CASES1

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS
MATEO CARIO vs. THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT, G.R. No. L-2746 December 6, 1906 The appellant, on the 23d of June, 1903, by his attorney in fact, Metcalf A. Clarke, filed a petition in the Court of Land Registration asking that he be inscribed as the owner of a tract of land in the municipality of Baguio, in the province of Benguet, containing 146 hectares. The Government of the Philippine Islands, appeared in the Court of Land Registration and opposed the petition. The Government of the United States that the land was part of the military reservation of Baguio. Judgment was entered in the Court of Land Registration in favor of the petitioner, from which judgment the respondents appealed in accordance with the law then in force to the Court of First Instance of the province of Benguet. The case was therein tried de novo, and judgment was entered dismissing the petition. The petitioner has brought the case here by bill of exceptions. The petitioner presented no documentary evidence of title, except a possessory information obtained in 1901. By the provisions of the Mortgage Law, under which this possessory information was obtained (art. 394), it produced only those effects which the laws give to mere possession. The petition not having shown any title from the Government, and the land being agricultural, the case is governed by the decisions of this court in the cases of Valenton et al. vs. Murciano 1 (2 Off. Gaz., 434); Cansino et al. vs. Valdez et al. 2 (4 Off. Gaz., 488); and Tiglao vs. The Insular Government 3 (4 Off. Gaz., 747). In these cases it was held that the mere possession of land such as that in controversy in this case would give the possessor and title thereto as against the Government; in other words, that the statute of limitations did not run against the State in reference to its agricultural lands. lawphil.net The petitioner, however, insists that although the statute of limitations as such did not run against the Government of Spain in the Philippine Islands, yet a grant is to be conclusively presumed from immemorial use and occupation. To say that the presumption of a grant is presumption of law is, in our opinion, simply to say that it amounts to a statute of limitations; and for a court to hold that the statute of limitations does not run against the Government as to its public agricultural lands, and at the same time to hold that if a person has been in possession of such lands for thirty years it is conclusively presumed that the Government has given him a deed therefor, would be to make two rulings directly inconsistent with each other. Considered as a presumption of fact, the contention could not be sustained in this particular case. Here the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant, It is known that for nearly three hundred years all attempts to convert the Igorots of the Province of Benguet to the Christian religion completely failed, and that during that time they remained practically in the same condition as they were when the Islands were first occupied by the Spaniards. To presume as a matter of fact that during that time, and down to at least 1880, the provisions of the laws relating to the grant, adjustment, and sale of public were taken advantage of by these deeds from the Government for these lands would be to presume something which did not exist. The appellant says in his brief (p.10): The Igorot, no less than the American Indian, is an aborigine, and is equally ignorant of the forms of law and procedure necessary to protect his interests. There is, moreover, in the case evidence that in 1894 the petitioner sought to obtain title from the Government in accordance with the laws then in force. In 1901 he made a contract with Metalcalf A. Clarke, by the terms of which he agreed to sell the land to Clarke for 6,000 pesos when he obtained title thereto from the Government, and this contract he does not say that he is the owner, but simply that he is in possession thereof. The court below found that the land is now worth upwards of P50,000. The possession of the land has not been of such a character as to require the presumption of a grant. No one has lived upon it for many years. It was never used for anything but pasturage of animals, except insignificant portions thereof, and since the insurrection against Spain it has apparently not been used by the petitioner for any purpose. The petitioner relies upon the case of the United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) and the case of The United Statesvs. Chaves (175 U.S., 509). In the case of Hays vs. The United States (175 U.S. 248) the court said at page 261; PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 1

But this presumption is subject to the limitation that where title is claimed from a deed which is shown to be void, it will not be presumed that there was an independent grant (Smith vs. Highbee, 12 Vermont,. 113), or where surrounding circumstances are inconsistent with the theory of a grant. (Townsend vs. Downer, 32 Vermont, 183). The substance of this doctrine is that lapse of time any be treated as helping out the presumption of a grant, but where a void grant is shown, it affords no presumption that another valid grant was made. Nor does such presumption arise if the surrounding circumstances are incompatible with the existence of a grant. In this case under consideration we can not find any evidence which justifies us in believing that a legal grant can have been made, and under those circumstances we can not consider possession since the date of the treaty as dispensing with the requirement that the title, if not perfect at that time, was one which the claimant would have a lawful right to make perfect had the territory not been acquired by the United States. In the case of Chaves vs. The United States (175 U.S., 552) the court made the following statement at page 562: Finally, it distinctly appears that the possession of the parties is insufficient in length of time to prove a valid title. In United States vs. Chaves (159 U.S., 452) the possession was under the claim of a grant made by the governor of New Mexico to the alleged grantees. The grant had been lost, but it had been seen and read by witnesses, and its existence had been proved by evidence sufficient, as we stated in the opinion (p. 460), to warrant 'the finding of the court below that the complainant's title was derived from the Republic of Mexico, and was complete and perfect at the date when the United States acquired sovereignty in the territory of New Mexico, within which the land was situated. We do not question the correctness to the remarks made by Mr. Justice Shiras in regard to evidence of possession and the presumptions which may under certain circumstances drawn as to the existence of a grant. We do not deny the right of the duty of a court to presume its existence in a proper case, in order to quiet a title and to give to long continued possession the quality of a rightful possession under a legal right. We recognized and enforced such a rule in the case of United States vs. Chaves decided at this term. in which the question is involved. We simply say in this case that the possession was not a duration long enough to justify any such inference. There is no proof of any valid grant, but on the contrary the evidence offered by the plaintiff himself and upon which the bases the title that he asks the court to confirm, shows the existence of a grant from a body which had no legal power to make it, and which, therefore, conveyed no title whatever to its grantee, and the evidence is, as given by the plaintiff himself, that it was under this grant alone that possession of the lands was taken. We can not presume (within the time involved in this case) that any other and valid grant was ever made. The possession of the plaintiff and of his grantors up to the time of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in 1848, had not been long enough to presume a grant. (Crispin vs. United States, 168 U.S., 208; Hayes vs. United States, 170 U.S., 637, 649, 653; Hays vs. The United States, ante 248.) The possession subsequently existing, we can not notice. Same authorities. As we understand it, it is well settled in the United States that prescription does not run against the Government as to its public lands in other words, that if a person desires to obtain title to the public lands of the United States situated within the boundaries of the States, he must do so in the way pointed out by the law. We do not understand that a person in possession of unsurveyed public lands in the State of Minnesota, for example, whose ancestors had occupied that the land for fortyh years, could maintain in court a claim that he was the legal owner of the lands by granted the land to his ancestors, a presumption founded not upon any proceedings taken in the General Land Office to acquire a patent thereto, but upon the mere possession for that length of time. The same is true of the public lands of Spain in the Philippine Islands. In the case of Valenton et al. vs. Marciano it was said: While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
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administrative officers, and obtain from them his deed, and until he did the State remained the absolute owner. But in any event, and whatever the law may be elsewhere, it seems clear that this doctrine of presumptive grant can not apply to the Philippines in view of the Spanish legislation for the Indies. From time to time there were promulgated laws which required the person in possession of public lands to exhibit their titles or grants thereto. If these titles or grants were found to be good, they were confirmed, but if they were not, or if the persons had no grants or titles at all, they were evicted from the land. For example, in Law 14, title 12, 4, Recompilation of the Laws of the Indies, it is stated: We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretrial courts designate, at such times as shall to them most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose their title deeds thereto. And those who are in possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts or by virtue of just prescriptive rights shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us to be disposed of at our will. In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, it was provided that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of promulgation and publication of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not the same shall be cultivated or tenanted, may, either in person or through their attorneys or representatives, appear and exhibit to said subdelegates the titles and patents by virtue of which said lands are occupied. Said subdelegates will designate as the period within which documents must be presented a term sufficient in length and proportionate to the distance the interested party may have to travel for the purpose of making the presentation. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties interested that in term designated, without a just and valid reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will be granted to others. In the regulations of June 25, 1880, it was provided as follows: ART. 8. If the interested parties shall not ask an adjustment of the lands whose possession they are unlawfully enjoining within the time of one year, or, the adjustment having been granted by the authorities, they shall fail to fulfill their obligation in connection with the compromise, by paying the proper sum into the treasury, the latter will, by virtue of the authority vested in it, reassert the ownership of the Stated over the lands, and will, after fixing the whole thereof, proceed to sell at public auction that part of the same which, either because it may have been reduced to cultivation or is not located within the forest zone, is not deemed advisable to preserve as State forest reservations. 4 In the royal decree of the 13th of February, 1894, published in the Official Gazzette of Manila of the 17th of April, 01894, it is provided in article 4 as follows: ART. 4. The title to all agricultural lands which were capable of adjustment (composicion) under the royal decree of the 25th of June, 1880, but the adjustments of which decree in the Gaceta de Manila, will revert to the State. Any claim to such lands by those who might have applied for the adjustment of the same, but who have not done so as the above mentioned date, will not avail them in any way or at any time. In view of these provisions of the law, it seems to us impossible to say that as to the public agricultural lands in the Philippines there existed a conclusive presumption after a lapse of thirty or any other number of years that the Government of Spain had granted to the possessor thereof a legal title thereto. The plaintiff is not entitled to the benefits of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, the Public Land Act, for the reason that act is not applicable to the Province of Benguet. The judgment of the court below is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
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After the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered accordingly and ten days thereafter the case be returned to the court below for execution. So ordered. J. H. ANKRON vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, G.R. No. L-14213 August 23, 1919 This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu. Its purpose was to have registered, under the Torrens system, a certain piece or parcel of land situated, bounded and particularly described in the plan and technical description attached to the complaint and made a part thereof. The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the Director of Lands. The oppositor [objector] alleged that the land in question was the property of the Government of the United States under the control and administration of the Government of the Philippine Islands. During the trial of the cause two witnesses only were presented by the petitioner. No proof whatever was offered by the oppositor. After hearing and considering the evidence, the Honorable Francisco Soriano, judge, reached the following conclusions of fact: 1. That the land sought to be registered consists of one parcel of land as marked and indicated on the plan and technical description presented; 2. That all of said land, with the exception of a small part at the north, the exact description and extension of which does not appear, has been cultivated and planted for more than forty-four years prior to the date of this decision; 3. That said land was formerly occupied, cultivated and planted by Moros, Mansacas and others, under a claim of ownership, and that they lived thereon and had their houses thereon, and that portion of the land which was not planted or cultivated was used as pasture land whereon they pastured their carabaos, cattle, and horses; 4. That all of said Moros and Mansacas sold, transferred and conveyed all their right, title and interest in said land to the applicant, J. H. Ankron, some eleven years past, at which time all of the said former owners moved o n to adjoining lands where they now reside; 5. That the possession under claim of ownership of the applicant and his predecessors in interest was shown to have been open, notorious, actual, public and continuous for more than forty-four years past, and that their claim was exclusive of any other right adverse to all other claims; 6. That the applicant now has some one hundred fifty (150) hills of hemp, some eight thousand (8,000) cocoanut trees, a dwelling house, various laborers' quarters, store-building, large camarin (storehouse of wood, a galvanized iron and other buildings and improvements on said land. Upon the foregoing facts the lower court ordered and decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the manner and conditions mentioned in said decision. The conditions mentioned with reference to the opening of the road, as found in said decision, are that the applicant give his consent, which he has already done, to the opening of said road which should be fifteen (15) meters wide and should follow approximately the line of the road as it now exists subject to the subsequent survey to be made by the engineer of the province of Davao. From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court. The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently identify the land in question. In reply to that argument, the record shows that a detained and technical description of the land was made a part of the record. The evidence shows that the boundaries of the land in question were marked by monuments built of cement. PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 4

