MMDA v Viron Transport G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007 J.

Carpio Morales

Facts: GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act. Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed down to whether 1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real properties without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality. Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005, reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act. MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals. And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but not between third persons.

Issues: 1. Is there a justiciable controversy? 2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?

Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed.

Ratio: 1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.

Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents. 2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications. It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated only to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education. In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project. MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the means. As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads. Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power. Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly oppressive? De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act. Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require" in approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existing facilities.

Social Justice Society vs. Hon. Lito Atienza, Jr. Mayor of Manila G.R. No. 156052 Digest

Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila

G.R. No. 156052

March 7, 2007

Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the socalled Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell.

However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program.

The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.

Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027.

Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts.

On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027.

Samad v. COMELEC

Facts: Sukarno S. Samad and Bai Unggie Abdula were among the contenders for Mayor in the Municipality of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao in the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992. Both were proclaimed mayor-elect by two different canvassing boards the Abdula, by the board headed by Abas A. Saga, on May 28, 1992, and Samad, by the board headed by Mucado M. Pagayao, on May 29, 1992. Both went to the Commission on Elections in separate petitions against each other. In SPA 92-314 Samad sought the nullification of the proclamation made in favor of Abdula and the calling of a special election in three precincts. In SPC 92-421 Abdula prayed that the proclamation of Samad be nullified and that he be enjoined from assuming as mayor of Kabuntalan. The COMELEC issued a resolution directing its Law Department to: 1) summon both election registrars Saga and Pagayao; 2) conduct an investigation of the matter; and 3) require Election Supervisor to comment on the petition. On that same date, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2489 terminating all pre-proclamation cases except the 86 cases named in the list annexed thereto. SPA 92-314 was not included in the list. Samad then filed in the RTC of Cotabato City an action for quo warranto and prohibition with preliminary injunction (SPL Civil Case 2938). The RTC Judge issued a temporary restraining order directing Abdula to cease and desist from exercising the powers and functions of the mayor of Kabuntalan and enjoining all officials and entities to respect the proclamation of petitioner Samad. On that same day, Abdula filed a petition with the CA (CA-GR SP No. 28683), questioning the validity of the order, which then issued a resolution enjoining its implementation. After finding that both the conflicting certificates of canvass and proclamation prepared by the Saga and Pagayao boards of canvassers were defective, the First Division of the COMELEC denied the consolidated petitions and directed the Office of the Executive Director to constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for the purpose of verifying which of the two sets of statements of votes upon which the two different proclamation documents were based was genuine, without prejudice to the resolution of the prayer for special elections in Kabuntalan. The COMELEC en banc sustained its First Division. It also declared that pending implementation of the challenged resolution, it was the responsibility of the DILG to designate an OIC-Mayor in the Municipality of Kabuntalan. This declaration prompted Samad to file with this Court a petition for certiorari with restraining order and injunction. The Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order commanding the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing the questioned resolutions.

The DILG recognized the Samad as mayor of Kabuntalan, but later on authorized Abdula to continue serving as a holdover mayor. Samad then came again to this Court in a petition for certiorari. This was referred to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-GR SP No. 29942, and consolidated with CA-GR SP No. 28683. Ramos then designated Abdula as officer-in-charge of the Office of the Mayor of Kabuntalan. Samad's the filed a petition questioning this designation.

Issue: Whether jurisdiction over the present controversy remained with the COMELEC

Held: Yes. SPA 92-314 was not only for the annulment of Abdula's proclamation but also for the holding of special elections in three precincts. It therefore fell under Section 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2489 which shall remain active and continue until the issues therein are finally resolved by the Commission. Moreover SPA 92-314 remained active because on June 29, 1992, the same day Resolution No. 2489 was issued, the COMELEC en banc, after finding that there were two Certificates of Canvass and Proclamation and two proclaimed mayors, issued another resolution requiring both Election Registrars Saga and Pagayao to appear before it, and the Election Supervisor Cabacungan to comment on the petition. Even assuming that SPA 92-314 was a purely preproclamation case, it could nevertheless continue beyond June 30, 1992,

pursuant to Section 5 of Resolution No. 2489, because it was the subject of the said order. It should also be noted that upon Abdula's motion, the COMELEC on September 11, 1992, ordered the said case, then pending in the First Division, to be consolidated with SPC 92-421 in the Second Division.

