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Academic Freedom
ARTICLE XIV EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ARTS, CULTURE AND SPORTS EDUCATION Sec 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all. Sec 5(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

A. Academic Speech Students and junior professors (considered neophytes in the field) suffer real punishment for speech deemed inadequate by the masters. Compared to general civil society where the 1st Amendment opposes prior and subsequent restraint based on determination if the speech is valuable or not. The First Amendment value of academic speech rests on its commitment to truth (however partially understood by the discipline), its honesty and carefulness, its richness of meaning, its doctrinal freedom, and its invitation to criticism. society ought to strive towards speech that is truthful. Academic freedom resembles other free expression values insofar as it protects the individual scholar's point of view; it is distinct insofar as it protects those structures that permit the individual scholar to engage with others in collective scholarship B. Student Speech and Extracurricular Political Activity

BYRNE article: ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A SPECIAL CONCERN OF THE 1ST AMMENDMENT J. Peter Byrne I. INTRODUCTION

The First Amendment protects academic freedom but there has been no adequate analysis of what academic freedom the Constitution protects or why it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in the law. Authors definition of academic freedom: non-legal term referring to the liberties claimed by professors through professional channels against administrative or political interference with research, teaching and governance. Of constitutional academic freedom: essence is the insulation of scholarship and liberal education from extramural political interference insulate the university in core academic affairs from state interference II. FIRST AMENDMENT ON CAMPUS

The term "academic freedom" should be reserved for those rights necessary for the preservation of the unique functions of the university, particularly the goals of disinterested scholarship and teaching. First Amendment rights w/c should not properly be a part of constitutional academic freedom: 1) no recognized student rights of free speech are properly part of constitutional academic freedom, because none of them has anything to do with scholarship or systematic learning (e.g. wearing of armbands, demonstrations, etc.) while the Constitution affords students at public institutions extensive civil rights, it affords them no rights of academic freedom at all. 2) the right of a professor to participate in political activity off campus and on her own time without institutional reprisal should not be viewed as a matter of constitutional academic freedom academic freedom should be understood to include only rights unique or necessary to the functions of higher education; exist as a necessary incident to university's commitment to the pursuit of truth and the controvertibility of dogma.

Concern is only with the substantive protection of academic freedom by the 1 st Amendment isolating which has been difficult because 1) courts have used legal doctrines not based on academic freedom to protect liberties of professors and students; 2) courts have declined to recognize a constitutional shield for many forms of classroom speech that seem at first blush to implicate general principles of free expression. Central paradox: The institutional right seems to give a university the authority to hire and fire without government interference those very individuals apparently granted a personal right to write and teach without institutional hindrance. Nonetheless, this paradox should be seen as neither collateral nor embarrassing; academic discourse benefits from the tension between the independence of a scholar's judgment and the university's evaluation of her professional competence.

C.

Tenure

Tenure is not equal to academic freedom but it promotes academic freedom since it requires public airing of explicit and categorically neutral reasons for dismissal. does not protect academic freedom of

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untenured since they will direct their scholarship to those likely to be accepted by the tenured. Humanistic values: valuable knowledge includes ideas that arent scientifically demonstrable and that students must receive a coherent education in the traditions of civilized thought, writing and art. The democratic value in higher education reflects the demands placed on our colleges and universities by the society at large that they help fulfill broad goals of social mobility and general prosperity.

III.

A.

THE AMERICAN TRADITION ACADEMIC FREEDOM Early History and Structure

OF

The structural elements that would give shape to academic freedom were established early: legal control by non-academic trustees; effective governance by administrators set apart from the faculty by political allegiance and professional orientation; dependent and insecure faculty.

E.

Professional Standard

Competence

as

Regulatory

B.

The Rise of the Scientific Research Value

Higher education began to be seen as scientific training for practical jobs rather than moral training of gentlemen for elite professions. The change is usefully, if simple-mindedly, expressed as a movement from a paradigm of fixed values vouchsafed by religious faith to one of relative truths continuously revised by scientific endeavor. Changes in the structure enlarged the status of the faculty now highly-trained professionals. Yet low salary and uncertain tenure remained They were no longer dependent on the will of clergymen but answerable to businessmen. Academic freedom became rallying cry for professors seeking more control over their professional lives. C. Development of the Concept of Academic Freedom

The integrity of academic freedom depends on the good faith of the professorate and on its collective ability to distinguish between scholars who disagree with accepted findings and those who do not understand them. what defines competence? When this question arises trouble develops. Without agreement about basic paradigms, competence loses much of the neutrality that might ordinarily be assumed, as there may be no shared criterion for evaluation.

IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE INDIVIDUAL SCHOLAR

Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy: university freedom for teaching and scholarship without interference from government is a positive right and that the state here had failed to provide a compelling justification for questioning an academic about the content of a lecture the four essential freedoms" of a university--to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study Three significant oddities about the plurality and concurring opinions in Sweezy: 1) never before had the Court suggested that academic freedom was protected by the 1 st Amendment. 2) Frankfurters decision looks solely to non-legal sources to describe the contents of acad. freedom 3) Although the content of acad. freedom was drawn from non-legal sources, they praised acad freedom by stressing the social utility of free universities. Sweezy endowed the new constitutional right of academic freedom with a legacy of triumphant rhetoric but also with an ambiguous description of the relationship between academic custom and positive legal right. The Court's decision not to ground its ruling on a positive right of academic freedom, moreover, presaged the Court's refusal to give this right the

Problem was the interference by the lay board of trustees or regents. Professors demanded that no ideological test be applied and evaluation done by professional peers. The American concept of academic freedom emerged from this ideological and practical conflict between academic social scientists and their lay employers. American Assoc. of University Professors (AAUP) insisted on a clear distinction between speech that was academic and that which was merely political or sectarian. AAUPs vision of academic freedom: 1) noble vision of the academic calling; 2) eliminates gravest evils of lay control over universities; 3) concept of peer review according to professional standards.

