IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS, OCTOBER 1974

1103

Book

Reviews

RICHARD R. SHIVELY, Book Reviews Editor

In this section, the IEEE Computer Society publishes reviews of books in the computer field and related areas. Readers are invited to send comments on these reviews for possible publication in the Correspondence section of this TRANSACTIONS. Please address your comments and suggestions to the Book Reviews Editor: Richard R. Shively, Bell Laboratories, Inc., Whippany, N.J. 07981. The Computer Society does not necessarily endorse the opinions of the reviewers.

B74-41 The Metaphorical Brain, An Introduction to Cybernetics as Artificial Intelligence and Brain Theory-M. A. Arbib. (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1972, 243 pp., $14.95.)
suggests

According to the dictionary definition, a "metaphor" merely a likeness between one kind of object or idea and another. Thus, the word connotes a less powerful bond of association than that customarily attributed to a model and its correspondent. Our current knowledge of brain function, particularly in relation to behavior, warrants the modesty; indeed, the term, "caricature," occasionally used by the author of this book may serve even better. This proposed "method of metaphors" implies flexible use of analogy, i.e., assertions such as the following can be advanced without any fear of commitment to "nothing but" projections and without much concern for the degree of current acceptance: "Humans are computers/machines." "Humans are animals." "Memory is a hologram." And even "Neurons are people." These are all examples of metaphors examined or referred to in this book. Part I begins with philosophical remarks on the need for metaphors and organizational principles in the evolution of a brain theory. While a polemic is mounted against "constricting" behaviorism and extreme biochemical reductionism is denigrated, a caricature of brain activity as "distributed action-oriented computation in a layered somatotopically organized machine" is initiated. In this view, "distributed" implies a customary Jacksonian organization, enriched with features obtained through contrasting sequential computing machines and parallel-computing brains. The premier example of distribution, discussed in detail later in the book, is that of neural control of movement. "Action orientation" implies that "the animal perceives its environment to the extent it is prepared to interact with that environment in some reasonably structured fashion." It antagonizes the notion of perception as a "passive process of clasification," or objectnaming enterprise. The stipulation allows the augured action to be displaced in time from the perception so that planning can be effecteda point made by the author but perhaps less forcefully than intended. Action orientation together with distribution purportedly aid the organism in avoidance of overloading its central brain storage and computing mechanisms. A robot analogy arises here, since overloading is a major concern in that area. Whether a similar situation obtains in the realm of organic brains is another matter, since nature often insists on being highly redundant (and at least potentially wasteful) in calculation. The final part of the brain caricature is an extension to almost all brain activity of the known somatotopy in systems such as the (layered) frog retina and "the layer in the human brain which receives touch information from the body." A basic idea is that such layers interact among themselves in an almost anarchical fashion without an "executive neuron" deciding overall system objectives. This autonomy and parallel action, occurring in a world of many objects with which to interact, give rise to the problem of how the organism is able to resolve potentially contradictory commands to effectors, discussed in detail later in the book, under "resolving redundancy of potential command" and "the reticular formation model." Earlv sections on anatomv and microanatomv of the nervous

intelligence. Heuristic methods are introduced as a methodology valid in many problem-solving domains, and by implication, of some relevance in theoretical psychology, an opinion, of course, a study in shared by many others. Scene analysis is presented building-up an internal representation. A simple illustration of an algorithm for controlling a robot is presented. The impression is given that many programs are needed to model a large repertoire of behavior; alternatives, such as that of Cunningham [11, of a small number of programs operating in conjunction with an evolving data structure, are not mentioned. In Part III, "Brain Theory," the emphasis moves toward characterizing organisms' output mechanisms and on to the coordination of input mechanisms, the internal representation and output mechanisms. Together with another series of neuroanatomical sketches, the discussions here form a basis for neuron net caricatures for a walking leg and for control of ballistic (saccadic) eye movements. The next chapter, "Memory and Perception in a Layered Computer," includes topics relating to: experimental evidence that the brain might be organized in terms of meaningful interactions with the real world; how types of internal representation might be differentiated; how transformations which invoke motor' output appropriate to sensory input might be effected in layered machines; and how the hologram metaphor for memory might mesh'with the distribution principle of the brain theory. The last chapter in this part deals with the command resolution problem mentioned above; the discussion is highlighted by a caricature of the visuomotor activity of a frog in the presence of flies. The role of mathematical argument can be more readily perceived here, because some simulation modeling efforts are. sketched. Possibilities for priority interrupt system caricatures analogous. to those of modern operating systems might have been mentioned in connection with command resolution. "Prospcts," the title of Part IV, and "Where Do We Go From Here." t title of the final chapter. terminate the reading. Reiteraas

