Bishop - The Myth That Harsh Punishments Reduce Juvenile Crime

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Section 3

Chapter 17

The Myth That Harsh Punishments Reduce Juvenile Crime


Donna M. Bishop

Throughout most of its 100-year history,

the juvenile court has been a childcentered institution with a mission to protect and treat, rather than punish, young offenders. Cultural ideas about youth that prevailed from the Progressive Era (late nineteenth to early twentieth century) until very recently evoked compassionate responses to adolescents who committed crimes or other forms of misbehavior. Society has long embraced the notion that adolescents are immature in their ability to reason, to make judgments, and to fully appreciate the consequences of their actions. Emotionally and socially, they are also immature: They lack the inner resources to cope well with stress and they are especially vulnerable to peer pressure. Because of their immaturity, juvenile offenders have traditionally been viewed as undeserving of adult-type punishments (Zimring 1981, 1998a, 1998b; Forst and Blomquist 1991; Scott and Grisso 1997). Adolescence is also a period of rapid change, a time of transition from childhood to adulthood when significant cognitive, emotional, and social development

takes place. During this period, young people are especially malleable. Compared to adults, who are more or less fixed in their ways, young people are more receptive to efforts to guide them in positive directions (Scott and Grisso 1997). These ideas about young people helped to shape a specialized juvenile court. Prior to 1899, juveniles were tried in criminal courts and subjected to the same punishments as adults. In that year, the juvenile court was created to stand as a bulwark against subjecting youth to harsh sanctions and to provide them with programs and services that would help them make the transition to lives as law-abiding and productive adults. This is not to suggest that the juvenile courts humanitarian ideals have routinely been realized in practice. Tools for diagnosis and assessment have historically been crude, and efforts to provide good interventions have often been misguided. For example, residential programs have sometimes been so underfunded, understaffed, and overcrowded that little in the way of treatment could be provided. Deservedly, the juvenile justice system has at times come under heavy criticism. At least until recently, however, criticism has most often led to reinvigorated efforts to achieve the systems rehabilitative mission (through innovations like intensive probation supervision, aftercare, institutional reform, and the adoption of more promising therapeutic techniques).

The Myth
Over the past three decades, a radical shift has taken place in American juvenile justice policy. Instead of focusing on protection and treatment, legislators and public officials have increasingly advocated punishment of young offenders to

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deter them from reoffending. They have implemented many strategies that threaten the nature and, ultimately, perhaps even the existence of the juvenile court. These include the displacement of probation services by an explicit focus on surveillance and accountability (Beyer 2003), the adoption of determinate and mandatory minimum sentencing (one size fits all punishments that are linked to the offense rather than the needs of the offender), the endorsement of punishment-oriented programming (e.g., house arrest, electronic monitoring, militarystyle boot camps), and the adoption of laws that permit or require the transfer of large numbers of youth (including preteens) to criminal court for prosecution and punishment as adults. All of these shifts rest on the myth that harsh punishments are effective in producing positive behavioral change. This myth arose for a number of reasons, three of which are especially important. In the 1970s, a series of evaluations was published that were critical of treatment programs. Especially influential was the widely publicized Martinson Report, which drew the conclusion that nothing works (Martinson 1974; Lipton, Martinson, and Wilks 1975). Critics of the report responded that the negative results could be explained by methodological problems and weak evaluations, rather than by the absence of effective treatments; but these responsesand even the subsequent retraction of the reports conclusion by its authorsfell on deaf ears. Instead, the public and policy makers became skeptical about the very idea of rehabilitation. Rising juvenile crime rates also contributed to punitive reforms. Juvenile arrests increased substantially from the mid1960s until 1980, which reinforced the view that rehabilitation programs were ineffective. Although juvenile crime rates

