III. Searches and Seizures TITLE Katz v. U.S.

349 U.S. 347 (1967); Stewart, J.

KEY FACTS & KEY ISSUES In the lower court, the defendant was convicted of transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of a federal statute. The evidence included secret recordings of the conversation, which were captured by FBI agents who attached recording devices to the public telephone booth where the call was made. Over the defendants objections, the Court of Appeals held that the recording did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights (i.e. against unreasonable searches and seizures) since there was no physical entrance into the booth.

RULING & KEY DOCTRINE The Fourth Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy; its protections go further, and often, have nothing to do with privacy. The Govts eavesdropping violated [defendants] privacy upon which [he] justifiably relied. The Fourth Amendment protection extends not only to tangible items, but also to oral statements. Because the amendment protects people and not places, its reach cannot turn on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion. The surveillance was narrow enough to be constitutionally authorized in advance, but it is invalid because it was not, in fact, conducted pursuant to the warrant procedure, which is a constitutional precondition for such electronic surveillance." The Fourth Amendment applies to stop and frisk procedures such as those followed in this case. When an officer restrains freedom to walk away, he has seized that person. An exploration of a persons [clothing] to find weapons is a search. Test of reasonableness. See comparison table in Appendix III.1. below. Good faith of the officer is not enough and cannot avoid the exclusionary rule. If subjective good faith were the only rest, the Fourth Amendment protections would evaporate. In determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be givento the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.

Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S. 1 (1968); Warren, C.J.

Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. He contended that the weapon seized from him was obtained through an illegal search. The facts show that the arresting officer (McFadden), who was long experienced in the beat and after observing Terry and two cohorts walk past a store several times, stopped the three men and introduced himself as a police officer. After the three refused to give their names, McFadden frisked Terrys outside clothing and felt a pistol, which he eventually secured. The CA ruled inter alia that the stop and frisk was not a search and seizure within the contemplation of the Fourth Amendment.

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People v. Marti
G.R. No. 81561; 18 Jan. 1991; 3rd Division; Bidin, J.

See Part I Table An officer applied for a warrant to search the person and residence of Nala in connection with alleged illegal possession of two particular firearms. After examining the requesting officer and his witness, the judge found probable cause and issued the warrant. The warrant used a wrong (first) name but provided an alias and the address of the subject. Items seized included those not listed in the warrant, but according to the State, were directly related to the offense alleged.

See Part I Table Requisites of a valid search warrant. See Appendix III.1. below. Error in first name. Error in first name does not invalidate the warrant; the warrant here contains a description personae (including additional descriptions) that will enable will enable the officer to identify the accused without difficulty. What is prohibited is a warrant against an unnamed party. Probable cause (search warrant): Such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe than an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Personal knowledge is not the same as personal belief Plain view doctrine. Exception to the warrant requirement. See Appendix III.3. below. Fruits of the poisonous tree are inadmissible in any proceeding. Search and seizure held to be invalid.

Nala v. Barroso, Jr.

G.R. No. 153087; 7 Aug. 2003; 1st Division; Ynares-Santiago, J.

Lim v. Felix
GR. Nos. 94054-57; 94266-69; 19 Feb. 1991; En Banc; Gutierrez, J.

Petitioners were among those implicated in the murder of a Masbate congressman. After a preliminary investigation, criminal complaints were filed against the petitioner in a Masbate court, which ordered their arrest. The petitioners, who were on bail, requested for a change in venue of the trial, and the case was transferred to Makati. In Makati, petitioners requested that the Masbate records be transmitted to Makati for the Makati judge to personally determine the existence of probable cause. Said judge denied the request, and said it would rely on the prior findings of probable cause by the Masbate court (and the provincial prosecutor).

The change in the 1987 Constitution provision required that probable cause be determined personally by a judge. The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of a judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. Citing Soliven v. Makasiar (1988): The judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. A judge is not precluded from relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers (such as a prosecutor, who is allowed to receive evidence in the same way that a commissioner does). The extent of the reliance depends on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the judges sound discretion. However, if a judge relies solely on the certification of the prosecutor, he or she has not personally determined probable cause and commits a grave abuse of discretion.

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Alvarez v. CFI
G.R. No. 45358; 29 Jan. 1937; En Banc; Imperial, J.

