Defence News

The maiden launch of Nirbhay, Indias sub-sonic cruise missile, has been further delayed. The launch, which was to take place in November this year, will now be done in January 2013, Dr. Saraswat said. A DRDO official said the Nirbhay launch was delayed because modifications had to be made in the launcher. While India already had had a successful supersonic cruise missile in BrahMos, it felt the need to develop a sub-sonic cruise missile. Hence the development of Nirbhay, which would fly at 0.65 Mach. The Aeronautical Development Establishment, a DRDO unit in Bangalore, designed Nirbhay, which had been derived from Lakshya, a pilotless target aircraft. Nirbhay is a two-stage, surface-to-surface, terrain-hugging missile. It takes the oxidiser from the air. So it can travel for a longer duration and a longer distance. Its range is around 1,000 km.

BMD programme ( Ballistic Missile Defence)

The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is set to conduct its eighth ballistic interceptor missile test any day between November 19 and 22. V.K. Saraswat, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, said that while the attacker, a modified Prithvi missile, would take off from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur, Odisha, the interceptor would blast off from the Wheeler Island and pounce on the attacker in endoatmosphere at an altitude of 15 km to 16 km. The interceptor missile is called Advanced Air Defence (AAD) system. While the attacker would mimic the path of a ballistic missile launched from a hostile country, the AAD would race at a supersonic speed to intercept the attacker and destroy it. As the crow flies, the Wheeler Island, off Dhamra village on the Odisha coast, is 70 km away from Chandipur. Asked what improvements were made in this interceptor mission, Dr. Saraswat said the modified Prithvi missile would have a higher velocity. We have improved the accuracy of the interception in the endo-atmosphere The interceptor will be launched in a hit-to-kill mode, he added. The Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme aims at protecting Indias vital assets from being targeted by the ballistic missiles launched by hostile neighbours. Of the seven interceptor missiles tests conducted by the DRDO so far, six have been successful. The first interceptor mission took place in November 2006 in exo-atmosphere at an altitude of 48 km and it was successful. The second test, again successful, took place in December 2007 in endo-atmosphere at an altitude of 15 km. Out of the seven tests, five took place in endoatmosphere at a height less than 20 km. After the seventh interceptor missile test on February 10, 2012, Dr. Saraswat asserted that the success confirmed that Indias BMD programme in the endo-atmosphere is now ready for deployment and the country is now in a position to take it to the next phase of production and induction.

INS TARKASH India took delivery on Friday of the fifth Russia-built multirole stealth frigate. INS Tarkash was commissioned . Tarkash belongs to the second batch of three modified Krivak-III (Talwar) class frigates India ordered from Russia in 2006 under a $1.6-billion contract. The first frigate of the batch, INS Teg, was delivered in April and the third one, INS Trikand, is undergoing dock trials and is expected to be handed over next summer after completing sea trials in the Baltic Sea. Each of the new frigates is armed with eight BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missiles instead of the less potent Club-N missiles installed on the first three frigates, which were delivered to the Indian Navy in 2003-2004. Speaking at the induction ceremony, Indias Ambassador to Russia Ajai Malhotra described INS Tarkash as a fine example of the evolution of Indo-Russian defence cooperation from buyer-seller relationship to joint research, development and production of advanced weapon systems. It is very satisfying that whilst the ship is made in Russia, it has on board many Indian systems, including the ships sonar and its entire communications set-up, Mr. Malhotra said. Of particular note is the BrahMos missile with which it is armed, which is the result of a joint IndoRussian cooperative effort and is probably the best supersonic missile in the world. Even though the construction of the first and second batches of frigates was dogged by long delays, Russia hopes that India will place more orders for the advanced warship, which proved its mettle during war games and the Indian Navys anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden. We hope therell be another contract for three frigates because they turned out to be very good and remain state-of-the-art, said Andrei Dyachkov, president of Russias United Shipbuilding Corporation. Given Indias emphasis on indigenising defence production, Russian shipbuilders are ready to discuss shifting construction of warships to India. Weve been discussing this option with our Indian colleagues and are ready to undertake a stepby-step transfer of production to India after training Indian shipbuilders, setting up the necessary infrastructure in India and building the first ship in a series in Russia, Mr. Dyachkov told The Hindu .
India's elusive nuclear weapon triad - the capability to fire nukes from the land, air and sea - has taken another leap closer to becoming an operational reality. Even as the indigenous nuclear submarine INS Arihant gets ready for sea trials, the country's first underwater ballistic missile "successfully" completed its developmental trials on Sunday. With this twelfth test of the K-15 missile conducted from a submerged platform or pontoon in the Bay of Bengal, DRDO officials said the 750-km range submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) was now ready for induction. "The two-stage missile, which rapidly climbed to a 20-km altitude after being launched from the pontoon, was tested for its full range over 700-km. This was its last developmental test, in which all mission objectives were met," said an official. "Now, the 10-metre tall missile, which can carry a one-tonne nuclear warhead, will undergo a usertrial within a month before it's integrated into the submarine. Only the US, Russia, France and China

