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House Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing On Disclosure of National Security Agency Surveillance Programs (Transcript 6.18.2013)
House Select Intelligence Committee Holds Hearing On Disclosure of National Security Agency Surveillance Programs (Transcript 6.18.2013)
June18,2013
ROGERS:
Thecommitteewillcometoorder. GeneralAlexander,DeputyAttorneyGeneralCole,ChrisInglis,DeputyDirectorJoyceandMr.Litt, thankyouforappearingbeforeustoday,especiallyonshortnotice. TherankingmemberandIbelieveitisimportanttoholdanopenhearingtoday,andwedon'tdoa tremendousamountofthose,toprovidethisHouseandthepublicwithanopportunitytoheardirectly fromyouhowthegovernmentisusingthelegalauthoritiesthatCongresshasprovidedtotheexecutive branchsincetheterroristattacksofSeptember11th,2001. I'dalsoliketorecognizethehardworkofthemenandwomenoftheNSAandtherestofthe intelligencecommunitywhoworkdayinanddayouttodisruptthreatstoournationalsecurity.People attheNSAinparticularhaveheardaconstantpublicdrumbeataboutalaundrylistofnefariousthings theyareallegedtobedoingtospyonAmericansallofthemwrong.Themisperceptionshavebeen great,yettheykeeptheirheadsdownandkeepworkingeverydaytokeepussafe.
ROGERS:
And,GeneralAlexander,pleaseconveyourthankstoyourteamforcontinuingeveryday,despitemuch misinformationaboutthequalityoftheirwork.Andthankthemforallofusforcontinuingtoworkto protectAmerica. IalsowanttotakethismomenttothankGeneralAlexanderwhohasbeenextendedasnationalsecurity adviserinonewayoranotherthreedifferenttimes.That'sapatriot. Thisisaverydifficultjobataverydifficulttimeinourhistory.Andforthegeneraltoacceptthose extensionsofhismilitaryservicetoprotectthisnation,Ithinkwithallofthethe,again,the misinformationoutthere,Iwanttothankyouforthat. Thankyouforyourpatriotism.ThankyouforcontinuingtoservetoprotecttheUnitedStates,again. Andyouhavethatgreatburdenofknowinglotsofclassifiedinformationyoucannottalkpubliclyabout. Iwantyoutoknow,thankyouonbehalfofAmericaforyourservicetoyourcountry. Thecommitteehasbeenextensivelybriefedontheseeffortsoveraregularbasisasapartofour ongoingoversightresponsibilityoverthe16elementsoftheintelligencecommunityandthenational intelligenceprogram. Inordertofullyunderstandtheintelligencecollectionprogramsmostofthesebriefingsandhearings havetakenplaceinclassifiedsettings.Nonetheless,thecollectioneffortsunderthebusinessrecords provisioninSection702oftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActarelegal,courtapprovedand
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subjecttoanextensiveoversightregime. Ilookforwardfromhearingfromallofthewitnessesabouttheextensiveprotectionsandoversightin placefortheseprograms. GeneralAlexander,welookforwardtohearingwhatyou'reabletodiscussinanopenforumabouthow thedatathatyouhaveyouobtainfromprovidersundercourtorder,especiallyunderthebusiness recordsprovision,isused. AndDeputyAttorneyGeneralCole,welookforwardtohearingmoreaboutthelegalauthorities themselvesandthestateoflawonwhatprivacyprotectionsAmericanshaveinthesebusinessrecords. Oneofthefrustratingpartsaboutbeingamemberofthiscommittee,andreallychallenge,issittingatthe intersectionofclassifiedintelligenceprogramsandtransparentdemocracyasrepresentativesofthe Americanpeople. Thepublictruststhegovernmenttoprotectthecountryfromanother9/11typeattack,butthattrustcan starttowanewhentheyarefacedwithinaccuracies,halftruthsandoutrightliesaboutthewaythe intelligenceprogramsarebeingrun. Oneofthemoredamagingaspectsofselectivelyleakingincompleteinformationisthatitpaintsan inaccuratepictureandfostersdistrustinourgovernment. Thisisparticularlysowhenthoseofuswhohavetakentheoathtoprotectinformationthatcandamage thenationalsecurityifreleasedcannotpubliclyprovideclarifyinginformationbecauseitremains classified. Itisattimeslikethesewhereourenemieswithourenemieswithinbecomealmostasdamagingasour enemiesontheoutside. Itiscriticallyimportanttoprotectsourcesandmethodssowearen'tgivingtheenemyourplaybook. It'salsoimportant,however,tobeabletotalkabouthowtheseprogramshelpprotectussotheycan continuetobereauthorized.Andthenwehighlighttheprotectionsandoversightofwhichthese programsoperateunder. GeneralAlexander,youandIhavetalkedoverthelastweek,abouttheneedtotobeabletopublicly elaborateonthesuccessstoriestheseauthoritieshavecontributedtowithoutjeopardizingongoing operations.Iknowyou'llhavetheopportunitytotalkaboutseveralofthosetoday. Iplacetheutmostvalueinprotectingsourcesandmethods.Andthat'swhyyou'vebeen,Ithink,so diligentinmakingsurethatanythingthat'sdisclosedcomportswiththeneedtoprotectsourcesand methods.Sothat,again,wedon'tmakeiteasierforthebadguysoverseas,terroristsinthiscase,todo harmtoUnitedStatescitizens,andIrespectthat. Ialsorecognizethatwhenweareforcedintothepositionofhavingsopubliclydiscussedintelligence programsduetoirresponsiblecriminalbehaviorthatwealsohavetobecarefultobalancetheneedfor secrecywhileeducatingthepublic. Ithinkyouhavestrucktherightbalancebetweenprotectingsourcesandmethodsandmaintainingthe public'strustbyprovidingmoreexamplesofhowtheseauthoritieshavehelpeddisruptterroristplots
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Well,Iagreewithreallyalotofwhatthechairmansaid. GeneralAlexander,ChrisInglis,youknow,yourleadershipinNSAhasbeenoutstanding.AndIjust wanttoacknowledgethepeoplewhoworkatNSAeveryday.NSAisinmydistrict.Ihavean occasiontocommunicate,andalotofthepeoplewhogotoworktoprotectourcountry,whowork hardeveryday,areconcernedthatthepublicthinkthey'redoingsomethingwrong.Andthat'snotthe caseatall. Andthemostimportantthingwecandoheretodayisletthepublicknowthetruefacts.Iknowthat ChairmanRogersandIandothermembershaveaskedyoutohelpdeclassifywhatwecan,thatwillnot hurtoursecurity,sothepubliccanunderstandthatthisimportant(sic)islegal,whywe'redoingthis programandhowitprotectsus. We'reheretodaybecauseofthebrazendisclosureofcriticalclassifiedinformationthatkeepsour countrysafe.Thiswidespreadleakbya29yearoldAmericansystemsadministratorputourcountry andouralliesindangerbygivingtheterroristsareallygoodlookattheplaybookthatweusetoprotect ourcountry.Theterroristsnowknowmanyofoursourcesandmethods. There'sbeenalotinthemediaaboutthissituation.Someright.Alotwrong.We'reholdingthisopen hearingtodaysowecansettherecordstraightandtheAmericanpeoplecanheardirectlyfromthe intelligencecommunityastowhatisallowedandwhatisnotunderthelaw.Weneedtoeducate membersofCongressalso,withthepublic. Tobeclear,theNationalSecurityAgencyisprohibitedfromlisteninginonphonecallsofAmericans withoutproper,courtapprovedlegalauthorities. Weliveinacountryoflaws.Theselawsarestrictlyfollowedandlayeredwithoversightfromthree branchesofgovernment,includingtheexecutivebranch,thecourtsandCongress. Immediatelyafter9/11,welearnedthatagroupofterroristswerelivingintheUnitedStatesactively plottingtokillAmericansonourownsoil.Butwedidn'thavetheproperauthoritiesinplacetostop thembeforetheycouldkillalmost3,000innocentpeople. Goodintelligenceisclearlythebestdefenseagainstterrorism.Therearetwomainauthoritiesthathave beenhighlightedinthepress,thebusinessrecordsprovisionthatallowsthegovernmenttolegallycollect whatiscalledmetadata,simplythephonenumberandlengthofcall.Nocontent,noconversations.This authorityallowsourcounterterrorismandthelawenforcementofficialstoclosethegaponforeignand
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domesticterroristactivities.Itenablesourintelligencecommunitytodiscoverwhetherforeignterrorists havebeenincontactwithpeopleintheU.S.whomaybeplanningaterroristattackonU.S.soil. ThesecondauthorityisknownasSection702oftheFISAAmendmentAct.Itallowsthegovernment tocollectthecontentofemailandphonecallsofforeignersnotAmericanslocatedoutsidethe UnitedStates.Thisallowsthegovernmenttogetinformationaboutterrorists,cyberthreats,weaponsof massdestructionandnuclearweaponsproliferationthatthreatenAmerica. ThisauthorityprohibitsthetargetingofAmericancitizensorU.S.permanentresidentswithoutacourt order,nomatterwheretheyarelocated. Bothoftheseauthoritiesarelegal.Congressapprovedandreauthorizedbothofthemoverthelasttwo years.Infact,theseauthoritieshavebeeninstrumentalinhelpingpreventdozensofterroristattacks, manyonU.S.soil. Butthefactstillremainsthatwemustfigureouthowthiscouldhavehappened.Howwasthis 29yearoldsystemsadministratorabletoaccesssuchhighlyclassifiedinformationandaboutsuch sensitivematters?Andhowwasheabletodownloaditandremoveitfromhisworkplaceundetected? Weneedtochangeoursystemsandpractices,andemploythelatestintechnologythatwouldalert superiorswhenaworkertriestodownloadandremovethistypeofinformation.Weneedtosealthis crackinthesystem. Andtorepeatsomethingincrediblyimportant:TheNSAisprohibitedfromlisteningtophonecallsor readingemailsofAmericanswithoutacourtorder.Period.Endofstory. Lookforwardyourtestimony.
ROGERS:
Chairman,RankingMember,thankyouforthekindwords.Iwilltellyouitisaprivilegeandhonorto serveasthedirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgencyandthecommanderoftheU.S.CyberCommand. Asyounoted,wehaveextraordinarypeopledoinggreatworktoprotectthiscountryandtoprotectour civillibertiesandprivacy. Overthepastfewweeks,unauthorizeddisclosuresofclassifiedinformationhaveresultedin considerabledebateinthepressaboutthesetwoprograms. Thedebatehadbeenfueled,asyounoted,byincompleteandinaccurateinformation,withlittlecontext providedonthepurposeoftheseprograms,theirvaluetoournationalsecurityandthatofourallies,and theprotectionsthatareinplacetopreserveourprivacyandcivilliberties. Today,wewillprovideadditionaldetailandcontextonthesetwoprogramstohelpinformthatdebate. Theseprogramswereapprovedbytheadministration,Congressandthecourts.Frommyperspective, asoundlegalprocessthatweallworktogetherasagovernmenttoprotectournationandourcivil
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libertiesandprivacy.
ALEXANDER:
Ironically,thedocumentsthathavebeenreleasedsofarshowtherigorousoversightandcomplianceour governmentusestobalancesecuritywithcivillibertiesandprivacy. LetmestartbysayingthatIwouldmuchratherbeheretodaydebatingthispointthantryingtoexplain howwefailedtopreventanother9/11.ItisatestamenttotheongoingteamworkoftheCentral IntelligenceAgency,theFederalBureauofInvestigation,andtheNationalSecurityAgency,working withouralliesandindustrypartners,thatwehavebeenabletoconnectthedotsandpreventmore terroristattacks. TheeventsofSeptember11,2001occurred,inpart,becauseofafailureonthepartofourgovernment toconnectthosedots.SomeofthosedotswereintheUnitedStates.Theintelligencecommunitywas notabletoconnectthosedomesticdots,phonecallsbetweenoperativesandtheU.S.andAlQaida terroristoverseas.Followingthe9/11commission,whichinvestigatedtheintelligencecommunity's failuretodetect9/11,CongresspassedthePATRIOTAct. Section215ofthatact,asithasbeeninterpretedandimplied,helpsthegovernmentclosethatgapby enablingthedetectionoftelephonecontactbetweenterroristsoverseasandoperativeswithintheUnited States.AsDirectorMuelleremphasizedlastweekduringhistestimonytothetotheJudiciary Committee,ifwehadhadSection215inplacepriorto9/11,wemayhaveknownthatthe9/11 hijackerMihdharwaslocatedinSanDiegoandcommunicatingwithaknownAlQaidasafehousein Yemen. Inrecentyears,theseprograms,togetherwithotherintelligence,haveprotectedtheU.S.andourallies fromterroristthreatsacrosstheglobetoincludehelpingpreventtheterroristthepotentialterrorist eventsover50timessince9/11.Wewillactuallybringforwardtothecommitteetomorrowdocuments thattheinteragencyhasagreedon,thatinaclassifiedsetting,giveseveryoneofthosecasesforyour review.We'lladdtwomoretodaypubliclywe'lldiscuss.Butasthechairmannoted,ifwegiveallof thoseout,wegiveallthesecretsofhowwe'retrackingdowntheterroristasacommunity.Andwe can'tdothat.Toomuchisatriskforusandforourallies.I'llgointogreaterdetailaswegothroughthis testimonythismorning. Ibelievewehaveachievedthesecurityandrelativesafetyinawaythatdoesnotcompromisethe privacyandcivillibertiesofourcitizens.Wewouldliketomakethreefundamentalpoints.First,these programsarecriticaltotheintelligencecommunity'sabilitytoprotectournationandourallies'security. Theyassisttheintelligencecommunityeffortstoconnectthedots. Second,theseprogramsarelimited,focused,andsubjecttorigorousoversight.Theyhavedistinct purposesinoversightmechanisms.Wehaverigoroustrainprogramsforouranalystsandtheir supervisorstounderstandtheirresponsibilitiesregardingcompliance. Third,thedisciplinedoperationoftheseprogramsprotectstheprivacyandcivillibertiesoftheAmerican people.Wewillprovideimportantdetailsabouteachofthose.First,I'dI'dasktheDeputyAttorney GeneralJimColetodiscusstheoverarchingframeworkofourauthority. Sir.
