UnderArt.

2176

I.JemimaFernando

FAUSTOBARREDOVS.SEVERINOGARCIAandTIMOTEAALMARIO G.R.No.L48006.July8,1942 BOCOBO,J: FACTS: On May 3, 1936, there was a headon collision on the road between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guidedbyPedroDimapalisbetweenMalabonandNavotas, Province of Rizal. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16yearold boy Faustino Garcia, sufferedinjuriesfromwhichhediedtwodayslater.Acriminal actionwas filedagainstFontanilla intheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal wherehewasconvicted.Thecourtinthe criminalcasegrantedthe petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. Thus, the parents of the deceased, Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, brought an action againstFaustoBarredoasthesoleproprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The lower court ruled in favor of the respondents which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals stating that Fausto Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Worksavailabletobepublic and to himself. In his defense, Barredo contends that the Court of Appeals erred in applying Article 1903 of the Civil Code since the provision itself speaks of (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law. His liability arised from a felony or a misdemeanor (crime) of Pedro Fontanilla and since there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, Barredo cannotbeheldresponsibleinthecase. ISSUE: Whether the respondents, Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, may bring a separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under 1903 in relation to Article1902oftheCivilCodeasanemployerofPedroFontanilla

HELD: A quasidelict or culpa extracontractual is a separateanddistinctlegalinstitution,independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the CivilCode,primarilyanddirectlyresponsibleforthenegligentactsofhisemployee. Inthepresentcase,thetaxidriverwasfoundguiltyofcriminalnegligence,sothatifhehadevensuedfor his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would havebeenheldprimarilyliableforcivildamages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choosewhich course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing,theywereactingwithintheirrights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just beenreleased,andbesides,hewasprobably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages. Thus, Barredo is primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in relationtoarticle1902, oftheCivilCode.

II.EdgarCruz SpousesElcanovReginaldHill,minor,&MarvinHill,fatherG.R.No.L24803,May26,1977 FACTS:SpsElcanofiledacomplaintbeforetheCFIforrecoveryofdamagesfromR.andM.Hillfor thekillingbyReginaldofSpsElcanosson.Reginaldwasacquittedinthecriminalcasebecauseoflack ofintenttokill,coupledwithmistake.TheCFIdismissedthecomplaintuponmotionofR.andM.Hill onthegroundsofresjudicataandthatNCCArts21762194onquasidelictdonotapply. ISSUES:1.IsthecivilactionfordamagesbarredbytheacquittalofReginaldinthecriminalcase whereintheactionforcivilliabilitywasnotreversed? 2.MayNCCArt2180(2nd&lastpars)beappliedagainstM.Hill,evenifReginald,thoughaminorat thetime,livingwithandgettingsubsistencefromhisfather,wasalreadylegallymarried?

HELD:1.No.Art2176,whereitrefersto"faultornegligence,coversnotonlyacts"notpunishableby law"butalsoactscriminalincharacter,whetherintentionalandvoluntaryornegligent.Consequently,a separatecivilactionliesagainsttheoffenderinacriminalact,whetherornotheiscriminallyprosecuted andfoundguiltyoracquitted,providedthattheoffendedpartyisnotallowed,ifheisactuallycharged alsocriminally,torecoverdamagesonbothscores,andwouldbeentitledinsucheventualityonlytothe biggerawardofthetwo,assumingtheawardsmadeinthetwocasesvary.Inotherwords,the extinctionofcivilliabilityreferredtoinPar(e)ofSec3,Rule111,refersexclusivelytocivilliability foundedonArt100oftheRPC,whereasthecivilliabilityforthesameactconsideredasaquasidelict onlyandnotasacrimeisnotextinguishedevenbyadeclarationinthecriminalcasethatthecriminalact chargedhasnothappenedorhasnotbeencommittedbytheaccused. 2.Yes.UnderArt2180,theobligationimposedbyArt2176isdemandablenotonlyforone'sownacts oromissions,butalsoforthoseofpersonsforwhomoneisresponsible.Thereasonbehindthejointand solidaryliabilityofparentswiththeiroffendingchildunderArt2180isthatitistheobligationofthe parenttosupervisetheirminorchildreninordertopreventthemfromcausingdamagetothirdpersons.

III.KennethE.Regaon

CINCOv.CANONOY G.R.No.L33171May31,1979 Facts: OnFebruary25,1970,petitionerPorfirioCincofiledaComplaintintheCityCourtofMandaueCity, Cebufortherecoveryofdamagesonaccountofavehicularaccidentinvolvinghisautomobileanda jeepneydrivenbyprivaterespondentRomeoHilotandoperatedbyprivaterespondentValeriana PepitoandCarlosPepito.Subsequently,acriminalcasewasfiledagainstthedriver,RomeoHilot, arisingfromthesameaccident. Atpretrial,privaterespondentsmovedtosuspendthecivilactionpendingthedeterminationofthe criminalsuit,invokingRule111,Sec.3(b),RulesofCourt,whichprovides: (b)Afteracriminalactionhasbeencommenced.nocivilactionarisingfromthesameoffensecanbe

prosecuted,andthesameshallbesuspended,inwhateverstageitmaybefound,untilfinaljudgmentin thecriminalproceedinghasbeenrendered TheCityCourtgrantedthemotionandorderedthesuspensionofthecivilcase.Motionfor reconsiderationwasdenied. PetitionerelevatedthematteroncertioraritotheCFIofCebuallegingthattheCityJudgeactedwith graveabuseofdiscretioninsuspendingthecivilactionforbeingcontrarytolawandjurisprudence. RespondentjudgeMateoCanonoydismissedthepetitionforcertiorarihence,petitionforreviewwith theSC. Issue:Cantherebeanindependentcivilactionfordamagetopropertyduringthependencyofthe criminalaction? Held:Yes

ThecomplaintfiledbythepetitionerwasquasidelictualbasedonArticles2176and2180oftheCivil Code.Liabilitybeingpredicatedonquasidelict,thecivilcasemayproceedasaseparateand independentcivilactionasprovidedinArticle2177. Art.2177.Responsibilityforfaultornegligenceundertheprecedingarticleisentirelyseparateand distinctfromthecivilliabilityarisingfromnegligenceunderthePenalCode. Theseparateandindependentcivilactionforaquasidelictisalsoclearlyrecognizedinsection2,Rule 111oftheRulesofCourt. Sec.2.Independentcivilaction.InthecasesprovidedforinArticles31,32,33,34and2177of theCivilCodeofthePhilippines,Areindependentcivilactionentirelyseparateanddistinctfromthec action,maybebroughtbytheinjuredpartyduringthependencyofthecriminalcase,providedtheright isreservedasrequiredintheprecedingsection.Suchcivilactionshagproceedindependentlyofthe criminalprosecution,andshallrequireonlyapreponderanceofevidence. Sec.3(b)ofRule111,RulesofCourtisnotapplicablebecauseitreferstothatcivilactionarisingfrom thecriminaloffense,notthecivilactionbasedonquasidelict. Also,Art.31provides,Whenthecivilactionisbasedonanobligationnotarisingfromtheactor omissioncomplainedofasafelony,suchcivilactionmayproceedindependentlyofthecriminal

proceedingsandregardlessoftheresultofthelatter.Inaddition,accordingtoArt.1157,quasidelict isanindependentsourceofobligation. Also,theconceptofquasidelicaasenunciatedinArticle2176oftheCivilCode(supra),issobroad thatitincludesnotonlyinjuriestopersonsbutalsodamagetoproperty. Thus,theSCgrantedtheWritofcertiorari,setasidetheDecisionofCFIofCebu,andorderedtheCity Courttoproceedwiththehearingofthecivilcase.

IV.HyacinthAldueso

Bakshvs.CourtofAppeals 115SCRA219,February19,1993 Ponente:Davide,Jr.

PrivaterespondentMarilouT.GonzalesfiledwiththeRegionalTrialCourtofPangasinanacomplaint fordamagesagainstthepetitionerGashemShookatBakshfortheallegedviolationoftheiragreementto gemarried.Sheallegesthatsheistwentytwoyearsold,single,Filipinoandaprettylassofgoodmoral characterandreputationdulyrespectedinhercommunity.BakshontheotherhandisanIraniancitizen whoproposedtomarryher.Theyagreedtogetmarriedaftertheendoftheschoolsemester.Baksh thenvisitedtheparentsofGonzalestosecuretheirapprovaltothemarriage.SometimeinAugust20, 1987,Bakshforcedthepetitionertolivewithhimandshewasavirginbeforeshebeganlivingwithhim. Aweekbeforethefilingofthecomplaint,Bakshsattitudetowardsherstartedtochange.He maltreatedandthreatenedtokillherasaresultofwhichshesustainedinjury.Duringtheconfrontation withtherepresentativeofbarangaycaptainofGuiligadaybeforethefilingofthecomplaint,Baksh repudiatedtheirmarriageagreementandaskedhernottolivewithhimanymore.Thepetitioneris alreadymarriedtosomeonelivinginBacolodCity.Gonzalesprayedforjudgmentorderingthe petitionertopayherdamagesintheamountnotlessthanP45,000.00reimbursementforactual expensesamountingtoP600.00attorneysfeesandcostsandgrantinghersuchotherreliefand remediesasmaybejustandequitable.Baksharguedthathedidnotproposemarriagetooragreedto

bemarriedwithMarilouanddeniedtheotherallegationsofthelatter.Hestatedthatheonlyasked Marilounottogohishousebecauseshehaddeceivedhimbystealinghismoneyandpassport.Inhis counterclaim,Bakshstatedthatthecomplaintisbaselessandunfoundedthatasaresultthereof,hewas unnecessarilydraggedintocourtandcomplledtoincurexpenses,andhassufferedmentalanxietyanda besmirchedreputation.HeprayedforanawardofP5,000formiscellaneousexpensesandP25,000.00 asmoraldamages

ThetrialcourtrenderedadecisionfavoringMarilouGonzalesapplyingArticle21oftheNewCivil Code.Thedecisionisbasedonthefactualfindingsandconclusionbythetrialcourtthata)Bakshand Gonzaleswerelovers,b)respondentisnotawomanofloosemoralsorquestionablevirtuewhoreadily submitstosexualadvances,c)petitioner,throughmachinations,deceitandfalsepretenses,promisedto marryprivaterespondent,d)becauseofhispersuasivepromisetomarryher,sheallowedherselftobe defloweredbyhim,e)byreasonofthatdeceitfulpromise,Marilouandherparentsinaccordancewith theFilipinocustomsandtraditionsmadesomepreparationfortheweddingthatwastobeheldon Octoberof1987,f)petitionerdidnotfulfullhispromisetomarryher,andg)suchactsofthepetitioner, whoisaforeignerandwhohasabusedPhilippinehospitality,haveoffendedoursenseofmorality,good customs,cultureandtraditions.TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedintotothethelowercourtsfindings.

Issue:

Isbreachofpromisetomarryisanactionablewrong?

Ruling:

No,breachofpromisetomarryisnotanactionablewrongandCongressdeliberatelyeliminatedfrom thedraftoftheNewCivilCodetheprovisionsthatwouldhavemadeitso.Notwithstanding,Article21 oftheCivilCodewhichisdesignedtoexpandtheconceptoftortsorquasidelictinthisjurisdictionby grantingadequatelegalremedyfortheuntoldnumberofmoralwrongswhichisimpossibleforhuman

foresighttospecificallyenumerateandpunishinstatutebooks.DamagepursuanttoArticle21maybe awardednotbecauseofpromisetomarrybutbecauseoffraudanddeceitbehindit.Whereamans promisetomarryisinfacttheproximatecauseoftheacceptanceofhislovebyawomanandhis representationtofulfillthatpromisethereafterbecomestheproximatecauseofthegivingofherselfunto himinasexualcongress,proofthathehad,inreality,nointentionofmarryingherandthatthepromise wasonlyasubtleschemeordeceptivedevicetoenticeorinveiglehertohimandtoobtainherconsent tothesexualact.

V.MariaCzabrinaOngDomingo OnDecember7,1988,analtercationbetweenBenignoTorzuelaandAtty.NapoleonDulayoccurred attheBigBangSaAlabang,AlabangVillage,MuntinlupaasaresultofwhichBenignoTorzuela,the securityguardondutyatthesaidcarnival,shotandkilledAtty.NapoleonDulay. PetitionerMariaBenitaA.Dulay,widowofthedeceasedNapoleonDulay,inherownbehalfandin behalfofherminorchildren,filedonFebruary8,1989anactionfordamagesagainstBenignoTorzuela andhereinprivaterespondentsSafeguardInvestigationandSecurityCo.,Inc.,and/orSuperguard SecurityCorp.allegedemployersofdefendantTorzuela.Itisstatedinaportionofthecomplaintfiled thattheincidentresultinginthedeathofNapoleonDulaywasduetotheconcurringnegligenceofthe defendants. Petitionersprayedforactual,compensatory,moralandexemplarydamages,andattorneysfees. PrivaterespondentSUPERGUARDfiledaMotiontoDismissonthegroundthatthecomplaintdoes notstateavalidcauseofaction.SUPERGUARDclaimedthatTorzuelasactofshootingDulaywas beyondthescopeofhisduties,andthatsincetheallegedactofshootingwascommittedwithdeliberate intent(dolo),thecivilliabilitythereforisgovernedbyArticle100oftheRevisedPenalCode Petitionersprayedforactual,compensatory,moralandexemplarydamages,andattorneysfees. PrivaterespondentSUPERGUARDfiledaMotiontoDismissonthegroundthatthecomplaintdoes notstateavalidcauseofaction.SUPERGUARDclaimedthatTorzuelasactofshootingDulaywas beyondthescopeofhisduties,andthatsincetheallegedactofshootingwascommittedwithdeliberate intent(dolo),thecivilliabilitythereforisgovernedbyArticle100oftheRevisedPenalCode

Petitionersprayedforactual,compensatory,moralandexemplarydamages,andattorneysfees. RespondentSUPERGUARDfurtherallegedthatacomplaintfordamagesbasedonnegligenceunder Article2176oftheNewCivilCode,suchastheonefiledbypetitioners,cannotlie,sincethecivil liabilityunderArticle2176appliesonlytoquasioffensesunderArticle365oftheRevisedPenalCode. RespondentjudgegrantedtheMotiontoDIsmissandalsodeclaredthatthecomplaintwasonefor damagesfoundedoncrimespunishableunderArticles100and103oftheRevisedPenalCodeas distinguishedfromthosearisingfromquasidelict. TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedtheorderofthetrialcourt. ISSUE:WhetherornotArticle2176appliesonlywhentheactcommittedwasdonewithnegligence. HELD: Anexaminationofthecomplaintinthepresentcasewouldshowthattheplaintiffs,petitionersherein,are invokingtheirrighttorecoverdamagesagainsttheprivaterespondentsfortheirvicariousresponsibility fortheinjurycausedbyBenignoTorzuelasactofshootingandkillingNapoleonDulay. ThereisnojustificationforlimitingthescopeofArticle2176oftheCivilCodetoactsoromissions resultingfromnegligence.WellentrenchedisthedoctrinethatArticle2176coversnotonlyacts committedwithnegligence,butalsoactswhicharevoluntaryandintentional. CitingElcanovHill,theCourtstatedthatArticle2176,whereitreferstofaultornegligence,covers notonlyactsnotpunishablebylawbutalsoactscriminalincharacter,whetherintentionaland voluntaryornegligent.Consequently,aseparatecivilactionliesagainsttheoffenderinacriminalact, whetherornotheiscriminallyprosecutedandfoundguiltyoracquitted,providedthattheoffended partyisnotallowed,ifheisactuallychargedalsocriminally,torecoverdamagesonbothscores,and wouldbeentitledinsucheventualityonlytothebiggerawardofthetwo,assumingtheawardsmadein thetwocasesvary.Inotherwords,theextinctionofcivilliabilityreferredtoinPar.(e)ofSection3, Rule111,refersexclusivelytocivilliabilityfoundedonArticle100oftheRevisedPenalCode,whereas thecivilliabilityforthesameactconsideredasquasidelictonlyandnotasacrimeisnotextinguished evenbyadeclarationinthecriminalcasethatthecriminalactchargedhasnothappenedorhasnotbeen committedbytheaccused. SinceArticle2176coversnotonlyactsofnegligencebutalsoactswhichareintentionalandvoluntary,it

wasthereforeerroneousonthepartofthetrialcourttodismisspetitionerscomplaintsimplybecauseit failedtomakeallegationsofattendantnegligenceattributabletoprivaterespondents.

VI.KennethRoySentillas

Garciav.Florido L35095/August31,1973/52SCRA420

Doctrine: Anoffendedpartyloseshisrighttointerveneintheprosecutionofacriminalcasenotonlywhenhehas waivedthecivilactionorexpresslyreservedhisrighttoinstitute,butalsowhenhehasactuallyinstituted thecivilaction.

Facts: OnAugust4,1971,petitioners,GermanC.Garcia,ChiefoftheMisamisOccidentalHospital,together withhiswife,LuminosaL.Garcia,andEsterFrancisco,bookkeeperofsaidhospital,hiredandboarded aPUcarownedandoperatedbyrespondent,MarcelinoInesin,anddrivenbyrespondent,Ricardo Vayson,foraroundtripfromOroquietaCitytoZamboangaCityforthepurposeofattendinga conference.Atabout9:30a.m.,whilethePUcarwasnegotiatingaslightcurveonthenationalhighway inBarrioGuisukan,Sindangan,ZamboangadelNorte,saidcarcollidedwithanoncomingpassenger busownedandoperatedbytheMactanTransitCo.,Inc.anddrivenbydefendant,PedroTumala.Asa resultoftheaforesaidcollision,petitionerssustainedvariousphysicalinjurieswhichnecessitatedtheir medicaltreatmentandhospitalization. PetitionerssubsequentlyfiledonSeptember1,1971withrespondentCourtofFirstInstanceofMisamis Occidentalanactionfordamagesagainsttheprivaterespondents,ownersanddrivers,respectively,of thePUcarandthepassengerbusthatfiguredinthecollision,withprayerforpreliminaryattachment.

OnSeptember29,1971,respondents,MactanTransitCo.,Inc.andPedroTumala,filedamotionto dismissonthegroundthattheplaintiffs(petitioners)hadnocauseofaction.Theprincipalargument advancedinsaidmotiontodismisswasthatthepetitionershadnocauseofactionforonAugust11, 1971,or20daysbeforethefilingofthepresentactionfordamages,respondentPedroTumalawas chargedinacriminalcasefor"doubleseriousandlessseriousphysicalinjuriesthroughreckless imprudence",andthat,withthefilingoftheaforesaidcriminalcase,nocivilactioncouldbefiled subsequenttheretounlessthecriminalcasehasbeenfinallyadjudicated. OnOctober14,1971,petitionersfiledanoppositiontosaidmotiontodismissallegingthatthe aforesaidactionfordamageswasinstitutednottoenforcethecivilliabilityoftherespondentsunderArt. 100oftheRevisedPenalCodebutfortheircivilliabilityonquasidelictspursuanttoArticles 21762194,asthesamenegligentactcausingdamagesmayproducecivilliabilityarisingfromacrime undertheRevisedPenalCodeorcreateanactionforquasidelictorculpaextracontractualunderthe CivilCode,andthepartyseekingrecoveryisfreetochoosewhichremedytoenforce. Indismissingthecomplaintfordamages,thelowercourtsustainedtheargumentsofrespondents, MactanTransitCo.,Inc.andPedroTumala,anddeclaredthatthere"shouldbeashowingthatthe offendedpartyexpresslywaivedthecivilactionorreservedhisrighttoinstituteitseparately"and becauseoftheprayerinthecomplaintaskingtheCourttodeclarethedefendantsjointlyandseverally liableformoral,compensatoryandexemplarydamages,theCourtisoftheopinionthattheactionwas notbasedon"culpaaquilianaorquasidelict." Issue: Whetherornottherespondenttrialcourterredindismissingpetitionerscomplaintfordamagesbecause there"shouldbeashowingthattheoffendedpartyexpresslywaivedthecivilactionorreservedhisright toinstituteitseparately". Decision:

Thetrialcourterredindismissingthecomplaintfordamages. TheessentialavermentsforaquasidelictualactionunderArticles21762194oftheNewCivilCode arepresent.Certainlyexcessivespeedinviolationoftrafficrulesisaclearindicationofnegligence.

