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T2 B10 Monograph-Presentation Drafts FDR - Power Point - Team 2 Interim Report - Intelligence Issues For Commission Discussion 689
T2 B10 Monograph-Presentation Drafts FDR - Power Point - Team 2 Interim Report - Intelligence Issues For Commission Discussion 689
T2 B10 Monograph-Presentation Drafts FDR - Power Point - Team 2 Interim Report - Intelligence Issues For Commission Discussion 689
on Transnational Terrorism
A Team 2 Interim Report:
Intelligence Issues for Commission Discussion
This Briefing
2/9/2004
Team 2 Responsibilities
2/9/2004
The Problem
The 21st Century national security environment differs
radically from the Cold War environment
Policymakers and US intelligence leadership are still
struggling to adapt to revolutionary change
A decentralized "Intelligence Community" lacks the agility
and flexibility to address transnational threats and is not
adapting fast enough to the new challenges
2/9/2004
Central Issue
2/9/2004
Key Consideration
Were the attacks of 9-11 sufficient to change our nation's basic approach to
intelligence, set forth by President Truman in 1947, and move away from a
decentralized intelligence "community?"
• Incremental change afforded by a decentralized "community," while arguably sufficient
against the Soviet target, is fatal against networked, tech savvy, suicidal transnational
terrorism
• Intelligence Community cannot reform itself- speaking out against the current structure
puts senior managers at odds with the Secretary of Defense, who has control over the
purse strings
• President has to be personally involved with directing reform and in convincing the
public, Congress and the Cabinet that the nation's interests will be better served through
a centralized, networked intelligence capability
• Foreign allies may be concerned about their links to CIA and NSA, but might be
gratified to work with one individual in the US that has appropriate authority
Without reform intelligence cannot help stop catastrophic terrorism in the United
States
2/9/2004
We've been admiring the problem
for along time...
Federal government Commissions/Reviews...
• Congressional Joint Inquiry (Graham-Goss, 2003)
• Counter-terrorism Intelligence Capabilities, Performance Prior to 9-11 (HPSCI)
• National Security Presidential Directive #5 (Scowcroft, 2001)
• Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change (Hart-Rudman, 2001)
• National Reconnaissance Office Commission (Kerrey & Goss, 2000)
• Countering the Changing Threat of Int'l Terrorism (Bremer, 2000)
• Report on the Advancement of Federal Law Enforcement (Webster, 2000)
• Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
WMD (Gilmore, 1999)
• India-Pakistan Nuclear Test Intelligence Review (Jeremiah, 1999)
• Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the US (Rumsfeld, 1999)
• Combating Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (1999)
• National Imagery and Mapping Agency Commission (1998)
• Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the US 1C (Aspin-Brown, 1996)
. IC21: Intelligence Community in the 21st Century (HPSCI, 1996)
• Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism (Bush, 1985)
• A Review of the Intelligence Community (Schlesinger, 1971)
2/9/2004
Pursued three lines of inquiry
Did US intelligence develop the sources & methods to collect
information effectively on transnational terrorism?
Did the analysts understand the nature of the threat,
communicate those insights to policymakers and effectively
warn of attack?
Were US collection and analytic resources effectively
managed to focus on transnational terrorism?
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What did we expect to find?
An integrated collection plan with open sources, signals and
human sources focused on transnational terrorism; creative
collection methods to penetrate terrorist cells and safe havens
An analytic strategy that identifies terrorist activity indicators;
in-depth analysis that guides and strengthens collection;
strategic and tactical warning
• Someone in charge of the problem ensuring that collection and
analysis across agencies are focused and resourced to support
operations and inform policy
2/9/2004
Facts & Circumstances Pre 9-11:
Findings & Causes
Collection: Vast array of sources and methods
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Did US intelligence develop the sources & methods to collect
information effectively on transnational terrorism?
]\
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Did US intelligence develop the sources & methods to collect
information effectively on transnational terrorism?