Petitioner asked the nullification of a search warrant which authorized the Anti-Usury Board, at any time of the day or night, to seize accounting books, documents, and papers in his residence. The warrant was issued by the judge after the chief of the secret service swore not on his own personal knowledge of the facts, but upon those of a reliable person.

The oath required [for the issuance of a search warrant] must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses because the purpose is to convince the magistrate (not the affiant) of the existence of probable cause. True test of sufficiency of affidavit is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be liable for damages. If the affidavit of the complainant is sufficient, a judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Fishing expedition. The seizure was for the sole purpose of collecting evidence which would be later used in the criminal proceedings that might be instituted against the petitioner, and is hence illegal. The defendants proposal of a compromise is not a waiver of his constitutional rights.

Bache & Co. v. Ruiz

G.R. No. 32409; 27 Feb. 1971; En Banc; Villamor, J.

The Ayala Ave. offices of the petitioner corporation were searched by BIR agents on the force of a search warrant issued by a judge. In issuing the warrant, the judge (1) instructed his clerk to take the depositions of the complainants; (2) asked his stenographer to read her notes; and then (3) asked the complainants to take the oath and simply warned them of perjury. The petitioner also complained that the warrants were illegal for not particularly describing the things to be seized, and that the warrant covered several distinct offenses.

A corporation (i.e. juridical person) is entitled to the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Revised Rules of Court (same rule in current ROC) requires the judge to personally examine under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses. In this case, the manner in which the judge conducted the examination did not afford him the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant and ask follow-up questions. No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. It does not matter that all offenses were covered by one statute. A search warrant is particularly described when the [1] description therein is as specific as the circumstances will allow, or [2] when the description expresses a conclusion of factnot of lawby which the warrant officer may be guided; or [3] the things described are limited to those which bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. The articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen evidence [already on hand].

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Stonehill v. Diokno
G.R. No. L-19550; 19 Jun. 1967; En Banc; Concepcion, C.J.

Judge and prosecutors issued 42 search warrants against petitioner corporation and private individuals. Warrants permitted search of corporations offices, warehouses, as well as residences of its officers. Petitioners assailed the orders as general warrants, since they lacked particularity there was no specific offense alleged, and the items to be seized were not detailed. During the search itself, items not among those enumerated in the warrant were seized.

The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby. Private individualpetitioners herein cannot contest validity of warrants against corporations (for searches in their offices). Exclusionary rule (unconstitutional searches). The unconstitutionality of the searches and seizures render the items seized as inadmissible in evidence. Exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. Court reversed Moncado v. Peoples Court, which applied the nonexclusionary rule, i.e. items seized under an unconstitutional search were still admissible as evidence, following the American common law doctrine that criminals should not go free only because the constable blundered. Remedy then was subsequent to the unconst. search, i.e. to sue (either under penal laws or for damages). (1) Ownership of property to be seized. The Rules of Court do not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against who, the search warrant is directed. [e.g. Necessarily, stolen property must be owned by another.] Possession of the property to be seized is the critical fact. (2) Items seized not real property. Under the Civil Code, the machineries confiscated would be considered immovable property as they were bolted to the ground. However, the Court has ruled previously that the Civil Code provision applies only when the owners of the machine also own the land/building. (3) Mere conclusions of law do not justify probable cause. [Respondents] broad statement in the application for the warrantthat the items were continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion [under P.D. 885]is a mere conclusion of law that does not satisfy probable cause requirements. As the premises were padlocked and sealed after the search, the operation also constituted a prior-restraint.

Burgos, Jr. v. Chief of Staff

G.R. No. 64261; 26 Dec. 1984; En Banc; Escolin, J.

Two search warrants were issued, permitting the search of the offices of the We Forum and Metropolitan Mail newspapers. The subject offense of the warrant was subversion under P.D. 885. Among others, (1) while the warrant was directed against Burgos, Jr., items that were owned by his co-petitioners were among those seized; and (2) real properties were included in the seizure. Petitioners also contest the lack of probable cause in the issuance of the warrant.

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Roan v. Gonzales
G.R. No. 71410; 25 Nov. 1986; En Banc; Cruz, J.