Issue: What was the effect upon the cases pending in the COMELEC of the filing by Samad of the petition for quo warranto in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City

Held: The COMELEC retained jurisdiction over SPA 92-314 and SPC 92-421. As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy, or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The exceptions to the rule are where: (1) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (2) quo warranto was not the proper remedy; (3) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to annul a proclamation; (4) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam; and (5) the proclamation was null and void. All the exceptions except the fourth apply here.

The Saga board which proclaimed the private respondent had been illegally constituted. The Election Supervisor of Maguindanao Mucado instructed Pagayao to continue the canvassing after the former chairman had been relieved by her and not the Municipal Treasurer of Kabuntalan. Moreover, quo warranto was not the proper remedy because (1) both the petitioner and the private respondent claimed to have assumed the office of the mayor of Kabuntalan and (2) the election of a candidate was not questioned on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility. Also the case before the RTC was not really one for quo warranto nor was it an election protest. Both petitions in the COMELEC and in the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato were directed at the illegality of the composition of the Saga board and of the proclamation of the private respondent. This matter is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC under Sections 241, 242, and 243 of the Omnibus Election Code xxx as a pre-proclamation controversy. The question of whether or not special elections should be called in the three precincts is also cognizable by the COMELEC under the Omnibus Election Code (under Sec. 6 of the omnibus election code).

Issue: Whether the COMELEC should not have denied the consolidated petitions for the annulment of the questioned proclamations

Held: Yes. Having ascertained that the proclamation in favor of Abdula had been made by a board constituted without proper authority, the COMELEC should have declared such proclamation null and void, along with the certificate of canvass and proclamation and the statements of votes prepared by that board.

Issue: Whether Samads proclamation is also null and void Held:

Yes. An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a valid proclamation. The canvass of the mayoralty election was incomplete because there were still three precincts with a total of 660 registered voters that had not sent in their returns. Precincts 3-A and 4-A reportedly did not function on election day, and the election returns in Precinct No. 13 were missing. In this situation, the COMELEC should determine whether there was indeed a failure of election that would necessitate the calling of a special election in the said precincts. Regarding the missing election returns in Precinct No. 13, Section 233 of the Omnibus Election Code mandates the board of canvassers to obtain them from the corresponding boards of election inspectors. If these returns have been lost or destroyed, the board may, upon prior authority of the Commission, resort to any of the authentic copies of said election returns or a certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission. Any proclamation in violation of this provision is null and void under Section 238 of the Code. It is only when authorized by the COMELEC or when the missing election returns will not affect the results of the election that the board can terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of the available returns. Precinct No. 13 had 224 registered voters and the margin between the petitioner and the private respondent is allegedly 153 votes only. As the missing election returns of that precinct will affect the outcome of the election, no proclamation can as yet be made. The Pagayao board was aware that "the result will be affected by the two (2) precincts that did not function and the one (1) precinct, the election returns of which were missing." Yet the Pagayao board proceeded to proclaim petitioner Samad as mayor-elect over Abdula and the other candidates. Undoubtedly, the said proclamation produced no legal effect whatsoever.

Issue: Whether Abdula is now estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City over SPL Civil Case No. 2938

Held: No. Inasmuch as it is the COMELEC that has exclusive jurisdiction over the present controversy, the restraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City are void ab initio. Consequently, President Ramos did not act improperly when he designated the private respondent as OIC-Mayor of Kabuntalan pending final resolution of the dispute. The designation was in accordance with the case of Sanchez v. Commission on Elections, 24 where this Court recognized the authority of the President of the Philippines to appoint an officer-in-charge of the office of mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga, pending settlement of the controversy over the position.

Issue: Whether Samad is guilty of forum-shopping for having filed a quo warranto case with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City although the COMELEC continued to have jurisdiction over the controversy

Held: No. This Court has held in a long line of decisions that "there is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The petitioner filed with the lower court a petition for quo warranto because he believed that SPC 92-314 had been terminated under COMELEC Resolution 2489. He therefore cannot be faulted for going to the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City to continue his challenge to Abdula's proclamation. The causes of action, subject matter, and issues raised in these four petitions are not identical. There is forumshopping only where the actions involve the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances. Neither is the private respondent guilty of the same charge. The fact that she prayed for the affirmance of her proclamation and the nullification of that of petitioner Samad does not make Abdula guilty of forum-shopping. The reason is that she sought this relief from one and the same forum, to wit, the COMELEC. Moreover, at the time she filed her petition in SPC 92-421, no adverse ruling or opinion had as yet been rendered by the COMELEC on these issues in SPA 92-314.