Art. 804 Suroza v. Honrado (1981) [41] Art. 804 provisions are mandatory.

Consequently, failure to comply with the two requirements nullifies the will. The will on its face is void because it is written in English, a language not known to the illiterate testatrix, and which is probably a forged will because she and the attesting witnesses did not appear before the notary as admitted by the notary himself. A judge who admits to probate such a will should face disciplinary action. In the absence of opposition, the judge should have personally conducted the hearing on the probate of the will so that he could have ascertained whether the will was validly executed. Art. 806 Garcia v. Lacuesta (1951) [54] A cross as signature. It is not here presented that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of the testator or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. The mere sing of a cross cannot be likened to a thumbmark, because the cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark. Nera v. Raymundo (1911) [61] Signing in the presence of witnesses Jaboneta v. Gustilo: The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature. The position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. Jaboneta doctrine: the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting their eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.

Icasiano v. Icasiano (1964) [64]

 The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate. That the failure of the witness to sign page three was entirely through pure oversight is shown by his own testimony as well as by the duplicate copy of the will, which bears a complete set of signatures in every page. RFB: The Icasiano holding cannot, and should not, be taken as a departure from the rule that the will should be signed by the witnesses on every page. The carbon duplicate was regular in all aspects. A cavalier disregard of the formal requirements of wills in reliance on Icasiano is not recommended.

Cagro v. Cagro (1953) [68] The signatures of the witnesses must be at the bottom of the attestation clause. Fact: signature of the three witnesses do not appear on the bottom of the attestation clause, but the page containing the clause is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signature. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signature at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. The signatures on the left-hand margin cannot be deemed as their signature to the clause because said signatures are in compliance with the legal mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed by the witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses. Dissenting opinion of Bautista Angelo: (a) substantial compliance; (b) the uncontradicted testimony of the witnesses that the clause was already written in the will when the same was signed obviates fear of the majority that the clause may have been only added on a subsequent occasion and not at the signing of the will. Cruz v. Villasor (1973) [72] The notary public cannot be counted as one of the attesting witnesses. The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. If the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent, or admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will.

 Furthermore, the function of the notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral arrangement. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses. For then he would be interested in sustaining the validity of his own act. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will which would be in contravention of the Article 805 requiring at least three credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will. Art. 808 Garcia v. Vasquez (1970) [75] Provision of Article 808 mandatory. Fact: testatrixs vision was mainly for viewing distant objects and not for reading print. For all intents and purposes of the rules on probate, the testatrix was not unlike a blind testator, and the due execution of her will would have required observance of Article 808. The rationale behind the requirement of reading the will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading the will himself (as when he is illiterate) , is to make the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be able to object if they are not in accordance with his wishes.

Alvarado v. Gaviola (1993) [80] The requirement has been liberally applied, the SC declaring substantial compliance to be sufficient. Facts: The lawyer who drafted the will and subsequent codicil read them aloud in the presence of the testator, the three instrumental witnesses and the notary public. The latter four followed the reading with their own respective copies previously furnished them. Substantial compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, because the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy testamentary privilege. It was not only the lawyer who read the documents. The notary public and the three instrumental witnesses likewise read the will and codicil, albeit silently. With four persons following the reading word with their own copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was reasonably assured that what was read to him (those which he affirmed were in accordance with his instructions), were the terms actually appearing in the typewritten documents.

Art. 809 Caneda v. CA (1993) [87] Fact: petitioners aver that the attestation clause is fatally defective since it fails to specifically state that the instrumental witnesses to the will witnessed the testator signing the will in their presence and that they also signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another. SC agrees with petitioners. The absence of a statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another is a fatal defect which must necessarily result in the disallowance of the will. Such defect in the attestation clause cannot be characterized as merely involving form of the will or the language used therein which would warrant the application of the substantial compliance rule contemplated in Art. 809. The defect is not only in the form or the language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Art. 805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause. Proper interpretation of the substantial compliance rule in Art. 809: Omission which can be supplied by an examination of the will itself, without the need of resorting to extrinsic evidence, will not be fatal and, correspondingly, would not obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However, those omissions which cannot be supplied except by evidence aliunde (from another source, from elsewhere, from outside source) would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and ultimately, of the will itself.

Art. 810 Roxas v. De Jesus (1985) [103] Issue: whether FEB./61 appearing in the holographic will is a valid compliance with Art. 810. A complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a will was executed. There is no contingency in this case. As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when, as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB./91 is a valid compliance with Art. 810, probate of the holographic will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Labrador v. CA (1990) [105] Fact: date appears in the body of the holographic will. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the testator. Both requirements are present in the subject will.

Art. 811 Gan v. Yap (1958) [114] In the probate of a holographic will, the document itself must be produced. Therefore, a lost holographic will cannot be probated. When the will itself is not submitted, the means of opposition and of assessing the evidence, are not available. And then, the only guaranty of authenticitythe testators handwritinghas disappeared. The execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. Ordinary vs. holographic wills. The difference lies in the nature of wills. In holographic wills, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in ordinary wills, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses and of the notary. The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.

Rodelas v. Aranza (1982) [122] Exception to the Gan ruling. Issue: whether a lost holographic will can be proved by means of a photostatic copy. Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court (i.e., comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. Azaola v. Singson (1960) [110] The three-witness provision in case of contested holographic wills is directory, not mandatory. Since the authenticity of the will was not contested, proponent was not required to produce more than one witness; but even if the genuineness of the holographic will were contested, Art. 811 cannot be interpreted as to require the compulsory presentation of three witnesses to identify the handwriting of the testator, under the penalty of having the probate denied.

 Since no witness may have been present at the execution of a holographic will, none being required by law, it becomes obvious that the existence of witnesses possessing the requisite qualifications is a matter beyond the control of the proponent. Art. 811 foresees the possibility that no qualified witness may be found (or what amounts to the same thing, that no competent witness may be willing to testify to the authenticity of the will, and provides for resort to expert evidence to supply the deficiency. Such resort to expert evidence is conditioned by if the Court deem it necessary, which reveal that what the law deems essential is that the Court should be convinced of the wills authenticity. Since the law leaves it to the trial court to decide if experts are still needed, no unfavorable inference can be drawn from a partys failure to offer expert evidence, until and unless the court expresses dissatisfaction with the testimony of the lay witnesses. SCs conclusion: the rule of Art. 811, par. 1, is merely directory and is not mandatory. Art. 814 Kalaw v. Relova (1984) [125] Effect of non-compliance. Issue: whether the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or not. Velasco v. Lopez: when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a holographic will have not been noted under his signature, the will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words, erased, or interlined. However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that which could remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by lay by affixing her full signature. Velasco ruling must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in a holographic will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not the essence and validity of the will itself. De la Cerna vs. Potot

In a case where a joint will between husband and wife was executed and the will was probated when the husband died before the effectivity of the Civil Code, the final decree of probate has conclusive effect as to the last will and testament, despite the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed

the invalidity of joint wills. A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate of a will is binding upon the whole world and public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk of occasional errors, judgment of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The probate decree of the will of the husband could only affect the share of the deceased husband. It could not include the disposition of the share of the wife who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue. It follows that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Thus, probate of the wifes will is denied as joint wills are now prohibited by the Civil Code. Subsection 4-Witnesses to Wills Article 821

Gonzales vs. CA

Under the law, there is no mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony, or competently proved otherwise, as well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. The attributes of the good standing of the witness in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the opposing party. In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution. Credible witnesses' mean competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay.

Gago vs. Mamuyac

The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of the will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the cancellation or revocation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved or be inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator.