Abelita III vs Doria

August 14, 2009

Judge Felimon Abelita III (petitioner) filed a complaint for Damages under Articles 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against P/Supt. German B. Doria (P/Supt. Doria) and SPO3 Cesar Ramirez (SPO3 Ramirez). Petitioner alleged in his complaint that on 24 March 1996, at around 12 noon, he and his wife were on their way to their house in Bagumbayan, Masbate, Masbate when P/Supt. Doria and SPO3 Ramirez (respondents), accompanied by 10 unidentified police officers, requested them to proceed to the Provincial PNP Headquarters at Camp Boni Serrano, Masbate, Masbate. Petitioner was suspicious of the request and told respondents that he would proceed to the PNP Headquarters after he had brought his wife home. Petitioner alleged that when he parked his car in front of their house, SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him, forcibly took the key to his Totoya Lite Ace van, barged into the vehicle, and conducted a search without a warrant. The search resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun. Petitioner presented the shotguns license to respondents. Thereafter, SPO3 Ramirez continued his search and then produced a .45 caliber pistol which he allegedly found inside the vehicle. Respondents arrested petitioner and detained him, without any appropriate charge, at the PNP special detention cell. P/Supt. Doria alleged that his office received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia about a shooting incident in Barangay Nursery. He dispatched a team headed by SPO3 Ramirez to investigate the incident. SPO3 Ramirez later reported that a certain William Sia was wounded while petitioner, who was implicated in the incident, and his wife just left the place of the incident. P/Supt. Doria looked for petitioner and when he found him, he informed him of the incident report. P/Supt. Doria requested petitioner to go with him to the police headquarters as he was reported to be involved in the incident. Petitioner agreed but suddenly sped up his vehicle and proceeded to his residence. P/Supt. Doria and his companions chased petitioner. Upon reaching petitioners residence, they caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house. The police officers saw a gun in the front seat of the vehicle beside the drivers seat as petitioner opened the door. They also saw a shotgun at the back of the drivers seat. The police officers confiscated the firearms and arrested petitioner. P/Supt. Dor ia alleged that his men also arrested other persons who were identified to be with petitioner during the shooting incident. Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearms and frustrated murder. An administrative case was also filed against petitioner before the Court.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless arrest and warrantless search and seizure were illegal under Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Ruling:
SC do not agree.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure states:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For the warrantless arrest under this Rule to be valid, two requisites must concur (1) the offender has just committed an offense; (2) the arresting peace officer or private person has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.

Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. In this case, P/Supt. Doria received a report about the alleged shooting incident. SPO3 Ramirez investigated the report and learned from witnesses that petitioner was involved in the incident. They were able to track down petitioner, but when invited to the police headquarters to shed light on the incident, petitioner initially agreed then sped up his vehicle, prompting the police authorities to give chase. Petitioners act of trying to get away, coupled with the incident report which they investigated, is enough to raise a reasonable suspicion on the part of the police authorities as to the existence of probable cause.

Plain View Doctrine The seizure of the firearms was justified under the plain view doctrine. Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (2) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (3) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. In this case, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.

LUCAS versus-LUCAS GR 190710, June 6, 2011 FACTS: Petitioner, filed a Petition to Establish Illegitimate Filiation (with Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing) before RTC of Valenzuela City. Respondent was not served with a copy of the petition. Nonetheless, respondent learned of the petition to establish filiation. His counsel therefore went to the trial court and obtained a copy of the petition. Petitioner filed with the RTC a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, on September 3, 2007, the RTC, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, issuedthe Order setting the case for hearing and urging anyone who has any objection to thepetition to file his opposition.After learning of the September 3, 2007 Order, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. Respondent averred that the petition was not in due form and substance because petitioner could not have personally known the matters that were alleged therein. He argued that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to respondent as petitioners father. Moreover, jurisprudence is still unsettled on the acceptability of DNA evidence. ISSUE: Should a court order for DNA testing be considered a search which must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid? RULING: Although a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing

Katz v. United States Citation. 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576, 1967 U.S. Brief Fact Summary. The petitioner, Katz (the petitioner), was convicted of transmitting wagering information over telephone lines in violation of federal law. The government had entered into evidence the petitioners end of telephone conversations that the government had obtained by placing a listening device to the phone booth that the petitioner used. The Court of Appeals rejected the petitioners contention that the evidence should be suppressed. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The protection of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution), against unreasonable searches and seizures, follows the person and not the place. Facts. The petitioner used a public telephone booth to transmit wagering information from Los Angeles to Boston and Miami in violation of federal law. After extensive surveillance, the FBI placed a listening device to the top of the telephone booth and recorded the petitioners end of the telephone conversations which was then used as evidence against him at his trial. The petitioner moved to have the evidence suppressed under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution, and that motion was denied. The Court of Appeals rejected the contention that the evidence is inadmissible. Certiorari was granted. Issue. Whether the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects telephone conversations conducted in a phone booth and secretly recorded from introduction as evidence against a person? Held. Justice Potter Stewart filed the majority opinion. The petitioner strenuously asserted that the phone booth was a constitutionally protected area. However, the Fourth Amendment protects persons and not places from unreasonable intrusion. Even in a public place, a person may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his person. Although the petitioner did not seek to hide his self from public view when he entered the telephone booth, he did seek to keep out the uninvited ear. He did not relinquish his right to do so simply because he went to a place where he could be seen. A person who enters into a telephone booth may expect the protection of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution as he assumes that the words he utters into the telephone will not be broadcast to the world. Once this is acknowledged, it is clear that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons and not areas from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Governments activities in electron ically listening to and recording the petitioners telephone conversations constituted a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and absent a search warrant predicated upon sufficient probable cause, all evidence obtained is inadmissible. Dissent. Justice Hugo Black (J. Black) filed a dissenting opinion. J. Black observed that eavesdropping was an ancient practice that the Framers were certainly aware of when they drafted the United States Constitution (Constitution). Had they wished to prohibit this activity under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution they would have added such language that would have effectively done so. By clever wording, the Supreme Court finds it plausible to argue that language aimed specifically at searches and seizures of things that can be searched and seized may, to protect privacy, be applied to eavesdropped evidence of conversations. Concurrence. Justice John Harlan (J. Harlan) filed a dissenting opinion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects persons, not places. There is a twofold requirement for what protection is afforded to those people. First, that a person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The critical fact in this case is that a person who enters a telephone booth shuts the door behind him, pays the toll, and is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted. On the other hand, conversations out in the open public would not be protected against being overheard as the expectation of privacy would not be reasonable. Discussion. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution provides constitutional protection to individuals and not to particular places. The two-part test for this protection is introduced by J. Harlan. First, the person must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and, second, that expectation must be reasonable.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES CITY OF ONTARIO, CALIFORNIA, et al. v . QUON et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

Argued April 19, 2010Decided June 17, 2010 No. 081332.

Petitioner Ontario (hereinafter City) acquired alphanumeric pagers able to send and receive text messages. Its contract with its service provider, Arch Wireless, provided for a monthly limit on the number of characters each pager could send or receive, and specified that usage exceeding that number would result in an additional fee. The City issued the pagers to respondent Quon and other officers in its police department (OPD), also a petitioner here. When Quon and others exceeded their monthly character limits for several months running, petitioner Scharf, OPDs chief, sought to determine whether the existing limit was too low, i.e., whether the officers had to pay fees for sending work-related messages or, conversely, whether the overages were for personal messages. After Arch Wireless provided transcripts of Quons and another employees August and September 2002 text messages, it was discovered that many of Quons messages were not work related, a nd some were sexually explicit. Scharf referred the matter to OPDs internal affairs division. The investigating officer used Quons work schedule to redact from his transcript any messages he sent while off duty, but the transcript showed that few of his on-duty messages related to police business. Quon was disciplined for violating OPD rules. He and the other respondentseach of whom had exchanged text messages with Quon during August and Septemberfiled this suit, alleging, inter alia , that petitioners violated their Fourth Amendment rights and the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA) by obtaining and reviewing the transcript of Quons pager messages, an d that Arch Wireless violated the SCA by giving the City the transcript. The District Court denied respondents summary judgment on the constitutional claims, relying on the plurality opinion in OConnor v. Ortega , 480 U. S. 709 , to determine that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of his messages. Whether the audit was nonetheless reasonable, the court concluded, turned on whether Scharf used it for the improper purpose of determining if Quon was using his pager to waste time, or for the legitimate purpose of determining the efficacy of existing character limits to ensure that officers were not paying hidden work-related costs. After the jury concluded that Scharfs intent was legitimate, the court granted petitioners summary judgment on the ground they did not violate the Fourth Amendment . The Ninth Circuit reversed. Although it agreed that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, the appeals court concluded that the search was not reasonable even though it was conducted on a legitimate, work-related rationale. The opinion pointed to a host of means less intrusive than the audit that Scharf could have used. The court further concluded that Arch Wireless had violated the SCA by giving the City the transcript. Held: Because the search of Quons text messages was reasonable, petitioners did not violate respondents Fourth Amendment rights, and the Ninth Circuit erred by concluding otherwise.. (a) The Amendment guarantees a persons privacy, dignity, and security against arbitrary and invasive governmental acts, without regard to whether the government actor is investigating crime or performing another function. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Assn. , 489 U. S. 602 . It applies as well when the government acts in its capacity as an employer. Treasury Employees v. Von Raab , 489 U. S. 656 . The Members of the OConnor Court disagreed on the proper analytical framework for Fourth Amendment claims against government employers. A four-Justice plurality concluded that the correct analysis has two steps. First, because some *government+ offices may be so open that no expectation of privacy is reasonable, a court must consider *t+he operational realities of the workplace to determine if an employees constitutional rights are implicated. 480 U. S., at 718. Second, where an employee has a

