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PART 1: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; MERGER, ABOLITION AND POWERS a. Creation of Local Government Units 1. Patricio Tan et al. v. COMELEC Facts: Prompted by the enactment of BP 885 (Act Creating Province of Negros del Norte), petitioners who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental filed with this Court a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping Comelec from conducting the plebiscite which, pursuant to and in implementation of the law. Petitioners contend that BP 885 is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in Article XI, Section 3 of our Constitution regarding the requirements in land area and estimated annual income. Petitioners also contend that a number of voters were excluded since the plebiscite was confined only to the inhabitants of three cities and eight municipalities in Negros del Norte, to the exclusion of the voters of the Province of Negros Occidental.. Comelec contends that the law is not unconstitutional. They claim that BP 885 does not infringe the Constitution because the requisites of the LGC have been complied with. They submit that the case has now become moot and academic with the proclamation of Negros del Norte as during the plebiscite, 164,734 were in favor of the creation of the new province while only 30,400 were against it. Issue: WON the province complied with the plebiscite requirement Held: No CREATION, ignore and disregard what the Constitution commands in Article XI Section 3 thereof We fail to find any legal basis for the unexplained change made when Parliamentary Bill No. 3644 was enacted into Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 so that it is now provided in said enabling law that the plebiscite "shall be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected." We are not disposed to agree that by mere legislative fiat the unit or units affected referred in the fundamental law can be diminished or restricted by the Batasang Pambansa to cities and municipalities comprising the new province, thereby ignoring the evident reality that there are other people necessarily affected. The court reversed the ruling in Paredes vs Executive Secretary (same issue but concerns barangay). Petitioners have averred without contradiction that after the creation of Negros del Norte, the province of Negros Occidental would be deprived of the long established Cities of Silay, Cadiz, and San Carlos, as well as the municipality of Victorias. No controversion has been made regarding petitioners' assertion that the areas of the Province of Negros Occidental will be diminished by about 285,656 hectares and it will lose seven of the fifteen sugar mills which contribute to the economy of the whole province. In the language of petitioners, "to create Negros del Norte, the existing territory and political subdivision known as Negros Occidental has to be partitioned and dismembered. What was involved was no 'birth' but "amputation." We agree with the petitioners that in the case of Negros what was involved was a division, a separation; and consequently, as Sec. 3 of Article XI of the Constitution anticipates, a substantial alteration of boundary. Issue: WON the new Province of Negros del Norte complied with the requirements as to land area Held: No

Ratio: The more significant and pivotal issue in the present case revolves around in the interpretation and application in the case at bar of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution. It can be plainly seen that the constitutional provision makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected" whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. We find no way to reconcile the holding of a plebiscite that should conform to said constitutional requirement but eliminates the participation of either of these two component political units. No one should be allowed to pay homage to a supposed fundamental policy intended to guarantee and promote autonomy of local government units but at the same time transgress,

Ratio: The original parliamentary bill no 3644 expressly declared that the new province contained an area of 285,656 ha. More or less. However, when Parliamentary bill was enacted into BP 885, the province now comprised a territory of 4,019.95 square kilometers. The certification of the provincial treasurer also indicates that there the province comprised of a lesser area. Although the certification stated that the land area of the municipality of Don Salvador was not available, it appeared that such is only 80.2 kilometers. This area if added to 2,685.2 square kilometers will result in approximately an area of only 2,765.4 square kilometers. The last sentence of the first paragraph of Section 197 LGC1 (requirements) is most revealing. As so stated
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SEC. 197. Requisites for Creation. A province may be created if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred square kilometers, a population of at least five hundred thousand persons, an average estimated annual income, as certified by the Ministry of Finance, of not less than ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years, and its creation shall not reduce the population and income of the mother province or provinces at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements under this section. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands.