Theoppositor neither presented the question of the failure of proper identification of the land in the lower court nor presented any proof whatever to show that said cement monuments did not exist. The appellant, in his second assignment of error, contends that the appellant failed to prove his possession and occupation in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926. The important prerequisites for registration of land imposed by said section 54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall beagricultural public land as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; (b) that the petitioner, by himself or his predecessors in interest, shall have been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of said Act. In the present case the applicant proved, and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the land in question was agricultural land and that he and his predecessors in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action. No question is raised nor discussed by the appellant with reference to the right of the Moros to acquire the absolute ownership and dominion of the land which they have occupied openly, notoriously, peacefully and adversely for a long period of years. (Cario vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. Rep., 132 [212 U. S., 449].) Accepting the undisputed proof, we are of the opinion that said paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 has been fully complied with and that the petitioner, so far as the second assignment of error is concerned, is entitled to have his land registered under the Torrens system. Under the third assignment of error the appellant contends that portions of said land cannot be registered in accordance with the existing Land Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares. That question is not discussed in the present brief. The appellant, however., refers the court to his discussion of that question in the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (39 Phil. Rep., 560). By reference to the argument in the brief in the case, it is found that the appellant relied upon the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1148 in relation with section 1820 of Act No. 2711 (second Administrative Code). Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall include all unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age." Said section 1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of this chapter 'public forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character." In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), which decision has been follows in numerous other decision, the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined by Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, was held to mean "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral nor timber lands" (forestry lands). Paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926 only permits the registration, under the conditions therein mentioned, of "public agricultural lands." It must follow, therefore, that the moment that it appears that the land is not agricultural, the petition for registration must be denied. If the evidence shows that it is public forestry land or public mineral land, the petition for registration must be denied. Many definitions have been given for "agricultural," "forestry," and "mineral" lands. These definitions are valuable so far as they establish general rules. In this relation we think the executive department of the Government, through the Bureau of Forestry, may, and should, in view especially of the provisions of section 4, 8, and 20 of Act No. 1148, define what shall be considered forestry lands, to the end that the people of the Philippine Islands shall be guaranteed in "the future a continued supply of valuable timber and other forest products." (Sec. 8, Act No. 1148.) If the Bureau of Forestry should accurately and definitely define what lands are forestry, occupants in the future would be greatly assisted in their proof and the courts would be greatly aided in determining the question whether the particular land is forestry or other class of lands. In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 5

land the proof must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands, that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39 Phil. Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra.) In view of the foregoing we are of the opinion, and so order and decree, that the judgment of the lower court should be and is hereby affirmed, with the condition that before the final certificate is issued, an accurate survey be made of the lands to be occupied by the road above mentioned and that a plan of the same be attached to the original plan upon which the petition herein is based. It is so ordered, with costs. VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL. vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL, G.R. No. L-20875 December 13, 1923 From the record it appears that in the year 1884 a number of "Bagos" or Igorots or non-Christians, numbering at that time about thirty, were invited by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the then town of Alava, now the municipality of Sison, of the Province of Pangasinan, and a tract of land which in the present complaint is alleged to have a superficial area of 77 hectares, 40 ares, and 50 centiares, in order that they might cultivate the same and increase the population of the said municipality; that said "Bagos" entered upon said land, took possession of it and have continued to live upon the same and have cultivated it since that date; that the appellants herein are some of the original thirty who entered upon the land, and the others are their legitimate descendants. On or about the 28th day of February, 1919, said appellants presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan to have said parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. Accompanying said petition there was an official plan prepared by the Bureau of Lands presented (Exhibit A). Various oppositions were presented to the registration of said parcel of land. Finally a judgment by default was entered and the cause was set down for trial. During the trial, for reasons which it is unnecessary to state here, it was discovered that it was necessary to present a new plan and a new technical description of the land, and the petitioners were ordered to present an amended plan of the land. In compliance with that order of the court, a new plan was presented (Exhibit A-1) and finally the cause was set down for hearing and a number of witnesses were presented by the petitioners to prove their right to have said parcel of land, as described in the amended petition and plan, registered under the Torrens system in their names. Immediately after the close of the presentation of proof by the petitioners, the oppositors presented a motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground that the petitioners had not presented proof sufficient to show that they are entitled to the registration of the land in question, which motion, after extensive argument pro and con, was granted, and the petition was dismissed without any pronouncement as to costs. From that decision the petitioners, after having presented a motion for a new trial and an exception duly presented to the overruling of said motion, appealed. In addition to the facts above stated, the record shows that at the time of the delivery of said parcel of land to the petitioners, it was unoccupied and unimproved public land; that since their entry upon the possession of the land in PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 6

the year 1884, they and their ancestors have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the same, believing in good faith that they were the owners; that the petitioners had cleared, improved, and cultivated the land and have constructed and maintained their homes thereon, exercising every requisite act of ownership, for a period of more than thirty-nine years, in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation, without any interruption whatsoever; that the land in question was never partitioned among the petitioners because it was the custom of the Bagos, Igorots, or non-Christians to occupy and possess their land in common; that the petitioners believed, and had a right to believe, from the fact that the land was given by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the municipality, that they thereby became the owners, to the exclusion of all others, and are now justified in their petition to have the said land registered under the Torrens system in their names, as the owners in fee simple, pro indiviso. No suggestion is made that the gobernadorcillo and the principalia of the town of Alava, now municipality of Sison, were not authorized in 1884, as representatives of the then existing Government, to give and to deliver the land in question to the petitioners and their ancestors for the purposes for which the land was so given. Neither was it denied that the land in question is agricultural land. No pretension is made that the land in question might not be registered under the Torrens system had the petitioners invoked the benefits of the public land law. No contention is made on the part of the petitioners that they were ever given a paper title to the land. Their contention is simply that they were given the land; that they accepted the same; that they lived upon the land, and cultivated it, and improved it, and occupied it to the exclusion of all others for a period of about thirty-nine years, and that therefore they are entitled to have the same registration under the Torrens system; that they have occupied and cultivated the same for a period sufficient to give them title and to have the same registered under the Torrens system. lawphi1.net The present case is not altogether unlike the case of Cario vs. Insular Government (7 Phil., 132), which was decided by this court in 1906, went to the Supreme court of the United States and was there decided in 1909 (212 U.S. 449 1). In the course of that decision, Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the court, said: "The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, providing that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by the Spanish law. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native, who had not a paper title, a trespasser and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. Whatever the law upon these points may be, every presumption is and ought to be against the government in the case like the present." Mr. Justice Holmes adds: "If there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt." If we were to look into the Royal Decrees of Spain, as the attorney for the appellants has done, we will find that Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the Philippines into trespassers of the land which they occupy, or even into tenants at will. (Book 4, Title 12, Law 14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias.) In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, we find the following: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession as a valid title by prescription." We may add that every presumption of ownership under the public land laws of the Philippine Islands is in favor of one actually occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of subsequently enacted registration land act. In view of the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Cario vs. Insular Government, we are forced to the conclusion that the lower court committed the errors complained of by the appellants in dismissing the petition. As was said by this court in the case of Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands (31 Phil., 272, 279): ". . . only under exceptional circumstances should an application for registry in the court of land registration be dismissed over the objection of the applicant, and without giving him an opportunity by the grant of new trial, or otherwise . . . to submit additional evidence in support of his claim of title, when there are strong or reasonable grounds to believe that he is the owner of all or any part of the land described in his application. This is specially true when the only ground for the dismissal of the application is the lack of formal or perhaps even substantial proof as to the chain to title upon which applicant relies, etc." Without a further detailed discussion of the assignments of error of the appellants, we are of the opinion, and so decide that the judgment entered in the court below, dismissing the petition of the applicants, should be reversed and the record remanded to the court a quo, with permission on the part of the petitioners to make such PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 7