SincethesamenegligentactresultedinthefilingofthecriminalactionbytheChiefofPolicewiththe MunicipalCourtandthecivilactionbypetitioners,itisinevitablethattheavermentsonthedrivers' negligenceinbothcomplaintswouldsubstantiallybethesame.Itshouldbeemphasizedthatthesame negligentactcausingdamagesmayproduceacivilliabilityarisingfromacrimeunderArt.100ofthe RevisedPenalCodeorcreateanactionforquasidelictorculpaextracontractualunderArts. 21762194oftheNewCivilCode. ItistruethatunderSec.2inrelationtoSec.1ofRule111oftheRevisedRulesofCourtwhichbecame effectiveonJanuary1,1964,inthecasesprovidedforbyArticles31,33,39and2177oftheCivil Code,anindependentcivilactionentirelyseparateanddistinctfromthecivilaction,maybeinstitutedby theinjuredpartyduringthependencyofthecriminalcase,providedsaidpartyhasreservedhisrightto instituteitseparately,butitshouldbenoted,however,thatneitherSection1norSection2ofRule111 fixesatimelimitwhensuchreservationshallbemade. Inthecaseatbar,thereisnoquestionthatpetitionersneverintervenedinthecriminalactioninstituted bytheChiefofPoliceagainstrespondentPedroTumala,muchlesshasthesaidcriminalactionbeen terminatedeitherbyconvictionoracquittalofsaidaccused.Itis,therefore,evidentthatbytheinstitution ofthepresentcivilactionfordamages,petitionershaveineffectabandonedtheirrighttopressrecovery fordamagesinthecriminalcase,andhaveoptedinsteadtorecovertheminthepresentcivilcase. Asaresultofthisactionofpetitionersthecivilliabilityofprivaterespondentstotheformerhasceased tobeinvolvedinthecriminalaction.Undoubtedlyanoffendedpartyloseshisrighttointerveneinthe prosecutionofacriminalcasenotonlywhenhehaswaivedthecivilactionorexpresslyreservedhis righttoinstitute,butalsowhenhehasactuallyinstitutedthecivilaction.Forbyeitherofsuchactionshis interestinthecriminalcasehasdisappeared.

VII.AngiereenMedina

NATIVIDADV.ANDAMOandEMMANUELR.ANDAMOvs.INTERMEDIATEand MISSIONARIESOFOURLADYOFLASALETTE,INC.,

Facts:

Withinthelandofrespondentcorporation(MissionariesofourLadyofLaSalette,Inc.),waterpaths andcontrivances,includinganartificiallake,wereconstructed,whichallegedlyinundatedanderoded petitioner'sland,causedayoungmantodrown,damagedpetitioners'cropsandplants,washedaway costlyfences,endangeredthelivesofpetitionersandtheirlaborersduringrainyandstormyseasons,and exposedplantsandotherimprovementstodestruction. PetitionersAndamoinstitutedacriminalactionintheRTCagainsttheofficersanddirectorsofherein respondentcorporation,fordestructionbymeansofinundationunderArticle324oftheRevisedPenal Code.Subsequently,petitionersfiledanotheractionagainstrespondentcorporation,thistimeacivil casefordamageswithprayerfortheissuanceofawritofpreliminaryinjunctionbeforethesamecourt. Respondentcorporationfiledamotiontodismissorsuspendthecivilactionduetothependencyofthe criminalaction.TheRTCissuedanordertodismissthecivilactionforlackofjurisdiction,asthe criminalcasewhichwasinstitutedaheadofthecivilcasewasstillunresolved.Saidorderwasanchored ontheprovisionofSection3(a),RuleIIIoftheRulesofCourtwhichprovidesthat"criminalandcivil actionsarisingfromthesameoffensemaybeinstitutedseparately,butafterthecriminalactionhasbeen commencedthecivilactioncannotbeinstituteduntilfinaljudgmenthasbeenrenderedinthecriminal action." TheCAaffirmedtheordertodismiss.

Issue: WhetheracorporationcanbeheldcivillyliablefordamagesunderArticles2176and2177oftheCivil Codeonquasidelictssuchthattheresultingcivilcasecanproceedindependentlyofthecriminalcase.

Resolution:

AcarefulexaminationoftheaforequotedcomplaintshowsthatthecivilactionisoneunderArticles 2176and2177oftheCivilCodeonquasidelicts.Alltheelementsofaquasidelictarepresent,towit:

(a)damagessufferedbytheplaintiff(b)faultornegligenceofthedefendant,orsomeotherpersonfor whoseactshemustrespondand(c)theconnectionofcauseandeffectbetweenthefaultornegligence ofthedefendantandthedamagesincurredbytheplaintiff. Clearly,frompetitionerscomplaint,thewaterpathsandcontrivancesbuiltbyrespondentcorporation areallegedtohaveinundatedthelandofpetitioners.Thereistherefore,anassertionofacausal connectionbetweentheactofbuildingthesewaterpathsandthedamagesustainedbypetitioners.Such actionifprovenconstitutesfaultornegligencewhichmaybethebasisfortherecoveryof damages.Article2176oftheCivilCodeimposesacivilliabilityonapersonfordamagecausedbyhis actoromissionconstitutingfaultornegligence,thus:

"Article2176.Whoeverbyactoromissioncausesdamagetoanother,therebeingfaultornegligence,is obligedtopayforthedamagedone.Suchfaultornegligence,ifthereisnopreexistingcontractual relationbetweentheparties,iscalledaquasidelictandisgovernedbytheprovisionsofthischapter.

Article2176,wheneveritrefersto"faultornegligence",coversnotonlyacts"notpunishablebylaw"but alsoactscriminalincharacter,whetherintentionalandvoluntaryornegligent.Consequently,aseparate civilactionliesagainsttheoffenderinacriminalact,whetherornotheiscriminallyprosecutedand foundguiltyoracquitted,providedthattheoffendedpartyisnotallowed,(ifthetortfeasorisactually chargedalsocriminally),torecoverdamagesonbothscores,andwouldbeentitledinsucheventuality onlytothebiggerawardofthetwo,assumingtheawardsmadeinthetwocasesvary. ThedistinctnessofquasidelictsisshowninArticle2177oftheCivilCode,whichstates: "Article2177.Responsibilityforfaultornegligenceundertheprecedingarticleisentirelyseparateand distinctfromthecivilliabilityarisingfromnegligenceunderthePenalCode.Buttheplaintiffcannot recoverdamagestwiceforthesameactoromissionofthedefendant." ThisCourtheldthataquasidelictorculpaaquilianaisaseparatelegalinstitutionundertheCivilCode withasubstantivityallitsown,andindividualitythatisentirelyapartandindependentfromadelictor crimeadistinctionexistsbetweenthecivilliabilityarisingfromacrimeandtheresponsibilityfor quasidelictsorculpaextracontractual.Thesamenegligencecausingdamagesmayproducecivil

liabilityarisingfromacrimeunderthePenalCode,orcreateanactionforquasidelictsorculpa extracontractualundertheCivilCode.Therefore,theacquittalorconvictioninthecriminalcaseis entirelyirrelevantinthecivilcase,unless,ofcourse,intheeventofanacquittalwherethecourthas declaredthatthefactfromwhichthecivilactionarosedidnotexist,inwhichcasetheextinctionofthe criminalliabilitywouldcarrywithittheextinctionofthecivilliability.

VIII.NoyPandi

Taylorv.ManilaElectricRailroadandLightCo. G.R.No.4977March22,1910 Ponente:JusticeCarson FACTS: The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electriclightsysteminthecityofManila. The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the son of a mechanical engineer, MORE MATURETHANTHEAVERAGEBOYOF HISAGEANDHAVINGACONSIDERABLEAPTITUDEANDTRAiNINGINMECHANICS. On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, crossed the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant. Finding on inquiry thatMr.Murphywasnot inhisquarters,theboys,impelledapparentlyby youthful curiosity, spent some time in wandering about the companys premises. After watching the operation of travelling crane used in the handling the defendants coal, they walked across the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. After some discussion astotheownershipofthecapsandtheirrighttotakethem,theboyspickedupallthey could find and hung them on a stick, of which each took one end, and carried them home. The boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They thrust the ends of the wires intoanelectriclight socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. They then opened one of the cups with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance, they got

matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious physical injuries to the plaintiff and his companions. David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule,oneofwhichinjuredhisrighteyetosuchan extentastonecessitateitsremovalbythesurgeonswhowerecalledintocareforhiswounds.

ISSUE:WONplaintiffisentitledtorecoverdamages?

HELD: NO. When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiffs own act, which contributed to the principal occurrence as one of its determining factor, he cannot recover damagesfortheinjury. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap, that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which wouldhaveavoidedtheinjury which resulted from his own deliberate act and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his ownwillfulandrecklessact,sothatwhileit maybetruethat these injuries would not have been incurred butforthenegligentactofthedefendantinleavingthecaps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiffs own act was the proximate and principal cause of the accidentwhichinflictedtheinjury. The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own fault, and thathecannotdemandreparationthereforfromanother.(Law25,tit.5,Partida3.) And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own negligence he should blame himselfforit.(Rule22,tit.4,Partida7.) According to the ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance shouldbeagainsthimselfandnotagainstanother.(Law2,tit.7,Partida2)

IX.RoseAbiera

G.R.No.L50959July23,1980

HEIRSOFPEDROTAYAG,SR.,petitioners, vs. HONORABLEFERNANDOS.ALCANTARA,PHILIPPINERABBITBUSLINES,INC. andROMEOVILLAYCUNANAN,respondents.

Facts: The petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar, Pedro Tayag, Jr., Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with the Court of First Instance of Tarlac, presided over by the respondent Judge, a complaint for damages against the private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan docketed therein as Civil Case No. 5114 alleging among others that in theafternoonofSeptember2,1974,whilePedroTayagSr.was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus and as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was at the time of the accidentbeingdriven by Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a fasterandgreaterspeedthanwhatwasreasonableandproperandina gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due regardsto injuries topersonsand damagetopropertiesandinviolationoftrafficrulesandregulations.

Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial on the ground that the criminal case against the driverofthebusRomeoVillawasstillpendinginsaidcourt,andthatSection3,RuleIll of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is terminated. The respondent Judge grantedthemotion,andconsequently,suspendedthehearingofCivil CaseNo.5114.