declined in the early 1980s, another upswing followed later in the decade, this one marked by sharp increases in innercity violence, including homicides committed disproportionately by minority youth (Snyder and Sickmund 1995; Cook and Laub 1998). Images of African American youths wielding guns tapped into racial stereotypes, fueled public fears, and generated what has been described as a moral panic (Feld 1977, 2003; Chiricos 2004). Although juvenile violence has declined sharply since 1992 to its lowest level in decades (Snyder 2003), nearly two-thirds of the public falsely believes serious juvenile crime continues to rise (Gallup Poll 2003). Due in no small part to the explosion of newspaper, magazine, and television coverage of youth violence (Chiricos 2004), ideas about adolescent offenders also shifted (Scott and Grisso 1997). Public perceptions are shaped largely by local television news (Gross and Aday 2003), and both television and the print media give excessive coverage to violent youth crime (especially when the offender is a minority), even when rates are declining (Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001). More important than the volume of stories is their sensationalist nature. Best-selling magazines have printed cover stories with titles such as Children Without Pity (Time October 26, 1992), Teen Violence: Wild in the Streets (Newsweek August 2, 1993), Heartbreaking Crimes: Kids Without a Conscience (People June 23, 1997), Big Shots: An Inside Look at the Deadly Love Affair Between Americas Kids and Their Guns ( Time August 2, 1993), and The Monsters Next Door (Time May 3, 1999). This kind of reporting conflicts with the image of juvenile offenders as misguided and immature, portraying them instead as thugs with little or no moral feeling or human regard. Although only a few schol-

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ars have subscribed to this view, those who have were prominently featured in the media. DiIulio and his colleagues, for example, described adolescent offenders as vicious and remorseless superpredators (DiIulio 1996; Bennett, DiIulio, and Walters 1996) and warned of the coming of the youngest, biggest, and baddest generation any society has ever known (Bennett, DiIulio, and Walters 1996:206). The portrayal of juvenile offenderseven preadolescent onesas adult-like and evil, legitimated the adoption of harsh, punitive policies.

important behavioral lessons as children as a result of being scolded, spanked, or denied privileges by parents. Research shows that parental monitoring and punishment indeed play a vital role in producing prosocial children and adults. So there is clearly some truth to this idea. However, we need to be careful not to generalize from the positive effect that punishment may have had on us while we were growing up, to draw sweeping conclusions about the effectiveness of punishment. The truth is that punishment does not always have the positive consequences we tend to assume.

The Kernel of Truth


When people panic about crime, common sense suggests harsh punishment as the solution (Cohen 1972; Gendreau et al. 2002; Chiricos 2004). A recent Gallup poll showed that more than 70 percent of the public believed that toughening penalties for juvenile offenders would make a major difference in reducing violent crime (Moon et al. 2000:41). There is clearly some truth to the idea of deterrence. After all, speeding drivers slow down when they see patrol cars. But consider how quickly they speed up again when the threat has passed. When the threat of punishment is clear and imminent, we tend to obey the law. But the threat of punishment is seldom clear and imminent. It is obviously impossible (and undesirable) to have police officers observing us at all times. So the threat of punishment is most often vague and uncertain. It should be no surprise, then, that research provides little support for the idea that threats of even severe punishment are effective in reducing crime. If the threat of punishment does not deter, common sense still indicates that actually being punished can change peoples behavior. Most can recall learning

The Truth or Facts


The effectiveness of punishment depends a great deal on the context in which it is administered (see, for example, Braithwaite 1989, 2000; Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2001). Braithwaite and others caution that the effect of punishment is dependent on who is doing the punishing, what message is communicated to the individual who is punished, and how the punishment is delivered. Punishment is most effective when it is administered by persons whom we love and respect, and whose opinions and judgments about us matter (Braithwaite 2001:11). Punishment delivered by a police officer, judge, or correctional officer with whom we have no relationship (and toward whom we may have negative attitudes) is much less likely to produce the desired results. The message communicated to the offender is also consequential. It is important to punish in ways that communicate disapproval of the behavior but that do not reject the individual (this is a good person who has done a bad act or this is a not-so-good person who has done a bad act, but can change). Effective punish-