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COLE:
Thankyouthankyou,General. Mr.Chairman,Mr.RankingMember,membersofthecommittee,asGeneralAlexandersaid,and andasthechairmanandrankingmemberhavesaid,allofusinthenationalsecurityareaareconstantly tryingtobalanceprotectingpublicsafetywithprotectingpeople'sprivacyandcivillibertiesinthis government.Andit'saconstantjobatbalancingthis. Wethinkwe'vedonethisintheseinstances.TherearestatutesthatarepassedbyCongress.Thisthis isnotaprogramthat'soffthebooks,that'sbeenhiddenaway.Thisispartofwhatgovernmentputs togetheranddiscusses.Statutesarepassed.Itisoverseenbythreebranchesofourgovernment,the Legislature,theJudiciary,andtheExecutiveBranch.Theprocessofoversightoccursbefore,during, andaftertheprocessesthatwe'retalkingabouttoday. AndIwanttotalkalittlebithowthatworks,whatthelegalframeworkis,andwhatsomeofthe protectionsarethatareputintoit.Firstofall,whatwehaveseenpublishedinthenewspaper concerning215thisisthebusinessrecordsprovisionsofthePATRIOTActthatalsomodifyFISA. You'veseenoneorderinthenewspaperthat'sacoupleofpageslongthatjustsaysunderthatorder, we'reallowedtoacquiremetadata,telephonerecords.That'soneoftwoorders.It'sthesmallestofthe twoorders.Andtheotherorder,whichhasnotbeenpublished,goesinto,ingreatdetailwhatwecan dowiththatmetadatahowwecanaccessithowwecanlookthroughitwhatwecandowithit,once wehavelookedthroughitandwhattheconditionsarethatareplacedonustomakesurethatwe protectprivacyandcivillibertiesand,atthesametime,protectpublicsafety. Letmegothroughafewofthefeaturesofthis.Firstofall,it'smetadata.Thesearephonerecords. Thesethisisjustlikewhatyouwouldgetinyourownphonebill.Itisthenumberthatwasdialed from,thenumberthatwasdialedto,thedateandthelengthoftime.That'sallwegetunder215.Wedo notgettheidentityofanyofthepartiestothisphonecall.Wedon'tgetanycellsiteorlocation informationastowhereanyofthesephoneswerelocated.And,mostimportantly,andyou'reprobably goingtohearthisabout100timestoday,wedon'tgetanycontentunderthis.Wedon'tlisteninon anybody'scallsunderthisprogramatall. Thisisunder,asIsaid,section215ofthePATRIOTAct.Thishasbeendebatedandupfor reauthorization,andreauthorizedtwicebytheUnitedStatesCongresssinceitsinceptionin2006andin 2011.Now,inorderthewayitworksis,thethereisanapplicationthatismadebytheFBIunder thestatutetotheFISAcourt.WecallittheFISC.TheyaskforandreceivepermissionundertheFISC underthistogetrecordsthatarerelevanttoanationalsecurityinvestigation.Andtheymustdemonstrate totheFISCthatitwillbeoperatedundertheguidelinesthataresetforthbytheattorneygeneralunder executiveorder12333.Thisiswhatcoversintelligencegatheringinthefederalgovernment. Itislimitedtotangibleobjects.Now,whatdoesthatmean?Thesearelikerecords,likethemetadata, thephonerecordsI'vebeendescribing.Butitisquiteexplicitlylimitedtothingsthatyoucouldgetwitha grandjurysubpoena,thosekindsofrecords.Now,it'simportanttoknowprosecutorsissuegrandjury subpoenasallthetimeanddonotneedanyinvolvementofacourtoranybodyelse,really,todoso. Underthisprogram,weneedtogetpermissionfromthecourttoissuethisaheadoftime.Sothereis courtinvolvementwiththeissuanceoftheseorders,whichisdifferentfromagrandjurysubpoena.But
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thetypeofrecords,justdocuments,businessrecords,thingslikethat,arelimitedtothosesametypesof recordsthatwecouldgetthroughagrandjurysubpoena. Now,theordersthatwegetlast90days.Sowehavetoreupandrenewtheseordersevery90days inordertodothis.Now,therearestrictcontrolsoverwhatwecandoundertheorder.And,again, that'sthebigger,thickerorderthathasn'tbeenpublished.There'srestrictionsonwhocanaccessitin thisorder.ItisstoredinrepositoriesatNSAthatcanonlybeaccessedbyalimitednumberofpeople. Andthepeoplewhoareallowedtoaccessithavetohavespecialandrigoroustrainingaboutthe standardsunderwhichthattheycanaccessit. Inordertoaccessit,thereneedstobeafindingthatthereisresponsiblesuspicionthatyoucan articulate,thatyoucanputintowords,thatthepersonwhosephonerecordsyouwanttoqueryis involvedwithsomesortofterroristorganizations.Andtheyaredefined.It'snoteveryone.Theyare limitedinthestatute.Sotherehastobeindependentevidence,asidefromthesephonerecords,thatthe personyou'retargetingisinvolvedwithaterroristorganization.
COLE:
IfthatpersonisaUnitedStatesperson,acitizen,oralawfulpermanentresident,youhavetohave somethingmorethanjusttheirownspeeches,theirownreadings,theirownFirstAmendmenttype activity.Youhavetohaveadditionalevidencebeyondthatthatindicatesthatthereisreasonable, articulablesuspicionthatthesepeopleareassociatedwithspecificterroristorganizations. Now,oneofthethingstokeepinmindisunderthelaw,theFourthAmendmentdoesnotapplytothese records.TherewasacasequiteanumberofyearsagobytheSupremeCourtthatindicatedthattoll records,phonerecordslikethis,thatdon'tincludeanycontent,arenotcoveredbytheFourth Amendmentbecausepeopledon'thaveareasonableexpectationofprivacyinwhotheycalledand whentheycalled.That'ssomethingyoushowtothephonecompany.That'ssomethingyoushowto many,manypeoplewithinthephonecompanyonaregularbasis. Oncethoserecordsareaccessedunderthisprocessandreasonablearticulablesuspicionisfound,that's foundbyspeciallytrainedpeople.Itisreviewedbytheirsupervisors.Itisdocumentedinwritingahead oftimesothatsomebodycantakealookatit.Anyoftheaccessingthatisdoneisdoneinanauditable fashion.Thereisatrailofit.Soboththedecisionandthefactsthatsupporttheaccessingandthequery isdocumented.Theamountthatwasdone,whatwasdoneallofthatisdocumentedandreviewed andauditedonafairlyregularbasis. Therearealsominimizationproceduresthatareputintoplacesothatanyoftheinformationthatis acquiredhastobeminimized.Ithastobelimitedanditsuseisstrictlylimited.Andallthatissetoutin thetermsofthecourtorder.AndifanyU.S.personsareinvolved,thereareparticularrestrictionson howanyinformationconcerningaU.S.personcanbeusedinthis. Now,thereisextensiveoversightandcompliancethatisdonewiththeserecordsandwiththisprocess. Everynowandthen,theremaybeamistakeawrongphonenumberishidorapersonwhoshouldn't havebeentargetedgetstargetedbecausethereisamistakeinthephonerecord,somethinglikethat. Eachofthosecomplianceincidents,ifandwhentheyoccur,havetobereportedtotheFISAcourt immediately.Andletmetellyou,theFISAcourtpushesbackonthis.Theywanttofindoutwhydid thishappen,whatweretheproceduresandthemechanismsthatallowedittohappen,andwhathave
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youdonetofixit.Sowheneverwehaveacomplianceincident,wereportittothecourtimmediately andwereportittoCongress.WereportittotheIntelligenceCommitteesofbothhousesandthe JudiciaryCommitteesofbothhouses. WealsoprovidetheIntelligenceandJudiciaryCommitteeswithanysignificantinterpretationsthatthe courtmakesofthe215statute.Iftheymakearulingthatissignificantorissueanorderthatissignificant initsinterpretation,weprovidethose,aswellastheapplicationswemadeforthoseorders,tothe IntelligenceCommitteeandtotheJudiciaryCommittee. Andevery30days,wearefilingwiththeFISC,withthecourt,areportthatdescribeshowwe implementthisprogram.Itincludesadiscussionofhowwe'reapplyingthereasonable,articulable suspicionstandard.Ittalksaboutthenumberofapprovedqueriesthatwemadeagainstthisdatabase, thenumberofinstancesthatthequeryresultsandcontainaU.S.personinformationthatwasshared outsideofNSA.Andallofthisgoestothecourt. Atleastonceevery90daysandsometimesmorefrequently,theDepartmentofJustice,theOfficeof theDirectorofNationalIntelligence,andtheNSAmeettoassessNSA'scompliancewithallofthese requirementsthatarecontainedinthecourtorder.Separately,theDepartmentofJusticemeetswiththe inspectorgeneralfortheNationalSecurityAgencyandassessesNSA'scomplianceonaregularbasis. Finally,thereisbystatutereportingofcertaininformationthatgoestoCongressinsemiannualreports thatwemakeontopoftheperiodicreportswemakeifthere'sacomplianceincident.Andthoseinclude informationaboutthedatathatwasrequiredandhowweareperformingunderthisstatute. Soonceagainkeepinginmind,allofthisisdonewiththreebranchesofgovernmentinvolved:oversight andinitiationbytheexecutivebranchwithreviewbymultipleagenciesstatutesthatarepassedby Congress,oversightbyCongressandthenoversightbythecourt. Now,the702statuteundertheFISAAmendmentsActisdifferent.Underthis,wedogetcontent,but there'sabigdifference.Youareonlyallowedunder702totargetforthispurposenonU.S.persons whoarelocatedoutsideoftheUnitedStates.SoifyouhaveaU.S.permanentresidentwho'sin Madrid,Spain,wecan'ttargetthemunder702.OrifyouhaveanonU.S.personwho'sinCleveland, Ohio,wecannottargetthemunder702.Inordertotargetaperson,theyhavetobeneitheracitizennor apermanentU.S.resident,andtheyneedtobeoutsideoftheUnitedStateswhilewe'retargetingthem. Now,there'sprohibitionsinthisstatute.Forexample,youcan'treversetargetsomebody.Thisiswhere youtargetsomebodywho'soutoftheUnitedStates,butreallyyourgoalistocaptureconversations withsomebodywhoisinsidetheUnitedStates.Soyou'retryingtodoindirectlywhatyoucouldn'tdo directly.Thatisexplicitlyprohibitedbythisstatute.Andifthereiseveranyindicationthatit'sbeing done,becauseagain,wereporttheusethatwemakeofthisstatutetothecourtandtotheCongress, thatisseen. Youalsohavetohaveavalidforeignintelligencepurposeinordertodoanyofthetargetingonthis.So youhavetomakesure,asitwasdescribed,thatit'sbeingdonefordefinedcategoriesofweaponsof massdestruction,foreignintelligence,thingsofthatnature.Thesearealldonepursuanttoanapplication thatismadebytheattorneygeneralandthedirectorofnationalintelligencetotheFISC.TheFISC givesacertificatethatallowsthistargetingtobedoneforayearperiod.Itthenhastoberenewedatthe endofthatyearinorderforittobereupped.
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Now,there'salsothereisarequirementthat,again,thereisreporting.Youcannotunderthetermsof thisstatutehaveandcollectanyinformationonconversationsthatarewhollywithintheUnitedStates. Soyou'retargetingsomeoneoutsidetheUnitedStates.IftheymakeacalltoinsidetheUnitedStates, thatcanbecollected,butit'sonlybecausethetargetofthatcalloutsidetheUnitedStatesinitiatedthat callandwentthere.IfthecallsarewhollywithintheUnitedStates,wecannotcollectthem. Ifyou'retargetingapersonwhoisoutsideoftheUnitedStatesandyoufindthattheycomeintothe UnitedStates,wehavetostopthetargetingrightaway.Andifthere'sanylagandwefindoutthatwe collectedinformationbecauseweweren'tawarethattheywereintheUnitedStates,wehavetotake thatinformation,purgeitfromthesystems,andnotuseit. Now,there'sagreatdealofminimizationproceduresthatareinvolvedhere,particularlyconcerningany oftheacquisitionofinformationthatdealsorcomesfromU.S.persons.AsIsaid,onlytargetingpeople outsidetheUnitedStateswhoarenotU.S.persons.Butifwedoacquireanyinformationthatrelatesto aU.S.person,underlimitedcriteriaonlycanwekeepit. Ifithastodowithforeignintelligenceinthatconversationorunderstandingforeignintelligence,or evidenceofacrimeorathreatofseriousbodilyinjury,wecanrespondtothat.Otherthanthat,we havetogetridofit.Wehavetopurgeit,andwecan'tuseit.Ifweinadvertentlyacquireanyofit withoutmeaningto,again,oncethat'sdiscovered,wehavetogetridofit.Wehavetopurgeit. Thetargetingdecisionsthataredoneare,again,documentedaheadoftime,reviewedbyasupervisor beforethey'reeverallowedtotakeplaceinthebeginning.TheDepartmentofJusticeandtheOfficeof theDirectorofNationalIntelligenceconductonsitereviewsofeachtargetingthatisdone.Theylookat themtodetermineandgothroughtheaudittodeterminethattheyweredoneproperly.Thisisdoneat leastevery60daysandmanytimesdonemorefrequentlythanthat. Inaddition,ifthere'sanycomplianceissue,itisimmediatelyreportedtotheFISC.TheFISC,again, pushesback:Howdidthishappen?Whataretheprocedures?Whatarethemechanismsyou'reusingto fixthis?Whathaveyoudonetoremedyit?Ifyouacquiredinformationyoushould(sic)have,haveyou gottenridofitasyou'rerequired?Andinaddition,we'reprovidingCongresswithallofthatinformation ifwehavecomplianceproblems. WealsoreportquarterlytotheFISCconcerningthecomplianceissuesthathavearisenduringthat quarter,ontopoftheimmediatereportsandwhatwe'vedonetofixitandremedytheonesthatwe reported.