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therein the "territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or more islands." The use of the word territory in this particular provision of the Local Government Code and in the very last sentence thereof, clearly, reflects that "territory" as therein used, has reference only to the mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. Said sentence states that the "territory need not be contiguous." Contiguous means (a) in physical contact; (b) touching along all or most of one side; (c) near, text, or adjacent."Contiguous", when employed as an adjective, as in the above sentence, is only used when it describes physical contact, or a touching of sides of two solid masses of matter. The meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with or related to them in the statute. Therefore, in the context of the sentence above, what need not be "contiguous" is the "territory" ---- the physical mass of land area. There would arise no need for the legislators to use the word contiguous if they had intended that the term "territory" embrace not only land area but also territorial waters, It can be safely concluded that the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is meant to be synonymous with "land area" only. The words and phrases used in a statute should be given the meaning intended by the legislature. The sense in which the words are used furnished the rule of construction. The distinction between "territory" and "land area" which respondents make is an artificial or strained construction of the disputed provision whereby the words of the statute are arrested from their plain and obvious meaning and made to bear an entirely different meaning to justify an absurd or unjust result. The plain meaning in the language in a statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. A construction based on a forced or artificial meaning of its words and out of harmony of the statutory scheme is not to be favored. Teehankee, concurring: The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the implementing acts complained of, viz. the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago and La Carlota and the Municipalities of La Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla, Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladolid, San Enrique, Ilog, Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the approval of a majority of the votes
The average estimated annual income shall include the income alloted for both the general and infrastructural funds, exclusive of trust funds, transfers and nonrecurring income.

in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. " It is plain that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the voters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole province is affected by its proposed division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule. The argument of fait accompli viz. that the railroaded plebiscite of January 3, 1986 was held and can no longer be enjoined and that the new province of Negros del Norte has been constituted, begs the issue of invalidity of the challenged Act. This Court has always held that it "does not look with favor upon parties 'racing to beat an injunction or restraining order' which they have reason to believe might be forthcoming from the Court by virtue of the filing and pendency of the appropriate petition therefor. Where the restraining order or preliminary injunction are found to have been properly issued, as in the case at bar, mandatory writs shall be issued by the Court to restore matters to the status quo ante." Where, as in this case, there was somehow a failure to properly issue the restraining order stopping the holding of the illegal plebiscite, the Court will issue the mandatory writ or judgment to restore matters to the status quo ante and restore the territorial integrity of the province of Negros Occidental by declaring the unconstitutionality of the challenged Act and nullifying the invalid proclamation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte and the equally invalid appointment of its officials.

2. Torralba v. Mun. of Sibagat (1987) Facts: BP 56, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur, is being challenged as violative of Section 3 Article XI of the 1973 Constitution2. Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local public officials of the new Municipality. According to the petitioners, the Local Government Code must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government Code had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.
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"Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected."

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Issue: WON BP 56 is invalid Held: No Facts: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines apportioned 2 legislative districts for Maguindanao. The first consists of Cotabato City and 8 municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM, created under its Organic Act, RA 6734, as amended by RA 9054. Cotabato City, as part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII (having voted against its inclusion in November 1989 plebiscite). On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the 8 municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. Later, 3 new municipalities were carved out of the original 9, constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, resulting to total of 11. Cotabato City is not part of Maguindanao. Maguindanao voters ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in 29 October 2006 plebiscite. On 6 February 2007, Cotabato City passed Board Resolution No. 3999, requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201. The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, adopted the COMELECs Law Department recommendation under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007. The COMELEC issued on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201. On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902 (subject of these cases), amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City). Meanwhile, the Shariff Kabunsuan creation plebiscite was supervised and officiated by the COMELEC pursuant to Resolution No. 7727. (Option Votes: In favor for creation 285,372; Against the creation 8,802) The following municipalities seceded from Maguindanao and formed the new province. All of them were from the first legislative district of Maguindanao. (Barira, Buldon, Datu Blah T. Sinsuat, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, Upi) Kabuntalan was chosen as the capital of the new province. The province was the first to be created under Republic Act No. 9054 or the Expanded ARMM law. Sandra Sema questioned COMELEC Resolution 7902 which combined Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato City into a single legislative district during the Philippine general election, 2007. Sema lost to incumbent Congress representative of the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato district, Didagen Dilangalen. Issue: Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

Ratio: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It contains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus been created. It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of government.The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec and in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885 in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in that law. 3. Bai Sema v. Comelec (2008) Province of Shariff Kabunsuan

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Ratio: The creation of any of the four local government units - province, city, municipality or barangay - must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities. Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x." Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the "next national elections" from the effectivity of the law. Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage

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of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers "[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x." The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress' power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and new provinces, was unconstitutional for "creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution." The Court answered in the negative. Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for "each province shall have at least one member" in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment . Second. Sema's theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or without regard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and (3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assembly's continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM. Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219 [38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces. The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case. In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the

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Constitution Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 4. The Prov. Of North Government (2008) Cotabato et al v. table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP. The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting." A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. [6] In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. Held: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution. Ratio: The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter for judicial review. As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo. Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the nonsigning of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an

Facts: On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations. [1] The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same. The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998. The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.[2] Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.[3] In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-war" against the MILF. When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating

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exception to the "moot and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOAAD can be renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original. The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law. The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement. An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was envisioned to be a species of these public rights. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda. One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society. Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny. In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined. The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional , for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by

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itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective. 5. Bagabuyo v. COMELEC (2008) FACTS: In 2006, Rep. Jaraula of Cagayan de Oro sponsored a bill increasing the citys legislative district from one to two. It eventually became a law causing COMELEC to promulgate a resolution that for the election of May 2007, Cagayan de Oro's voters would be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. Bagabuyo filed a petition and argued that COMELEC cannot implement the act without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local government unit. ISSUE: WON a plebiscite is required in the case at bar HELD/RATIO: No. The Court upheld COMELECs arguments that the law merely increased the representation of CDO in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and that the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay. In this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place. Further, the law did not bring about any change in CDOs territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. 6. League of Cities v. COMELEC (2011) FACTS: During the 11th Congress, 33 bills were filed seeking to convert 33 municipalities into cities. Out of the 33 bills, only 24 were not enacted into law. In the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was passed which amended the Local Government Code. It increased the income requirement from 20 million to 100 million. Due to this new law, Congress sought to enact a joint resolution exempting the 24 municipalities from the new income requirement. This was however not approved. Sixteen out of the original 24 municipalities filed individual cityhood bills. These bills were enacted into law between March to July 2007. The statutes contained a provision which exempted the 16 municipalities from the new income requirement. The League of Cities assailed the constitutionality of these cityhood laws on two grounds: 1) The cityhood laws violate Article X, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution which states that cities can be created only in accordance with the local government code and 2) the cityhood laws violate the equal protection clause as they put the municipalities at an advantage as against all other municipalities that are similarly situated. ISSUE: Whether or not the cityhood laws are constitutional. RULING: The original case declared the laws unconstitutional. The MR reversed this decision and ruled in favor of their constitutionality. Upon a second MR, the Court again reversed itself. Finally, on the fourth ruling, the Supreme Court ruled that the laws were constitutional. FIRST DECISION (Nov. 18, 2008 decision) The cityhood laws violate Article X, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution. Under this provision, the creation of cities must be based on the Local Government Code and no other law. The legislature cannot prescribe different criteria in another law, in violation of the predetermined requirements in the Local Government Code. Allowing that would then render nugatory the entire purpose of having a Local Government Code. Since the Local Government Code determines the requirements, if there are indeed exemptions, they too must be clearly stated in the same Code. In the case of the 16 municipalities, no such exemption is written in their favor. The said laws also violate Article X, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The provision states that local government units are entitled to a just share in the national income. There will be no just share if the criteria are not uniform for local government units. In the case of the cityhood laws, the cities involved, which earn only about 20 million, will get the same share as those who actually earn the 100 million requirement in the law. Along this line, the laws also violate the equal protection clause. There was no substantial distinction which would justify the favorable treatment accorded to the cities in the cityhood laws as opposed to every other city earning 20 million pesos. The fact that they sought cityhood before the amendment of the LGC is not a substantial distinction SECOND DECISION ( Dec. 21, 2009) The cityhood laws are constitutional The power to create cities is legislative in character. Article X, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution only meant that Congress alone can impose the criteria for the creation of cities, it did not limit the power of the legislature. The said constitutional provision should be construed to mean that Congress can create cities so long as it is done through a law. In other words, Congress can create cities through a codified set of laws as in the LGC or through a single subject enactment as in the case of the cityhood laws. Moreover, the legislative intent in making the cityhood laws was to exempt the cities involved from RA 9009. The said exemption does not violate equal protection because it is based on substantial distinctions. The municipalities involved in this case have already met the requirements for cityhood under the old LGC even before it was amended. Allowing the amendment to apply to them would be the same as changing the rules in the middle of the game. THIRD DECISION (August 24, 2010) The cityhood laws are unconstitutional.