have successfully developed SLBMs till now," he added. There is reason to cheer but the bubbly can only be popped once the K-15 missiles are successfully tested from the 6,000-tonne INS Arihant, the country's first indigenous nuclear-powered submarine, which is now all set to undergo "sea-acceptance trials" after its miniature 83 MW pressurized lightwater reactor goes "critical" at Visakhapatnam soon. Navy chief Admiral D K Joshi last month had alluded to this, holding that the nation would get "good news" on this front "very soon". INS Arihant has been undergoing extensive "harbor-acceptance trials", with all its pipelines being "cleared and tested" on shore-based steam for several months now, before its reactor is "fired" for the sea-trials. Built with four silos to carry 12 K-15s, or four of the 3,500-km range K-4 missiles under-development at present, INS Arihant will of course have to test-fire the 10-tonne missile during the sea trials before it can be said that India's long-awaited nuclear triad has finally become operational. The first two legs of the triad, already in place with the armed forces, are the Agni series of missiles and fighters like Sukhoi-30MKIs and Mirage-2000s configured to deliver nuclear warheads. The absence of an operational SLBM, however, has for long left a "big credibility gap" in the country's nuclear deterrence posture. Only a nuclear-powered submarine, which can stay underwater for extended periods, armed with nuclear-tipped missiles can provide a country with effective and difficult-to-detect "second or retaliatory strike capabilities". But the development of both INS Arihant and K-15 has meandered for well over a decade now. India may now have the INS Chakra, the Akula-II class nuclear-propelled submarine leased from Russia for 10 years, but it did not come armed with "strategic" missiles due to international treaties. The utility of SSBNs (nuclear submarines with long range missiles) can be gauged from the fact that even the US and Russia are ensuring that two-thirds of the strategic warheads they eventually retain under arms reduction agreements will be in the shape of SLBMs. Consequently, INS Arihant and its three follow-on submarines in the process of being built, along with the K-15 and K-4 missiles, are considered critical for India's "strategic deterrence and autonomy".
The Agni-VI, to be developed by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), joins the Prahaar missile as the new symbols of Indias po werful strategic complex. Both missiles, however, invite questions as to the validity of Indias credible minimum deterrence doctrine for its emerging nuclear force. The Agni-VI is reported to have a range of 6,000 km, and is being designed as the first Indian ballistic missile to host multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. It will hold four to six warheads, and will be Indias largest ballistic missile yet at 20 metres long and weighing 65-70 tonnes. To give a sense of the haste of DRDO missile projects, it is the successor missile to the Agni-V, a 5,000 km range missile first tested only last April.1 There was a certain strategic rationale for developing the Agni-V: its aegis brings Beijing, Shanghai and other Chinese east coast metropolises into Indian range for the first time, bringing a symmetry and perhaps stability to their bilateral nuclear deterrence. However, this same rationale made further-reaching and more destructive Indian missiles a weak proposition. With China in its entirety already in range, what further strategic targets exist that merit an Agni-VI? What are the geopolitical advantages to be gained by an Agni-VI that outweigh the tensions and uncertainty about the intentions of Indias nuclear force that the missile generates?

Minister of State for Home Mullappally Ramachandran said the issue of repealing/amending AFSPA has been under consideration of the government and Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee and the

Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) have also made certain recommendations on the subject. - See more at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/amendment-on-afspa-only-after-reviewingground-realities-govt/1080665/#sthash.y8qxcG3w.dpuf

