive Statistics
See the data section and data appendix for data descriptions. Each row presents the summary statistics for a
particular variable. The number of observations, mean, standard error, 25th and 75th percentiles, median,
minimum values, and maximum values are reported.
34
Table 3 Correlation Coefficients
The Pearson correlation coefficients in this table are significant at or above the 5% level.
Africa Model
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics for observations occurring on the continent
of Africa. The mean of LNDEATHS is 6.74 (3,486 deaths) and the range is between 3.22
(25 deaths) and 10.78 (48,033 deaths). As predicted, COLDWAR, ETHFRAC, and
LNPOP have positive correlation coefficients, while GDPGROWTH, PEACE, and
POLITYSCORE are negatively correlated with LNDEATHS. POLITYSCORE and
PEACE have smaller correlation coefficients than the global statistics. The
POLITYSCORE correlation is not as strong as in the global statistics while LNAREA

35
and PEACE correlations are much stronger. Unlike the global statistics and my
prediction, INCINEQ has a negative correlation, LNAREA has a positive correlation, and
OPENNESS has a negative correlation to LNDEATHS. As I predicted, MAIZEPR and
WHEATPR are positively correlated to LNDEATHS. Unlike my prediction,
MAIZEPRCHG and WHEATPRCHG are negatively correlated to LNDEATHS. It is
interesting to note all price variables except sugar have a stronger correlation than in the
global statistics.
Table 4 Africa Descriptive Statistics
36
Asia
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for observations occurring in Asia. The
mean of LNDEATHS is 5.68 (2,208 deaths). As predicted, COLDWAR, ETHFRAC,
INCINEQ, and OPENNESS are positively correlated to LNDEATHS, while
GDPGROWTH, LNAREA, and PEACE are negatively correlated. It is interesting to note
the coefficient of GDPGROWTH is weaker, INCINEQ is stronger, LNAREA is stronger,
and PEACE is weaker than in the global statistics. Unlike my prediction, LNPOP is
negatively correlated to LNDEATHS. As I hypothesized, MAIZEPRCHG and
WHEATPRCHG are positively correlated with LNDEATHS. Unlike my hypothesis,
MAIZEPR and WHEATPR have a negative correlation coefficient.
Table 5 Asia Descriptive Statistics
37
Cold War
Tables 6 and 7 provide descriptive statistics for the Cold War and post-Cold War
cluster. For observations of battles during the Cold War, the mean of LNDEATHS is 6.3
(3149 deaths). As I predicted, ETHFRAC, INCINEQ, and OPENNESS have a positive
correlation coefficient, while GDPGROWTH, LNAREA, PEACE, and POLITYSCORE
have a negative coefficient. It is interesting to note that ETHFRAC and PEACE have
smaller correlation coefficients than in the global statistics. Unlike my hypothesis,
LNPOP has a negative correlation to LNDEATHS. Like my commodity price hypothesis,
MAIZEPR and WHEATPR have positive coefficients. MAIZEPRCHG and
WHEATPRCHG have negative coefficients.
For observations of post-Cold War battles, the mean of LNDEATHS is 5.81 (2067
deaths). The correlation coefficients have the same sign as the Cold War variables. The
PEACE coefficient is stronger than in the descriptive statistics for battles fought during
the Cold War.

38
Table 6 Cold War Descriptive Statistics
Table 7 Post – Cold War Descriptive Statistics
39
Empirical Results
Global Model
In this section, I use a basic OLS specification and Tobit specification to test my
predictions about results across all time periods and regions. I start with a baseline
regression. Table 8 reports my results. Columns (1) – (11) I regress each key independent
variable by itself. Each independent variable is significant at or above the .1% level.
According to the first regression, GDPGROWTH explains 6% of the variation in
LNBATTLEDEATHS. The same is true for OPENNESS. GDPGROWTH,
PRIMCOMM, OIL, COLDWAR, and OPENNESS have large coefficients. For example,
a 1% change in OPENNESS causes 126.2% increase in LNDEATHS. In column (12), I
regress all of the key independent variables together. Although the adjusted R2 is .284,
many of the variables are not significant at or above the 5% level. This, coupled with
information about correlation between key independent variables, tells me this regression
suffers from multicollinearity. I choose GDPGROWTH, POLITYSCORE, INCINEQ,
and PEACE as my baseline independent variables. Column (15) shows GDPGROWTH is
significant at the 5% level while the rest of the variables are significant at the .1% level.
The adjusted R2 is .216.
Using the baseline variables found in table 9, I add price variables. When I regress
each price variable with the baseline independent variables, none of the price variables
are significant at or above the 5% level. In columns (3) – (6), there is a modest reduction
in adjusted R2 values when I regress price variables. When I regress all of the price
variables together with the baseline variables in column (2), the adjusted R2 increases by .
40
003 from the baseline. (column (1)). The baseline variables are still significant and carry
the same sign. None of the price variables are significant at or above the 5% level in this
regression. It is interesting to note the coefficient of RICEPR changes from positive to
negative in regression 2 and 5. The same happens to COTTPR’s coefficient in regression
2 and 4.
Table 10 shows the results of the regressions of baseline variables and price
change variables on LNDEATHS. When I regress each price change variable separately,
none are significant at or above the 5% level. Also, the adjusted R2 falls between the
baseline regression and the regressions with individual price change variables. The
regression in column (2) shows the coefficients do not gain significance when they are all
regressed together with baseline variables. The adjusted R2 falls in this regression too. It
is interesting to note the RICEPRCHG coefficient changes signs between columns (2)
and (6).
41
Table 8 Baseline OLS regression results

42
Table 9 Price OLS regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDPGROWTH -0.0512* -0.0495* -0.0513* -0.0512* -0.0507* -0.0517* -0.0497* -0.0512*
(0.0230) (0.0227) (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0228) (0.0231)
POLITYSCORE -0.0359*** -0.0360*** -0.0357*** -0.0358*** -0.0361*** -0.0359*** -0.0361*** -0.0359***

(0.00478) (0.00472) (0.00481) (0.00477) (0.00478) (0.00478) (0.00477) (0.00479)
INCINEQ 0.0428*** 0.0434*** 0.0427*** 0.0429*** 0.0428*** 0.0426*** 0.0430*** 0.0428***

(0.00682) (0.00699) (0.00681) (0.00684) (0.00683) (0.00687) (0.00685) (0.00683)
PEACE -0.00199*** -0.00200*** -0.00198*** -0.00199*** -0.00197*** -0.00199*** -0.00197*** -0.00199***

(0.000339) (0.000345) (0.000337) (0.000339) (0.000341) (0.000339) (0.000340) (0.000339)
COFFPR -0.00151 0.000885

(0.00349) (0.00302)
COTTPR 0.00574 0.00168

(0.00557) (0.00352)
RICEPR 0.00139 -0.00193

(0.00574) (0.00294)
MAIZEPR 0.000936 0.000161

(0.00647) (0.00314)
SUGARPR -0.00240 -0.00136

(0.00190) (0.00107)
WHEATPR -0.00161 -0.00114

(0.00502) (0.00275)
_cons 4.505*** 4.313*** 4.450*** 4.351*** 4.675*** 4.644*** 4.654*** 4.488***

(0.305) (0.534) (0.373) (0.464) (0.406) (0.473) (0.327) (0.463)
N 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537
adj. R2 0.216 0.213 0.215 0.215 0.216 0.215 0.217 0.215
See the Descriptive Statistics Table and Data Appendix for data descriptions. The estimates reported in this table were obtained from
OLS estimation with robust standard errors. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is measured in terms of the
natural log of battle deaths (LNDEATHS). * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
43
Table 10 Price change OLS regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDPGROWTH -0.0512* -0.0522* -0.0524* -0.0515* -0.0515* -0.0512* -0.0498* -0.0514*
(0.0230) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0230) (0.0231) (0.0231) (0.0228) (0.0231)
POLITYSCORE -0.0359*** -0.0362*** -0.0359*** -0.0359*** -0.0359*** -0.0359*** -0.0361*** -0.0359***

(0.00478) (0.00477) (0.00475) (0.00478) (0.00478) (0.00479) (0.00475) (0.00478)
INCINEQ 0.0428*** 0.0427*** 0.0428*** 0.0426*** 0.0426*** 0.0428*** 0.0434*** 0.0427***

(0.00682) (0.00697) (0.00683) (0.00684) (0.00688) (0.00687) (0.00687) (0.00690)
PEACE -0.00199*** -0.00200*** -0.00198*** -0.00199*** -0.00199*** -0.00199*** -0.00199*** -0.00199***

(0.000339) (0.000340) (0.000339) (0.000339) (0.000338) (0.000339) (0.000340) (0.000338)
COFFPRCHG 0.00151 0.00155

(0.00199) (0.00198)
RICEPRCHG 0.000697 -0.000108

(0.00433) (0.00259)
WHEATPRCHG 0.00287 0.000403

(0.00632) (0.00315)
MAIZEPRCHG 0.000174 0.000745

(0.00577) (0.00330)
SUGARPRCHG -0.00259 -0.00176

(0.00147) (0.00128)
COTTPRCHG 0.00179 0.00119

(0.00358) (0.00324)
_cons 4.505*** 4.506*** 4.495*** 4.508*** 4.509*** 4.504*** 4.487*** 4.508***