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Article 10, Sec. 10 of the 1987 Constitution clearly states that the Local Government Code must be the basis for the creation of cities. RA 9009 is an amendment of the LGC, therefore, the new income requirement prescribed by it should be complied with. If Congress truly intended that the municipalities involved in this case be exempt from RA 9009, it should have been stated in the law itself. The cityhood laws violate equal protection. First, there was no substantial distinction between the municipalities in this case and all other municipalities similarly situated. Second, the said law is limited to specific conditions only, contrary to the requirement that a valid distinction must not only apply to specific conditions but to future conditions as well. Third, the law does not apply to all municipalities similarly situated. The laws give advantage to certain municipalities on the basis of an arbitrary date. FOURTH DECISION (February 15, 2011) The Cityhood laws are constitutional The legislative intent was to exempt the municipalities involved from the coverage of RA 9009. This intent was expressed in the exemption clause found in the cityhood laws. The enactment of these laws was in valid exercise of the legislative power. In fact these cityhood laws can be deemed to have amended the LGC in that these laws provided for exemption. FINAL RULING: The cityhood laws are constitutional. The municipalities involved are validly constituted as cities. 7. Navarro v. Executive Secretary (2010, 2011) Dinagatan Case FACTS: Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461. ISSUE: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional? 10 February 2010 and 12 May 2010 Decisions UNCONSTITUTIONAL Sec. 461 requires compliance with an income requirement of P20 million, which was met by the province. However, it also requires compliance with either the population OR the land area requirement. The province did not comply with the population requirement. Based on the official NSO census in 2000, the province only had 106,951 inhabitants, which is short of the 250,000 required by law. The province, however, held a special census that was monitored by a local NSO branch, but was NOT certified by the NSO, stating that their population was 371,000. In an NSO national census conducted after the passage of the Act, it was verified that the province only had 120,813 inhabitants, still short of the 250,000 requirement. The province did NOT comply with the land area requirement. Sec. 461(a)(i) requires that the land area of a province be contiguous and a minimum of 2,000 sq. km. However, Dinagat Islands did NOT meet the statutory requirement of 2,000 sq. km. Their argument is that since the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code under Art. 9.2 provides an exception that the land area requirement does not apply if the area is not contiguous. The exception for non-contiguity is provided for in Sec. 461(b). This exception under the Local Government Code, does not include an exception to the land area requirement. The IRR of a law should always be consistent with the law, and hence, if the IRR goes beyond what the law said, it is unconstitutional. 12 April 2011 Decision CONSTITUTIONAL Initially in the dissent of Justice Nachura in the earlier decisions, he mentioned that when Sec. 461 (b) created an exception on contiguity, it also carried along an exception to the land area requirement because based on the phraseology of the provision, the land area requirement modifies contiguity. The 2nd Motion for Reconsideration was allowed on the basis of intervention of movants who were not part of the original case. They were elected officials of Surigao Del Norte who were adversely affected by the outcome of the unconstitutionality of Dinagat Islands. Hence, the majority now looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities and how they allow an exception to the land area requirement in the cases of non-contiguity. Therefore, it must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such exception to provinces. The idea is that land area requirement for island provinces is unfair because it will render them far from the government center. If it will be construed as it was in the original decision, it will seem as if the Congress was partial to contiguous provinces which is against the equal protection clause.

* Latasa v Comelec (2003, Azcuna) FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was the mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in 1992, 1995 and 1998. In September 2000, a plebiscite was conducted to convert the municipality to City of Digos. This marked the end of the term of Latasa as mayor of the municipality. However, the charter of the new city provides that Latasa will stay in position in a hold-over capacity until the next election. In 2001 elections, Latasa again filed a COC to run as mayor. He argues that although he has already served three consecutive term in municipal mayor, this is his first bid as a city mayor.

