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The Role of Cross-Cultural Factors in Integrative Conflict Resolution and Crisis Communication: The Hainan Incident
Yi-Hui Huang and Olwen Bedford American Behavioral Scientist 2009 53: 565 DOI: 10.1177/0002764209347631 The online version of this article can be found at: http://abs.sagepub.com/content/53/4/565

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The Role of Cross-Cultural Factors in Integrative Conflict Resolution and Crisis Communication: The Hainan Incident
Yi-Hui Huang1 and Olwen Bedford2

American Behavioral Scientist 578 53(4) 565 2009 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0002764209347631 http://abs.sagepub.com

Abstract This article offers an integrated theoretical and policy-oriented framework for crosscultural conflict resolution by exploring relationships among conflict resolution styles and crisis communicative strategies with emphasis on both conflict structure and cross-cultural factors. Using the Hainan negotiation between China and the United States as a case study, the factors inherent in conflict are investigated with respect to Chinese cultural characteristics. The congruence of the Chinese context with integrative conflict management is explored. The analysis indicated that the use of mediators and consideration of renqing (favor) and mianzi (face), which are central resources in Chinese interpersonal interactions, are likely to contribute to an integrative conflict solution. Keywords integrative conflict resolution, crisis communication, cultural-differences, face, mianzi Understanding cross-cultural differences in conflict management style and crisis communicative strategy is essential to the practice of public diplomacy and public relations, especially given the globalized business economy and the proliferation of international trade agreements. Many would argue that this is particularly the case for
1 2

The Chinese University of Hong Kong, HONG KONG Nanyang Technological University, SINGAPORE

Corresponding Authors: 1.Yi-Hui Huang, Journalism and Communication Division, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, N.T., Hong Kong Email: yhuang@cuhk.edu.hk 2. Olwen Bedford, 04-03 HSS, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore 639798 Email: olwenbedford@ntu.edu.sg

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diplomats and business people in the United States and China, inasmuch as the United States is the current global superpower and it seems probable that China will either join or replace it as a superpower in the decades to come. We use the case of the negotiation between China and the United States in the wake of the Hainan Incident to provide a context for exploring relationships among conflict resolution styles and crisis communicative strategies with an emphasis on both conflict structure and crosscultural factors. The Hainan Incident occurred in April 2001 when a Chinese interceptor fighter jet collided with a U.S. surveillance aircraft near Chinas Hainan Island. China demanded an apology, but the United States insisted that it had a right to fly in the area. The greatest conflict revolved around the terms sorry, apology, and regret. Various perspectives have been used to investigate the Hainan negotiations. Gries and Peng (2002) maintained that both cultural differences and commonalities between China and the United States played a significant role in the Sino-American apology diplomacy. Cheng and Ngok (2004) investigated the impact of Chinese historical memory of U.S. hegemonic behavior. Gries (2005) applied social identity theories to define the case as a consequential (language is central to national identity), zero-sum game (because face or national identity was at stake) that involved a salient foreign nation (an out-group comparison entity). In this article, we focus on integrative conflict resolution style and strategic ambiguity to argue that the structure of the conflict and cross-cultural differences combined to influence the course of negotiation and communication in the incident. The result of our analysis is an integrated, comprehensive, theoretical, and policy-oriented framework for cross-cultural conflict resolution (see Figure 1). The trait approach in the cross-cultural psychology literature explains cultural differences as arising from the stable, general characteristics of negotiators, such as the degree to which their value-orientations are individualistic as opposed to collectivistic (Morris & Fu, 2001, p. 325). Instead of using country as a benchmark to represent culture, we adopt Yangs (1992) theory that two main types of cultural syndromes (collectivistic and individualistic) characterize human relations in contemporary societies around the world. Chinese and Americans differ markedly on these dimensions, with Chinese being collectivistic and Americans individualistic. This article contains five sections. First, the Hainan Incident is briefly introduced. Second, the literature involving conflict management style and crisis communicative strategy (CCS) is reviewed to provide an analytical framework for crisis response. Third, five factors inherent in every conflict are identified through an analysis of the literature. Fourth, Chinese cultural characteristics relevant to conflict resolution are examined. Last, the factors inherent in conflict are reexamined with respect to Chinese cultural characteristics, and the congruence of the Chinese context with integrative conflict management and third-party mediation are discussed.