(0.305) (0.311) (0.306) (0.306) (0.307) (0.307) (0.307) (0.308)
N 537 537 537 537 537 537 537 537
adj. R2 0.216 0.213 0.216 0.215 0.215 0.215 0.218 0.215
44
I report the results of the baseline Tobit specification in Table 11. When I regress
each independent variable separately in columns (3) – (13), I find each variable is
significant at or above the .1% level. COLDWAR, PRIMCOMM, OIL, and OPENNESS
have large and positive coefficients. Unlike my prediction, LNPOP has a negative effect
on LNDEATHS. When I regress all of the variables together in regression 1, the pseudo
R2 value is .090. POLITYSCORE, INCINEQ, PEACE, and OPENNESS are the only
significant variables at or above the 5% level. It is interesting to note in this regression,
LNPOP has a positive coefficient, while in column (12) it has a positive coefficient.
Based on column (2), I choose GDPGROWTH, POLITYSCORE, INCINEQ, and
PEACE as my baseline variables. These variables are the same as the ones I chose for my
OLS specification. The regression in column (2) only explains 6.4% of the variation in
LNDEATHS. GDPGROWTH is significant at or above the 5% level, PEACE is
significant at the 1% level, while the rest of the variables are significant at the .1% level.
POLITYSCORE and INCINEQ have relatively large coefficients: a one-unit change in
POLITYSCORE decreases LNDEATHS by 3.59% while a one-unit change in INCINEQ
changes LNDEATHS by 4.28%.
Table 12 shows the results of my Tobit regressions with price variables. When I
regress the price variables separately in columns (3) – (8), the pseudo R2 is the same for
each regression, and none of the price variables are significant. The baseline variables
keep the same significance and sign as the baseline Tobit and there are not large changes
in the baseline coefficients. Column (2) shows the results of regressing all baseline and
price variables together. The pseudo R2 increases by .001 and none of the price variables
45
are significant. The baseline variables keep their significance and the coefficients do not
differ from the baseline Tobit regression (column (1)). It is interesting to note RICEPR
changes signs between columns (2) and (6).
Price change variables along with baseline variables are included in Table 13.
Columns (3) – (8) show the results of regressing each price change variable separately.
The regressions explain between 6.4 and 6.5% of the variation in LNDEATHS. The price
change variables are not significant. Column (2) shows the results of the regression with
all baseline and price change variables. The baseline variables do not change in
significance and the coefficients show small changes. This model explains 6.5% of the
variation in LNDEATHS. All of the price change variables are insignificant.
RICEPRCHG changes signs between columns (2) and (6).
The pseudo R2 values of the Tobit models are much smaller than the adjusted R2
values of the OLS models. The baseline variables stay the same between the Tobit and
OLS models and do not change signs. The sign of the baseline variables reflect my
predictions. The price and price change variables were insignificant according to these
models. PRIMCOMM and OIL are significant and have large positive coefficients in both
the OLS and Tobit regressions. Next, I explore the relationships of key and commodity
variables according to region and time period.

46
Table 11 Baseline Tobit regression results
Tobit estimation with robust standard errors. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is measured in terms of the
47
48
Table 12 Price Tobit regression results
49
50
Table 13 Price change Tobit regression results
51
Africa Model
To model severity in Africa, I use OLS and Tobit specifications. Tables 14 and 15
shows the result of my baseline OLS for battle years occurring in Africa. Columns (2) –
(12) show the results of separate regression for each key variable. The model with
PEACE explained 16% of the variation of LNDEATHS. OIL, COLDWAR, and
OPENNESS have relatively large coefficients. POLITY, PRIMCOMM, and INCINEQ,
three variables used as baseline variables in the global regressions, were statistically
insignificant. LNPOP and LNAREA took positive coefficients. In the global regressions,
they took negative coefficients. Column (1) shows the results of the global baseline
model. The model explains 22.3% of the variation of LNDEATHS but two of the
variables are statistically insignificant. Columns (13) – (21) show the results of many
different regressions using combinations of the key variables. Column (21) shows the
baseline Africa OLS model. Like my hypothesis, GDPGROWTH has a negative
coefficient while LNPOP and ETHFRAC have a positive relationship to LNDEATHS.
Oil has a large coefficient: when the OIL dummy is 1, LNDEATHS changes by 115.9%.
Price variables are included in the baseline OLS regression in Table 16. Columns
(2) – (7) show the results of regressing each price variable separately. COFFPR and
COTTPR are statistically significant at the 5% level. A $1change in coffee prices leads to
a .969% increase of LNDEATHS while a one dollar change in cotton prices leads to a .
887% increase. The model with COFFPR adds 1.3% explanatory power to the baseline
model. COTTPR adds .7% explanatory power to the baseline. The rest of the price
variables have positive coefficients and are insignificant. The baseline variables do not
52
change significance and have small changes in their coefficients. When I regress all of the
price and baseline variables together, the explanatory power of the model is 24%, but
none of the price variables are significant.
Table 17 shows the results of the inclusion of price change variables in the
baseline OLS regression. Columns (3) – (8) show the results of regressing baseline
variables with each price variable. None of the price change variables are significant and
the baseline variables do not show a large change in coefficient or significance.
Compared to the baseline model in column (1), columns (2) – (8) decrease the
explanatory power by about 1%. When I regress all of the price change variables with the
baseline variables in column (2), I find there are not significant price change variables.
The baseline variables do not change significance or have a large change in the value of
coefficients. It is interesting to note the coefficient of COTTPRCHG changes from
positive to negative from columns (2) - (4).
Table 18 and 19 provide information about the significance of baseline in a Tobit
regression. Columns (3) – (13) show regressions of individual key variables. Unlike my
prediction, LNAREA has a positive coefficient and OPENNESS has a negative
coefficient. Although it is not statistically significant, it is interesting to note INCINEQ
has a negative relationship to LNDEATHS. I regress all of the key variables together. The
results are shown in column (14). The pseudo R2 is .139 but most of the variables are
insignificant. The model used as the global Tobit model explains 7% of the variation of
LNDEATHS but two variables are insignificant. Column (2) shows the results of using
the Africa OLS baseline variables. I chose these as my Tobit Africa baseline variables
53
because all of the coefficients are significant at or above a 1% level and because the
pseudo R2 is relatively high. The coefficients of GDPGROWTH, PEACE, ETHFRAC,
and LNPOP meet my predictions.
Table 20 shows the results of the inclusion of price variables in the baseline Africa
Tobit model. Columns (2) – (7) show the results of regressing individual price variables
with the baseline variables. COTTPR and COFFPR have a positive relationship to
LNDEATHS and statistically significant at the 5% level. The rest of the price variables
are insignificant and positively related to LNDEATHS. When I regress all of the price
variables and the baseline variables, the pseudo R2 is .007 higher than the baseline model.
All price variables are insignificant in this regression although the baseline variables
retain their significance. MAIZEPR and SUGARPR change from positive in the
individual regressions to negative in column (8). Column (9) shows the results of
regression COTTPR and COFFPR together. Both variables are insignificant when
regressed together although the pseudo R2 is .006 higher than the baseline Africa Tobit.
Table 21 presents the results of the Tobit regressions with price change variables
included. None of the price change variables are significant in columns (2) – (7). In
column (2), the significance of OIL increased from 1% to .1% when COFFPRCHG was
the price change variable. The significance of OIL increases again in the regression with
all of the baseline and price change variables. In this regression, all price change
variables are insignificant and the pseudo R2 shows a .002 increase from the baseline
model. The COTTPRCHG coefficient changes signs between columns (3) and (8).
54
For the Africa regressions, the pseudo R2 values of the Tobit models are much
smaller than the adjusted R2 values of the OLS models. The baseline variables stay the
same between the Tobit and OLS models and do not change signs. The sign of the
baseline variables reflect my predictions. The global and Africa models both have
GDPGROWTH, PEACE, and ETHFRAC as baseline determinants. Unlike other baseline
models presented in this paper, OIL is included as an explanatory variable. All price and
price change variables were insignificant except for the price of coffee and the price of
cotton. These coefficients had a positive relationship to battle severity. Next, I explore the
relationships of key and commodity variables in Asia.
Table 14 Africa baseline OLS regression results

55
56
Table 15 Africa baseline OLS regressions - continued

(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
GDPGROWTH -0.141*** -0.138***

(0.0328) (0.0333)
POLITYSCOR
E
INCINEQ 0.00163
(0.0120)
PEACE
PRIMCOMM
OIL 1.023** 1.125*** 1.159***

(0.319) (0.312) (0.301)
COLDWAR 0.295
(0.218)
ETHFRAC 0.000164** 0.000159** 0.000184*** 0.000179*** 0.000180*** 0.0000887 0.000185*** 0.000186*** 0.000181***
(0.0000498) (0.0000503) (0.0000422) (0.0000430) (0.0000418) (0.0000684) (0.0000418) (0.0000422) (0.0000417)
OPENNESS 1.841* 2.012* 2.074* 2.197** -0.156 1.195

(0.859) (0.806) (0.824) (0.803) (1.287) (0.798)
LNPOP 0.707** 0.321* 0.891*** 0.877*** 1.028*** 0.742*** 0.760*** 0.539*** 0.657***
(0.222) (0.148) (0.164) (0.172) (0.180) (0.211) (0.166) (0.0937) (0.123)
LNAREA 0.101 0.164

(0.0921) (0.0887)
_cons -5.177 -0.822 -6.990** -6.901** -9.179*** -5.601 -5.556* -2.788 -4.840*
(2.649) (1.874) (2.241) (2.320) (2.542) (3.163) (2.300) (1.531) (2.042)
N 290 290 338 338 299 136 336 336 297

adj. R-sq 0.108 0.098 0.128 0.131 0.178 0.110 0.146 0.144 0.195
57
58
Table 16 Africa price OLS regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ETHFRAC 0.000125** 0.000134** 0.000132** 0.000130** 0.000127** 0.000126** 0.000134** 0.000140**
(0.0000433) (0.0000433) (0.0000428) (0.0000438) (0.0000431) (0.0000434) (0.0000439) (0.0000439)
OIL 0.998** 1.017** 0.995** 0.993** 0.994** 0.997** 0.972** 0.986**