Amidst global economic slowdown that fuelled fears of a cut in defence spending, Union Finance Minister P. Chidambaram gave a 14 per cent hike in defence budget aimed at sustaining armed forces modernisation drive. The Defence Ministrys allocation was proposed to be Rs. 2,03,672 crore, up by Rs. 25,169 crore from last years revised estimate of Rs. 1,78,503 crore. The budget estimate in 2012-13 was Rs. 1,93,407 crore, but tough economic conditions prompted the Finance Ministry to cut it by Rs. 14,904 crore. I propose to increase the allocation for defence to Rs 2,03,672 crore. This will include Rs 86,741 crore for capital expenditure, Mr. Chidambaram said while assuring the Lok Sabha that financial constraints would not come in the way of providing any additional requirement for the security of the nation. Reacting to the allocation, Defence Minister A.K. Antony said that taking into account the difficult economic situation both at home and abroad, the Finance Minister had done a good job. Factoring the current economic scenario, he has been fair to the defence sector also by increasing the budget and assuring that should there be any urgent need in future the same will be provided, he said. The country is in the process of going for big ticket purchases like warships, missile systems, artillery guns, multi-role fighter jets and transport planes as well as improving the infrastructure in the north-east, bordering China. Difficult economic conditions notwithstanding, IHS Janes has predicted that India will become the worlds fourth-largest defence spender by 2020, just behind the U.S., China and Russia. It will surpass France, the U.K. and Japan. According to IHS Jane, Indias defence spending will reach $65.4 billion in 2020. In the pipeline are one of the largest global defence order for 126 Rafale fighter jets from Dassault Aviation of France, estimated to be anywhere between $10 to $20 billion. Contract negotiations with the French firm are in an advanced stage, which edged out Eurofighter in the race to bag the order. The deal is likely to be signed by the middle of this year. Another key order will be for a mid-air refueller, for which Airbus A-330 MRTT has been chosen.

Among other major acquisitions in the offing are the 22 Apache attack choppers and 15 heavy-lift choppers.
For all the talk about indigenisation of defence equipment for self-reliance in the long run, the Union budget has cold-shouldered the private sector, which has been seeking a larger role in defence production. The budget has earmarked a token Rs. 1 crore for facilitating the Indian industry to fashion highend defence systems. While Rs. 89.22 crore was apportioned last year to assist the industry in developing prototypes under the Make category of defence procurement, the allocation was cancelled by the Finance Ministry when it cut back Rs. 14,904 crore from the defence outlay. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) stipulates that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) bear 80 per cent of the development cost of such prototypes. But projects under way in this category, like the future infantry combat vehicle (FICV) and the tactical communication system (TCS) are on a slow track thanks to the MoDs historic mistrust of the domestic industry, rue industry insiders. Without a level-playing field, projects undertaken to give a fillip to indigenisation have all been stalled for a long time, laments Geethanjali Nataraj, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Ficci) director in-charge of defence. Cosmetic hike Ms. Nataraj terms cosmetic the (8 per cent) hike in capital expenditure in the sector, saying the Defence Ministry has got a raw deal. Given the rate of inflation and the depreciation of rupee, theres hardly anything for enhancing indigenisation with the participation of private sector, she says. The industry does have the capability to execute projects like FICV and the TCS, besides those in the pipeline like the battlefield management system (BMS), operational data link (ODL) and the net-centric operations system (NCOS), but the government looks the other way, she says. In contrast, Gurpal Singh, Confederation of Indian Industrys principal adviser (Defence), welcomes the defence outlay of Rs. 2,03,672 crore, an increase of nearly 14 per cent over the revised estimates last year in the backdrop of the slow economic growth and the pressing needs of military modernisation. Mr. Singh is optimistic about Finance Minister P. Chidambarams assurance that more funds would be ploughed in for enhancing security preparedness in case of need. He feels that benefits such as zero customs duty for plant and machinery extended to the industry under the National Electronics Policy should also include the defence sector. Chief Executive Officer of Tata Power Strategic Electronics Division Rahul Chaudhry feels disheartened at the cut in the allocation for prototype development expenditure.

For decades, the Defence Ministry has been talking about building a defence industrial base in the country and advocating domestic research ad development. The budget has once again ignored the issue of extending 80-IA benefits for investments in defence manufacturing infrastructure and has not announced any schemes to give impetus to indigenous R&D. I sincerely hope that this is not an indication of the governments true priority on indigenisation and a correction will be effected before the budget is approved, he told The Hindu. The former Vice-Chief of the Navy, Vice-Admiral (retd.), Raman P. Suthan, however, thinks that money has never been a constraint on hardware acquisition for the forces. The problem lies with the procurement process which takes several years for completion. The DPP is a failsafe mechanism offering little scope for departure, but people are scared to take decisions. While everyone gets wiser post-facto, you cant wait for all the 100 factors to be in place to take decisions on such key issues, he says. He is confident that the government would make available funds for big ticket purchases, but likens the process to a game of snake and ladder, with the government getting into a scrap-all mode at a faint hint of corruption. You must delink corruption from capability- building. The purchase of the Barak missile defence system, for instance, was mired in controversies, but its induction has made the forces more confident as it is a pretty good weapon, he says.
The development trial of India's first indigenously developed sub-sonic cruise missile 'Nirbhay' is likely take place tomorrow from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur near here in Balasore district. "Range co-ordination work and final check-up for the test is almost complete and the test flight is to be carried out tomorrow if everything goes all right," aDRDO scientist associated with the project said today. The missile, under development since 2007, has a range of 1,000 kms. Though India has the technology of supersonic missiles like BrahMos jointly developed by India and Russia, Nirbhay with a medium range is a different kind of missile being developed by the Aeronautical Development Establishment, a Defence Research and Development Organisation laboratory based at Bangalore.