The Hainan Incident

On April 1, 2001, a U.S. surveillance plane was flying near Hainan Island, about 100 kilometers off Chinas southern coast. Two Chinese fighter jets were sent out to

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A five-component framework: Factors inherent in conflict

Incorporation of Chinese cultural features into the framework

Factor 1: Level of conflict Factor 2: The source and nature of conflict Factor 3: Power and resources Factor 4: Time and relation continuity Factor 5: Cost and consequence

Factor 1: In-group versus out-group distinction Feature 2: Face as a critical source of conflict Feature 3: Mianzi (face) and renqing (favor) as essential resources of negotiation and third-party mediation as an important source of power Feature 4: An emphasis on relationship has subtle effects on Chinese conflict resolution Feature 5: Favor high-contextual, indirect, future-oriented rhetoric

Conflict management style: Integrative style

Crisis communicative strategy: Strategic ambiguity

Figure 1. An integrated theoretical framework for cross-cultural conflict resolution and crisis communication

intercept it, and a midair collision occurred, damaging the U.S. plane and causing it to make an emergency landing at the Lingshui military airfield on Hainan Island where the 24 crew members were detained by the Chinese. The Chinese jet crashed into the South China Sea, killing the pilot. Rising tensions complicated negotiations over the release of the 24 airmen and return of the aircraft.

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On the first day of the incident, Chinese spokesman Zhu Bangzao stated that it was normal and in accordance with international practice for Chinese military jets to track U.S. surveillance planes over Chinas water areas and that the direct cause of the crash was that the U.S. plane had suddenly veered into the Chinese jet. Furthermore, the U.S. plane had intruded into Chinas airspace and landed without permission. The United States should therefore bear all responsibility (P.R.C. Embassy, 2001). The official U.S. position assessed no blame (U.S. Aircraft Collides, 2001). Later, media reports circulated that the Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, was well known by U.S. fliers to be especially aggressive in encounters with U.S. reconnaissance planes and that the Chinese jet had bumped the U.S. plane. Also, before landing, the crew of the damaged plane had broadcast multiple emergency distress signals that had gone unanswered (Richter, 2001). On April 3, President Jiang Zemin spoke for the first time about the air collision, urging the cessation of future surveillance flights near Chinese waters. Doing so would not only prevent similar incidents from occurring, Jiang said, but would also be a step toward improving Sino-American relations (US Holds All Responsibilities, 2001). Adopting a similar tone of dissatisfaction, on April 4, Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan said that theUnited States should bear full responsibility for the incident and apologize to China (China Urges US, 2001), and Chinese Vice-Premier Qian Qichen pressed the United States to review the incident; employ a practical, positive approach; and ultimately apologize to the Chinese people (Chinese Vice-Premier, 2001). On April 4, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer said, the accident took place over international airspace, over international waters, and we do not understand any reason to apologize. The United States did not do anything wrong (Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 2001a). The U.S. position was that according to theUnited Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United States has a right to fly military planes in the area. However, on April 5, President Bush softened the response, saying I regret that a Chinese pilot is missing, and I regret one of their airplanes is lost, and our prayers go out to the pilot, and his family (Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 2001b). Unrelenting, on April 5, 2001, Chinese Ambassador Yang Jiechi said, This is an incident caused totally by the American side....At least you should say, Sorry (Lehrer, 2001). And, spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Yuxi Sun stated that China welcomed as a step in the right direction U.S. statements of regret, but he also repeated the demand for a full apology (U.S. Regret, 2001). On April 11, U.S. ambassador to China Joseph Prueher sent a letter with two sorries to Chinese Foreign Minister Tang: Please convey to the Chinese people and to the family of pilot Wei Wang that we are very sorry for their loss and that the U.S. is very sorry for entering Chinese airspace and making an emergency landing that did not have verbal clearance (Letter, 2001). The next day, the Chinese authorities released the 24 American servicemen and women. The Zhongnanhai party headquarters was brightly lit all night Wednesday as President Jiangs supporters celebrated what they called a resounding victory. On the