D.

The Challenge of other Academic Values

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practical force promised. that its rhetorical enthusiasms

A.

The Supreme Court and Institutional Academic Freedom

Also in other cases, Barenblatt and Keyishian, the Court's use of rhetoric to define the content of academic freedom increases the ambiguity already created by basing the case's holding upon vagueness. However, despite their analytical shortcomings, Sweezy and Keyishian contributed substantially to the virtual extinction of overt efforts by non-academic government officials to prescribe political orthodoxy in university teaching and research.

Academic freedom is described by Frankfurter not as a limitation on the grounds or procedures by which academics may be sanctioned but as "the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a university." Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Widmar v. Vincent represents both a refreshing acknowledgment that universities must and should distinguish among speakers on the basis of the content of their speech and a pioneering inquiry into which university administrative decisions the First Amendment should protect. Thus, core academic administrative decisions-determining who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study-cannot be interfered with by civil authorities without impairing the unique virtues of academic speech. When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment. Academic Abstention It describes the traditional refusal of courts to extend common law rules of liability to colleges where doing so would interfere with the college administration's good faith performance of its core functions. The recognition of authority over internal affairs and the exclusion of judicial governance go hand in hand; they amount to a substantial degree of common law autonomy. Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as academic abstention raised to constitutional status, so that judges can consider whether statutes or regulations fail to give sufficient consideration to the special needs or prerogatives of the academic community. State Constitutional Law The tradition of constitutional autonomy for state universities seems to have contributed to the development of the federal right of institutional academic freedom. At a minimum, it confirms the persistence of the view, inherent in academic abstention, that civil authorities ought to respect the special needs and values of universities, even when erected and supported by the state.

Constitutional Academic State Action Doctrine: An Aside

Freedom

and

the

Faculty and students at state universities enjoy extensive substantive and procedural constitutional rights against their institutions while faculty and students at private institutions enjoy none. Thus, the state action doctrine mandates judicial enforcement of constitutional liberties against institutional infringements for half the nation's academics and denies it to the other half for reasons which, if desirable at all, are very far removed from the realities of academic life The Proper Scope of Judicial Intervention Courts seem entirely ill-equipped to resolve these disputes. Asked to protect the academic freedom of a candidate denied tenure by faculty vote, a court would need to determine what, in fact, are the requirements for tenure, whether the candidate met the requirements, and whether the faculty rejected the candidate for some non-academic reason. Such an inquiry, backed by the coercive power of the state, would put the department or school into intellectual receivership, with the court determining the appropriate paradigms of thought. Courts then should only ascertain if the administrators can establish that they in good faith rejected the candidate on academic grounds. The Court has come to limit the judiciary's role to excluding non-academics from imposing ideological criteria on academic decision-making, while refusing to impose substantive limits on academic administrators who in good faith penalize faculty for academic speech V. CONSTITUTIONAL ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE PROTECTION OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

While the right to institutional academic freedom has arisen at the time in our history when universities have been most subject to federal regulation, no federal regulation has been invalidated under the right. As in Sweezy and Keyishian, the new turn in academic freedom has flowered in dicta and rhetoric more than in holdings and rules

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Constitutional academic freedom can perhaps best be seen as a principle that regulation should not proceed so far as to deprive the university of control over its academic destiny. This principle has been fashioned by courts, explaining why they restrain themselves from imposing farreaching constitutional or common law duties on the university. As such, it represents academic abstention raised to a constitutional level. Institutional Academic Freedom and the First Amendment And what are the indigenous values served by universities? 1) the university is the preeminent institution in our society where knowledge and understanding are pursued with detachment or disinterestedness. 2) The disinterested search for knowledge fosters a manner of discourse that, at its best, is careful, critical, and ambitious 3) The university aspires to instill in those entering adulthood a capacity for mature and independent judgment. Preserving the fundamental academic values of disinterested inquiry, reasoned and critical discourse, and liberal education justifies a constitutional right of academic freedom. These goals give intellectual and educational expression to the vision of human reason implicit in the Constitution. Who are do be protected by constitutional academic freedom? Universities that do not respect the academic freedom of professors (understood as the core of the doctrine developed by the AAUP) or the essential intellectual freedom of students (a concept barely developed) ought not to be afforded institutional autonomy. VI. CONCLUSION Through repetition, the scope of institutional autonomy has come to be understood as the four freedoms offered by Justice Frankfurter: "'to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. The four freedoms adequately express the degree of autonomy necessary for a university to harbor liberal studies. The great virtue of these freedoms is that they recognize that liberal studies involve more than the simple act of speaking-that they require "'that atmosphere which is most *340 conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. This requires security, stimulation, tolerance, generosity of mind, the hiring of competent people, and the reward of excellence. Constitutional protection can preserve the possibility that academics might attain the goals of learning and scholarship. It cannot do more; it should not do less.