COLE:
toCongressthatreportsoncompliance,thenumberofdisseminationsunderthisprogramthatrelateto U.S.persons,thenumberoftargetsthatwerereasonablybelievedatthetimetobeoutsidetheUnited StateswhowerelaterdeterminedtobeintheUnitedStates,andwhenthatwasdone.Soinshort,there is,frombefore,duringandaftertheinvolvementofallthreebranchesoftheUnitedStatesgovernment, onarobustandfairlyintimateway.I'dliketomakeoneotherobservation,ifImay,onthis.Wehave triedtodothisinasthorough,asprotective,andastransparentawayaswepossiblycan,consideringit isthegatheringofintelligenceinformation. Countriesandalliesofoursallovertheworldcollectintelligence.Weallknowthis.Andtherehave recentlybeenstudiesabouthowtransparentoursystemisintheUnitedStates,comparedtomanyof ourpartners,manyintheE.U.CountrieslikeFrance,theU.K.,Germany,whoweworkwithregularly. AndareportthatwasjustrecentlyissuedinMayofthisyearfoundthattheFISAAmendmentsAct,the statutethatwe'retalkingabouthere,andIwillquote,"Imposesatleastatmuch,ifnotmore,due processandoversightonforeignintelligencesurveillancethanothercountries."AndthisincludesE.U. countries.Anditsaysunderthis,theU.S.ismoretransparentaboutitsprocedures,requiresmoredue processprotectionsinitsinvestigationsthatinvolvenationalsecurity,terrorismandforeignintelligence. Thebalanceisalwaysoneweseektostrivetotoachieve.ButIthinkasI'velaidouttoyou,wehave doneeverythingwecantoachieveit.AndIthinkpartoftheproofofwhatwe'vedoneisthisreportthat cameoutjustlastmonth,indicatingoursystemisasgood,andfranklybetter,thanallofouralliesand liaisonpartners.ThankyouMr.Chairman.
ALEXANDER:
Mr.Chairman,Iwillnowswitchtothevalueoftheprogram,andtalkaboutsomestatisticsthatwe're puttingtogether.Aswestated,theseprogramsareimmenselyvaluableforprotectingournation,and securitythesecurityofourallies.Inrecentyears,theinformationgatheredfromtheseprograms providedtheU.S.governmentwithcriticalleadstohelppreventover50potentialterroristeventsin morethan20countriesaroundtheworld.FAA702contributedinover90percentofthesecases.At least10oftheseeventsincludedhomelandbasedthreats.Inthevastmajority,businessrecords,FISA reportingcontributedaswell.IwouldalsopointoutthatitisagreatpartnershipwiththeDepartmentof HomelandSecurityinthosewithadomesticnexus. ButtherealleadfordomesticeventsistheFederalBureauofInvestigation.Ithasbeenourhonorand privilegetoworkwithDirectorMueller,andDeputyDirectoryJoycewhoI'llturnitnowoverto Sean?
JOYCE:
TerrorismTaskForceandNYPDandfoundbombmakingcomponentsinbackpacks.Zazilater confessedtoaplottobombtheNewYorksubwaysystemwithbackpacks.AlsoworkingwithFISA businessrecords,theNSAwasabletoprovideapreviouslyunknownnumberofoneofthe coconspiratorscoconspirators,AdisMedunjanin.ThiswasthefirstcoreAlQaidaplotsince9/11 directedfromPakistan.Anotherexample,NSAutilizing702authoritywasmonitoringaknown extremistinYemen.ThisindividualwasincontactwithanindividualintheUnitedStatesnamedKhalid Ouazzani.OuazzaniandotherindividualsthatweidentifiedthroughaFISAthattheFBIappliedfor throughtheFISCwereabletodetectanascentplottingtobombtheNewYorkStockExchange. Ouazzanihadbeenprovidinginformationandsupporttothisplot.TheFBIdisruptedandarrestedthese individuals.AlsoDavidHeadley,aU.S.citizenlivinginChicago.TheFBIreceivedintelligence regardinghispossibleinvolvementinthe2008Mumbaiattacksresponsibleforthekillingofover160 people.Also,NSAthrough702coverageofanAlQaidaaffiliatedterroristfoundthatHeadleywas workingonaplottobombaDanishnewspaperofficethathadpublishedthecartoondepictionsofthe ProphetMohammed.Infact,Headleylaterconfessedtopersonallyconductingsurveillanceofthe Danishnewspaperoffice.He,andhiscoconspiratorswereconvictedofthisplot. Lastly,theFBIhadopenedaninvestigationshortlyafter9/11.Wedidnothaveenoughinformation,nor didwefindlinkstoterrorismandthenweshortlythereafterclosedtheinvestigation.However,theNSA usingthebusinessrecordFISAtippedusoffthatthisindividualhadindirectcontactswithaknown terroristoverseas.Wewereabletoreopenthisinvestigation,identifyadditionalindividualsthrougha legalprocess,andwereabletodisruptthisterroristactivity.Thankyou.Backtoyou,General?
ALEXANDER:
Sothat'sfourcasestotalthatwe'veputoutpublicly.Whatwe'reintheprocessofdoingwiththe interagencyislookingatover50casesthatwereclassified,andwillremainclassified,thatwillbe providedtobothoftheIntelCommitteesoftheSenateandtheHouse,toallofyou.Those50cases rightnowhavebeenlookedatbytheFBI,CIAandotherpartnerswithinthecommunity,andthe NationalCounterterrorismCenterisvalidatingallofthepointssothatyouknowthatwhatwe'veputin thereisexactlyright.Ibelievethenumbersfromthosecasesissomethingthatwecanpubliclyreveal, andallpubliclytalkabout. Whatweareconcerned,asthechairmansaid,istogoingintomoredetailonhowwestoppedsomeof thesecases,asweareconcerneditwillgiveouradversariesawaytoworkaroundthose,andattack us,orourallies.Andthatwouldbeunacceptable.Ihaveconcernsthattheintentionalandirresponsible releaseofclassifiedinformationabouttheseprogramswillhavealong,andirreversibleimpactonour nation'ssecurity,andthatofourallies.Thisissignificant.IwanttoemphasizethattheForeign IntelligenceisthebesttheForeignIntelligenceProgramthatwe'retalkingabout,isthebest counterterrorismtoolsthatwehavetogoaftertheseguys. Wecan'tlosethosecapabilities.Oneoftheissuesthathasrepeatedlycomeup,wellhowdoyouthen protectcivillibertiesandprivacy?Whereistheoversight?Whatareyoudoingonthat?Wehavethe deputydirectoroftheNationalSecurityAgency,ChrisInglis,willnowtalkaboutthatandgiveyou somespecificsaboutwhatwedo,andhowwedoitwiththeseprograms.
INGLIS: 11
Thisauthoritydoesnot,therefore,allowthegovernmenttolisteninonanyone'stelephonecalls,even thatofaterrorist.Theinformationacquiredunderthecourtorderfromthetelecommunications providersdoesnotcontainthecontentofanycommunications,whatyouaresayingduringthecourseof theconversation,theidentitiesofthepeoplewhoaretalking,oranycellphonelocationalinformation. AsyoualsoknowthisprogramwasspecificallydevelopedtoallowtheU.S.governmenttodetect communicationsbetweenterroristsoperatingoutsidetheU.S.,whoarethemselvescommunicatingwith potentialoperativesinsidetheU.S.,agaphighlightedbytheattacksof9/11. ThecontrolsontheuseofthisdataatNSAarespecific,rigorous,anddesignedtoensurefocuson counterterrorism.Tothatend,themetadataacquiredandstoredunderthisprogrammaybequeried onlywhenthereisareasonablesuspicionbasedonspecificanddocumentedfactsthatanidentifier,like atelephonenumber,isassociatedwithspecificforeignterroristorganizations. Thisdeterminationisformallyreferredtoasthe"reasonablearticulablesuspicionstandard."Duringall 2012,the12monthsof2012,weatNSAapprovedfewerthan300uniquenumbers,whichwerethen usedtoinitiateaqueryofthisdataset. Thesecondprogram,authorizedunderSection702oftheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct, authorizestargetingonlyforcommunicationsofforeignerswhoarethemselvesnotwithintheUnited Statesforforeignintelligencepurposes,withthecompelledassistanceofanelectroniccommunications serviceprovider. AsInotedearlier,NSAbeingaforeignintelligenceagency,foreignintelligenceforusisinformation relatedtothecapabilities,intentions,oractivitiesofforeigngovernments,foreignorganizations,foreign persons,orinternationalterrorists.Letmebeveryclear.Section702cannotbeandisnotusedto intentionallytargetanyU.S.citizenoranyU.S.person,anypersonknowntobeintheUnitedStates,a personoutsidetheUnitedStatesifthepurposeistoacquireinformationfromapersoninsidetheUnited States.Wemaynotdoanyofthosethingsusingthisauthority. Theprogramisalsokeyinourcounterterrorismefforts,asyou'veheard.Morethan90percentofthe informationusedtosupportthe50disruptionsmentionedearlierwasgainedfromthisparticular authority.Again,ifyouwanttotargetthecontentofaU.S.personanywhereintheworld,youcannot usethisauthority.Youmustgetaspecificcourtwarrant. I'dliketonowdescribeinfurtherdetailssomeoftherigorousoversightforeachoftheseprograms. First,fortheSection215program,alsoreferredtoasbusinessrecordsFISA,controlsand(ph) determinehowwemanageandusethedataareexplicitlydefinedandformallyapprovedbytheForeign
12
IntelligenceSurveillanceCourt. First,themetadatasegregatedfromotherdatasetsheldbyNSAandallqueriesagainstthedatabase aredocumentedandaudited.Asdefinedintheordersofthecourt,only20analystsatNSAandtheir twomanagers,foratotalof22people,areauthorizedtoapprovenumbersthatmaybeusedtoquery thisdatabase.Allofthoseindividualsmustbetrainedinthespecificproceduresandstandardsthat pertaintothedeterminationofwhatismeantbyreasonable,articulablesuspicion. Every30days,NSAreportstothecourtthenumberofqueriesanddisseminationsmadeduringthat period.Every90days,theDepartmentofJusticesamplesallqueriesmadeacrosstheperiodand explicitlyreviewsthebasisforeveryU.S.person,oreveryU.S.identityquerymade.Again,wedonot knowthenamesoftheindividualsofthequerieswemightmake. Inaddition,onlysevenseniorofficialsatNSAmayauthorizethedisseminationofanyinformationwe believethatmightbeattributabletoaU.S.person.Again,wewouldnotknowthename.Itwouldonly bethetelephonenumber.AndthatdisseminationinthisprogramwouldonlybemadetotheFederal BureauofInvestigationatdeterminingthattheinformationisrelatedtoandnecessarytounderstanda counterterrorisminitiative. TheForeignIntelligenceSurveillancecourtreviewstheprogramevery90days.Thedatathatwehold mustbedestroyedwithinfiveyearsofitsacquisition.NSAandtheDepartmentofJusticebriefed oversightcommitteesontheemploymentoftheprogram.Weprovidewrittennotificationofall significantdevelopmentswithintheprogram.TheDepartmentofJusticeprovidesoversightcommittees withallsignificantforeignintelligencesurveillancecourts'opinionsregardingtheprogram. Turningmyattentiontothe702program,theForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtannuallyreviews certification,whicharerequiredbylaw,thatarejointlysubmittedbytheattorneygeneralandthe directorofnationalintelligence.Thesecertificationsdefinethecategoriesofforeignactorsthatmaybe appropriatelytargetedand,bylaw,mustincludespecifictargetingandminimizationproceduresthatthe attorneygeneralandthecourtbothagreeareconsistentwiththelawandtheFourthAmendmentofthe Constitution.TheseproceduresrequirethatacommunicationoforconcerningaU.S.personmustbe promptlydestroyedafterit'sidentified,eitherasclearlynotrelevanttotheauthorizedpurpose,orasnot containingevidenceofacrime. Thestatutefurtherrequiresanumberofreportstobeprovidedtoboththecourtandtheoversight committees.AsemiannualassessmentbytheDepartmentofJusticeandtheOfficeoftheDirectorof NationalIntelligence,regardin(ph)compliancewiththetargetingandminimizationproceduresan annualI.G.assessmentthatreportscompliancewithproceduralrequirementslaidoutwithintheorder thenumberofdisseminationsthatmayrefertoU.S.persons,thenumberoftargetslaterfoundtobein theUnitedStates,andwhetherthecommunicationsofsuchtargetswereeverreviewed. AnannualdirectorofNSAreportisalsorequiredtodescribethecomplianceeffortstakenbyNSAand addressthenumberofU.S.personidentitiesdisseminatedinNSAreporting.Finally,Foreign IntelligenceSurveillanceCourtproceduresrequireNSAtoinformthecourtofanynovelissuesoflaw ortechnologyrelevanttoanauthorizedactivityandanynoncompliancetoincludetheExecutive Branch'splanforremedyingthatsameevent.InadditiontotheproceduresI'vejustdescribed,the DepartmentofJusticeconductsonsitereviewsatNSAtosampleNSA's702targetingandtasking
13