Search warrant was issued by the judge, against petitioner, authorizing military to collect evidence to support a prosecution for illegal possession of firearms. None of the items listed in the warrant were discovered; instead, the officers conducting the search found a gun and eighteen live bullets, which they confiscated. Aguilar-Roque was previously accused of Rebellion in another case and was at large. She and petitioner were arrested without a warrant at an intersection near her house; after said arrest, a search (supported by a search warrant) was conducted on her residence, where the police confiscated 431 items. Petitioners assailed the validity of the search warrant and pray for exclusion of all items.

Mere affidavit not sufficient. The judge himself must ask searching questions. In this case, Judge only asked if the warrant applicant knew and understood the contents of his affidavit. The examination must be probing and exhaustive to establish probable cause. Prohibited items may be seized, but only if the search was valid. It does not follow that because the offense was malum prohibitum, the subject thereof is illegal per se. Decision, 1985: Particularity. The items to be seized must be so particular as to (1) provide definite guidelines and (2) not allow discretion on the part of the searching officers. Search warrant issued was null, but SC in 1985 ruled that seizure of the items at the residence were valid as incidental to a lawful arrest. Partial Reconsideration, 1987: OSG deferred to Teehankees dissent in-part in the 1985 Decision, i.e. even if the arrest was lawful, the exception for searches incidental to a lawful arrest should be strictly limited to (1) the person of the arrested individual and to (2) dangerous weapons or anything that may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. Search incidental to lawful warrantless arrests, exception to warrant rule. The general rule is a search, to be valid, must be supported by a search warrant. However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. [Accused was search while transporting drugs.] Hence, a crime was being committed and he was caught in flagrante delicto. The case falls within the exceptions in the Rules of Court. Faced with on-the-spot information, the officers did not have time to obtain a warrant. [Appellants suspicious failure to produce his passport gave the authorities] probable cause which justified the warrantless searches made on the personal effects of the accused.

Nolasco v. Pao
G.R. No. 69803; En Banc;
Dec.: 8 Oct. 1985; Melencio-Herrera, J. Reso.: 30 Jan. 1987; Melencio-Herrera, J.

People v. Malmstedt
G.R. No. 91107; 19 Jun. 1991; En Banc; Padilla, J.

Malmstedt, a Swedish national, was travelling back from Sagada on board a bus when the vehicle was stopped by NARCOM agents. Said agents noticed a bulge on his waist (which they thought to be a gun but turned out to be a pouch bag) and asked him to produce his passport, which he refused. The agents compelled him to surrender his pouch bag, which contained hashish. More drugs were found in his traveling bags. He was then arrested and brought to headquarters. A few hours before the arrest, NARCOM received a tip that a Caucasian would be transporting drugs from Sagada.

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People v. Amminudin
G.R. No. 74869; 9 Jul. 1988; En Banc; Cruz, J.

Iloilo PC officers received a tip from informants that Aminnudin was carrying drugs and on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City. As he disembarked, he was identified by the informant, after which he was arrested by waiting officers, who later inspected the bag he was carrying. The bag contained marijuana. The accused pointed out that he was arrested and searched without a warrant.

The search and arrest were illegal. (1) Not a valid warrantless arrest. Accused was not caught in flagrante delicto. There was no outward indication that called for his arrest. He was just innocently disembarking the vessel. (2) Not a valid warrantless search. The search was not incident to a lawful arrest. Evidence obtained inadmissible. (3) Expediency could not be invoked in this case. There was no effort on the part of law enforcement to comply with the law, i.e. procure valid warrants. Exceptions to arrest warrant requirement. See Appendix III.4. below. (Note: Case decided before revision of ROC) Not in flagrante delicto. The arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the fact that a crime has been committed, etc. The offense must also be in his presence or within his view. Not in hot pursuit. Under Sec. 6(b), a crime must in fact have been committed first. The commission of the crime must be undisputed, and the test of reasonable ground [read: probable cause in current ROC] applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. Generally, if a warrantless arrest is unlawful at the moment it is made, nothing that happens afterwards can make it lawful. Fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. Courts indulge every reasonable presumption against a waiver of constitutional rights.

People v. Burgos
G.R. No. 68955; 4 Sep. 1986; 2nd Division; Gutierrez, J.

