Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-14279 October 31, 1961 THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, petitioners, vs. EASTERN SEA TRADING, respondent. Office of the Solicitor General for petitioners. Valentin Gutierrez for respondent. CONCEPCION, J.: Petition for review of a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing a decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at the Port of Manila from August 25 to September 7, 1954. Some shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as much as none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to the aforementioned circulars of the Central Bank. In due course, the Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a decision on September 4, 1956, declaring said goods forfeited to the Government and the goods having been, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds, filed by the same, as principal, and the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety, in compliance with orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 23942 and 23852 thereof directing that the amounts of said bonds be paid, by said principal and surety, jointly and severally, to the Bureau of Customs, within thirty (30) days from notice. On appeal taken by the consignee, said decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs on December 27, 1956. Subsequently, the consignee sought a review of the decision of said two (2) officers by the Court of Tax Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs and ordered that the aforementioned bonds be cancelled and withdrawn. Hence, the present petition of the Commissioner of Customs for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. The latter is based upon the following premises, namely: that the Central Bank has no authority to regulate transactions not involving foreign exchange; that the shipments in question are in the nature of "no-dollar" imports; that, as such, the aforementioned shipments do not involve foreign exchange; that, insofar as a Central Bank license and a certificate authorizing the importation or release of the goods under consideration are required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45, the latter are null and void; and that the seizure and forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328,1 not only because the same seeks to implement an executive agreement2 extending the effectivity of our3 Trades and Financial Agreements4 with Japan which (executive agreement), it believed, is of dubious validity, but, also, because there is no governmental agency authorized to issue the import license required by the aforementioned executive order. The authority of the Central Bank to regulate no-dollar imports and the validity of the aforementioned Circulars Nos. 44, and 45 have already been passed upon and repeatedly upheld by this Court (Pascual vs. Commissioner of Customs, L-10979 [June 30, 1959]; Acting Commissioner of Customs vs. Leuterio, L-9142 [October 17, 1959] Commissioner of Customs vs. Pascual, L-9836 [November 18, 1959]; Commissioner of Customs vs. Serree Investment Co., L-12007 [May 16, 1960]; Commissioner of Customs vs. Serree Investment Co., L-14274 [November 29, 1960]), for the reason that the broad powers of the Central Bank, under its charter, to maintain our monetary stability and to preserve the international value of our currency, under section 2 of Republic Act No. 265, in relation to section 14 of said Act authorizing the bank to issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and the exercise of the powers assigned to the

Monetary Board and to the Central Bank connote the authority to regulate no-dollar imports, owing to the influence and effect that the same may and do have upon the stability of our peso and its international value. The Court of Tax Appeals entertained doubts on the legality of the executive agreement sought to be implemented by Executive Order No. 328, owing to the fact that our Senate had not concurred in the making of said executive agreement. The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties" (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into without such concurrence. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. xxx xxx xxx

. . . the right of the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history we have entered into executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts. xxx xxx xxx

Agreements with respect to the registration of trade-marks have been concluded by the Executive with various countries under the Act of Congress of March 3, 1881 (21 Stat. 502). Postal conventions regulating the reciprocal treatment of mail matters, money orders, parcel post, etc., have been concluded by the Postmaster General with various countries under authorization by Congress beginning with the Act of February 20, 1792 (1 Stat. 232, 239). Ten executive agreements were concluded by the President pursuant to the McKinley Tariff Act of 1890 (26 Stat. 567, 612), and nine such agreements were entered into under the Dingley Tariff Act 1897 (30 Stat. 151, 203, 214). A very much larger number of agreements, along the lines of the one with Rumania previously referred to, providing for most-favored-nation treatment in customs and related matters have been entered into since the passage of the Tariff Act of 1922, not by direction of the Act but in harmony with it. xxx xxx xxx

International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements. xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized the validity and constitutionality of executive agreements entered into without Senate approval.

