OCTAVIANO, Leslie Anne O.

2006-33060

The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

Sangalang vs. IAC December 22, 1988 | Sarmiento Facts: Five consolidated petitions were filed by respondent BAVA and three residents of Bel-Air Village against other residents of the Village and the Ayala Corporation, formerly the Makati Development Corporation, as the developer of the subdivision. The petitioners sought to enforce certain restrictive easements in the deeds of sale over their respective lots in the subdivision. These were the prohibition on the setting up of commercial and advertising signs on the lots, and the condition that the lots be used only for residential purposes. Petitioners alleged that respondents, who were residents along Jupiter Street of the subdivision, converted their residences into commercial establishments in violation of the deed restrictions, and that respondent Ayala Corporation ushered in the full commercialization of Jupiter Street by tearing down the perimeter wall that separated the commercial from the residential section of the village. (It is alleged that they have converted their residences into commercial establishments - a restaurant, a bakery and coffee shop, an advertising firm; and a construction company - in violation of the said restrictions.) Municipal officials opened, destroyed and removed the gates forcibly, and then opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic. This lead to a tremendous increase in the volume of traffic passing along Jupiter Street coming from EDSA to Estrella Street, then to Zodiac Street to Jupiter Street, and along the entire length of Jupiter Street to its other end at Reposo Street. With the opening of the entire length of Jupiter Street to public traffic, the different residential lots located in the northern side of Jupiter Street ceased to be used for purely residential purposes. They became, for all purposes, commercial in character. Four cases of these cases want to enforce the "deed restrictions" in question against specific residents (private respondents in the petitions) of Jupiter Street and another case with respect to Reposo Street. Their mother case is a petition to hold the vendor itself, Ayala Corporation (formerly Makati Development Corporation), liable for tearing down the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had therefore closed its commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full "commercialization" of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very restrictions it had authored. The CA rejected claims under the same 'deed restrictions" as a result of Ordinance No. 81 enacted by the Government of the Municipality of Makati, as well as Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street both for residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of police power.

Issue: WON Ordinance No. 81 of the Municipal Council of Makati and Ordinance No. 81-01 of the MMC are valid Held: YES. There is a recognition under both Ordinances Nos. 81 and 8 1-01 that Jupiter Street lies as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation's commercial section. And since 1957, it had been considered as a boundary not as a part of either the residential or commercial zones of Ayala Corporation's real estate development projects. Since both Ordinances recognized Jupiter Street as the boundary between Bel-Air Village and the commercial district, Jupiter Street was not for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air residents. The perimeter wall on said street was constructed not to separate the residential from the commercial blocks but simply for security reasons, hence, in tearing down said wall, Ayala Corporation did not violate the deed restrictions in the deeds of sale. The ordinances, specifically MMC Ordinance No. 8101, are a legitimate exercise of police power. The power of the MMC and the Makati Municipal Council to enact zoning ordinances for the general welfare prevailed over the deed restrictions. In the second Sangalang/Yabut decision (on motion for reconsideration), it was held that the opening of Jupiter Street was warranted by the demands of the common good in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. Jupiter was opened by the Municipal Mayor to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent to the Village. The same reason was given for the opening to public vehicular traffic of Orbit Street, a road inside the same village. The destruction of the gate in Orbit Street was also made under the police power of the municipal government. The gate, like the perimeter wall along Jupiter, was a public nuisance because it hindered and impaired the use of property, hence, its summary abatement by the mayor was proper and legal. Cabrera vs. CA March 18, 1991 | Cruz Facts: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158, which closed the old road leading to the new Capitol Building to traffic, giving the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties. Deeds of Exchange were executed where the Province of Catanduanes conveyed to the respondents portions of the closed roads in exchange for their own respective properties, on which was subsequently laid a new concrete road leading to the Capitol Building. Part of the old road was used by petitioner to plant his vegetables. He filed this petition, alleging that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province

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The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contended that Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said road. He alleged that the closure of the road injured him and his family since they can no longer use it in going to the national road leading to the old capitol building but must instead pass through a small passageway. RTC sustained the authority of the provincial board to enact Resolution No. 158. CA also upheld the the resolution saying that under Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code, municipal authorities can close thoroughfares, subject to the approval or direction of the Provincial Board. Petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable because Resolution No. 158 is not an order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with private properties. Issue: WON Resolution No. 158 was a valid exercise of police power Held: YES. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the following provisions of Republic Act No. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code: R.A. No. 5185, Section 11 (II) (a): II. The following actions by municipal officials or municipal councils, as provided for in the pertinent sections of the Revised Administrative Code shall take effect without the need of approval or direction from any official of the national government: Provided, That such actions shall be subject to approval or direction by the Provincial Board: (a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246; xxx xxx xxx Sec. 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. With the prior authorization of the Department Head, a municipal council may close any municipal road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or place aforesaid or any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed. The provincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the

inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads. The construction of the new road will be more convenient to the public, more solid and wider and to have a better town planning whereby the Capitol would be reached directly from the pier for purposes of improving services to the public. The original passageway was already unnecessary. The problem of compensation with regards to the land that is going to be used in the new road was dealt with by exchanging some portions of this old passageway with properties where the proposed new road would pass. The petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred, such as it is, is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire community. This is not a case where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled to just compensation. The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. As the trial judge acutely observed, whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered pales in significance compared to the greater convenience the new road has been giving to the public. Dacanay vs. Asistion May 6, 1992 | Grino-Aquino Facts: MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Public streets or thoroughfares were leased or licensed to market stallholders. One of these streets was "Heroes del '96" where the petitioner lives. The OIC city mayor of Caloocan City caused the demolition of the market stalls on Heroes del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. Certain stall owners filed an action for prohibition to stop said action. The trial court dismissed the petition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it issued earlier. It found that Heroes del '96, Gozon and Gonzales streets are of public dominion, hence, outside the commerce of man and thus, it is not subject to lease. Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas: Properties for public use may not be leased to private individuals. Such a lease is null and void for the reason that a municipal council cannot withdraw part of the plaza from public use. However, due to the change of administration after the decision came out, City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets. Francisco U. Dacanay, a concerned citizen, taxpayer and resident on Heroes del '96 Street wrote a letter to Mayor Asistio, Jr. asking for the demolition of the illegally-constructed stalls. There being no response, Dacanay sought President Corazon C. Aquino's intervention by writing her a letter which was referred to the city mayor. Pending the ongoing study of the city officials, Dacanay

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The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

filed a complaint against the mayor and the city engineer in the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman recommended the filing of information in court. Dacanay filed the present petition for mandamus on, praying that the public respondents be ordered to enforce the final decision in Civil Case No. C-12921, which upheld the city mayor's authority to order the demolition of market stalls Issue: WON the mayor and city engineer acted with grave abuse of discretion in not enforcing the final decision of Civil Case No. C-12921 Held: YES. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect. The EO, which authorized the use of streets as a vending area for stallholders, may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents bad started to look for feasible alternative sites for flea markets. They have had more than ample time to relocate the street vendors. Macasiano vs. Diokno August 10, 1992 | Medialdea Facts: The respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86-1990, which authorized the closure of particular streets located at Baclaran, Paraaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. Respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said streets. Petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent Palanyag. Macasiano then wrote a letter to Palanyag. This prompted respondent municipality and Palanyag to file with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus to enjoin the enforcement of the

letter-order. The lower court upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 86. Issue: WON Ordinance 86 is a valid exercise of police power Held: NO. The powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount considerations of health and wellbeing of the members of the community. The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states: Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces, cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. The streets concerned in the case at bar are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government, which are devoted to public service, are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local Government Code, which states: Sec. 10. Closure of roads. A local government unit may likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part of thereof shall be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed.

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The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

The closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned. It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of the LGC. Those roads and streets, which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons. Assuming arguendo that it could pass the aforementioned ordinance, the same cannot be considered approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority due to noncompliance by respondent municipality of the conditions imposed by the former. Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the ordinance. The presence of stalls in the concerned streets has caused problems in the passage of fire trucks and ambulance, losing valuable time, which could, otherwise, have been spent in saving lives and properties. Pilapil vs. CA November 26, 1992 | Davide, Jr. Facts: The Pilapil spouses own a parcel of land (Lot No. 320 and Lot No. 323) in Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu. The land formerly belonged to Marcelo Pilapil, the grandfather of petitioner Socrates Pilapil. Respondents (the Colomidas) purchased from Esteria vda. de Ceniza a parcel of land also located at Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan, Cebu. It is located around 70 meters from the National Road. The Colomidas claim that they had acquired from Sesenando Longkit a road right of way which leads towards the National Road; this road right of way, however, ends at that portion of the property of the Pilapils where a camino vecinal (roadway) exists all the way to the said National Road. The Colomidas "tried to improve the road of "camino vecinal", for the convenience of the public," but the Pilapils harassed and threatened them with "bodily harm from making said improvement." The Pilapils also threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. The Colomidas filed against the Pilapils a petition for injunction and damages and pray for a restraining order against the Pilapils to cease and desist from preventing or harassing them (Colomidas) from using the camino vecinaland/or fencing off the same. The Pilapils

