Basco et al vs. PAGCOR FACTS: PD 1869 is the charter which created the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation.

PAGCOR was created to enable the government to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Section 13 par 2 of the decree exempts PAGCOR, franchise holder from paying any tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise whether national or local. According to the petitioners, this waived the Manila City governments right to impose taxes and license fees which is recognized by law. ISSUE: Whether or not the exemption clause of PD 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy? RULING: The city of Manila, being a municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes. Its power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state which has the inherent power of the state to tax. The court added that since one of the roles of PAGCOR is to regulate gambling casinos, this places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the government PAGCOR should be and actually is exempted from local taxes, otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded, or subjected to control by a mere local government. The matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a state concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the state to retain it or delegate it to local government. Pimentel vs aguirra FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments. HELD: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance. The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one.

Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. LEYNES vs. COA Facts: Petitioner Judge Tomas C. Leynes who, at present, is the presiding judge of the RTC of Calapan City, Branch 40, was formerly assigned to the Municipality of Naujan as the sole presiding judge of the MTC thereof. As such, his salary and representation and transportation allowance (RATA) were drawn from the budget of the SC. In addition, petitioner received a monthly allowance of P944 from the local fund of the Municipality of Naujan starting 1984. The Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, through Resolution No. 057, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the Provincial Budget Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly allowance by the municipality to petitioner judge. The SB unanimously approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judges monthly allowance from P944 to P1,600. On February 17, 1994, Provincial Auditor Salvacion Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the SB of Naujan directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter. She opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the SC. Her directive was based on the following: Section 36, RA No. 7645, General Appropriations Act of 1993; NCC No. 67, which provides that in all cases, commutable and reimbursable RATA shall be paid from the amount appropriated for the purpose and other personal services savings of the agency or project from where the officials and employees covered under this Circular draw their salaries. No one shall be allowed to collect RATA from more than one source. Petitioner judge appealed to COA Regional Director Gregoria Ong who, however, upheld the opinion of Provincial Auditor Dalisay and who added that Resolution No. 101 failed to comply with Section 3 of LBC. 53, which provides the conditions in granting allowances/additional compensation to the national government officials/employees assigned to their locality at rates authorized by law, rules and regulations. Issue: Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan can validly provide RATA to its Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court. Held: Section 447(a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, provides: (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants . . ., and shall: (1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective municipal government, and in this connection shall: (xi) When the finances of the municipal government allow, provide for additional allowances and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public elementary and high school teachers, and other national government officials stationed in or assigned to the municipality.

Social Justice Society (SJS), Vladimir Alarique T. Cabigao, and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr., in his capacity as Mayor of Manila Facts: On November 20, 2001, The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Maynila enacted Ordinance No. 8027. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, jr. approved the said ordinance on November 28, 2001. and it became effective on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Shell. However, on June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy entered into a memorandum of understanding with the oil companies in which they agreed that :scaling down of Pandacan Terminals was the most viable and practicable option. Under the memorandum of understanding, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy permits the Oil Companies to continuously operate in compliance with legal requirements, within the limited area resulting from the joint operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the memorandum of understanding in Resolution No. 97. In that resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the memorandum of understanding was effective only for a period of six months starting July 25, 2002. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies. Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance. Issue: Whether or not respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan Terminals. And Whether or not the June 26, 2002 memorandum of understanding and the resolutions ratifying it can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027. Held: The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as City Mayor of Manila, to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to put into effect Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or negated by the courts. On the other hand assuming that the terms of the memorandum of understanding were contradictory with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. There is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027. Wherefore the Court Ordered Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., as mayor of the city of Manila to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. CITY OF DAVAO VS RTC FACTS: GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of its properties for nonpayment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently

reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City. On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC. During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax. RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition. ISSUE/S: Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC HELD: Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs. However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been withdrawn. Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress. Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the taxexempt status of GSIS. Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it. The GSIS tax-exempt status, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the City of Davao.

tax exemption rules governing GSIS and exceptions the plenary powers of Congress cannot be limited by passage of un-repealable laws

. HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES, INC.G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009 Chico-Nazario, J.: Doctrine: A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the nonimpairment clause. Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43, as amended, into an IFMA.The cause of action of PICOP Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the trialcourt is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969 Document signed by then PresidentFerdinand Marcos, to enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) with PICOP. Issue: Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized under the non-impairment clause by which the government may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA) Held: NO. Our definitive ruling in Oposa v. Factoran that a timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-impairment clause is edifying. We declared: Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the du e p roces s cla use of the C ons titu tion. Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing th e obligation of con tra cts s ha ll b e pa ssed." cann ot be invoked.The Presid en tial Wa rranty ca nnot, in any manner, be constru ed a s a con tra ctual und erta king assu ring PICOP of exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas. Such an interpretation would resu lt in the complete ab dication b y the State in fa vor of PICOP of the sovereign p ower to con trol an d s upervise the exp lora tion, d evelopmen t and u tiliza tion of the na tural resou rc es in th e a rea. Lino Vs Pano . G.R. No. 129093 FACTS:On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro, Laguna, for a mayors permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz in a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995which was issued on September 18, 1995.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. In the said complaint, respondent Calvento asked the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna, Branch 93, for the following reliefs: (1) a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, ordering the defendants to refrain