amendment to their petition as they may deem wise and necessary and to present such additional evidence as they may desire; and that the oppositors be permitted to present whatever evidence they may have in opposition, with the understanding that the evidence which has heretofore been adduced shall stand as a part of the evidence of the main trial. And without any findings as to costs, it is so ordered. ANDRES MANARPAAC, ET AL. vs. ROSALINO CABANATAN, G.R. No. L-23300 October 31, 1967 On appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing the complaint, without costs. On December 7, 1960, the plaintiffs, numbering 24 in all, surnamed Manarpaac, filed this action against Rosalino Cabanatan, the Director of Lands and the Register of Deeds of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, on a complaint which as amended on December 22, 1960, alleges that the plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial, in actual possession as owners of two parcels of land, the first with an area of 8,742 sq. m. and assessed at P160.00 under tax declaration No. 034206, in the name of Rogaciano Manarpaac, the second, with an area of 12211 sq. m. and assessed at P390.00 under tax declaration No. 030876, both parcels are situated at Barrio 15, Batac, Ilocos Norte, specifically described in paragraph "2" of the complaint; that such possession has been public, uninterrupted and in the concept of owner; that they have their houses built on the land; that in the year 1956, the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan filed an application for free patent of a parcel of agricultural public land situated at Barrio Suyo, Batac, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 27,788 sq. m., and said defendant "taking advantage of the ignorance and lack of education of the plaintiffs, wilfully, fraudulently, maliciously, and surreptitiously without previous notice to the plaintiffs whatsoever, included the above described parcels of land" (par. "2" of the complaint) in his application for free patent; that on November 7, 1959, a free patent was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the Director of Lands, and on December 3, 1959, certificate of title No. V-105031 was issued in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan by the register of deeds; that said certificate of title which included the land of the plaintiffs, is null and void, because the patent was obtained thru "fraudulent misrepresentation"; and that the proceedings leading to the investigation and survey of the land were without notice and without compliance with the requirements of the law. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that the free patent and the certificate of title be declared null and void, and the same should be cancelled; "4. That in case the title issued may not be annulled, that the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan be ordered to reconvey unto the plaintiffs their lands unlawfully and fraudulently included in said title"; that the defendant be ordered to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00; and "6. That the plaintiffs pray for such further relief and remedy as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises." The defendants filed separate answer. In his answer dated February 8, 1961, Rosalino Cabanatan denied the material allegations in the complaint, and, as special defense alleged: (a) that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of title in his name were regular and after compliance with the requirements of the law; (b) that the plaintiffs never protested with the Director of Lands against the defendant's application for free patent; they did not appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands awarding the land to said defendants; and the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies required by law, and, therefore, the decision of the Director of Lands has become final; (c) that the original complaint was for nullity of title, however, the amended complaint is for RECONVEYANCE which is legally impermissible, for it changed the cause of action, and hence, the amended complaint should have been dismissed, and the plaintiffs required to file a new complaint. In its answer dated January 6, 1961, the Director of Lands alleged that the issuance of the free patent was regular and after compliance with the requirements of the law; that "2. . . . he admits the allegation in paragraph 6 of the complaint to the effect that one year from the issuance of patent has not yet elapse "; and that the plaintiffs never filed any protest with the Bureau of Lands against the application for free patent filed by Rosendo Cabanatan. The Register of Deeds in his answer dated January 11, 1961, alleged that the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of Rosalino Cabanatan was in pursuance of a decree of patent presented to its office and that he merely acted in compliance of the law. On September 22, 1962, Rosalino Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss on the following ground: "That even assuming that plaintiffs have a right over the land in suit, their action has already prescribed and that the court, PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 8

therefore, has no jurisdiction", predicating the contention of the rulings that "When any public lands are alienated, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of Section 22 of the Land Registration Act and shall become registered land . . . and a certificate of title shall be issued as in other cases of registered land (Diwaling Sumail, et al. v. CFI of Cotabato, L-8287, April 20, 1955), and the one year period under Section 38 of Act 496 should, in the case of public land grants (patent), be counted from the issuance of the patent by the Government under the Public Land Act (Nelayan v. Nelayan, L-14518. August 29, 1960). The plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss. On September 23, 1963, the court issued an order dismissing the complaint holding that the free patent having been issued on November 3, 1959, and the first complaint was filed on December 7, 1960, the action for review of the decree was, therefore, filed more than one year after the issuance of the patent. From this order, the plaintiffs appealed directly to this Court. From the averment of facts in the complaint, it clearly appears that the plaintiffs have been, since time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names of two of them and have built their houses on the land, but that through fraud and irregularity, defendant Rosalino Cabanatan succeeded in securing for himself, the certificate of title in question. The foregoing recital of facts in the complaint are sufficient averment of ownership. Possession since time immemorial, carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or, that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. And so, we said in one case . . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial. FOR SUCH POSSESSION WOULD JUSTIFY THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND HAVE NEVER BEEN PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR THAT IT HAD BEEN A PRIVATE PROPERTY EVEN BEFORE THE SPANISH CONQUEST. (Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, citing Cario v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449, 53 L. Ed. 394.) Whether this presumption should hold as a fact or not, is a question appropriately determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at least, are given the opportunity to adduce, their respective evidence. The ruling in Susi v. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 414 [re-affirmed in Mesin v. Pineda, L-14722, May 25, 1960] sustained on all fours the validity of plaintiffs' theory, thus In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts. If by legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the state, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.
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If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it. In the case at bar, predicated upon the allegations in the complaint, together with the admission of defendant Cabanatan in his answer that the amended complaint is an action for reconveyance, which are deemed admitted on a motion to dismiss, there can hardly be any debate that the complaint states a sufficient cause of action for recovery of possession of the land for, settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. (Casilan v. Espartero, 95 Phil. 799). WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside, and the case is ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. Costs in this appeal against the defendant Rosalino Cabanatan. E. W. McDANIEL vs. Honorable GALICANO APACIBLE, G.R. No. L-17597 February 7, 1922 This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court for the writ of prohibition. Its purpose is to prohibit the respondent Honorable Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, from granting a lease of a parcel of petroleum land located in the municipality of San Narciso, of the Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which parcel of land is particularly described in paragraph 6 of the petition. To the petition the respondent Galicano Apacible demurred. The respondent Juan Cuisia neither demurred nor answered. The facts upon which the petition is based are admitted and may be stated as follows: 1. That on or about the 7th day of June, 1916, the petitioner entered upon and located, in accordance with the provisions of Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as well as the provisions of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, three petroleum placer mineral claims, each of an area of 64 hectares, on an unoccupied public land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands; 2. That on or about the 15th day of July, 1916, the plaintiff recorded in the office of the mining recorder in the municipality of Lucena, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, notices of location of the aforesaid three placer claims under the names of "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3;" 3. That the plaintiff, at all times since the 7th day of June, 1916, has remained in open and continuous possession of said three mineral placer claims; 4. That plaintiff, in the year 1917 and in each year thereafter, performed not less than two hundred pesos (P200) worth of labor on each of the said three mineral claims; 5. That in the year 1918 plaintiff drilled five wells on the said three mineral claims, and by means of such wells in the said year (1918) made discoveries of petroleum on each of the said three claims; 6. That on or about the 18th day of June, 1921, the respondent Juan Cuisia made application to the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, under the provisions of Act No. 2932 of the Philippine Legislature, for a lease of a parcel of petroleum land in the municipality of San Narciso, Province of Tayabas, Philippine Islands, which said parcel of land included within its boundaries the three said mineral claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," which said three mineral placer claims had therefore been located as above indicated and held by the plaintiff as above described; 7. That upon the filing of the said application for lease, as described in the paragraph immediately preceding, by the said Juan Cuisia, the petitioner herein protested in writing to the respondent Galicano PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 10

Apacible against the inclusion in the said lease of the said three mineral claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," located and held by him as above recited; 8. That the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, did on or about the 9th day of March, 1921, deny petitioner's said protest; and 9. That the plaintiff is informed and believed, and upon that information and belief averred, that the respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, under and by virtue of the supposed authority of Act No. 2932, is about to grant the application for the said lease of the respondent Juan Cuisia, and to place him (Juan Cuisia) in possession of the said three mineral claims located and held by the petitioner. Upon the foregoing facts the petitioner contends that said Act No. 2932, in so far as it purports to declare open to lease, lands containing petroleum oil on which mineral claims have been validly located and held, and upon which discoveries of petroleum oil have been made, is void and unconstitutional, in that it deprives the petitioner of his property without due process of law and without compensation , and that the defendant Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, is without jurisdiction to lease to the respondent Juan Cuisia the following mineral claims "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi No. 2," and "Maglihi No. 3," and prays that the writ of prohibition be issued out of this court, directing and prohibiting the respondent Galicano Apacible to desist from issuing the lease of the mineral placer claims herein mentioned. The respondent Galicano Apacible, as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, in support of his demurrer, contends: (a) That the acts complained of are in conformity with the authority given by Act No. 2932; (b) that the petitioner has no vested right in the three mineral claims; and ( c) that the demurrer puts squarely in issue the constitutionality of Act No. 2932. Act No. 2932 was approved on the 31st day of August, 1920. Section 1 provides that "all public lands containing petroleum or other mineral oils and gas, on which no patent, at the date this Act takes effect, has been issued, are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location and lease ," etc. Said section further provides, "that parties having heretofore filed claims for any lands containing said minerals, shall be given preference to lease their respective claims, provided they file a petition to that effect within six months from the date of the approval of this Act." Section 2 provides that "all such lands (public lands) may be leased by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the manner and subject to the rules prescribed by the Council of State." It will be noted from the provisions of said Act No. 2932 that "all public lands containing petroleum, etc., on which no patent, at the date this Act takes effect (August 31, 1920), has been issued, are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location, and lease," with a preference, however, in favor of those who had therefore filed claims for such lands. It will be further noted, from the provisions of said Act, that "all public lands containing petroleum, etc., are hereby withdrawn from sale and are declared to be free and open to exploration, location and lease," without any preference to any claim or right which citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States had therefore acquired in any public lands, and that the only right left to them is one of "preference," and that even the preference was limited for a period of six months from the 31st day of August, 1920. The petitioner contends, that, having located and held, and having discovered petroleum oil upon the said claims prior to the 31st day of August, 1920, he had acquired a property right in his three claims; and that said Act No. 2932 had deprived him of that right without due process of law , in contravention of paragraph 1 of section 3 of Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and that said Act was therefore unconstitutional and void. In support of the contention the petitioner cites many authorities. Mr. Lindlay, one of the highest authorities on Mining Law, has discussed extensively the question now before us. (Lindlay on Mines, vol. I, sections 322, 539.)
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The general rule is that a perfected, valid appropriation of public mineral lands operates as a withdrawal of the tract from the body of the public domain, and so long as such appropriation remains valid and subsisting, the land covered thereby is deemed private property. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant (patent) by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession of the lands located. And even though the locator may obtain a patent to such lands, his patent adds but little to his security. (18 Ruling Case Law, p. 1152 and cases cited.) The owner of a perfected valid appropriation of public mineral lands is entitled to the exclusive possession and enjoyment against every one, including the Government itself. Where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator. It was said by the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon, "The Government itself cannot abridge the rights of the miner to a perfected valid location of public mineral land. The Government may not destroy the locator's right by withdrawing the land from entry or placing it in a state of reservation." (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S., 431.) A valid and subsisting location of mineral land, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the statutes of the United States, has the effect of a grant by the United States of the present and exclusive possession of the lands located, and this exclusive right of possession and enjoyment continues during the entire life of the location. There is no provision for, no suggestion of, a prior termination thereof. (Gwillim vs. Donnellan, 115 U.S., 45; Clipper Mining Co. vs. Eli Mining and Land Co., 194 U.S., 220.) There is no pretense in the present case that the petitioner has not complied with all the requirements of the law in making the location of the mineral placer claims in question, or that the claims in question were ever abandoned or forfeited by him. The respondents may claim, however, that inasmuch as a patent has not been issued to the petitioner, he has acquired no property right in said mineral claims. But the Supreme Court of the United States, in the cases of Union Oil Co. vs. Smith (249 U.S., 337), and St. Louis Mining and Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co. (171 U.S., 650), held that even without a patent, the possessory right of a locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the United States. There is no conflict in the rulings of the Court upon that question. With one voice they affirm that when the right to a patent exists, the full equitable title has passed to the purchaser or to the locator with all the benefits, immunities, and burdens of ownership, and that no third party can acquire from the Government any interest as against him. (Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U.S., 504, and cases cited.) Even without a patent, the possessory right of a qualified locator after discovery of minerals upon the claim is a property right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to the land is in the Government, and it is capable of transfer by conveyance, inheritance, or devise. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Forbes vs. Jarcey, 94 U.S., 762; Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279; Del Monte Mining Co. vs. Last Chance Mining Co., 171 U.S., 55; Elver vs. Wood, 208 U.S., 226, 232.) Actual and continuous occupation of a valid mining location, based upon discovery, is not essential to the preservation of the possessory right. The right is lost only by abandonment as by nonperformance of the annual labor required. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Farrell vs. Lockhart, 210 U.S., 142; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U.S., 389.) The discovery of minerals in the ground by one who has a valid mineral location perfects his claim and his location not only against third person, but also against the Government. A mining claim perfected under the law is property in the highest sense of that term, which may be sold and conveyed, and will pass by descent, and is not therefore subject to the disposal of the Government. (Belk vs. Meagher, 104 U.S., 279, 283; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U.S., 431; Consolidated Mutual Oil Co. vs. United States, 245 Fed. Rep., 521; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131, 136, 137.) The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 12

exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U.S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.) From all of the foregoing arguments and authorities we must conclude that, inasmuch as the petitioner had located, held and perfected his location of the mineral lands in question, and had actually discovered petroleum oil therein, he had acquired a property right in said claims; that said Act No. 2932, which deprives him of such right, without due process of law, is in conflict with section 3 of the Jones Law, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Therefore the demurrer herein is hereby overruled, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that, unless the respondents answer the petition herein within a period of five days from notice hereof, that a final judgment be entered, granting the remedy prayed for in the petition. So ordered. GOLD CREEK MINING CORPORATION vs. EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ; G.R. No. 45859 September 28, 1938 This petition seeks to compel the respondents, as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as Director of the Bureau of Mines, respectively, to approve petitioner's application for patent for a certain mining claim and prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto, and to forward and submit said papers for the signature of the President of the Philippines. The petition alleges that petitioner owns the Nob Fraction mineral claim, situated in the barrio of Gomok, municipality of Itogon, sub-province of Benguet, Mountain Province, and located on public lands by C. L. O'Dowd in accordance with the provisions of the Act of congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act of Congress of February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, relative to the location of mining claims; that said claim was located on January 1, 1929, and the original declaration of location registered in the office of the mining recorder of Benguet, Mountain Province, on January 7, 1929; that from March 16 to 17, 1934, an amended location on the premises was made, for which an amended declaration of location was registered in the office of the mining recorder on April 3, 1934; that petitioner by itself and its predecessors in interest, has been in continuous and exclusive possession of said claim from the date of location thereof: that prior to August 9, 1933, petitioner filed in the office of the Director of Lands an application for an order of patent survey of said claim, which survey was duly authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and performed by a mineral land surveyor in the former divisions of mines, Bureau of Science, from August 9, 1933, to April 30, 1934, at the expense of petitioner; that the return of the surveyor, the plat and field notes of the claim and certificate that more than P1,600 worth of labor and improvements had been expended on said claim, were approved by the Director of the Bureau of Science; that prior to November 15, 1935, petitioner filed with the mining recorder an application for patent, together with a certificate showing that more than P1,600, worth of labor and/or improvements had been expended by the petitioner upon said claim, and with the plat and field notes above mentioned; having previously posted a copy of such plat, together with notice of said application for patent in a conspicuous place upon said claim; and filed a copy of such plat and of such notice in the office of said mining recorder, as well as an affidavit of two persons that such notice had been duly posted; that prior to November 15, 1935, the notice of petitioner's application for patent was forwarded by the mining recorder to the division of mines, so that the latter could order the publication of said notice was made once a week for a period of sixty days in the "Philippines Herald," "El Debate," and the Official Gazette, commencing February 13, 1936; that the sum of P113.59 was tendered to respondents, as payment for the purchase price of said claim, the area of which is 4.5434 hectares; and that petitioner has requested the respondents, as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and as director of the Bureau of Mines, respectively, to approve its application for patent, and to prepare the necessary papers relative to the issuance thereof and to submit such papers for the signatures of the President of the Philippines, but the respondents have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse, to do so. Petitioner claims that it is entitled, as a matter of right, to the patent applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law for the issuance of such patent. Respondents, in their answer, admit some allegations of the petition and deny others, and, by way of special defense, allege that "petitioner was not and is not entitled as a matter of right to a patent to the 'Nob Fraction' claim PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 13

because the Constitution provides that 'natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated'; and that the respondents are, not only under no obligation to approve petitioner's application for a patent to said claim and to prepare the necessary papers in relation thereto, but, also, in duty bound to proven the issuance of said patent and the preparation of the aforesaid papers, because they have sworn to support and defend the Constitution." This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an interpretation, a determination of the meaning and scope, of section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, with reference to mining claims. The cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to determining the status, under the Constitution and the Mining Act (Commonwealth Act No. 137), of the holders of unpatented mining claims which were located under the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended. In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the public interest to meet squarely the fundamental question presented, disregarding for that purpose certain discrepancies found in the pleadings filed in this case. This is in accord with the view expressed by the Solicitor-General in his memorandum where he says that "the statements of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be accepted for the purpose of the legal issues raised. We deny some of the allegations in the petitions and allege new ones in our answers, but these discrepancies are not of such a nature or importance as should necessitate introduction of evidence before the cases are submitted for decision. From our view of the cases, these may be submitted on the facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the difference between the allegations in the pleadings to be adjusted or ironed out by the parties later, which, we are confident, can be accomplished without much difficulty." Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows: SECTION 1. All agriculture, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions prohibits the alienation of natural resources, with the exception of public agriculture land. It seems likewise clear that the term "natural resources," as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provisions itself. It first declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other natural resources of the Philippines, belong to the State. It then provides that "their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution." Next comes the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources. This prohibition is directed against the alienation of such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain" were declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral lands which at the time the constitutional provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do not come within the prohibition. This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in the present proceeding formed part of the public domain on November 15, 1935, when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective in accordance with section 6 of Article XV thereof. In deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provisions must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 14

prior and existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption." (Barry vs. Truax, 13 N. D., 131; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.) It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: "The moment the locator discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public lands afterward included in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not effect the validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public domain even as against the Government . (Union Oil Co.vs. Smith, 249 U. S., 337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.)" The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. "Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law. ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral rights of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues." (18 R. C. L., 1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S., 348, 351; 32 Law. ed., 168, 170), the court said: There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not comply with all the requirements of the law in making the location of the Pay Streak Lode Mining claim, or that the claim was ever abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the claim. They marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily traced. They posted the required notice, which was duly recorded in compliance with the regulations of the district. They had thus done all that was necessary under the law for the acquisition of an exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the ground. The claim was thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of the United States to render their title perfect, and that they could obtain at any time upon proof of what they had done in locating the claim, and of subsequent expenditures to specified amount in developing it. Until the patent issued the government held the title in trust for the locators or their vendees. The ground itself was not afterwards open to sale. In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was said: The rule established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of state and lower Federal courts, that when the location of a mining claim is perfected under the law, it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense of that term; and may be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title of the United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the state; and is "real property," subject to the lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a state or territorial court. (Belk vs. Neagher, 104 U. S., 279, 283; 26 L. ed., 737, 737; 1 Mor. Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wulff, 152 U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 L. ed., 532-534; 14. Sup. Ct. Rep., 651; 18 Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs. Wood, 208 U. S., 226, [317] 232; 52 L. ed., 464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S., 389; 53 L. ed., 564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349.) The owner is not required to purchased the claim or secure patent from the United states; but so long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent. (Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U. S., 306; 74 Law. ed., 445.) PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 15