deny therein the existence of a "camino vecinal" on their property and allege, inter alia, that the enclosing of their property by a fence was done in the valid exercise of their right of ownership The lower court ruled in favor of the Colomidas. RTC based their finding on Resolution No. 106 of the Municipal Council of Liloan authorizing the residents of Bahak, Poblacion, Liloan to repair and improve a camino vecina in their sitio. This shows that there is a "camino vecinal" at Bahak. Mr. Longakit, who has been living at Sitio Bahak since 1933, also testified that both sides of the "camino vecinal" formerly belonged to the grandfather of respondent Socrates Pilapil. It was that "camino vecinal" in connection with which he secured Resolution No. 106. CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the trial court. Issue: WON the Municipality of Liloan has a camino vecinal in sitio Bahak of barangay Poblacion, and if it does, whether such road traverses the property of the Pilapils or only passes along its side Held: YES, it does. It passes along its side. It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere with such a right. The decision of the Municipality of Liloan with respect to the said camino vecinal in sitio Bahak must prevail. It is thus pointless to concentrate on the testimonies of both witnesses since the same have, for all intents and purposes, become irrelevant. A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use. Pursuant to Section 10, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of the LGC, the above powers of a local government unit, the Municipality of Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or repaired and (c) close any municipal road. In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang Bayan, approved the Urban Land Use Plan; this plan was duly signed by the Municipal Mayor. By doing so, the said legislative body determined, among others, the location of the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak. Engineer Jordan, the then Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, had the authority to prepare the zoning plan and admit it to the Sangguniang Bayan for approval. Among his functions under the governing law at the time was to formulate an integrated economic, social, physical and other development objectives and policies for the consideration and approval of the sangguniang bayan and the municipal mayor, and prepare municipal comprehensive plans and other development planning document.

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The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

As further declared by Engineer Jordan, the camino vecinal in sitio Bahak "passes the side of the land of Socrates Pilapil. This is the proposed road leading to the national highway." The zoning plan, duly proved to be an official act of the Municipality of Liloan, binds not only the Pilapils and the Colomidas, but also the general public. MMDA vs. Bel Air Village Association Inc. March 27, 2000 | Puno Facts: Neptune Street is owned by respondent BAVA. It is a private road inside Bel-Air Village, a private residential subdivision in the heart of the financial and commercial district of Makati City. It runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia, formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street are guarded by iron gates. Respondent Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA) received from petitioner MMDA, through its Chairman, a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished. Respondent instituted against petitioner before the RTC of Makati City an action for injunction, enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and the demolition of the perimeter wall. The lower court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. Respondent questioned the denial before the appellate court, which conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street. The CA issued a preliminary injunction and thereafter rendered a decision finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. The MR of the decision was denied, hence, this petition for review. Citing the Sangalang cases, petitioner MMDA claimed that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. Issue: WON the MMDA, in the exercise of its mandate, has the power to open a private road to public traffic Held: NO. The MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a special metropolitan political subdivision as

contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units i.e., twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan, Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of Malabon, Navotas, Pateros, San Juan and Taguig.With the passage of Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. "Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual local government units comprising Metro Manila." 26 There are seven (7) basic metro-wide services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1) development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control; and (7) public safety. The implementation of the MMDA's plans, programs and projects is undertaken by the local government units, national government agencies, accredited people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector as well as by the MMDA itself. For this purpose, the MMDA has the power to enter into contracts, memoranda of agreement and other arrangements with these bodies for the delivery of the required services Metro Manila. The governing board of the MMDA is the Metro Manila Council. The Council is composed of the mayors of the component 12 cities and 5 municipalities, the president of the Metro Manila Vice-Mayors' League and the president of the Metro Manila Councilors' League. The Council is headed by Chairman who is appointed by the President and vested with the rank of cabinet member. As the policymaking body of the MMDA, the Metro Manila Council approves metro-wide plans, programs and projects, and issues the necessary rules and regulations for the implementation of said plans; it approves the annual budget of the MMDA and promulgate the rules and regulations for the delivery of basic services, collection of service and regulatory fees, fines and penalties. Metropolitan Manila was created as a response to the finding that the rapid growth of population and the increase of social and economic requirements in these areas demand a call for simultaneous and unified development; that the public services rendered by the respective local governments could be administered more efficiently and

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The Law on Local Governments Prof. Gisella D. Reyes

economically if integrated under a system of central planning. The scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven basic services. Its powers are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is nothing in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. No provision in R.A. No. 7924 empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. Sangalang is not applicable to the case at bar because it involved zoning ordinances passed by the municipal council of Makati. In the letter-notice of MMDA, there was no cited ordinance or law either by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Also, MMDA is not the same entity as the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) in Sangalang. MMCs charter shows that it possessed greater powers, which were not bestowed on the present MMDA. Moreover, the character of the MMDA as a mere administrative body is affirmed by the debate in Congress when the H.B. from which R.A. No. 7924 originated was first taken up by the Committee on Local Governments in the HOR. Said Hon. Ciriaco Alfelor, the committee chairman, the MMDA will not elect the Governor nor have the power to tax. In short, it will not possess any political power. Unlike the MMC which was considered as the central government of Metro Manila. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the power to appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time, review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances, resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen (13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila. Constitution itself expressly provides that Congress may, by law, create "special metropolitan political subdivisions" which shall be subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected; the jurisdiction of this subdivision shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination; and the cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic services requiring coordination; and the

cities and municipalities comprising this subdivision shall retain their basic autonomy and their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The Committee deliberations would show that clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Also, it is to be noted that R. A. No. 7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.