legitimate privacy expectation, an employers intrusion on that expectation for noninvestigatory, work related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances. . Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, would have dispensed with the operational realities inquiry and concluded that the offices of government employees are *generally+ covered by Fourth Amendment protections, id., at 731, but he would also have held that government searches to retrieve work-related materials or to investigate violations of workplace rulessearches of the sort that are regarded as reasonable and normal in the private-employer contextdo not violate the Amendment, (b) Even assuming that Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, the search was reasonable under both OConnor approaches, the pluralitys and Justice Scalia s.. (1) The Court does not resolve the parties disagreement over Quons privacy expectat ion. Prudence counsels caution before the facts in this case are used to establish farreaching premises that define the existence, and extent, of privacy expectations of employees using employer-provided communication devices. Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as proper behavior. At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms, and the laws treatment of them, will evolve. Because it is therefore preferable to dispose of this case on narrower grounds, the Court assumes, arguendo, that: (1) Quon had a reasonable privacy expectation; (2) petitioners review of the transcript constituted a Fourth Amendment search; and (3) the principles applicable to a government employers search of an employees physical office apply as well in the electronic sphere.. (2) Petitioners warrantless review of Quons pager transcript was reasonable under the OConnor pluralitys approach because it was motivated by a legitimate work -related purpose, and because it was not excessive in scope. See 480 U. S., at 726. There were reasonable grounds for [finding it] necessary for a noninvestigatory work-related purpose, ibid., in that Chief Scharf had ordered the audit to determine whether the Citys contractual character limit was sufficient to meet the Citys needs. It was also reasonably related to the objectives of the search, ibid., because both the City and OPD had a legitimate interest in ensuring that employees were not being forced to pay out of their own pockets for work-related expenses, or, on the other hand, that the City was not paying for extensive personal communications. Reviewing the transcripts was an efficient and expedient way to determine whether either of these factors caused Quons overages. And the review was also not excessively intrusive. Ibid. Although Quon had exceeded his monthly allotment a number of times, OPD requested transcripts for only August and September 2002 in order to obtain a large enough sample to decide the character limits efficaciousness, and all the messages that Quon sent while off duty were redacted. And from OPDs perspective, the fact that Quon likely had only a limited privacy expectation lessened the risk that the review would intrude on highly private details of Quons life. Similarly, because the City had a legitimate reason for the search and it was not excessively intrusive in light of that justification, the search would be regarded as reasonable and normal in the private -employer context and thereby satisfy the approach of Justice Scalia s concurrence, id., at 732. Conversely, the Ninth Circuits least intrusive means approach was inconsistent with controlling precedents. See , e.g., Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U. S. 646 . Pp. 1216. (c) Whether the other respondents can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their text messages to Quon need not be resolved. They argue that because the search was unreasonable as to Quon, it was also unreasonable as to them, but they make no corollary argument that the search, if reasonable as to Quon, could nonetheless be unreasonable as to them. Given this litigating position and the Courts conclusion that the search was reasonable as to Quon, these other respondents cannot prevail..