(0.305) (0.309) (0.312) (0.309) (0.307) (0.306) (0.307) (0.311)
LNPOP 0.466*** 0.456*** 0.469*** 0.462*** 0.469*** 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.466***

(0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) (0.131)
GDPGROWTH -0.116*** -0.103** -0.112** -0.113** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.109** -0.0972**

(0.0338) (0.0344) (0.0340) (0.0344) (0.0337) (0.0339) (0.0345) (0.0352)
PEACE -0.00223*** -0.00207*** -0.00213*** -0.00218*** -0.00221*** -0.00223*** -0.00217*** -0.00203***

(0.000535) (0.000526) (0.000540) (0.000540) (0.000535) (0.000536) (0.000539) (0.000532)
COFFPR 0.00969* 0.00639

(0.00396) (0.00486)
COTTPR 0.00887* 0.00855

(0.00423) (0.00751)
MAIZEPR 0.00468 -0.00994

(0.00465) (0.0101)
RICEPR 0.00335 0.00271

(0.00386) (0.00702)
SUGARPR 0.000343 -0.00207

(0.00149) (0.00256)
WHEATPR 0.00495 0.00757

(0.00359) (0.00648)
_cons -1.141 -1.647 -2.017 -1.572 -1.504 -1.204 -1.733 -2.224

(2.256) (2.216) (2.282) (2.346) (2.301) (2.292) (2.329) (2.270)
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
adj. R2 0.234 0.247 0.241 0.235 0.233 0.231 0.237 0.240
59
Table 17 Africa price change OLS regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ETHFRAC 0.000125** 0.000128** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125**
(0.0000433) (0.0000438) (0.0000434) (0.0000434) (0.0000434) (0.0000434) (0.0000434) (0.0000434)
OIL 0.998** 1.007** 1.005** 0.998** 0.995** 0.994** 0.998** 1.000**

(0.305) (0.304) (0.304) (0.306) (0.305) (0.306) (0.306) (0.305)
LNPOP 0.466*** 0.472*** 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.467*** 0.464*** 0.466*** 0.466***

(0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133) (0.133)
GDPGROWTH -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.117***

(0.0338) (0.0342) (0.0338) (0.0341) (0.0339) (0.0338) (0.0340) (0.0339)
PEACE -0.00223*** -0.00223*** -0.00222*** -0.00223*** -0.00222*** -0.00222*** -0.00223*** -0.00223***

(0.000535) (0.000541) (0.000535) (0.000535) (0.000534) (0.000536) (0.000534) (0.000536)
COTTPRCHG 0.00212 -0.000425

(0.00473) (0.00433)
RICEPRCHG -0.00560 -0.00222

(0.00540) (0.00317)
WHEATPRCHG 0.0101 0.000600

(0.00864) (0.00420)
MAIZEPRCHG -0.00726 -0.00227

(0.00951) (0.00518)
SUGARPRCHG 0.000533 0.000202

(0.00222) (0.00194)
COFFPRCHG -0.00133 -0.00117

(0.00263) (0.00262)
_cons -1.141 -1.248 -1.148 -1.137 -1.158 -1.113 -1.142 -1.147

(2.256) (2.271) (2.258) (2.259) (2.254) (2.262) (2.261) (2.260)
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297
adj. R2 0.234 0.223 0.232 0.231 0.232 0.232 0.231 0.231
60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
INCINEQ -0.00560 -0.0227

(0.0139) (0.0124)
POLITYSCORE -0.0323*** -0.00580

(0.00688) (0.00545)
GDPGROWTH 0.00407 -0.116*** -0.124***

(0.0460) (0.0335) (0.0338)
PEACE -0.00310*** -0.00223*** -0.00387***

(0.000649) (0.000530) (0.000452)
OIL 0.998** 0.966**

(0.302) (0.331)
ETHFRAC 0.000125**
(0.0000430)
LNPOP 0.466***
(0.132)
PRIMCOMM 1.808
(0.945)
COLDWAR 0.555*
(0.215)
OPENNESS
LNAREA
_cons 7.225*** -1.141 6.688*** 6.661*** 7.839*** 7.318*** 6.516*** 6.638*** 6.346***
(0.570) (2.237) (0.107) (0.120) (0.532) (0.115) (0.153) (0.102) (0.180)
sigma
_cons 1.398*** 1.591*** 1.804*** 1.830*** 1.582*** 1.678*** 1.811*** 1.794*** 1.817***
(0.0949) (0.0616) (0.0573) (0.0559) (0.0882) (0.0547) (0.0593) (0.0621) (0.0569)
N 114 297 299 341 136 341 336 336 341

pseudo R-sq 0.076 0.070 0.011 0.001 0.006 0.044 0.004 0.008 0.005
Table 18 Africa baseline Tobit regression results
61
62
Table 19 Africa baseline Tobit regression results - continued

(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17)
INCINEQ 0.0163
(0.0147)
POLITYSCORE -0.0371***
(0.00573)
GDPGROWTH -0.0279 -0.117*** -0.111***

(0.0541) (0.0326) (0.0330)
PEACE -0.00263** -0.00351*** -0.00378*** -0.00339***

(0.000833) (0.000489) (0.000457) (0.000491)
OIL 1.278
(0.739)
ETHFRAC 0.000180*** 0.000117

(0.0000457) (0.0000650)
LNPOP 0.508*** 0.505

(0.0930) (0.359)
PRIMCOMM 3.162 1.684* 1.820*

(2.271) (0.854) (0.883)
COLDWAR -0.140 0.649** 0.537** 0.700**

(0.356) (0.236) (0.203) (0.229)
OPENNESS -1.416** 0.823

(0.462) (1.126)
LNAREA 0.339***
(0.0621)
_cons 6.161*** 5.782*** -1.509 2.943*** -2.261 6.763*** 6.712*** 6.460***

(0.177) (0.315) (1.503) (0.662) (5.760) (0.236) (0.209) (0.241)
sigma
_cons 1.795*** 1.807*** 1.765*** 1.763*** 1.242*** 1.645*** 1.644*** 1.628***
(0.0546) (0.0556) (0.0555) (0.0621) (0.0852) (0.0565) (0.0586) (0.0599)
N 338 341 338 293 114 299 336 297

pseudo R-sq 0.011 0.007 0.019 0.018 0.139 0.057 0.052 0.059
See the descriptive statistics section and Data Appendix for data descriptions. The estimates reported in this table were obtained from
63
Table 20 Africa price Tobit regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)

GDPGROWT
-0.116*** -0.103** -0.112*** -0.113*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.109** -0.0972** -0.104**
H
(0.0335) (0.0341) (0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0334) (0.0336) (0.0342) (0.0346) (0.0343)
PEACE -0.00223*** -0.00207*** -0.00213*** -0.00218*** -0.00221*** -0.00223*** -0.00217*** -0.00203*** -0.00205***
(0.000530) (0.000521) (0.000534) (0.000535) (0.000530) (0.000531) (0.000533) (0.000522) (0.000524)
OIL 0.998** 1.017*** 0.995** 0.993** 0.994** 0.997** 0.972** 0.986** 1.011**
(0.302) (0.306) (0.309) (0.306) (0.304) (0.303) (0.304) (0.305) (0.308)
ETHFRAC 0.000125** 0.000134** 0.000132** 0.000130** 0.000127** 0.000126** 0.000134** 0.000140** 0.000136**
(0.0000430) (0.0000429) (0.0000424) (0.0000433) (0.0000427) (0.0000429) (0.0000435) (0.0000431) (0.0000426)
LNPOP 0.466*** 0.456*** 0.469*** 0.462*** 0.469*** 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.466*** 0.459***
(0.132) (0.130) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) (0.129) (0.131)
COFFPR 0.00969* 0.00639 0.00778

(0.00392) (0.00477) (0.00460)
COTTPR 0.00887* 0.00855 0.00423

(0.00419) (0.00737) (0.00488)
MAIZEPR 0.00468 -0.00994

(0.00461) (0.00987)
RICEPR 0.00335 0.00271

(0.00383) (0.00689)
SUGARPR 0.000343 -0.00207

(0.00148) (0.00251)
WHEATPR 0.00495 0.00757

(0.00355) (0.00636)
_cons -1.141 -1.647 -2.017 -1.572 -1.504 -1.204 -1.733 -2.224 -1.965
(2.237) (2.193) (2.259) (2.322) (2.277) (2.269) (2.305) (2.228) (2.241)
sigma
_cons 1.591*** 1.574*** 1.580*** 1.587*** 1.589*** 1.590*** 1.585*** 1.568*** 1.572***
(0.0616) (0.0638) (0.0637) (0.0635) (0.0621) (0.0616) (0.0636) (0.0644) (0.0643)
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297

pseudo R-sq 0.070 0.075 0.073 0.071 0.071 0.070 0.072 0.077 0.076
See the Descriptive Statistics Table and Data Appendix for data descriptions. The estimates reported in this table were obtained from Tobit estimation with
robust standard errors. Standard errors are in parenthesis. The dependent variable is measured in terms of the natural log of battle deaths (LNDEATHS). * p <
0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
64
Table 21 Africa price change Tobit regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDPGROWTH -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.115*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.115***

(0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0337) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0337) (0.0335) (0.0335)
PEACE -0.00223*** -0.00222*** -0.00223*** -0.00222*** -0.00222*** -0.00223*** -0.00223*** -0.00223***
(0.000530) (0.000530) (0.000529) (0.000528) (0.000531) (0.000529) (0.000531) (0.000530)
OIL 0.998** 1.005*** 0.998** 0.995** 0.994** 0.998** 1.000** 1.007***