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U.S. side, CNN news coverage reported, Members of the U.S. Congress voiced their approval Wednesday of the Bush administrations handling of the Chinese standoff and hailed the anticipated return of 24 U.S. military personnel from China (Lam, 2001). On April 12, Bush stated, I know the American people join me in expressing sorrow for the loss of life of a Chinese pilot. Our prayers are with his wife and his child. Meanwhile, Bush maintained, We were over international waters in international airspace. We had every right to be there. And its a right that we have always insisted upon in the past (Office of the Press Secretary, White House, 2001c). The conclusion of the incident appeared to be a mutually acceptable ending. Both sides got what they wantedfreedom of 24 U.S. crewmembers for the United States and face for China. Both claimed their diplomatic victories internationally while giving divergent messages to their citizens.

Conflict Management Style and Crisis Communicative Strategy

Conflict management style represents the manner in which one handles disagreement (Cushman & King, 1985; Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Leung, 1987; Nomura & Barnlund, 1983). There are three main styles. Integrative style aims to reconcile the interests of both parties, reach joint benefits, or attain win-win goals through open information exchange and joint decision making (Putnam, 1990, p. 3). Distributive style entails a fixed-sum, variable-share pay-off structure; one persons gain is anothers loss (Putnam, 1990). Avoidance style involves denying the presence of conflict, shifting or avoiding the focus of the issue, or sidestepping disagreement (Putnam & Wilson, 1982). Some researchers have suggested that all bargaining, particularly that involving cross-cultural conflict, ought properly to be of an integrative sort because an integrative style maximizes benefit to all parties involved (Lituchy, 1997). Others have noted that the integrating individual interests orientation which dominates American conflict literature...may not generalize so effectively to other cultural contexts (Tinsley, 1997, p. 209). The goal of this article is to examine the conditions that influence choice of an integrative style as the preferred way of dealing with conflict and assess the overall fit of the integrative style in conflict management with Chinese culture. Crisis communicative strategies are the verbal and nonverbal responses an organization uses to address a crisis. A review of crisis responses reveals five main strategies (Y.H. Huang, Lin, & Su, 2005): denial, excuse, justification, diversion, and corrective action. These strategies can be arranged in a two-way matrix of defenseaccommodation and specificity-ambiguity. Strategic ambiguity has been viewed as a valuable tool because it allows plausible deniability while preserving a privileged position, facilitating organizational change, and promoting unified diversity (Eisenberg & Goodall, 1997). Applying CCS to analysis of the Hainan Incident, it is clear that Chinas stance in crisis communication did not change throughout the course of the incident. China took a strong defensive position and held firm, specifically requesting

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a public apology from the United States. In contrast, the United Statess stance moved from defensive to accommodating and from specific to ambiguous. The U.S. crisis response changed from denial to justification and then to a strategic expression of being sorry.