FACTS: Defendant, Paul Sweezy, was convicted of contempt for failure to answer questions asked by the Attorney General of New Hampshire In 1951 a statute was passed by the New Hampshire legislature to regulate subversive acts. In 1953, legislature adopted a joint resolution authorizing the attorney general to make full and complete investigations with respect to violations of the subversive activities act of 1951 which includes among others authorizing him to act upon his own motion and upon such information as in his judgment may be reasonable or reliable. o Statute defines a person to be subversive if he, by any means, aids in the commission of any act intended to assist in the alteration of the constitutional form of govt by force or violence.

Sweezy was summoned to appear on two separate occasions in 1954 under suspicion of subversion in connection with the membership of his wife in the Progressive Party, an article he wrote wherein he affirmed that he styled himself as a classical Marxist and a socialist, and a lecture he delivered on March 22, 1954 for a humanities course at the university. Petitioner answered most of the questions but declined to answer certain questions about his knowledge regarding the Progressive Party in his 1st appearance and about the lecture he delivered and his opinions or beliefs in his 2 nd appearance stating only that he hat never been a member of the Communist Party. Because of his continuous decline to answer he was cited in contempt.

ISSUE: W/N the investigation deprived Sweezy of due process of law under the 14th Amendment HELD: Yes. It is recognized that the right to lecture or associate are civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution but they are not absolute rights. o In this case, it is believed that there was an unquestionable invasion of the petitioners liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political expression areas in which the government should be extremely reticent to tread. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities

SWEEZY vs. NEW HAMPSHIRE 06/15/57.Warren, CJ:

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would imperil the future of our Nation. In this case, the record does no reveal what reasonable or reliable information led the Attorney General to question petitioner (no showing of probable cause) therefore, if the interrogation of the Attorney General was in fact entirely unrelated to the object of the legislature in authorizing such inquiry, the Due Process Clause would preclude the endangering of constitutional liberties and can be treated as an absence of authority to conduct the inquiry. Because of this there can be no showing of a sufficient state interest to infringe the constitutional rights of the petitioner. university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which prevail the four essential freedoms of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. The inviolability of privacy belonging to a citizens political loyalties has so overwhelming an importance to the wellbeing of our kind of society that it cannot be constitutionally encroached upon on the basis of so meager a countervailing interest of the State as may be argumentatively found in the remote, shadowy threat to the security of New Hampshire allegedly presented in the origins and contributing elements of the Progressive Party and the petitioners relations to these. GARCIA vs. FACULTY ADMISSION COMMITTEE Epicharis (wat a name) Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee represented by Fr. Lambino 1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A. in Theology; 2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for the first semester, 197576, Respondent told her about the letter he had written her, informing her of the faculty's decision to bar her from re-admission in their school; reason in the letter: Pet.s frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class although she ahd the requisite intellectual capability 3. That the reasons stated in said letter, dated May 19, 1975 ... do not constitute valid legal ground for expulsion, for they neither present any violation of any of the school's regulation, nor are they indicative of gross misconduct; 4. That from June 25, 1975, Petitioner spent much time and effort in said school for the purpose of arriving at a compromise that would not duly inconvenience the professors and still allow her to enjoy the benefits of the kind of instruction that the school has to offer, but all in vain; she was in fact told by Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering were unacceptable, their decision was final, and that it were better for her to seek for admission at the UST Graduate School; 5. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informed that she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfill their requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later in Theology which would entail about four to five years more of studies whereas in the Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, it would entail only about two years more;

Concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter: Whether the Attorney General of New Hampshire acted within the scope of the authority given him by the state legislature is not for the US SC to determine but is a matter for the decision of the courts of that State. Petitioner as mentioned answered most of the questions asked of him, making it known that he had never been a Communist, never taught the violent overthrow of the Government, never knowingly associated with Communists in the State, but was a socialist believer in peaceful change He refused to answer questions regarding: 1) a lecture given by him at the University of New Hampshire, 2) activities of himself and others in the Progressive political organizations, and 3) opinions and beliefs, invoking the constitutional guarantees of free speech SC stated that: For societys good if understanding be essential need of society inquiries and speculations into the natural sciences, into anthropology, economics, law, etc. must be left as unfettered as possible except for reasons that are exigent and obviously compelling. exclusion of governmental intrusion into the intellectual life of a university. Cites a quote from the Open Universities in South Africa: In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, it ideal being the ideal of Socrates to follow the argument where it leads. This implies the right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge It is the business of a

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6. Considering that time was of the essence in her case, and not wanting to be deprived of an opportunity for gaining knowledge necessary for her life's work, enrolled as a special student at said UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, even if she would not thereby be credited with any academic units for the subject she would take; 7. That Petitioner could have recourse neither to the President of her school, Fr. Jose Cruz, he being with the First Couple's entourage now in Red China, nor with the Secretary of Education, since this is his busiest time of the year, and June 11, 1975 is the last day for registration; ... " 8. She prayed for a writ of mandamus for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester Issues: WON the Faculty Admissions Committee had authority and discretion in allowing Pet. to continue studying or not? Held: Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit Ratio: 1.Pet. cannot compel the res by mandamus to admit her into further studies since the respondent had no clear duty to admit the pet. -That respondent Fr. Antonio B. Lambino, S.J., and/or the Loyola School of Theology thru its Faculty Admission Committee, necessarily has discretion as to whether to admit and/or to continue admitting in the said school any particular student, considering not only academic or intellectual standards but also other considerations such as personality traits and character orientation in relation with other students as well as considering the nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary. degree program because only the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School can make such admission; That in the case of petitioner, no acceptance by the Assistant Dean of the Ateneo de Manila Graduate School was given, so that she was not accepted to a degree program but was merely allowed to take some courses for credit during the summer of 1975; Being admitted to the school is a privilege and not a right. -There are standards that must be met. There are policies to be pursued. Discretion appears to be of the essence. In terms of Hohfeld's terminology, what a student in the position of petitioner possesses is a privilege rather than a right. She cannot therefore satisfy the prime and indispensable requisite of a mandamus proceeding. Such being the case, there is no duty imposed on the Loyola School of Theology. In a rather comprehensive memorandum of petitioner, who unfortunately did not have counsel, an attempt was made to dispute the contention of respondent. There was a labored effort to sustain her stand, but it was not sufficiently persuasive. It is understandable why. It was the skill of a lay person rather than a practitioner that was evident. While she pressed her points with vigor, she was unable to demonstrate the existence of the clear legal right that must exist to justify the grant of this writ. 2. the recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. -It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments - For the sociologist, Robert McIver it is "a right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation, or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted authority within or beyond the institution - philosopher Sidney Hook, this is his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines

- technical aspect of admissions: the Chairman of the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola School of Theology, which is a religious seminary situated in Loyola Heights, Quezon Cityis in in collaboration with the Ateneo de Manila University, the Loyola School of Theology allows some lay students to attend its classes and/or take courses in said Loyola School of Theology but the degree, if any, to be obtained from such courses is granted by the Ateneo de Manila University and not by the Loyola School of Theology; For the reason above given, lay students admitted to the Loyola School of Theology to take up courses for credit therein have to be officially admitted by the Assistant Dean of the Graduate School of the Ateneo de Manila University in order for them to be considered as admitted to a degree program Petitioner in the summer of 1975 was admitted by respondent to take some courses for credit but said admission was not an admission to a

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3. Court further discusses academic freedom that its reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. - Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." - Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of Dijon, France, "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the individual university teacher." (2 types) - "the four essential freedoms" of a university to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. 4. The decision is not to be construed as in any way reflecting on the scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondent due acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances deemed relevant. It could be that on more mature reflection, even petitioner would realize that her transfer to some other institution would redound to the benefit of all concerned. At any rate, as indicated earlier, only the legal aspect of the controversy was touched upon in this decision. 105. PHCR then announced that its application to increase school fees was approved by DECS. The student council then filed a motion for consideration. DECS then put the implementation on hold pending talks on the matter. In the meantime the CMT commandant gave a list of students with CMT deficiencies, with petitioner Isabelo being on the list. As such, he was expelled and not allowed to enroll for the next semester on the following grounds: * Non compliance of CMT requirement as per DECS Order No. 9, S. 1990 and DECS Memorandum No. 80, S. 1991 and PHCR Internal Memo. No. 891-007; * No NCEE during the admission in the BS Criminology course; * Official Admission Credential not yet submitted; * Void declaration of CMT subjects (MS 11, 12, 21 and 22) which are docketed in the registration card. Not being allowed into the school premises, Isabelo sent a letter to DECS. Director Rosas of DECS then issued Order No. 9 which stated: . . . concerning the dropping from the rolls without due process of the students petitioners . . . , Manuelito Isabelo, Jr., . . ., please be advised that pending resolution thereof, the propriety of allowing the students to continue attending their classes to protect their interest as well as that of the school, is hereby enjoined. In this connection, it is hereby directed that the abovenamed students be re-admitted to classes and be allowed to take all examinations that they have missed pending final resolution of this case/issue. PHCR did not comply with the directive. Petitioner claims that the reason why he was not being admitted was due to his being against the increase on tuition payments. Respondent school invokes academic freedom in the expulsion of Isabelo. ISSUE: ISABELO vs. PERPETUAL HELP. Vitug. FACTS: Petitioner Isabelo was a criminology student in Perpetual Help College of Rizal (PHCR). Being the PRO and acting Secretary of the student council, he was asked to sign Resolution No. 105, which would increase tuition payments by 20%. He refused to sign and asked for a 2-week period to talk it over with his fellow officers. After they met on the matter, the council presented a 9-point proposal. With an assurance that the request of the student council would be considered favorably, the petitioner finally signed Resolution No. WON Isabelos expulsion was within the schools academic freedom. HELD: NO RATIO: Here the court sites Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, which upheld the rule that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the school and that such an admission is a mere privilege, rather than a right, on the part of the student. Like any other right, however, academic freedom has never

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been meant to be an unabridged license. It is a privilege that assumes a correlative duty to exercise it responsibly. With regards to contracts, the court said that the contract between student and school is not one that is only on a semestral basis, but the student has a right to be enrolled for the entire period in order to complete his course. Finally the court says that the punishment of expulsion appears to us rather disproportionate to his having had some deficiencies in his CMT course. There is, however, an administrative determination to be made whether petitioner does indeed deserve to be a senior in PHCR. Case remanded to DECS for further proceedings. "three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in the College" as well as the BOR's 1001st resolution, wrote a letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested that they never intended to question the Faculty's right to academic freedom; that they believed the issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the college. The students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached was the letter to the UPCM Faculty. The RTC dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency meeting where it denied the appeal of the students by a vote of 86 on the ground that they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM. The students filed with the RTC a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. The RTC issued an order for the admission of the students to the college. The BOR in its 1031 st meeting resolved to approve the admission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them. The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with the CA. The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to follow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension. The CA dismissed the petition of the petitioners. The petitioners brought the issue before the SC. ISSUE: The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for them to admit the students. This prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus with the RTC. The RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission. After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction, the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolved that "the act of fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examination required in any college of the University is within the authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding the exercise of such act should be elevated and resolved finally by the University Council of the autonomous campus." In the interim, the RTC's order was questioned before the SC by the UPCM Committee on Admissions, which was dismissed. Hence, the students were admitted to the UPCM and passed three years in the college. 2. Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students, upon advice of the U.P. President and burdened with WoN the BOR violated the academic freedom of the petitioners. NO. The BOR could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to the college of medicine. RATIO: 1. The powers vested in the BOR and the UC by the UP Charter (Act No. 1870) are clear: to the BOR belongs the governance and the general powers of administration of the university and to the UC the power to fix the admission requirements to any college in the university. The University Code grants to the College Faculty the power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to the approval of the autonomous UC. Any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear the