(39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 753-754) (See, also, U.S. vs. Curtis-Wright Export Corporation, 299 U.S. 304, 81 L. ed. 255; U.S. vs. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 81 L. ed. 1134; U.S. vs. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 86 L. ed. 796; Ozanic vs. U.S., 188 F. 2d. 288; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 15, pp. 1905-1906; California Law Review, Vol. 25, pp. 670675; Hyde on International Law [Revised Edition], Vol. 2, pp. 1405, 1416-1418; Willoughby on the U.S. Constitutional Law, Vol. I [2d ed.], pp. 537-540; Moore, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 210-218; Hackworth, International Law Digest, Vol. V, pp. 390-407). (Emphasis supplied.) In this connection, Francis B. Sayre, former U.S. High Commissioner to the Philippines, said in his work on "The Constitutionality of Trade Agreement Acts": Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated "agreements" time or "protocols". The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade-agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trademarks and copyrights, etcetera. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect of the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation." (39 Columbia Law Review, pp. 651, 755.) The validity of the executive agreement in question is thus patent. In fact, the so-called Parity Rights provided for in the Ordinance Appended to our Constitution were, prior thereto, the subject of an executive agreement, madewithout the concurrence of two-thirds (2/3) of the Senate of the United States. Lastly, the lower court held that it would be unreasonable to require from respondent-appellee an import license when the Import Control Commission was no longer in existence and, hence, there was, said court believed, no agency authorized to issue the aforementioned license. This conclusion is untenable, for the authority to issue the aforementioned licenses was not vested exclusively upon the Import Control Commission or Administration. Executive Order No. 328 provided for export or import licenses "from the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Import Control Administration" or Commission. Indeed, the latter was created only to perform the task of implementing certain objectives of the Monetary Board and the Central Bank, which otherwise had to be undertaken by these two (2) agencies. Upon the abolition of said Commission, the duty to provide means and ways for the accomplishment of said objectives had merely to be discharged directly by the Monetary Board and the Central Bank, even if the aforementioned Executive Order had been silent thereon.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered affirming that of the Commissioner of Customs, with cost against respondents defendantappellee, Eastern Sea Trading. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-10500 June 30, 1959 USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., defendants-appellees. BENGZON, J.: The central issue in this litigation concerns the validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950) whereby the Philippine Government undertook to return to the United States Government in ten annual installments, a total of about 35-million dollars advanced by the United States to, but unexpanded by, the National Defense Forces of the Philippines. In October 1954, the USAFFE Veterans Associations Inc., hereafter called Usaffe Veterans, for itself and for many other Filipino veterans of World War II, ex-members of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE) prayed in its complaint before the Manila court of first instance that said Agreement be annulled, that payments thereunder be declared illegal and that defendants as officers of the Philippine Republic be restrained from disbursing any funds in the National Treasury in pursuance of said Agreement. Said Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available, instead of being remitted to the United States, should be turned over to the Finance Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for the payment of all pending claims of the veterans represented by plaintiff. The complaint rested on plaintiff's three propositions: first, that the funds to be "returned" under the Agreement were funds appropriated by the American Congress for the Philippine army, actually delivered to the Philippine Government and actually owned by said Government; second, that U.S. Secretary Snyder of the Treasury, had no authority to retake such funds from the P.I. Government; and third, that Philippine foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the so-called Romulo-Snyder Agreement. The defendants moved to dismiss, alleging Governmental immunity from suit. But the court required an answer, and then heard the case merits. Thereafter, it dismissed the complaint, upheld the validity of the Agreement and dissolved the preliminary injunction i had previously issued. The plaintiff appealed. On July 26, 1941, foreseeing the War in the Pacific, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, called into the service of the Armed Forces of the United States, for the duration of the emergency, all the organized military forces of the Philippine Commonwealth. His order was published here by Proclamation No. 740 of President Quezon on August 10, 1941. In October 1941, by two special orders, General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces in the Far East (known as USAFFE) placed under his command all the Philippine Army units including the Philippine Constabulary, about 100,000 officers and soldiers. For the expenses incident to such incorporation, mobilization and activities, the Congress of the United States provided in its Appropriation Act of December 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353, 77th Congress) as follows: For all expenses necessary for the mobilization, operation and maintenance of the Army of the Philippines, including expenses connected with calling into the service of the armed forces of the United States the organized military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, . . . but shall be expanded and accounted for in the manner prescribed by the President of the United States, S269,000.00; to remain available until June 30, 1943, which shall be available for payment to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines upon its written request, either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual costs, as authorized by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, of necessary expenses for the purposes aforesaid. . . . (Emphasis Ours.)