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His opponent in the election Romeo Sunga filed a disqualification case against Latasa in the Comelec on the ground of violation of the three-term rule. Comelec granted the petition. Latasa filed a MR that was not acted upon until the day of election and hence, he won and proclaimed as the mayor. ISSUE: WON Latasa can still run as mayor of Digos City after serving three terms as mayor of municipality of Digos. HELD: The new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court believes that Latasa did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor unlike in Lonzanida case, where petitioner for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office. In this case, there was no interruption in the holding of office and hence, the three consecutive term is completed. Since Latasa was proclaimed but later on disqualified, the second placer Sunga, cannot assume the position but the vice mayor. b. Presumption of constitutionality 8. Alvarez v. Guingona (1996) Facts: This concerns the validity of RA 7330 converting the municipality of Santiago Isabela into an independent component city to be known as the city of Santiago. The law was challenged mainly because the act did not allegedly originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Consitution. Also, petitioner claims that the Municipality of Santiago has not met the minimum average annual income required under Section 450 of the LGC in order to be converted into a component city. Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB 8817 which was filed on April 18, 1993. After the third reading, the bill was transmitted to the Senate on January 18, 1994. Meanwhile, a counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. On February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the senate. The committee recommended that HB 8817 be approved without amendment, taking into consideration that the house bill was identical to the senate bill. Issue: WON the IRAs are to be included in the computation of the average annual income of a municipality for the purposes of its conversion into an independent component city Held: Yes Ratio: Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its average annual income for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls below the required annual income of P20,000,000 for its conversion into a city. After deducting the IRA, ti appears that the average annual income arrived at would only be P13,109,560.47 based on the 1991 constant prices. Petitioners asseverate that the IRAs are not actually income but transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on factors like population, land and equal sharing. Petitioners asseverations are untenable because Internal Revenue Allotments form part of the income of Local Government Units. It is true that for a municipality to be converted into a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at least Twenty Million Pesos for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income must be duly certified by the Department of Finance. A Local Government Unit is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs. Remaining to be an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio, the local government unit is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. The practical side to development through a decentralized local government system certainly concerns the matter of financial resources. With its broadened powers and increased responsibilities, a local government unit must now operate on a much wider scale. More extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. Understandably, the vesting of duty, responsibility and accountability in every local government unit is accompanied with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its powers and effectively carry out its functions. Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in every local government unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes, such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and (3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its territorial boundaries. For purposes of budget preparation, which budget should reflect the estimates of the income of the local government unit, among others, the IRAs and the share in the national wealth utilization proceeds are considered items of income. This is as it should be, since income is defined in the Local Government Code to be all revenues and receipts collected or received

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forming the gross accretions of funds of the local government unit. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the local government unit. 11 They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed funds. To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of "funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and governmentowned-or-controlled corporations". Issue: WON considering that Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 2770 can be sait to have originated in the House of Representatives Held: Yes Ratio: Although a bill of local application like HB No. 8817 should, by constitutional prescription, originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the claim of petitioners that RA 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243, was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representatives first before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate. Petitioners themselves cannot disavow their own admission that HB No. 8817 was filed on April 18, 1993 while SB No. 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. The filing of HB No. 8817 was thus precursive not only of the said Act in question but also of SB No. 1243. Thus, HB No. 8817, was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the enactment of Republic Act No. 7720. No violation of Section 24, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution is perceptible under the circumstances attending the instant controversy. Furthermore, petitioners themselves acknowledge that HB No. 8817 was already approved on Third Reading and duly transmitted to the Senate when the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted its public hearing on HB No. 8817. HB No. 8817 was approved on the Third Reading on December 17, 1993 and transmitted to the Senate on January 28, 1994; a little less than a month thereafter, or on February 23, 1994, the Senate Committee on Local Government conducted public hearings on SB No. 1243. Clearly, the Senate held in abeyance any action on SB No. 1243 until it received HB No. 8817, already approved on the Third Reading, from the House of Representatives. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance: Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill. Every law, including RA No. 7720,has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No. 7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who petition this court to declare a law to be unconstitutional must clearly and fully establish the basis that will justify such a declaration; otherwise, their petition must fail. Taking into consideration the justification of our stand on the immediately preceding ground raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 7720, the Court stands on the holding that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition is, therefore, inevitable. c. Governmental powers/ functions 9. Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme (1991) Facts: Petitioner is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. At about 7 am of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the petitioner and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered physical injuries. Private respondents instituted an action against Nieveras and Balagot before the CFI. The defendants filed a third party complaint against petitioner and Bislig. The complaint was then amended to implead petitioner and Bislig. Petitioner raised as defense lack of cause of action, non suability of the State, prescription and negligence of the owner and driver of the jeepney. The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay the plaintiffs. The owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from liability. Petitioner filed an MR which was dismissed for having been filed out of time. Issue: WON the court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss. Held: Yes