from implementing or enforcing Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995; (2) an order requiring Hon. Municipal Mayor Calixto R. Cataquiz to issue a business permit for the operation of a lotto outlet; and (3) an order annulling or declaring as invalid Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995.On February 10, 1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining the petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995. ISSUE: WON Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T. 1995 is valid HELD: As a policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which may be contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.n our system of government, the power of local government units to legislate and enact ordinances and resolutions is merely a delegated power coming from Congress. As held in Tatel vs. Virac, ordinances should not contravene an existing statute enacted by Congress. The reasons for this is obvious, as elucidated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp Plaza II vs Cassion FACTS The City of Butuan, through its Sanggunian, passed SP Resolution 427-92 authorizing the City Mayor to sign the Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the City of Butuan. Pursuant to the MoA, Mayor Plaza issued EO No. 06-92 reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 additional DSWD employees headed by Virginia Tuazon as Officer-in-charge. Its office was transferred from the original CSSDO building to the DSWD building. Aggrieved by the development, Respondents refused to recognize Tuazon as their new head & to report at the DSWD building contending that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 & Tuazons designation as the CSSDOs Officer-in-charge are illegal. Respondents failed to report for work despite Mayor Plazas series of orders directing them to do so. Thereafter, they were administratively charged for grave misconduct & insubordination and were preventively suspended for 60 days. Upon expiration of their suspension, the respondents informed the Mayor that they are willing to return to work but only to their old office, not the DSWD building. They also failed to report to Tuazon at the DSWD building despite the Mayors instructions to do so. Mayor Plaza then dropped the respondents from the rolls pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, Series of 1993 which provides that officers & employees who are absent for at least 30 days without approved leavemay be dropped from the service without prior notice. ISSUE 1. Whether EO No. 06-92 directing the devolution of 19 national DSWD employees to the city DSWD to be headed by petitioner Tuazon should be upheld as valid. 2. Whether private respondents were denied due process when they were dropped from the rolls. HELD 1. Sec.17 of the LGC authorizes the devolution of personnel,

assets & liabilities, records basic services, and facilities of a national government agency to LGUs. Under this Code, the term devolution refers to the act by which the government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions & responsibilities. Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel & may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head. EO No. 06-92 did not violate respondents security of tenure as they were not transferred to another office without their consent. Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service & may be imposed as an administrative penalty. The change of respondents place of work from the CSSDO to the DSWD building is not a transfer. It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service. 2. Dropping from the rolls is not an administrative sanction. Thus, private respondents need not be notified or heard. Their assertion that they were denied due process is, therefore, untenable.

15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous government of the former class (decentralization of government) is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national government acting through the President (and the Department of Local Government). 32 If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense (decentralization of power), its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former category only (decentralization of administration) it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense (decentralization of power), that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions." Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker. SEC. 12. Government Centers. - Provinces, cities, and municipalities shall endeavor to establish a government center where offices, agencies, or branches of the national government , local government units, or government-owned or -controlled corporations may, as far as practicable, be located. In designating such a center, the local government unit concerned shall take into account the existing facilities of national and local agencies and offices which may serve as the government center as contemplated under this Section. The national government , local government unit or government-owned or -controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for the construction of its buildings and facilities in the government center.cralaw SEC. 13. Naming of Local Government Units and Public Places, Streets and Structures. - (a) The sangguniang panlalawigan may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission (PHC), change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction:chanrobles virtual law library (1) Component cities and municipalities, upon the recommendation of the sanggunian concerned; (2) Provincial roads, avenues, boulevards, thorough-fares, and bridges; (3) Public vocational or technical schools and other postsecondary and tertiary schools; (4) Provincial hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities; and (5) Any other public place or building owned by the provincial government. (b) The sanggunian of highly urbanized cities and of component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, hereinafter referred to in this Code as independent component cities, may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission, change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) City barangays, upon the recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned;

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONAvs.CONTE MANGELIN, DOCTRINE OF THE CASE: Decentralization of power, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. FACTS: On March 12, 1987 petitioner Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao. On November 2, 1987, members of Regional Legislative Assembly sans the petitioner Limbona convened in defiance to short recess called for by petitioner as the latter was to attend a congressional committee hearing for Muslim Affairs in Congress. During the convention, having acquired quorum, members thereof move to declare the Speakership of the Regional Legislative Assembly vacant, thereby expelling petitioner from office. Petitioner Limbona filed petition for injunction praying that a restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining respondents from proceeding with their session to be held on November 5, 1987, and on any day thereafter and that judgment be rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents of their session on November 2, 1987 as null and void. In view thereof, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to hear and decide matters over autonomous region was challenged by respondents. ISSUE: Are the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? HELD: An autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category (decentralization of power) [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec.