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Analysis: Many veterans, new players
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Did the analysts understand the nature of the threat,
communicate those insights to policymakers and effectively
warn of attack?
d No
National Intelligence Estimate of 1995 and the update in 1997
were on target; strategic warning was given; reporting was
performed (NID, SEIB, PDB) and direct support was provided
to the NSC Coordinating Sub-Group.
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Did the analysts understand the nature of the threat,
communicate those insights to policymakers and effectively
warn of attack?
0 However, the NIEs lacked an in-depth understanding
Communicating threat to policymakers was uneven; most terrorism analysis was
operational/tactical; tactical warning was not provided (surprised by WTC
bombing, East Africa embassy bombings, attack on Cole, 9-11 attacks).
• No comprehensive analytic strategy
• The orientation of the analysis was overseas
• No "Red Team" effort or quality control system
• Current reporting (SitReps, DITSums, SEIBs, PDBs) pushed out in-depth
analysis
• No one was in charge of warning of attack
• Existing information wasn't shared; insufficient language skills
• Analysis didn't drive/inform collection
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Management: Existing Structure
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Were US collection and analytic resources effectively
managed and focused on transnational terrorism?
No
The DCI was passionate about the issue; many officers were
zealous, if not heroic, in their efforts against UBL and al-
Qa'ida; focus of CIA and White House senior management
was performing covert action legally, effectively
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Were US collection and analytic resources effectively
managed and focused on transnational terrorism?
2/9/2004 19
Post 9-11:
Tactical & Strategic Response
Tactical Response after 9-11 was impressive...
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DCFs strategic response remains weak, incremental
2/9/2004 22
Administration's strategic response on intelligence has
been weak, incremental, and confusing
0 Established Department of Homeland Security "Intelligence Unit"
• Information Analysis & Infrastructure Protection off to a slow start, dependent on
detailees from other agencies for personnel
• Will be customer of finished intelligence of the Intelligence Community, including FBI
• Value added - will conduct information sharing function with state and local
governments
Q Established Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)
• Focuses on "integration" of analysis, not operations
• Will have access to raw reporting, but cumbersome info handling rules
• Dependent on agencies (CIA, NSA, FBI, etc.) for personnel, acquisition authority,
funding
• Hobbled by un-resolved information sharing/security rules
• Value added - transcends the foreign/domestic divide
O Expanded resources
. National Foreign Intelligence up by XX percent (2001 to 2004)
• Good money into a broken system will not help
2/9/2004 23
Transnational threats are not new
2/9/2004 24
What accounts for these
findings?
External Forces Undermine Effectiveness
2/9/2004 26
Leadership / Management Impacts Effectiveness
3 Secretary of Defense
• Secretary Cohen did not meet with the DCI on terrorism or other threats
• Secretary Rumsfeld meets regularly with the DCI on Community issues
0 The DCI
• Focused on leading CIA, made little effort to manage the Community
• Focused on operations - not Community strategy
0 Within the constraints of his authority, the DCI and his senior Community
leadership failed...
• To make hard choices regarding priorities and budgets
• To delegate sufficient authority
• To ensure that the Community gave priority to terrorism
• To remove information-sharing barriers
• To remedy chronic problems in strategic analysis
• To direct establishment of a collection-management system
2/9/2004 27
Structure Also Inhibits Effectiveness
2/9/2004 28
Options
Considerations
Independence of the DCI
€ Foreign-domestic divide
9 The "Two Elephants" problem (Defense and Homeland
Security as major consumers)
O Rationalizing the intelligence functions
• Discipline (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT)
• "Center" approach (Goldwater-Nichols concept)
• Technical, human source, all-source analysis
2/9/2004 30
Options
2/9/2004 31
Next Steps
Thoroughly examine implications of the Commission's
preferred centralization option (s)
• Gap-filling interviews (foreign and domestic)
• Support hearing questions for DCI, Secretary of Defense
• Develop an actionable agenda that you can provide the President
Continue to digest documents
Resources review (data requested of OMB and DCFs staff)
Oversight review (interviews scheduled)
Additional work with colleagues on Foreign/Domestic
2/9/2004 32