Sotowrapup,Chairman,firstI'dliketojusthitonwhenwesaysevenofficials,that'sseven positionsthatatNSAcandisseminateU.S.personsdata.Today,thereare10peopleinthose positions.OneofthoseisourSIGINToperationsofficer.Everyoneofthosehavetobe credentialed.ChrisandIaretwoofthoseofficials. Idowanttohitacoupleofkeypoints.First,withourindustrypartners,underthe702program,the U.S.governmentdoesnotunilaterallyobtaininformationfromtheserversofU.S.companies.Rather, theU.S.companiesarecompelledtoprovidetheserecordsbyU.S.law,usingmethodsthatareinstrict compliancewiththatlaw. Further,asthedeputyattorneygeneralnoted,virtuallyallcountrieshavelawfulinterceptprograms underwhichtheycompelcommunicationproviderstosharedataaboutindividualstheybelieve representathreattotheirsocieties.Communicationprovidersarerequiredtocomplywiththose programsinthecountriesinwhichtheyoperate.TheUnitedStatesisnotuniqueinthiscapability. TheU.S.,however,operatesitsprogramunderthestrictoversightandcomplianceregimethatwas notedabovewithcarefuloversightsbythecourts,Congress,andtheadministration.Inpractice,U.S. companieshaveputenergyandfocusandcommitmentintoconsistentlyprotectingtheprivacyoftheir customersaroundtheworld,whilemeetingtheirobligationsunderthelawsofU.S.andothercountries inwhichtheyoperate.AndIbelievetheytakethoseseriously. Ourthirdandfinalpoint,asAmericans,wevalueourprivacyandourlibertyourcivilliberties. AmericansasAmericans,wealsovalueoursecurityandoursafety.Inthe12yearssincetheattacks onSeptember11th,wehavelivedinrelativesafetyandsecurityasanation.Thatsecurityisadirect resultoftheintelligencecommunity'squieteffortstobetterconnectthedotsandlearnfromthemistakes thatpermittedthoseattackstooccuron9/11. Inthose12years,wehavethoughtlongandhardaboutoversightandcomplianceandhowweminimize theimpactonourfellowcitizens'privacy.Wehavecreatedandimplementedandcontinuetomonitor monitoracomprehensivemissioncomplianceprograminsideNSA.Thisprogram,whichwas developedbasedonindustrybestpracticesandcomplianceworkstokeepoperationsandtechnology alignedwithNSA'sexternallyapprovedprocedures. OutsideofNSA,theofficerofthetheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligence,Departmentof Justice,andtheForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceCourtproviderobustoversightaswellasthis committee.Idobelievewehavethatbalanceright. Insummary,theseprogramsarecriticaltotheintelligencecommunity'sabilitytoprotectournationand ourallies'security.Theyassisttheintelligencecommunity'seffortstoconnectthedot.Second,these programsarelimited,focused,andsubjecttorigorousoversight.Theyhavedistinctpurposesand
14
Yes,Mr.Chairman,Mr.RankingMember,membersofthecommittee,Ijustwanttospeakverybriefly andaddressacoupleofadditionalmisconceptionsthatthepublichasbeenfedaboutsomeofthese programs. ThefirstisthatcollectionunderSection702oftheFISAAmendmentsActissomehowalooseningof traditionalstandardsbecauseitdoesn'trequireindividualizedwarrants.And,infact,exactlytheopposite isthecase.ThekindofcollectionthatisdoneunderSection702,whichiscollectingforeignintelligence informationforforeignersoutsideoftheUnitedStateshistoricallywasdonebytheexecutivebranch underitsownauthoritywithoutanykindofsupervisionwhatsoever. AndasaresultoftheFISAAmendmentsAct,thishasnowbeenbroughtunderajudicialprocesswith thekindofrestrictionsandlimitationsthathavebeendescribedbytheotherwitnesseshere.So,infact, thisisatighteningofstandardsfromwhattheywerebefore. ThesecondmisconceptionisthattheFISAcourtisarubberstampfortheexecutivebranch.And peoplepointtothefactthattheFISAcourtultimatelyapprovesalmosteveryapplicationthatthe governmentsubmitstoit. ButthisdoesnotrecognizetheactualprocessthatwegothroughwiththeFISAcourt.TheFISAcourt isjudges,federaldistrictjudgesappointedfromaroundthecountrywhotakethisoninadditiontotheir otherburdens.They'reallwidelyrespectedandexperiencedjudges.Andtheyhaveafulltime professionalstaffthatworksonlyonFISAmatters. WhenweprepareanapplicationforforaFISA,whetherit'sunderoneoftheseprogramsora traditionalFISA,wefirstsubmittothecourtwhat'scalleda"readcopy,"whichthecourtstaffwill reviewandcommenton. Andifandtheywillalmostinvariablycomebackwithquestions,concerns,problemsthattheysee. AndthereisaniterativeprocessbackandforthbetweenthegovernmentandtheFISAcourttotake careofthoseconcernssothatattheendoftheday,we'reconfidentthatwe'representingsomething thattheFISAcourtwillapprove.Thatishardlyarubberstamp.It'sratherextensiveandseriousjudicial oversightofthisprocess. Thethirdpoint,thethirdmisconceptionthatIwanttomakeisthattheprocesswehavehereisonethat simplyreliesontrustforindividualanalystsorindividualpeopleatNSAtoobeytherules. AndIjustIIwon'tgointodetailastotheoversight,becauseIthinkit'sbeenadequately describedbytheothers.Butthepointis,thereisamultilayeredlevelofoversight,firstwithinNSA,then involvingmyagency,theOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceandtheDepartmentofJustice andultimatelyinvolvingtheFISAcourtandtheCongresstoensurethattheserulesarecompliedwith.
15
AndthelastpointthatI'dthelastmisconceptionIwanttoaddressisthatthisinformationshouldn't havebeenclassifiedanditwasclassifiedonlytotoconcealitfromtheAmericanpeopleandthatthe leaksofthisinformationarenotdamaging. And,Mr.ChairmanandMr.RankingMember,youbothmadethispoint.Theseare,asGeneral Alexandersaid,extremelyimportantcollectionprogramstoprotectusnotonlyfromterrorists,butfrom otherthreatstoournationalsecurity,awidevariety. Andtheyhaveproducedahugeamountofvaluableintelligenceovertheyears.Wearenowfacedwith asituationthatbecausethisinformationhasbeenmadepublic,weruntheriskoflosingthesecollection capabilities.We'renotgonnaknowformanymonthswhethertheseleaksinfacthavecausedustolose thesecapabilities.Butififtheyiftheydohavethateffect,thereisnodoubtthattheywillcauseour nationalsecuritytobeaffected. Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:
Allright,andbutyouhavealsohadmilitaryservice.Isthatcorrect?
INGLIS:
Sir,Idid.Iservedforaperiodof13yearsonactivedutyintheUnitedStatesAirForce,andthen transitionedtotheNationalSecurityAgency.
ROGERS:
Soyourosetotherankofof?
INGLIS:
IwasbrigadiergeneralintheAirNationalGuard.Asinallthings,it'scomplicated. (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:
Great.Well,thankyouforthatservice. Youmentionedin"queriesoflessthan300,"whatdoeswhatdoesthatmean?
INGLIS:
Well,describetheinquiryit'snotputyoudon'tputinaname?
INGLIS:
Wedonot,sir.
ROGERS:
Soyouputin... (CROSSTALK)
INGLIS:
Theonlythingwegetfromtheprovidersarenumbers.Theonlythingwecouldpossiblythenbounce againstthatdatasetarenumbers,themselves.
ROGERS:
Right.Sotherearenonamesandnoaddressesaffiliatedwiththesephonenumbers.
INGLIS:
No,therearenot,sir.
ROGERS:
OK.Justphonenumbers.
INGLIS:
That'sright,sir.
ROGERS:
OK.Goahead.
INGLIS: 17
Soananalystwouldthentrytodeterminewhethertherewasadescribable,itmustbewritten, documentationthatwouldsaythatthereisasuspicionthatthisisattributedtoaforeignterroristplotand theremightbeaU.S.nexus. Afterhavingmadethatdetermination,theywouldmakeafurtherchecktodeterminewhetheritis possibletodiscernthatthismightbeassociatedwithaU.S.person.Thewayyouwouldinferthatisyou mightlookattheareacodeandsaythatareacodecouldlikelybeintheUnitedStates.Weallknow thatwithinthisarea,thatifyouseeanareacodethatbeginswith301,thatwouldbeMaryland.That wouldbeyouronlyinsightintowhetherornotthismightbeattributabletoaU.S.person. Ifthatweretobethecase,thenthecaseforareasonable,articulablesuspiciousmustgetafurther reviewtoensurethatthisisnotasituationwheresomebodyismerelyexpressingtheirFirstAmendment rights. Ifthat'sallthatwas,iftheyweremerelyexpressingtheirFirstAmendmentrights,howeverobjectionable anypersonmightfindthat,thatisnotabasistoquerythedatabase. Ifitgetsthroughthosechecks,thenatthatpoint,itmustbeapprovedbyoneofthose20plustwo individuals20analysts,speciallytrainedanalysts,ortheirtwomanagerssuchthatitmightthenbe appliedasaqueryagainstthedataset.Again,thequeryitselfwouldjustbeanumber,andthequery againstthedatasetwouldthendeterminewhetherthatnumberexistsinthedatabase.That'showthat queryisformed.And,again... (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:
Sotheresponseisnotanameit'sanaddress.It'saphonenumber.
INGLIS:
Itcannotbe.Ifitweretobeanameorifitweretobeanaddress,therewouldbenopossibilitythatthe databasewouldreturnanymeaningfulresults,sincenoneofthatinformationisinthedatabase.
ROGERS:
Justaphonenumberpopsbackup.
INGLIS:
Again,Ijustwanttomakeveryclear,therearenonamesandnoaddressesinthatdatabase.
INGLIS:
Therearenot,sir.
ROGERS:
OK.Andwhyonlylessthan300queriesofphonenumbersintothatdatabase?
18
INGLIS:
Arethosequeriesreportedtothecourt?
INGLIS:
Isthereacourtapprovedprocessinordertomakethatqueryintothatinformationofonlyphone numbers?
INGLIS:
Yes,sir.Thecourtexplicitlyapprovestheprocessbywhichthosedeterminationsweremade,andthe DepartmentofJusticeprovidesarichoversightauditingofthatcapability.
ROGERS:
Great.Thankyou. GeneralAlexander,istheNSAonprivatecompany'sserversasdefinedunderthesetwoprograms?
ALEXANDER:
Wearenot.
ROGERS:
IsistheNSAhavetheabilitytolistentoAmericans'phonecallsorreadtheiremailsunderthesetwo programs?
ALEXANDER:
No,wedonothavethatauthority.
ROGERS:
DoesthetechnologyexistattheNSAtoflipaswitchbysomeanalysttolistentoAmericans'phone
19
callsorreadtheiremails?
ALEXANDER:
No.
ROGERS:
SothetechnologydoesnotexistforanyindividualorgroupofindividualsattheNSAtoflipaswitchto listentoAmericans'phonecallsorreadtheiremails?
ALEXANDER:
Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:
Investigatingterrorismisnotanexactscience.It'slikeamosaic.Andwetrytotakethesedisparate piecesandbringthemtogethertoformapicture.Therearemanydifferentpiecesofintelligence.We haveassets.Wehavephysicalsurveillance.Wehaveelectronicsurveillancethroughalegalprocess phonerecordsthroughadditionallegalprocessfinancialrecords. Also,theseprogramsthatwe'retalkingaboutheretoday,they'reallvaluablepiecestobringthatmosaic togetherandfigureouthowtheseindividualsareplottingtoattacktheUnitedStateshereorwhetherit's U.S.interestsoverseas. So,everydot,asGeneralAlexandermentioned,weheartheclichefrequentlyafter9/11about connectingthedots.Icantellyouasateam,andwiththecommitteeandwiththeAmericanpublic,we cometogethertoputallthosedotstogethertoformthatpicturetoallowustodisrupttheseactivities.
ROGERS:
inthebeginning,Iwouldbeconcerned,too.So,thisisveryimportantthatwegetthemessageoutto theAmericanpublicthatwhatwedoislegalandwe'redoingittoprotectournationalsecurityfrom attacksfromterrorists. Now,thereareoneareathat,Mr.Litt,youyouaddressedthisbutIthinkit'simportanttojust reemphasizetheFISAcourt.Youknow,again,it'sunfortunate,whenpeopledisagreewithyou,they attackyou.Theysaythingsthataren'ttrue.WeknowthatthesearefederaljudgesintheFISAcourt. Theyhaveintegrity,andthattheywillnotapproveanythingthattheyfeeliswrong.Wehave90day periodswherethecourtlooksatthisissue. Iwanttoaskyou,though,GeneralAlexander,doyoufeelinanywaythattheFISAcourtisa rubberstampbasedontheprocess?Ourforefatherscreatedagreatsystemofgovernment,andthat's checksandbalances.Andthat'swhatweare.That'swhatwedointhiscountrytofollowour Constitution.It'sunfortunatethatthesefederaljudgesarebeingattacked.
ALEXANDER:
Idonot.Ibelieve,asyouhavestated,thefederaljudgesonthatcourtaresuperb.Ournationwouldbe proudofwhattheydoandthewaytheygobackandforthtomakesurewedothisexactlyright. Andeverytimewemakeamistake,howtheyworkwithustomakesureitisdonecorrectlytoprotect ourcivillibertiesandprivacyandgothroughthecourtprocess.Theyhavebeenextremelyprofessional. Thereis,frommyperspective,norubberstamp. It'skindofinteresting.It'slikesayingyoujustrana26milemarathonsomebodysaid,"Well,thatwas justajog."Everytimeweworkwiththecourt,thedetailsandthespecificsofthatthatgofromusup throughtheFBI,throughtheDepartmentofJusticeandthroughthecourtoneachoneofthoseorders thatwegotothecourt.Thereistremendousoversight,complianceandwork.AndIthinkthecourthas doneasuperbjob. Moreimportantly,ifIcould,whatweworkedhardtodoistobringallofthesealltheseundercourt supervisionforjustthisreason.Imean,we'vedonetherightthing,Ithink,forourcountryhere. Thankyou.