People may not remember, but General Ranjit Singh Dayal was Gen Sundarjis deputy, he was the lion of Haji Pir Pass. He got the Mahavir Chakra. He got Haji Pir Pass in that very difficult war.

Crossing an important milestone at the last meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), the Ministry of Defence has, for the first time, decided to allow Indian private entities to participate in a bid for making artillery guns. It is learnt that while approving the Army's proposal for upgunning of 300 more 130 mm M-46 field guns to a 155 mm gun system, the DAC on April 2 also decided that the request for proposal (RFP) would also go to interested private players. The Ordnance Factory Board, which used to automatically get these orders, will now be one of the contestants.

This is the first time that South Block has decided to let the Indian private sector make an offensive weapon platform. While companies have been keen, the opportunity has never come. However, private entities such as the Tatas and L&T have been involved in making important ancillary equipment such as launchers for the Pinaka missile. The upgunning of 130 mm guns was originally awarded to Israeli firm Soltam which completed the first lot of 180 guns but it was then blacklisted. It was no longer possible to proceed with the original plan of upgunning all 480 guns of 130 mm. Some transfer of technology did take place but it has all remained mothballed with the gun carriage factory in Jabalpur, sources said. In 2010, the Army did float a request for information for the remaining 300 guns but the process ran into delays. For an Army facing shortage of artillery guns, this move is also being seen as a test case for opening the doors to the Indian private sector to manufacture lethal weapon systems given the problems India faces as a major global arms importer. Besides, the DAC meeting, headed by Defence Minister A K Antony, also gave its stamp of approval to a new process of acquisition by which buying globally would be the last option. A new gradation has now been set under which the first priority would be to 'buy Indian', the next would be 'buy and make Indian' that would allow private entities room for collaboration, after which would come options of 'buy and make global' and then 'buy global'. This, sources said, is another step aimed at giving priority to the Indian private sector so that they can set up defence manufacturing units in India, either on their own or through collaboration. All this will be part of the new Defence Procurement Policy, which is expected to be finalised at the next DAC meeting on April 20. Significant changes are also expected in the preparation of Qualitative Requirements (QRs) for the purchase of military equipment. The new policy is likely to make it clear that once the DAC approves a set of QRs, then no deviation would be permitted. But if necessary for any technical reason, it would have to be approved afresh by the DAC. Insiders said that Ministry of Defence still remains opposed to increasing the FDI limit in the sector from 26 to 49 per cent. The view is that there exists a provision to approve such investment in special cases depending on the nature of technology to be transferred and that is as far as the Ministry would like to go for the moment. The defence ministry's decision, taken at the meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) earlier this month, to allow the Indian private sector to participate in the bidding

for artillery guns is a welcome step. But it should have come years ago. There was no convincing rationale for the MoD's practice of trusting foreign private arms manufacturers with its armament details, while continuing to exclude domestic private firms. That's set to change with the army's plans for upgunning 300 of its 130 mm M-46 field guns. But this is just a first step and must be seen as the beginning of a longer, arduous process. The new acquisition process, approved at the DAC meeting, places global procurement at the bottom of the pile. Buying arms in the global market as a last resort would hold only if domestic ordnance production were up to the task of meeting the military's quantitative and qualitative equipment needs. India's ordnance factories and PSUs, such as HAL, till date have managed little beyond joint production; so far, private players have been restricted to the manufacture of ancillary equipment. The UPA's instinct to ban and blacklist foreign manufacturers after each procurement scandal has stalled India's military modernisation and eroded the military's conventional edge in the subcontinent. The artillery regiments, in particular, have been grounded, since most of the major foreign suppliers are blacklisted. India's immediate military needs include new guns, air-defence missiles to protect naval assets, fighter aircraft and new-age submarines. Clearly, this is a tall order for the domestic ordnance industry to meet any time soon. For the long term, the MoD has to ensure that successful private bidders are not circumscribed by a restrictive environment. They must be free to discover their partners abroad and acquire the best technology possible. In the aftermath of the UN's approval of the Arms Trade Treaty, perceived to be biased against net importers like India, the imperative of an overhaul of domestic arms production is clear. Only that will give shape to the military-industrial complex that a country with the world's fourth-largest armed forces should have created long ago. The defence ministry's decision, taken at the meeting of the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) earlier this month, to allow the Indian private sector to participate in the bidding for artillery guns is a welcome step. But it should have come years ago. There was no convincing rationale for the MoD's practice of trusting foreign private arms manufacturers with its armament details, while continuing to exclude domestic private firms. That's set to change with the army's plans for upgunning 300 of its 130 mm M-46 field guns. But this is just a first step and must be seen as the beginning of a longer, arduous process. The new acquisition process, approved at the DAC meeting, places global procurement at the bottom of the pile. Buying arms in the global market as a last resort would hold only if domestic ordnance production were up to the task of meeting the

