Paula T. Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

124371, November 23, 2000 Facts: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula were married before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diegofound all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16, 1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of hislast will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate but before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died. Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor contending that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, that such properties were acquired during their marriage and that Lorenzos will would encroach her legitime. Alicia filed in the testate proceeding a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary. On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition. The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo

Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1). Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente? Held: The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing. The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining. Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzos Will by calling to the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that American law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is no such thing as American law for the whole nation of the US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within that state. As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines. The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.

Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court. Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated. The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court. People of the Philippines vs. Fernando Felipe G. R. No. L-40432, July 19, 1982 Facts: Herein accused Fernando Felipe was convicted by the lower court of the crime of rape committed by him against his niece-in-law Ruth Pancho. As a result of the incident the victim got pregnant, who was then 25 years old. When the accused appealed his case, one of his defenses was the fact that the victims child was born on March 13, 1972 and that the victim could not have been raped on July 9, 1971 because there are only 247 days between these dates. Accused claimed that the normal period of gestation is 280 days and the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length of uterine development of a child. Issue: Whether or not the victims child is considered a normal child. Held: Yes, the victims child was normal. As aptly contended by the Solicitor General in his brief, "a child born 8 months and seven days after conception is considered normal. ...; that in certain instances the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length of the uterine development of a child, but by providing that a premature child is one which has an intra-uterine life of less than seven months (Art. 41, Civil Code) the Code impliedly recognizes that a child which had an intrauterine life of 8 months, as in the case at bar, is a normal child." Milagros Joaquino vs. Lourdes Reyws, G.R. No. 154645, July 13, 2004 FACTS: Respondent Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo Reyes. Reyes had illicit relations with petitioner Joaquino. A property in BF Homes Paranaque was executed in favor of Joaquino. Joaquino had no means to pay for this property. The funds used to purchase this property were earnings of Reyes from his position as corporate executive and from a loan secured from Commonwealth Insurance Corporation. Joaquino and Reyes had 3 illegitimate children. Upon Reyes' death, ownership of the property was disputed. Respondent Reyes, the widow, demands that it be reconveyance, claiming that it was part of L & R's conjugal partnership of gains. Joaquino, on the other hand, claims co-ownership under Article 148. HELD:

Article 148 is the property regime that will apply in case where the partners have a legal impediment to marry each other. In this property regime, only the property acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. The registration of a property in the name of the paramour who had no income whatsoever at the time of the donation by a husband is tantamount to a donation which is void under Article 87 of the Family Code. The paramour then holds the property under a constructive trust under Article 1456 in favor of the conjugal partnership of the husband with the legitimate spouse. Status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedents estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action such as in a case for recovery of property. Board of Optometry vs. Angel B. Colet G.R. No. 122241, July 30, 1996 Prayer of the Petitioners: The petitioners seek to annul and set aside the order rendered by herein public respondent Judge Angel B. Colet, who granted the writ of preliminary injunction restraining, enjoining, and prohibiting the herein petitioners in enforcing and implementing the Revised Optometry Law or any regulations or Code of Ethics issued thereunder. Prayer of Respondents: Herein private respondents prayed that the writ of preliminary injunction be made permanent. Facts: Congress enacted R.A. No. 8050, entitled An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating Optometrists, and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995. Herein private respondents filed with a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order. They cited the following as grounds for their petition: 1. that there was derogation in the legislative process and vitiation of legislative consent; 2. that RA No. 8050 violates the due process clause of the Constitution; 3. that RA No. 8050 violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power; and 4. that it is violation of the guaranty of freedom of speech and press. Meanwhile, upon examination of the petition, it was found out that the body of the petition gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of the alleged herein associations OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP, except for Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. The petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-74770, merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and home addresses. As to herein petitioners, they filed an opposition to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that: 1. respondents do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the relief they sought; 2. respondents have no legal existence or capacity to file the case; 3. that the implementation of the questioned law carries no injurious effect; and 4. that herein respondents failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of the questioned law.

The Regional Trial Court granted the writ of preliminary injunction. The court was inclined to find prima facie, that petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. Thus, herein petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order. Issue: Whether or not herein private respondents have legal existence or capacity (locus standi) to question the constitutionality of RA No. 8050. Ruling: Only natural and juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, and every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Under Article 44 of the Civil Code, an association is considered a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. There is serious doubt as to the existence of private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP. For one, the body of the petition in Civil Case No. 9574770 makes no mention of these associations nor states their addresses. Further, nowhere is it claimed therein that they are juridical entities. These run counter to Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which provides that facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements of the alleged presidents representing the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, were such "associations" mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their "associations." For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action, such as herein questioned petition. Therefore, since OPAP, COA, ACMO, and SMOAP were not shown to be juridical entities, they cannot, for obvious reasons, be deemed real parties in interest. Thus, petitioners prayer is granted. The questioned order rendered by the Regional Trial Court granting the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction are hereby annulled and set aside. Principle: An association can only be considered as a juridical person if the law grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995 Facts: Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte. Private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, a candidate for the sameposition, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutionalrequirement for residency. Private respondent contended that petitioner lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement forcandidates for the House of Representatives.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6 of the Constitution Held: For election purposes, residence is used synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in the district for only 7 months, because of the following: (a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; Tacloban became petitioners domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought the family to Leyte; (b) domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose; in the absence of clear and positive proof of the concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law; when petitioner married President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium; (d) even assuming that she gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired the right to choose a new one only after her husband died, her actsfollowing her return to the country clearly indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice.