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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Commission /(*$/ 127,&( Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of the following information

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,1752'8&7,21 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. OBJECTIVES GENERAL ORGANISATIONS INVOLVED IN THE PROJECT



6859(< 2) :25. '21( ,1 7+( ,17(51$7,21$/ ),(/' 2.1. 2.1.1. 2.1.2. 2.1.3. 2.1.4. SYNTHESIS OF WORK DONE BY OECD-NEA, IAEA AND WANO OECD Nuclear Energy Agency IAEA WANO International Databases



2.2. SYNTHESIS OF WORK DONE UNDER EUROPEAN CONTEXT 2.2.1. Introduction 2.2.2. General orientation or European research and training programmes in the field of nuclear energy 2.2.3. The Working Group on Codes and Standards (WGCS) 2.2.4. The European networks: NESC, AMES, ENIQ 2.2.5. Conclusions  $*(,1* 3+(120(1$ 3.1. 3.2. 3.2.1. 3.2.2. 3.2.3. 3.3. 3.3.1. 3.3.2. 3.3.3.  4.1. 4.1.1. 4.1.2. 4.1.3. 4.1.4. INTRODUCTION TECHNOLOGICAL ASPECTS Ageing of systems, structures and components Methods of identifying ageing in service Mitigation of ageing effects (prevent, delay, restore) OTHER ASPECTS General Technological obsolescence Ageing of culture and procedure  BELGIAN APPROACH Introduction General regulatory framework License life Design life 

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4.2. FRENCH APPROACH 4.2.1. General regulatory framework 4.2.2. The context in which ageing is monitored 4.3. 4.3.1. 4.3.2. 4.3.3. 4.3.4. 4.3.5. 4.4. SPANISH APPROACH General Regulatory requirements NPP lifetime management programmes Periodic safety reviews UNESA guideline for periodic safety review development OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

4.4.1. General 4.4.2. United Kingdom 4.5. 4.5.1. 4.5.2. 4.5.3. 4.5.4.  5.1. 5.1.1. 5.1.2. 5.1.3. 5.1.4. 5.1.5. 5.1.6. 5.1.7. 5.2. 5.2.1. 5.2.2. 5.2.3. 5.2.4. 5.2.5. 5.2.6. 5.2.7. 5.2.8. 5.3. 5.3.1. 5.3.2. 5.3.3. 5.3.4. 5.3.5. 5.3.6. 5.3.7. 5.4. 5.4.1. 5.4.2. 5.4.3. 5.4.4. 5.4.5. 5.4.6.  COMPARISON OF REGULATORY APPROACHES General Periodic safety reviews Ageing management programs Generic evaluations  BELGIAN APPROACH Introduction Systems, structures and components Prioritisation of components Selection / identification of ageing mechanisms Ageing prediction criteria Surveillance / periodic testing Mitigation of ageing effects Maintenance programs / component repair / replacement / improvement FRENCH APPROACH Introduction Systems, structures and components Prioritisation of components Selection / identification of ageing mechanisms Ageing prediction criteria Surveillance / periodic testing Mitigation of ageing effects Maintenance programs / component repair / replacement / improvement Other considerations SPANISH APPROACH Introduction Systems, structures and components Prioritisation of components Selection / identification of ageing mechanisms Ageing prediction criteria Surveillance / periodic testing Mitigation of ageing effects Maintenance programs / component repair / replacement / improvement COMPARISON OF UTILITIES APPROACHES Introduction Organisation Prioritisation of systems, structures and components Identification and selection of ageing mechanisms Management of ageing mechanisms Conclusions 

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6.4. 6.4.1. 6.4.2. 6.4.3. 6.4.4. 6.5. 6.5.1. 6.5.2. 6.5.3. 6.5.4. 6.6. 6.7.  7.1. 7.2. 

COMPARISON IN TERM OF ORGANISATION Differences due to the context of the companies Internal organisation of ageing management Management of personnel Expert appraisal / advice COMPARISON IN TERM OF ACTIVITIES Methodologies Operating procedures Surveillance programme Maintaining equipment qualification COMPARISON IN TERM OF MONITORING CONCLUSION  CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONS 

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$33(1',;  6859(< $1' 6<17+(6,6 2) :25. '21( %< ,17(51$7,21$/ 25*$1,6$7,216 A. B. OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY DOCUMENTS IAEA DOCUMENTS  

$33(1',;  35,25,7,6$7,21 2) ,03257$17 &20321(176 $&&25',1* 72 1$7,21$/ 0(7+2'2/2*,(6 1. 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 2. 3. 4. 1. 1.0. 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 1.4. 1.5. 1.6. 1.7. 1.8. 1.9. 1.10. GENERAL Introduction Screening methodology Criteria definition Implementation BELGIUM APPROACH FRENCH APPROACH SPANISH APPROACH

$33(1',;  (48,30(17 $*(,1* 6800$5,(6 BELGIUM EXAMPLES General Reactor pressure vessel Vessel internals Steam generator Primary pump Primary piping Fatigue Piping Reactor containment Electrical and I&C equipment Electrical cables



2. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 2.4. 2.5. 3. 3.0. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 3.5. 3.6.

FRENCH EXAMPLES Reactor pressure vessel Irradiation embrittlement Pipes, cast elbows and primary coolant pump casings Instrumentation and control Reactor containment Electrical cables SPANISH EXAMPLES General Reactor pressure vessel Irradiation embrittlement Steam generator Class 1 piping Fatigue (thermal stratification) Piping Erosion/corrosion Concrete structures Cables  

$33(1',;  (9$/8$7,21 2) 1$7,21$/ $3352$&+(6 $&&25',1* 72 $0$7 *8,'(/,1(6 $33(1',;  &203$5,621 2) 81(6$ 0(7+2'2/2*< :,7+ ,$($ $1' 86 0(7+2'2/2*,(6 1. 2. 3. 3.1. 3.2. 3.3. 3.4. 4. 5. 1. 2. INTRODUCTION PURPOSE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE METHODOLOGIES Guideline 95-10 (Rev. 1, January 2000) IAEA's methodology for ageing control in components important for nuclear safety (Technical Report Series N338) Life management methodology established by UNESA Comparison of the methodologies CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES

$33(1',;  %,%/,2*5$3+< 21 $*(,1* 0$1$*(0(17 INTRODUCTION DOCUMENTS



/LVW RI 6\PEROV
AG: Activity Groups of WGCS AMAT: Ageing Management Assessment Teams of IAEA AMES: Ageing Materials Evaluation and Studies AMP: Ageing Management Programme ANSI: American National Standards Institute ASME: The American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM: The American Society for Testing and Materials ATWS: Anticipated Transient Without Scram AVB: Anti-Vibration Bars in Steam Generators AVN: Association Vinotte Nuclear AVT: All Volatile Treatment BWR: Boiling Water Reactor CDD: Component Degradation Datasheet CNRA: Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities of OECD CRC: Corrosion Resistant Cladding CRP: Co-ordinated Research Projects of IAEA CRPPH: Committee on Radiation Protection and Public Health of NEA CSN: Spanish Nuclear Safety Council CSNI: Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations of OECD DG: Directorates-General of the EC DNPA: Small Angles Neutron Diffraction DSIN: French Nuclear Installations Safety Directorate EC: European Commission ECCS: Emergency Core Cooling System EDG: Emergency Diesels Generators ENIQ: European Network for Inspection Qualification ENIS-G: European Nuclear Installations Safety Group EPRI: Electric Power Research Institute EU: European Union FAC: Flow Accelerated Corrosion FBR: Fast Breeder Reactor FIM: French Average Irradiation embrittlement prediction formula FIS: French Upper Bound Irradiation embrittlement prediction formula FP: Euratom Framework Programme FSAR: Final Safety Analysis Report GALL:Generic Ageing Lessons Learned HSE: British Health and Safety Executive IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency IASCC: Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking ICDE: International Common cause failure Data Exchange IDPRVM: International Database on reactor Pressure Vessel Materials IEEE: The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IGSCC: Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking INSAG: International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group of IAEA ISI: In-Service Inspection IWG-LMNPP: International Working Group on Life Management of Nuclear Power Plants JRC: Joint Research Center of the EC KTA: Kern Technische Ausschuss LCM: Lifetime Cycle Management LWR: Light Water Reactor

MIC: MOV: MPDS: MR: NDC: NDE: NDT: context NEA: NEI: NII: NPP: NESC: NRC: NRWG: NSSS: NUSS: OECD: PISC: PLEX: PLIM: PSA: PSR: PTE: PWG: PWR: PWSCC: RCC: Islands RG: RPV: RSE-M:

Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion Motor Operated Valves Maintenance Practices Data Sheet Maintenance Rules Nuclear Development Committee of OECD Non Destructive Examination Non Destructive Testing or Nil Ductility Temperature, depending on the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD US Nuclear Energy Institute Nuclear Installation Inspectorate of United Kingdom Nuclear Power Plant Network for Evaluating Steel Components United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulators Working Group of the EC Nuclear Steam Supply System Nuclear Safety Standards of IAEA Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Programme for the Inspection of Steel Components Plant Life Extension Plant Life Management Probabilistic Safety Assessment Periodic Safety Review Thermo-Electric Power Principal Working Groups of CSNI Pressurised Water Reactor Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking French Design and Construction Rules for Components of PWR Nuclear

Regulatory Guide of the US-NRC Reactor Pressure Vessel French In Service Inspection Rules for Mech. Components of PWR Nuclear Islands RSK: German Reactors Safety Commission RWMC: Radioactive Waste Management Committee of NEA SCC: Stress Corrosion Cracking SESAR/FAP: Senior Group of Experts on Nuclear Safety Research Facilities and Programmes SG: Safety Guides of IAEA, or Steam Generator, depending on the context SSC: Systems, Structures and Components TECDOC: Technical Document of IAEA TGSCC: Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking TLAA:Time Limited Ageing Analyses US DOE: United States Department of Energy VISA: French qualification procedure for electrical equipment (Ageing, Irradiation, Seismic and Accident environment conditions) WANO: World Association of Nuclear Operators WGCS: Working Group on Codes and Standards of EC


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The objectives of the study covered by this report are defined in [57]. They consist in providing recommendations for the development of a methodology to monitor, control and anticipate the ageing of Nuclear Islands, in order to maintain their level of safety during the whole NPP life cycle. This is obtained through a synthesis of the potential ageing mechanisms, their potential effects and the available identification and mitigation methods, and an evaluation of the existing ageing management practices in Belgium, France and Spain, using international recommendations as guidance documents. The aspects covered include, in particular, classification of component priorities, identification of degradation phenomena, surveillance methods and preventive maintenance and repair / replacement programs. This synthesis comparison work is the basis for the recommendations issued at the end of the study.

 *(1(5$/
Ageing in nuclear power plants shall be managed so as to ensure that the design functions remain available throughout the service life of the plant. From the safety perspective, this implies that ageing degradation of systems, structures and components important to safety remain within acceptable limits, and that procedures and personnel training remain adapted. Ageing means evolution of personnel and procedure adequacy and evolution of material or equipment properties, which, after a certain time, may not be compatible with the required safety margins, or with an economic functioning of the plant. Repair or replacement of components, as well as change in service conditions for a better compatibility with component reduced capacities are possible. In parallel, safety requirements may increase with time, following the evolution of the public acceptance, and costs of other energy sources may decrease, limiting as a result the economic interest of a continued operation. The plant life will then be the result of the consideration of ageing in a changing regulatory, political, technical and economic context. In the context of stable safety requirements, the evolution of the safety margins for a given component can be illustrated as shown in figure 1-1 [89]. This figure which is given for illustrative purpose only and do not take into account the possibility of component replacement shows that a better evaluation of the applied loading, as well as a better knowledge of component performance can result in a modification of the demonstrated safety margin, and consequently of the potential component life. A reduction of the applied loading or an increase of component performance would result in an increase of the safety margin. Figure 1-2 illustrates the combined influence of the above considerations with a possible evolution of safety requirements [58]. Some additional considerations on safety requirements are included in Section 4.

As shown on these figures, life extension is not only obtainable through repair or replacement of components, but also through a better use and a better evaluation of the real evolution of component performance, for example a better prediction of material properties evolution, a better evaluation of existing defects and mechanical behaviour of real defects, or a better knowledge of operating conditions. A lot of studies may consequently be classified as contributing to ageing and plant life management, and bibliography syntheses referred to in Section 2 and in Appendices 1 and 6 provide more information on this topic.

Parameter Structure resistance

Required margin

Applied loading Time

Acceptable life
)LJXUH 

Illustration of possible component margin evolution during service.

Safety margin Safety requirements Improvement of component performance Rough evaluation of component performance Time Acceptable life
)LJXUH 

Illustration of combined evolution of component margins and safety requirements.

10

This report is more specifically dedicated to the safe management of ageing and will be focussed on: the presentation of the work done under international auspices. This aspect is covered in Section 2, supplemented by Appendix 1, the presentation of the practices of ageing management in three European countries: Belgium, France and Spain. This aspect is covered in Section 4 for regulatory aspects and in Section 5 for ageing management strategies, supplemented by Appendices 2 and 3, the comparison of theses practices with international recommendations. This is covered in Section 6, supplemented by Appendices 4 and 5. For a better understanding of sections 4 to 6, Section 3 includes a summary of the various degradation phenomena and their governing parameters, the methods of identifying ageing in service, and the possible mitigation methods of ageing effects. The references specifically used or referred to in the main text of this report are listed in Section 8. An extended bibliography is given in Appendix 6. Conclusions and recommendations are provided in Section 7.

 25*$1,6$7,216 ,192/9(' ,1 7+( 352-(&7

Three countries are involved in the project: Belgium, France and Spain, represented by the following organisations: Belgatom is a subsidiary of Tractebel and Belgonuclaire, acting on activities including, among others, application of industrial codes, surveillance, management of time life and dismantling, and repair / replacement. EDF (Electricit de France), is the French national electricity utility, in charge of building and operating electricity generating plants. Its activities also include engineering, life management, R & D, surveillance and non-destructive examinations, and repair / replacement. FRAMATOME, ensuring the general management of the project, is the French based designer and manufacturer of nuclear reactors. The Group offers products, services and maintenance related to nuclear realisations, fuel fabrication, connectors and industrial equipment. IPSN (Institute for Nuclear Safety and Protection) is the technical support of the French Safety Authority, in charge of preparing safety analyses for the Nuclear Installations Safety Directorate (DSIN), or reports discussed by the standing group of experts, to prepare DSIN decisions. UNESA is the Spanish Electricity Association, commissioned by its members to carry out activities on the electricity business. In the nuclear area, it coordinates aspects relating to nuclear plant safety and radiological protection, regulation and operation, and technology engineering, as well as R & D.

11

12



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The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1st February 1958 under the name of OEEC European Nuclear Agency. It received its present designation on 20th April 1972, when Japan became its first non-European full Member. NEA membership today consist of all OECD Member countries, except New Zealand and Poland. The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the Agency (for more information, visit the NEA web site: http://www.nea.fr). The primary objective of the NEA is to promote co-operation among the governments of its participating countries in furthering the development of nuclear power as a safe, environmentally acceptable and economic energy source. The NEA works in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, with which it has concluded a Co-operation Agreement, as well as with other international organisations in the nuclear field.  3UHVHQWDWLRQ RI 1($ FRPPLWWHHV ZRUNLQJ LQ WKH DJHLQJ DUHD

Four committees develop actions relating with ageing or life management (fig. 2.1): the Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA), the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI), the Nuclear Development Committee (NDC), the Nuclear Science Committee (NSC). Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities

2.1.1.2.1.

The Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) is an international committee made up primarily of senior nuclear regulators. It was set up in 1989 as a forum for the exchange of information and experience among regulatory organisations and for the review of developments which could affect regulatory requirements. The Committee focuses primarily on power reactors and other nuclear installations currently being built and operated. It also may consider the regulatory implications of new designs of power reactors and other types of nuclear installations. The Committee is responsible for the programme of the NEA, concerning the regulation, licensing and inspection of nuclear installations.

13

)LJXUH  Organisation chart of the NEA

2.1.1.2.2.

Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations

The NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) in an international committee made up of scientists and engineers. It was set up in 1973 to develop and co-ordinate the activities of the Nuclear Energy Agency concerning the technical aspects of the design, construction and operation of nuclear installations insofar as they affect the safety of such installations. The Committees purpose is to foster international co-operation in nuclear safety amongst the OECD Member countries. CSNI constitutes a forum for the exchange of technical information and for collaboration between organisations which can contribute, from their respective backgrounds in research, development, engineering or regulation, to these activities and to the definition of its programme of work. It also reviews the state of knowledge on selected topics of nuclear safety technology and safety assessment, including operating experience. It initiates and conducts programmes identified by these reviews and assessments in order to overcome discrepancies, develop improvements and reach

14

international consensus in different projects and International Standard Problems, and assists in the feedback of the results to participating organisations. The greater part of CSNIs current programme of work is concerned with safety technology of water reactors. The principal areas covered are operating experience and the human factors, reactor coolant system behaviour, various aspects of reactor component integrity, the phenomenology of radioactive releases in reactors accidents and their confinement, containment performance, risk assessment and severe accidents. The Committee also studies the safety of the fuel cycle and operates an international mechanism for exchanging reports on nuclear power plant incidents. CSNI works through five Principal Working groups, (PWGs) dealing with Operating Experience and Human Factors (PWG-1), Coolant System Behaviour (PWG-2), Integrity of Structures and Components (PWG-3), Accidental Radioactivity Release (PWG-4) and Risk Assessment (PWG-5) (figure 2.2).
C O M M IT TE E O N T H E SA FE TY O F NU C LE A R IN ST A L LA T IO N (CSN I) C hairm an : M. Livolant S ecretary : G.M. F resc ura

W ork ing Gro up on Fu el Cy cle Sa fet y

PW G-1 O perati ng Exp erience & Hum an F acto rs

PW G-2 Co ol ant Sy st em B eha vio ur

PW G-3 In teg rity of Com po nent s and Structures

P W G-4 Confin ement of Accidental R adioacti ve R eleases

PW G-5 Risk Assessm ent

C hai rman : M . Kanamorf Sec ret ary : B . Kau fer

C h airma n : K. Kath oll S ecretary : L. C arlss o n

C hai rm an : M . Ro creux Secreta ry : M . H reho r

C hai rm an : H. Sc hu lz Secreta ry : A. M i ller

Ch airm an : D. De B oek S ecretary : J . R o yen

Chairm an : J .A. M urphy Secretary : D . Ka ufer

Tas k G roup on Safety Res earc h in Mem ber Countries

T ask G roup on S afety Research in Member Countries

Expanded task Force on Hu man Factors In cident Rep orting System (IRS)

T hermalhydraulic Application task G roup Degraded Core Cooling T ask G roup Tas k F orc e on F uel Safety c riteria

T ask G roup on Containment A spects of S evere A ccident Management

Task Gro up on Fire R isk As ses sment

Fuel Inc ident Notification and A nalys is Sy s. (F INAS)

F uel Incident Notific at ion and Analys is Sys. (FINAS)

Com puter-Based Safety Sys tem s

T ask G roup on S evere A ccident Phenomena in the Containment T ask G roup on Fission Product Phenomena in the Primary Circuit and the Containment

Task Group on Hum an R eliabi lityErro rs of Comm ission

ICDE ProjectCom mon Cause Failure Data

Task Group on Software Reliability

Topical Opinio n Pap ers, other PSA studies and Data Base Support

NEA C o-o peratio n w ith C EEC an d N IS

S ESAR /FAP

S upp ort G ro up on V VER44 0/213 Bu bbler C on deser C o nta inm ent Res earch

Sup port Gro up o n VV ER TH Cod e Valid ation Matrix

Sup port G ro up o n VV ER -1 000 Larg e S ca le T es t F ac ilitie s (P SB )

Ch airm an : T. K in g S ec retary : J . R oy en

)LJXUH  Previous structure of CSNI. Since 1996 PWG-3 has had 3 sub-groups, dealing with the integrity of metal structures and components, the ageing of concrete structures, and the seismic behaviour of structures. Typical activities are the organisation of Workshops and Specialists

15

Meetings, the preparation of State of the Art Reports, organisation of round robin exercises such as PISC in NDE or FALSIRE in fracture mechanics. Ageing of active components (such as pumps, valves, diesels ... ) is covered by PWG-1 and ageing of passive components and structures by PWG-3, but interesting information about ageing trend of components can be also gained in the studies of PWG-5 on reliability data base. At the beginning of 2000, restructuring of the five Principal Working Groups into four Working Groups has been engaged. This would be accomplished by merging the former PWG 2 and PWG 4 into a single Working Group (fig. 2.3)..

COMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATION (CSNI) Chairman : M. Livolant Secretary : G.M. Frescura CSNI Bureau : A. Thadani, A. Alonso

Working Groups

CSNI Programme Group

Special Expert Groups

Risk Assessment

Analysis and Management of Accidents

Integrity of Components Structure

Operating Experience

Human and Organisational Factors

Fuel Safety Margins

Chairman : Secretary :
Human Reliability Errors of Commission Software Reliability

Chairman : Secretary :
Design Basis

Chairman : Secretary :
Integrity of Metal Components and Structures Concrete Structures Ageing

Chairman : Secretary :
Fuel Cycle Safety

Chairman : Secretary :

Chairman : Secretary :

Severe Accidents

Fission Product Behaviour

Seismic Behaviour of Structures

DATA Bases Incident Reporting System (IRS) ICDE Project-Common Cause Failure Data Computer-Based Safety Systems Fuel incident & Reporting System (FINAS)

NEA Co-operation with CEEC and NIS

HALDEN REACTOR PROJECT

Support Group on VVER440/213 Bubbler Condeser Containment Research

Support Group on VVER TH Code Validation Matrix

Support Group on VVER-1000 Large Scale Test Facilities (PSB)

RASPLAY

Sandia Lower Head Failure Project

)LJXUH  Revised structure of CSNI 2.1.1.2.3. Nuclear Development Committee

The Committee for Technical and Economic Studies on Nuclear Energy and the Fuel Cycle, known as the Nuclear Development Committee (NDC) has the following scope : Assessment of the potential future contribution of nuclear energy to overall energy demand ; Assessment of demand and supply for the different phases of the nuclear fuel cycle ;

16

Review of the technical and economic characteristics of nuclear energy growth and of the nuclear fuel cycle ; Evaluation of the technical and economic consequences of the various strategies for the nuclear fuel cycle.

The NDC set up an Expert Group on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management (PLIM) in 1991. The main scope and objectives of the PLIM Expert Group are to assist decision makers at the Member states government level in evaluating the economics and politics of plant life extension by providing a published report in which the following types of key issues are addressed in broad terms: Rationale for plant life extension in different NEA Member countries (economics, financial, reliability, availability, safety, etc ... ) ; Financial and economic concerns including intermediate results at incremental time periods of extension (5, 10, 15 and 20 years) ; Major technical concerns and constraints ; Institutional issues in and public acceptance on the plant life extension ; Need for and feasibility of creating data base which will encompass a wide range of data for plant life extension ; Precedents in other NEA Member countries and IAEA Member states.

It produced at 1997 a draft of an International Terminology on Plant Ageing (with the cooperation of IAEA and CEC). The final document entitled "Common Ageing terminology" was issued in July 1999. In 1997 a group of experts was set up to collect and evaluate nuclear power plant refurbishment cost data and experience accumulated over the last years in participating countries. This information may be useful to reactors operators faced with nuclear plant life cycle evaluations (issued 1999). New orientations for the PLIM Expert Group are under discussion. An international workshop was organised on 26 and 27 June 2000 to review the prospects for PLIM and the motivation for Research and Development to increase confidence investment to extend plant life. It was hosted by the United States Department of Energy (US DOE) in Washington, D.C, USA. A selection of papers presented is included in Appendix 6. 2.1.1.2.4. Nuclear Science Committee

This Committee has some relevant activities on neutron dosimetry benchmarks and material degradation modeling.  /LVW RI UHFHQW 2(&' GRFXPHQWV UHODWLQJ WR $JHLQJ DQG 6WUXFWXUDO ,QWHJULW\

The following documents with a link to ageing are summarised: see third column of tables below and summaries in Appendix 1.

17

2.1.1.3.1.

CNRA Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y = yes; N = no). Corresponding sheet in Append.1 Future nuclear regulatory challenges - November Y 1998 A.1 Title Regulatory Aspects of Ageing Reactors - March 1999 Y A.2

No

Reference

[1]

[2]

NEA 66 98 10 P ISBN 92.64.16106-6 NEA/CNRA/R(99)1

2.1.1.3.2. 3*:

CSNI

No

Reference

Title

Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y yes; N no). Corresponding sheet in Append.1 N

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

NEA/CSNI/R(95)1 State of the art on key fracture mechanics aspects of integrity assessment, 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)6) NEA/CSNI/R(95)4 Report on round robin activities on the calculation of crack opening behaviour and leak rates for small bore piping components, 1995 (also referenced as OCDE/GD(95)90) NEA/CSNI/R(95)6 Workshop on Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Failure Probabilities (1992: Kln, Germany), 1995 (also referenced as OCDE/GD(95)91 NEA/CSNI/R(95)17 International Workshop on Aged and Decommissioned Material Collection and Testing for Structural Integrity Purposes (1995 : Mol, Belgiurn), 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)10) NEA/CSNI/R(95)18 Leak before break in reactor piping and vessels specialists meeting (1995: Lyon, France), 1996, Vols 1-3 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)11 NEA/CSNI/R(95)19 Report of the task group reviewing national and international activities in the area of ageing of nuclear power plant concrete structures, 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)31) NEA/CSNI/R(96)1 FALSIRE : phase 2 : CSNI project for Fracture Analyses of Large-Scale International Reference Experiments, 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)187)

Y A.3

Y A. 4

[9]

18

No

Reference

Title

Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y yes; N no). Corresponding sheet in Append.1 N

[10]

[11]

[12]

Probabilistic structure integrity analysis and its relationship to deterministic analysis (1996: Stockholm, Sweden), 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)124) NEA/CSNI/R(96)10 Seismic shear wall ISP: NUPECs seismic ultimate dynamic response test: comparison report, 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)188) NEA/CSNI/R(96)11 Report of the task group on the seismic behaviour of structures : status report, 1997 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)189) NEA/CSNI/R(97)1 NDE Techniques capability demonstration and inspection qualification : proceedings of the Joint EC, OCDE IAEA Specialists Meeting (1997: Petten, The Netherlands), 1997 (also referenced as: EUR 17354 EN) Fatigue crack growth benchmark Joint WANO/OECD-NEA Workshop: Prestress loss in NPP containments (1997: Poitiers, France), 1997 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(97)225) Development priorities for NDE of concrete structures in nuclear plants (NEA Workshop, Risley, United Kingdom, Nov. 97) 1998 Status report on seismic re-evaluation - Nov. 1998 Development priorities for non-destructive examination of concrete structures in nuclear plant, Nov. 1998 Survey of organic components in nuclear power plants, 1998 Experience with Thermal Fatigue in LWR Piping Caused by Mixing and Stratification - December 1998 PISC III: Final report, 1998 Finite Element analysis of degraded concrete structure - Workshop Proceedings - BNL, NY, USA, 29-30 Oct. 1998 - Sept 99 NPP Containment Prestress loss. Summary Statement - Sept. 99 Relation of ageing and seismic engineering - Draft June 1999 Plant Ageing Management - Providing a technical basis for long-term operation of light water reactors Draft - May 1999 Activities of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in the area of concrete containment ageing - A.

NEA/CSNI/R(96)4

Y A.5 N

[13]

[14] [15]

NEA/CSNI/R(97)8 NEA/CSNI/R(97)9

[16]

NEA/CSNI/R(97)28

[17] [18]

NEA/CSNI/R(98)5 NEA/CSNI/R(98)6

N Y (conclusions in ref. [22]) A.6 N (conclusions in ref. [18]) Y A.7 Y A.8 Y A.9 Y A.10 N Y A.11 Y A.12 Y A.13 Y A.14 N

[19] [20]

NEA/CSNI/R(98)7 NEA/CSNI/R(98)8

[21] [22]

NEA/CSNI/R(98)9 NEA/CSNI/R(99)1

[23] [24] [25]

NEA/CSNI/R(99)11 OECD/PWG 3 CSNI - PWG 3 Technical Position Document Transaction of the SMIRT15- Seoul,

[26]

19

No

Reference

Title

Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y yes; N no). Corresponding sheet in Append.1

Korea August 15-20,1999 3:*  No Reference

MILLER and L. SMITH

Title

Summary (Y = yes; N = no). Corresponding sheet in Append.1 Y A.15

[27]

[28]

Evidence of Ageing Effects on Certain Safety Related Components Volume 1 : Summary and Analysis (68 pages) Volume 2: Contributions - RESTRICTED 2A: France, Sweden - 2B: Finl - 2C: Japan, US, UK Septembre 1995 NEA/CSNI/R(97)23 Operating and Maintenance Experience with Computer-based Systems in NPPs - Septembre 1998 (53 pages)

NEA/CSNI/R(95)9

Y A16

3:*  No Reference Title Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y = yes; N = no) N

[29]

NEA/CSNI/R(98)10

Reliability Data Collection - Workshop Proceedings - Budapest, Hungary (21-23 April 1998) - March 1999 (260 pages)

20

6(6$5)$3 6HQLRU *URXS RI ([SHUWV RQ 1XFOHDU 6DIHW\ 5HVHDUFK )DFLOLWLHV DQG 3URJUDPPHV No Reference Title Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y = yes; N = no) N

[34]

SESAR-FAP

Major Facilities and Programmes at risk - Draft, 18 August 1999

2.1.1.3.3.

NDC Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y yes; N no) Corresponding sheet in Append.1 Y A.17 N Y A.18 N

No

Reference

Title

[30] NEA/SEN/NDC(97)11 PLIM Workshop - 6th Meeting of the Expert Group Rev. 1 on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management - June 1997 (229 pages) [31] Common Ageing Terminology - July 1999 (Joint work of NEA, CEC and IAEA; in five language) [32] NEA/NDC/DOC(99)1 Refurbishment costs of Nuclear Power plants January 1999 (76 pages) - RESTRICTED [33] Policy and Effective Management of Nuclear Power Plant Life Management - First draft version 5 April 15,1999  6\QWKHVLV RI 2(&'1($ GRFXPHQWV RQ DJHLQJ

CNRA and CNSI consider ageing issues as important for the future. A distinction is made between the physical ageing of components and structures and other ageing concerns : ageing of analytical techniques and documentation, ageing of rules and standards, ageing of technology, ageing of organisation, ageing of plant personnel. The first domain is linked to the demonstration of the structural integrity of the components and structures throughout the lifetime of a plant. The second domain deals more globally with the management of change. Managing the physical ageing of the plant components and structures is the highest priority but no real concerns are expressed in regard of safety. It is considered that the ageing of active components for functional aspects is correctly managed by the overall maintenance and surveillance programmes. The management problem is mainly with passive parts or passive components. Needs for further research and development are indicated in the following areas: Metallic components and structures: better understanding of the ageing phenomena affecting the pressure boundary of the primary systems (fatigue, thermal and irradiation embrittlement, thermal shock, corrosion, erosion and cracking, crack initiation and propagation under the various environmental conditions prevailing),

21

to test materials from decommissioned reactors to improve the knowledge of irradiation effects and other ageing degradations and to gain more information on defect distributions.

Concrete structures Performance of the structures has been good, nevertheless developments are needed: techniques for in-service inspection of thick sections and inaccessible areas (determination of as-built structural details ; detection of flaws ; characterisation and quantification of flaws) and inspection techniques for anchorage and sensitive parts, durability of remedial measures and repairs, loss of prestressing force in tension of post-tensioned concrete structures, validation of methods for the finite elements analysis of degraded structures.

Organic components Research is needed to develop more realistic end of life criteria or forecast lifetime in terms of the functionality of a component and condition monitoring methods. Relating to the management of change, to provide a technical basis for long-term operation of nuclear power plants it is necessary to : update the individual plant documentation to avoid gaps in knowledge, establish a system of information retrieval to bridge gaps between todays and previous design and manufacturing standards and safety rules, determine more precisely minimum functional requirements to allow qualification of new equipment (standard ones when possible), research needs to ensure safety of replacement of ageing Instrumentation and Control are to be defined in order to supply as much as possible standards modules, ageing of organisation should be managed : specific skills shall be identified and transferred when supplies disappear, taking into account the expected length of life time, several "generations" of personnel shall successively insure that the knowledge of design criteria, the reasons of choice of solutions are always known : transfer of knowledge is an important challenge, enforce clubs of users of similar technology internationally. ,$($ *HQHUDO SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI ,$($

 

The IAEA is an autonomous intergovernmental organisation within UN family which was founded in 1957 in accordance with a decision of the General Assembly of the United Nations. Its Statutory mandate is "to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world and to ensure, so far as it is able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under it supervision or control is not used in such a way to further any military purpose". It is authorised to foster research and development in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the exchange of scientific and technical information, to establish and administer safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials to military purposes that were intended for

22

use in civil nuclear programmes and to establish or adopt health and safety standards regarding nuclear energy.  $FWLYLWLHV LQ WKH ILHOG RI DJHLQJ DQG OLIH PDQDJHPHQW

These activities are carried out in the Division of Nuclear Power for life management and technological aspects and in Division of Nuclear Installation Safety for more safety-related aspects. 2.1.2.2.1. Safety related aspects : Safety Standards and guidance

6DIHW\ 6WDQGDUGV General guidance on NPP activities relevant to the management of ageing (maintenance, testing, examination and inspection of Systems, Structures and Components (SSC)) is given in the Safety Standards (NUSS) Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants : Operation (No 50-C-0, Rev. 1) and associated Safety Guides on In-service inspection (50-SG-02), Maintenance (50-SG-07, Rev. 1) and Surveillance (50-SG-08, Rev. 1). All these documents are being revised : 50-C-0 will become "Requirements for the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants : Operation" 50-SG-02, 07 and 08 will be combined in "Maintenance, Testing, Surveillance and In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plants". Other publications deal with a comprehensive safety review of NPPs which includes non-physical ageing, resulting in SSCs, procedures, documentation, etc. becoming outof date in comparison with current standards, methods and technology : Safety Reports Series No 12 : Evaluation of Safety of Operating NPPs Built to Earlier Standards, Safety Guide 50-SG-012 : Periodic Safety Review of Operational NPPs. Moreover it is intended to put in each standard a paragraph on ageing (if necessary). *XLGDQFH The IAEA initiated activities on safety aspects of NPP ageing in 1985 to increase awareness of the emerging safety issue relating to physical ageing of plants systems, structures and components (SSCs) and in 1989 a systematic project aimed at assisting Member States in understanding ageing of SSCs important to safety and in effective ageing management of these SSCs in order to ensure their integrity and functional capability throughout their service life. This project integrates information on the evaluation and management of safety aspects of NPP ageing generated by Member States into a common knowledge base, and derives guidance and assists Member States in the application of this guidance. Main results of the projects are documented in the list of selected IAEA documents of paragraph 2.1.2.3. They fall into four groups. $ZDUHQHVV. Following up on the first International Conference on Safety Aspects of Ageing and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plants which was organised by the IAEA in 1987, increased awareness of physical ageing of SSCs and its potential safety impact was achieved by the development and wide dissemination in 1990 of an IAEA-TECDOC on Safety Aspect of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing [35]. While in the 1980s most people believed that classical maintenance programmes were adequate for dealing with the ageing of nuclear plants, in the 1990s the need for ageing and life management of NPPs became widely recognised.

23

)LJXUH  ,$($ 2UJDQLVDWLRQDO FKDUW

3URJUDPPDWLF *XLGHOLQHV The following programmatic guidance reports have been developed using experience of Member States. 'DWD &ROOHFWLRQ DQG 5HFRUG .HHSLQJ IRU WKH 0DQDJHPHQW RI 1XFOHDU 3RZHU 3ODQW $JHLQJ [36]. provides information on the baseline, operating and maintenance data needed and a system for data collection and record keeping. 0HWKRGRORJ\ IRU WKH 0DQDJHPHQW RI $JHLQJ RI 1XFOHDU 3RZHU 3ODQW &RPSRQHQWV ,PSRUWDQW WR 6DIHW\ >@ gives guidance on screening SSCs to make effective use of
24

limited resources and on performing ageing management studies to identify or develop effective ageing management actions for the selected components. ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ DQG 5HYLHZ RI 1XFOHDU 3RZHU 3ODQW $JHLQJ 0DQDJHPHQW 3URJUDPPHV >@ provides information on the systematic ageing management process and an organisational model for its implementation. (TXLSPHQW 4XDOLILFDWLRQ LQ 2SHUDWLRQDO 1XFOHDU 3RZHU 3ODQWV >@ documents current methods and practices relating to upgrading and preserving equipment qualification in operational NPPs and reviewing the effectiveness of plant equipment qualification programmes. &RPSRQHQW VSHFLILF JXLGHOLQHV TECDOC documents on Assessment and Management ageing of Major NPP Components Important to Safety The guidance of Ref. [37] has been used to implement Co-ordinated Research Projects (CRPs) on management of ageing of concrete containment buildings and incontainment instrumentation and control cables (see 2.1.2.2.3), and to develop comprehensive technical documents on Assessment and Management of Ageing of Major Nuclear Power Plant Components Important to Safety. The objectives of the report series are : to help ensure the functional capability of selected NPP components important to safety by documenting current practices on ageing assessment and management of these components, to provide a common technical basis for a dialogue between NPP operators and regulators.

These reports are component specific ; they are focused on safety perspective ; economics and therefore life management aspects are not addressed. The structure is common to all the reports : component description component design basis potential ageing mechanisms operating guidelines inspection and monitoring requirements, techniques and practices methods for the assessment of degradation maintenance methods systematic component specific ageing management programme (AMP). Steam Generators [40] Concrete Containment Buildings [41] PWR Reactor Pressure Vessels [42] PWR RPV Internals [43] BWR RPV Internals (in preparation) Metal components of BWR Containment Systems (in preparation) PWR Primary Piping (near completion) Instrumentation and Control Cables (end 1999 ; linked to CRP 2.3)

The LWR components selected are :

A technical document presenting good practices in the Implementation of Configuration Management in NPPs is in preparation (management of the ageing of documentation).

