United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

November 17, 2003

The Honorable Lee Hamilton

Vice Chairman
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States
301 7th Street, S.W. '"'
Room 5125
Washington, D.C. 20407

Dear Mr. Vice Chairman:

This letter responds to your request for my views regarding the recent
testimony of John Deutch before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States. I believe my thoughts are fully consistent with those of
my employer, but in this instance I need to be clear that I am only responding as a
concerned citizen.

Process

At the outset, I believe it is important to acknowledge that substantial

progress can be achieved without fundamental changes in the structure of the
Intelligence Community or the authority of its leaders. While the experiences of
private sector organizations are not always applicable to government institutions, I
have no doubt that tremendous gains can be achieved through "business process
re-engineering."

For example, the Community Management Staff does not have a mechanism
for independently and comprehensively modeling and assessing the numerous
multi-billion dollar platform and sensor programs that DoD and the Intelligence
Community purchase every year. Stunning, but true. The Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence is pressing the Secretary of Defense and the DCI to
develop such a capability through the language contained in report Section 335 of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2004. It remains to be seen,
The Honorable Lee Hamilton
November 17, 2003
Page Two

however, whether the bureaucracy can be moved. This is but one of many
opportunities to develop tighter and more effective linkages between DoD and the
1C in strategic planning (e.g. via the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Defense
Planning Guidance, and the NFIP and JMIP budget builds).

Further, beyond budget and policy formulation, new processes for

managing, collecting, analyzing and disseminating information can produce a high
return on investment. Examples in these domains include a more sophisticated
and aggressive use of open source information (there is a fairly stunning classified
example at DIA that merits your attention) and more sophisticated leverage of US
personnel overseas. Finally, developing an independent cadre to staff the DCI,
instead of relying on detailees from the agencies he is charged with monitoring, is
a simple step that would produce significant benefits. One has only to consider a
Secretary of Defense staffed primarily by service personnel to perceive the
importance of this initiative.

Structure and Authority

While significant headway can be made without major changes in the

structure of the Intelligence Community, it is also true that new structures and
authorities, coupled with able and aggressive leadership, can dramatically improve
efficiency and effectiveness. In many respects the organizational issues
confronting the 1C are analogous to those confronting the JCS prior to the
Goldwater-Nichols Act. As you know, the fundamental problem confronting the
Department of Defense prior to Goldwater-Nichols was excessive Service control
over military operations, policies and budgets. In response, Congress strengthened
the then flaccid integrating mechanisms in DoD, specifically the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs and the Commanders of the Combatant Commands. The difference in
military performance before Goldwater Nichols (e.g. Desert 1, Lebanon, and
Grenada), and after (Panama, Haiti, and Iraq) is stark and clear. In fact, I am
convinced that the Goldwater-Nichols Act did more to enhance national security
than any weapons systems ever procured by the Department of Defense.
The Honorable Lee Hamilton
November 17, 2003
Page Three

Although the Goldwater-Nichols reorganization is not a precise template for

restructuring the Intelligence Community, the problems are fundamentally similar:
towering vertical structures (NSA, CIA, DIA, NRO, NIMA, the service intel
components) and relatively weak integrating mechanisms (the DCI and CMS).
Any reorganization proposal needs to address this fundamental problem. In that
regard, I would suggest that the Intelligence Community's lack of responsiveness
to the DCI's declaration of war on Al Queda was in part a result of the DCI's weak
community management authorities and inability to move the system. A
strengthened DCI could more effectively manage the Intelligence Community,
leading to performance improvements comparable to those achieved by the
military in the wake of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Implementation

A conservative, incremental approach would involve the creation of a

permanent cadre to staff the DCI much as the SecDef has an OSD staff. This
simple change coupled with aggressive business process reengineering and "year
of execution budget authority" for the DCI over NFIP programs, would
significantly strengthen the DCI's ability to manage the Intelligence Community
and respond to new threats and opportunities.

A more aggressive and far-reaching plan would have to address the

fundamental changes that have occurred since the current structure was
established by the National Security Act of 1947. Specifically, it would recognize
that the once useful distinction between home and abroad has become not only
irrelevant, but dysfunctional. This is not to suggest any need to reduce the
protections afforded US persons under the Constitution, merely that globalization
and the development of cyberspace, combined with the rise of apocalyptic
terrorists groups empowered by lethal new technologies, require a different, more
agile structure that is not impeded by outmoded geographic distinctions. In that
regard, Dr. Deutch's suggestion that both foreign and domestic intelligence be
consolidated under the DCI makes a great deal of sense functionally, although its
political viability is uncertain. Achievement of a model along these lines - or for
that matter any substantial reorganization - will require meticulous research by the
The Honorable Lee Hamilton
November 17, 2003
Page Four

Congressional oversight committee's, a substantial hearing record - and/or a

renewed interest on the part of the Administration. At the end of the day,
incremental steps will be better than none, and a more aggressive reorganization
will probably have to wait until a consensus can be built not only on the
Intelligence Authorization Committees, but with the Armed Services Committees
as well.

Hopefully your Commission will be able to prompt movement on these

critical but sorely neglected issues. If nothing else, the conservative, incremental
steps outlined above should represent a minimum expectation for reform.

I have deliberately kept my remarks brief and at a very high level, but I am
more than happy to further discuss these matters with any member of the
Commission or its staff. Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time.

Sincere!

Christopher K. Mellon
Minority Staff Director, SSCI
202-518-7060