REYES vs. COURT of APPEALS. Medialdea, 1991 FACTS: Respondent-students as then applicants to the University of the Philippines College of Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in the NMAT which was the cutoff score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986. However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. Upon appeal of some concerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996 th resolution reverted to the NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile.

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UC's approval. Otherwise, the same becomes unenforceable. 3. At the time the students took the NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile was without the UC'S and University Presidents approval. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is vested in the University Council of the autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the University of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). The UC has the final say in admission requirements provided the same conforms with law, rules and regulations of the university. In the event the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in the university, to step in and to correct the anomaly. The questioned order of the Board of Regents in upholding the admission requirement approved by the University Council in 1986 is supportive of right of the University Council to fix or approve admission requirements, against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the admission requirements approved by the University Council without following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University. We are, likewise, unconvinced by petitioners' arguments that the BOR's 1031 st is contrary to justice and equity because the students themselves judicially confessed that they have no right to admission. In their letter to the Faculty, The student's aforesaid feeling does not amount to a categorical admission of the absence of a legal right. Considering such antagonistic conditions, We can empathize with the students' mental anxiety and emotional strain in their three years in college in the company of some professors who looked down on them as academic pretenders. Furthermore, the students were pressed for time as they have only one more year before graduation. These circumstances combined with the advice of the U.P. President unduly influenced the students to write this reconciling letter. FACTS: Petitioner UP questions, in this petition for review on certiorari the Order of the lower court denying the motion to dismiss the complaint for damages filed against two of its professors for alleged derogatory statement uttered concerning the Tasadays, the cavedwelling inhabitants of the rain forest of Mindanao. August 15-17, 1986: The "International Conference on the Tasaday Controversy and Other Urgent Anthropological Issues" was held at the Philippine Social Science Center in Diliman, Quezon City. Jerome Bailen, Professor of the University of the Philippines (UP) Dept of Anthropology was the designated conference chairman. He presented therein the "Tasaday Folio," a collection of studies on Tasadays done by leading anthropologists who disputed the authenticity of the Tasaday find and suggested that the "discovery" in 1971 by a team led by former Presidential Assistant on National Minorities (PANAMIN) Minister Manuel Elizalde, Jr. was nothing more than a fabrication made possible by inducing Manobo and T'boli tribesmen to pose as primitive, G-stringed, leafclad cave dwellers. In the same conference, UP history professor, Zeus Salazar, traced in a publication the actual genealogy of the Tasadays to T'boli and Manobo ethnic groups. He likewise presented ABC's "20/20" videotaped television documentary showing interviews with natives claiming to have been asked by Elizalde to pose as Tasadays. Almost a year later or in July 1988, UP allegedly sent Salazar and Bailen to Zagreb, Yugoslavia to attend the 12th Intl Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences. There, Salazar and Bailen reiterated their claim that the Tasaday find was a hoax. Their allegations were widely publicized in several dailies. In their complaint, plaintiffs allege the ff causes of action: 1. defendants' conduct and statements that the Tasadays were nonexistent or frauds deprived them of their peace of mind and defiled the Tasadays' dignity and personality 2. defendants' contention that Elizalde caused the Tasadays to pose and pretend was defamatory and pictured the plaintiffs as dishonest and publicityseeking persons, thereby besmirching their reputation and causing them serious anxiety 3. defendants' "concerted efforts to publicly deny plaintiff Tasadays' personality and their existence as a distinct ethnic community within the forest area reserved under the Proclamation (No. 995) unjustly becloud or tend to becloud their rights thereunder 4. defendants' "deliberate and continuing campaign to vex and annoy" the Tasadays and the use of "false and perjured 'evidence' to debase and malign" them, caused them to incur attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

4.

5.

6.

7.