The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in the McDaniel case in determinative of the fundamental question involved in the instant case. But he maintains "that this decision is based on a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court relied," and that it "is not well founded and should be abandoned." We do not deem it necessary to belabor this point. Whether well founded or not, the decision in that case was the law when section 1 Article XII of the Constitution became effective; and even if we were disposed to overrule that decision now, our action could not affect rights already fixed under it. Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does not come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in this case. In Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States held that " mandamus will lie to compel the secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for a patent for a mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do so is based on his misinterpretation of a statute." In the course of its decision the court said: "While the decision of this court exhibit a reluctance to direct a writ of mandamus against an executive officer, they recognize the duty to do so by settled principles of law in some cases. (Lane vs. Hoglund, 244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 L. ed., 1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552; and case cited.) In Roberts vs. United States (176 U. S., 221, 231; 44 L. ed., 443, 447; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred to and quoted in the Hoglund case, this court said: "Every statute to some extent requires constructions by the public officer whose duties may be defined therein. Such officer must read the law, and he must therefore, in a certain sense, construe it, in order to form a judgment from its languages what duty he is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in all cases make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one. If the law direct him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is committed to him, and which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to perform, then that act is ministerial, although depending upon a statute which requires, in some degree a construction of its language by the officer. Unless this be so, the value of this writ is very greatly impaired. Every executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon him by a statute might refuse to perform it, and hen his refusal is brought before the court he might successfully plead that the performance of the duty involved the construction of a statute by him, and therefore it as not ministerial, and the court could on that account be powerless to give relief. Such a limitation of the powers of the court, we think, would be most unfortunate, as it would relieve from judicial supervision all executive officers in the performance of their duties whenever they should plead that the duty required of them arose upon the construction of a statute, no matter how plain its language, nor how plainly they violated their duty in refusing to perform the act required." In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings, to grant the relief sought by the petitioner. Considering, however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for a patent on its merits as due to their misinterpretation of certain constitutional and statutory provisions, following the precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, a writ of mandamus should issue directing the respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered. Separate Opinions LAUREL, J., concurring: This is a case, as I understand it, of a mining claim whose location was duly perfected under a law of the Congress of the United States prior to the inauguration of our Commonwealth. This law of the Congress is the Act of July 1, 1902, the first Congressional legislation that gave us a cherished bill of rights. I express the opinion that a perfected location of a mining is an "existing right" within the purview of section 1, Article XII, of our Constitution. It is a substantial property right and permits the locator to take all the necessary PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 16

steps leading to the issuance of a patent. It is not contingent or expectant because nor contingency or expectation is neither property nor property right. It is a legal right in the sense that it is recognized by law and acknowledged by the Constitution. And recognition implies protection. I must, therefore, reject the suggestion that by the interposition of the Constitution such a right had been wiped out or frittered and now to be referred to. The saving clause in the section involved of the Constitution was originally embodied in the report submitted by the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and Other Natural Resources to the Constitutional Convention on September 17, 1934. It was later inserted in the first draft of the Constitution as section 13 of Article XIII thereof, and finally incorporated as we find it now. Slight have been the changes undergone by the proviso from the time it came out of committee until it was finally adopted. When first submitted and as inserted in the first draft of the Constitution it reads: "subject to any right, grant, lease, or concession existing in respect thereto on the date of the adoption of the Constitution." As finally adopted, the proviso reads: "subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this constitution." This recognition is not mere graciousness but springs from the just character of the government established. The framers of the Constitution were not obscured by the rhetoric of democracy or swayed to hostility by an intense spirit of nationalism. They well knew that conservation of our natural resources did not mean destruction or annihilation of acquired property rights. Withal, they erected a government neither episodic nor stationary but well-nigh conservative in the protection of property rights. This notwithstanding nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of the provisions embodied in the instrument. But while I regard the recognition and protection of the right here invoked inevitable, I feel constrained to withhold my assent to the invocation of the case of McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia ([1922], 42 Phil., 749), insofar as citation thereof may imply unqualified acceptance of or adherence to the broad rule that where there is a valid and perfected location of a mining claim, the area covered is not only thereby segregated from the body of the public domain but becomes the private property of the locator. My opinion is that while the locator, under the circumstances, secures the beneficial ownership or the dominium utile, the government retains the bare ownership or the dominium directum, until the locator's claim ripens into full ownership upon full compliance with all the requirements of the law for the issuance of a patent. I, therefore, concur in the result. CONCEPCION, J., dissenting: With regret, I have to dissent from the opinion of my learned colleagues in this very important case now under advisement. We are concerned with the correct construction of a constitutional prohibition in a matter directly related to the conservation of a great portion of our national wealth: the mines. Because of the refusal of the respondents, the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce and the Director of the Bureau of Mines, to approve the application of the petitioner, Gold Creek Mining Company, for the issuance in its favor of the patent for or title to a mining claim, and to prepare the papers necessary for the issuance of said patent and submit them for the signature of the President of the Philippines, the petitioner seeks to obtain from this court a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to do what they refused to do. Instead of granting or dismissing the petition, the majority orders the respondents to act on the application, which, they rule, is not affected by the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution and in Commonwealth Act No. 137. This is the first point on which I disagree with the majority, for the reason that, as alleged in the petition, the respondents refused to approved the petitioner's application and, on the other hand, that the Solicitor-General pointed out in his memorandum that the statement of facts contained in the briefs of the petitioner may be accepted for the purpose of deciding the legal questions raised; and although there are some discrepancies between the allegations of the parties, they are not of such nature or moment as would require the introduction of evidence before the case is submitted for decision. In my opinion, this court should now dispose of the petition for mandamus on its merits, granting or dismissing the same, instead of ordering the respondents to act on the petitioner's application, it being a fact that said respondents had already acted by denying said application.
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Now, considering the petition on its merits, should we order the respondents to approve the petitioner's application for patent, or should we, on the contrary, deny the remedy prayed for? In other words, should we hold that the petitioner is entitled to the patent applied for, or on the contrary, that it has acquired such right? Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution provides as follows: All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five yeas renewable for another twenty-five years, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant. The majority maintains that the foregoing constitutional provision prohibits the alienation of natural resources and that the term "natural resources" includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not the mineral lands which at the time the provisions became effective no longer formed part of the public domain. The majority further states that the claim in question, having been located prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, has ceased to be land of the public domain and, therefore, does not fall within the prohibition contained in the foregoing section which expressly provides that the natural resources shall not be alienated. It is true that the mining claim in question was located prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth on November 15, 1935. It may be conceded that a location, once made and perfected, operates to segregate the land from the public domain, but this in no wise means that the Government parts with the absolute ownership over the mining claim by the mere fact of its location. Location should only be understood as segregating the land located from the public domain in the sense that it is no longer open to location or susceptible of appropriation by another, while the locator has not lost his right to or abandoned the mining claim. To give a broader meaning and greater effect to the location of a mining claim is to contend against the express provisions of sections 36, 37 and 39 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by section 9 of another Act of Congress of February 6, 1905, that location is all that is necessary to acquire absolute ownership over a location of a claim to the issuance of the patent for or title to the land, is a far cry. Location, without more, confers only the right of possession. Thus section 36 of the Act of Congress of February 6, 1905 refers to the "manner of recording, and amount of work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim." Section 39 of the same Act also speaks of the right of possession of the claim, and the right to the issuance of a patent only arises after the execution of certain works and acts prescribed by law, such as the labor or improvements made each year (sec. 36); the full description and identification of the land by means of plat and field notes (sec. 37); the notice and publication of the application for a patent by the locator, etc., etc. (sec. 37). The same majority states: "The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by the law." (emphasis mine.) Well, then: the Act of Congress does not fix any period within which the conditions prescribed ought to be complied with. It does specify the time for recording a claim in the registry, but it does not determine the period within which to make the necessary annual labor or improvements thereon. The law requires universal publication and notice of the application for a patent for a determine number of days, but it fails to fix the date when said notice may be made and published. The law requires that, if there be any claim adverse to the application for a patent, the corresponding action should be instituted in the proper court to determine who is entitled to the patent; but no period is fixed within which the litigation should be decided. The law finally requires the payment of a certain sum for every hectare of land covered by the mining claim before the patent is issued; but it does not prescribed the period within which to pay said sum, which is the price for the alienation of the land by the Government in favor of the applicant for the title or patent. PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 18

I now ask: Within what time must the conditions prescribed by the law be complied with in order that the locator may become entitled to the patent? I gather from the majority opinion that, as long as the location of the mining claim was perfected before the inauguration of the new Government of the Philippines on November 15, 1935, the other conditions may be complied with even after said date in order that the locator may acquire a right to the patent. I dissent on this fundamental point from the majority opinion. I maintain that in prohibiting the alienation of natural resources, save any existing right, the Constitution does not refer to the right of location or to the inherent right of possession, or to any inchoate or contingent right which are only a means to bring about another right; as this right cannot be acquired until after compliance with all the conditions prescribed by law, it is evident that the prescribed conditions should be complied with before the inauguration of the Commonwealth. Was the petitioner entitled to the issuance of the patent for the mining claim in question before the inauguration of the Commonwealth on November 15, 1935? I hold that he was not, because on said date, according to the very allegations of the petition for mandamus, the publication in the newspapers of the application for a patent for a period of 60 days as prescribed by law had not been made, as said publication was only commenced on February 13, 1936. Neither was the payment of P25 per hectare made before the inaugurations of the new Government, that is, the Government had not been paid the price for the alienation of the mineral land when Article XII of the Constitution went into effect. Petitioner's right, therefore, to the patent had not matured before November 15, 1935, wherefore, he falls squarely within the constitutional prohibition. A similar thing has been provided for by Act No. 926, passed in October 1903, and Act No. 2874, passed in November, 1919, in relation to public lands. Section 54, paragraph 6, of the first Act, and section 45, paragraph ( b), of the second, provide that those who have been in possession of agricultural lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894, may acquire a perfect title of ownership; and it is necessarily inferred that those who commenced their possession of such lands after July 26, 1894 have no right to obtain title, notwithstanding the fact that their possession may have been for 10, 20 or 30 years. This is exactly what the Constitution has provided: to fix a time for determining those who have become entitled to the patent for a mining claim. Although the provisions of the Act of Congress of 1905 are very clear and there is no better aid to construction than the law itself, I nevertheless cite the following authorities which support my points of view in this opinion. The locator of a mining claim under the United states laws, prior to the actual payment of the purchasemoney and the issuance to him of the receipt therefor by the Land Department, possesses a mere privilege to purchase the property, and a constable's sale of the mine before payment only passes that privilege. . . . (Hamilton vs. Southern Nev. G. & S. Min. Co., 33 Fed., 562.) . . . But he is not the owner of the land until he pays for it, and obtains the United States patent. It is a part of a public domain. In the meantime the defendant is occupying it under a mere license from the government, which may be revoked at any time by the repeal of the act giving it. . . . His licensce under the statute to occupy and to work it as mining ground is sufficient for that purpose until withdrawn by congress, without purchasing it. . . . (U. S. vs. Nelson, Fed. Cas. No. 15, 864.) (Emphasis mine.) A prospector on the public mineral domain may protect himself in the possession of his pedis possessioniswhile he is searching for mineral. His possession so held is good as a possessory title against all the world, except the government of the United States. . . . (Crossman vs. Pendery, 8 Fed., 693.) A possessory title, while it may not be divested by any one except the United States, may be avoided by the default of its owner, either by abandonment or by forfeiture for non-compliance with local regulations or with the statutory requirements as to annual labor. . . . (1 The Law of Mines and Mining in the United States, Barringer & Adams, 318, 319.) Prior to the issuance of a patent the locator cannot be said to own the fee simple title. The fee resides in the general government, whose tribunals, specially charged with the ultimate conveyance of the title, must pass upon the qualifications of the locator and his compliance with the law. Yet, as between the locator and everyone else save the paramount proprietor the estate acquired by a perfected mining location possesses all the attributes of a title in fee, and so long as the requirements of the law with reference to continued development are satisfied, the character of PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 19

the tenure remains that of a fee. As between the locator and the government, the former is the owner of the beneficial estate, and the latter holds the fee in trust, to be conveyed to such beneficial owner upon his application in that behalf and in compliance with the terms prescribed by the paramount proprietor. (Lindley on Mines, 3d. ed., sec. 539, p. 1200.) (Emphasis mine.) I therefore vote for the denial of the petition. OPOSA vs. THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "intergenerational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth." The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered: . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5 The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 20

island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect." Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial. As their cause of action, they specifically allege that: CAUSE OF ACTION 7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass. 9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area. 10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests. 11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes. A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A". 12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier. 13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults. 14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure. This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 21