(0.302) (0.301) (0.303) (0.302) (0.303) (0.302) (0.302) (0.298)
ETHFRAC 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000125** 0.000128**

(0.0000430) (0.0000430) (0.0000430) (0.0000430) (0.0000430) (0.0000429) (0.0000429) (0.0000430)
LNPOP 0.466*** 0.467*** 0.466*** 0.467*** 0.464*** 0.466*** 0.466*** 0.472***

(0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.131)
COFFPRCHG -0.00117 -0.00133

(0.00260) (0.00258)
COTTPRCHG -0.000425 0.00212

(0.00428) (0.00464)
MAIZEPRCHG -0.00227 -0.00726

(0.00512) (0.00933)
RICEPRCHG -0.00222 -0.00560

(0.00313) (0.00529)
SUGARPRCHG 0.000202 0.000533

(0.00192) (0.00218)
WHEATPRCHG 0.000600 0.0101

(0.00416) (0.00848)
_cons -1.141 -1.148 -1.137 -1.158 -1.113 -1.142 -1.147 -1.248

(2.237) (2.235) (2.236) (2.231) (2.239) (2.238) (2.237) (2.228)
sigma
_cons 1.591*** 1.590*** 1.591*** 1.590*** 1.590*** 1.591*** 1.591*** 1.585***
(0.0616) (0.0617) (0.0617) (0.0617) (0.0618) (0.0616) (0.0615) (0.0603)
N 297 297 297 297 297 297 297 297

pseudo R-sq 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.072
65
Asia Model
The baseline OLS estimates for Asia are presented in Tables 22 and 23. In
Columns (2) – (12), each key variable is regressed individually. The POLITYSCORE
model explains 7.1% of the variation of LNDEATHS while the INCINEQ model explains
13.2%. Although their signs fit my prediction, GDPGROWTH, OPENNESS, and PEACE
are insignificant by themselves. Unlike my hypothesis, the LNPOP coefficient is negative
instead of positive. Column (1) shows the results of regressing each key variable together.
Although the adjusted R2 is .261, many variables are insignificant. Column (16) shows
the model I choose as the baseline for Asia. It explains 23.4% of the variation of
LNDEATHS and the coefficient signs match my hypothesis.
In Table 24, I include price variables with the baseline regression. Columns (1) –
(7) show the result of regressing baseline variables with individual commodity prices.
None of the individual commodity price variables are significant, and the only adjusted
R2 to increase from the baseline instead of decrease, is the WHEATPR regression. Each
price variable coefficient is negative. Column (8) shows the results of regressing each
price variable together with baseline variables. All price variables are insignificant and
the adjusted R2 is lower than of the baseline. In this regression, the variable
POLITYSCORE increases in significance.
Table 25 shows the results of my Asia Price Change OLS regressions. When I
regress the baseline variables with separate price change variables, the adjusted R2 of
those regressions are lower than the baseline, and none of the price change variables are
significant. Column (8) shows the results of regressing each price change variable
66
together with the baseline model. The adjusted R2 is even lower than the individual price
change regressions. Also, none of the price change variables gains significance. Between
the individual price change regressions and the regression in column (8), the coefficients
of RICEPRCHG and WHEATPRCHG change from negative to positive.
I present the results of my baseline Tobit regression in Tables 26 and 27. When I
regress each baseline variable separately, the pseudo R2 are very low (the highest is .037
for INCINEQ). PRIMCOMM and OIL re insignificant. PEACE is also insignificant.
When all of the baseline variables are regressed together, PEACE, OIL, and
PRIMCOMM become significant. ETHFRAC and OPENNESS lose significance. This
model has the highest pseudo R2 but many insignificant variables. I choose the same
baseline model variables I chose for the Asia baseline OLS regression. POLITYSCORE,
INCINEQ, and PEACE are all significant (PEACE is the only variable to be significant
below the .1% level). Also, the model explains 7% of the variation of LNDEATHS. The
difference between this model and the global Tobit model is the exclusion of
GDPGROWTH as an explanatory variable.
Table 28 shows the results of regressing price variables with the Asia Tobit
baseline variables. When baseline variables are regressed with individual price variables,
the price variables are not significant, and the pseudo R2 is .001 higher than the baseline
model. When all of the price variables are regressed with baseline variables, the pseudo
R2 is .004 higher than the baseline model, but all of the price variables are insignificant.
Between regression 8 and the individual price variable regression, the coefficients of
MAIZEPR, RICEPR, and SUGARPR switch from negative to positive.

67
Results of the inclusion of price change variables in a Tobit regression are
included in Table 29. The pseudo R2 has a small range: from .070 to .071 for all
regressions. None of the price change variables are significant in columns (2) – (8). The
coefficient of RICEPRCHG changes from negative to positive between columns (5) and
(8) and the WHEATPRCHG coefficient changes from negative to positive between
regressions 7 and 8. The baseline variables retain the same significance through all of the
regressions and show small fluctuations in the value of the coefficient.
As is the case in the global and Africa regressions, the pseudo R2 values of the
Asia Tobit models are much smaller than the adjusted R2 values of the OLS models. The
baseline variables stay the same between the Tobit and OLS models and do not change
signs. The sign of the baseline variables reflect my predictions. Like the global model,
POLITY, INCINEQ, and PEACE are significant variables in the baseline. All price and
price change variables were insignificant. In my last empirical results section, I explore
the relationships of key and commodity variables of observations occurring during the
Cold War.
68
Table 22 Asia baseline OLS regression results
69
Table 23 Asia baseline OLS regression results – continued

(13) (14) (15) (16)
GDPGROWTH -0.0330 -0.0196

(0.0342) (0.0390)
POLITYSCORE -0.0304*** -0.0263** -0.0378***

(0.00860) (0.01000) (0.00535)
PRIMCOMM
OIL -0.712
(0.626)
COLDWAR
ETHFRAC 0.000495** 0.0000579

(0.000180) (0.000140)
INCINEQ 0.0659*** 0.0578*** 0.0648***

(0.0101) (0.0149) (0.00968)
PEACE -0.00185** -0.00128* -0.00152*

(0.000583) (0.000648) (0.000629)
OPENNESS
LNPOP -0.396*** -0.179

(0.0891) (0.149)
LNAREA 0.0677
(0.128)
_cons 11.75*** 3.214*** 5.807* 3.236***

(1.392) (0.422) (2.532) (0.398)
N 348 234 251 251

adj. R-sq 0.087 0.198 0.221 0.234
70
Table 24 Asia price OLS regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITYSCORE -0.0378*** -0.0372*** -0.0365*** -0.0362*** -0.0370*** -0.0373*** -0.0341*** -0.0338***

(0.00535) (0.00550) (0.00564) (0.00582) (0.00559) (0.00544) (0.00575) (0.00547)
INCINEQ 0.0648*** 0.0655*** 0.0657*** 0.0657*** 0.0655*** 0.0654*** 0.0663*** 0.0650***

(0.00968) (0.00969) (0.00963) (0.00968) (0.00968) (0.00975) (0.00977) (0.0100)
PEACE -0.00152* -0.00153* -0.00153* -0.00150* -0.00148* -0.00149* -0.00158* -0.00182**

(0.000629) (0.000630) (0.000624) (0.000630) (0.000632) (0.000628) (0.000616) (0.000606)
COFFPR -0.00299 -0.000376

(0.00433) (0.00534)
COTTPR -0.00376 -0.00314

(0.00441) (0.00815)
MAIZEPR -0.00294 0.0112

(0.00390) (0.00875)
RICEPR -0.00221 0.00149

(0.00461) (0.00897)
SUGARPR -0.000722 0.000717

(0.00176) (0.00318)
WHEATPR -0.00494 -0.0132

(0.00358) (0.00761)
_cons 3.236*** 3.390*** 3.532*** 3.495*** 3.402*** 3.295*** 3.744*** 3.703***

(0.398) (0.460) (0.544) (0.540) (0.543) (0.423) (0.549) (0.662)
N 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251

adj. R-sq 0.234 0.233 0.233 0.233 0.232 0.232 0.238 0.228
71
Table 25 Asia price change OLS regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITYSCORE -0.0378*** -0.0378*** -0.0380*** -0.0378*** -0.0379*** -0.0381*** -0.0379*** -0.0380***

(0.00535) (0.00532) (0.00549) (0.00546) (0.00554) (0.00558) (0.00549) (0.00575)
INCINEQ 0.0648*** 0.0649*** 0.0651*** 0.0653*** 0.0650*** 0.0654*** 0.0652*** 0.0658***

(0.00968) (0.00971) (0.00979) (0.00972) (0.00970) (0.00977) (0.00979) (0.0100)
PEACE -0.00152* -0.00150* -0.00152* -0.00149* -0.00151* -0.00149* -0.00150* -0.00147*

(0.000629) (0.000630) (0.000632) (0.000625) (0.000628) (0.000630) (0.000626) (0.000634)
COFFPRCHG 0.00119 0.00131

(0.00297) (0.00303)
COTTPRCHG -0.00147 -0.00139

(0.00497) (0.00571)
MAIZEPRCHG -0.00306 -0.00278

(0.00494) (0.00789)
RICEPRCHG -0.00121 0.00201

(0.00444) (0.00686)
SUGARPRCHG -0.00152 -0.00151

(0.00222) (0.00243)
WHEATPRCHG -0.00224 0.0000246

(0.00544) (0.0103)
_cons 3.236*** 3.226*** 3.229*** 3.221*** 3.232*** 3.223*** 3.226*** 3.199***