RUPPERSBERGER:
So,thisisaverydifficultquestion,especiallywhenthatpersonisasystemadministratorandtheyget
21
greataccess...
RUPPERSBERGER:
Whydon'tyousaywhatasystemadministratoris?
ALEXANDER:
OK.Thankyou. Iyieldback.
ROGERS:
(OFFMIKE)
THORNBERRY:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Andthankyouallforbeinghere,andformakingsomeadditionalinformationavailabletothepublic.I knowit'sfrustratingforyou,asitisforus,tohavethesetargetednarrowleaksandnotbeabletotalk aboutthebiggerpicture. GeneralAlexander,youmentionedthatyou'regoingtosendustomorrow50casesthathavebeen stoppedbecauseoftheseprograms,basically.Fourhavebeenmadepublictothispoint.AndIthink therearetwonewonesthatyouaretalkingabouttoday.ButIwouldinviteyoutoexplaintousbothof thosetwonewcasesMowlin(ph)andtheOperationWiFicase.Andoneofthemstartswitha215 oneofthemstartswitha702. AndsoIthinkit'simportantforyoutoprovidetheinformationabouthowtheseprogramsstopped thoseterroristattacks.
ALEXANDER:
OK.I'mgoingtodeferthis,becausetheactualguyswhoactuallydoalltheworkand(inaudible)isthe FBI,andgetitexactlyright.I'mgoingtohaveSeandothat.Goahead,Sean.
JOYCE:
Thatisabsolutelycorrect.Andifyourecall,under702,ithastobeanonU.S.personoutsidethe UnitedStates,andthenalsooneofthecriteriaislinkedtoterrorism.
THORNBERRY:
OK.WouldyousaythatthistheirintentiontoblowuptheNewYorkStockExchangewasaserious plot?Oristhissomethingthattheykindofdreamedabout,youknow,talkingamongtheirbuddies?
JOYCE:
Ithinkthejuryconsidereditserious,sincetheywereallconvicted.
THORNBERRY:
OK.Andandwhatabouttheotherplot?October,2007,thatstartedIthinkwitha215?
JOYCE:
I'msorry.Repeatformeagainwhattheywereplottingtodo.
JOYCE:
Heasactuallyhewasprovidingfinancialsupporttoanoverseasterroristgroupthatwasadesignated terroristgroupbytheUnitedStates.
THORNBERRY:
Buttherewassomeconnectiontosuicidebombingsthattheyweretalkingabout,correct?
23
JOYCE:
NotintheexamplethatI'mcitingrighthere.
THORNBERRY:
Oh,I'msorry,thegroupinSomaliatowhichhewasfinancing,that'swhattheythat'swhattheydodo inSomalia,correct?
JOYCE:
Thatiscorrect,andasyouknow,aspartofourclassifiedhearingsregardingtheAmericanpresencein inthatareaoftheworld.
THORNBERRY:
OK.OK,thankyou. Chairman(OFFMIKE)
ALEXANDER:
IfIcould,Congressman,justjusthitacouplekeypoints.It'sover50cases.AndthereasonI'mnot givingaspecificnumberiswewanttherestofthecommunitytoactuallybeefthoseupandmakesure that(inaudible)wehavethereisexactlyright.I'dgiveyouthenumber50X.Butifsomebodysays, "Well,notthisone."Actually,whatwe'refindingoutistherearemore.Theysaid,"Youmissedthese threeorfour."Sothosearebeingaddedtothepacket. Onthetopofthatpacketwe'llhaveasummaryofallofthese,thelistingofthose.Ibelievethose numbersarethingsthatwecanmakepublic,thatyoucanuse,thatwecanuse.Andwe'lltrytogiveyou thenumbersthatapplytoEurope,aswell,aswellasthosethathadanexusintheUnitedStates. Theissueontermsofreleasingmoreonthespecificoverseascasesis(inaudible)ourit'sourconcern thatinsomeofthosenow,goingintofurtherdetailsofexactlywhatwedidandhowwediditmay preventusfromdisruptingafutureplot. Sothat'ssomethingthatworkinprogress.Ourintentistogetthattothecommitteetomorrowforboth bothIntelCommitteesfortheSenateandHouse.
THORNBERRY:
Great.Thankyou.
ROGERS:
Mr.Thompson?
THOMPSON:
Ibelievetheanswertothatisyes,butIwoulddeferthattothedeputyattorneygeneral.
COLE:
Ithashappened.It'snotoften,butitdoeshappen.
THOMPSON:
Thankyou. Mr.Cole,whatkindsofrecordscomprisethedatacollectedunderthebusinessrecordsprovision?
COLE:
Haveyoupreviouslycollectedanythingelseunderthatauthority?
COLE:
Underthe215authority?
THOMPSON:
Correct.
COLE:
I'mnotsurebeyondthe215andthe702thatansweringaboutwhatwehaveandhaven'tcollected hasbeendeclassifiedtobetalkedabout.
THOMPSON:
That'scorrect.
THOMPSON:
Andandthereactuallyhasbeendatathathasbeeninadvertentlycollectedanditwasdestroyed, nothingelsewasdonewithit?
COLE:
That'scorrect.Thethisisaverystrictprocessthatwegothroughinthatregard.Youcangeta wrongdigitonaphonenumberandyoucollectthewrongnumber,somethinglikethat.Andwhenthat's
25
discovered,that'stakencareofinthatway.
THOMPSON:
Andwhodoesthechecking?Whowhodeterminesifsomethinghasbeeninadvertentlycollectedand thendecidesthatit'sneedstobedestroyed?
COLE:
Ihavenoidea.
THOMPSON:
Anybodyelse?
ALEXANDER:
I'mnotsureIunderstandthecontextofthespecialimmunity.
THOMPSON:
IIdon'teither.That'swhy... (CROSSTALK)
ALEXANDER:
Wetreatyouwithspecialrespect. (LAUGHTER)
THOMPSON:
Hesaidwitha"specialimmunitytoitssurveillance."
ALEXANDER:
Didyouwanttoaddtothat?
INGLIS(?):
No,IwouldsimplyhavesaidthatyourstatusasU.S.personsgivesyouaspecialstatus,aswe've describedthroughoutthishearing.
THOMPSON:
Yes,thatisaccurate.Withoutthe702toolwewouldnothaveidentifiedNajibullahZazi.
THOMPSON:
Thankyou.Ihavenofurtherquestion. Iyieldbackthebalanceofmytime.
ROGERS:
Mr.Miller?
MILLER:
Well,it'sactuallybusinessrecords,FISA,it'stheFBI(inaudible). Goahead.
JOYCE:
TheFBIispartoftheprocess.ItthengoesovertotheDepartmentofJustice.Andtheyaretheones iftheDAGwantstocommentonthat.
COLE:
Thecourtisasinglejudge?
COLE: 27
Iguessthecruxofmyquestionis,wouldtherebeawaythatifyoudidnotgettheanswerthatyou wantedfromacertainjudgecouldyougotoanotherFISAcourtjudgeandaskforanotheropinion?
COLE:
LITT:
Thankyou.Iyieldback.
ROGERS:
Ms.Schakowsky?
SCHAKOWSKY:
ThankyouMr.Chairman.GeneralAlexander,doyoufeelthatthisopenhearingtodayjeopardizesin anywayournationalsecurity?
ALEXANDER:
HowmanypeoplewereinthesamepositionasSnowdenwas,asasystemsmanagertohaveaccessto thisinformationthatcouldbedamagingifreleased?
ALEXANDER:
Howmanyofthoseareoutsidecontractors,ratherthan...
ALEXANDER:
ALEXANDER:
Well,we'reactuallycountingallofthosepositions.I'llgetyouanaccuratenumber.
SCHAKOWSKY:
Well,I'mgoingtoreferthatovertoMr.LittbecausetheclassifyingauthorityonthatwouldbeDNI.
LITT:
Asyoumayknow,wehavebeenworkingforsometimeontryingtodeclassifyopinionsoftheFISA court.It'sbeenaverydifficulttask,becauselikemostlegalopinions,youhavefactsintermingledwith legaldiscussion.Andthefactsfrequentlyinvolveclassifiedinformation,sensitivesourcesandmethods. Andwhatwe'vebeendiscoveringisthatwhenyouremovealloftheinformationthatneedstobe classified,you'releftwithsomethingthatlookslikeSwisscheese,andisnotreallyverycomprehensible. Havingsaidthat,IthinkasasGeneralAlexandersaid,there'sinformationoutinthepublicdomain now.There'sthedirectorofnationalintelligencedeclassifiedcertaininformationabouttheseprograms lastweek. Andasaresultofthat,wearegoingback,takinganotherlookattheseopinionstoseewhether,inlight ofthatdeclassification,there'snowwecanmakeamorecomprehensiblereleaseoftheopinion.So theanswertothatis,wearelookingatthatandandfranklywewouldliketoreleaseittothepublic domain,asmuchofthisaswecan,withoutcompromisingnationalsecurity.
SCHAKOWSKY:
IthinkGeneralAlexander,sowhatothertypesofofrecordsarecollectedunderthisSection215? Cancanyoutalkaboutthatatall?
ALEXANDER:
Yeah,forNSAtheonlytheonlyrecordsthatarecollectedunderbusinessrecords215isthis telephonydata.That'sall.
SCHAKOWSKY:
Andisthereauthorizationtocollectmore?
ALEXANDER:
Under215forus?No,thisistheonlythatwedo.Nowitgetsintootherauthorities,butit'snotours. AndIdon'tnowiftheI'llpassthattotheattorneygeneralbecauseyou'reaskingmenowoutsideof
30
NSA.
COLE:
Whataboutemails?
COLE:
ThankyouMr.Chairman.
ALEXANDER:
Thankyou.Iyieldback.
CONAWAY:
Isthereaaninternalcontrolaudit,sotospeakthatlooksattheentiresystemthatsays,we'vegotthe waterfrontcovered?Andwe'redoingwhatweneedtodo?
COLE:
Andthatpersonwouldhavetherequisiteclearancestoknowallthedetails? (CROSSTALK)
LITT:
Andwhowhodotheyreportto?Isthatreportpublic?
LITT:
It'sthepresident'sboard.Isuspectthattotheextentthey'remakingaclassifiedreport,itwouldnotbe
32
public.Totheextentthattheycanmakeanunclassifiedreport,it'suptothemwhetherornotitbecomes public.
CONAWAY:
OK.Andit'smechanicallyoverwrittenandallofthebackupcopiesofthataredoneawaywith,and...
INGLIS:
Yes,sir.
CONAWAY:
OK.
INGLIS:
NotthatI'mawareofrightnow.But,obviously,thecourtsaresufferingundersequestration,like
33
everybodyelse.SoIdon'tknowwhat'sgonnahitthemaswegoforward.
CONAWAY:
Thankyou,sir, Iyieldback.
ROGERS:
Mr.Conaway. Mr.Langevin?
LANGEVIN:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Andgentlemen,Iwanttothankyouallforyourtestimonyheretodayandforyourservicetoourour country. I'masmembersofthecommittee,Ihavebeenbriefedontheprogram,andandIknowtheexcess ofduediligenceyou'vegonethroughtomakesurethatthisisdoneright. SoIthinkit'simportantthatthisdiscussionisbeinghadthismorning.Andhopefullyit'sgonnagive greaterconfidencetotheAmericanpeoplethatalltheagenciesinvolvedhavedottedtheiri'sand crossedtheirt's. Iespeciallythinkit'shelpfulthatwehavethediscussionabouttheFISAcourttodayandandhow detailedthetherequestshavetobebeforetheygetapprovalandit'smadeclearthatthesearenot justonepagedocumentsthatarepresentedtoaFISAjudgeandthenit'srubberstamped. Itactuallygoesthroughexcessiveduediligence,andandbeforeitevengetstothepointwherethe judgeseesit.And,obviously,iftheifallthecriteriahavebeenmet,thenitgetsitgetsapproved, andifit'sifthecriteriahavenotbeenmet,it'sgonnaberejected. So,Iwon'tbelaborthatpoint,exceptingthat'sbeenhadbeenaveryfruitfuldiscussion. ButcanyoutalkfurtherabouttheagaintheroleoftheI.G.andgointothatthatthatprocessa littlemoresothatthetheamountofreviewtheI.G.does,onceaqueryhasbeenmadeintermsofthe rangeofqueriesthathavebeenmade,Ithinkthat'swouldbeimportanttoclarify.
INGLIS:
OK.
COLE(?):
SosoIthinkeithermaybeImisspokeororyoumisspoke.Wewewearenotlookingat allatU.S.persons.The702isanyoneoutsidetheUnitedStates.AndevenifaU.S.personisoutside oftheUnitedStates,itdoesnotincludeitinthe702coverage. OK,soit'sanonU.S.personoutsidetheUnitedStates,andithastohavethere'sthreedifferent criteriaitgoesthrough.Oneofthoselinksisterrorism.Sothatiswherespecificallyonlycertain individualsaretargeted.Thoseones,oneofthecriteria,linkedtoterrorism. Onnumerousoccasions,asI'veoutlinedinsomeoftheexamples,thoseindividualsoutsidetheUnited StateswerediscoveredcommunicatingwithsomeoneinsidetheUnitedStates. Wethenthatis,beingtippedfromtheNSA.Wethengothroughthelegalprocesshere,theFBI does,regardingthatU.S.person.Sowegoandwehavetoservewhat'scalledanationalsecurityletter toidentifythesubscriber.It'smuchlikeasubpoena. Followingthat,ifwewanttopursueelectronicsurveillance,wehavetomakeaspecificapplication
35
regardingthatpersonwiththeFISAcourthere.