In subsequent Acts, the U.S. Congress appropriated moneys in language identical to the above: S28,313,000.00 for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1943; and S100,000,000 each year, for the fiscal years ending June 30, 1944, June 30, 1945, and June 30, 1946.1 The last pertinent appropriation was Public law No. 301 (79th Congress) known as the Rescission Act. It simply set aside 200 million dollars for the Army for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1946. Now, pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353 above-quoted, President Roosevelt issued on January 3, 1942, his executive Order No. 9011 prescribing partly as follows: 2. (a) Necessary expenditures from funds in the Philippine Treasury for the purposes authorized by the Act of December 17, 1941, will be made by disbursing officers of the Army of the Philippines on the approval of authority of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the Far East, and such purposes as he may deem proper, and his determination thereon shall be final and conclusive upon the accounting officers of the Philippine Government, and such expenditures will be accounted for in accordance with procedures established by the Philippine Commonwealth Laws and regulations. (Emphasis Ours.) Out of the total amounts thus appropriated by the United States Congress as above itemized, P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the Philippines Armed Forces by means of vouchers which stated "Advance of Funds under Public law 353-77th Congress and Executive Order No. 9011". This amount was used (mostly) to discharge in the Philippine Islands the monetary obligations assumed by the U.S. Government as a result of the induction of the Philippine Armed Forces into the U.S. Army, and of its operations beginning in 1941. Part of these obligations consisted in the claims of Filipino USAFFE soldiers for arrears in pay and in the charges for supplies used by them and the guerrillas. Of the millions so transferred, there remained unexpended and uncommitted in the possession of the Philippine Armed Forces as of December 31, 1949 about 35 million dollars. As at that time, the Philippine Government badly needed funds for its activities, President Quirino, through Governor Miguel Cuaderno of the Central Bank proposed to the corresponding officials of the U.S. Government the retention of the 35-million dollars as a loan, and for its repayment in ten annual installments. After protracted negotiations the deal was concluded, and the RomuloSnyder Agreement was signed in Washington on November 6, 1950, by the then Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Carlos P. Romulo, and the then American Secretary of the Treasury, John W. Snyder. Principal stipulation therein was this paragraph: 3. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines further agrees to pay the dollar amount payable hereunder to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States in ten annual installments, the first nine payments to be in the amount of S3,500,000.00 and the final residual payment to be in the amount determined by deducting the total of the previous principal payments from the total amount of dollars to be paid to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, the latter amount to be determined as provided in Article II hereof. . . . It should be added that the agreement, made on the basis of the parties' belief that S35-million was the outstanding balance, provided in its article II for an audit by appropriate officers to compute the exact amount due. In compliance with the Agreement, this Government has appropriated by law and paid to the United States up to and including 1954, yearly installments totaling of P33,187,663.24. There is no reason to doubt that subsequent budgets failed to make the corresponding appropriations for other installments. In this appeal, the Usaffe Veterans reiterated with extended arguments, their basic propositions. They insists: first, the money delivered to the U.S. to the Armed Forces of the Philippine Island

