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SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL

condition for the possibility of historical cultures in their various forms. R icke rt a rgu e d b o th th a t the histo ria n o f an y cu ltu re in se le c ting historically significant facts must appeal to the values thought significant by that culture rather than those of the historian and that the values of different cultures approximate the universally valid values that condition them. M artin Heidegger studied under Rickert at Freiburg. In 1916, when Rickert moved to the University of Heidelberg, Husserl was appointed to the chair vacated by Rickert at Freiburg.

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SARTRE, JEAN-PAUL (19051980). Jean-Paul Sartre studied at the cole Normale Suprieure, passing his agrgation in 1929. After brief military service, he taught at a lyce in Le Havre for six years, during which time he read and studied the works of Husserl and M artin Heidegger . Sartres early philosophical works are thoroughly phenomenological in character. His first work, The Transcendence of the Ego (La transcendance de lego , 1936) was a detailed critique of Husserls views on the ego , although the position Sartre took is remarkably similar to Husserls own view, since it involves a non-egological conception of consciousness . Both also assert that a pre-reflective self-awareness belongs to all intentional experience. This leads to Sartres view that consciousness is best characterized as foritself (pour-soi) undetermined and self-determining or free whereas whatever is not characterized by this pre-reflective self-awareness is just what it is in-itself (en -so i) . Sartres early works on the imagination ( Lim agination [1936] [ Im agination: A Psychological Critique ] and Limaginaire [1940] [ The Imaginary ]) are attempts to work out a theory of intentionality that emphasizes this freedom of consciousness as foritself. And his Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (Esquisse dune thorie des motions , 1939) develops a view of the emotions as freely chosen ways of relating to what an experiencing agent encounters in the world . The themes of these early works were fully developed in Sartres masterpiece Being and Nothingness ( Ltre et le nant , 1943). Despite viewing consciousness essentially as freedom, Sartre develops a view of transphenomenality, the view, that is, that the appearing phenomenon d ep end s fo r its being not only on consciousness but the horiz on of objects in which it is presented. Moreover, Sartres view of consciousness as freedom was carefully qualified by an extensive consideration of the manner in which freedom is situated socially and historically and the manner, therefore, in which the exercise of freedom is conditioned by the