Ratio: In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of non-suability of the State until trial. However, the judge failed to resolve such defense, proceeded with the trial and then rendered a

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decision against the municipality and its driver. The judge did not commit GAD when it arbitrarily failed to resolve the issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the municipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when in his decision he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee. The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Consti, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent." Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict. Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued. A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable." Anent the issue of whether or not the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or proprietary functions (Torio vs. Fontanilla). According to City of Kokomo vs Loy(Indiana SC), municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers, agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or sovereign power." It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.We already stressed in the case of Palafox, et. al. vs. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the Provincial Treasurer that "the construction or maintenance of roads in which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are admittedly governmental activities." After a careful examination of existing laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation. d. Proprietary powers/ functions 10. City of Manila v. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989) Facts: Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. died and was buried in North Cemetery which lot was leased by the city to Irene Sto. Domingo for the period from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021. The wife paid the full amount of the lease. Apart, however from the receipt, no other document embodied such lease over the lot. Believing that the lease was only for five years, the city certified the lot as ready for exhumation. On the basis of the certification, Joseph Helmuth authorized the exhumation and removal of the remains of Vicencio. His bones were placed in a bag and kept in the bodega of the cemetery. The lot was also leased to another lessee. During the next all souls day, the private respondents were shocked to find out that Vicencios remains were removed. The cemetery told Irene to look for the bones of the husband in the bodega. Aggrieved, the widow and the children brought an action for damages against the City of Manila; Evangeline Suva of the City Health Office; Sergio Mallari, officer-in-charge of the North Cemetery; and Joseph Helmuth, the latter's predecessor as officer-incharge of the said burial grounds owned and operated by the City Government of Manila. The court ordered defendants to give plaintiffs the right to make use of another lot. The CA affirmed and included the award of damages in favor of the private respondents. Issue: WON the operations and functions of a public cemetery are a governmental, or a corporate or proprietary function of the City of Manila. Held: Proprietary

Ratio: Petitioners alleged in their petition that the North Cemetery is exclusively devoted for public use or

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purpose as stated in Sec. 316 of the Compilation of the Ordinances of the City of Manila. They conclude that since the City is a political subdivision in the performance of its governmental function, it is immune from tort liability which may be caused by its public officers and subordinate employees. Private respondents maintain that the City of Manila entered into a contract of lease which involve the exercise of proprietary functions with Irene Sto. Domingo. The city and its officers therefore can be sued for any-violation of the contract of lease. The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to be exercised by and through its city government in conformity with law, and in its proper corporate name. It may sue and be sued, and contract and be contracted with. Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. Governmental powers are those exercised in administering the powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and political. Municipal powers on the one hand are exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate. In connection with the powers of a municipal corporation, it may acquire property in its public or governmental capacity, and private or proprietary capacity. The New Civil Code divides such properties into property for public use and patrimonial properties (Article 423), and further enumerates the properties for public use as provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provisions, cities or municipalities, all other property is patrimonial without prejudice to the provisions of special laws. Thus in Torio v. Fontanilla, the Court declared that with respect to proprietary functions the settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable to third persons ex contractu. Under the foregoing considerations and in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila. The administration and government of the cemetery are under the City Health Officer, the order and police of the cemetery, the opening of graves, niches, or tombs, the exhuming of remains, and the purification of the same are under the charge and responsibility of the superintendent of the cemetery. With the acts of dominion, there is no doubt that the North Cemetery is within the class of property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. Furthermore, there is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of the private respondents. Hence, obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties. Thus a lease contract executed by the lessor and lessee remains as the law between them. Therefore, a breach of contractual provision entitles the other party to damages even if no penalty for such breach is prescribed in the contract. Issue: WON the city is liable for damages Held: Yes Ratio: All things considered, even as the Court commiserates with plaintiffs for the unfortunate happening complained of and untimely desecration of the resting place and remains of their deceased dearly beloved, it finds the reliefs prayed for by them lacking in legal and factual basis. Under the aforementioned facts and circumstances, the most that plaintiffs ran ask for is the replacement of subject lot with another lot of equal size and similar location in the North Cemetery which substitute lot plaintiffs can make use of without paying any rental to the city government for a period of forty-three (43) years, four (4) months and eleven (11) days corresponding to the unexpired portion of the term of the lease sued upon as of January 25, 1978 when the remains of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo, Sr. were prematurely removed from the disputed lot; and to require the defendants to look in earnest for the bones and skull of the late Vivencio Sto. Domingo Sr. and to bury the same in the substitute lot adjudged in favor of plaintiffs hereunder. As regards the issue of the validity of the contract of lease of grave lot No. 159, Block No. 195 of the North Cemetery for 50 years beginning from June 6, 1971 to June 6, 2021 as clearly stated in the receipt duly signed by the deputy treasurer of the City of Manila and sealed by the city government, there is nothing in the record that justifies the reversal of the conclusion of both the trial court and the Intermediate Appellate Court to the effect that the receipt is in itself a contract of lease. ( Under the doctrine of respondent superior, (Torio v. Fontanilla), petitioner City of Manila is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25, 1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force and effect. PART 2: DECENTRALIZATION; LOCAL AUTONOMY; POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS a. Local Government Units vis a vis National Government: Power of general supervision 11. Drilon v. Lim (1994) Facts: The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code3. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal
3