LANGEVIN:
OK.Thankyou.
ROGERS:
That'sanimportantpointwecan'tmakeenough. Mr.Lobiondo?
LOBIONDO:
So,under702,IthinkthebestcaseissomethatSeanJoycemade.Ifwesee,ifwe'retrackingaknown terroristinanothercountry,sayPakistan,Yemenorsomeplace,andweseethemcommunicatingwith someoneintheUnitedStates,andithasaterrorismnexus,focusedondoingsomethingintheUnited States,wetipthattotheFBI. Soourjobistoidentify,seethenexusofit.Itcouldbeinanothercountryaswell.Sosometimes,we'd seesomebodyinthatoneofthosecountriesplanningsomethinginEuropeorelsewhere.Wewould thensharethatthroughintelligencemeetingstothosecountries. ButwhenitcomesintotheUnitedStates,ourjobends.We'retheoutsideandweprovidethattothe insideFBItotakeitfromthere.Sothey,then,takeitandsay,"Doesthismakesense?"They'llgoup,as Seanexplained,lookattheprocessforgettingadditionalinformationtoseeifthisisaleadworth following.
LOBIONDO: 36
AndwhatdoesthegovernmenthavetodoifitwantstotargetaU.S.personunderFISAwhenthey're locatedabroadwhenthey'renothere?Whatwhatwouldbetheprocessforthegovernment?
COLE:
Andwhatifyou... (CROSSTALK)
INGLIS:
And,sir,ifImight.Andagain,thatcouldnotbedoneunder702.There'saseparatesectionofthe ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceActthatwouldallowthat,butitwouldnotbedoableunder702.
LOBIONDO:
Andandwhatifyouwanttomonitorsomeone'scommunicationintheUnitedStates?
COLE:
So,Ijustwanttoreemphasizethat.YouyouhavetospecificallygototheFISAcourtandmake yourcaseastowhythisinformationisnecessarytobeaccessed.
COLE:
That'scorrect.
LOBIONDO:
Andwithoutthat,youhavenoauthorityandcannotdoitanddonotdoit.
COLE:
That'scorrect.
LOBIONDO:
OK.Thankyou. Iyieldback,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS: 37
Great.Thankyouverymuch. Mr.Schiff?
SCHIFF:
Anddoesthecourtscrutinizeafteryoupresentbacktothecourt,"thesearetheoccasionswherewe foundreasonablearticulablefacts,"dotheyscrutinizeyourbasisforconductingthosequeries?
COLE:
Yes,theydo.
SCHIFF:
Soitmaybesomethinglikethatthatwe'dbringbackandlookat.Sowearegoingtolookatthat.And wehavealreadycommittedtodoingthatandwewilldothat,andgothroughallthedetailsofthat.
SCHIFF:
AndIwouldjustencourageinthelastsecondthatbeyondthetwoprogramsatissuehere,tothedegree youcandeclassifyotherFISAcourtopinions,Ithinkit'sinthepublicinterest.
39
LITT:
Yes,Ithinkthat'spartofwhatwe'redoing.
SCHIFF:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
COLE:
Doyouhaveafollowup?
SCHIFF:
It'smorethelattertheaggregatenumberwherewe'vemadeaquery.Andifthere'sanyproblemsthat havebeendiscovered,thenwewithspecificityreporttothecourtthoseproblems.
SCHIFF:
Itmaybeworthconsideringprovidingthebasisofthereasonableandarticulablefactsandhavingthe courtreviewthatasaasafurthercheckandbalance.I'djustmakethatsuggestion.
ROGERS:
Mr.Cole,myunderstanding,though,isthateveryaccessisalreadypreapprovedthatthewayyouget intothesystemiscourtapproved.Isthatcorrect?
COLE:
Andandjusttobeclear,soiftheydon'tfollowthecourtapprovedprocess,thatwouldbea
40
variation,thatwouldhavetobereportedtothecourt?
COLE:
That'scorrect.
ROGERS:
OK.Butyouaremeetingthecourtapprovedprocesswitheveryquery?
COLE:
That'scorrect.
INGLIS:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Mr.Cole,reallywhat'shappenedhereisthatthetotalityofmanyproblemswithintheexecutivebranch hasnowtarnishedthefinefolksattheNSAandtheCIA.AndIjustmadeashortlisthere,but,you know,rightafterBenghazitherewasthere'sliesafterBenghazi,fourdeadAmericans.Fastand Furious,theCongressstillismissingdocuments.WehavedeadAmericansanddeadMexicancitizens. YouatleasttappedintoorgotphonerecordsfromAPreporters,FoxNewsreporters,includingfrom theHouseGalleryrightherewithinthisbuilding. Lastweek,asyouknow,A.G.HolderhasbeenisbeingaccusedbytheJudiciaryCommitteeof possiblylyingtothecommittee. Andthentotopitalloff,youhave,youknow,anIRSofficialwhowithotherofficialsranlikeacovert mediaoperationonaFridaytohelp,youknow,trytoreleasedocumentstothinkthatthiswouldjustgo awayaboutthereleaseofpersonaldatafromU.S.citizensfromtheIRS. Sonowyouknow,Iunderstandwhenmyconstituentsaskme,"Well,iftheIRSisleakingpersonal data"GeneralAlexander,thisquestion'sforyou"howdoIknowforsurethattheNSAandthe and(inaudible)peoplethataretryingtoprotectthiscountryaren'tleakingdata?" SoMr.Mr.Rogersaskedthequestionabout,youknow,howdoweknowthatthatsomeone fromtheWhiteHousejustcan'tgoturnaswitchandbegintolistentotheirphoneconversations?
41
Thankyou,Congressman. Ithinkthekeythekeyfactshere.Whenwedisseminatedata,everythingthatwedisseminateandall thequeriesthataremadeintothedatabaseare100percentauditable.Sotheyareauditedbynotonly theanalystswho'sactuallydoingthejobbuttheoverseersthatlookandsee,didhedothatrightorshe dothatright. Ineverycasethatwehaveseensofarwehavenotseenoneofouranalystswillfullydosomething wronglikewhatyouyoujustsaid.That'swheredisciplinaryactionwouldcomein. WhatIhavetooverwriteunderwriteiswhensomebodymakesanhonestmistake.Thesearegood people.Iftheytransposetwolettersintypingsomethingin,that'sanhonestmistake.Wegobackand say,nowhowcanwefixit?Thetechnicalcontrolsthatyoucanseethatwe'readdinginhelpfixthat. Butisitisourintenttodothisexactlyright. Inthat,oneofthethingsthatwehaveistremendoustrainingprogramsforourpeoplethattheygo through.HowtoprotectU.S.personsdata?HowtointerfacewiththebusinessrecordFISA?The rolesandresponsibilitiesunderFAA702.Everyone,includingmyself,atNSAhastogothroughthat trainingtoensurethatwedoitright. Andwetakethatveryseriously.Ibelievethebestintheworldat(ph)termsofprotectingourprivacy. AndIwouldjusttellyou,youknow,theotherthingthat'ssometimesconfusedhereisthat,"Well,then they'regettingeverybodyelseintheworld."Butourourapproachisforeignintelligenceyouknow, it'sthesamethinginEurope.We'renotinterestedininwell,one,wedon'thavethetime.And, two,oursistoprotectourcountryandourallies.Ithinkwedothatbetterthananyoneelse. Now,Chris,anythingifyouwanttoaddtothat?
INGLIS:
nationalsecurity.Canyougointoafewofthosespecifics?
JOYCE:
General?
ALEXANDER:
Sothetobeclear,Snowdendidnothavethecertificatesnecessarilynecessarytoleadthatpublic forum?
ALEXANDER:
Absolutely.
ALEXANDER:
...expectus.Sothat'swhereIneedtoreallyjointhatdebateonthissidetomakesurethatwhatwedo isexactlyright.Ithinkonthingslikehowweminimizedata,howwerunthisprogram,thethosekinds ofthings,Ithinkwecanwewe'retryingtobethat'swhyChriswentthroughthosegreatdetails. IthinkthosearethingsthattheAmericanpeopleshouldknow.Becausewhattheyfindoutisshoot, lookattheoversight,thecompliance,andthetrainingthatarepeoplearegoingthrough.Thisishuge. Thisisn'tsomerogueoperationthatagroupofguysupatNSAarerunning.Thisissomethingthathave oversightbythecommittees,thecourts,theadministrationina100percentauditableprocessona businessrecordFISA. Youknow,that'sextraordinaryoversight.AndIthinkwhentheAmericanpeoplelookatthat,theysay, "Wow,forlessthan300selectors,thatamountofoversight"andthat'swhatwejointlyagreedtodo. Ithinkthat'stremendous.
SEWELL:
Samelevelofsecurityclearanceandthesameprocessforsecuringthem.
45
SEWELL:
OK. Thankyou.Iyieldbacktherestofmytime.
ROGERS:
Thankyou. Mr.Westmoreland.
WESTMORELAND:
Numberone,thatwasnotaFISAcourt.IntheRosencase,therewerenophonesbeingtapped.Itwas justtoacquireacoupleofemails.Andthereisavery,veryrobustsystem.It'ssetoutinregulationsthat theDepartmentofJusticefollowsofthekindsofscrubbingandreviewthatmustbedonebeforeany subpoenalikethatcanbeissued. Youhavetomakesurethatyou'veexhaustedallotherreasonableavenuesofinvestigationthatthat's donebeforeyouevengettothedecisionaboutwhetherornotsuchaaprocessshouldbeused.You havetomakesurethattheinformationyou'relookingatisvery,verytailoredandonlynecessarytruly necessarytobeabletomovetheinvestigationforwardinasignificantway. Therehastherearerestrictionsonwhatcanbedonewiththeinformation.Anditgoesthroughavery longprocessofreviewfromtheU.S.attorney'sofficethroughtheUnitedStatesattorneyhimorherself, intothe,usually,thecriminaldivisionoftheJusticeDepartment,throughtheassistantattorneygeneralof thecriminaldivision,throughthedeputyattorneygeneral'sofficeandup,ultimately,totheattorney generalsigningit.Itgetsalotofreviewbeforethat'sdoneunderthecriteriathatwehaveinour guidelinesandourCFR.
WESTMORELAND:
SosotheDOJdidn'tbecause(inaudible)asecurityleak,theDOJdidn'tcontacttheFBIorthe NSA,ortherewasnocoordinationwiththat?ItwasstrictlyaDOJcriminalinvestigation?
COLE:
Well,theFBIdoescriminalinvestigationwith...
WESTMORELAND:
Iunderstand.
COLE: 46
...theDepartmentofJustice.Andtheywerecontactedinthatregard.ButitwasnotpartoftheFISA process.ItdidnotinvolvetheNSA.
WESTMORELAND:
AndIthinkthat'swhatweneedtobeclearof,is...
COLE:
Correct.
WESTMORELAND:
...thatitwasabsolutelynotpartoftheFISAprocess.Andthatisalotmoredetailedandalotmore scrutinizedasfarasgettinginformationthanwhatthiswas.Isthatcorrect?
COLE:
Well,they'rebothverydetailedandveryscrutinizedprocesses.They'retheyhavedifferentaspectsto them.Butthey'rebothveryunusually,frankly,detailedandscrutinized,bothofthoseprocesses.
WESTMORELAND:
Sowouldhehavebeenfamiliarwiththeseprogramsathispreviousjob?
ALEXANDER:
Mr.Westmoreland,ifIjustmight...
WESTMORELAND:
Yes?
LITT:
Thankyou.Iyieldback.
HIMES:
ThankyouMr.ChairmanandItoowouldliketothankthepanelforappearingheretodayandforyour servicetothecountry.IthinkI'vetoldeachofyouthatinmylimitedtimeonthiscommittee,I'vebeen heartenedbyyourcompetence,andbythecompetenceoftheagenciesinwhichyouwork.I'llalsoadd thatI'veseennothinginthelastweek,weekandahalftosuggestthatanyoftheseprogramsthatare beingdiscussed,areoperatinginanywayoutsidethelaw.AndIwouldaddthatthecontrolsthat appeartobeinplaceontheseprogramsseemseemsolid.I'llalsosaythatIdon'tknowthatthere's anywaytodooversightwithoutapostureofskepticismonthepartoftheoverseers. AndsoIhopeyou'lltakemyobservationsandquestionsinthatspirit.AndI'dliketolimitmyquestions andobservationspurelytoSection215andtheVerizondisclosures,whichquitefrankly,troubleme. Theytroublemebecauseofthebreadthandthescopeoftheinformationcollection.Theytroubleme becauseIthinkthisishistoricallyunprecedentedintheextentofthedatathatisbeingcollectedon potentiallyallAmericancitizens.Andthecontrolswhichyou'velaidoutforus,notwithstanding,Ithink new(sic)forthiscountry.Weknowthatwhenacapabilityexists,there'sapotentialforabuse.Mr. NunesranthroughalotofcurrentissuesgoingbacktoJ.EdgarHooverbuggingthehotelroomsof MartinLutherKing,toNixon,toconcernsaroundtheIRS. Ifacapabilityexists,fromtimetotimeitwillbeabused.AndoneofthethingsthatI'mconcernedabout isthisindividualwhoIwho'sresumewouldIthinkmakehimmakeitunlikelythathewouldgetan unpaidinternshipinmyoffice,hehadaccesstosomeofthemostsensitiveinformationthatwehave. Andperhapshecouldhave,orsomeonelikehim,couldhavechosenadifferentpath.Couldhave accessedphonenumbersandthoughwespentalotoftimeonthefactthatyoudon'tgetnames,we allknowthatwithaphonenumberandGoogle,youcangetanameprettyquickly.