In Criminal Case No. 836, the respondent Judge rendered a decision acquitting the accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt. Thereafter, the private respondents

filed a motion to dismissCivilCaseNo.5114onthegroundthatthepetitionershavenocauseofaction against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the criminalaction.Thepetitionersopposed the motion alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but onquasidelict.Therespondent Judge issued an order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114. The petitioners moved to reconsiderhowever,thesamewasdeniedbyrespondentJudge.Hence,thispresentpetition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuseofdiscretionindismissingCivilCaseNo.5114.

Held: Yes. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. The provision refers to a civilactionbased,notontheactoromissionchargedasafelonyin acriminalcase, but one based on an obligation arising from other sources, like quasidelict. The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damagesbasedonquasidelict. All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent (2) damage caused bythesaidactor commission (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission and (4) no preexistingcontractualrelationbetweentheparties. Thus, the Court ruled that the respondent Judge actedwithgraveabuseofdiscretion amountingtolack of jurisdictionindismissingCivilCaseNo.5114.Theorderofdismissalisalsosetaside,and thecaseis remandedtothelowercourtforfurtherproceedings,withcostsagainsttheprivaterespondents.

UnderArt.2177

I.MartinMichaelHatol

Barredov.Garcia L48006 July8,1942

Facts:

OnMay3,1936,ontheroadbetweenMalabonandNavotas,ProvinceofRizal,therewasaheadon collisionbetweenataxioftheMalateTaxicabdrivenbyPedroFontanillaandacarretelaguidedby PedroDimapalis.Thecarretelawasoverturned,andoneofitspassengers,16yearoldboyFaustino Garcia,sufferedinjuriesfromwhichhediedtwodayslater.AcriminalactionwasfiledagainstFontanilla intheCourtofFirstInstanceofRizal,andhewasconvictedandsentencedtoanindeterminatesentence ofoneyearandonedaytotwoyearsofprisioncorreccional.Thecourtinthecriminalcasegrantedthe petitionthattherighttobringaseparatecivilactionbereserved.SeverinoGarciaandTimoteaAlmario, parentsofthedeceasedonMarch7,1939,broughtanactionintheCourtofFirstInstanceofManila againstFaustoBarredoasthesoleproprietoroftheMalateTaxicabandemployerofPedroFontanilla. TheCourtofFirstInstanceofManilaawardeddamagesinfavoroftheplaintiffsforP2,000pluslegal interestandlateronmodifiedbytheCourtofAppealsbyreducingthedamagestoP1,000withlegal interest.ItisundisputedthatFontanilla'snegligencewasthecauseofthemishap,ashewasdrivingon thewrongsideoftheroad,andathighspeed.AstoBarredo'sresponsibility,theCourtofAppeals foundhewascarelessinemployingFontanillawhohadbeencaughtseveraltimesforviolationofthe AutomobileLawandspeedingviolationwhichappearedintherecordsoftheBureauofPublicWorks availabletobepublicandtohimself.

ThemaintheoryofthedefenseisthattheliabilityofFaustoBarredoisgovernedbytheRevisedPenal Codehence,hisliabilityisonlysubsidiary,andastherehasbeennocivilactionagainstPedro

Fontanilla,thepersoncriminallyliable,Barredocannotbeheldresponsibleinthecase. Issue:

WhetherornottheplaintiffsmaybringthisseparatecivilactionagainstFaustoBarredo,thusmakinghim primarilyanddirectly,responsibleunderarticle1903oftheCivilCodeasanemployerofPedro Fontanilla. Held:

Authoritiessupportthepropositionthataquasidelictor"culpaaquiliana"isaseparatelegalinstitution undertheCivilCodewithasubstantivityallitsown,andindividualitythatisentirelyapartand independentfromdelictorcrime.Uponthisprincipleandonthewordingandspiritarticle1903ofthe CivilCode,theprimaryanddirectresponsibilityofemployersmaybesafelyanchored.

SomeofthedifferencesbetweencrimesunderthePenalCodeandtheculpaaquilianaorcuasidelito undertheCivilCodeare:

1.Thatcrimesaffectthepublicinterest,whilecuasidelitosareonlyofprivateconcern. 2.That,consequently,thePenalCodepunishesorcorrectsthecriminalact,whiletheCivilCode,by meansofindemnification,merelyrepairsthedamage. 3.Thatdelictsarenotasbroadasquasidelicts,becausetheformerarepunishedonlyifthereisapenal lawclearlycoveringthem,whilethelatter,cuasidelitos,includeallactsinwhich"anykingoffaultor negligenceintervenes."However,itshouldbenotedthatnotallviolationsofthepenallawproducecivil responsibility,suchasbeggingincontraventionofordinances,violationofthegamelaws,infractionof therulesoftrafficwhennobodyishurt.

IntheleadingcaseofRakesvs.AtlanticGulfandPacificCo.itwasheld:

Itiscontendedbythedefendant,asitsfirstdefensetotheactionthatthenecessaryconclusionfrom

thesecollatedlawsisthattheremedyforinjuriesthroug

hnegligenceliesonlyinacriminalactioninwhichtheofficialcriminallyresponsiblemustbemade primarilyliableandhisemployerheldonlysubsidiarilytohim.

Accordingtothistheorytheplaintiffshouldhaveprocuredthearrestoftherepresentativeofthe companyaccountablefornotrepairingthetrack,andonhisprosecutionasuitablefineshouldhavebeen imposed,payableprimarilybyhimandsecondarilybyhisemployer.

ThisreasoningmisconceivedtheplanoftheSpanishcodesuponthissubject.Article1093oftheCivil Codemakesobligationsarisingfromfaultsornegligencenotpunishedbythelaw,subjecttothe provisionsofChapterIIofTitleXVI.Section1902ofthatchapterreads:

"Apersonwhobyanactoromissioncausesdamagetoanotherwhenthereisfaultornegligenceshall beobligedtorepairthedamagesodone.

"SEC.1903.Theobligationimposedbythepreceedingarticleisdemandable,notonlyforpersonalacts andomissions,butalsoforthoseofthepersonsforwhomtheyshouldberesponsible

"Thefather,andonhisdeathorincapacity,themother,isliableforthedamagescausedbytheminors wholivewiththem.

xxx

xxx

xxx

"Ownersordirectorsofanestablishmentorenterpriseareequallyliableforthedamagescausedbytheir employeesintheserviceofthebranchesinwhichthelattermaybeemployedorintheperformanceof theirduties.

xxxxxx

xxx

"Theliabilityreferredtointhisarticleshallceasewhenthepersonsmentionedthereinprovethatthey employedallthediligenceofagoodfatherofafamilytoavoidthedamage."

Fromthisarticletwothingsareapparent:

(1)Thatwhenaninjuryiscausedbythenegligenceofaservantoremployeethereinstantlyarisesa presumptionoflawthattherewasnegligenceonthepartofthematteroremployereitherintheselection oftheservantoremployee,orinsupervisionoverhimaftertheselection,orbothand

(2)thatpresumptionisjuristantumandnotjurisetdejure,andconsequently,mayberebutted.It followsnecessarilythatiftheemployershowstothesatisfactionofthecourtthatinselectionand supervisionhehasexercisedthecareanddiligenceofagoodfatherofafamily,thepresumptionis overcomeandheisrelievefromliability.

Thebasisofcivillawliabilityisnotrespondentsuperiorbuttherelationshipofpaterfamilias.Thistheory basestheliabilityofthemasterultimatelyonhisownnegligenceandnotonthatofhisservant.(Bahiavs. LitonjuaandLeynes[1915],30Phil.,624Cangcovs.ManilaRailroadCo.[1918],38Phil.,768.)

Firstly,theRevisedPenalCodeinarticle365punishesnotonlyrecklessbutalsosimplenegligence.If weweretoholdthatarticles1902to1910oftheCivilCodereferonlytofaultornegligencenot punishedbylaw,accordingtotheliteralimportofarticle1093oftheCivilCode,thelegalinstitutionof culpaaquilianawouldhaveverylittlescopeandapplicationinactuallife.Deathorinjurytopersonsand damagetopropertythroughanydegreeofnegligenceeventheslightestwouldhavetobe indemnifiedonlythroughtheprincipleofcivilliabilityarisingfromacrime.Insuchastateofaffairs,what spherewouldremainforcuasidelitoorculpaaquiliana?Weareloathtoimputetothelawmakerany intentiontobringaboutasituationsoabsurdandanomalous.Norarewe,intheinterpretationofthe

laws,disposedtoupholdtheletterthatkillethratherthanthespiritthatgivethlife.Wewillnotusethe literalmeaningofthelawtosmotherandrenderalmostlifelessaprincipleofsuchancientoriginandsuch fullgrowndevelopmentasculpaaquilianaorcuasidelito,whichisconservedandmadeenduringin articles1902to1910oftheSpanishCivilCode.

Secondly,tofindtheaccusedguiltyinacriminalcase,proofofguiltbeyondreasonabledoubtis required,whileinacivilcase,preponderanceofevidenceissufficienttomakethedefendantpayin damages.Therearenumerouscasesofcriminalnegligencewhichcannotbeshownbeyondreasonable doubt,butcanbeprovedbyapreponderanceofevidence.Insuchcases,thedefendantcanandshould bemaderesponsibleinacivilactionunderarticles1902to1910oftheCivilCode.Otherwise,there wouldbemanyinstancesofunvindicatedcivilwrongs.Ubijusibiremedium.

Thirdly,toholdthatthereisonlyonewaytomakedefendant'sliabilityeffective,andthatis,tosuethe driverandexhausthis(thelatter's)propertyfirst,wouldbetantamounttocompellingtheplaintiffto followadeviousandcumbersomemethodofobtainingrelief.True,thereissucharemedyunderour laws,butthereisalsoamoreexpeditiousway,whichisbasedontheprimaryanddirectresponsibility ofthedefendantunderarticle1903oftheCivilCode.Ourviewofthelawismorelikelytofacilitate remedyforcivilwrongs,becausetheprocedureindicatedbythedefendantiswastefulandproductiveof delay,itbeingamatterofcommonknowledgethatprofessionaldriversoftaxisandsimilarpublic conveyanceusuallydonothavesufficientmeanswithwhichtopaydamages.Inconstruingthelaws, courtshaveendeavoredtoshortenandfacilitatethepathwaysofrightandjustice.