U.P. vs. COURT of APPEALS. J. Romero

consti 2: academic freedom

The plaintiffs invoked Art. 26 of the Civil Code and pegged their claims for moral and nominal damages at the "amount equivalent to defendants' combined salaries for two (2) months, estimated at P32,000.00." Procedural crap: Plaintiffs (defendants herein) filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief against the UP professors stating the above causes of action. UP filed a motion to intervene, stating that the UP profs were under their supervision. Salazar and Bailen filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. With the MFR denied in the lower court, they filed a petition for certiorari for gadalej, which was dismissed by the SC. Meanwhile, UP filed a motion to dismiss in the lower court, but it was struck off the record. In the CA, everything else was denied, because petitioners allegations were not stated in the complaint. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE HELD: 1. WON res judicata applies as regards the denial of the UP profs petition for certiorari NO 2. WON the UP professors are covered by the protective mantle of Academic Freedom YES, but UP should have defended its profs in the course of the trial case, instead of trying to terminate the proceedings prematurely Hence, the CAs denial of the profs motion to dismiss is AFFIRMED and the case is remanded. RATIO: 1. Super daming procedural crap nakakahilo. While it is true that the instant petition and the previous case revolve around the issue of WON the lower court correctly denied the motion to of the UP profs, there is an aspect of the case which takes it out of the ambit of the principle of res judicata (final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive upon the parties in any subsequent litigation involving the same cause of action) . The said principle applies when there is, among others, identity of parties and subject matter in two cases. Concededly, the fact that UP is the petitioner here while Salazar and Bailen were the petitioners in the previous case is not a hindrance to the application of res judicata because the situation is akin to the adding of other parties to a case which had been finally resolved in a previous one. UP was not an original party-defendant in the original suit, but it intervened and made common cause with Bailen and Salazar in alleging that the case should be dismissed in order to hold inviolate academic freedom, both individual and institutional. There is, therefore, a resultant substantial identity of parties, as both UP, on the one hand, and Bailen and Salazar, on the other hand, represent the same interests in the two petitions. However, the requisite of identity of subject matter in the two petitions is wanting. Private respondents identify the subject matter as "the trial judge's refusal . . . to dismiss the complaint against Bailen and Salazar. It should be noted, however, that two motions to dismiss the same complaint were filed in this case and they were separately resolved. The first was the one filed by Bailen and Salazar. The second motion to dismiss was filed by UP but on February 15, 1989, the lower court struck it off the record. Thus, to hold that res judicata applies to herein facts would be stretching to its limits the requirement of identity of subject matter. 2. Academic Freedom UP has no cause of action because there are insufficient allegations in its new complaint. It cannot invoke the same allegations in its original complaint because that has been previously struck off the record by the lower court. On its face, herein complaint, however, does not allege any right or interest of the petitioner that is affected by the complaint simply because it was not an original defendant. As correctly observed by the lower court, the complaint does not even show that petitioner authorized Bailen and Salazar to conduct a study on the Tasaday. Neither does it even appear that the trip to Zagreb, Yugoslavia of Bailen and Salazar was sanctioned or sponsored by the petitioner. Hence, by filing the motion to dismiss the complaint against Salazar and Bailen or by alleging defenses in its answer which amounted to invoking lack of cause of action as a ground for dismissal, the petitioner confined itself to the allegations of the complaint. On the other hand, a cause of action against Bailen and Salazar can be made out from the complaint: their acts and utterances allegedly besmirched the reputation of the plaintiffs as they were shown therein to have staged a fraud. This is not to say, however, that UP's intervention was improper. Coming to the defense of its faculty members, it had to prove that the alleged damaging acts and utterances of Bailen and Salazar were circumscribed by the constitutionally-protected principle of academic freedom. However, it should have championed the cause of Bailen and Salazar in the course of the trial of the case. It erred in trying to abort the proceedings at its inception through the device of filing the motion to dismiss. This procedural lapse, notwithstanding, no irremediable injury has been inflicted on the petitioner as, during the trial, it may still invoke and prove the special defense of institutional academic freedom as defined in Tangonan v. Pao and in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology. Since Bailen and Salazar had defaulted and thereby forfeited their right to notice of subsequent proceedings and to participate in the trial, petitioner's answer in intervention shall be the gauge in determining whether issues have been joined. With respect to the prayer of the complaint for "judgment declaring plaintiff Tasadays to be a distinct ethnic community within the territory defined under Presidential Proclamation No. 995" the lower court is cautioned that the same is akin to a prayer for a

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judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship which may not be granted in a petition for declaratory relief. The issue of WON Bailen and Salazar infringed on plaintiffs' civil and human rights when they maliciously and falsely spoke and intrigued to present plaintiffs Tasaday as fakers and impostors collaborating in a hoax or fraud upon the public with and under the supervision of plaintiff Elizalde, is not within the province of the court to make pronouncements on for these are matters beyond its expertise. competence and preparation for a medical school, Justice Florentino Feliciano raised the following point: - The test is the reasonable relation between the lawful method, which is prescribing the passing of the NMAR as condition for admission to medical schools, and the lawful subject the securing of the health and safety of the general community. - The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. - The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes also covers the admission to the practice. - For MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the lawful subject is the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical schools by upgrading through selectivity in the process of admission like limiting admission to those who passed the NMAT (lawful method). - Furthermore, the use of admission tests is widely used in the United States (Medical College Admission Test) and in other countries with more educational resources than that of the Philippines. - Ultimately, the measure contributes to the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance that could infiltrate the medical profession. - Test for the valid exercise police power involves the concurrence between: a. b. the interest of the of public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State; the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

DECS vs. SAN DIEGO. Cruz. The basic issue of the case is whether or not a person who failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) thrice, in violation of the three-flunk rule, is entitled to take it again. FACTS: Roberto Rey C. San Diego is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. He took the NMAT THREE times and flunked all of them [Court found that he actually failed FOUR times a misplaced persistence like a hopeless love]. When he applied for the FIFTH time, the DECS and the Director of Center for Educational Measurement rejected his application on the basis of the three-flunk rule: MECS [Minister of Education, Culture and Sports] Order No. 12, Series of 1972: A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) consecutive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. San Diego went to the RTC to compel his admission to the test. Through a petition for mandamus, he invoked his rights to academic freedom and quality education. He also raised the issues of due process and equal protection. By agreement of the parties, he was allowed to take the NMAT. RTC declared the Order invalid because it deprived San Diegos of his right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power. Angles of the Case : 1. MECS Order No. 12 creating the three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power. - In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, which upheld the constitutionality of the NMAR in limiting the admission to medical schools to those that initially proved their

2. Right to quality education is not absolute - While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a constitutional right to be a doctor A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one who want to be a lawyer may prove better a plumber, he should be so advised and advised. - San Diego must yield to the rule and the fact that there are other people who are more prepared than him, considering the crowded medical schools that we have today.