Witness Masamlok surrendered to the authorities and claimed that Burgos, threatening the former with a firearm, forcibly recruited him to the NPA. Upon such complaint and without securing warrants, the authorities arrested Burgos. When asked about the firearm, Burgos wife pointed to where it was buried. Later, Burgos himself pointed to subversive documents in his house.

Chimel v. California
395 U.S. 752 (1969); Stewart, J.

Police officers, armed with an arrest warrant (but without a search warrant), served it upon Chimel when the later arrived at his house from work. Chimel refused to allow police officers to look around, but nonetheless the police searched the entire house on the basis of the lawful arrest. The evidencecoins and medals, among otherswas used in a burglary trial, where Chimel was convicted.

Limit of search incidental to a lawful arrest. Arresting officer may search (1) the arrestees person to (a) discover/remove weapons and (b) seize evidence to prevent its concealment/destruction; and (2) the area within the immediate control of the arrestee, i.e. area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. Beyond that, a search warrant is needed. The Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the citizen and police [so that an] objective mind might weigh the need to invade privacy in order to enforce the law.
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Manalili v. C.A.
G.R. No. 113447; 9 Oct. 1997; 3rd Division; Panganiban, J.

Two Caloocan Anti-Narcotics unit policemen were conducting a surveillance of the city cemetery on info that drug addicts were roaming the area. In the process, they chanced upon a male person who appeared high on drug, e.g. reddish eyes, walking in a swaying manner. The policemen stopped the man, and asked him what he was holding in his hands. The man resisted, but later allowed them to examine his wallet where they found marijuana leaves. The man was arrested. According to the arresting officers, two groups of Muslim-looking men were posted at opposite sides of Quezon Blvd. The men were acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast. When the police approached one group, the latter fled into different directions. Upon catching up with them and conducting a search, they found a grenade tucked in Malacats waistline. Seven days before the incident, bomb threats were reported. The trial court upheld the search and seizure as a valid stop-and-frisk procedure.

Stop-and-frisk. The search was valid, being akin to a stop-andfrisk. In Philippine jurisprudence, it is one of the exceptions to the general rule against warrantless searches (Posadas v. CA). To require a police officer [to search] only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile, and much too late under the circumstances. Valid waiver of a right; requirements. (1) Right to be waived existed. (2) Person waiving it had actual or constructive knowledge of said right. (3) He had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [Petitioner waived inadmissibility of evidence by failing to raise it before the trial court.] [Assuming the grenade was in the possession of Malacat] the arrest and search of the petitioner were invalid. Searches incidental to lawful arrests. The precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be madethe process cannot be reversed. [In this case, the arrest was illegal since it did not fall within the Rule 113 exceptions.] Stop and Frisk. Applying Terry v. Ohio, a mere suspicion or hunch will not validate a stop-and-frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. Customs search. Except in the case of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authorities under the customs law may effect a search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. (Reasoning based on Tariff and Customs Code, and in the rule that importation is not terminated until full payment of customs duties, among others.) Search of a moving vehicle, exception to general rule. In the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, there is a necessary difference between the search of a dwelling and that of a moving vehicle, as the latter can be moved out quickly of a jurisdiction where the search warrant must be sought.

Malacat v. C.A.
G.R. No. 123595; 12 Dec. 1997; En Banc; Davide, Jr., J.

Papa v. Mago
G.R. No. 27360; 28 Feb. 1968; En Banc; Zaldivar, J.

Manila police obtained reliable information that a shipment of misdeclared/undervalued goods from Hong Kong would be released the following day in the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. The trucks, upon leaving the customs zone, were intercepted by policemen. Manila CFI held that the search illegal and issued mandamus to return the confiscated goods.

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People v. Aruta
G.R. No. 120915; 3 Apr. 1998; 3rd Division; Romero, J.

Officer received a tip from informant that a certain Rose Aruta would arrive from Baguio with a large amount of marijuana. The following day, while positioned (in anticipation of the woman) a bus stopped and unloaded a woman (Aruta). After the informant pointed her out, the officers asked Aruta about the contents of the bag; the woman surrendered the bag, and it was found to contain dried marijuana leaves. Among other grounds, Aruta contests the admissibility of the evidence, as the search and seizure were effected without a warrant.