Atthisjuncture,itshouldbesaidthattheprimaryanddirectresponsibilityofemployersandtheir presumednegligenceareprinciplescalculatedtoprotectsociety.Workmenandemployeesshouldbe carefullychosenandsupervisedinordertoavoidinjurytothepublic.Itisthemastersoremployerswho principallyreaptheprofitsresultingfromtheservicesoftheseservantsandemployees.Itisbutrightthat theyshouldguaranteethelatter'scarefulconductforthepersonnelandpatrimonialsafetyofothers. Manyjuristsalsobasethisprimaryresponsibilityoftheemployerontheprincipleofrepresentationof

theprincipalbytheagent.Alltheseobservationsacquireapeculiarforceandsignificancewhenitcomes tomotoraccidents,andthereisneedofstressingandaccentuatingtheresponsibilityofownersofmotor vehicles.

Fourthly,becauseofthebroadsweepoftheprovisionsofboththePenalCodeandtheCivilCodeon thissubject,whichhasgivenrisetotheoverlappingorconcurrenceofspheresalreadydiscussed,and forlackofunderstandingofthecharacterandefficacyoftheactionforculpaaquiliana,therehasgrown upacommonpracticetoseekdamagesonlybyvirtueofthecivilresponsibilityarisingfromacrime, forgettingthatthereisanotherremedy,whichisbyinvokingarticles19021910oftheCivilCode. Althoughthishabitualmethodisallowedbyourlaws,ithasneverthelessrenderedpracticallyuseless andnugatorythemoreexpeditiousandeffectiveremedybasedonculpaaquilianaorculpa extracontractual.Inthepresentcase,weareaskedtohelpperpetuatethisusualcourse.Butwebelieve itishightimewepointedouttotheharmdonebysuchpracticeandtorestoretheprincipleof responsibilityforfaultornegligenceunderarticles1902etseq.oftheCivilCodetoitsfullrigor.Itis hightimewecausedthestreamofquasidelictorculpaaquilianatoflowonitsownnaturalchannel,so thatitswatersmaynolongerbedivertedintothatofacrimeunderthePenalCode.Thiswill,itis believed,makeforthebettersafeguardingofprivaterightsbecauseitreestablishesanancientand additionalremedy,andforthefurtherreasonthatanindependentcivilaction,notdependingonthe issues,limitationsandresultsofacriminalprosecution,andentirelydirectedbythepartywrongedorhis counsel,ismorelikelytosecureadequateandefficaciousredress.

II.EvanorBonaobra

G.R.No.L39999May31,1984 ROYPADILLA,FILOMENOGALDONES,ISMAELGONZALGOandJOSEFARLEY BEDENIA,petitioners, vs. COURTOFAPPEALS,respondent.

FACTS: ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariofaCourtofAppeals'decisionwhichreversedthetrialcourt's judgmentofconvictionandacquittedthepetitionersofthecrimeofgravecoerciononthegroundof reasonabledoubtbutinspiteoftheacquittalorderedthemtopayjointlyandseverallytheamountof P9,000.00tothecomplainantsasactualdamages. Thepetitionerswerechargedunderthefollowinginformation: TheundersignedFiscalaccusedROYPADILLA,FILOMENOGALDONES,PEPITOBEDENIA, YOLLYRICO,DAVIDBERMUNDO,VILLANOAC,ROBERTOROSALES,VILLANIA, ROMEOGARRIDO,JOSEORTEGA,JR.,RICARDOCELESTINO,REALINGOalias "KAMLON",JOHNDOEaliasTATO,andFOURTEEN(14)RICARDODOESofthecrimeof GRAVECOERCION,committedasfollows: ThatonoraboutFebruary8,1964ataround9:00o'clockinthemorning,inthemunicipalityofJose Panganiban,provinceofCamarinesNorte,Philippines,RoyPadilla,FilomenoGaldones,Pepito Bedenia,YollyRico,DavidBermundo,Villanoac,RobertoRosales,Villania,RomeoGarrido,Jose Ortega,Jr.,RicardoCelestino,RealingoaliasKamlon,JohnDoealiasTato,andFourteenRichard Does,bymeansofthreats,forceandviolencepreventAntonioVergaraandhisfamilytoclosetheirstall locatedatthePublicMarket,BuildingNo.3,JosePanganiban,CamarinesNorte,andbysubsequently forciblyopeningthedoorofsaidstallandthereafterbrutallydemolishinganddestroyingsaidstalland thefurnituresthereinbyaxesandothermassiveinstruments,andcarryingawaythegoods,waresand merchandise,tothedamageandprejudiceofthesaidAntonioVergaraandhisfamily. TheCourtofFirstInstanceofCamarinesNortefoundtheaccusedRoyPadilla,FilomenoGaldonez, IsmaelGonzalgoandJoseParleyBedeniaguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthecrimeofgrave coercion. ThepetitionersappealedthejudgmentofconvictiontotheCourtofAppeals.Theycontendedthatthe trialcourt'sfindingofgravecoercionwasnotsupportedbytheevidence.Thepetitionersstatedthatthe lowercourterredinfindingthatthedemolitionofthecomplainants'stallwasaviolationofthevery directiveofthepetitionerMayorwhichgavethestallownersseventytwo(72)hourstovacatethe marketpremises.

ThedispositiveportionofthedecisionoftherespondentCourtofAppealsstates: WHEREFORE,weherebymodifythejudgmentappealedfrominthesensethattheappellantsare acquittedongroundofreasonabledoubt.buttheyareorderedtopayjointlyandseverallyto complainantstheamountofP9,600.00,asactualdamages. Thepetitionersfiledamotionforreconsiderationcontendingthattheacquittalofthe defendantsappellantsastocriminalliabilityresultsintheextinctionoftheircivilliability. ISSUE: WhetherornottheCourtofAppealscommittedareversibleerrorinrequiringthepetitionerstopaycivil indemnitytothecomplainantsafteracquittingthemfromthecriminalcharge. HELD: Inthecasebeforeus,thepetitionerswereacquittednotbecausetheydidnotcommittheactsstatedin thechargeagainstthem.Thereisnodisputeovertheforcibleopeningofthemarketstall,itsdemolition withaxesandotherinstruments,andthecartingawayofthemerchandize.Thepetitionerswere acquittedbecausetheseactsweredenominatedcoercionwhentheyproperlyconstitutedsomeother offensesuchasthreatormaliciousmischief. Theextinctionofthecivilactionbyreasonofacquittalinthecriminalcaserefersexclusivelytocivil liabilityexdelictofoundedonArticle100oftheRevisedPenalCode.Inotherwords,thecivilliability whichisalsoextinguisheduponacquittaloftheaccusedisthecivilliabilityarisingfromtheactasa crime. Aseasilyas1942,theSupremeCourtspeakingthroughJusticeJorgeBocoboinBarredov.Garcia,et at.73Phil.607laiddowntherulethatthesamepunishableactoromissioncancreatetwokindsofcivil liabilitiesagainsttheaccusedand,whereprovidedbylaw,hisemployer.'Thereisthecivilliabilityarising fromtheactasacrimeandtheliabilityarisingfromthesameactasaquasidelict.Eitheroneofthese twotypesofcivilliabilitymaybeenforcedagainsttheaccused,However,theoffendedpartycannot recoverdamagesunderbothtypesofliability. Thejudgmentofacquittalextinguishestheliabilityoftheaccusedfordamagesonlywhenitincludesa declarationthatthefactsfromwhichthecivilmightarisedidnotexist.Thus,thecivilliabilityisnot extinguishedbyacquittalwheretheacquittalisbasedonreasonabledoubtasonlypreponderanceof

evidenceisrequiredincivilcaseswherethecourtexpresslydeclaresthattheliabilityoftheaccusedis notcriminalbutonlycivilinnatureand,wherethecivilliabilitydoesnotarisefromorisnotbasedupon thecriminalactofwhichtheaccusedwasacquitted. ThereisnothingcontrarytotheCivilCodeprovision(Article29)intherenditionofajudgmentof acquittalandajudgmentawardingdamagesinthesamecriminalaction.Thetwocanstandsidebyside. Ajudgmentofacquittaloperatestoextinguishthecriminalliability.Itdoesnot,however,extinguishthe civilliabilityunlessthereisclearshowingthattheactfromwhichcivilliabilitymightarisedidnotexist.

III.FidsEsteban

IV.GailDivino

PhilippineRabbitBusLinesvsPeople G.R.No.147703 April14,2004 FACTS: OnJuly27,1994,accusedNapoleonRomanyMacadangdangwasfoundguiltyandconvictedofthe crimeofrecklessimprudenceresultingtotriplehomicide,multiplephysicalinjuriesanddamageto property.Admittedly,accusedhadjumpedbailandremainedatlarge.Itisworthmentioningthat Section8,Rule124oftheRulesofCourtauthorizesthedismissalofappealwhenappellantjumpsbail. Counselforaccused,hiredandprovidedbypetitionerfiledanoticeofappealwhichwasdeniedbythe trialcourt.TheSupremeCourtaffirmedthedenialofthenoticeofappealfiledinbehalfofaccused. Simultaneously,onAugust6,1994,petitionerfileditsnoticeofappealfromthejudgmentofthetrial court.TheCourtofAppealsheldthatsincethenoticeofappealfiledbytheaccusedhadalreadybeen dismissedbytheCA,thenthejudgmentofconvictionandtheawardofcivilliabilitybecamefinaland executory.Includedinthecivilliabilityoftheaccusedwastheemployer'ssubsidiaryliability.Hence,the petitionwiththeSupremeCourt.

ISSUE: Whetherornotanemployer,whodutifullyparticipatedinthedefenseofitsaccusedemployee,may appealthejudgmentofconvictionindependentlyoftheaccused.