25

$JHLQJ PDQDJHPHQW UHYLHZ JXLGHOLQHV $0$7 *XLGHOLQHV >@ is a reference document for IAEA Ageing Management Assessment Teams (AMAT) and for utility self-assessments ; these reviews can be programmatic or problem oriented. The focus of the project work has progressively shifted from developing awareness, to preparing first programmatic, and then component specific guidelines. In the future, the focus will be on providing services to assist Member States in the application of the guidelines. A reduced effort will be maintained to facilitate information exchange through the preparation of additional guidelines and the updating of existing guidelines. *XLGDQFH LQ SUHSDUDWLRQ Methodology for SSC selection and safety based prioritisation of Ageing Management actions Guidance on minimising premature ageing Guidance on optimisation of NPP maintenance in support of ageing management. 2.1.2.2.2. Life Management and Technological Aspects

In the Division of Nuclear Power, these activities are co-ordinated by the International Working Group on Life Management of Nuclear Power Plants (IWG-LMNPP). This group set up twenty years ago is now composed of representatives from 27 countries(*) and 2 international organisations (OECD-NEA and EC). The IWG-LMNPP covers the following aspects : Design Materials Fabrication Monitoring, Testing, Inspection and data bases of their results Degradation mechanisms, their significance and mitigation Assessment and means of plant life management Strategic, economic and administrative aspects of NPP life management and decommissioning. Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) integrity Steam Generator life Management Primary Circuit Operation and Integrity Reactor Internals Operation and Integrity Secondary Circuit Containment/civil structures Cables Other items of importance including economic aspects of life management. Steam generator repair and replacement, practices and lessons learned (1996) Methodology of pressurised thermal shock evaluation (1997) Irradiation effects and mitigation (1997) NPP condition Monitoring and Maintenance (1998) NPP life management policies and strategies (1998) Behaviour of core internals (1998).
from which all western and eastern European countries.
26

Its topical priorities are :

(*)

In recent years the IWG-LMNPP has organised several specialists meeting :

and in co-ordination with other international organisations : NDE techniques capability demonstration and inspection qualification (1997 ; joint EC/OECD-NEA/IAEA meeting) Non destructive methods for monitoring degradation (1999; joint EC/IAEA meeting) Irradiation embrittlement and mitigation (1999) Erosion/corrosion of NPP components (1999)

The next meetings planned are :

Besides these meetings and the regular meetings of the IWG-LMNPP, Research Coordination meetings are organised for the participants to Co-ordinated Research Projects (CRP): CRP "Management of ageing reactor pressure vessel primary nozzle" (This CRP is ended) CRP "Assuring structural integrity of reactor pressure vessel" (completed in 1999).

IAEA has also taken the initiative and proposed the establishment of a database on ageing management and life extension of NPP key components important to safety and productivity (reactor pressure vessel / primary piping / containment / other key components) ; at the moment only the international RPV material surveillance database is well developed. 2.1.2.2.3. Research contract programme

Pilot studies were initiated at IAEA in 1989 related to the evaluation and management of the safety aspects of nuclear power plant ageing. The purpose of the studies was to facilitate the exchange of information and collaboration among international organisations engaged in ageing management and evaluation projects. This led to the development of an overall strategy for IAEA-coordinated ageing management studies involving four components (see ref. 55) : (1) (2) (3) (4) reactor pressure vessel primary nozzle, motor-operated isolating valve, concrete containment building, in-containment instrumentation and control cables.

Studies on components (1) and (2) are sponsored by the Nuclear Power Division with sponsorship of components (3) and (4) by the Nuclear Installation Safety Division. These components were selected on the basis that they represent different safety functions and material, as well as susceptibility to different ageing mechanisms. The general objectives of the ageing studies for each of these components were to identify dominant ageing mechanisms and to identify or develop an effective strategy for managing ageing effects caused by the identified mechanisms. Results of these studies were expected to have application in : (1) monitoring the degradation and in preventative maintenance of the selected components (including the development of criteria for designs of the type and timing of preventative maintenance actions), (2) predictions of component performance and remaining service life under all expected service conditions, (3) future designs and material selections, (4) amendments to applicable codes, standards and regulatory requirements.

27

The resulting pilot studies were implemented in two phases. Phase I pilot studies (i.e., interim ageing studies) were completed through Technical Committee Meeting. Under Phase I dominant ageing mechanisms were identified as well as a strategy for managing ageing. Phase II activities (comprehensive ageing studies) have been implemented through IAEA Co-ordinated Research Projects (CRP) that take place over a three- to four-year period. The status of these CRP is as follows : (1) RPV primary nozzle : ended in 1999; report pending (2) Motor-operated isolation valve : phase 4 stopped in 1998 with only partial achievement - Report pending (3) Concrete containment building : completed in 1996 (4) In containment instrumentation and control cables : end foreseen by mid 2000. In 1999 some new CRPs have been launched (Department of Nuclear Energy). They are on : Ageing of materials in spent fuel storage facilities. Mechanism of Nickel effect in radiation embrittlement of RPV steels Surveillance programmes results application to RPV integrity assessments /LVW RI VHOHFWHG ,$($ GRFXPHQWV UHODWLQJ WR DJHLQJ DQG OLIH PDQDJHPHQW



[35] [36]

[37]

[38] [39] [40]

[41]

[42]

Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y = yes ; N = no) Corresponding sheet in Append. 1 TECDOC-540 (1990) Safety Aspects of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing Y B.1 Safety Series No 50Data collection and Record keeping for the Y P.3 (1991) management of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing - A B.2 Safety Practice Technical Reports Methodology for the Management of Ageing of Y Series No 338 Nuclear Power Plant Components Important to B.3 1992 Safety Safety Series No 15 Implementation and Review of a Nuclear Power Y 1999 Plant Ageing Management Programme B.4 Safety Reports Series Equipment Qualification in Operational Nuclear Y No 3 - 1998 Power Plants B.5 TECDOC-981 Assessment and management of ageing of major Y November 1997 nuclear power plant components important to B.6 safety : Steam Generators TECDOC-1025 Assessment and Management of Ageing of Y June 1998 Major Nuclear Power Plants Components B.7 Important to Safety : Concrete Containment Buildings TECDOC-1120 Assessment and management of ageing of major Y October 1999 nuclear power plant components important to B.8 Reference Title
28

Reference

Title

Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y = yes ; N = no) Corresponding sheet in Append. 1 Y B.9 N N

safety : PWR Pressure Vessels Assessment and management of ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety : PWR Vessel Internals [44] Services Series No 4 AMAT Guidelines. Reference document for the March 1999 IAEA ageing management assessment teams [45] TECDOC-932 Final Report : Pilot Studies on Management of March 1997 Ageing of Instrumentation and Control Cables Results of a co-ordinated research programme 1993-1995 [46] IAEA/NSNI - Report Co-ordinated Research Programme (CRP) on on the IAEA Management of Ageing of In-Containment Research Instrumentation and Control Cables - LIMITED Coordination meeting DISTRIBUTION - 8-12 June 1998, EDF, Bordeaux, France [43] TECDOC-1119 October 1999 [47] Safety Reports Series No 12 1998 [48] Safety Series No 50-C-0 (Rev. 1) 1988 [49] Safety Series No 50-SG-09 1994 [50] Safety Series No 50-SG-012 1994 [51] Evaluation of the Safety of Operating Nuclear Power Plant Built to Earlier Standards - A common Basis for Judgement Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants : Operation (In course of revision ; draft April 1999) Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation : A safety Guide Periodic Safety of Operational Nuclear Power Plants : A Safety Guide

Y B.10

Y B.11 Y B.12 Y B.13 Y B.14

Transactions of the Systematic Ageing Management Process : a key 15th International element for Long Term Safety, Reliability and Conference on Economy of Nuclear Power Plants - J. Structural Mechanics Pachner/IAEA in Reactor Technology (SMIRT15) Seoul, Korea (August 15-20, 1999) [52] Internat. Conference Aspects of Plant Life Assurance and Plant Life on the Nuclear Power Management. Option L.M. Davies, A.D. Boothroyd and L. Ianko Vienna - 5-9 Sep. 94 Paper IAEA-CN-59/40 [53] TECDOC-1084 Review of Selected Cost Drivers for Decisions May 1999 on Continued Operation of Older Nuclear Reactors - Safety Upgrades, Lifetime Extension,

Y B.15

29

Reference

Title

Summary with conclusions and recommendations (Y = yes ; N = no) Corresponding sheet in Append. 1 N Y B.16 Y B.17

[54] [55]

IWG-LMNPP-94/6 1994 TECDOC-670 October 1992 INSAG-14 November 1999

[56]

Decommissioning International Database on Ageing Management and Life Extension - Database Specification Pilot studies on Management of Ageing of Nuclear Power Plant Components - Results of Phase I Safe management of the Operating Lifetimes of Nuclear Power Plants



6\QWKHVLV RI WKH ,$($ 'RFXPHQWV

The IAEA has developed a set of useful guidance for the systematic ageing management process for physical or material ageing ([36], [37], [38], [44]). Non-physical ageing is to be managed by periodic safety reviews ([47], [50]) and a permanent attention to these problems. Moreover several IAEA NUSS codes and Guides may be of help for the management of ageing ([39], [48], [49]) as well as comprehensive technical documents (TECDOC) focused on ageing ([35], [40], [41], [42], [45], [53], [55]). As relates to the difficulties encountered to manage the physical ageing, the opinions found in the IAEA documents broadly support those of OECD-NEA. For example it is indicated that the ageing of active and relatively short-lived components can be adequately managed by existing operations, maintenance and qualification programmes ([51]). Critical components or structures are the same than those identified by NEA.   :$12 *HQHUDO SUHVHQWDWLRQ RI :$12

The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) unites all nuclear electricity operators in the world. It facilitates the exchange of operating experience, so that its members can work together to achieve the highest possible standards of safety and reliability in operating their nuclear power plants. The establishment of WANO came from the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in 1986. Beyond the immediate effects of the accident, there were far reaching repercussions for the nuclear power industry as a whole. It caused nuclear operators to reassess the issue of safety and made them aware of the need for international cooperation. Through WANO all nuclear power plant operators can communicate and exchange information with one another within a culture of cooperation and openness. WANOs mission

30

WANOs mission is to maximise the safety and reliability of the operation of nuclear power plants by exchanging information and encouraging communication, comparison and emulation amongst its members. Experience shows that many accidents could have been prevented if lessons had been learned from previous incidents. The basic principle underlying WANO is that it is better to learn from someone elses mistakes than from your own, and that it is better to have the benefit of someone elses good ideas rather than do all the work yourself with perhaps no better results. WANOs organisation Membership of WANO is through one or more of its four regional centres, Atlanta, Moscow, Paris and Tokyo, and is determined by geographical location or reactor type. There is also a coordinating centre in London. The regional centres carry out the WANO Governing Boards decisions and organise WANOs programmes. Much of their work involves collecting, screening and analysing operating information before sending it to members and ensuring WANO programmes meet member needs. A central Governing Board provides the overall direction of WANO and establishes WANO policies. WANOs programmes The WANOs mission is implemented through 5 programmes which are: 7KH 2SHUDWLQJ ([SHULHQFH ,QIRUPDWLRQ ([FKDQJH 3URJUDPPH

This programme enables all members to learn from the operating experience of other plants. In particular, the programme alerts members to events that have occurred at other plants and enables members to take action to prevent similar events from happening at their own plants. The programme is sometimes known as Event Reporting. 7KH 2SHUDWRU WR 2SHUDWRU ([FKDQJH 3URJUDPPH

This programme enables members to directly share plant operating experience and ideas for improvement through face to face communication and by using the electronic messaging system, NUCLEAR NETWORK. 7KH 3HUIRUPDQFH ,QGLFDWRU 3URJUDPPH

This programme provides a means by which members can assess the performance of their plants objectively. There are ten performance indicators, which relate to nuclear plant safety and reliability, plants efficiency and personnel safety.

31

7KH *RRG 3UDFWLFHV 3URJUDPPH

This programme enables members to learn from each others best practices and thereby improve their own operational safety and reliability. A good practice is a technique, programme or process that has been proven particularly effective at improving safety and reliability at one or more nuclear power plants. 7KH 3HHU 5HYLHZ 3URJUDPPH

This programme aims to help WANO members compare their operational performance against best international practice through an in-depth, objective review of their operations by an independent team from outside their utility. The review, carried out at the request of the plant, is conducted by an international review team consisting of staff from other members nuclear power plants.  /LIH 0DQDJHPHQW DQG 7HFKQRORJLFDO DVSHFWV

WANO itself does not produces or induces on the subject of ageing, analysis of the events which are reported by the different member utilities and the Nuclear power plants they are operating through the Operating Experience Information Exchange Programme. It provides a data bank on all reported events, which is accessible to all member operators. Since the beginning of 1998 a codification system has been set up for all the event reports provided by the utilities and plants. It is already used for the events reported since that date, and the WANO Experience Feed Back is codifying all the events reported previously. The quite detailed coding system includes the following main fields: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Category under which the event was reported (8 sub fields), Consequence of the event (10 sub fields), Malfunctioning, failed, affected, degraded systems (107 sub fields), Malfunctioning, failed, affected, degraded components (45 sub fields), Status of the reactor at the time the event occurred or was detected (11 sub fields), Activity that was being performed at the time the event occurred or was detected (23 sub activities), 7. Group of staff most involved in, or likely to learn from the event (31 sub fields), 8. Direct cause : The failure, action, omission or condition which immediately produced (or-led to) the event (55 sub fields), 9 and 10. Root cause and causal factors (190 sub fields) When there are a lot of sub fields they are in 2 or 3 sub levels. Out of all these codes only a few of them can be considered as linked to ageing. They can be: In "Direct cause" : loosening... (0101) corrosion, erosion .... (0102) fatigue (0104) break, rupture, crack.... (0106) wear... (0108)

In "Root cause" : historical design does not meet current requirements (2009)

32

ageing of component (2302) degraded sub component contributed to failure (2304) component beyond expected lifetime (2306) equipment erosion/corrosion (2308) failed within expected lifetime (2309)

The events under these codes could be used as material for different kind of analysis.   ,17(51$7,21$/ '$7$%$6(6 ,$($

In the frame on the International Working Group on Life Management of NPPs (IWG-LMNPP) an International Database on NPP life management has been set-up. The structure is composed of 5 databases (see fig 2.5) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. International Database on reactor pressure vessel materials (IDPRVM) Database on pipe work on NPP Database on Steam Generators Database on NPP concrete containment Database on other NPP components

)LJXUH  Structure of the International Database on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management

Only the first database (IDPRVM) is working at the moment, with the following participation Belgium, Brazil, France, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, USA. It deals with material identification ageing history mechanical testing visual data

33

references evaluated data

For more information see "International Database on Ageing and Life Extension Database specification" - IWG-LMNPP - 94/6, 1994 [54]. Database 2 (pipework) and 3 (Steam Generators) are in course of setting up. Their structure is indicated in the following figures 2.6 and 2.7.

)LJXUH  Structure of the IAEA International Database on Pipework of Nuclear Power Plants

)LJXUH  Structure of the International Database on Steam Generators

 2.1.4.2.1.

2(&' &61, PWG 1

34

,QWHUQDWLRQDO &RPPRQ &DXVH )DLOXUH 'DWD ([FKDQJH ,&'( 'DWDEDVH : contains independent failures as well as common cause failures for Pumps, Emergency Diesels Generators (EDG), Motor Operated Valves (MOV), Safety Valves, Relief Valves and Checks Valves. Participants : Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, USA. ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 'DWDEDVH RQ H[SHULHQFH IHHGEDFN RI FRPSXWHULVHG V\VWHPV. Participants: Japan, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Sweden, USA. 2.1.4.2.2. PWG 3

3LSLQJ IDLOXUH GDWDEDVH, in conjunction with EPRI (coordination), the Westinghouse Owners Group and the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate - in course of setting-up (project completed by July 2000). 2.1.4.2.3. PWG 5 Since 1986 OECD-PWG 5 has arranged a series of international workshops on living PSA in particular to facilitate international exchange on Reliability Data Collection. The last workshop, held on 21-23 April 1998 was focused on Reliability Data Collection (see ref. [29]).

 6<17+(6,6 2) :25. '21( 81'(5 (8523($1 &217(;7

 ,1752'8&7,21

There are relatively few studies made under European Commission contracts on ageing management, which is the reason why the present study was undertaken. Nevertheless, studies made on topics of interest to ageing management are numerous. As shown in Section 1, life extension is not only obtainable through repair or replacement of components, but also through a better use and a better evaluation of the real evolution of component performance. A lot of studies may consequently be classified as contributing to ageing and plant life management: for example: characterisation of materials dealt with in Working Group on Codes and Standards (WGCS) Activity group Nr3, in-service inspection practices and non-destructive examination techniques covered by WGCS activity group Nr1, and mechanical analysis tools dealt with in WGCS activity group Nr2. Several institutions in Europe have capabilities to deal with several of the problems posed by the ageing of structural components and their structural integrity assessment. These institutions and the Joint Research Center (JRC) have developed cooperative programmes now organised in Networks [82]. They include representatives of utilities, engineering companies, R&D laboratories and Regulatory Bodies. These networks are organised and managed like the PISC programme, the institute for advanced materials of JRC playing the role of operating agent and manager of these networks. Each network: ENIQ, AMES, NESC deals with a specific aspect of fitness for purpose of materials in structural components. The intent of this Section is to summarise and highlight the main studies made under European auspices, which may be of interest for ageing management.

35



*(1(5$/ 25,(17$7,21 2) (8523($1 5(6($5&+ $1' 75$,1,1* 352*5$00(6 ,1 7+( ),(/' 2) 18&/($5 (1(5*< WK )UDPHZRUN 3URJUDPPH



The strategic goal of the specific programme "Research and training programme in the field of nuclear energy" [90] is to help exploit the full potential of nuclear energy, by making current technologies even safer and more economical and by exploring new concepts. Ageing management clearly falls under the first of these approaches. Under key action 2 "Nuclear fission", one of the first research objectives is related to improved methods for understanding and managing the effect of ageing on equipment and structures, for on-line monitoring (which may contribute to improve margins), and for risk informed approaches to plant modernisation and inspection, which contribute to the demonstration and improvement of available safety margins. Under topic 2.1, and particularly "Plant life extension and management", the 5-th Framework Programme expresses the following objectives: "develop a common basis for the continued safe operation and prolonging the safe operational life-span of existing installations and to better methods for their inspection, maintenance and management (both in terms of performance and occupational exposure)". The following aspects are identified: Integrity of equipment and structures: Understand, predict and properly manage the effect of ageing, such as environmental assisted cracking, wear, fatigue, irradiation damage, and dynamic loads on equipment and structures, and develop methods for estimating the influence of these effects on the safety margins under normal and abnormal operation. Concerning embrittlement of components, the following projects may be mentioned [95] (see figure 2.7): FRAME will be focused on the improvement of the assessment of the RPV embrittlement through the development of a method allowing a direct measurement of the fracture toughness, RETROSPEC have the objective of improving the evaluation of the neutron doses where no or unreliable data from surveillance specimens are available, PISA intends to provide a better understanding of the role of phosphorus in the embrittlement process of RPV steels. The following projects are focused on corrosion issues: INTERWELD deals with irradiation assisted cracking of austenitic steels used for reactor internals, CASTOC concerns environmentally assisted corrosion of low alloy steels under static and cyclic conditions. Prediction of structural safety margins are dealt with under ADIMEW project, which has the same objectives than FP-4 BIMET, and VOCALIST the intent of which is to improve safety margins predictions. FP-5 project WAHA/WHLOADS covers optimisation of operational conditions, in particular dynamic loadings during operation. On-line monitoring, inspection and maintenance: Development of innovative or improved non-destructive methods and techniques for on-line monitoring and of risk-