(0.398) (0.399) (0.401) (0.399) (0.398) (0.399) (0.400) (0.409)
N 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251

adj. R-sq 0.234 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.232 0.233 0.232 0.219
72
Table 26 Asia baseline Tobit regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
GDPGROWTH 0.0832 -0.0203
(0.0459) (0.0357)
POLITYSCORE -0.0223*** -0.0394***

(0.00586) (0.00649)
PRIMCOMM -12.30*** 2.413

(3.047) (1.265)
OIL 3.047* 0.651

(1.287) (0.339)
COLDWAR 0.750** 0.721***

(0.232) (0.194)
ETHFRAC -0.000386 0.000228**

(0.000353) (0.0000749)
INCINEQ 0.0787*
(0.0377)
PEACE -0.00356***
(0.000848)
OPENNESS 1.603
(1.389)
LNPOP 0.0268
(0.361)
LNAREA 0.0283
(0.125)
_cons 5.171 5.405*** 5.511*** 5.111*** 5.238*** 5.146*** 4.777***

(6.464) (0.116) (0.0896) (0.114) (0.0811) (0.162) (0.170)
sigma
_cons 1.467*** 1.623*** 1.925*** 1.624*** 1.624*** 1.973*** 1.620***
(0.0664) (0.0492) (0.0600) (0.0430) (0.0425) (0.0602) (0.0437)
N 234 357 484 424 424 485 415

pseudo R-sq 0.089 0.000 0.018 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.007
73
Table 27 Asia baseline Tobit regression results - continued

(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
GDPGROWTH
POLITYSCORE -0.0378***
(0.00532)
PRIMCOMM
OIL
COLDWAR
ETHFRAC
INCINEQ 0.0668*** 0.0648***

(0.00994) (0.00962)
PEACE -0.000808 -0.00152*

(0.000627) (0.000625)
OPENNESS 1.571***
(0.241)
LNPOP -0.197***
(0.0517)
LNAREA -0.527***
(0.0651)
_cons 3.051*** 5.740*** 7.415*** 8.843*** 11.52*** 3.236***

(0.408) (0.105) (0.309) (0.943) (0.736) (0.395)
sigma
_cons 1.640*** 1.995*** 1.861*** 1.605*** 1.903*** 1.534***
(0.0650) (0.0619) (0.0530) (0.0453) (0.0602) (0.0722)
N 251 485 480 424 485 251

pseudo R-sq 0.037 0.001 0.021 0.009 0.023 0.070
74
Table 28 Asia price Tobit regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITYSCORE -0.0378*** -0.0372*** -0.0365*** -0.0362*** -0.0370*** -0.0373*** -0.0341*** -0.0338***
(0.00532) (0.00545) (0.00559) (0.00578) (0.00555) (0.00539) (0.00570) (0.00537)
INCINEQ 0.0648*** 0.0655*** 0.0657*** 0.0657*** 0.0655*** 0.0654*** 0.0663*** 0.0650***

(0.00962) (0.00961) (0.00955) (0.00960) (0.00960) (0.00967) (0.00969) (0.00987)
PEACE -0.00152* -0.00153* -0.00153* -0.00150* -0.00148* -0.00149* -0.00158* -0.00182**

(0.000625) (0.000625) (0.000619) (0.000625) (0.000627) (0.000623) (0.000611) (0.000594)
COFFPR -0.00299 -0.000376

(0.00429) (0.00524)
COTTPR -0.00376 -0.00314

(0.00438) (0.00800)
MAIZEPR -0.00294 0.0112

(0.00387) (0.00859)
RICEPR -0.00221 0.00149

(0.00457) (0.00880)
SUGARPR -0.000722 0.000717

(0.00175) (0.00312)
WHEATPR -0.00494 -0.0132

(0.00355) (0.00747)
_cons 3.236*** 3.390*** 3.532*** 3.495*** 3.402*** 3.295*** 3.744*** 3.703***

(0.395) (0.456) (0.539) (0.536) (0.538) (0.420) (0.544) (0.650)
sigma
_cons 1.534*** 1.532*** 1.532*** 1.532*** 1.533*** 1.533*** 1.527*** 1.522***
(0.0722) (0.0715) (0.0712) (0.0713) (0.0718) (0.0723) (0.0703) (0.0694)
N 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251
pseudo R-sq 0.070 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.073 0.074
75
Table 29 Asia price change Tobit regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITYSCORE -0.0378*** -0.0378*** -0.0380*** -0.0378*** -0.0379*** -0.0381*** -0.0379*** -0.0380***

(0.00532) (0.00528) (0.00545) (0.00542) (0.00549) (0.00553) (0.00544) (0.00565)
INCINEQ 0.0648*** 0.0649*** 0.0651*** 0.0653*** 0.0650*** 0.0654*** 0.0652*** 0.0658***

(0.00962) (0.00964) (0.00971) (0.00964) (0.00962) (0.00969) (0.00971) (0.00986)
PEACE -0.00152* -0.00150* -0.00152* -0.00149* -0.00151* -0.00149* -0.00150* -0.00147*

(0.000625) (0.000625) (0.000627) (0.000620) (0.000623) (0.000624) (0.000621) (0.000623)
COFFPRCHG 0.00119 0.00131

(0.00294) (0.00298)
COTTPRCHG -0.00147 -0.00139

(0.00493) (0.00561)
MAIZEPRCHG -0.00306 -0.00278

(0.00490) (0.00774)
RICEPRCHG -0.00121 0.00201

(0.00441) (0.00673)
SUGARPRCHG -0.00152 -0.00151

(0.00220) (0.00239)
WHEATPRCHG -0.00224 0.0000246

(0.00539) (0.0101)
_cons 3.236*** 3.226*** 3.229*** 3.221*** 3.232*** 3.223*** 3.226*** 3.199***

(0.395) (0.396) (0.398) (0.396) (0.395) (0.396) (0.397) (0.401)
sigma
_cons 1.534*** 1.534*** 1.534*** 1.533*** 1.534*** 1.532*** 1.534*** 1.531***
(0.0722) (0.0723) (0.0727) (0.0724) (0.0722) (0.0731) (0.0724) (0.0738)
N 251 251 251 251 251 251 251 251

pseudo R-sq 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.071
76
Cold War Model
This section tests hypothesis about severity during the Cold War era. Tables 30
and 31 shows the results of my baseline OLS regressions. In columns (2) – (11), I regress
each key variable alone. Unlike my prediction, LNPOP has a negative coefficient. The
rest of the coefficients reflect my hypothesis. All variables are significant at or above the
1% level. According to adjusted R2 values, the POLITYSCORE model explains 6.3% of
the variation, the ETHFRAC model explains 5.5% of the variation, and OPENNESS
explains 5% of the variation of LNDEATHS. OIL, PRIMCOMM, and OPENNESS have
positive and relatively large coefficients. Column (12) shows the results of regressing all
key variables together. The adjusted R2 of this model is .006 higher than in the baseline
model. The signs of the coefficients fit my predictions. The variables shown in column
(14) are the ones I choose to be the baseline for the Cold War.
I the results of regressing price variables with the baseline variables in Table 32.
Columns (3) – (8) show the results of regressing baseline variables with individual price
variables. None of the price variables are significant and the adjusted R2 values range
from .227 to .231 (the baseline model has an adjusted R2 value of .228). Column (2)
shows the results of regressing each price variable together with baseline variables.
SUGARPR is statistically significant at the 5% level. None of the other variables are
significant. The adjusted R2 is .232. Between the regressions with individual price
variables and the regression with all price variables, the COFFPR and WHEATPR
coefficients change from positive to negative, and the RICEPR coefficient from negative
77
to positive. The baseline variables keep the same significance through all of the
regressions and show a small fluctuation in coefficient values.
Table 33 shows the results of regressing price change variables with the baseline
variables. Columns (3) – (8) show the results of the individual price change variable
regressions. SUGARPRCHG is significant at the 5% level and this regression has the
highest adjusted R2. The rest of the variables are insignificant and the adjusted R2 has a
range from .227 to .234. In the regression with baseline and all price change variables,
none of the price change variables are significant, and the R2 is the same as the baseline
model shown in column (1). The RICEPRCHG and MAIZEPRCHG coefficients change
from negative to positive between the individual price change regressions and the
regression of all baseline and price change variables.
The results of the baseline Cold War Tobit regressions are provided in Tables 34
and 25. Columns (3) – (12) show the results of regressing each key variable separately.
Variables in these regressions are all significant at or above the 1% level. All coefficients
match my hypothesis except LNPOP. When I regress all key variables together, the
pseudo R2 is .093, but many variables are insignificant. The OIL and PRIMMCOM
coefficients are different than they were in the individual regressions. I choose the Cold
War OLS baseline variables for the Tobit baseline model. Column (1) shows the results of
this regression. This model explains 6.9% of the variation of LNDEATHS. Each variable
is significant. Also, the signs of the coefficients match my hypothesis.
I include price variables along with the baseline variables in Table 36. Columns
(3) – (8) show the results of regressing baseline variables with individual price variables.
78
None of the coefficients are statistically significant and the pseudo R2 fluctuates
between .069 and .070. The pseudo R2 of the baseline regression is .069. When I regress
all price variables together with baseline variables, SUGARPR is significant at the 5%
level. The rest of the variables are insignificant. This regression has a pseudo R2 of .074.
The baseline coefficients do not change significance or signs across all regressions.
Table 37 shows the results of including price change variables in the Tobit
regressions. When I regress baseline variables with individual price change variables,
only the SUGARPRCHG coefficient is statistically significant. This regression result
does not have much more explanatory power than the baseline regression without price
change information or the other individual regressions. When I regress all of the price
change variables together with baseline variables, none of the price change variables are
statistically significant and the pseudo R2 is only .003 higher than the pseudo R2 of the
baseline regression. Between this regression, and columns (3) – (8), the coefficients of
RICEPRCHG and MAIZEPRCHG change from positive to negative. All baseline
coefficients retain the same significance through all of the regressions.
The pseudo R2 values of the Cold War Tobit models are much smaller than the
adjusted R2 values of the OLS models. The baseline variables stay the same between the
Tobit and OLS models and do not change signs. Like the global model, POLITYSCORE
and PEACE are significant and in the baseline. Unlike other baseline regressions,
LNAREA is included. The sign of the baseline variables reflect my predictions. In the
OLS and Tobit regressions, the SUGARPR coefficient is significant in regressions with
79
all other baseline and price variables, and SUGARPRCHG is significant when regressed
with baseline variables.