Valid warrantless searches and seizures. See Appendix III.4. below. Probable cause. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In these cases, probable cause (warrantless searches) must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. The arrest being incipiently illegal, I logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal. [There was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested.] Search conducted at checkpoints. Warrantless [checkpoint] search is not unconstitutional for as long as the [1a] vehicle is neither searched [1b] nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the [2] inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. (Citing Valmonte v. De Villa [1990]. Language of the Court seems to imply that checkpoints are valid because of [1] moving vehicle and [2] plain view exceptions.) Extensive search without a warrant valid only if the officers had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that (1) the motorist was a law offender or (2) they would find the evidence of a crime in the vehicle. Mere passive conformity is not consent within the constitutional guaranty.

Aniag v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 104961; 7 Oct. 1994; En Banc; Bellosillo, J.

During the Gun Ban, the House Seargent-atArms wrote petitioner Congressman to ask him to surrender the House-issued firearms. While the Congressmans driver was on the way to Batasan, he was stopped at a police checkpoint. The police asked him to open the car trunk, where the gun was found. The COMELEC ordered the filing of a complaint against Aniag, despite QC prosecutors recommendation to drop unofficial charges.

Valmonte v. De Villa
G.R. No. 83988; En Banc; Decision: 29 Sep. 1989; Padilla, J. Reso.: 24 May 1990; Padilla, J.

Petitionersas taxpayers, members of IBP, and in Valmontes case, citizen of Valenzuela question the constitutionality of checkpoints set by the NCRDC in Valenzuela, and alleges that these were blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search warrants or court orders.

Decision, 1989: The general allegation is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of Valmontes right against unlawful search and seizure. [Taking judicial notice of the increasing insurgency in urban centers,] between the right of the state to self-preservation and promote public welfare and an individuals right against a warrantless but reasonable search, the former prevails. Cruz, dissent: The Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on natl security.
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In Re Umil et al v. Ramos
G.R. No. 81567, etc.; 9 Jul. 1990; En Banc; Per Curiam

Eight (consolidated) petitions for habeas corpus were filed, with petitioners alleging that the detentions were unlawful since arrests were without warrants. Further, as there were no preliminary investigations conducted, information filed against the detainees were null and void.

Relevant to the topic, as held in the different petitions: Arrests for continuing offenses [such as subversion] is impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of society. For an officer to make an arrest by reason of a crime, the indubitable existence of a crime is not required. It is sufficient that the arresting person has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an act with the characteristics of a crime and that the arrestee participated therein. (Compare with People v. Burgos) Sarmiento, dissent: Warrantless (or citizens) arrest is not possible in subversion, in the absence of any overt act that would justify action on the part of authorities. The rule on warrantless arrest is an exceptional one, that should only be exercised in the most urgent cases and when the guilt of an offender is plain and evident. Arrest of [Nazareno] should not fall under the ROC exceptions on warrantless arrests since he was arrested 14 days after the imputed crime.

People v. Mengote
G.R. No. 87059; 22 Jun. 1992; 1st Division; Cruz, J.

An informer told the WPD that there were three suspicious-looking persons at a corner in Tondo. Following the information, plainclothesmen on the scene approached two people who were suspiciously looking from side-to-side (and one of whom was holding his abdomen). Upon accosting them, a search was conducted and yielded weapons. Accused killed by stabbing and shooting a man after a drinking spree. 19 hours later, the two were arrested by police officers (without a warrant) who seized from them the weapons. Accused verbally confessed to the crime; accused was not informed of right to counsel.

Arrests in flagrante delicto, requirements: the person must be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense; (2) in the presence of the arresting officer. Arrests in Hot Pursuit, requirements: (1) offense had just in fact been committed; (2) the arresting officer had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the [arrestee] did it. Arrest does not fall within Rule 113 exceptions. (1) Personal knowledge is not personal gathering of information. (2) The arrest must have been immediately after the commission, not 19 hours later. xxx the illegality of a warrantless arrest cannot deprive the state of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.

People v. Manlulu
G.R. No. 102140; 22 Apr. 1994; 1st Division; Bellosillo, J.