military's quantitative and qualitative equipment needs. India's ordnance factories and PSUs, such as HAL, till date have managed little beyond joint production; so far, private players have been restricted to the manufacture of ancillary equipment. The UPA's instinct to ban and blacklist foreign manufacturers after each procurement scandal has stalled India's military modernisation and eroded the military's conventional edge in the subcontinent. The artillery regiments, in particular, have been grounded, since most of the major foreign suppliers are blacklisted. India's immediate military needs include new guns, air-defence missiles to protect naval assets, fighter aircraft and new-age submarines. Clearly, this is a tall order for the domestic ordnance industry to meet any time soon. For the long term, the MoD has to ensure that successful private bidders are not circumscribed by a restrictive environment. They must be free to discover their partners abroad and acquire the best technology possible. In the aftermath of the UN's approval of the Arms Trade Treaty, perceived to be biased against net importers like India, the imperative of an overhaul of domestic arms production is clear. Only that will give shape to the military-industrial complex that a country with the world's fourth-largest armed forces should have created long ago.
The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), the apex decision-making body of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), has revised the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) that details the process for buying defence equipment for the military. MoD today announced that the new policy, DPP-2013, has the twin objectives of infusing greater efficiency in the procurement process and strengthening the defence manufacturing base in the country. DPP-2013 goes beyond the earlier DPPs of 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008 and 2011 in explicitly backing indigenous defence industry. It stipulates that Indian defence companies will get access to the militarys long-term equipment road map, providing them with the time needed for developing the equipment that the military needs in the future; provides a level playing field between the defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs) and the private defence companies; simplifies the buy & make (Indian) procedure to benefit Indian industry; and defines ambiguous terms in the DPP like indigenous content. As Business Standard has reported (Apr 13: Ministrys initiative to push indigenous development), DPP-2013 stipulates the categorisation of each procurement case should favour indigenisation, with equipment being bought internationally only if developing and building in India proves impossible. Categorisation is a key decision in each acquisition project, in which MoD decides whether the equipment should be developed and built in India (buy Indian and make categories); or built in India by an indigenous consortium (buy & make Indian); or built in India with transfer of technology (buy & make with ToT); or bought over the counter from a foreign vendor (buy global). The MoD announcement says DPP-2013 provides for a preferred order of categorisation, with global cases being a choice of last resort. The order of preference, in decreasing order, shall be: (1) buy (Indian); (2) buy & make (Indian); (3) make; (4) buy & make with ToT; and (5) buy (global). Any proposal to select a particular category must now state reasons for excluding the higher preferred category/categories. MoD has also granted a longstanding request by private defence companies for access to the militarys 15-year Long-Term Integrated Perspective Plan (LTIPP), so that they have the lead time needed to meet future