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae. 16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country. A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B". 17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs. 18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with. 19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other; (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977) 20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution); b. c. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid); "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.) 21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation. 22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6 On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion. On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 22

raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8 On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto. Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful environment. It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question. Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires. On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally. As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twentyfive (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process. Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 23

We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come. The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition. After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows: xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant. Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government. The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11 We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides: PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 24

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article: Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them. While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life. The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question: MR. VILLACORTA: Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution? MR. AZCUNA: Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12 The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted. Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
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Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources. This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads: Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations. (2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources. The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides: Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy. (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources. Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy. Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 26

with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted. A cause of action is defined as: . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18 It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute." After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties. The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that: Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says: The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government. As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary. In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted: PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 27

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . . The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that: The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24 We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the nonimpairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides: . . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . . Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held: . . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576). We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26 . . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302]. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
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Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27 cannot be invoked. In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the nonimpairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp. 28 this Court stated: The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit: Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest. In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31 Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right. WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements. No pronouncement as to costs. Separate Opinions FELICIANO, J., concurring I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
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The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case. The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health"). P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics: (a) (b) (c) (d) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) air quality management; water quality management; land use management; natural resources management and conservation embracing: fisheries and aquatic resources; wild life; forestry and soil conservation; flood control and natural calamities;
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(v) (vi) energy development; conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code. As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here. My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss. It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter. The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads: Section 1. ...
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied) When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments the legislative PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 31

and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene. My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist. I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination. MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., G.R. No. 98332 January 16, 1995 The instant petition seeks a ruling from this Court on the validity of two Administrative Orders issued by the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to carry out the provisions of certain Executive Orders promulgated by the President in the lawful exercise of legislative powers. Herein controversy was precipitated by the change introduced by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. No longer is the utilization of inalienable lands of public domain through "license, concession or lease" under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions 1 allowed under the 1987 Constitution. The adoption of the concept of jura regalia 2 that all natural resources are owned by the State embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, as well as the recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources, not only for national economic development, but also for its security and national defense, 3 ushered in the adoption of the constitutional policy of "full control and supervision by the State" in the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources. The options open to the State are through direct undertaking or by entering into co-production, joint venture; or production-sharing agreements, or by entering into agreement with foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development and utilization. Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution provides: Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or product-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law . In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
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xxx xxx xxx The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. (Emphasis supplied) Pursuant to the mandate of the above-quoted provision, legislative acts 4 were successively issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative power. 5 To implement said legislative acts, the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in turn promulgated Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, the validity and constitutionality of which are being challenged in this petition. On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her then legislative powers under Article II, Section 1 of the Provisional Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing the interim procedures in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987 Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and activities and to hasten the development of mineral resources. The pertinent provisions read as follows: Sec. 1. Existing mining permits, licenses, leases and other mining grants issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources and Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences, including existing operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall continue and remain in full force and effect, subject to the same terms and conditions as originally granted and/or approved. Sec. 2. Applications for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, including renewal applications for approval of operating agreements and mining service contracts, shall be accepted and processed and may be approved; concomitantly thereto, declarations of locations and all other kinds of mining applications shall be accepted and registered by the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences. Sec. 3. The processing, evaluation and approval of all mining applications, declarations of locations, operating agreements and service contracts as provided for in Section 2 above, shall be governed by Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws and their implementing rules and regulations: Provided, however, that the privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions thereof shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive Order No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals. The pertinent provisions relevant to this petition are as follows: Sec. 1. The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (hereinafter referred to as "the Secretary") is hereby authorized to negotiate and enter into, for and in behalf of the Government, joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources with any Filipino citizens, or PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 33

corporation or association at least sixty percent (60%) of whose capital is owned by Filipino citizens. Such joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and shall include the minimum terms and conditions prescribed in Section 2 hereof. In the execution of a joint venture, co-production or production agreements, the contracting parties, including the Government, may consolidate two or more contiguous or geologically related mining claims or leases and consider them as one contract area for purposes of determining the subject of the joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreement. xxx xxx xxx Sec. 6. The Secretary shall promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this Executive Order. Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of 1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement under Executive Order No. 279." 6 Under the transitory provision of said DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. On November 20, 1980, the Secretary of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the "Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation." 7 Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82 enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims. Section 3 of DENR Administrative Order No. 82 provides: Sec. 3. Submission of Letter of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs). The following shall submit their LOIs and MPSAs within two (2) years from the effectivity of DENR A.O. 57 or until July 17, 1991. i. Declaration of Location (DOL) holders, mining lease applicants, exploration permitees, quarry applicants and other mining applicants whose mining/quarry applications have not been perfected prior to the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57. ii. All holders of DOL acquired after the effectivity of DENR A.O. No. 57. iii. Holders of mining leases or similar agreements which were granted after (the) effectivity of 1987 Constitution. Failure to submit letters of intent and MPSA applications/proposals within the prescribed period shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims. The issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. 8 to file the instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before this Court.
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In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits. On July 2, 1991, the Court, acting on petitioner's urgent ex-parte petition for issuance of a restraining order/preliminary injunction, issued a Temporary Restraining Order, upon posting of a P500,000.00 bond, enjoining the enforcement and implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, as amended, Series of 1989 and 1990, respectively. 9 On November 13, 1991, Continental Marble Corporation, 10 thru its President, Felipe A. David, sought to intervene11 in this case alleging that because of the temporary order issued by the Court , the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 in San Fernando, Pampanga refused to renew its Mines Temporary Permit after it expired on July 31, 1991. Claiming that its rights and interests are prejudicially affected by the implementation of DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, it joined petitioner herein in seeking to annul Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 and prayed that the DENR, Regional Office No. 3 be ordered to issue a Mines Temporary Permit in its favor to enable it to operate during the pendency of the suit. Public respondents were acquired to comment on the Continental Marble Corporation's petition for intervention in the resolution of November 28, 1991. 12 Now to the main petition. If its argued that Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 have the effect of repealing or abrogating existing mining laws 13 which are not inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279. Invoking Section 7 of said Executive Order No. 279, 14 petitioner maintains that respondent DENR Secretary cannot provide guidelines such as Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 which are inconsistent with the provisions of Executive Order No. 279 because both Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 merely reiterated the acceptance and registration of declarations of location and all other kinds of mining applications by the Bureau of Mines and GeoSciences under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, until Congress opts to modify or alter the same. In other words, petitioner would have us rule that DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by the DENR Secretary in the exercise of his rule-making power are tainted with invalidity inasmuch as both contravene or subvert the provisions of Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 or embrace matters not covered, nor intended to be covered, by the aforesaid laws. We disagree. We reiterate the principle that the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in the legislative enactment. The principle was enunciated as early as 1908 in the case of United States v. Barrias. 15 The scope of the exercise of such rule-making power was clearly expressed in the case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, 16decided in 1914, thus: "Of course, the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provision of the law, they are valid." Recently, the case of People v. Maceren 17 gave a brief delienation of the scope of said power of administrative officials: PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 35