48
HecouldhavechosentomakeapointaboutCongressmanHimesmaking2:00amphonecallsoutofa barinWashington.OrtheCEOofGooglemakingphonecalls.Oranythingreally.Informationthatwe holdtobeprivate.SoIguessI'vegottwoquestions.IguessIdirectthisoneon215toMr.Littand thenMr.Cole.Wheredowedrawtheline?Soinotherwords,solongastheinformationisnot informationtowhichIhaveareasonableexpectationofprivacyunderMarylandv.Smithandunder Section215powers,wheredowedrawtheline? Couldyou,forexamplehavevideodata?AsIwalkaroundWashingtonmyIsupposethatyoucould probablyreconstructmydaywithvideothatiscapturedonthirdpartycameras.Couldyoukeepthatin awaythatisanalogoustowhatyou'redoingwithphonenumbers?Andagainwithallofthecareful guardsandwhatnot,couldyounotreconstructmydaybecauseIdon'thaveareasonableexpectation ofprivacyaroundIknowthat'sahypothetical,butI'mtryingtoidentifywherethelineis?
COLE:
Well,Ithinkthetherealissuehereishowit'saccessed?Whatitcanbeusedfor?Howyoucan actually...
HIMES:
III'mstipulatingthatthatsystem,eventhoughweknowit'snotperfect,I'mstipulatingthatthat systemisperfect.AndI'masking,whereisthelimitastowhatyoucankeepinthetank?
COLE:
IIthinksomeofitisamatterfortheUnitedStatesCongresstodecideaspolicymatters,andthe legislatingthatyoudosurroundingtheseacts,astowhereyou'regoingtodrawthoselines.Certainlythe courtshavelookedatthisanddeterminedthatunderthestatuteswehave,thereisarelevance requirement,andthey'renotjustsayingoutofwholeclothyou'reallowedtogatherthesethings.You havetolookatitalltogether.Andthey'reonlysayingthatyoucangatherthisvolumeunderthese circumstances,undertheserestrictions,withthesecontrols.Withoutthosecircumstancesandcontrols andrestrictions,thecourtmaywellnothaveapprovedtheordersunder215toallowthatcollectionto takeplace. Soyoucan'tseparatethatout,onefromtheotherandsay,justtheacquisition,whatcanwedo? Becausetheacquisitioncomestogetherwiththerestrictionsonaccess.
HIMES:
Andifthoserestrictionsandcontrolsareadequate,there'stheoreticallynorestrictiononyourabilityto storeinformationonanythingforwhichIdonothavethereasonableexpectationforprivacy?
COLE:
I'llreferbacktoNSA... (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:
Letme... (CROSSTALK)
49
HIMES:
...Idohaveonemorequestion. (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:
Yeah,thisistheconversationIdohaveonemoremuchmore...
ALEXANDER:
CanI...
HIMES:
...specificquestion.
ALEXANDER:
...canIhit...
HIMES:
Yeah.
ALEXANDER:
...ifIcould.I'llaskformoretimeifIcould,becauseIdothinkwhatyou'veaskedisveryimportant.So yourquestionis,couldsomebodygetoutandgetyourphonenumberandseethatyouwereatabar lastnight?Theanswerisno.Becausefirstinoursystem,somebodywouldhavehadtoapprove,and there'sonly22peoplethatcanapprove,areasonablearticulablesuspiciononaphonenumber.Sofirst, thathastogetinput.Onlythosephonenumbersthatareapprovedcouldthenbequeried.Andsoyou havetohaveoneofthose22breakalaw.Thenyouhavetohavesomebodygoinandbreakalaw. Andthesystemis100percentauditable,soitwillbecaught. Thereisnowaytochangethat.Andsoonthatsystem,whoeverdidthatwouldhavebrokenthelaw. Thatwouldbewillful.Andthenthatpersonwouldbefoundbythecourttobeinviolationofacourt order,andthat'smuchmoreserious.Wehaveneverhadthathappen.
HIMES:
Yeah.No,IIthankyou.Iappreciatethat,andIIsortofIthinkit'sreallyimportanttoexplore thesethesebrightlinesaboutwhatyoucankeepandwhatyoucan't.Again,Idon'tseeanything aboutthecontrolsystemsthataretroubling,butIdohaveonelastquickquestionifthechairmanwill indulgemein.General,thisisIguessforyouandit'sit'ssomethingthatIaskedyouinclosedsession. Asweweighthis,becauseobviouslywe'reweighingsecurityagainstprivacyandwhatnot,asweweigh this,Ithinkit'sreallyimportantthatweunderstandexactlythenationalsecuritybenefit.AndIlimit myselfto215here. 50episodes.Idon'tthinkit'sadequatetosaythat702and215authoritiescontributedtoourpreventing 50episodes.Ithinkit'sreallyessentialthatyougradetheimportanceofthatcontribution.ThequestionI askedyou,andandyoucananswernow,orI'dreallyliketogetintothis.Howmanyofthose50 episodeswouldhaveoccurred,butforyourabilitytousetheSection215authoritiesasdisclosedinthe Verizonsituation?Howessential,notjustcontributingto,buthowessentialaretheseauthoritiesto
50
stoppingwhichterroristattacks?
ALEXANDER:
OK.Forclarityover50.Andin90percentofthosecasesFAA702contributed,andin50percentI believetheywerecritical.Wewillsendthattothecommittee.
HIMES:
Thisis702you'retalkingabout?
ALEXANDER:
Thisis702.
HIMES:
OK.
ALEXANDER:
Now,shiftingtothebusinessrecordFISA,andI'lldoaMuttandJeffhere,I'mnotsurewhichoneI am.There'sjustover10thathadadomestic.Andthevastmajority...
HIMES:
10ofthe50weresection...
ALEXANDER:
Justover10. (CROSSTALK)
HIMES:
Andhowmanywouldyousaywerecritical.
ALEXANDER:
No.No,you're...
HIMES:
I'msorry.
ALEXANDER:
...letmefinish.
HIMES:
DidIgetitwrong?
ALEXANDER:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:
(OFFMIKE)
BACHMANN:
Thatistrue.It'sdestroyedwhenitreachesfiveyearsofage.
BACHMANN:
Andhowlongdothephonecompaniesontheirownmaintaindata?
INGLIS:
No,thesearecourtordersthatrequiretheircompliancewiththetermsofthecourtorder.
BACHMANN:
Soletmejustfortherecordstate,isNSAspyingtodayorhaveyouspiedonAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:
WewedonottargetU.S.personsanywhereintheworldwithoutaspecificcourtwarrant.
BACHMANN:
AnddoestheNSAlistentothephonecallsofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:
WedonottargetorlistentothetelephonecallsofU.S.personsunderthattargetingwithoutaspecific courtwarrant.
BACHMANN:
DoestheNSAreadtheemailsofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:
Sameanswer,ma'am.
BACHMANN:
DoestheNSAreadthetextmessagesofAmericancitizens?
INGLIS:
Again,wedonottargetthecontentofU.S.personcommunicationswithoutaspecificwarrant anywhereontheearth.
BACHMANN:
InmytimeatNSA,no,ma'am.
BACHMANN:
Doesthegovernmentkeepthevideodata,likeMr.Himeshadjustquestioned?Doesthegovernment haveadatabasewithvideodatainit,trackingmovementsoftheAmericanpeople?
INGLIS: 53
No,ma'am. (CROSSTALK)
BACHMANN:
I'msorry.That'snotthemicrophoneisn'ton.
INGLIS:
NSAdoesnotholdsuchdata.
ALEXANDER:
Yeah,andwedon'tknowofanydataanybodythatdoes.SoIthinkthoseareheld,asyouseefrom Boston,byindividualshopownersand(inaudible).
BACHMANN:
Butbutdoesthefederalgovernmenthaveadatabasewithvideodatainittrackingthewhereabouts oftheAmericanpeople?
JOYCE:
TheFBIdoesnothavesuchadatabase,noramIawareofone.
BACHMANN:
DowedoestheAmericangovernmenthaveadatabasethathastheGPSlocationwhereaboutsof Americans,whetherit'sbyourcellphonesorbyanyothertrackingdevice?Isthereaknowndatabase?
INGLIS:
NSAdoesnotholdsuchadatabase.
BACHMANN:
We'renotallowedtodothat,nordowedothat,unlesswehaveacourtordertodothat.Anditwould beonlyinspecificcasesandalmostalwaysthatwouldbeanFBIlead,notours.
BACHMANN:
SodowemaintainadatabaseofalloftheemailsthathaveeverbeensentbytheAmericanpeople?
ALEXANDER:
No.No,wedonot.
BACHMANN:
Doweisthereadatabasefromourgovernmentthatmaintainsadatabaseofthetextmessagesofall Americans?
ALEXANDER: 54
NononethatIknowof,andnoneatNSA.
BACHMANN:
AndsoIthinkwhatyouhavetoldthiscommitteeisthattheproblemisnotwiththeNSA,thatistrying tokeeptheAmericanpeoplesafe.You'vetoldusthatyouhave100percentauditablesystemthathas oversightbothfromthecourtandfromCongress. Itseemstomethattheproblemhereisthatofanindividualwhoworkedwithinthesystem,whobroke laws,andwhochosetodeclassifyhighlysensitiveclassifiedinformation.Itseemstomethat'swhereour focusshouldbe,onhowtherecouldbeabetrayaloftrustandhowatraitorcoulddosomethinglikethis totheAmericanpeople.Itseemstomethat'swhereourfocusmustbeandhowwecanprevent somethinglikethatfromeverhappeningagain. Letmeaskyouropinion:HowdamagingisthistothenationalsecurityoftheAmericanpeoplethatthis trustwasviolated?
ALEXANDER:
Ithinkitwasirreversibleandsignificantdamagetothisnation.
BACHMAN:
HasthishelpedAmerica'senemies?
ALEXANDER:
Ibelieveithas.AndIbelieveitwillhurtusandourallies.
BACHMANN:
Iyieldback,Mr.Chair.
ROONEY:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Iwanttothankthepanel. Youknow,oneofthenegativesaboutbeingsolowonthetotempoleuphereisbasicallyallthe questionsthatIwantedtoaddresshavebeenasked. AndIthinkI'mreallyproudofthiscommitteebecauseonbothsidesoftheaisle,alotofthequestions wereverypoignant.AndIhopethattheAmericanpeopleandthosethatareintheroomhavelearneda lotaboutwhathappenedhereandlearnedalotaboutthepeopleonthepanel. Icansayspecifically,GeneralAlexander,mytimeontheIntelligenceCommittee,Ihavemorerespect foryou.AndI'mgladthatyou'retheoneuptheretestifyingsotheAmericanpeoplecanseedespite whatthey'rewhat'sbeingportrayedandthesuspicionsthatareoutthere,thatthereisnobodybetter toarticulatewhathappenedandwhatwe'retryingtodothanyourself. SoIwanttothankyouforthat. WeweI'llaskacouplebasicquestionsthatIthinkthatmighthelpclearsomethingsup. Mr.Cole,youtalkedabouthowthetheFourthAmendmentisn'tapplicableunderthebusiness recordsexceptionandthePatriotActSection215,applicablecaselaw,Marylandv.Smith,etcetera.
55
Certainly.Firstofallweaswesaid,wedon'tgivethereasonablesuspiciontothecourtaheadof time.Theysetoutthestandardsforustouse. Buttheanalogy,andI'vehearditusedseveraltimesis,ifyou'relookingforaneedleinthehaystack, youhavetogetthehaystackfirst.Andthat'swhywehavetheabilityunderthecourtordertoacquire andthekeywordhereisacquireallofthatdata. Wedon'tgettouseallofthatdatanecessarily.Thatisthenextstep,whichisyouhavetobeableto determinethatthereisreasonable,articulablesuspiciontoactuallyusethatdata. Soifwewanttofindthatthereisaphonenumberthatwebelieveisconnectedwithterrorist organizationsandterroristactivity,weneedtohavetherestofthehaystack,alltheothernumbers,to findoutwhichonesitwasincontactwith. And,asyouheardMr.Inglissay,it'saverylimitednumberoftimesthatwemakethosequeries becausewedohavestandardsthathavetobemetbeforewecanevenmakeuseofthatdata.Sowhile itsitsthere,itisusedsparingly.
ROONEY:
DidyouoranybodythatyouknowattheNSAbreakthelawintryingtoobtainthisinformation?
COLE:
IamawareofnobodywhohasbrokenthelawattheNSAinobtainingtheinformationinthelawful sense.There'sotherissuesthatwehavewiththeleaksthathavegoneonhere.
ROONEY:
AndmaybethisquestionisforGeneralAlexander:Basedoneverythingthatwe'veheardtoday,doyou seeanyproblemswitheither702or215thatyouthinkshouldbechangedbythisbody?
ALEXANDER:
Sothosearethestepsthatwewillabsolutelythey'llgobackandandlookattheentirearchitecture andthat'sacommitmentthatFBIandNSAhasmadetotheadministrationandtothiscommittee.
ROONEY:
Finalquestion,Mr.Joyce,what'snextforMr.Snowdenwecanexpect?
JOYCE:
Justice.
ROONEY:
Iyieldback,Mr.Chairman.Thankyou. (CROSSTALK)
POMPEO:
Great.Thankyou,Mr.Chairman. Thankyouallforbeingheretoday.Youknow,thishasbeenthishasbeenagreathearing.Ithinkthe Americanpeoplewillhavegottenachancetohearfromfolkswhoareactuallyexecutingthisprogramin animportantway,andthey'llhaveachoicewhethertobelieveMr.InglisandGeneralAlexanderora felonwhofledtocommunistChina. Forme,there'saneasyanswertothat. Therearethosewhotalkaboutthewaronterrorwindingdown,theysaywe'retowardtheendofthis, theseprogramswerecreatedpost9/11tocountertheterroristthreat,butforthesoldiersfighting overseasandouralliesandforusintheStates. GeneralAlexander,Mr.Joyce,doyouthinktheseprogramsarejustasmuchneededtodayasthey wereintheimmediateaftermathof9/11?