equipment needs. Today, MoD said: DAC has approved the release of a public version of its 15-year perspective document (LTIPP), outlining the Technology Perspective and Capability Road map (TPCR) against LTIPP 2012 2027. The TPCR will provide useful guidance to the Indian defence industry for boosting its infrastructural capabilities and directing its R&D and technology investments. An advantage DPSUs and Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) have enjoyed over private firms has been MoDs nomination of selected DPSUs as the recipients of Maintenance Transfer of Technology (MToT) from foreign vendors in major acquisitions. For example, in aircraft purchases (Jaguar, Sukhoi-30, Hawk, etc) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd has been nominated by MoD as the MToT partner, entitling it to receive the technology and infrastructure needed to maintain, service, overhaul and upgrade the aircraft through its service life. Now, levelling the playing field between DPSUs and private industry, MoD says: MToT has been hitherto reserved largely for OFB and DPSUs through the nomination process. A DPP amendment has been approved that does away with nomination by the Department of Defence Production and facilitates selection of MToT partners by Indian bidders. This measure is expected to have a positive impact on private-sector participation in maintenance, repair & overhaul work. Besides finalising DPP-2013, DAC today also clarified important issues relating to defence licensing. A defence items list has been finalised and sent to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP, under the commerce ministry). An explicit list of defence items will clarify which items actually need a defence licence. MoD has also informed DIPP that dual-use items (with civil as well as military applications) will not require licences. DAC has also allayed apprehensions among foreign vendors and governments that information, documents and technology transferred to the Indian defence industry may not be secure. DAC today finalised draft security guidelines that will be circulated for consultations with stakeholders, including licensed defence industries. MoD says: A complete security framework for Indian private industries participating in defence cases will be in place in the near future. MoD also cleared a keenly anticipated mechanism for providing micro, small and medium scale enterprises (MSMEs) with funds for developing defence equipment. According to MoD, Sidbi has decided to earmark an amount of Rs 500 crore for providing loans (to defence MSMEs), and further, a fund of Rs 50 crore for equity support out of India Opportunities Fund managed by its subsidiary, namely, Sidbi Venture Capital Ltd. DPP-2013 goes a long way towards addressing longstanding demands of the Indian defence industry, particularly the private sector. Rahul Chaudhry, CEO (Strategic Electronics Division) of Tata Power and co-chair of Ficcis defence committee, says: The steps enumerated today will take India and Indian industry towards substitutive self-reliance. MoD has addressed several key industry recommendations. We welcome this and eagerly await the details in the fine print of DPP-2013. Separately, in a bid to speed up financial sanctions for capital procurement, DAC has tripled the financial powers of the army, navy, air force and coast guard chiefs from the current Rs 50 crore to Rs 150 crore. Finally, after a succession of arms procurement scandals, most recently around the procurement of AgustaWestland VVIP helicopters, Defence Minister A K Antony has divested himself of discretionary powers to approve deviations from DPP. Henceforth, only DAC will have this power.

The Ladakh intrusion by China points to India's imperative to review its strategic priorities

It is almost with disdain that a bunch of Chinese soldiers have set up camp inside Indian territory. Baffled by this defiant Chinese intrusion into Ladakh, the Indian establishment has chosen to downplay the incident. What is worrisome is that we seem to have no answers to such repeated Chinese provocations across the Line of Actual Control (LAC). This stand-off may be defused diplomatically, but what it really shows is the PLA's contempt for our military capability. This raises a serious question: why do we continue to remain militarily fragile vis-a-vis China, despite being nuclear-armed, with a deterrent that boasts of an ICBM capability? A candid assessment will reveal we are operationally disadvantaged across the LAC. In handling border situations, nuclear deterrence is hardly of consequence, as the military equation is determined solely by "conventional" war-fighting capability. In this respect, it would be absurd to compare our war-fighting capability with that of the PLA. China belongs to a different league and we would only be deluding ourselves if we believe that our nuclear deterrent has a sobering influence on China. Removing the intrusion during the Kargil war, or launching Operation Parakram, may have worked with Pakistan, but against the PLA, a coercive manoeuvre would be a different ballgame. Our strategic calculations would need to keep in mind the PLA's aggressive war-fighting doctrine of "Forward Defence", matched by its robust build-up along the entire McMahon Line. Handling the Sumdorong Chu situation in 1986 was commendable, but we need to remember that the PLA has come a long way since then. With a vastly upgraded conventional war-fighting capability, the PLA has rapidly modernised its armed forces in comparison to ours, which have been degraded through years of neglect. We consequently lack the refinements needed for manoeuvre warfare in our mountainous borders with China. With improved border infrastructure and massive airlift resources, the PLA can deploy up to four full-fledged mountain divisions to any point along the LAC within 24 hours. In contrast, our troops remain bogged down by decrepit border infrastructure and lack of mobility. That is the ground reality. As the chairman of the chiefs of staffs committee, when I visited our forward outposts on the Chinese border, I was heartened by the brave faces of our field commanders, though they knew they would be outclassed. But why are we in such a paradox nuclear-armed, yet militarily fragile? It is because we have deluded ourselves that nuclear deterrence reduces the need for conventional force levels and, taken in by this flawed proposition, scarce national resources have been diverted to build a nuclear war-fighting machine that will never be used. Influenced by

nuclear warfare gurus with a "nuclear mindset", we have misplaced our strategic priorities. Where our foremost need has always been to equip and modernise our conventional force levels to match our vastly superior northern neighbour, we have merrily stockpiled a nuclear arsenal. The overriding need has always been to build up our conventional combat capability, for that is what credible deterrence is about. More, nuclear deterrence remains counterproductive unless matched by an effective and credible conventional war-fighting capability. What ultimately matters is "conventional deterrence", which not only prevents a war but, if the need arises, ensures a credible response. And that is the dilemma we face, with the Chinese soldiers defiantly squatting inside our territory in Ladakh. It is mistakenly believed in some quarters that China is preoccupied with its domestic agenda and problems in the South and East China Seas and would rather not stir up a border conflict with India. To military professionals, this would seem unconvincing, for it is China's belligerence and huge capability that remains our concern. Moreover, China has always been a non-status quo power, which remains miffed at being constantly compared to India. Dismissing the PLA's intrusion into Ladakh as just another border incident may have geostrategic implications viewed in the context of China's longstanding territorial claims. Hopefully, we are not going to make the type of strategic blunder Great Britain made in the 1960s and 1970s, when it opted for the Polaris-Trident programme to bolster its nuclear deterrence. Massive resources were diverted that emasculated Britain's conventional war-fighting capability. It cost the Royal Navy dearly. An atrophied Royal Navy realised the consequences of this folly much later in1982, when it could barely assemble a motley group of ships to sail for the Falklands. A navy that took centuries to build and proudly ruled the waves was eclipsed by the misplaced strategic priorities of its government. The Ladakh incident may blow over, but it ought to act as a wake-up call to review our strategic priorities. The Salient features of the DPP- 2013, promulgated by MoD today are as follows: 1. The first major change that has been brought in relates to the introduction of the preferred categorisation in the following order; Buy(Indian), Buy & Make(Indian), Make(Indian), Buy & Make, Buy(Global). While seeking the approval for ccord of Necessity (AoN) in a particular category, say, Buy (Global), it will now be necessary to give justification for not considering the other higher preference categories. This is expected to give a stronger impetus to indigenization. (a new Para 20a) 2. Stipulations related to the indigenous content have been clarified and made more stringent. Indigenous content requirements will now extend all the way to the lowest tier of the sub-

vendor. Hence, import content in the products supplied by the sub-vendors will not qualify towards indigenous content. (Para 4) 3. Besides this, the requirement of the prescribed indigenous content, e.g. 30% in the Buy (Indian) category is to be achieved on the overall cost basis, as well as in the core components i.e. the basic equipment, manufacturers recommended spares, special tools and test equipments taken together. In addition, the basic equipment must also have minimum 30% indigenous content at all stages including the one offered at the trial stage. It has further been stipulated that an indigenization plan will be provided by the vendor. These stipulations will ensure more meaningful efforts towards indigenization. 4. While a penalty has been stipulated for not achieving the required indigenous content at a given stage, a scope to make up the deficiency at later stages has been provided. 5. Likewise, in the Buy and Make (Indian) cases, there is no stipulation regarding the minimum indigenous content in the Buy component and the Indian vendor is given the elbow room to achieve the prescribed indigenous content in the overall delivery. This enables the Indian vendor the time to absorb ToT, set up manufacturing facility while concurrently meeting the service requirements. 6. A method for assessment of indigenous content, based on self certification by vendors, has been given (Appendix F to Chapter I) while keeping provision for audit by MoD or its nominated agency, if found necessary. 7. A major set of changes aimed at making the procurement process speedier includes the stipulation to finalize the SQRs before seeking the accord for Acceptance of Necessity (Para 17 - Chapter) and reducing the validity period of an AoN from 2 years to one year. This will bring down the processing time of individual cases significantly. 8. Procurement cases are also expected to be speeded up on account of enhanced delegation of powers of the SCAPCHC from Rs 50 Crores to 150 Crores and the power of the DPB from 150 Crores to 300 crores (Para 18). 9. In order to encourage timely submission of the bids by the vendors and to discourage last minute requests for extension of time, it has been stipulated (Para 33) that any request for extension of the bid submission date must be made at least two weeks prior to the bid submission date with adequate justification. 10. Impetus to indigenization would also require simplification of the Buy and Make (Indian) and Make procedure. The exercise to simplify the Buy and Make (Indian) procedure has been completed doing away inter alia with the requirement of short-listing the vendors through the Project Appraisal Committee while keeping the validity of the AoN to two years permitting comprehensive consultations with the Industry (Para 25a). This is expected to bring more