80
Table 30 Cold War baseline OLS regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GDPGROWTH -0.0234 -0.116***
(0.0261) (0.0189)
POLITYSCORE -0.0362*** -0.0293***

(0.00528) (0.00409)
INCINEQ 0.0254** 0.0291**

(0.00890) (0.00948)
PEACE -0.00257*** -0.00299***

(0.000436) (0.000335)
PRIMCOMM 2.985***
(0.657)
OIL 0.736***
(0.200)
ETHFRAC 0.000227***
(0.0000347)
OPENNESS 1.244***
(0.180)
LNPOP
LNAREA
_cons 5.388*** 6.239*** 6.108*** 5.765*** 6.027*** 5.641*** 5.013*** 6.695*** 7.321***
(0.406) (0.0678) (0.0674) (0.0916) (0.0693) (0.0879) (0.426) (0.0837) (0.170)
N 369 692 846 780 745 772 406 849 832

adj. R-sq 0.223 0.049 0.063 0.032 0.018 0.055 0.023 0.067 0.050
81
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
GDPGROWTH -0.0142 -0.0726*** -0.0768***
(0.0274) (0.0184) (0.0186)
POLITYSCORE -0.0254*** -0.0330*** -0.0290*** -0.0189*** -0.0128* -0.0113* -0.0157***
(0.00532) (0.00443) (0.00445) (0.00432) (0.00519) (0.00512) (0.00426)
INCINEQ 0.00254 0.0323*** 0.0212*
(0.0129) (0.00852) (0.00915)
PEACE -0.00301*** -0.00251*** -0.00275*** -0.00202*** -0.00270*** -0.00255*** -0.00247***
(0.000461) (0.000427) (0.000438) (0.000391) (0.000351) (0.000360) (0.000351)
PRIMCOMM -1.348 1.800* 1.741**
(1.928) (0.710) (0.626)
OIL -0.0609 0.769***
(0.369) (0.208)
ETHFRAC 0.000135*
(0.0000605)
OPENNESS 0.628
(0.649)
LNPOP -0.240*** -0.195 -0.249*** -0.212*** -0.213***
(0.0443) (0.213) (0.0446) (0.0470) (0.0440)
LNAREA -0.173*** -0.0530 -0.156** -0.209***
(0.0438) (0.0780) (0.0537) (0.0505)
_cons 10.17*** 8.076*** 10.92*** 5.064*** 7.271*** 8.353*** 10.76*** 9.928*** 9.762***
(0.755) (0.472) (3.085) (0.391) (0.830) (0.556) (0.771) (0.842) (0.786)
N 781 801 366 406 406 693 689 688 776
adj. R-sq 0.034 0.016 0.284 0.217 0.228 0.120 0.162 0.171 0.142
Table 31 Cold War baseline OLS regression results - continued

82
83
Table 32 Cold War price OLS regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITYSCORE -0.0290*** -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0292*** -0.0291*** -0.0290*** -0.0290*** -0.0291***
(0.00445) (0.00437) (0.00441) (0.00444) (0.00442) (0.00445) (0.00442) (0.00446)
INCINEQ 0.0212* 0.0213* 0.0206* 0.0212* 0.0208* 0.0213* 0.0219* 0.0211*

(0.00915) (0.00947) (0.00917) (0.00911) (0.00916) (0.00918) (0.00927) (0.00918)
PEACE -0.00275*** -0.00283*** -0.00274*** -0.00279*** -0.00278*** -0.00275*** -0.00270*** -0.00275***

(0.000438) (0.000440) (0.000439) (0.000444) (0.000442) (0.000443) (0.000440) (0.000439)
LNAREA -0.156** -0.159** -0.154** -0.153** -0.154** -0.156** -0.158** -0.155**

(0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0536) (0.0536) (0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0534) (0.0534)
COFFPR -0.000426 0.00303

(0.00390) (0.00306)
COTTPR 0.00402 0.00306

(0.00611) (0.00358)
MAIZEPR 0.00223 0.00224

(0.00756) (0.00316)
RICEPR 0.00683 -0.000106

(0.00580) (0.00277)
SUGARPR -0.00439* -0.00150

(0.00184) (0.00101)
WHEATPR -0.00119 0.000734

(0.00626) (0.00270)
_cons 7.271*** 6.810*** 7.109*** 6.984*** 7.064*** 7.279*** 7.434*** 7.192***

(0.830) (0.906) (0.840) (0.885) (0.860) (0.847) (0.828) (0.853)
N 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406
adj. R2 0.228 0.232 0.229 0.228 0.228 0.227 0.231 0.227
84
Table 33 Cold War price change OLS regression results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

POLITYSCORE -0.0290*** -0.0297*** -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0290*** -0.0290*** -0.0292*** -0.0292***
(0.00445) (0.00445) (0.00443) (0.00442) (0.00445) (0.00445) (0.00439) (0.00446)
INCINEQ 0.0212* 0.0223* 0.0210* 0.0212* 0.0215* 0.0214* 0.0220* 0.0220*

(0.00915) (0.00947) (0.00917) (0.00918) (0.00922) (0.00919) (0.00927) (0.00929)
PEACE -0.00275*** -0.00279*** -0.00274*** -0.00276*** -0.00274*** -0.00275*** -0.00276*** -0.00275***

(0.000438) (0.000437) (0.000440) (0.000439) (0.000437) (0.000438) (0.000436) (0.000437)
LNAREA -0.156** -0.155** -0.156** -0.158** -0.155** -0.156** -0.155** -0.155**

(0.0537) (0.0537) (0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0536) (0.0537) (0.0535) (0.0536)
COFFPRCHG 0.00167 0.00196

(0.00262) (0.00251)
RICEPRCHG 0.00475 -0.000820

(0.00462) (0.00245)
WHEATPRCHG -0.00671 -0.00248

(0.00764) (0.00317)
MAIZEPRCHG 0.00381 -0.00156

(0.00685) (0.00352)
SUGARPRCHG -0.00264 -0.00247*

(0.00141) (0.00124)
COTTPRCHG -0.00297 -0.00347

(0.00386) (0.00361)
_cons 7.271*** 7.248*** 7.280*** 7.319*** 7.263*** 7.267*** 7.262*** 7.232***

(0.830) (0.843) (0.830) (0.831) (0.831) (0.831) (0.833) (0.833)
N 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406
adj. R2 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.228 0.227 0.227 0.234 0.228
85
Table 34 Cold War baseline Tobit regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITYSCORE -0.0290*** -0.0254*** -0.0293***

(0.00442) (0.00525) (0.00408)
INCINEQ 0.0212* 0.00254 0.0291**

(0.00910) (0.0127) (0.00947)
PEACE -0.00275*** -0.00301*** -0.00299***

(0.000436) (0.000455) (0.000335)
LNAREA -0.156** -0.0530

(0.0534) (0.0769)
GDPGROWTH -0.0142 -0.116***

(0.0270) (0.0189)
PRIMCOMM -1.348 2.985***

(1.901) (0.657)
OIL -0.0609 0.736***

(0.364) (0.200)
ETHFRAC 0.000135*
(0.0000597)
OPENNESS 0.628
(0.640)
LNPOP -0.195
(0.210)
_cons 7.271*** 10.92*** 6.239*** 6.108*** 5.013*** 6.695*** 5.765*** 6.027***

(0.826) (3.043) (0.0677) (0.0673) (0.426) (0.0836) (0.0915) (0.0693)
sigma
_cons 1.501*** 1.415*** 1.701*** 1.845*** 1.696*** 1.839*** 1.734*** 1.775***
(0.0526) (0.0540) (0.0375) (0.0387) (0.0473) (0.0395) (0.0358) (0.0360)
N 406 366 692 846 406 849 780 745

pseudo R-sq 0.069 0.093 0.013 0.016 0.006 0.017 0.009 0.005
86
Table 35 Cold War baseline Tobit regression results - continued

(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
POLITYSCORE
INCINEQ
PEACE -0.00278*** -0.00259*** -0.00245***

(0.000361) (0.000375) (0.000384)
LNAREA -0.173*** -0.114* -0.158**

(0.0438) (0.0519) (0.0539)
GDPGROWTH -0.0692*** -0.0744*** -0.0815***

(0.0172) (0.0177) (0.0182)
PRIMCOMM 2.009**
(0.735)
OIL
ETHFRAC 0.000227*** 0.000205*** 0.000180*** 0.000157***

(0.0000347) (0.0000360) (0.0000392) (0.0000383)
OPENNESS 1.244*** 1.181*** 0.934*** 0.616**

(0.179) (0.186) (0.202) (0.233)
LNPOP -0.240***
(0.0442)
_cons 5.641*** 7.321*** 10.17*** 8.076*** 7.215*** 8.184*** 8.185***