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Appendix III.1. Tests of Reasonableness for Warrantless Searches and Seizures Terry v. Ohio (1968) In determining whether the seizure and search were unreasonable our inquiry is a dual one: 1. [GDV: Nature of govt interest] Whether the officers action was justified at its inception. In this case, McFadden had reason to believe that he was dealing with dangerous individuals. [GDV: Character of the intrusion] Whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. In this case, the search was limited to a weapon. People v. Aruta [In the cited cases] there was [1] information received which became the bases for conducting the warrantless search. Furthermore, [2] additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken together with the information, constituted probable cause which justified the warrantless searches and seizures. The cited text seems to imply the (1) information and (2) additional factors and circumstances determine the reasonableness of the search, considering probable cause here was to be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. SJS v. Dangerous Drugs Board Factor[s] to consider in the matter of reasonableness 1) Nature of the privacy interest: analysis of the privacy expectation 2) Character of the intrusion: is the enabling law authorizing a search narrowly drawn or narrowly focused?

2.

Pollo v. Constantino-David (2011) [GDV: Pollo reconciles seemingly conflicting doctrines of Terry, Aruta, and SJS] Under this standard, both the inception and the scope of intrusion must be reasonable. 1. Justified at inception: if reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. 2. Scope of intrusion is reasonable: if measures used in the search are reasonable related to the searchs objectives, and it is not highly intrusive. Appendix III.2. Requisites for a Valid Search Warrant (Nala v. Barroso) 1) Probable cause is present; 2) Such presence is determined personally by a judge; 3) Complainant and his witnesses are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation; 4) The applicant and witnesses testify on facts personally known to them; and 5) Warrant specifically describes the person and place to be searched and the things to be seized.

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Appendix III.3. Requisites of the Plain View Doctrine (Nala v. Barroso); Compare with People v. Arutas Plain View requisites below 1) Law enforcer has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; 2) The discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; 3) It is immediately apparent that the item he observes may be the evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. Appendix III.4. Valid Warrantless Searches and Valid Warrantless Arrests VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES VALID WARRANTLESS ARRESTS People v. Aruta (1998) Rules of Court, Rule 113, Sec. 5 1. Incident to a Lawful Arrest: Warrantless search incidental to a A police officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest: lawful arrest, as recognized under Rule 126, Sec. 12 of the Rules 1. [In flagrante delicto] When, in his presence, the person to be of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting 2. Plain View: Seizure of evidence in plain view; requisites to commit an offense. 3. Moving Vehicle: Highly regulated by govt, the vehicles 2. [Hot pursuit] When an offense has just been committed and he inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy has probable cause to believe, based on personal knowledge of 4. Consented: Consented warrantless search facts and circumstances, that the person to be arrested has 5. Customs search committed it. 6. Stop and Frisk 3. [Escaped prisoners] When the person to be arrested is a 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. Appendix III.5. Table of Requisites for Valid Warrantless Searches TYPE REQUISITES Arresting officer may search 1) The arrestees person to a) Discover or remove weapons and b) Seize evidence to prevent concealment or destruction; and 2) The area within the immediate control of the arrestee, i.e. area from which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. CASE Chimel v. California

Incident to a Lawful Arrest

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Plain View

Vehicle Checkpoint

Requisites: 1) Prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties 2) Evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are 3) Evidence must be immediately apparent 4) Plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search Routine checks are not unconstitutional if: 1) Vehicle is neither searched; nor its occupants subjected to a body search; and 2) Inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. Extensive search without a warrant valid only if the officers had reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that a) The motorist was a law offender; or b) They would find the evidence of a crime in the vehicle. Requisites for a valid waiver of a constitutional right 1) Right to be waived existed; 2) Person waiving it had actual or constructive knowledge of said right; 3) He had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [1] Where a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous;

People v. Aruta (N.B. substantially the same as Nala v. Barroso requirements)

Valmonte v. de Villa (1990) Aniag v. COMELEC

Aniag v. COMELEC (citing People v. Bagista) [Not sure if the requirements in Vehicle Checkpoints and the Search of a Moving Vehicle are the same.] People v. Aruta, in relation to Manalili v. C.A.

Search of a Moving Vehicle

Consented Search (Waiver of a Constitutional Right)

Terry v. Ohio, as cited in Manalili v. C.A.

Stop and Frisk

[2] where in the course of investigating this behavior, he identified himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries; and [3] where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety xxx

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