A Five-Component Framework: Factors Inherent in Conflict

Our analysis of recent studies of conflict management (e.g., Druckman, Martin, Nan, & Yagcioglu, 1999; Kleiboer, 1996; Levinger & Rubin, 1994) suggests that every conflict contains five inherent factors. Each of these factors is examined with respect to its utility in integrative versus distributive negotiation management. Factor 1: Level of conflict. As the degree of complexity of a conflict increases with the move from interpersonal to intergroup, interorganizational, and international relations (Levinger & Rubin, 1994), the difficulty of resolving the conflict through use of integrative strategy is also likely to increase in that same order. It is more difficult to pinpoint the other partys preferences, intentions, and expectations in international disputes than in interpersonal, intergroup, or even interorganizational relations (Pruitt, 1995). Likewise, decisions tend to be firmer, more competitive, and less trusting. Because the Hainan Incident entailed a high level of conflict complexity, Yee (2004) maintained it was necessary to use a dual-level game approach to investigate the issue. That is, Yee suggested the case was a product of political processes conducted simultaneously at the international level between the two governments as well as at the domestic level between each government and its societal constituency. Factor 2: The source and nature of conflict. Conflict may have four possible sources (Moore, 1986). Conflict of interest results from perceived or actual contrary positions, wants, or claims on a resource or power. Data conflicts are usually caused by miscommunication or lack of communication. Relationship conflicts often involve misconceptions and stereotypes. Conflict over values and ideology stems from differences in basic values, beliefs, and principles (Greenhalgh, 1993). The first two sources of conflict generally can be productively resolved with logical or factual information and effective two-way symmetrical communication (Fisher & Ury, 1991). Relationship conflict is often regarded as nonzero sum and involves nondivisible issues. As such, it is most likely to be productively resolved with an integrative strategy (Moore, 1986). Conflict over values and ideology is generally the most difficult to resolve (Conrad, 1985). During the Hainan Incident, the major stake on the United States side was the 24 crewmembers detained in China. For China, it was the pilot who had lost his life. With respect to responsibility for the loss of a life, the United States concentrated on culpability while China concentrated on consequences (Gries & Peng, 2002). On top of it all, face was a common concern for both sides (Gries & Peng, 2002). It was particularly essential for China in this negotiation (Gries, 2005). We discuss face in greater detail in the section on Chinese cultural features.

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Factor 3: Power and resources. Power balance or lack thereof is a critical issue in all conflict situations. Most conflict situations involve power asymmetry (i.e., differences in experience, information, cost of delay, or of going to court; Ross, 1970), which makes an integrative solution less likely, especially if one party is completely powerless. This is because the powerful can ensure that the outcome favors their demands. However, even when the power asymmetry is moderately large, an integrative strategy may still be applied by finding ways of equalizing the balance of power. A trusted third party or mediator (Rubin & Salacuse, 1990) or an intervention design with a symmetrical process of conflict resolution (Rouhana & Korper, 1996) have been suggested as a way to achieve a balance of power. Evidence suggests that an equivalent level of power makes both parties fear escalation and hence exercise greater care not to antagonize each other (Pruitt & Camevale, 1993). If the power difference is only slight, the general result is conducive to problem solving. Rubin and Zartmans (1995) review of more than 20 studies found unequivocal support for the hypothesis that perceptions of equal power among negotiators tend to result in more effective negotiation than unequal power. Comparable power between two sides, as between the United States and China, should leave room for an integrative solution. Factor 4:Time and relation continuity. An issue of immediacy (e.g., the freedom of the 24 American crewmembers) often makes conflict difficult to manage productively and so an integrative solution is unlikely (Axelrod, 1984). If the effect of the conflict is delayed until some point in the future, then threat, promise, or commitment can be used (Ross, 1982). If the conflict is in the past, these strategies are not applicable. The relationship over time of those involved in the conflict is also important to take into consideration. A single transaction is more difficult to resolve integratively, compared to situations in which reputation and long-term relationships have to be taken into account (Greenhalgh, 1993; Ross, 1970). People in collectivistic cultures perceive time and relation continuity differently from those in individualistic cultures. In contrast to individualistic cultures emphasizing working and transactional relationships, collectivistic cultures underscore long-term and continuous relationships (Y.H. Huang, 2003; Yum, 1988). In this case, both sides emphasized the importance of facilitating Sino-American relations to use President Jiangs words. President Bush echoed this sentiment and said, our approach has been to keep this accident from becoming an international incident. When a conflict situation is considered to be continuous or when a long-term relationship is taken into account, an integrative strategy is more likely to develop, and it should be a major factor contributing to the closing of the incident. Factor 5: Cost and consequence. The possibility that a costly or damaging outcome might result from failure of the negotiation, for example, war or litigation and adjudication by a court, can impact the contending parties bargaining approaches either way (Ross, 1970). If the outcome equally affects contending parties, these concerns could drive them to resolve the conflict integratively. Alternatively, the intensity of the conflict could press the parties to take incompatible extreme positions. High conflict intensity,

