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Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragant 80 Phil 776 FACTS: On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and a half tons in Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong, Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragantes intestate estate is financially cpable of maintaining the proposed service. Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party applicant and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the law. ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial personality. HELD: The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.

GELUZ v COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a twomonth old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari. ISSUE: Did the Plaintiff have the right for damages in behalf of his unborn child? HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet possess a personality to speak of because it

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was aborted in uterus. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. Quimiguing vs Icao 34 SCRA 132 FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, the defendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close and confidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married, he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times under force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result, Carmen became pregnant despite drugs supplied by defendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying. Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages and attorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lower court in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause of action. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no cause of action. ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages. HELD: Yes. Petition granted. Supreme Court held that a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742. Lower courts theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus, she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused. WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered. People of the Philippines vs. Fernando Felipe G. R. No. L-40432, July 19, 1982 FACTS: Herein accused Fernando Felipe was convicted by the lower court of the crime of rape committed by him against his niece-in-law Ruth Pancho. As a result of the incident the victim got pregnant, who was then 25 years old.

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When the accused appealed his case, one of his defenses was the fact that the victims child was born on March 13, 1972 and that the victim could not have been raped on July 9, 1971 because there are only 247 days between these dates. Accused claimed that the normal period of gestation is 280 days and the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length of uterine development of a child. ISSUE: Whether or not the victims child is considered a normal child. HELD: Yes, the victims child was normal. As aptly contended by the Solicitor General in his brief, "a child born 8 months and seven days after conception is considered normal. ...; that in certain instances the Civil Code considers 300 days as the length of the uterine development of a child, but by providing that a premature child is one which has an intra-uterine life of less than seven months (Art. 41, Civil Code) the Code impliedly recognizes that a child which had an intra-uterine life of 8 months, as in the case at bar, is a normal child." JOAQUIN VS. NAVARRO FACTS: Feb. 6, 1945: battle of liberation of Manila, Joaquin Navarro, Sr., 70, wife Angela Joaquin, 67, daughters Pilar (32-33), Concepcion, and Natividad (23-25), son Joaquin Navarro, Jr., 30 and his wife Adela Conde sought refuge on the ground floor of German Club Building. Building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting hitting the three daughters who fell. Sr. decided to leave building. His wife didnt want to leave so he left with his son, his sons wife and neighbor Francisco Lopez . As the y came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground the rest lay flat on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping may people presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela and Francisco sought refuge in an air raid shelter where they hid for three days. Feb. 10, 1945: on their way to St.Theresa Academy, they met Japanese patrols, Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. Trial Court ruled that Angela Joaquin outlived her son while Court of Appeals ruled that son outlived his mother. ISSUE: Order of death of Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. HELD: Reversed. Art. 43 civil code: Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place. In light of the conditions painted by FL, a fair inference can be arrived at that JN Jr died before his mother. The presumption that AJ died before her son was based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect (3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art. 43 Speaks about resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of survivorship.