projects under the Buy and Make (Indian) category. Simplification of the Make procedure is underway and is expected to be completed in few months. 11. In Buy (Global) cases, it will now be possible for the Indian vendor to give Maintenance ToT to another Indian vendor of their choice (Para 28) . The MToT partner is no longer required to be nominated by the DDP. 12. The appendix F and G to the RFP i.e. the Payment Terms and Commercial Offer have been recast as Commercial Clauses and Evaluation Criteria of Price Bid Format. These include use of the International Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS 2010), bringing payment terms for Indian Bidders on par with those for the foreign bidders, specificity in stages and modes of payment and removal of excise duty in determination of L-1. Apart from the major salient features of the DPP 2013 enumerated above, a number of other changes have been made which are procedural in nature and aim at bringing clarity and efficiency and in the procurement procedures. Further measures to strengthen the Indian Defence Sector are under consideration and will be brought about after due consultation with all stake holders. In the meantime, it is expected that this document will be well received by the Industry, the users and other stakeholders at large in the Indian Defence Sector.
Last week I attended my zillionth seminar on defence indigenisation and, for the zillionth time, found myself lamenting the Indian strategic community's mistaken belief within that we would be largely self-reliant in defence if our current indigenisation ratio of 70:30 could be improved to 30:70. In other words, India imports 70 per cent of its defence requirements, while building only 30 per cent in the country; reverse that ratio and things would be fine. This notion is fallacious. It is like saying that the Electronic Warfare systems on a Royal Navy battleship are not British because most of the chips inside were made in Taiwan. The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) is an Indian fighter, even though 90 per cent of it comes from abroad. What determines whether a fighter or tank is Indian or foreign is not how many foreign commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) sub-systems and systems there are inside. Rather, it is design expertise and the key components and systems that money cannot buy. Another falsehood about indigenisation is the argument that allowing more foreign direct investment (FDI) in defence production would bring to India a rush of technology and manufacture from global defence giants. The current FDI cap of 26 per cent, it is argued, makes foreign investors reluctant to transfer high technology, and allows them only a meagre share of the profit. These are flawed notions. Governments, not companies, control defence technology and its release is based on strategic considerations more than profit. For Western governments, with declining defence budgets, the need to safeguard high-tech defence manufacturing jobs at home overrides any argument their companies make about labour arbitrage in India. To manage success in indigenisation, the complex defence planning landscape must be reduced to four key players. First there is the military, which must be made to understand that dependence on foreign weapons systems is at least as great a long-term strategic threat as is Pakistan or China. For too long, the services have held out the prospect of "imminent threat" to persuade the defence ministry to import foreign weaponry instead of adequate Indian systems that are available. This was seen in the case of the Akash air defence missile, the Arjun tank, the Tejas fighter, and now an artillery gun. The defence ministry must muster the political courage to flatly say, "War is not imminent. Operational readiness today is less vital than building our own weaponry tomorrow." Secondly, once the need to drive hard at indigenisation is internalised, stock must be taken of resources for

pursuing this goal. The much-vilified Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is now an increasingly ambitious player, emboldened by success in developing technologies, systems and entire weapons platforms. But the DRDO cannot realistically be responsible for the whole gamut of development. With an energised private sector waiting in the wings, the DRDO must focus on basic research and enabling technologies, while the public and private sectors can translate those into systems and platforms. The new DRDO chief, Avinash Chander, says he is forging partnerships with academic institutions that would allow DRDO scientists, academics and research students to work in community, developing far-reaching technologies that would be "transplanted" onto DRDO laboratories. For DRDO diehards, who developed entire platforms (and a credible missile arsenal) while defying international technology denial regimes, the suggestion to stay confined to a corner of the playfield will seem heresy. But the DRDO's long-term good lies in being canalised into carefully chosen avenues rather than in dissipating energy needlessly. The third crucial component is the private sector, where top-drawer managerial and technological expertise waits to be allowed into the lucrative field of defence development and production. Holding them back is the question of finance: a defence ministry that has spent lakhs of crores on nine defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs) and 40 ordnance factories (OFs) finds it politically risky to allocate government money to the private sector competition. The defence ministry would rather the private sector paid its own way. Earlier this year, Defence Minister A K Antony called on private defence companies to abandon their "miserly attitude" towards R&D. There is something to Mr Antony's uncharacteristic outburst; even big players like the Tata group and L&T have hesitated in investing in defence, waiting for the defence ministry to pick up the tab. Fourthly, the defence ministry must realise that the avoidance of decision making cannot be its only policy in this landscape of competing interests. With the military demanding immediate overseas procurement; the DRDO looking to spread its wings; the DPSUs/OFs pushing the frontiers of cronyism; and the private sector waiting for a perfect policy environment before making a grand entrance, the policy makers cannot confine themselves to risk-free decisions aimed at shielding officials from accusations of mala fide. A multidisciplinary body, led by the DRDO, must carry out a Technology Gap Assessment to identify a development road map for the future. Specific technology projects must be allocated to industry, with design houses being set up by groups that would share costs with the government. The defence ministry's fear of being seen as favouring a particular business house cannot block targeted involvement. Modalities must be evolved for funding design and development. Individual projects can be funded through the American DARPA model. And major design centres can be set up - envision the Tata Design Centre, or the L&T Submarine Research Bureau for which companies submit proposals, which will be evaluated by a DRDO-led decision-making body.