were straight payments for military services; ownership thereof vested in the Philippine Government upon delivery, and consequently, there was nothing to return, nothing to consider as a loan; and second, the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was void because it was not binding on the Philippine Government for lack of authority of the officers who concluded the same. With regard to the first point, it must be remembered that the first Congressional Act of December 17, 1941 (Public Law No. 353) appropriating S269-million expressly said the amount "shall be available for payment to the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines upon its written request, either in advance of or in reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual costs" of operation, mobilization and maintenance of the Philippine Army. Note carefully, the money is to handled to the Philippine Government either in advance of expenditures or in reimbursement thereof. All the vouchers signed upon receipt of the money state clearly, " Advance of funds under Public law 353-7th Congress and Executive Order No. 9011". In any system of accounting, advances of funds for expenditures contemplate disbursements to be reported, and credited if approved, against such advances, the unexpended sums to be returned later. In fact, the Congressional law itself required accounting "in the manner prescribed by the President of the U.S." and said President in his Executive Order No. 9011, outlined the procedure whereby advanced funds shall be accounted for. Furthermore, it requires as a condition sine qua non that all expenditures shall first be approved by the Commanding General, United States Army Forces Army Forces in the Far East. Now, these ideas of "funds advanced" to meet such expenditures of the Philippine Army as may be approved by the USAFFE Commanding-General, in connection with the requirement of accounting therefor evidently contradict appellant's thesis that the moneys represented straight payments to the Philippine Government for its armed services, and passed into the absolute control of such Government. In fact, the respective army officers of both nations,2 who are presumed to know their business, have consistently regarded the money as funds advanced, to be subsequently accounted for which means submission of expenditures, and if approved, return of unexpended balance. Now then, it is undeniable that upon a final rendition of accounts by the Philippine Government, a superabit resulted of at least 35 million dollars in favor of the U. S. Instead of returning such amount in one lump sum, our Executive Department arranged for its repayment in ten annual installments. Prima facie such arrangement should raise no valid objection, given the obligation to return-which we know exists. Yet plaintiff attempts to block such repayment because many alleged claims of veterans have not been processed and paid, December 31, 1949, having been fixed as the deadline for the presentation and/or payment of such claims. Plaintiff obviously calculates that if the return is prevented and the money kept here, it might manage to persuade the powers-that-be extend the deadline anew. Hence the two-pronged attack: (a) no obligation to repay; (b) the officers who promised to repay had no authority to bind this Government. The first ground has proved untenable. On the second, there is no doubt that President Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had power to contract budgetary loans under Republic Act No. 213, amending the Republic Act No. 16. The most important argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of the Agreement by the Senate of the Philippines to make it binding on this Government. On this matter, the defendants explain as follows: That the agreement is not a "treaty" as that term is used in the Constitution, is conceded. The agreement was never submitted to the Senate for concurrence (Art. VII, Sec. 10 (7). However, it must be noted that treaty is not the only form that an international agreement may assume. For the grant of the treaty-making power to the Executive and the Senate does not exhaust the power of the government over international relations. Consequently, executive agreements may

be entered with other states and are effective even without the concurrence of the Senate (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 10th ed., 303; Taada and Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed., Vol. II, 1055). It is observed in this connection that from the point of view of the international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers (Hackworth, Digest of International Law, Vol. 5, 395, citing U. S. vs. Belmont, 301 U. S. 342, State of Russia vs. National City Bank of New York, 69 F. (2d) 44; United States vs. Pink, 315 U. S. 203; Altman & Co., vs. United States, 224 U. S. 583. See also McDougal and Lans, "Treaties and Executive Agreements 54 Yale Law Journal 181, 318, et seg.; and Sinco; Op. cit. 305) "The distinction between so-called executive agreements" and "treaties" is purely a constitutional one and has no international legal significance" (Research in International Law Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties (Harvard Law School), Comment, 29 Am. J. Int.) Law Supp. 653, 897. See also Hackworth, op. cit. 391). There are now various forms of such pacts or agreements entered into by and between sovereign states which do not necessarily come under the strict sense of a treaty and which do not require ratification or consent of the legislative body of the State, but nevertheless, are considered valid international agreements. In a survey of the practice of States made by Harvard Research in the Draft Convention in the Law of Treaties (1935, pp. 711-713) it has been shown that there had been more executive agreements entered into by States than treaties (Hudson, International Legislation, I, p. ixii-xcvii). In the leading case of Altman vs, U. S., 224, U. S. 583, it was held that "an international compact negotiated between the representatives of two sovereign nations and made in the name and or behalf of the contracting parties and dealing with important commercial relations between the two countries, is a treaty both internationally although as an executive agreement it is not technically a treaty requiring the advice and consent of the Senate. (Herbert Briggs, The Law of Nations, 1947 ed., p. 489). Nature of Executive Agreements. Executive Agreements fall into two classes: (1) agreements made purely as executive acts affecting external relations and independent of or without legislative authorization, which may be termed as presidential agreements and (2) agreements entered into in pursuants of acts of Congress, which have been designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements (Sinco, supra, 304; Hackworth, supra, 390; McDougal and Lans, supra, 204-205; Hyke, International Law, 2nd ed., Vol. II; et seq.) The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these two classes, for precisely on September 18, 1946, Congress of the Philippines specifically authorized the President of the Philippines to obtain such loans or incur such indebtedness with the Government of the United States, its agencies or instrumentalities (Republic Act No. 16, September 18, 1946, amended by Republic Act No. 213, June 1, 1948). . . . Even granting, arguendo, that there was no legislative authorization, it is hereby maintained that the Romulo-Snyder Agreement was legally and validly entered into to conform to the second category, namely, "agreements entered into purely as executive acts without legislative authorization." This second category usually includes money agreements relating to the settlement of pecuniary claims of citizens. It may be said that this method of settling such claims has come to be the usual way of dealing with matters of this kind (Memorandum of the Solicitor of the Department of State (Nielson) sent to Senator Lodge by the Under-Secretary of State (Philip), August 23, 1922, MS Dept. of State, file 711.00/98a). Such considerations seems persuasive; indeed, the Agreement was not submitted to the U.S. Senate either; but we do not stop to check the authorities above listed nor test the conclusions derived therefrom in order to render a definite pronouncement, for the reason that our Senate Resolution No. 153 practically admits the validity and binding force of such Agreement. Furthermore, the acts of Congress Appropriating funds for the yearly installments necessary to