HELD: Wellestablishedinourjurisdictionistheprinciplethattheappellatecourtmay,uponmotionormotu proprio,dismissanappealduringitspendencyiftheaccusedjumpsbail.Inthecasebeforeus,the accusedemployeehasescapedandrefusedtosurrendertotheproperauthoritiesthus,heisdeemed tohaveabandonedhisappeal.Consequently,thejudgmentagainsthimhasbecomefinalandexecutory. Thecasesdealingwiththesubsidiaryliabilityofemployersuniformlydeclarethat,strictlyspeaking,they arenotpartiestothecriminalcasesinstitutedagainsttheiremployees.Althoughinsubstanceandin effect,theyhaveaninteresttherein,thisfactshouldbeviewedinthelightoftheirsubsidiaryliability. Whiletheymayassisttheiremployeestotheextentofsupplyingthelatter'slawyers,asinthepresent case,theformercannotactindependentlyontheirownbehalf,butcanonlydefendtheaccused. Moreover,anappealfromthesentenceofthetrialcourtimpliesawaiveroftheconstitutionalsafeguard againstdoublejeopardyandthrowsthewholecaseopentoareviewbytheappellatecourt.Ifthe presentappealisgivencourse,thewholecaseagainsttheaccusedemployeebecomesopentoreview. Itthusfollowsthatapenaltyhigherthanthatwhichhasalreadybeenimposedbythetrialcourtmaybe metedouttohim.Petitioner'sappealwouldthusviolatehisrightagainstdoublejeopardy,sincethe judgmentagainsthimcouldbecomesubjecttomodificationwithouthisconsent.Toallowemployersto disputethecivilliabilityfixedinacriminalcasewouldenablethemtoamend,nullifyordefeatafinal judgmentrenderedbyacompetentcourt. Thefactremainsthatsincetheaccusedemployee'sconvictionhasattainedfinality,thenthesubsidiary liabilityoftheemployeripsofactoattaches.Thereisonlyonecriminalcaseagainstthe accusedemployee.Afindingofguilthasbothcriminalandcivilaspects.Itistheheightofabsurdityfor thissinglecasetobefinalastotheaccusedwhojumpedbail,butnotastoanentitywhoseliabilityis dependentupontheconvictionoftheformer.Inotherwords,theemployerbecomesipsofacto subsidiarilyliableupontheconvictionoftheemployeeanduponproofofthelatter'sinsolvency,inthe

samewaythatacquittalwipesoutnotonlyhisprimarycivilliability,butalsohisemployer'ssubsidiary liabilityforhiscriminalnegligence. Petitioneradmitsthatbyhelpingtheaccusedemployee,itparticipatedintheproceedingsbeforethe RTCthus,itcannotbesaidthattheemployerwasdeprivedofdueprocess.Itmighthavelostitsright toappeal,butitwasnotdenieditsdayincourt.Infact,itcanbesaidthatbyjumpingbail,the accusedemployee,notthecourt,deprivedpetitioneroftherighttoappeal.

V.JoseBelarmino

Peoplev.Ligon152SCRA419July29,1987

Facts: Accusedappellant,FernandoGabatwasconvictedofthecrimeofRobberywithhomicideand wassentencedtoreclusionperpetua.GabatallegedlyrobbedJoseRosalesOrtiz,a17year oldworkingstudent,acigarettevendor.AccordingtoPrudencioCastillo,ataxidriver,who allegedlysawtheincidentthattranspiredonthenightOrtizdied.AccordingtoCastillo,hewas atadistanceofabout3meterstravellingonthesamelaneandwasbehindtheKombidriven byRogelioLigontogetherwithGabat.

Castillo,inhistestimony,saidthatGabatgrabbedtheboxofcigarettesfromRosales.That whilewaitingforthetrafficlighttochangefromredtogreen,Castilloidlywatchedthe VolkswagonKombiandsawGabatsignaltoOrtiz.WhileOrtizwashandlingthecigarettesto Gabat,thetrafficlightchangedtogreenandastheKombimovedforward,Gabatgrabbedthe boxfromOrtiz.OrtizranbesidetheJombiandwasabletoholdontothewindowsillwithhis righthand.HowevermastheKombicontinuedtospeedtowardstheC.M.Rectorunderpass, GabatforciblyremovethehandofRosalesfromthesaidwindowsillandasaresultfellface downontheground.

Ontheotherhand,accordingtoGabat,afterOrtizhandedthetwostickscigarettesGabatin turnpaidhima5pesobill.Inordertochangethesaidbill,Ortizplacedhisboxbetweenthe armofGabatandthewindowframe.Whenthetrafficlightchangedtogreen,Ligonmovedthe vehicleforward.ThatinspiteofGabatsordertostopthevehicle,Ligonsaidthatitcouldnot bedoneduethethemovingvehiculartraffic.WhenOrtizfelldown,GabatshoutedatLigon butthelatterrepliedthattheyshouldgoontoLasPinasandreporttheincidenttotheparents ofGabatandthatlatertheywouldcomebacktothesceneoftheincident.Atthispoint,the KombiwasblockedbyCastillostaxiandthejeepdrivenbythepoliceman.

ThetrialcourtgavefullcredencetoCastillostestimonyanddismissedGabatstestimonyon thegroundthatitisofcommonknowledgethatcigarettevendorsdonotletgooftheir cigarette.GabatwasconvictedbythetrialcourtHence,thisappeal.

Issue:

Whetherapersonwhoisnotcriminallyliableisalsofreefromcivilliability.

Held:

AccordingtotheCourtofAppeals,althoughCastilloisadisinterestedwitness,histestimony evenifnottaintedwithbiasisnotentirelyfreefromdoubtbecausehisobservationofthe eventcouldhavebeenfaulty.Castillostaxiwasdrivingacarlowerinheightcomparedtothe Kombi.ThewindshieldoftheKombi(1978model)isoccupyingapproximately1/3oftherear endofthevehiclemakingitvisuallydifficultforCastillotoobservewhatclearlytranspired. Also,Castillosstatementgiventothepoliceontheeveningoftheincidentdidnotmention thathesawGabatforciblypryingoffthehandofRosalesfromthewindowsillthoughsuch appearedinthepolicereport. Giventhecircumstances,theCourtisnotconvincedwithmoralcertaintythattheguiltof

Gabatwasestablishedbeyondreasonabledoubt.Assuchheisacquitted.However,suchdoes notnecessarilyexempthimfromcivilliabilityassuchonlyrequiresapreponderanceof evidenceandsuchevidenceissufficienttoestablishGabatsliability.TheCourtfindsGabats actandomissionwithfaultandnegligencecauseddamagetoOrtiz.Thathefailedtoprevent thedriverfrommovingforwardwhilethepurchasewascompletedHefailedtohelpOrtiz whilethelatterclungtothemovingvehicleedidnotenforcehisordertoLigontostopand thatheacquiescedinthedriversactofspeedingawayinsteadofstoppingandpickingup Ortiz. HisacquittalinthecriminalprosecutiondoesnotbartheheirsofOrtizfromrecovering damages.Thejudgmentofacquittalextinguishesthecivilliabilityonlywhenitincludesa declarationthatthefactsfromwhichthecivilliabilitymightarisedidnotexist. Wherefore,GabatissentencedtoindemnifytheheirsofOrtiztheamountofP15,000forthe lattersdeath,P1,733forhospitalandmedicalexpenses,4,100forfuneralexpenses,andthe allegedlossofincomeamountingtoP20,000.

UnderArt.11701174

I.ReynoldOrsua

Cangcovs.ManilaRailroadCo. F: Plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was a clerk of the Manila Railroad Company. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, Rizal, which is located upon the line of thedefendantrailroadcompanyandhehasfreepassin the use of the train, supplied by the company. On January 20,1915,asthetraindrewuptothestation in San Mateo the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second classcar where he wasriding and,making his exit through the door,tookhispositionuponthestepsofthecoach,seizingtheuprightguardrailwith

his right hand for support. Jose Cangco stepped off, but one or both of his feetcameincontactwitha sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop. He was hospitalized and his arm wasamputated. He filed acomplaintto recoverdamagesintheCFIofManilafoundinghisactionuponthenegligenceof the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. CFI enteredinfavorofthedefendantcompanyconsideringthatpetitionerisguiltyofcontributory negligence.Hence,plaintiffappealed. I:WhetherornotManilaRailroadCoisliablefordamages. H: Yes. It is important to note that the foundation of thelegalliabilityofthedefendantisthecontractof carriage, and that the obligation arises from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendanttoexerciseduecareinitsperformance. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to to culpacontractualbutonlytoculpaaquiliana. In this case, the Court had the occasion of differentiating culpa aquiliana and culpa contractual. In the former, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee thereinstantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him, after the selection, or both and (2) that that presumption is rebuttable. In the latter, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contract, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regarddoesnotrelievethemasterofhisliabilityforthebreachofhiscontract. When the source of the obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the

benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed orrefused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contractisdueto willfulfaultortonegligenceonthepartofthedefendant,orofhis,servantsoragents. The contractofdefendanttotransportplaintiffcarriedwith it,byimplication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and itsnonperformance could not be excusedbyproofthatthefaultwasmorallyimputabletodefendant'sservants. The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving itstrains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failingto wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case,iftheaccidentwascausedbyplaintiff'sown negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merelycontributedtohisinjury,thedamagesshould beapportioned. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Our conclusion is that the conduct oftheplaintiffinundertakingtoalightwhilethetrainwas yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributorynegligence.Respondentisliablefordamages.

II.IanLuisAguila Foresvs.Miranda Facts: Mirandawasoneofthepassengersofthejeepthathitthebridgewallbecauseofitsexcessivespeed thedriverlostcontrolofsuch.Mirandawasinjuredandfracturedpartofbody.PazForeswasthe

registeredownerofthejeep,butsheclaimsthatshesoldittoSachermanthedaybeforetheaccident. TheCFIofmanilaawardedactualdamagesamountingto10K.TheCA,however,modifiedthe judgmentoftheCFIbyawardingnotonlyactualdamagesbutalsomoraldamages.

Issue: whetherornottherespondentisentitledtomoraldamages

Held: Moraldamagesarenotrecoverableindamageactionspredictedonabreachofthecontractof transportation,inviewofArticles2219(1and2)and2220. Art.2219.Moraldamagesmayberecoveredinthefollowingandanalogouscases: (1)Acriminaloffenseresultinginphysicalinjuries (2)Quasidelictscausingphysicalinjuries xxxxxxxxx Art.2220.Willfulinjurytopropertymaybealegalgroundforawardingmoraldamagesifthecourt shouldfindthat,undercircumstances,suchdamagesarejustifydue.Thesameruleappliestobreaches ofcontractwherethedefendantactedfraudulentlyorinbadfaith. GR:Bycontrastingtheprovisionsofthesetwoarticleitimmediatelybecomesapparentthat: (a)Incaseofbreachofcontract(includingoneoftransportation)proofofbadfaithorfraud(dolus), i.e.,wantonordeliberatelyinjuriousconduct,isessentialtojustifyanawardofmoraldamagesand (b)Thatabreachofcontractcannotbeconsideredincludedinthedescriptiveterm"analogouscases" usedinArt.2219notonlybecauseArt.2220specificallyprovidesforthedamagesthatarecausedby contractualbreach,butbecausethedefinitionofquasidelictinArt.2176oftheCodeexpressly excludesthecaseswherethereisa"preexistingcontractualrelationbetweentheparties." EXCEPTION:mishapresultinginDEATHofPASSENGER,Art1764makesthecommoncarrier expresslysubjecttotheruleofArt.2206,thatentitlesthedeceasedpassengerto"demandmoral damagesformentalanguishbyreasonofthedeathofthedeceased.Wheretheinjuredpassengerdoes notdie,moraldamagesarenotrecoverableunlessitisprovedthatthecarrierwasguiltyofmaliceor

badfaith.Merecarelessnessofthecarrier'sdriverdoesnotperseconstituteofjustifyaninferenceof maliceorbadfaithonthepartofthecarrier. III.LaraMagulta

FAREASTBANKANDTRUSTCO.VS.COURTOFAPPEALS,LUISLUNAAND CARLITALUNA Vitug,J.