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal

14
to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code) null and void for non-compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed. (Petition originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.) Issue: WON the lower court has jurisdiction consider the constitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC Held: Yes to ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be.. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act. That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and noncompliance with the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure. The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. (allegations: No written notices of public hearing, no publication of the ordinance, no minutes of public hearing, no posting, no translation into Tagalog) Judge Palattao however found that all the procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court. We agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed ordinances were published in

Ratio: BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution. Issue: WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional Held: Yes

Ratio: Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

15
the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.

12. Solicitor General Authority (1991)

v.

Metopolitan

Manila

Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However, petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of drivers licenses and removal of license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles. Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate comments in light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power conferred upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity. Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in the LGC Held: No

16
The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila. mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced before the CA, a petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the cases. Issue: WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials. Issue: Yes Ratio: It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law," to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The issue consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language? It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right - or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the USA. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution - and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest - is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local

13. Ganzon v. Court of Appeals (1991) Facts: The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent (Sec of Local Government) issued a preventive suspension order for a period of sixty days. In the other case, respondent ordered petitioner's second preventive suspension for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent in the RTC. Presently, he instituted an action for prohibition, in the respondent CA. Meanwhile, the respondent issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting

17
Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition. The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, Commissioner Blas Ople would not. The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 337. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance selfgovernment. As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national administration - but not power to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency. Issue: WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon are proper Held: No

Ratio: The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and nothing less than tyranny. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion. Ganzon Supplement: Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the

18
central government in the manner the law may provide; The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy; Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials; "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have); The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided: that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)] that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code. acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who are to pay it. Since taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be mistaken. There can be no question that under Section 14 RA 6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing authority. The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the constitution provides for the exercise by LGUs of their power to tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and the exemption from taxation. Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs: (o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities and LGUs. Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property tax. Section 234 of LGC provides for the exemptions from payment of GOCCs, except as provided therein. On the other hand, the LGC authorizes LGUs to grant tax exemption privileges. Reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of the LGC, we conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Secs 133 the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, and LGUs"; however, pursuant to Sec 232, provinces, cities, municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial used thereof has been granted to a taxable person." As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section 234, which enumerates the properties exempt from real property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as the real property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to those enumerated there-in; all others not included in the enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC. Moreover, even as the real property is owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of its political subdivisions covered by item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has

14. MCIAA v. Marcos (1996) Facts: Petitioner was created by virtue of RA6958, mandated to "principally undertake the economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug Airport in Cebu City. Under Section 1: The authority shall be exempt from realty taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. However, the Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging to petitioner. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption. It also asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the LGC which puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. The city refused insisting that petitioner is a GOCC performing proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC. Petitioner filed a declaratory relief before the RTC. The trial court dismissed the petitioner ruling that the LGC withdrew the tax exemption granted the GOCCs. Issue: WON the City of Cebu has the power to impose taxes on petitioner Held: Yes