(2) City roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares,and bridges; (3) Public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, community colleges and non-chartered colleges; (4) City hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and (5) Any other public place or building owned by thecity government.cralaw (c) The sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may, in consultation with the Philippine Historical Commission, change the name of the following within its territorial jurisdiction:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) city and municipal barangays, upon recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned; (2) city, municipal and barangay roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges; (3) city and municipal public elementary, secondary and vocational or technical schools, post-secondary and other tertiary schools; (4) city and municipal hospitals, health centers and other health facilities; and (5)Any other public place or building owned by the municipal government. (d) None of the foregoing local government units, institutions, places, or buildings shall be named after a living person, nor may a change of name be made unless for a justifiable reason and, in any case, not oftener than once every ten (10) years. The name of a local government unit or a public place, street or structure with historical, cultural, or ethnic significance shall not be changed, unless by a unanimous vote of the sanggunian concerned and in consultation with the PHC. (e) A change of name of a public school shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local school board concerned. (f) A change of name of public hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local health board concerned.cralaw (g) The change of name of anylocal government unit shall be effective only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected. In any change of name, the Office of the President, the representative of the legislative district concerned, and the Bureau of Posts shall be notified. LTO versus CITY OF BUTUAN G.R. No. 131512 January 20, 2000 Facts: Local Council of the City of Butuan passed an ordinance entitled "An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and imposing Penalties for Violations thereof and for other Purposes." The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle, and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. Main Issue: The Court is asked in this instance to resolve the issue of whether under the present set up the power of the Land Registration Office ("LTO") to register, tricycles in particular, as well as to issue licenses for the driving thereof, has likewise devolved to local government units. Relevant Questions and Answers:

What is the primary function of Land Transportation Board? The LTO is a line agency under the DOTC whose powers and functions, pursuant to Article III, Section 4 (d) [1],10 of R.A. No. 4136, otherwise known as Land Transportation and Traffic Code, as amended, deal primarily with the registration of all motor vehicles and the licensing of drivers thereof. What is the primary function of Land Transportation and Franchising Board? The LTFRB, upon the other hand, is the governing body tasked by E.O. No. 202, dated 19 June 1987, to regulate the operation of public utility or "for hire" vehicles and to grant franchises or certificates of public convenience ("CPC"). Finely put, registration and licensing functions are vested in the LTO while franchising and regulatory responsibilities had been vested in the LTFRB. Under the Local Government Code, what certain functions of DOTC were transferred to the Local Government Units? Under the LGUs indubitably now have the power to regulate the operation of tricycles-for-hire and to grant franchises for the operation thereof. Under the Local Government Code, certain functions of the DOTC were transferred to the LGUs, thusly: Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. xxxxxxxxx (3) Subject to the provisions of Book II of this Code, enact ordinances granting franchises and authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses, upon such conditions and for such purposes intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the city and pursuant to this legislative authority shall: xxxxxxxxx (VI) Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Transportation and Communications, regulate the operation of tricycles and grant franchises for the operation thereof within the territorial jurisdiction of the city. (Emphasis supplied). Relying on the foregoing provision of law, are the powers of the LTO (1) to register tricycles-for-hire and (2) to issue license for driving thereof now devolved to Local Government Units? No. The newly delegated powers pertain to the franchising and regulatory powers theretofore exercised by the LTFRB and not to the functions of the LTO relative to the registration of motor vehicles and issuance of licenses for the driving thereof. Clearly unaffected by the Local Government Code are the powers of LTO under R.A. No. 4136 requiring the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles "used or operated on or upon any public highway" in the country. Thus Sec. 5. All motor vehicles and other vehicles must be registered. (a) No motor vehicle shall be used or operated on or upon any public highway of the Philippines unless the same is properly

registered for the current year in accordance with the provisions of this Act (Article 1, Chapter II, R.A. No. 4136). The Commissioner of Land Transportation and his deputies are empowered at anytime to examine and inspect such motor vehicles to determine whether said vehicles are registered, or are unsightly, unsafe, improperly marked or equipped, or otherwise unfit to be operated on because of possible excessive damage to highways, bridges and other infrastructures.17 The LTO is additionally charged with being the central repository and custodian of all records of all motor vehicles.18 Ergo, the registration of the tricycles and issuance of a license for the driving thereof is maintained by the LTO. What is the rationale why said functions of LTO were not devolved to Local Government Code? If the tricycle registration function of respondent LTO is decentralized, the incidence of theft of tricycles will most certainly go up, and stolen tricycles registered in one local government could be registered in another with ease. The determination of ownership thereof will also become very difficult. Fake driver's licenses will likewise proliferate. This likely scenario unfolds where a tricycle driver, not qualified by petitioner LTO's testing, could secure a license from one municipality, and when the same is confiscated, could just go another municipality to secure another license. Devolution will entail the hiring of additional personnel charged with inspecting tricycles for road worthiness, testing drivers, and documentation. Revenues raised from tricycle registration may not be enough to meet salaries of additional personnel and incidental costs for tools and equipment. TRICYCLES LTO Registration of tricycles and issuance of license for the driving thereof.

LTFRB LGU

Power to regulate the operation of tricycle-for-hire and to grant franchises thereof.