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similar to extreme consequences of failure, can push people to adopt extreme decisions either waysupporting or removing all possibility of an integrative resolution. In this case, both the United States and China definitely would not want to face the possibility of a costly or damaging outcome such as a war. In this circumstance, China could choose to delay or prolong the process of negotiation. Nevertheless, the United States did not have a BATNA (i.e., best alternative to negotiated agreement; see Fisher, Ury, & Patton, 1991) but had to choose to make a concession in return for the freedom of the 24 crewmembers. In summary, structure-wise, the high level of conflict complexity and severe source of conflict involving human life, freedom, and national identity made this negotiation difficult. However, a comparatively equal power balance as well as a mutual pre ference to maintain relation continuity and avoid costly consequences created the intention and possibility for an integrative solution.

Incorporation of Chinese Cultural Features Into the Framework

The collectivistic characteristics of Chinese culture and Confucian traditions that emphasize long-term relationships, harmony, interpersonal relationships, face, loyalty, order, and harmony (Chen, 1996) contribute to particular Chinese conflict management styles. Understanding the Chinese cultural features that correspond to the five structural factors just described is important for achieving a productive resolution. Factor 1: In-group versus out-group distinction. The distinction between in-group and out-group members is of great importance in Chinese society, with in-group members being given preferential treatment (Yum, 1988). Important in-group memberships are ascribed and fixed, viewed as facts of life to which people must accommodate. Boundaries between in-groups and out-groups are stable, relatively impermeable, and important (Kim, 1994; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1995). Whether a person or the party in conflict is included as an in-group member could potentially counterbalance the influence of the aforementioned levels and sources of conflict in three ways. First, with its emphasis on interpersonal relationships, Chinese culture may contribute to the transformation of various higher levels of conflict into interpersonal conflict because personal relations often penetrate public (professional) relations (Yum, 1988). Second, suppressing ones own interests, values, and goals for those of the group and duty to the in-group are important values in collectivist cultures (Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis, 1972). These values discourage integrative solutions, but they encourage rapid resolution of conflict. While the institutionalized hierarchical structure of social relations in Chinese culture details proper behavior toward in-group members, not much is defined with regard to out-group members. If the negotiation counterpart is considered part of the out-group (the United States in this case), reaching a solution may have additional challenges as the path for resolution is not well defined. For a typical, grass-roots, outgroup conflict, third-party mediation is usually used to help change and balance the power configuration and facilitate integrative bargaining (Sohn & Wall, 1993; Wall &

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Blum, 1991). The Hainan Incident, which was an out-group conflict, did not entail use of a suitable mediator. Feature 2: Face as a critical source of conflict. If contending parties are committed to enforceable costs, such as irreversible threats, demands, promises, or voluntary but irrevocable sacrifices of freedom or choice, a distributive strategy is most likely to be adopted (Schelling, 1956). In the Western sense, such cost or commitment often refers to time, money, credibility, or reputation. In Chinese culture, in addition to these components, face is an especially critical component to be considered, particularly in a circumstance that becomes public and formal such as the Hainan Incident. Today, diplomacy in Chinese terms is often seen as a competition of national identity, due to the zero-sum nature of face and the Wests historic victimization of China (Cheng & Ngok, 2004). In fact, because conflict in the Hainan negotiation was an issue of face (Gries, 2005), negotiation was difficult. Feature 3: Mianzi and renqing as resources; third-party mediation as power. In Chinese society, mianzi (face) and renqing (favor) can be sources of conflict, but they are also resources to be exchanged. The hierarchical social structure defines the power-balance among people of various roles, helping to maintain harmony and order and institutionally preventing the perception or actual existence of some conflict (Hwang, 1987). Face and favor are commonly deployed to alter the power-balance in a negotiation, which can be occur in three ways. First, in a collectivist relational-oriented society, issues of mianzi (face) are embedded in all everyday discourse (Gao, 1998; Gao & Ting-Toomey, 1998). The more skilled the impression management, the more likely it is for the resource allocator to accept the petitioners request. Second, the concept of renqing (favor), which is inherently connected to reciprocity, is considered on a continuous and long-term basis. Third, mianzi and renqing are often interchangeable. Renqing may contain not only such substantive materials as money, goods, or services but also the abstract component of affection. For example, maintaining ones face or doing face-work in front of others means doing a renqing (favor) for this person. Thus, such continuous exchange of face and favor makes debt difficult to calculate or to ever fully pay off (Hwang, 1987). Third-party mediation is highly related to the cultural features of face and favor. While people of all cultures use mediation in conflict resolution, Chinese culture is particularly sensitive to the use of third-person mediation for three reasons. First, mediators act as informal intermediaries in collectivistic cultures, a role different from the contractual and professional nature of mediators in individualistic cultures. Second, an integrative solution is more likely to develop than a distributive one when there is a credible and dependable third party or mediator. Chinese mediators effect change through persuading the parties, somewhat aggressively, to restore harmony, often acting as authority figures who project a mediator-knows-best approach (Wall & Blum, 1991, p. 18). Mediators generally start by discussing the potential negative outcomes with the disputants and then asking them to grant face to the mediators (L. L. Huang, 1996). The hope is that each party takes a step back and reassesses.