36

informed approaches to inspection and maintenance. FP-5 projects related to this topic include: GRETE, which deals with NDT potential to support decision-making process for failure prevention, IQNAR/SPICRACK devoted to the improvement of ultrasonic inspection performance for detection and sizing possibly present cracks in structural components, LIRES, which has the objective to develop electrodes likely to be used in harsh operational LWR conditions for corrosion potential monitoring. Organisation and management of safety: Development of methods and tools, including quantitative indicators, to assess the role of man, organisation and management in maintaining and improving safety. Development of better methods and preventive measures that can be used for a risk based systems approach to plant modernisation, including PSA-techniques and applications. Development of man-machine interface and a common understanding of the qualification of advanced safety and control systems. Within FP-5, the following issues will be addressed: Computer-based systems to support I&C functions important to safety, within BESECBS project, The development of a safety justification framework for the refurbishment of systems important to safety, within CEMSIS project. Networking: Following FP-4 INTACT concerted action, the VERSAFE project will be funded under FP-5 to cover plant life management and accident prevention and mitigation strategies. The present study covers the whole above field, and intends to compare the existing national approaches and to prepare recommendations on the complementary actions to be undertaken in order to optimise the ageing management of nuclear power plants. The above objectives intend to permit a better evaluation of plant performance (see figure 1-2). Under topic 2.4 "Radiation protection", the programme also identifies risk assessment and management approach developments that can find technical and social acceptance, governing safety requirements evolution (the second topic in figure 1-2). This aspect is also very important from ageing management point of view as far as the acceptable plant life is more and more identified with public acceptance criteria. Consequently, the present study shall also deal with an improvement of the consistency and presentation of ageing management concepts, capable of finding broad acceptance. The 5-th Framework Programme also identifies support for research topics, in order to provide tools and exchange of data needed for key actions implementation. Those related to ageing concerns include facilities for degradation investigation, equipment and material performance evaluation, data bases on safety assessment of major components, and supports to networks focusing on the major issues of the identified key actions. Training activities are also part of this programme. As far as ageing of expertise and procedures are part of the global ageing evaluation, such activities shall also be considered in the recommendations to be prepared in the context of the present study. Exchanges, and special training courses fall under this scope. Maintaining the nuclear expertise is a necessary condition for the current NPPs to continue to operate in a safe and competitive way.

37

Even if work is done on extreme severe accident mitigation, and if such action may have consequences on public acceptance, ageing management shall primarily focus on the prevention, which is the first step of the defence-in-depth approach.  UG DQG WK )UDPHZRUN 3URJUDPPHV

The achievements of the 3-rd and 4-th Euratom Framework Programmes have been presented in [92] and [95], together with the orientations of the above 5-th programme: Topics covered are illustrated by Figure 2.8. As far as plant safety is concerned, the 3-rd Framework Programme was focussed particularly on severe accident evaluation, these actions being continued under the context of the 4-th programme together with actions on ageing and probabilistic safety analyses. This differs from the 5-th programme, which is mainly focussed to problems solving and socio-economic challenges. What was new with the 4-th programme was its consistency with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty stating the obligation to co-ordinate research and technological development activities so as to ensure consistency between national policies and community policy. This has led to an increased weight of consultative committees with representatives coming from governments, regulatory authorities, manufacturing industry, electric utilities, universities, research organisations and others. Reference [92] is mainly devoted to actions concerning severe accidents, which essentially concern new projects with evolutionary design. Concerning ageing actions, the 4-th Framework Programme includes 11 actions mainly on structural (essentially metallic) components subjected to irradiation embrittlement or other operating conditions. Three projects addressed neutron irradiation and dosimetry: AMES has established the dosimetry to be used as well as the irradiation programmes to be carried out under this network, MADAM has reviewed the neutron damage indexation and prepared conversion tables of damage indices used for embrittlement assessment, RESQUE addressed the issue of qualification, verification and comparison of stud and electron beam welding for reconstitution of irradiated impact and toughness specimens. Concerning neutron irradiation induced material degradation, the REFEREE project deals with the experimental determination of the difference between toughness and Charpy impact transition curves. With respect to structural integrity of components and welds, three projects are cofunded by the European Union: DISWELD deals with techniques for assessing environmentally assisted cracking of dissimilar metal welds, BIMET carries out pipe tests to follow crack growth and path of cracks by various analysis methods, VORSAC studies the evolution of residual stresses and related phenomena

38

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'LVVHPLQDWLRQ )3 DQG )3 -65, )LJXUH  Schematic representation of all FP-4 and FP-5 projects in the field of plant life extension and management, using the structure of FP-5 (extracted from ref. [95]). Four actions concern more strategic studies reviewing the range of ageing related topics relevant to nuclear safety, which constitute the essential task of the present study. Sate of the art reports are being prepared on the following topics: MODAGE action concentrates on the present capabilities of modelling corrosion in primary and secondary circuits, INTACT surveys ageing research activities and will indicate further research needs, AMES-NDT reviews NDT and NDE techniques that are or will soon be available,

39

 EURIS analyses the tools available for defining in an effective way risk-informed in-service inspection programmes [91]. Containment integrity actions have been identified, which mainly deal with behaviour under accident conditions. A report has been issued on the evaluation of nuclear expertise in Europe [93]. The intent of this report is to collect and analyse information on nuclear expertise and to make recommendations enabling to maintain a high safety level in the existing installations and to keep the nuclear option open. 180 answers were received from various experts. Ref. [92] summarises the key items of this study, in particular the need for a sufficient level of expertise to run safely the current generation of reactors and to ensure the necessary safety margins in ageing reactors. Especially in the case of plant life extension, one has to understand the meaning and intent of existing safety margins, before "eating" them. This leads to keep a minimum of nuclear educated engineers able to think and to act beyond standard operating procedures. The report also notices that due to lack of student interest, teaching staff and university laboratories are ageing (and the same may become true for safety authority staff itself). It was even said that "a bad reactor with a good team is usually better than a good reactor with a bad team". This point has led to some of the recommendations included in the 5-th Framework Programme.  +DUPRQLVDWLRQ RI QDWLRQDO VDIHW\ UXOHV DQG UHJXODWLRQV

One of the overall objectives of the Communitys activities is to help harmonise the national safety rules and regulations. In order to achieve its strategic goals in the area of nuclear energy, DG ENV is running the "Nuclear Regulators Working Group" (NRWG), made of representatives from safety regulatory authorities from EU Member States and Applicant States. The same organisations plus nuclear operators from the same countries, who were members of the "defunct" Reactor Safety Working Group discontinued in November 1998, are now members of the new European Nuclear Installations Safety Group (ENIS-G). This group will have to deal with the general framework to provide measures dealing with sharing of experience, particularly in issues such as ageing or obsolescence of some components. The NRWG provides a forum for exchanges covering in particular the following topics which are of interest for ageing management: feedback of operating experience, risk analysis with emphasis on risk based in-service inspection methods, operational safety fundamentals and development of safety culture. At the Industry level, expert groups have been established, which inscribe their activities within the general orientations defined in the above-described programmes. As far as ageing is concerned, reference [59] is particularly dedicated to a preparatory work for an indicative programme related to ageing issues to be handled by the Working Group on Codes and Standards, presented in Section 2.2.3 below. It includes a synthesis of existing work made at the international level, with 142 references identified. The status of the ageing research programmes at the international level and in the various countries is addressed.

40

The R&D effort on ageing is analysed in this report, including work recently carried out, on-going programmes, and future activities. Gaps in the knowledge which need to be covered in future research have been identified, including: Life assessment technology and NDE for physical properties altered by ageing Improved monitoring techniques, Reproduction of phenomena on test specimens, Research on reactor pressure vessel internals degradation and mitigation, Repair and degradation mitigation technologies.

In order to perform this work, the report proposes a tentative of programme, grouped into six topics: Database generation (toughness, mechanical properties of aged materials), Material degradation studies (typical failure selection, detailed examinations, verification of code and standard validity), Degradation detection techniques (toughness testing, direct evaluation of actual material properties, small specimen testing, correlation between KV tests and toughness properties, development of new monitoring systems), Assessment procedures (conservatism and improvement of prediction formulas, determination of margins which guarantee safe operation, evaluation of nocivity of factory defects), Repair/mitigation technologies (improved materials, stress relief, repair procedures under-water, robotics optimised water chemistry) Recommendations for Codes and Standards (introduction of actual data instead of design data, material characteristics curves, toughness determination from KV specimens, standardised and validated NDE methods to determine physical and mechanical properties, recommendations on surface conditions). Among the various international studies, report [59] also summarises the contexts where ageing studies are covered in the European Union: The Working Group on Codes and Standards (WGCS), The Ageing Materials Evaluation and Studies (AMES), The European Network for Inspection Qualification (ENIQ), The Network for Evaluating Steel Components (NESC).