(0.0878) (0.170) (0.754) (0.472) (0.188) (0.508) (0.491)
sigma
_cons 1.720*** 1.827*** 1.734*** 1.878*** 1.563*** 1.545*** 1.531***
(0.0342) (0.0378) (0.0357) (0.0397) (0.0374) (0.0395) (0.0411)
N 772 832 781 801 681 636 635

pseudo R-sq 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.004 0.057 0.051 0.055
87
Table 36 Cold War price Tobit regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITYSCORE -0.0290*** -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0292*** -0.0291*** -0.0290*** -0.0291*** -0.0290***

(0.00442) (0.00432) (0.00439) (0.00441) (0.00440) (0.00442) (0.00443) (0.00439)
INCINEQ 0.0212* 0.0213* 0.0206* 0.0212* 0.0208* 0.0213* 0.0211* 0.0219*

(0.00910) (0.00935) (0.00911) (0.00905) (0.00911) (0.00912) (0.00913) (0.00921)
PEACE -0.00275*** -0.00283*** -0.00274*** -0.00279*** -0.00278*** -0.00275*** -0.00275*** -0.00270***

(0.000436) (0.000434) (0.000436) (0.000441) (0.000439) (0.000440) (0.000437) (0.000437)
LNAREA -0.156** -0.159** -0.154** -0.153** -0.154** -0.156** -0.155** -0.158**

(0.0534) (0.0530) (0.0533) (0.0532) (0.0532) (0.0534) (0.0530) (0.0531)
COFFPR -0.000426 0.00303

(0.00385) (0.00304)
RICEPR 0.00683 -0.000106

(0.00572) (0.00275)
WHEATPR -0.00119 0.000734

(0.00618) (0.00269)
MAIZEPR 0.00223 0.00224

(0.00747) (0.00314)
SUGARPR -0.00439* -0.00150

(0.00182) (0.00100)
COTTPR 0.00402 0.00306

(0.00603) (0.00356)
_cons 7.271*** 6.810*** 7.109*** 6.984*** 7.064*** 7.279*** 7.192*** 7.434***

(0.826) (0.895) (0.835) (0.879) (0.854) (0.842) (0.848) (0.822)
sigma
_cons 1.501*** 1.487*** 1.499*** 1.500*** 1.500*** 1.501*** 1.501*** 1.497***
(0.0526) (0.0535) (0.0532) (0.0534) (0.0531) (0.0526) (0.0528) (0.0522)
N 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406
pseudo R-sq 0.069 0.074 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.070
88
Table 37 Cold War price change Tobit regression results

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLITYSCORE -0.0290*** -0.0297*** -0.0289*** -0.0288*** -0.0290*** -0.0290*** -0.0292*** -0.0292***

(0.00442) (0.00440) (0.00441) (0.00439) (0.00442) (0.00442) (0.00437) (0.00443)
INCINEQ 0.0212* 0.0223* 0.0210* 0.0212* 0.0215* 0.0214* 0.0220* 0.0220*

(0.00910) (0.00935) (0.00912) (0.00912) (0.00916) (0.00914) (0.00921) (0.00924)
PEACE -0.00275*** -0.00279*** -0.00274*** -0.00276*** -0.00274*** -0.00275*** -0.00276*** -0.00275***

(0.000436) (0.000432) (0.000437) (0.000436) (0.000434) (0.000435) (0.000433) (0.000435)
LNAREA -0.156** -0.155** -0.156** -0.158** -0.155** -0.156** -0.155** -0.155**

(0.0534) (0.0530) (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0533) (0.0534) (0.0531) (0.0532)
COFFPRCHG 0.00167 0.00196

(0.00258) (0.00249)
RICEPRCHG 0.00475 -0.000820

(0.00456) (0.00244)
WHEATPRCHG -0.00671 -0.00248

(0.00754) (0.00315)
MAIZEPRCHG 0.00381 -0.00156

(0.00677) (0.00350)
SUGARPRCHG -0.00264 -0.00247*

(0.00139) (0.00123)
COTTPRCHG -0.00297 -0.00347

(0.00381) (0.00359)
_cons 7.271*** 7.248*** 7.280*** 7.319*** 7.263*** 7.267*** 7.262*** 7.232***

(0.826) (0.832) (0.825) (0.825) (0.826) (0.826) (0.828) (0.828)
sigma
_cons 1.501*** 1.490*** 1.500*** 1.500*** 1.501*** 1.501*** 1.494*** 1.500***
(0.0526) (0.0536) (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0530) (0.0527)
N 406 406 406 406 406 406 406 406
pseudo R-sq 0.069 0.072 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.071 0.069
Chapter 5
Conclusion
The most important findings of my study are that grievance variables influence
the severity of conflict, OIL was a significant variable for Africa, and population is a
significant variable for Africa. Except for LNPOP, the variables in the baseline equations
were consistent with my predictions. POLITYSCORE, INCINEQ, PEACE,
GDPGROWTH and LNAREA have a negative relationship to severity while
COLDWAR, ETHFRAC, and OPENNESS have a positive relationship. PRIMCOMM
and OIL, proxies for natural resource abundance and opportunity, have a positive
relationship to severity. This could mean rebels engage in conflict when they can profit
from resources. It is also interesting to note the differences between the global, regional,
and Cold War models. In the models for Africa, OIL is significant and has a positive
correlation to severity. Africa was the only model that included LNPOP in its baseline
and the only baseline model not to include POLITYSCORE. The LNPOP finding is
interesting because it means that the distribution of populations may have different
consequences based on other characteristics of a region.
Except for the Cold War and Africa regressions, world commodity price
information seems to be insignificant. Although a few price and price change coefficients
are significant they are very small. In the Africa OLS and Tobit regressions, the prices of
90
coffee and cotton have small positive coefficients and are significant when regressed with
the baseline. The price of sugar is significant in the Cold War OLS and Tobit models
when regressed with all other price and baseline variables. The sugar price change
variable is also significant in the Cold War OLS and Tobit regressions but it is significant
when regressed individually without other price change variables.
My OLS models explained less than 30% of the variation in LNDEATHS and my
Tobit models explained less than 10%. The weaknesses of my analysis are
multicollinearity, how I use commodity price information, and the fact my sample may
not be random. Poverty is a large determinant of civil war onset and most countries in my
sample are impoverished. Many of my independent variables have some relation to each
other (e.g., many authoritative regimes prosper because they are in poor countries). A
way for future research to solve this problem is to use instrumental variables. I use price
level and price change variables without including a measure of how important each
commodity is to the region where a battle year takes place. It is hard to include such a
variable because of multicollinearity: a ratio of how much land is used to grow a specific
crop to the total land area is related to poverty and other variables that influence why
citizens choose to farm certain crops. Since I compiled my dataset from a variety of
sources, my sample may not be random. For example, the battle deaths and income
inequality data is limited by the inability of researchers to gather information in some
situations. As the information about battle deaths and other variables improves,
researchers can create better models. A new direction for future research could be an
investigation of the link between commodity prices, labor intensity, and crop importance.
91
Although Dube and Vargas study this question from the perspective of Columbia,
researchers should try to come up with global and regional models. Future studies should
also examine the role of OIL African conflicts.
Although my adjusted and pseudo R2 values are relatively small, policymakers
can expand upon these ideas. There short-term and long-term policies that can address the
grievance citizens feel. For example, if a country seems to be on the brink of violence and
has a history of income inequality, a nongovernmental organization or international
organization could create economic opportunities for citizens by subsidizing certain
industries.
Data Appendix
COLDWAR Dummy variable assigned a 1 if a