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In the presence of experienced Chinese mediators of a certain social status, disputants should have the social awareness to grant the mediator face or a favor without being asked. In the Hainan Incident, insufficient experience with exchanging resources in Sino-American relations that could be used as leverage for resolving the conflict, such as face, favor, or even a credible third party, all made the situation even more difficult (Cheng & Ngok, 2004). Feature 4: Emphasis on relationships. Relations continuity can be regarded as a common mindset that fosters integrative bargaining. Chinese people experience themselves as embedded in a network of debts to others, who in turn are constrained by their debts and long-term relationships to other people. They judge their relationships with others and their responses to requests on two dimensions: relationship hierarchy and relationship closeness (Y.H. Huang, 2000). Conflict can be institutionally resolved through these social structures that dictate who has the right or the duty to decide how to resolve the conflict or to determine to which person a benefit should rightfully be allocated. Government plays the role of the patriarch, like a father rewarding and disciplining his children (Shuang, 1993). This dynamic is illustrated in the Hainan Incident in that it is the Chinese governments responsibility in its role as father to attain justice for his son (i.e., the pilot and the pilots family) and country (all the extended families). For an out-group conflict involving a paternal-authoritarian-andson relation accompanied by a face issue, a distributive strategy is most likely to occur. Feature 5: Favor high-contextual, indirect, future-oriented rhetoric. Transcendence (see Hearit, 1997), which is often used to redefine the context in which organizational or personal acts are understood, is particularly pertinent to Chinese culture (Y. H. Huang, 2006). Specifically, Chinese culture values high-context and indirect communication styles (Gudykunst et al., 1996). On the other hand, Chinese political culture favors a higher ground of morality and appreciates more abstract, lofty, and essentially idealistic futureand eternity-oriented rhetorical themes (Pye, 1990). These characteristics contribute to the likelihood that people will use redefinition, reframing, and dissociation and provide a possible explanation for the rhetoric involving diversion and ambiguity (see Y.H. Huang et al., 2005). The use of sorry, apology, and regret in the Hainan case perfectly depict the strategies of transcendence, diversion, and ambiguity and represent the negotiated, diplomatic outcome between China and the United States. In sum, although the emphasis of relations continuity encourages an integrative solution, other cultural characteristics, such as identity as an out-group member, conflict, and the father-protecting-son complex, made the Hainan Incident even more difficult. Lack of a third party forced both parties to engage in a face game, which then resulted in a rhetorical struggle. The solution to this public relations conflict and diplomatic crisis hinged on rhetoric. The effective image (or face) restoration (Benoit, 1995) and crisis communication strategies that were employed took into consideration the Chinese rhetorical characteristics that allowed a face-saving mechanism and led to the eventual resolution of the diplomatic crisis. Cultural factors indeed play a significant role in crisis management and should be considered integral components of crisis communicative strategy.

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Huang and Bedford Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research and/or authorship of this article.

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Bios
Yi-Hui Huang is professor of journalism and communication at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Olwen Bedford is assistant professor of psychology at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.

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