comply with such Agreements constitute a ratification thereof, which places the question the validity out of the Court's reach, no constitutional principle having been invoked to restrict Congress' plenary power to appropriate funds-loan or no loan. In conclusion, plaintiff, to say the least, failed to make a clear case for the relief demanded; its petition was therefore, properly denied.

EN BANC

Respondents. July 16, 2011 x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x G.R No. 187167 Present: CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners, - versus HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS,

The Antecedents In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), 4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines 7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate Promulgated: their own applicable maritime zones.

and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,9 as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime pa ssage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
13

Paris.

We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.

The Issues The petition raises the following issues: 1. Preliminarily 1. 2. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.

In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.

2.

On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

The Ruling of the Court On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional. On the Threshold Issues

Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack oflocus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.

Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the su it, thus satisfying

Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands

one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.17

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes

sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris. 22

In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or

Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners. 18 multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts. the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are such law. drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine States like ours could not be any clearer: Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf . The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long

exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).

text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.

Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.24

The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over

UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.26 RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area.27 Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the
25

the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.

Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints,increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29 Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as amended, taking into account the Treaty of Paris delimitation (in square nautical miles) Internal or archipelagic waters Extent of maritime area using RA 9522, taking into account UNCLOS III (in square nautical miles)

166,858

171,435

Territorial Sea

274,136

32,106

Exclusive Economic Zone TOTAL 440,994

382,669

586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles. 31

Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, 33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.

The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations: What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group

Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained

Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah: current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents: [T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit: 1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.35 Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)

UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution. 38

2.

3.

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 12136 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37

Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution 39 or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this: Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. 1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.

2.

This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.

sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III. 47

xxxx 4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)

The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41 Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x.49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50 treated the right to a healthful and balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. 42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community. The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser footing vis-vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to theirterritorial UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III. In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it. provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 251) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752), are not violated by RA 9522.

RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones

Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a twofronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.

The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental s helf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.

PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, et.al v. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, et.al G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011, EN BANC (Carpio, J.) The conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress in March 2009 to comply with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. Such compliance shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan Island Ground (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones. Petitioners, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers or legislators assail the constitutionality of R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments contending that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, thus subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners have contended that these passage rights will violate the Constitution as it shall expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 9522 is unconstitutional for converting internal waters into archipelagic waters HELD: Petition DISMISSED. The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional and is consistent with the Philippines national interest. Aside from being a vital step in safeguarding the countrys maritime zones, the law also allows an internationally-recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritim e zones and continental shelf. The Court also finds that the conversion of internal waters into archipelagic waters will not risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exercise of sovereignty over waters and air space, bed and subsoil and the resources therein. Furthermore, due to the absence of its own legislation regarding routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage, the Philippines has no choice but to comply with the international law norms. The Philippines is subject to UNCLOS III, which grants innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise, thus, the right of innocent passage, being a customary international law, is automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. If the Philippines or any country shall invoke its sovereignty to forbid innocent passage, it shall risk retaliatory

measures from the international community. With compliance to UNCLOS III and the enactment of R.A. 9522, the Congress has avoided such conflict. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, the compliance to UNCLOS III through the R.A. 9522 will not expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazard. As a matter of fact, if the Philippines did not comply with the baselines law, it will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured and which will produce two-fronted disaster: (1) open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around the archipelago and (2) it shall weaken the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. Such disaster was avoided through the R.A. 9522.