ALEXANDER:
Ido.
JOYCE:
Yes,that'scorrect.
POMPEO:
Doyouhavesomethingtoadd,General?
ALEXANDER:
That'sexactlyright.Infact,anyplace,anytimewecanhelp,wewilldoit.
POMPEO:
ALEXANDER:
Notbeyondtheareacode.
POMPEO:
No,wedon't.
POMPEO:
...we'vegotthatright.
ALEXANDER:
Wedon'thavethatinthedatabase.
POMPEO:
Yes.
POMPEO:
Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.I'llmakethisbrief. Iwanttofirstofallthankallwitnessesfortheirtestimony,fortheirservice,andforallyou'vedoneto strengthenandmaintainthisprogram. Myquestion,GeneralAlexander,isistoyouandalsoperhapstoMr.Joyce, Severaltimesinyourtestimonyyoureferenced9/11andhowandIrecallafterSeptember11ththere wasawasaloudchallengetotheintelligencecommunitytodoabetterjobofconnectingthedots,be moreaggressive,beyouknow,bemoreforwardthinking,trytoanticipatewhat'sgoingtohappen, thinkoutsidethebox,allthoseclichesweheardatthetime. AndasIseeit,thisisaverylegitimateandlegalresponsetothatrequest. Iwouldaskyou,GeneralAlexander,oryou,Mr.Joyce,Ibelievereferencedthecase,afterSeptember
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Idon'tknow,Congressman,iftheattackcouldhavebeenprevented.WhatIcantellyouisthatisatool thatwasnotavailabletousatthetimeof9/11.Sowhentherewasactuallyacallmadefromaknown terroristinYementoKhalidMihdharinSanDiego,wedidnothavethattoolorcapabilitytotrackthat call. Now,thingsmayhavebeendifferent,andwewillneverknowthat,unfortunately. Sothatisthetoolthatwe'retalkingabouttodaythatwedidnothaveatthetimeof9/11. Movingforward,asyoumentionedaboutthethestockexchange,herewehaveasimilarthingexcept thiswasunder,again,the702program,whereNSAtippedtousthataknownextremistinYemenwas talkingorconversingwithanindividualinsidetheUnitedStates,welateridentifiedasKhalidOuazzani. AndthenwewereabletogouponourlegalauthoritieshereintheUnitedStatesonOuazzani,whowas inKansasCityandwereabletoidentifytwoadditionalcoconspirators. Wefoundthroughelectronicsurveillancetheywereactuallyintheinitialstagesofplottingtobombthe NewYorkStockExchange. So,astoreallysummarize,asImentionedbefore,allofthesetoolsareimportant. AndasCongressmanSchiffmentioned,weshouldhavethisdialogue.Weshouldallbelookingfor ways,asyousaid,thinkingoutsidetheboxofhowtodoourbusiness. ButIsitherebeforeyoutodayhumblyandsaythatthesetoolshavehelpedus.
KING:
General?
ALEXANDER:
helpthat. IdeallygoingfromMihdhar,wewouldhavebeenabletofindtheotherteams,theotherthreeteamsin theUnitedStatesand/oroneinGermanyorsomeotherplace. SotheabilitytousethemetadatafromthebusinessrecordFISAwouldhaveallowedus,webelieve,to seesome. Now,soit'shypothetical.Therearealotofconditionsthatwecanputthatwecouldputonthere. You'dhavetohavethisright.You'dhavetohavetheRASright. Butwedidn'thavethatability.Wecouldn'tconnectthedotsbecausewedidn'thavethedots. Andso,Ithinkwhatwe'vegothereisthatoneadditionalcapability,onemoretooltohelpuswork togetherasateamtostopfutureattacks.AndasasSeanhaslaidout,youknow,whenyoulookat this,youknow,theNewYorkCitytwoandothers,Ithinkfrommyperspective,youknow,those wouldhavebeensignificanteventsforournation.Andso,Ithinkwhatwe'vejointlydonewith Congressishelpedsetthisprogramupcorrectly.
KING:
Thatiscorrect,Chairman.
ROGERS:
Andso,withoutthatinitialtip,youmightnothavefoundtheotherveryweightyevidencethathappened subsequenttothattip.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:
Absolutely.
ROGERS:
JOYCE:
Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:
AndandaccordingtointheunclassifiedreportthattipultimatelyledtotheFBI'sopeningofafull investigationthatresultedintheFebruary2013conviction.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:
Yes,itis,Chairman.
ROGERS:
No,actually,hewasthesubjecttoapriorinvestigation...
ROGERS:
Thatwasclosed.
JOYCE:
...severalyearsearlierthatwasclosed...
ROGERS:
Right.
JOYCE:
...becausewecouldnotfindanyconnectiontoterrorism.
ROGERS:
Right.
JOYCE:
Andthen,ifwedidnothavethetipfromNSA,wewouldnothavebeenabletoreopen...
ROGERS:
Reopenthecase.Butatthetime,youweren'tinvestigatinghim?
JOYCE:
Absolutelynot.Itwasbasedon... (CROSSTALK)
ROGERS:
JOYCE:
No,wedidnot.Sowehadtoservelegalprocesstoidentifythatsubscriberandthencorroborateit. AndthenwelaterwentuponelectronicsurveillancewithanorderthroughtheFISC.
ROGERS:
Andandwhenyouwentupontheelectronicsurveillance,youusedacourtorder,awarrant...
JOYCE:
Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:
...asubpoena?Whatdidyouuse?
JOYCE:
WeusedaFISAcourtorder.
ROGERS:
Allright.Soyouhadtogoback.Youhadtoproveastandardofprobablecausetogouponthis individual'sphonenumber.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:
That'sright.Andasbeenmentioned,hopefullyseveraltimestoday,anyoneinsidetheUnitedStates,a U.S.person,whetherthey'reinsideoroutside,weneedaspecificcourtorderregardingthatperson.
ROGERS:
No,theydonot.Youcanjustgetagrandjury'ssubpoena,and,separatefrompreservingit,youcan acquirethemwithagrandjurysubpoena.Andyoudon'tneedtogotoacourttodothat.
ROGERS:
Right,sothatisalowerlegalstandardinordertoobtaininformationonaU.S.citizenonacriminal matter.
COLE:
That'scorrect,Mr.Chairman.
ROGERS:
Right.
COLE:
Andyoudon'tneedacourtaheadoftime.
ROGERS:
Soso,intotal,thisisamuchmoreoverseenand,bytheway,onacriminalembezzlementcasein Chicago,youwouldn'tbriefthattoCongress,wouldyou?
COLE:
No,wewouldnot,notasanormalcourse.
ROGERS:
That'scorrect.InanormalcriminalembezzlementcaseinChicago,youwouldhavetheFBIandthe JusticeDepartmentinvolved.Andthat'saboutit.
ROGERS:
Right.
COLE:
obtainedareofthesamekind.
ROGERS:
Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:
DotheyperformeconomicespionageactivitiestargetedatU.S.companiesintheUnitedStates?
JOYCE:
Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:
Dotheyconductespionageactivitiestowardmilitaryandintelligentservices,bothhereandabroad,that belongtotheUnitedStatesofAmerica?
JOYCE:
Yes,theydo.
ROGERS:
Dotheytargetpolicymakersanddecisionmakers,DepartmentofStateandotherotherpolicy makersthatmightengageinforeignaffairswhenitcomestotheUnitedStates?
JOYCE:
Yes.
ROGERS:
Wouldyouhowwouldyouratethemasanadversarialintelligenceservicegiventheotherintelligence servicesthatweknowareadversarial,theRussians,theIranians,theothers?
JOYCE:
Theyareoneofourtopadversaries.
ROGERS:
Yeah.AndyouhavehadastringofsuccessesrecentlyinprosecutionsforChineseespionageactivities intheUnitedStates.Isthatcorrect?
JOYCE:
Thatiscorrect.
ROGERS:
Andso,thathasbeenbotheconomic,and,ifIunderstandit,aswellasthemilitaryefforts.Sothey've beenveryaggressiveintheirespionageactivitiestowardtheUnitedStates.Isitwouldyouisthata
65
fairassessment?
JOYCE:
IthinktheyhavebeenveryaggressiveagainstUnitedStatesinterests.
ROGERS:
Verycarefully. (LAUGHTER) Withalotoflegaloversight.IIthinkoneofthethingsthatyouknow,it'spublicknowledgeout thereaboutthecyberactivitiesthatwe'reseeing.ButIalsothinkthatwhat'smissing,perhaps,inthis conversationwiththeChineseiswhat'swhat'sacceptablepracticeshere.AndIthinkthepresident hasstartedsomeofthatinthediscussionswiththethenewpresidentofChina. AndIthinkthat'ssomeofthestuffthatweactuallyhavetohave.Thisneednotbeanadversarial relationship.IthinkourcountrydoesalotofbusinesswithChina,andweneedtolookat,howcanwe improvetherelationswithChinainsuchawaythatbothourcountriesbenefit?Becausewecan.AndI thinkthat'sgoodforeverybody. Whatconcernsmeisnowthisprogramandwhatwe'retalkingaboutwithChina,asgotIthinkwe've gottosolvethisissuewithChinaandthenlookatwaystomovetomoveforward.AndIthinkwedo havetohavethatdiscussiononcyber.Whatiswhataretherightstandards,havethatdiscussionboth privatelyandpublicly.Andit'snotjustourcountry.It'sallthecountriesoftheworld,aswellasChina.
ROGERS:
Yes.
ROGERS:
Wouldyouarguethattheyengageincyberactivitiestostealbothmilitaryandintelligencesecretsofthe UnitedStates?
ALEXANDER:
Yes.
ROGERS:
Ithinkthat'sthat'scorrect.
ROGERS:
Yeah,IIwantedtosay,ifIcould,justacouplethings,becausetheydidn'tcomeupininthis testimony.But,first,thankstothiscommittee,theadministrationandothers,inthesummerof2009we setupthedirectorDirectorateofCompliance.Putsomeofourbestpeopleinittoensurethatwhat we'redoingisexactlyright.Andthiscommitteewasinstrumentalinhelpingussetthatup.Sothat'sone point. Whenwetalkaboutoversightandcompliance,peoplethinkit'sjustonceinawhile,buttherewas rigorousactionsbyyouandthisentirecommitteetosetthatup. Thesecondis,intheopenpressthere'sthisdiscussionaboutpatternanalysisthey'reouttheredoing patternanalysisonthis.Thatisabsolutelyincorrect.Wearenotauthorizedtogointothedata,norare wedataminingordoinganythingwiththedataotherthanthosequeriesthatwediscuss,period.We're notauthorizedtodoit.Wearen'tdoingit.Therearenoautomatedprocessesrunninginthebackground pullingtogetherdatatryingtofigureoutnetworks. Theonlytimeyoucandopatternanalysisis,onceyoustartthequeryonthatqueryandwhereyougo forward.Youcan'tgoinandtrytobringupyouknow,Ihavefourdaughtersand15grandchildren.I
67
AndIdoappreciateit.AndIwanttocommendthefolksfromtheNSAhavealwayswe'venever hadtoissueasubpoena.Allthatinformationhasalwaysreadilyprovided.Youmeetwithus regularly.WehavestaffandinvestigatorsattheNSAfrequently.Wehaveanopendialoguewhen problemshappenwedodealwiththeminaclassifiedway,ininawayIthinkthatAmericanswould beproudthattheirelectedrepresentativesdealwithissues. AndI'mnotsayingthattherearesomehiddenissuesouttheretherearenot. Iknowthishasbeendifficulttocomeandtalkaboutverysensitivethingsinapublicway.Inorderto preserveyourgoodworkandtheworkonbehalfofallthepatriotsworkingtodefendAmerica,Istill believeitwasimportanttohaveameetingwherewecouldatleast,insomeway,discussandreassure thelevelofoversightandredundancyofoversightonaprogramthatweallrecognizeneededanextra careandattentionandlotsofsetsofeyes.Ihopetodayinthishearingthatwe'vebeenabletodothat. IdobelievethatAmericahastheresponsibilitytokeepsomethingssecretasweservetoprotectthis country.AndIthinkyoualldothatwell.Andthedarndestthingisthatwemayhavefoundthatitis easierforasystemsanalystorasystemsadministratortostealtheinformationthanitisforusto accesstheprograminordertopreventaterroristattackintheUnitedStates.Andwe'llbeworking moreonthoseissues. Andwehavehadgreatdialogueaboutwhat'scomingonsomeotheroversightissues. Again,thankyouvery,verymuch.Thankyouallforyourservice.AndIwishyouallwelltoday.
ListofPanelMembersandWitnessesPANELMEMBERS:
REP.MIKEROGERS,RMICH.CHAIRMAN REP.MACTHORNBERRY,RTEXAS REP.JEFFMILLER,RFLA. REP.K.MICHAELCONAWAY,RTEXAS REP.PETERT.KING,RN.Y. REP.FRANKA.LOBIONDO,RN.J. REP.DEVINNUNES,RCALIF. REP.LYNNWESTMORELAND,RGA. REP.MICHELEBACHMANN,RMINN.
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REP.JOEHECK,RNEV. REP.TOMROONEY,RFLA. REP.MIKEPOMPEO,RKAN. REP.JOHNA.BOEHNER,ROHIOEXOFFICIO REP.C.A.DUTCHRUPPERSBERGER,DMD.RANKINGMEMBER REP.MIKETHOMPSON,DCALIF. REP.JANSCHAKOWSKY,DILL. REP.JIMLANGEVIN,DR.I. REP.ADAMB.SCHIFF,DCALIF. REP.LUISV.GUTIERREZ,DILL. REP.JIMHIMES,DCONN. REP.EDPASTOR,DARIZ. REP.TERRIA.SEWELL,DALA. REP.NANCYPELOSI,DCALIF.EXOFFICIO
WITNESSES:
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