battle year takes place before 1991
and 0 if a battle year is after 1991.
ETHFRAC A measure of ethnic concentration.
GDPGROWTH The difference between LN(GNP
per capita)
in the year before the observation
and LN (GNP per capita) two years
before the observation.
INCINEQ An index if income inequality in
income shares per quintile.
LNAREA The natural log of the land area.
LNPOP The natural log of the population.
COFFPR, COTTPR, MAIZEPR, The world prices of coffee, cotton,
RICEPR, SUGARPR, WHEATPR maize, rice, sugar, and wheat.
COFFPRCHG, COTTPRCHG, The percent change in world price
MAIZEPRCHG, RICEPRCHG, from the previous year (coffee,
SUGARPRCHG, WHEATPRCHG cotton, maize, rice, sugar, and
wheat).
OIL Dummy variable assigned a 1 if a
country exports oil and 0 if a
country does not.
OPENNESS An aggregate measure of the effects
of language, geographic remoteness,
and population.
PEACE The number of peaceful months
before the observation.
POLITYSCORE A measure of regime authority.
PRIMCOMM Ratio of primary commodity exports
to GDP.
References
Bennett, D. S., and Allan C. S. III. 1996. The Duration of Interstate Wars, 1816-1985. The
American Political Science Review 90, no. 2:239-257.
Ciccone, Antonio, and Brückner, Markus. 2007. Growth, Democracy, and Civil War.
SSRN.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of
Civil Conflict. Defence and Peace Economics 13, no. 6:435-450.
Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke. 2002. Aid, Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict
Societies. Vol. 2902. Copyright: Information provided in collaboration with the
RePEc Project: http://repec.org.
Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke. 2002. Military Expenditure: Threats, Aid, and Arms
Races. Vol. 2927. Copyright: Information provided in collaboration with the RePEc
Project: http://repec.org.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa. Journal
of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1:13-28.
Collier, Paul, and Hoeffler, Anke. 1999. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Vol. 2355.
Copyright: Information provided in collaboration with the RePEc Project: http://
repec.org.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1999. Justice-seeking and loot-seeking in civil war.
Washington, DC: World Bank. Accessed from http://econ.worldbank.org/files/
13203_CHJusticeSeeking.pdf/.
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. 1998. On Economic Causes of Civil War. Oxford
Economic Papers 50, no. 4:563-573.
de Soysa, Indra. 2002. Paradise Is a Bazaar? Greed, Creed, and Governance in Civil War,
1989-99. Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 4:395-416.
Deininger, Klaus, and Lyn Squire. 1996. A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality.
World Bank Economic Review 10, no. 3:565-591.
94
Djankov, Simeon, and Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2007. The Colonial Origins of Civil
War.Copyright: Information provided in collaboration with the RePEc Project: http://
repec.org.
Dube, Oeindrila, and Vargas, Juan F. 2006. Resource Curse in Reverse: The Coffee Crisis
and Armed Conflict in Colombia. Vol. 06/05. Copyright: Information provided in
collaboration with the RePEc Project: http://repec.org.
Elbadawi, Ibrahim A.1999. Civil wars and poverty: The role of external interventions,
political rights and economic growth. Paper presented at the World Bank's
Conference on "Civil Conflicts, Crime and Violence," February, Washington, DC.
Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Håvard Hegre. 2008. Globalization, Economic Shocks, And
Internal Armed Conflict. Defence and Peace Economics 19, no. 1:37.
Eriksson, Mikael, Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Sollenberg. 2003. Armed Conflict,
1989-2002. Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 5:593-607.
Fearon, James D. 2004. Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer than Others?
Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 3:275-301.
Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1:75-90.
Ghobarah, Hazem A., Paul Huth, and Bruce Russett. 2003. Civil Wars Kill and Maim
People--Long after the Shooting Stops. American Political Science Review 97, no.
2:189-202.
Gissinger, Ranveig, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 1999. " Globalization and Conflict:
Welfare, Distribution, and Political Unrest." Journal of World-Systems Research 5:
274– 300.
Goldstone, Jack A, Ted Robert Gurr, Barbara Harff, Marc A. Levy, Monty G. Marshall,
Robert H. Bates, David L. Epstein, Colin H. Kahl, Pamela T. Surko, John C. Ulfelder,
and Alan N. Unger. In consultation with Matthew Christenson, Geoffrey D. Dabelko,
Daniel C. Esty, and Thomas M. Parris. State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III
Findings. McLean, VA: Science Applications International Corporation, 30
September 2000.
Gurr, Ted R. 1985. On the Political Consequences of Scarcity and Economic Decline.
International Studies Quarterly 29, no. 1:51-75.
95
Gurr, Ted R., and Mark I. Lichbach. 1986. Forecasting Internal Conflict: A Competitive
Evaluation of Empirical Theories. Comparative Political Studies 19, no. 1:3-38.
Gurr, Ted R., and Mark I. Lichbach. 1986. Forecasting Internal Conflict: A Competitive
Evaluation of Empirical Theories. Comparative Political Studies 19, no. 1:3-38.
Hegre, Havard. 2004. The Duration and Termination of Civil War. Journal of Peace
Research 41, no. 3:243-252.
King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001. Improving forecasts of state failure. World Politics
53, no. 4:623-658.
Krause, Volker, and Susumu Suzuki. 2005. Causes of Civil War in Asia and Sub-Saharan
Africa: A Comparison. Social Science Quarterly 86, no. 1:160-177.
Lacina, Bethany. 2006. Explaining the Severity of Civil Wars. Journal of Conflict
Resolution 50, no. 2:276-289.
Lacina, Bethany & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005. 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A
New Dataset of Battle Deaths', European Journal of Population 21(2–3): 145–166.
Marshall, Monty G., & Jaggers, Keith. (2000). Polity IV project: Political regime
characteristics and transitions, 1800-1999. University of Maryland, Center for
International Development and Conflict Management. http://
www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm Accessed February 15, 2008.
Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. Economic Shocks and
Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. Journal of Political Economy
112, no. 4:725-753.
Miguel, Edward, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. 2004. Economic Shocks and
Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. Journal of Political Economy
112, no. 4:725-753.
Montalvo, Jose G., and Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. Why Ethnic Fractionalization?
Polarization, Ethnic Conflict and Growth.Copyright: Information provided in
collaboration with the RePEc Project: http://repec.org.
Muller, Edward N., and Erich Weede. 1990. Cross-National Variation in Political
Violence: A Rational Action Approach. Journal of Conflict Resolution 34, no.
4:624-651.
Murdoch, James C., and Todd Sandler. 2002. Economic Growth, Civil Wars, and Spatial
Spillovers. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1:91-110.
96
Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil Wars. Journal of
Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1:29-54.
Reynal-Querol, Marta. 2002. Political Systems, Stability and Civil Wars. Defence and
Peace Economics 13, no. 6:465-483.
Reynal-Querol, Marta, and Djankov, Simeon. 2007. The causes of civil war. Vol. 4254.
Copyright: Information provided in collaboration with the RePEc Project: http://
repec.org.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2002. A Review of Recent Advances and Future Directions in the
Quantitative Literature on Civil War. Defence and Peace Economics 13, no.
3:215-243.
Sambanis, Nicholas. 2001. Do Ethnic and Nonethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?:
A Theoretical and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1). Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no.
3:259-282.
Stock, James H., and Watson, Mark W., eds. 2003. Introduction to econometrics. Boston,
MA: Addison Wesley.
Summers, Robert & Heston, Alan, 1991. The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded
Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 106(2), pages 327-68, May.
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1999. Domestic Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Nepotism: A Comparative
Analysis. Journal of Peace Research 36, no. 1:55-73.
Weede, Erich. 1986. Income Inequality and Political Violence Reconsidered. American
Sociological Review 51, no. 3:438-441.
The World Bank Group. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development
Policy. http://go.worldbank.org/NVE73KUDJ0 Accessed April 01, 2008.
The World Bank Group. 2006. Economic Prospects 2007: Managing the Next Wave of
Globalization. http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/
EXTDECPROSPECTS/GEPEXT/EXTGEP2007/0,,contentMDK:
21139275~menuPK:3016149~pagePK:64167689~piPK:64167673~theSitePK:
3016125,00.html Accessed April 10, 2008.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2006. Trade and Development
Report 2007. http://www.unctad.org/Templates/webflyer.asp?
docid=7183&intItemID=2508&lang=1&mode=downloads Accessed March 10,
2008.
97

Civil Conflict Severity and Commodity Prices: A Nexus Between The Two?

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Civil Conflict Severity and Commodity Prices: A Nexus Between The Two?

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE

CIVIL CONFLICT SEVERITY AND COMMODITY PRICES: A NEXUS

DEAN GREGORY HESS

CANDACE MICHELLE WILLIAMS

FALL 2007 - SPRING 2008

APRIL 28, 2008

Copyright © 2008 by Candace Michelle Williams

I WOULD LIKE TO THANK EVERY EDUCATOR WHO BELIEVES MY INTELLECTUAL

expenditure is the level of expenditure of a government’s neighbors. Refugees burden

states.5 Civil wars endanger the lives of many people.

applied tariffs in developing countries (UNCTAD 2006). As developing nations are

civil war severity.

Literature Review: Greed, Grievance, and Globalization

to be able to mobilize resources in order to challenge governments, their economic status

7 RD is a sociological phenomenon where a population is unhappy about the status of economic

8 See Weede (1986)

civil war incidence (2008).13 In Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War, CH

impact on war incidence.

The importance of share of primary exports in GDP the CH models indicates

that increase the duration of civil wars.

Gissinger and Gleditsch’s (1999) study complements CH’s findings on the

economic integration. Opponents of this theory believe increased openness destabilizes

governments, intensifies horizontal inequalities, and threatens balanced development. The

themselves from economic deprivation.

According to their analysis, a high level of trade is conducive to peace, but

increased direct foreign investment creates instability.16 Exporters of manufactured goods

globalization on conflict could be indirect effects. There are characteristics of poor

countries that increase the probability of civil conflict.

importance of democracy and ethnic fractionalization.17,18 Eldabawi’s most important

most explanatory power.

same causes?”.20 Sambanis’ nonethnic model shows socioeconomic development

economic development indicators. Many socioeconomic indicators are nonsignificant.

Reynal-Querol and Djankov write a series of papers measuring the impact of

conflict using religious fragmentation to explain cleavages.21 Reynal-Querol argues

conflicting claims are based on interest groups or linguistic divisions.22 Reynal-Querol

Reynal-Querol find the quality of institutions is an important determinant of conflict and

Studies estimating the ability of democratic and economic institutions to attenuate

civil war incidence in autocracies. In democracies, there is not statistically significant

likely to experience failure.26 Infant mortality rates, ethnic discrimination, ethnic

Goldstone et al. over-forecast conflict because of outlier countries and autocorrelation.

polarization and democracy decrease the severity of civil wars.

In an unpublished manuscript, Dube and Vargas (2007) measure the impact of

price of labor-intensive commodities reduces conflict because citizens experience greater

opportunity. In municipalities where coffee (a labor-intensive good) is a primary export, a

rise in the price of coffee reduced violence disproportionately compared to non-coffee

and intensity of conflict in oil municipalities.

impact of fluctuations of international commodity prices on the severity of conflict.

I explore the determinants of battle severity conditional on a country suffering a

the literature, I include variables about world commodity prices.

Economic Development and Global Integration

challengers trying to control these resources.

I use measures of income inequality, oil dependence, and primary commodity

dependence to control for the impact of economic opportunity. Income inequality

commodity exports to GDP (PRIMCOMM) is a proxy for the abundance of natural

30 The Gini coefficient is reported in income shares per quintile.

levels of economic openness may be prone to exploitation, expropriation, and other

population to show how open a country is to trade.

the level of democracy.32

The Cold War

There is no consensus about whether or not the ethnic composition of a nation

heterogeneity may proxy ethnic tensions. I use ethno-linguistic fractionalization index

(ETHFRAC) to proxy tension.

goods. COFFPRCHG, COTTPRCHG, RICEPRCHG, MAIZEPRCHG, SUGARPRCHG,