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ment sends a message that the behavior is wrong, but at the same time teaches and encourages more appropriate behavior and communicates confidence in the individuals capacity to change (Braithwaite and Braithwaite 2001:9). The model of effective punishment is the loving parent: He or she does not threaten to banish the child from the family or suggest that the child is worthless and unforgivable. Punishment that is ineffective communicates not only that the act is bad, but also that the individual who committed the act is bad. When our whole personhood is attacked, we feel humiliated and tend to defend ourselves by denying the legitimacy of what is being said (not only about us, but about our behavior). We are also apt to react with anger and defiance (see Sherman 1993, 2003). All too frequently, punishments imposed by courts and correctional agencies invoke these counterproductive responses because they are accompanied by messages of rejection. Finally, how the message is communicated makes a difference. When we treat people with respect, they feel valued. When we afford them an opportunity to be heard, they are more likely to feel they are being treated fairly. When we belittle, nag, insult, when we are blunt and harsh in communicating disapproval, the results are often contrary to what we intend. One of the most consistent findings in criminological research is that children of parents who reject and degrade, and who punish their children harshly, are likely to behave aggressively and violently (Ahmed 2001; Baumrind 1978; Farrington 1989; McCord 1979; McCord, McCord, and Zola 1959; Power and Chapieski 1986; Sampson and Laub 1993; Smith and Thornberry 1995; Stouthamer-Loeber et al. 2001; Strassberg et al. 1994; Wells and

Rankin 1988; Widom 1992; Widom and Maxfield 2001). If harsh, unreasoning, and punitive discipline has negative effects within the family, similar strategies used by the state are likely to backfire as well. A number of studies have shown that offenders are more likely to re-offend if justice officials treat them in ways they perceive as unfair or disrespectful. Paternoster and associates (1997), for example, found that suspects who were treated with respect by police and permitted to relate their version of events, not only felt they had been treated more fairly, but were significantly less likely to reoffend than suspects who were not so treated (see also Sherman 1993). Pfeiffer (1994) reported that defendants randomly assigned to judges who scolded offenders at sentencing had significantly higher rates of recidivism than defendants assigned to judges who did not scold. Evaluations of punitive correctional strategies (e.g., surveillance, drug testing, electronic monitoring, detention, Scared Straight and its derivatives, boot camps, transfer to criminal court) consistently show that they are not effective in reducing juvenile crime (see, for example, Lipsey 1992; Lipsey and Wilson 1998; Peters, Thomas, and Zamberlan 1997; Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and Finckenauer 2000; for a review and discussion, see Howell 2003). Indeed, many of these programs, especially those in which degradation is a central feature, frequently increase the risk of recidivism. Take transfer, for example. Contrary to reformers expectations, research consistently shows that transferred youth reoffend more quickly and at higher rates, and commit more serious offenses than similar offenders who are retained in the juvenile system (see, for example, Bishop et al. 1996; Fagan 1995).

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Treatment-oriented programs, especially those that incorporate cognitive behavioral therapy and parent/family interventions, are considerably more effective than punishment-oriented ones. There are effective nonresidential treatment programs for minor and first-time offenders as well as effective residential interventions for serious and chronic offenders. In treatment-oriented institutions, young offenders more often develop positive ties to staff, are more receptive to the idea of change, more often learn important social and problem-solving skills, and are more optimistic about remaining law-abiding following release (Street, Vinter, and Perrow 1966; Feld 1977; Poole and Regoli 1983). Recent meta-analyses (studies that examine the effects of multiple programs of the same type) have shown that certain treatment strategies produce substantial reductions in recidivism even among very high-risk offenders (Lipsey and Wilson 1998:336).

To understand the interests served by the myth, recall the discussion above of the factors that prompted the punitive reforms: (1) the idea that effective treatment programs do not exist; (2) the idea that youth crime, especially violent crime, is increasing; and (3) the idea that adolescent offenders have changed, that they are not the immature and vulnerable children conceived by the founders of the juvenile justice system, but are instead savvy, vicious, and morally impoverished products of a permissive society. Each of these ideas is also a myth and, the more each is reinforced, the greater is the support for punishment as a solution.

Crime and the Media


The myth of rising youth crime and the myth of the superpredator go hand in hand, and both are sustained by the media. Violent crimes receive a grossly disproportionate share of media coverage: More than 25 percent of crime reporting is about murder (Beckett and Sasson 2004) but murders constitute less than one tenth of one percent of all crimes known to the police (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2002). Not only is violence overreported, but also the incidence of particular kinds of violence is exaggerated. Violent crimes most often involve people who are known to each other (spouses, friends, acquaintances), but stranger crime is much more likely to be covered. There is also racial distortion in the coverage. Most violent crime is intraracial, but violent offenses involving black male assailants and white victims are much more likely to receive saturation news coverage. These acts of violence resonate criminal stereotypes and tap into deeply held racial prejudices (Chiricos 2004:53; see also Beckett and Sasson 2004; Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001; Feld 2003).