FACTS: PrivateRespondentLuisLunaappliedfor,andwasaccorded,aFAREASTCARDissuedby petitionerFarEastBank.Uponrequest,asupplementalcardwasalsoissuedtoClaritaS.Luna. SometimeinAugust1988,Claritalosthercreditcard.Petitionerwasforthwithinformed.Inorderto replacethelostcard,Claritawasrequiredtosubmitanaffidavitofloss.Thereafter,inaccordancewith thebanksinternalsecurityprocedureandpolicy,thelostcardalongwiththeprincipalcardwaslabeled asaHotCardorCancelledCardinthemasterfile. OnOctober6,1998,Luistenderedadespedidalunchforaclosefriendandanotherguestatthe BahiaRooftopRestaurantoftheHotelIntercontinentalManila.Aspayment,Luispresentedhis FAREASTCARDtotheattendingwaiterwhopromptlyverifiedthroughatelephonecalltothebanks CreditCardDepartment.Sincethecardwasnothonored,Luiswasforcedtopayincashthebill amountingtoP588.13.Naturally,Luisfeltembarrasedbytheincident. Inaletter,dated11October1988,privaterespondentLuisLuna,throughcounsel,demandedfrom FEBTCthepaymentofdamages.AdrianV.Festejo,avicepresidentofthebank,expressedthe bank'sapologiestoLuisthroughaletter.AletterwaslikewisesentbyFastehototheManagerofthe BahiaRooftopRestauranttoassurethattherespondentswereveryvaluedclientsofFEBTC. Stillfeelingaggrieved,privaterespondentsfiledacomplaintfordamageswiththeRTCofPasig againstFEBTC.TheRTCrenderedajudgmentorderingFEBTCtopayprivaterespondentsmoral damages,exemplarydamagesandattorneysfees.TheCourtofAppealsaffirmedthedecisionofthe trialcourt.

ISSUE: Whetherornottheawardofdamagesisproper

HELD: Theawardofmoraldamagesisnotproper. Inculpacontractual,moraldamagesmayberecoveredwherethedefendantisshowntohave actedinbadfaithorwithmaliceinthebreachofthecontract(Article2220).Badfaith,inthiscontext, includesgross,butnotsimple,negligence. Concededly,thebankwasremissinindeedneglectingtopersonallyinformLuisofhisowncard's cancellation.Nothinginthefindingsofthetrialcourtandtheappellatecourt,however,cansufficiently indicateanydeliberateintentonthepartofFEBTCtocauseharmtoprivaterespondents.Neithercould FEBTC'snegligenceinfailingtogivepersonalnoticetoLuisbeconsideredsogrossastoamountto maliceorbadfaith. Maliceorbadfaithimpliesaconsciousandintentionaldesigntodoawrongfulactforadishonest purposeormoralobliquityitisdifferentfromthenegativeideaofnegligenceinthatmaliceorbadfaith contemplatesastateofmindaffirmativelyoperatingwithfurtivedesignorillwill. Article21onhumanrelationscannotlikewisebeinvokedbyrespondents.Article21ofthe Code,itshouldbeobserved,contemplatesaconsciousacttocauseharm.Thus,evenifweareto assumethattheprovisioncouldproperlyrelatetoabreachofcontract,itsapplicationcanbewarranted onlywhenthedefendant'sdisregardofhiscontractualobligationissodeliberateastoapproximatea degreeofmisconductcertainlynolessworsethanfraudorbadfaith.Mostimportantly, Article21isameredeclarationofageneralprincipleinhumanrelationsthatclearlymust,inanycase, givewaytothespecificprovisionofArticle2220oftheCivilCodeauthorizingthegrantofmoral damagesinculpacontractualsolelywhenthebreachisduetofraudorbadfaith.

Theawardofexemplarydamagesislikewiseimproper Exemplaryorcorrectivedamages,areintendedtoserveasanexampleorascorrectionforthepublic

goodinadditiontomoral,temperate,liquidatedorcompensatorydamages.Incriminaloffenses, exemplarydamagesareimposedwhenthecrimeiscommittedwithoneormoreaggravating circumstances(Art.2230,CivilCode).Inquasidelicts,suchdamagesaregrantedifthedefendantis showntohavebeensoguiltyofgrossnegligenceastoapproximatemalice.Incontractsand quasicontracts,thecourtmayawardexemplarydamagesifthedefendantisfoundtohaveactedina wanton,fraudulent,reckless,oppressive,ormalevolentmanner.

ThecourtawardedNominaldamagesandAttorneysfees Nevertheless,thebank'sfailure,evenperhapsinadvertent,tohonoritscreditcardissuedtoprivate respondentLuisshouldentitlehimtorecoverameasureofdamagessanctionedunderArticle2221of theCivilCodeprovidingthusly:

Art.2221.Nominaldamagesareadjudicatedinorderthatarightoftheplaintiff,whichhasbeen violatedorinvadedbythedefendant,maybevindicatedorrecognized,andnotforthepurposeof indemnifyingtheplaintiffforanylosssufferedbyhim.

Reasonableattorney'sfeesmayberecoveredwherethecourtdeemssuchrecoverytobejustand equitable(Art.2208,CivilCode).Weseenoissueofsounddiscretiononthepartoftheappellate courtinallowingtheawardthereofbythetrialcourt.

IV.LowellMadrileno

Facts: Rafael Carrascoso was a civil engineer and a member ofagroupof48FilipinopilgrimsthatleftManila for LourdesonMarch30,1958.OnMarch28,1958,thedefendant,AirFrance,throughitsauthorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,issuedtoplaintiffa"firstclass"roundtripairplaneticketfromManilato Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager ofthe

defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the"first class"seatthathewasoccupyingbecausetherewas a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat,theplaintiff,aswastobeexpected, refused,andtolddefendant'sManagerthathisseat would be taken over his dead body a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. CarrascosoandpacifiedMr.Carrascosotogivehisseattothewhiteman" Air France asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availabilityoffirstclassseats.BoththeRTCandtheCAruledinfavorofCarrascoso Issue: Whether or not Carrascoso is entitled to an award for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneysfees Ruling: It can be substantially derived from the facts that First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage covering, amongstothers,theBangkokTeheranlegSecond,That saidcontractwas breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok and Third, that there was bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascosotoleave hisfirstclassaccommodation berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the termbadfaithinthecomplaint.But,theinferenceofbadfaithisthere,itmaybe drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relationbetweentheparties.Butthestressoftheactionisputonwrongfulexpulsion.

Carrascoso was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to the

defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without his consent but againsthiswill.Moreover,inviewofArt. 2219 oftheCivilCode,AirFranceisresponsible forthetortuousactsofitsemployees.

Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is oneattendedwithpublicdutypartakingthenatureof acontract of transportation. The stress of Carrascoso's action is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier a case of quasidelict. Damages are proper in thiscase.

Exemplary damages are well awarded. TheCivilCodegivesthecourtamplepowertograntexemplary damagesincontractsandquasicontracts.Theonlyconditionisthatdefendantshouldhave "actedin a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The manner of ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legalprecept.Andthis,inadditiontomoral damages. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similarjudgmentforattorneys'fees.

V.JanelleMupas Phil.SchoolofBusinessAdministrationvs.CourtofAppeals

Facts AstabbingincidentcausedthedeathofCarlitosBautistawhileonthesecondfloorpremisesofthe PhilippineSchoolofBusinessAdministration(PSBA)promptedtheparentsofthedeceasedtofilesuit intheRegionalfordamagesagainstthesaidPSBAanditscorporateofficer.Atthetimeofhis death,CarlitoswasenrolledinthethirdyearcommercecourseatthePSBA.Itwasestablishedthathis assailantswerenotmembersoftheschool'sacademiccommunitybutwereelementsfromoutsidethe school.

Substantially,therespondentssoughttoadjudgethemliableforthevictim'suntimelydemisedueto

theirallegednegligence.

Issue WONPSBAanditsofficersmaybeheldliableforCarlitosdeath.

Held Thelawholdstheteachersandheadsoftheschoolstaffliableunlesstheyrelievethemselvesofsuch liabilitypursuanttothelastparagraphofArticle2180by'provingthattheyobservedallthediligence topreventdamage.'

Article2180,inconjunctionwithArticle2176oftheCivilCode,establishestheruleofinlocoparentis.It hadbeenstressedthatthelaw(Article2180)plainlyprovidesthatthedamageshouldhavebeencaused orinflictedbypupilsorstudentsoftheeducationalinstitutionsoughttobeheldliablefortheactsofits pupilsorstudentswhileinitscustody.However,thismaterialsituationdoesnotexistinthepresentcase for,asearlierindicated,theassailantsofCarlitoswerenotstudentsofthePSBA,forwhoseactsthe schoolcouldbemadeliable.

Aschool,likeacommoncarrier,cannotbeaninsurerofitsstudentsagainstallrisks.Thisisspeciallytrue inthepopulousstudentcommunitiesofthesocalled"universitybelt"inManilawheretherehavebeen reportedseveralincidentsrangingfromgangwarstootherformsofhooliganism.