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provision. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended (U.S. v. Tupasi Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned (University of Santo Tomas v. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see Collector of Internal Revenue v. Villaflor, 69 Phil. 319; Wise & Co. v. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del Mar v. Phil. Veterans Administration, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349). xxx xxx xxx . . . The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558). In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People v. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091). Considering that administrative rules draw life from the statute which they seek to implement, it is obvious that the spring cannot rise higher than its source. We now examine petitioner's argument that DENR Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 contravene Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279 as both operate to repeal or abrogate Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other mining laws allegedly acknowledged as the principal law under Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279. Petitioner's insistence on the application of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, as the governing law on the acceptance and approval of declarations of location and all other kinds of applications for the exploration, development, and utilization of mineral resources pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, is erroneous. Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pertains to the old system of exploration, development and utilization of natural resources through "license, concession or lease" which, however, has been disallowed by Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. By virtue of the said constitutional mandate and its implementing law, Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211, the provisions dealing on "license, concession or lease" of mineral resources under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws are deemed repealed and, therefore, ceased to operate as the governing law. In other words, in all other areas of administration and management of mineral lands, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, and other existing mining laws, still govern. Section 7 of Executive Order No. 279 provides, thus: Sec. 7. All provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, other existing mining laws, and their implementing rules and regulations, or parts thereof, which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order, shall continue in force and effect. Specifically, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, on lease of mining claims under Chapter VIII, quarry permits on privately-owned lands of quarry license on public lands under Chapter XIII and other related provisions on lease, license and permits are not only inconsistent with the raison d'etre for which Executive Order No. 279 was passed, but contravene the express mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It force and effectivity is thus foreclosed.
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Upon the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987, 18 the State assumed a more dynamic role in the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the country. Article XII, Section 2 of the said Charter explicitly ordains that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. Consonant therewith, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may be undertaken by means of direct act of the State, or it may opt to enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements, or it may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. Given these considerations, there is no clear showing that respondent DENR Secretary has transcended the bounds demarcated by Executive Order No. 279 for the exercise of his rule-making power tantamount to a grave abuse of discretion. Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279 specifically authorizes said official to promulgate such supplementary rules and regulations as may be necessary to effectively implement the provisions thereof. Moreover, the subject sought to be governed and regulated by the questioned orders is germane to the objects and purposes of Executive Order No. 279 specifically issued to carry out the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner likewise maintains that Administrative Order No. 57, in relation to Administrative Order No. 82, impairs vested rights as to violate the non-impairment of contract doctrine guaranteed under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution because Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates and automatically converts mining leases and other mining agreements into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from effectivity of said guideline, while Section 3 of Administrative Order No. 82, declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent (LOIs) and MPSAs within two (2) years from the effectivity of Administrative Order No. 57 or until July 17, 1991 shall cause the abandonment of mining, quarry, and sand gravel permits. In Support of the above contention, it is argued by petitioner that Executive Order No. 279 does not contemplate automatic conversion of mining lease agreements into mining production-sharing agreement as provided under Article 9, Administrative Order No. 57 and/or the consequent abandonment of mining claims for failure to submit LOIs and MPSAs under Section 3, Administrative Order No. 82 because Section 1 of said Executive Order No. 279 empowers the DENR Secretary to negotiate and enter into voluntary agreements which must set forth the minimum terms and conditions provided under Section 2 thereof. Moreover, petitioner contends that the power to regulate and enter into mining agreements does not include the power to preterminate existing mining lease agreements. To begin with, we dispel the impression created by petitioner's argument that the questioned administrative orders unduly preterminate existing mining leases in general. A distinction which spells a real difference must be drawn. Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution does not apply retroactively to "license, concession or lease" granted by the government under the 1973 Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987. The intent to apply prospectively said constitutional provision was stressed during the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, 19 thus: MR. DAVIDE: Under the proposal, I notice that except for the [inalienable] lands of the public domain, all other natural resources cannot be alienated and in respect to [alienable] lands of the public domain, private corporations with the required ownership by Filipino citizens can only lease the same. Necessarily, insofar as other natural resources are concerned, it would only be the State which can exploit, develop, explore and utilize the same. However, the State may enter into a joint venture, co-production or production-sharing. Is that not correct? MR. VILLEGAS: Yes. MR. DAVIDE: Consequently, henceforth upon, the approval of this Constitution, no timber or forest concession, permits or authorization can be exclusively granted to any citizen of the Philippines nor to any corporation qualified to acquire lands of the public domain? PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 37

MR. VILLEGAS: Would Commissioner Monsod like to comment on that? I think his answer is "yes." MR. DAVIDE: So, what will happen now license or concessions earlier granted by the Philippine government to private corporations or to Filipino citizens? Would they be deemed repealed? MR. VILLEGAS: This is not applied retroactively. They will be respected. MR. DAVIDE: In effect, they will be deemed repealed? MR. VILLEGAS: No. (Emphasis supplied) During the transition period or after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 until the first Congress under said Constitution was convened on July 27, 1987, two (2) successive laws, Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, were promulgated to govern the processing and approval of applications for the exploration, development and utilization of minerals. To carry out the purposes of said laws, the questioned Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82, now being assailed, were issued by the DENR Secretary. Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 provides: ARTICLE 9 TRANSITORY PROVISION 9.1. All existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less shall be subject to these guidelines. All such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreement within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines. However, any minimum firm which has established mining rights under Presidential Decree 463 or other laws may avail of the provisions of EO 279 by following the procedures set down in this document. It is clear from the aforestated provision that Administrative Order No. 57 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. It bears mention that under the text of Executive Order No. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the strictures of the non-impairment of contract clause under Article III, Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution 20 do not apply to the aforesaid leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. They can be amended, modified or altered by a statute passed by Congress to achieve the purposes of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Clearly, Executive Order No. 279 issued on July 25, 1987 by President Corazon C. Aquino in the exercise of her legislative power has the force and effect of a statute or law passed by Congress. As such, it validly modified or altered the privileges granted, as well as the terms and conditions of mining leases and agreements under Executive Order No. 211 after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution by authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources and prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals.
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Well -settled is the rule, however, that regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, such as those granted pursuant to Executive Order No. 211 referred to this petition, are subject to alterations through a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State. In the 1950 case of Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 21 where the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 34 changing the 50-50 sharecropping system in existing agricultural tenancy contracts to 55-45 in favor of tenants was challenged, the Court, upholding the constitutionality of the law, emphasized the superiority of the police power of the State over the sanctity of this contract: The prohibition contained in constitutional provisions against: impairing the obligation of contracts is not an absolute one and it is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula. Such provisions are restricted to contracts which respect property, or some object or value, and confer rights which may be asserted in a court of justice, and have no application to statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State, and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. They do not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police powers. By enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals, comfort, or general welfare of the community, even the contracts may thereby be affected; for such matter can not be placed by contract beyond the power of the State shall regulates and control them. 22 In Ramas v. CAR and Ramos 23 where the constitutionality of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 1199 authorizing the tenants to charge from share to leasehold tenancy was challenged on the ground that it impairs the obligation of contracts, the Court ruled that obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such power is exercised to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive. The economic policy on the exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources under Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution could not be any clearer. As enunciated in Article XII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources under the new system mandated in Section 2, is geared towards a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. The exploration, development and utilization of the country's natural resources are matters vital to the public interest and the general welfare of the people. The recognition of the importance of the country's natural resources was expressed as early as the 1984 Constitutional Convention. In connection therewith, the 1986 U.P. Constitution Project observed: "The 1984 Constitutional Convention recognized the importance of our natural resources not only for its security and national defense. Our natural resources which constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation, should be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their prosperity. This will ensure the country's survival as a viable and sovereign republic." Accordingly, the State, in the exercise of its police power in this regard, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211. Police Power, being co-extensive with the necessities of the case and the demands of public interest; extends to all the vital public needs. The passage of Executive Order No. 279 which superseded Executive Order No. 211 provided legal basis for the DENR Secretary to carry into effect the mandate of Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which would lead us to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing mining leases and agreements are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term "production-sharing agreement" if they are so minded. Negotiation negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner in the instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA) requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 39

arrived at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the subsequent Administrative Order No. 82. We, therefore, rule that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be sustained, and their force and effect upheld. We now, proceed to the petition-in-intervention. Under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, an intervention in a case is proper when the intervenor has a "legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof. "Continental Marble Corporation has not sufficiently shown that it falls under any of the categories mentioned above. The refusal of the DENR, Regional Office No. 3, San Fernando, Pampanga to renew its Mines Temporary Permit does not justify such an intervention by Continental Marble Corporation for the purpose of obtaining a directive from this Court for the issuance of said permit. Whether or not Continental Marble matter best addressed to the appropriate government body but certainly, not through this Court. Intervention is hereby DENIED. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 2, 1991 is hereby LIFTED. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 48327 August 21, 1991 This Petition for Review assails the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 15 September 1977 and 18 May 1978 in C.A.-G.R. No. 59538-R, which dismissed the appeal filed therein by the Republic and two (2) bureau directors. Private respondents are applicants for registration of a parcel of land situated in Beckel La Trinidad, Benguet, containing an area of 34,178 square meters and covered by Survey Plan Psu-105218. In their application dated 13 February 1970, private respondents claim to have acquired the land from their father Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical, exclusive and open possession thereof since time immemorial. 1 On 18 November 1970, the Office of the Solicitor General filed on behalf of the Director of Lands an Opposition 2contending that: (1) private respondents have no registrable title; (2) the parcel of land sought to be registered is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines; and (3) the application for registration was filed after expiration of the period provided for in R.A. No. 2061, hence the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet, on the other hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss 3 based solely on the ground that the application made by private respondents was filed beyond 31 December 1968, the extended period for filing of applications for registration provided for by R.A. No. 2061. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet later filed another Opposition 4 first time in representation of the Director of Forestry, stating that the parcel of land sought to be registered is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve covered by Proclamation No. 217 dated 16 February 1929. On 12 November 1970, the land registration court issued an Order 5 declaring a general default against the whole world except the Bureau of Lands, the Reforestration Administration, and the Bureau of Forestry. Another Order 6was then issued denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Provincial Fiscal. Thereupon, the case proceeded to trial. On 7 August 1974, the land registration court rendered a Decision 7 with the following dispositive portion: In view thereof, finding the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest to have been in open, continuous and notorious possession of the aforesaid land as bonafide owner[s] thereof for more than 30 years, their title hereto (sic) is hereby confirmed. Let an order issue for the issuance of the PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 40

decree after the finality of this decision in the names of Paulina Paran, widow; Elisa Paran Maitim, married to Beles Paran; Sina Paran, widow; all of legal age, Filipino citizens and residents of Beckel La Trinidad, Benguet, in equal undivided shares. It is so ordered. A copy of the Decision was received by the Provincial Fiscal on 13 August 1974 who filed neither a motion for reconsideration nor a notice of appeal. The Solicitor General, who was separately furnished a copy of the Decision, received it on 26 August 1974. On 25 September 1974, the last day then allowed for filing an appeal, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied. Copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration was received by the Solicitor General almost a year later, on 18 August 1975; on the very same day, he immediately filed a notice of his intention to appeal. The record on appeal subsequently filed by the Solicitor General was approved, "having been filed within the period prescribed by law," and the records of the case were ordered elevated to the Court of Appeals. Earlier, however, the land registration court had directed the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree for the titling of the land in the name of private respondents. The Order dated 23 June 1975 was issued because no appeal had apparently been perfected at that time from the Decision promulgated on 7 August 1974. The Solicitor General asked that that Order be set aside on the ground that it was issued prematurely, that is, he had not yet received as of 23 June 1975 the order denying his motion for reconsideration of the decision. The Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration was denied by the land registration court. Considering that the Solicitor General had filed an appeal from the Decision dated 7 August 1974, private respondents urged the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal contending that the Decision of the land registration court had attained finality and was no longer open to review. By a Resolution 8 of the Court of Appeals dated 15 September 1977, the motion of private respondents was granted and the appeal interposed by petitioners was dismissed. The Resolution reads: ACTING on the motion to dismiss appeal filed by counsel for applicants-appellees on the ground that the appellant's brief clearly indicates that appellant is only appealing from the original order which was already final and executory. (sic) Upon examination of the records of this case, the court finds out that the contention of appellees is tenable. In view of the same, the Court RESOLVED to GRANT applicants-appellees' motion. Wherefore, the appeal interposed by appellant is now and considered abandoned. Petitioners moved for reconsideration of that Resolution; their motion was denied in an extended Resolution 9 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 18 May 1978. Petitioners in the instant Petition for Review urge that: 1. respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that petitioners' appeal was perfected on time; 2. respondent Court of Appeals erred in not holding that [the] decision rendered without jurisdiction does not attain finality since [the] land involved is part of [the] Central Cordillera Forest Reserve; and that 3. respondent Court of Appeals erred in not declaring as void in these proceedings [the] trial court's decision.10 The first issue raised by petitioners is founded on the holding of the Court of Appeals, that: This Admission notwithstanding, and if only to clarify, we will rule on the issue of perfection of the appeal in this case. We maintain that the decision in the court below had already become final and PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 41

executory when the appeal was interposed. The period of appeal should commence to run from the date the Provincial Fiscal recieved a copy of the decision, to wit: August 13, 1974. The thirty-day period of appeal had lapsed when the Solicitor General filed his notice of appeal. The receipt by the Provincial Fiscal of the decision is deemed that of the Solicitor General. The records reveal that it was the Provincial Fiscal who all along had represented the Government in the hearing of the application for registration. His official actuations and omissions in regard to the case must perforce bind the Office of the Solicitor General. To ignore the official actuations and omissions of the fiscal in the hearing of the application for registration would be a virtual admission that there was no opposition on the part of the Government, a situation which would have been even more absurd. 11 Petitioners for their part contend that the thirty-day (30) period (now fifteen [15] days) for filing an appeal should not commence to run from the time the Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the Decision of the land registration court on 13 August 1974, but rather only from 26 August 1974 when the Solicitor General received his own copy of the Decision. Recent decisions of this Court sustain the position taken by petitioners. The Office of the Solicitor General is the entity that is empowered to represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings 12 and as such, the Solicitor General is entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders, notices and decisions. Service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing the reglementary period or filing of appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality. The representative of the Solicitor General, e.g. the Provincial Fiscal, has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal should be made. 13 From the chronology of the instant case, it is evident that the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General was filed within the appropriate period. Although the Provincial Fiscal had received earlier a copy of the Decision of the land registration court, the Solicitor General received his copy only on 26 August 1974. On 25 September 1974, the last day then allowed for filing an appeal, the Solicitor General filed a motion for reconsideration. The order denying this motion for reconsideration was received on 18 August 1975; on the same day, the Solicitor General filed a notice of appeal. The Court considers the appeal of the Solicitor General to have been filed on time since the motion for reconsideration earlier filed had suspended the running of the period to appeal. 14 During the proceedings below, petitioners had asked the land registration court to dismiss the application for registration of private respondents on the ground that the same was filed beyond the time allowed under R.A. No. 2061. R.A. No. 2061 had fixed a period expiring on 31 December 1968 while private respondents' application was filed sometime in 1970. The Court does not agree that private respondents are barred by prescription from having their imperfect title confirmed. The original text of Section 47 of C.A. No. 141 provided that applications for confirmation had to be filed at the latest on 31 December 1938. Pursuant to C.A. No. 292, the period was extended to 31 December 1941; later, that period was extended once more to 31 December 1957 by R.A. No. 107. The period for filing was for the third time extended by R.A. No. 2061 to allow applicants until 31 December 1968 to file their petitions. The extensions of time did not, however, end with R.A. No. 2061. R.A. No. 6236 again extended the period of 31 December 1976. The amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6236 reads: See. 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend beyond December thirty-one, nineteen hundred and seventy-six within which to take advantage of the benefit of this chapter: Provided, That this extension shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed 144 hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with section forty-five of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this chapter, but this section shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under this chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.(Emphasis supplied) The Court notes that the application of private respondents was filed on 13 February 1970, i.e., after expiration of the period provided in R.A. No. 2061. We consider, however, that the above underscored portions of R.A. No. 6236, PUP COLLEGE OF LAW Page 42

which was approved 19 June 1971, validated the application filed in the interim by private respondents, and the exercise of jurisdiction by the land registration court in respect of the subject matter of the application. The fact that a succession of statutes had simply extended the original time period, 15 rather than established a series of discrete periods of time with specific beginning dates and ending dates, shows a clear legislative intent to avoid interregna which would have generated doubts and difficult questions of law. In fact, R.A. No. 6236 was amended anew by P.D. No. 1073 issued on 25 January 1977 to allow applications to be filed on or before 31 December 1987. Petitioners, however, maintain that the land applied for is forest land located within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and hence not subject to registration. This was in fact the principal issue litigated by the parties before the land registration court. Petitioners submitted a letter dated 4 June 1971 signed by Baguio City Forester Luis U. Baker, Bureau of Forestry, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, informing the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet that the land occupied by private respondents lay within the boundaries of the vast Reserve.16 While private respondents do not dispute that the land was formerly a part of the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve, they contend that it had already been released therefrom. Private respondents submitted a certification17 signed by Leopoldo Palacay, Chief of Land Classification Party No. 57 of the Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, showing the legal nature or status of the land as alienable or disposable. After appraisal of the evidence submitted by the parties, the land registration court held that the land involved had already been released from the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve and, accordingly, rendered a decision confirming the title of private respondents. There is no question that a positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department of the Government is needed to declassify land which had been classified as forestal and to convert it into alienable or disposable lands for agricultural or other purposes. 18 In the case of Director of Lands vs. Funtilar, 19 the Court considered the reports of the District Forester and the District Land Officer as adequate proof that the land applied for was no longer classified as forestal. In that case, both the District Forester and the District Land Officer made identical findings that the land applied for was alienable and disposable in character and did not interpose any opposition to the application for registration. The difficulty in the instant case is that while the certification of Leopoldo Palacay on which private respondents rely may, standing alone, be evidence that a reclassification had occurred, it is contradicted by an official report of Luis Baker. Moreover, the private respondents' application for registration was in fact opposed by the Director of Lands as well as the Director of Forestry. The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and positively that the land here involved had been officially released from the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We consider and so hold that once a parcel of land is shown to have been included within a Forest Reservation duly established by Executive Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the parcel of land continues to be part of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent withdrawal therefrom or de-classification is shown. A simple, unsworn statement of a minor functionary of the Bureau of Forest Development is not, by itself, such evidence. Under the view we take of this case, however, the definite resolution of this question becomes unnecessary. The applicants in the instant case are natives of Benguet and members of the Ibaloi tribe. 20 They are members of a cultural minority whose application for registration of land should be considered as falling under Section 48(c) of C.A. No. 141. At the time private respondents filed their application, the text of Section 48 read: Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit: xxx xxx xxx
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(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been, in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (emphasis supplied) Section 48(c), quoted above, did not form part of the original text of C.A. No. 141; it was added on 18 June 1964 by R.A. No. 3872. It is clear to the Court that the addition of subsection (c) was intended to create a distinction between applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles by members of national cultural minorities and applications by other qualified persons in general. 21 Members of cultural minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to lands of the public domain, whether disposable or not; they may therefore apply for public lands even though such lands are legally forest lands or mineral lands of the public domain, so long as such lands are in fact suitable for agriculture. The rest of the community, however, "Christians" or members of mainstream society may apply only in respect of "agricultural lands of the public domain," that is, "disposable lands of the public domain" which would of course exclude lands embraced within forest reservations or mineral land reservations. That the distinction so established in 1964 by R.A. No. 3872 was expressly eliminated or abandoned thirteen (13) years later by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, only highlights the fact that during those thirteen (13) years, members of national cultural minorities had rights in respect of lands of the public domain, disposable or not. P.D. No. 1073 amended Sections 48(b) and (c) of C.A. No. 141 in the following manner: The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c) , Chapter VIII, of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. (Emphasis supplied) It is important to note that private respondents' application for judicial confirmation of their imperfect title was filed in 1970 and that the land registration court rendered its decision confirming their long-continued possession of the lands here involved in 1974, that is, during the time when Section 48(c) was in legal effect. Private respondents' imperfect title was, in other words, perfected or vested by the completion of the required period of possession prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073. Private respondents' right in respect of the land they had possessed for thirty (30) years could not be divested by P.D. No. 1073. The Court stressed in Director of Lands vs. Funtilar (supra): The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact, all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice. Every application for a concession of public lands has to be viewed in the light of its peculiar circumstances. A strict application of the Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry (supra) ruling is warranted whenever a portion of the public domain is in danger of ruthless exploitation, fraudulent titling, or other questionable practices. But when an application appears to enhance the very reasons behind the enactment of Act 496, as amended, or the Land Registration Act, and Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Public Land Act, then their
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provisions should not be made to stand in the way of their own implementation . (Emphasis supplied) The land registration court found that the possession of private respondents, if tacked on to that of their predecessors-in-interest, sufficiently meets the requirement of thirty (30) years open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession. Private respondents acquired the property from their deceased father who, in turn, had inherited it from private respondents' grandfather. Even before the death of their father, private respondents were already occupying the land. They lived on it since their father had built a house on the land and had planted it with bananas, camote, avocadoes, oranges and mangoes. Dayotao Paran had declared the land for taxation purposes prior to 1938 and had since paid the corresponding realty taxes. 22 The Declarations of Real Property submitted by private respondents indicated that the land had become suitable to agriculture. Aside from sweet potatoes and vegetables, private respondents harvested rice from the land. 23 To enhance their agricultural production, private respondents or their predecessors-in-interest had built terraces and dikes. Forester Luis Baker noted this fact in his report. Clearly, the requirements of Section 48(c) were satisfied by private respondents. They are entitled to judicial confirmation of their imperfect title. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the land registration court dated 7 August 1974 is AFFIRMED.
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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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CASES ON LAND TITLES AND DEEDS

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