Interests Served by the Myth


Despite an almost complete lack of evidence to support it, the myth that harsh punishments reduce juvenile crime continues to flourish. It does so in part because commonsense notions about the efficacy of punishment are deeply ingrained and resistant to change. It does so in part because the public and politicians are skeptical about social science research, especially when the research evidence contradicts popular mythology (Finckenauer and Gavin 1999). And it does so in part because there is a communication gap between criminologists and both policy makers and the media. But there are other reasons for the endurance of the myth. Simply put, the myth serves powerful political and economic interests.

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The majority of people depend on the media, especially local television news, to form opinions about crime and crimecontrol policies (Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001; Gross and Aday 2003). It is little wonder, then, that people exaggerate the level of youth violence or believe the children of today are more dangerous and ruthless than those of the past. It is in the interest of the media to highlight violent crime, especially violence committed by young black males, because this is the kind of crime that the public fears most. This is not to suggest that the media intentionally try to generate fear or champion a punitive crime control agenda, but they exploit fear and inadvertently promote that agenda in the interest of profit. Dramatic accounts of the most feared crimes sell newspapers and magazines. They attract viewers to television news and other crime-related programming, and generate advertising revenues. Violent crime is cheap and easy to report (it does not require in-depth investigative reporting) and it has wide audience appeal (Dorfman and Schiraldi 2001).

The Politics of Crime


The myth of effective punishment also serves political interests. A public that is frightened about violent youth crime responds positively to conservative politicians who propose solutions that appeal to commonsense ideas. The punishment solution is simplistic, intuitive, and wins votes. Playing on public fears of violence, reinforcing the myth of adult-like adolescents, and advocating punitive solutions with catchy sound bites like adult crime, adult time unfortunately have become successful strategies for winning elections (Beckett and Sasson 2004). Advocating a simplistic get tough agenda does more than help win elections. Sadly, the punishment solution al-

lows politicians to ignore (or remain ignorant of) the good treatment programming that might provide young offenders a much better chance of becoming productive adults. It also provides powerful resistance to dismantling punitive programs whose damaging effects have been demonstrated. Empirical evidence that punitive programs are ineffective is frequently rejected by policy makers because of skepticism about social science research and because belief in the efficacy of punishment is so strong. Finckenauer and Gavin (1999:368) conclude that It is easier [for legislators] to continue such programs and avoid angering constituents than it is to stop them. More important still, because the punishment solution places responsibility for crime on the immoral choices of individual youths, it diverts public attention from the social and economic conditions that are the underlying causes of violent crime and that, ultimately, must be addressed if crime is to be prevented. However, the interests of the wealthy and the powerful are better served by advocating punishment as a solution than they are by addressing the enduring social and economic problemspoverty, income inequality, inadequate inner-city schools, unemployment, urban declinethat contribute to youth crime (Chiricos 2004).

Policy Implications of Belief in the Myth


The United States has endorsed punishment of children and adolescent offenders to an unprecedented degree, and blurred traditional lines of distinctionphilosophically, programmatically, and jurisdictionallybetween the juvenile and adult systems. The myth that harsh punishments are effective in reducing youth crime has generated policies that are

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costly and wasteful. The myth represents a formidable barrier to the development of more humane and effective responses to juvenile crime and, in the end, has done a disservice to victims, offenders, and the public. Exposing the myth that punishment is an effective strategy to reduce youth crime will depend ultimately on the ability to destroy the myths that support it. Restoring less monstrous conceptualizations of adolescents represents a real challenge. The demonization of youth must be replaced by the realization that the children and adolescents of today are little different than those of a generation ago. Policy makers and the public also need to be made aware that youth violence has declined to its lowest levels in decades. Instead of episodic reporting of individual acts of violence as they occur, the coverage needs to be contextualized to reveal broader crime patterns and trends (Casey Journalism Center on Children and Families 2002). More balanced and responsible media reporting should also include more noncrime stories about youth, as well as thoughtful analyses of youth policy. Additionally, policy makers and the public need to be educated about the counterproductive effects of punishment that takes place in a context devoid of positive attachment and respect, and about the promise of well-implemented, evidence-based treatment programs carried out by professionals who communicate messages of hope rather than messages of rejection. Sadly, because the punishment solution and the myths that support it serve powerful interests, the prospects for real change, at least in the short term, appear slim.

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