information in a simple setting. These hypothetical internal elements, though postulated at the level of spatial and temporal relations rather than at some more physiological or biochemical level, are intended to help justify the imperative that no psychology can be successful without consideration of more than stimulus-response coincidences; that is, an internal representation is required. The next topics, forming Part II of the book, survey systems theory and artificial intelligence (AI). The benefits of specifying an internal representation are most obvious here and this is emphasized through homely nonbiological examples of state-dependent systems. Feedback mechanisms are portrayed as a means of "algorithmic control," and features of adaptative control mechanisms are outlined. Except for dabbling with group theory concepts in connection with a pattern transformation scheme, the mathematical aspects of these topics are almost entirely omitted. The AI section begins with a brief consideration of the nature of

system provide the basis for identifying the behaviorally functional components of the brain as whole neurons acting as participants in neural nets of the McCullough-Pitts variety. As a part of a large section on cat and frog "visual preprocessing," in which some celebrated experimental findings are reviewed, two such simple neuron net designs for the visual system are presented. One design is for a motion detection function and the other for extracting boundary

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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTERS, OCTOBER 1974

tion of primacy for internal models and a systems theory endorsement stand out. Visuomotor coordination is promoted as a key paradigm for all behavior, and (a sort of) motor theory of mental development and learning is asserted. The book ends with social commentary, projecting a bright future in the face of potentially diminished (individual) self-conception and human control in an age when an intelligent robot and man share the pinnacle of evolution's highest product. In summary, the book takes as its theme the notion that "cybernetics as Al and brain theory" must look to the brain for sources of caricatures, metaphors and models. The realization of these often lies in neural net descriptions which yield to elementary pencil-andpaper analysis. When higher level mathematical insights are needed, systems theory, feedback and control systems techniques, (Al) heuristics, and computer simulation are likely to be the appropriate tools. The approach is essentially speculative; it may well run the risk of becoming too speculative, its structures and mechanisms then becoming too fragile to meet the test of time. The fate of the simple neuron models used extensively by the Rashevsky school of "mathematical biophysics" comes to mind: though many analogies to psychological processes were evolved (see [21, especially Vol. II), this work has often been criticized as being remote from experiment, and consequently is ignored by many. A second related problem of the speculative approach is that it can pose problems which may not be real. An example here may well be the formulations presented for redundancy of potential command. More bad effects than good will occur if caricatures increase (in number or size) well beyond the point of demonstration of plausible alternative mechanisms. Among defects of the work are a number of rather poorly done figures. In that of the synaptic region, for example, an unidentified structure envelopes the junction. Among those depicting light entering the eye, the light impinges on the rods and cones in one figure, but on the ganglion cells in another! A potential weakness arises also

in the frequent "term dropping," e.g., Fourier transform, stability theory, sequential machine, automata theory, multidimensional scaling and other terms, which are sprinkled about the text, but left undercharacterized or undiscussed. Fortunately, a complete understanding of the aforementioned terms is often not a prerequisite to following the trend of the argument, though the lack of development of the tools associated with them leaves the book at too low a level to introduce the "brain theory" to students of hard science. The Preface describes the book as "by no means light reading," yet "accessible to anyone who reads Scientific American." The book could possibly be useful as an introduction for psychology students. Evidence of success in the general area of softer sciences has been registered by its having been designated recipient of the 1973 book-of-the-year award from the American Society for Information Sciences. The certain charm achieved by interweaving quasi-philosophical comment, biological data, hypothetical structures and models may well be responsible for this. A more forceful scientific presentation would have resulted, had the book begun with a full explication of the biological record as the substrate for subsequent generalizations of neuron-net and other caricatures. The book advertises its speculative nature in its title, but the appropriate offering of it as a paperback (at about one quarter the price) remains to be realized.

REFERENCES
[1] M. Cunningham, Intelligence: Its Organization and Development. New York: Academic, 1972. [21 N. Rashevsky, Mathemtatical Biophysics, Vols. I and II. New York: Dover, 1960.

KEVIN D. REILLY Dep. Inform. Sci. Univ. Alabama in Birmingham Birmingham, Ala.