Ratio: As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range,

19
been granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise. Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No. 6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under Section 133, as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, the petitioner can no longer invoke the general rule in Section 133. It must show that the parcels of land in question, which are real property, are any one of those enumerated in Section 234, either by virtue of ownership, character, or use of the property. Most likely, it could only be the first, but not under any explicit provision of the said section, for one exists. In light of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of the Government", it could only be within be first item of the first paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the terms Republic of the Philippines" to embrace ."instrumentalities" and "agencies." This view does not persuade us. In the first place, the petitioner's claim that it is an instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o), which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in the second place it fails to consider the fact that the legislature used the phrase "National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phrase "Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision "in Section 234(a). The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987 defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which the functions of the government are exercised through at the Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivision or other forms of local government." These autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions" are the political subdivision. On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the different forms of local Governments." The National Government then is composed of the three great departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial. An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;" while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-owned and controlled corporations". If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real property taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned in Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the latter. Yet, it did not Moreover, that Congress did not wish to expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of the government including governmentowned and controlled corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code. Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and any government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its charter" was excluded. The justification for this restricted exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax exemption privileges, specially in light of the general provision on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments 33 and the objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals. 34 The power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned and controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was a need for this entities to share in the requirements of the development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other charges due from them. The crucial issues then to be addressed are: (a) whether the parcels of land in question belong to the Republic of the Philippines whose beneficial use has been granted to the petitioner, and (b) whether the petitioner is a "taxable person". It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then administered by the Lahug Air Port and includes the parcels of land the respondent City of Cebu seeks to levy on for real property taxes. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands" among other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines. This "transfer" is actually an absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof because the petitioner's authorized capital stock consists of "the value of such real estate owned and/or administered by the airports."

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Hence, the petitioner is now the owner of the land in question and the exception in Sec 234(c) of the LGC is inapplicable. Petitioner cannot claim that it was never a "taxable person" under its Charter. It was only exempted from the payment of real property taxes. The grant of the privilege only in respect of this tax is conclusive proof of the legislative intent to make it a taxable person subject to all taxes, except real property tax. Finally, even if the petitioner was originally not a taxable person for purposes of real property tax, in light of the forgoing disquisitions, it had already become even if it be conceded to be an "agency" or "instrumentality" of the Government, a taxable person for such purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section 234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which, as earlier adverted to, applies to the petitioner. Accordingly, the position taken by the petitioner is untenable. Reliance on Basco vs. Pagcor is unavailing since it was decided before the effectivity of the LGC. Besides, nothing can prevent Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the government performing governmental functions may be subject to tax. Where it is done precisely to fulfill a constitutional mandate and national policy, no one can doubt its wisdom. approval from the President granting additional benefits to its personnel. This is in conformity with the policy of standardization of compensation laid down in RA 6758. Issue: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance of P3,760,000 for premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees. Ruling: Yes. It is clear from Section 1 of AO 103 that the President authorized all agencies of the national government as well as LGUs to grant the maximum amount of P2,000 productivity incentive benefit to each employee who has rendered at least one year of service as of 31 December 1993. In Section 2, the President enjoined all heads of government offices and agencies from granting productivity incentive benefits or any and all similar forms of allowances and benefits without the Presidents prior approval. From a close reading of the provisions of AO 103, petitioner did not violate the rule of prior approval from the President since Section 2 states that the prohibition applies only to government offices/agencies, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards. Nowhere is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid.

15. Prov. of Negros v. COA (2010) Doctrine: The Presidents power of general supervision means the power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is distinguished from the Presidents power of control which is the power to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the President over that of the subordinate officer. Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the Presidents authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed. Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a resolution allocating P4,000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. The Committee on Awards granted the insurance coverage to Philam Care Health System Incorporated (Philam Care). Petitioner Province of Negros Occidental, and Philam Care entered into a Group Health Care Agreement. After a post-audit investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension suspending the premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as provided under Administrative Order No. 103 (AO 103). Then President Joseph E. Estrada directed the COA to lift the suspension but only in the amount ofP100,000. The Provincial Auditor ignored the directive of the President. The COA ruled that under AO 103, no government entity, including a local government unit, is exempt from securing prior