VI.JonathanVinarao

Syquiav.CA Pursuant to a DeedofSaleexecutedbetweenplaintiffappellantJuanJ.Syquiaanddefendantappellee, the former, father of deceased Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed defendantappellee to

inter the remains of deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery. That on September 4, 1978, preparatory to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the coffin ofthedeceasedwasremovedfromits niche underground with the assistance of certain employees of defendantappellant (sic) that as the concrete vault was being raised to the surface, plaintiffsappellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole approximatelythree(3)inchesindiameternearthebottom ofoneofthewallsclosingoutthe width of the vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water drained out of the hole that the water which had collected inside the vaulthaverisentothelevelofthe coffinandfloodedthesameaswellastheremainsofthedeceasedwithilleffectsthereto. Due to the alleged unlawful and maliciousbreachbythedefendantappelleeofitsobligationtodelivera defectfree concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the deceased and the coffin against the elements which resulted in the desecration of deceased's grave and in the alternative, because of defendantappellee's gross negligence conformably to Article 2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayedthatjudgmentberenderedorderingdefendantappelleeto pay plaintiffsappellants P30,000.00 for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary damagesetc. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did not guarantee that the cement vault would be waterproof that there could be no quasidelict because the defendant was not guilty of any fault or negligence, and because there was a preexisting contractual relation between the Syquias and defendant ManilaMemorialParkCemetery,Inc.Onappeal,CAaffirmedthe decisionofRTC.

ISSUE:Whetherthedefendenthascommittedculpaaquiliana.

HELD: No. The Court of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of privaterespondenttojustifyanaward of damagesagainstit. Althoughapreexisting contractualrelationbetweenthepartiesdoesnotpreclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard therespondent'sCourtfindingthat

therewasnonegligence. In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and CertificateofPerpetualCare"6onAugust27,1969. That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined theirrespectiverightsandobligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasidelict or culpa aquiliana, butforculpacontractualasprovided byArticle1170oftheCivilCode,towit: Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those whoinanymannercontravenethetenorthereof,areliablefordamages. The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be send in the interment. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Regulations of the ManilaMemorialParkCemetery,Inc.thatthevaultwouldbewaterproof. Wehold,therefore,thatprivaterespondentdidnotbreachthetenorofitsobligationtotheSyquias. Calalasv.CA,Sunga Private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. Sunga stepped down to give way when an Isuzu truck owned by Francisco Salva and driven byIglecerioVerenabumpedthejeepney.Asaresult,Sungawasinjured.Sungafiledacomplaint against Calalas for violation of contract of carriage. Calalas filed a third party complaint against Salva. The trial court held Salva liable and absolved Calalas, taking cognisance of another civil case for quasidelict wherein Salva and Verena were held liable to Calalas. The Court of Appealsreversedthe decisionandfoundCalalasliabletoSungaforviolationofcontractofcarriage.

Issue: Whether thedecisioninthecaseforquasidelictbetweenCalalasononehandandSalvaandVerenaon theotherhand,isresjudicatatotheissueinthiscase

Held: The argument that Sunga is boundbythe rulinginCivilCaseNo.3490findingthedriverandtheowner of the truck liable for quasidelictignoresthefactthatshewasneverapartytothatcaseand,therefore, theprincipleofresjudicatadoesnotapply. Nor aretheissuesinCivilCaseNo.3490andinthepresentcasethesame.TheissueinCivilCaseNo. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasidelict for the damage caused to petitioners jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contractofcarriage.Thefirst,quasidelict,alsoknownasculpaaquilianaor culpaextracontractual, has as its source thenegligenceofthetortfeasor.Thesecond,breach ofcontractorculpacontractual, ispremiseduponthenegligenceintheperformanceofacontractualobligation. There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage topetitionersjeepney,shouldbebindingonSunga.Itisimmaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine ofproximatecauseisapplicable onlyinactionsforquasidelict,notinactions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a deviceforimputingliabilitytoapersonwherethereisno relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a preexisting contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who createtheobligation,andthefunctionofthelawismerelytoregulatetherelationthuscreated.

Art.1173.Thefaultornegligenceoftheobligorconsistsintheomissionofthatdiligencewhichis requiredbythenatureoftheobligationandcorrespondswiththecircumstancesofthepersons,ofthe timeandoftheplace.Whennegligenceshowsbadfaith,theprovisionsofArticles1171and2201, paragraph2,shallapply.

Ifthelaworcontractdoesnotstatethediligencewhichistobeobservedintheperformance,thatwhich

isexpectedofagoodfatherofafamilyshallberequired.(1104a)

I.MarieUy

G.R.No.L12219March15,1918

AMADOPICART,plaintiffappellant, vs. FRANKSMITH,JR.,defendantappellee.

Facts:

Inthisactiontheplaintiff,AmadoPicart,seekstorecoverofthedefendant,FrankSmith,jr.,thesumof P31,000,asdamagesallegedtohavebeencausedbyanautomobiledrivenbythedefendant.Froma judgmentoftheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheProvinceofLaUnionabsolvingthedefendantfrom liabilitytheplaintiffhasappealed.

TheoccurrencewhichgaverisetotheinstitutionofthisactiontookplaceonDecember12,1912,on theCarlatanBridge,atSanFernando,LaUnion.Itappearsthatupontheoccasioninquestionthe plaintiffwasridingonhisponyoversaidbridge.Beforehehadgottenhalfwayacross,thedefendant approachedfromtheoppositedirectioninanautomobile,goingattherateofabouttenortwelvemiles perhour.Asthedefendantnearedthebridgehesawahorsemanonitandblewhishorntogivewarning ofhisapproach.Hecontinuedhiscourseandafterhehadtakenthebridgehegavetwomore successiveblasts,asitappearedtohimthatthemanonhorsebackbeforehimwasnotobservingthe ruleoftheroad.

Theplaintiff,itappears,sawtheautomobilecomingandheardthewarningsignals.However,being perturbedbythenoveltyoftheapparitionortherapidityoftheapproach,hepulledtheponycloselyup

againsttherailingontherightsideofthebridgeinsteadofgoingtotheleft.Hesaysthatthereasonhe didthiswasthathethoughthedidnothavesufficienttimetogetovertotheotherside.Thebridgeis showntohavealengthofabout75metersandawidthof4.80meters.Astheautomobileapproached, thedefendantguidedittowardhisleft,thatbeingthepropersideoftheroadforthemachine.Inso doingthedefendantassumedthatthehorsemanwouldmovetotheotherside.Theponyhadnotasyet exhibitedfright,andtheriderhadmadenosignfortheautomobiletostop.Seeingthattheponywas apparentlyquiet,thedefendant,insteadofveeringtotherightwhileyetsomedistanceawayorslowing down,continuedtoapproachdirectlytowardthehorsewithoutdiminutionofspeed.Whenhehad gottenquitenear,therebeingthennopossibilityofthehorsegettingacrosstotheotherside,the defendantquicklyturnedhiscarsufficientlytotherighttoescapehittingthehorsealongsideoftherailing whereitasthenstandingbutinsodoingtheautomobilepassedinsuchcloseproximitytotheanimal thatitbecamefrightenedandturneditsbodyacrossthebridgewithitsheadtowardtherailing.Inso doing,itasstruckonthehockofthelefthindlegbytheflangeofthecarandthelimbwasbroken.The horsefellanditsriderwasthrownoffwithsomeviolence.Fromtheevidenceadducedinthecasewe believethatwhentheaccidentoccurredthefreespacewheretheponystoodbetweentheautomobile andtherailingofthebridgewasprobablylessthanoneandonehalfmeters.Asaresultofitsinjuriesthe horsedied.Theplaintiffreceivedcontusionswhichcausedtemporaryunconsciousnessandrequired medicalattentionforseveraldays.

Issue:

Wasthedefendant,inmaneuveringhiscarinthemannerabovedescribed,guiltyofnegligencesuchas givesrisetoacivilobligationtorepairthedamagedone?

Held:

Yes.

Asthedefendantstartedacrossthebridge,hehadtherighttoassumethatthehorseandtheriderwould passovertothepropersidebutashemovedtowardthecenterofthebridgeitwasdemonstratedto hiseyesthatthiswouldnotbedoneandhemustinamomenthaveperceivedthatitwastoolateforthe horsetocrosswithsafetyinfrontofthemovingvehicle.Inthenatureofthingsthischangeofsituation occurredwhiletheautomobilewasyetsomedistanceawayandfromthismomentitwasnotlonger withinthepoweroftheplaintifftoescapebeingrundownbygoingtoaplaceofgreatersafety.The controlofthesituationhadthenpassedentirelytothedefendantanditwashisdutyeithertobringhis cartoanimmediatestopor,seeingthattherewerenootherpersonsonthebridge,totaketheother sideandpasssufficientlyfarawayfromthehorsetoavoidthedangerofcollision.Insteadofdoingthis, thedefendantranstraightonuntilhewasalmostuponthehorse.Hewas,wethink,deceivedintodoing thisbythefactthatthehorsehadnotyetexhibitedfright.Butinviewoftheknownnatureofhorses, therewasanappreciableriskthat,iftheanimalinquestionwasunacquaintedwithautomobiles,hemight getexitedandjumpundertheconditionswhichhereconfrontedhim.Whenthedefendantexposedthe horseandridertothisdangerhewas,inouropinion,negligentintheeyeofthelaw.

Thetestbywhichtodeterminetheexistenceofnegligenceinaparticularcasemaybestatedasfollows: Didthedefendantindoingtheallegednegligentactusethatpersonwouldhaveusedinthesame situation?Ifnot,thenheisguiltyofnegligence.Thelawhereineffectadoptsthestandardsupposedto besuppliedbytheimaginaryconductofthediscreetpaterfamiliasoftheRomanlaw.Theexistenceof negligenceinagivencaseisnotdeterminedbyreferencetothepersonaljudgmentoftheactorinthe situationbeforehim.Thelawconsiderswhatwouldbereckless,blameworthy,ornegligentinthemanof ordinaryintelligenceandprudenceanddeterminesliabilitybythat.

Itgoeswithoutsayingthattheplaintiffhimselfwasnotfreefromfault,forhewasguiltyofantecedent negligenceinplantinghimselfonthewrongsideoftheroad.Butaswehavealreadystated,the defendantwasalsonegligentandinsuchcasetheproblemalwaysistodiscoverwhichagentis immediatelyanddirectlyresponsible.Itwillbenotedthatthenegligentactsofthetwopartieswerenot contemporaneous,sincethenegligenceofthedefendantsucceededthenegligenceoftheplaintiffbyan

appreciableinterval.Underthesecircumstancesthelawisthatthepersonwhohasthelastfairchanceto avoidtheimpendingharmandfailstodosoischargeablewiththeconsequences,withoutreferenceto thepriornegligenceoftheotherparty.