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3. The order does not violate the equal protection clause - A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things. There are substantial distinctions between medical students and other students who are not required to take the NMAT and not subjected to the three-flunk rule. The medical profession have a delicate responsibility towards society that warrants a different treatment towards them. Holding: The three-flunk rule is a valid exercise of police power. Court said that San Diegos intellectual capacity is not depreciated, rather, he may be meant for another calling. The rule is intended to avoid a nation of misfits square pegs trying to fit into round holds. The decision of the RTC declaring MECS Order No. 12 invalid is reversed. TABLARIN vs. GUTIERREZ. Feliciano FACTS: Teresita Tablarin and other students, in their behalf and in behalf of other applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken or taken but failed the NMAT during 1987-88 and for the future years to come, wants to be admitted into schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, Tablarin and company either did not take or failed the NMAT which is required by the Board of Medical Education (Board) and conducted by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the CEM from: a. enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of its objectives the standardization and regulation of the medical education. It created the Board of Medical Education composed by representatives from education government institutions, private medical specialty societies, association of medical schools and dean of the UP College of Medicine. The one of the administrative functions of the Board is to prescribe requirements for admission with necessary rules and regulations for proper implementation. The Medical Act of 1959 provides that one of the minimum requirements is certificate of eligibility given by the Board. requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission. MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985 provided a uniform admission test called the NMAT - The petitioners cited State Policies which include Article II, Section 11 on the dignity of every human person and human rights, Article II, Section 13 on the vital role of the youth in nation building, Article II, Section 17 on the priority to education. They also cited Article XIV, Section 1 giving emphasis to the phrase right of ALL citizens to quality education. Furthermore, the NMAT requirement is challenged as a violation of the fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements stated by Article XIV, Section 5 (3). - Court said that the petitioners did not demonstrated how the measures provided by the Board collide with these relatively specific State policies. In short, they were not able to present a prima facie case with regards to the State Policies angle. - About the right of all citizens to quality education, this phrase should not be construed as compelling to State to make quality education available across the board. Quality education, will be shouldered by the State in so far that the citizens were able to quality under fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. 2. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as amended [Medical Act of 1959] , is not an undue delegation of legislative power. - The general principle of non-delegation of powers (delegates non potest delegare or delegati potestas non potest delegare a delegated power may not be further delegated by the person to whom such power is delegated) flows from the fundamental rule of the separation of and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government. However, this rule was made to adapt to the complexities of the modern government referred to by Justice Laurel in Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The as an additional requirement for the issuance of the certificate of eligibility. proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMA, and administering the NMAT.

c. d.

The petition was denied by the RTC and the NMAT was conducted and administered. It was noted that the petitioners were not able to present a case of unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. Angles of the case: 1. Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382 , as amended [Medical Act of 1959], and MECS Order No. 52, s. of 1985 do not violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution presented by the petitioners.

b.

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Public Service Commission. This is known as the principle of subordinate legislation. - Standards for subordinate legislation may be expressed or implied. The body of the statute and the goal to standardize and regulate the medical profession satisfy the necessary standards required. 3. The NMAT is not an unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement which results in a denial of due process. - The petitioners did not specify what factors in the NMAT support their claim. If they are questioning the burden imposed by the NMAT, which would pertain to the utility and wisdom of the NMAT, then these are matters that should be addressed by the administrative and legislative bodies not by the Court. 4. The provisions questioned are part of the valid exercise of the police power of the State. - Police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power of the sovereign to promote the important interests and needs the general order of the general community. - The provisions pass the test for the valid exercise of police power: concurrence test between lawful subject and lawful method. 5. The flexible cut-off score that can be changed by the Board after consultation with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges does not violate the equal protection clause. - The measure is not arbitrary or capricious. It is a flexible measure that takes into consideration changes of different factors that would merit a commensurate change in the cut-off score like: number of students who reached the cut-off score in the previous year, available slots, average scores, level of difficulty of the examination. Setting a permanent cut-off scores would result to unreasonable rigidity. HOLDING: Prescribing the NMAT and requiring to pass successfully pass it as requirements for entering medical schools are not unconstitutional impositions. Decision of the RTC DENYING the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. NON vs. JUDGE DAMES FACTS: Petitioner students of Mabini Colleges were not allowed to re-enroll because they participated in student mass actions against their school the preceding sem On Feb 22, 1988, the date of the resumption of classes at Mabini College, petitioners continued their rally picketing, even though without any renewal permit, physically coercing students not to attend their classes, thereby disrupting the scheduled classes and depriving a great majority of students of their right to be present in their classes Together with the abovementioned fact, the lower court considered that in signing their enrollment forms, they waived the privilege to be re-enrolled. The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students xxx whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college xxx In addition the students signed pledges saying they respect their alma matter, that they will conduct themselves in a manner that would not put the college in a bad light. Judge Dames decision considering these facts said that what the students assert is a mere privileges not a legal right. Respondent Mabini College is free to admit or not to admit the petitioners for re-enrollment in view of the academic freedom enjoyed by the school. ISSUE/HELD: WON the doctrine laid down in Alcuaz insofar as it allowed schools to bar the re-admission or reenrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. The re-admission or reenrollment of students on the ground of termination of contract should be reversed. YES RATIO: In Alcuaz, it was said that enrollment is a written contract for one semester and contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties. At the end of each sem, the contract is deemed terminated. However, this case is not a simple case about a school refusing re-admission. The refusal to readmit or to re-enroll petitioners was decided upon and implemented by school authorities as a reaction to student mass actions This is a case that focuses on the right to speech and assembly as exercised by students vis--vis the right of school officials to discipline them. The student does not shed his constitutionally protected rights at the schoolgate. In protesting grievances disorder is more or less expected because emotions run high. That the

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protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Consti is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. Right to discipline cannot override constitutional safeguards. Citing Malabanan and Villar the court reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring students from enrolling. Under academic freedom, students my be barred from re-enrollment based on academic deficiencies. Permissible limitations on student exercise of constitutional rights within the school. Constitutional freedom of free speech and assembly also not absolute. However, imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process and penalty imposed must be proportionate to the offense committed. (procedural due process: right to be informed in writing, right to ans the charges, right to be informed of the charges against them, right to adduce evidence, and for this evidence to be duly considered) The nature of contract between a school and its students is not an ordinary contract but is imbued with public interest. The Consti allows the State supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational institutions. [see art XIV sec1-2, 4(1) ]. According to par 107 and 137 of the respondent schools manual, a student is enrolled not just for one sem but for the entire period necessary for the student to complete his/her course. BP blg 232 gives the students the right to continue their course up to graduation. Academic freedom not a ground for denying students rights. In Villar, the right of an institution of higher learning to set academic standards cannot be utilized to discriminate against students who exercise their constitutional rights to speech and assembly, for otherwise there will be a violation of their right to equal protection. School said most of them had failing grades anyway. In answer students say they are graduating students and if there are any deficiencies these do not warrant nonreadmission. Also there are more students with sores deficiencies who are re-admitted. And some of the petitioners had no failing marks. The court held that the students were denied due process in that there was no due investigation. In fact it would appear from the pleadings that the decision to refuse them reenrollment because of failing grades was a mere afterthought. Discipline may be warranted but penalty shld be commensurate to the offense committed with due process. But penalty, if any is deserved should not anymore be enforced. Moot and academic. Theyve already suffered enough.

ALCUAZ vs. PSBA Justice Paras: FACTS: Students and some teachers of PSBA rallied and barricaded the school because they wanted to admin to hear their grievances with regards to not being able to participate in the policy-making of the school, despite the regulations set by the admin with regards to protest actions During the regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester of school year 1986-1987. court ordered the school authorities to create a special investigating committee to conduct an investigation, who made recommendations which the school adopted a lot of procedural crap, petitioners respondents filing and answering complaints and the

petitioners claim that they have been deprived of due process when they were barred from reenrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by respondents as "anarchic" rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and assembly. Petitioners allege that they have been deprived of procedural due process which requires that there be due notice and hear hearing and of substantive due process which requires that the person or body to conduct the investigation be competent to act and decide free from bias or prejudice.

ISSUE: A. Whether or not there has been deprivation of due process ? B. WON there was contempt of Court by the respondents HELD: A. NO. there was no deprivation of due process.

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1. There is no existing contract between the two parties. Par 137 of Manual of Regulations for Private Schools states that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the "written contracts" required for college teachers are for 'one semester. after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. It is a time-honored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. "The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties." 2. The Court has stressed, that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. Standards of procedural due process are: a. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; b. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired: c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them; d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and e.the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case. 3. Printed Rules and Regulations of the PSBA-Q.C. were distributed at the beginning of each school Enrollment in the PSBA is contractual in nature and upon admission to the School, the Student is deemed to have agreed to bind himself to all rules/regulations promulgated by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports. Furthermore, he agrees that he may be required to withdraw from the School at any time for reasons deemed sufficiently serious by the School Administration. Petitioners clearly violated the rules set out by the school with regard to the protest actions. Necessary action was taken by the school when the court issued a temporary mandatory injunction to accept the petitioners for the first sem & the creation of an investigating body. 4. The Court, to insure that full justice is done both to the students and teachers on the one hand and the school on the other, ordered an investigation to be conducted by the school authorities, in the resolution of November 12, 1986. Findings of the investigating committee: 1. 2. students disrupted classes petitioners involved were found to be academically deficient & the teachers are found to have committed various acts of misconduct.

5. The right of the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations has always been recognized by this Court Thus, the Court has ruled that the school's refusal is sanctioned by law. Sec. 107 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations vs as valid grounds for refusing reenrollment of students. The opposite view would do violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the school and enshrined under the Constitution. Court ordinarily accords respect if not finality to factual findings of administrative tribunals, unless : 1. the factual findings are not supported by evidence; 2. where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; 3. where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; 4. when palpable errors are committed; or 5. when a grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest. investigation conducted exhaustive and adequate. was fair, open,

.B. No. The urgent motion of petitioners and intervenors to cite respondents in contempt of court is likewise untenable. 1. no defiance of authority by mere filing of MOR coz respondent school explained that the intervenors were actually reinstated as such faculty members after the issuance of the temporary mandatory injunction. 2. respondent school has fully complied with its duties under the temporary mandatory injunction The school manifested that while the investigation was going on, the intervenors-faculty members were teaching and it was only after the investigation, that the recommendations of the Committee were adopted by the school and the latter moved for the dismissal of the case for having become moot and academic

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16