The group activities are described hereafter.  :*&6  7+( :25.,1* *5283 21 &2'(6 $1' 67$1'$5'6 :*&6 2EMHFWLYHV

The objective of the working group on codes and standards, initially created in the context of the European Fast Reactor development, and enlarged later to cover LWR activities is to analyse the existing codes and standards in order to identify discrepancies and to carry out studies facilitating the reduction of this discrepancy by the member states, allowing a pre-harmonisation of European codes and standards. The WGCS is not specifically dedicated to ageing evaluation. It also covers design and construction rules applicable at the plant design stage. An overview on pre-harmonisation studies conducted by WGCS has been published in [83]. The WGCS organisation includes three activity groups: AG1, AG2, AG3, the activities of which are presented below, as far as they concern ageing management:

41



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AG1 activities cover in-service surveillance, including non-destructive examination and material degradation evaluation activities in the general framework of in-service inspection (ISI) activities. Defect assessment and evaluation of flaws also fall in its scope as well as repair, maintenance and component replacement practices. In the context of these activities, the non-destructive examination (NDE) practices and associated acceptance criteria given in the various ISI codes (essentially RSE-M [60] and ASME XI [61]) have been evaluated [62]. It was found that these codes, though different with regard to their detailed rules and allowable defect tables, provide comparable intrinsic safety coefficients for the various operating conditions. Differences found may be related to differences on the consideration of in-service crack growth potential. Progresses in the harmonisation of European in-service inspection codes have been covered in report [63]. Two parts deal respectively with LWR and FBR. Concerning LWR, the major differences in the requirements of RSE-M, KTA [64] and ISI specification for Sizewell B based on ASME XI with attachment specifications agreed with Nuclear Installation Inspectorate (NII) are identified. The report concentrates on differences in the ISI of key primary circuit components (RPV, SG, pressuriser, reactor coolant pumps and pipework). The intent of NDE is to find potentially detrimental defects. Qualification of NDE techniques consequently depend on the suspected defects. According to RSE-M classification: conventional qualifications are applied where no defect is suspected (this applies at the construction stage, and also applies to the majority of in-service examinations) general qualifications are applied where the presence of particular defects is postulated, following return of experience on similar plants, specific qualification, which shall be obtained on realistic defects is required where the presence of particular defects is stated for the construction under consideration. The report [65] deals with the comparison of the various practices in this field and covers the construction and operation stages. It also refers to Nuclear Regulators Working Group (NRWG) document on qualification of NDT [66], and to ENIQ Report N2 [67]. Other reports, such as [68], extend the comparison of ISI practices to eastern countries, and reports [69] and [70] cover the relationship between manufacturing standards and in-service inspection needs, i.e. inspectability. Continuous on-line monitoring of NPPs components has also be covered in report [71], which cover, in particular: the identification and comparison of Codes and Standards including continuous monitoring requirements. Areas where harmonisation may be desirable are suggested, the survey of continuous monitoring techniques for structural damage and material degradation detection. A list of the major degradation mechanisms for various NPP components has been compiled together with a list of techniques which may be used to monitor each mechanism. The importance given to ISI code, defect acceptability and on-line monitoring is linked to the fact that no real confidence can be given to ageing management processes if they cannot be based on real and efficient examinations conducted on actual components.

42



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AG2 activities cover design and analysis topics. Its role was enlarged to cover the strategy to be followed for the future evolutions of the design and construction codes, taking into account the new European projects and the transposition of the European Pressure Equipment Directive [72], which is not strictly speaking applicable to the most important nuclear components, but which will influence the overall standards landscape. AG2 activities are not specifically dedicated to ageing evaluation, but the tools developed for a better harmonisation of practices, particularly in the fatigue and fast fracture evaluation domain may be used in the context of the study. In particular, the following topics have been covered in AG2 reports: fatigue and creep-fatigue damage assessment, including syntheses on fatigue data and parameters likely to influence fatigue resistance [73], or benchmarks for the evaluation of thermal striping in order to explain actual phenomena and to permit more realistic damage prediction [74]. fast fracture evaluations, which needs a good understanding of the conditions of transferability of data obtained from specimens to the analysis of defect assessment in real structures [75], [76], [77], and the evaluation of the effect of potential residual stresses [78]. In addition, acceptance of defects have to consider their potential behaviour under faulted conditions: report [79] evaluates in particular the defect tolerance under conditions for which ASME or RCC level D [94] criteria are applicable.  $* $FWLYLWLHV

AG3 activities deal with code harmonisation and development of expertise in the fields of materials selection and properties. This includes in particular: evaluation of in-service degradation of material properties by the effect of neutron irradiation, corrosion or thermal ageing, evaluation of properties of materials, with special emphasis on fracture mechanics testing procedures and fatigue properties. Work on re-evaluation of toughness reference curves for fracture mechanics analyses has in particular been done [80], and environment effects on fatigue are currently reviewed. Nevertheless, there are few studies specifically dedicated to ageing, which is covered by AMES Reports (see section 2.2.4 below). A report [81] has made the synthesis of the results of the RPV irradiation surveillance programmes of four countries and has compared these results with the predicted calculated values.   7+( (8523($1 1(7:25.6 1(6& $0(6 (1,4 2EMHFWLYHV

Adequate understanding of the mechanisms that can contribute to component failure can only be gained through supporting research programs. R&D institutions in Europe have consequently joined their efforts in European Networks to deal with the following problems, which have been considered important: understanding and modelling of the major ageing phenomena and validation of mitigation measures,

43

 research and development of techniques for on-line monitoring of these degradations, improvement, better use and qualification of periodic inspection procedures, capability of precise structural assessment to evaluate safely the remaining margin to failure. Each of these networks: ENIQ, AMES, NESC deals with a specific aspect of the fitness for purpose of materials in structural components.  7KH $JHLQJ 0DWHULDOV (YDOXDWLRQ DQG 6WXGLHV $0(6

The European Network on Ageing Materials Evaluation and Studies (AMES) was set up to bring together the organisations in Europe that have the main capabilities on RPV materials assessment and research, with the following objectives: Establish and execute AMES projects in this area, Act as an European review Group, Provide technical advice to regulatory bodies, General Directorates of the EU and provide a base for the development of common European standards, Participation in collaborative programmes with the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe. Activities include: review of capabilities within member organisations and existing knowledge base, study of RPV and other components, such as reactor internals, assessment of the availability of stocks of irradiated and un-irradiated materials including those that might be recovered from operating or decommissioned reactors, understanding of the underlying effects for irradiation damage, thermal ageing and annealing, annealing validation an re-irradiation studies of LWR materials, the survey of national regulatory requirements and standards at European level relevant to material damage and mitigation methods. Various reports have been issued, particularly on irradiation embrittlement mitigation [87] and thermal annealing [88]. AMES has developed a strategy for subjects related to ageing [86].  7KH (XURSHDQ 1HWZRUN IRU ,QVSHFWLRQ 4XDOLILFDWLRQ (1,4

The objective of ENIQ network is the co-ordination and management at European level of expertise and resources for the assessment and qualification of NDE inspection techniques and procedures, primarily for nuclear components. The primary focus is on ISI performance demonstration. ENIQ proposals is the basis for establishing a European attitude about inspection qualification in general. Three major tasks have been covered: Gathering of information which can be of interest for inspection qualification: correlation between real and realistic flaws, inventory of available assemblies and blocks, application of human factors and reliability studies, structural integrity significance of flaws. Studies on qualification schemes of ISI procedures, development of qualification procedures for specific reactor components, development of a simulator for ultrasonic inspections. "Recommended Practices" have been defined, which are

44

considered for defining NDE qualification requirements in codes and standards, such as RSE-M. Application of what is acquired within the first groups of tasks: management schemes of available resources, development of accreditation criteria, co-operation with eastern countries.  7KH 1HWZRUN IRU (YDOXDWLQJ 6WHHO &RPSRQHQWV 1(6&

The assessment of integrity of a structure containing flaws is an interdisciplinarity activity with inputs from NDE, materials testing, stress and fracture analysis. Several collaborative programmes have been conducted in these various topics as shown above and also in PISC (Programme for the Inspection of Steel Components) [84] and FALSIRE [85] concerning respectively NDE reliability and fracture mechanics areas. It is the interaction between the disciplines which is essential in order to take right technical decisions and judgements. The concept of NESC is consequently to explore international practices in the entire process of structural integrity assessment. Particular attention has been given to: capability of current NDE techniques and interpretation of NDE data statistical treatment of NDE data for structural assessment allowance for stable tearing and warm-prestressing analysis of complex stress fields for fracture assessment, integrity arguments and risk evaluation, design of large scale structural test and validation of assessment methods on full size components.

The experimental programme investigates the pressurised thermal shock transient by means of the procurement and fabrication of a cylinder with cracks and materials properties to simulate a damaged pressure vessel, the inspection of this cylinder by participating organisations using various ISI tools, integrity assessment and test of the simulated vessel in the spinning cylinder test facility at Risley. The test is followed by post-inspection using ISI procedures, reassessment of structural integrity using new NDE information, destructive examination, and re-evaluation of NDE and structural integrity assessments. This approach allows to evaluate the global consistency and pessimism of the various methods and hypotheses.  &21&/86,21

As shown in this report, various aspects of ageing management are addressed in different European programmes and contexts. WGCS, AMES, ENIQ and NESC studies provide valuable inputs for the evaluation of the ageing of mechanical components, as well as in certain cases a complete strategy for the consideration of particular ageing phenomena, such as RPV embrittlement. Topics retained in these studies resulted from a consensus among the various participants, which did consider prioritisations coming from the return of experience or from studies made in other contexts. Except in ref. [59], no strategy documents were prepared in the field of ageing management, which is the reason why the present study has been decided.

45




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Many studies are under way in the energy production industry to maintain high plant capability and availability factors in face of ageing phenomena. Study of such phenomena and development of mitigation measures is thus part of the operation of power plants. Different ageing phenomena can contribute to degradations that can lead to extended plant outage or shorten the projected lifetime of the plant. Typical failure mechanisms include: corrosion and stress-corrosion cracking, irradiation and thermal embrittlement, vibration, thermal cycling, fatigue, wear-out, erosion, deposit effects, creep in fast breeder reactors and some components of non nuclear plants.

These phenomena have to be studied and understood, and in several cases, adequate understanding of the mechanisms can only be gained through supporting laboratory tests research programmes. A plant life management programme shall include the following tasks: identification of components of importance to plant life, identification of life threatening factors, understanding and description of ageing phenomena, development of methods for in-service ageing detection, identification of mitigation methods, evaluation of components replacement possibilities, study of annealing and repair methods for non replaceable components.

This Section describes the main ageing phenomena which may occur in a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP). The methods of identifying ageing in service and mitigation of ageing are also covered. Ageing phenomena can be physical (resulting in deterioration of physical characteristics of Systems, Structures and Components (SSC)). If ageing is not effectively managed, it could affect the capability of SSC to perform their required functions. They may also be non-physical. Paragraph 3.3 covers these other aspects, which include human ageing and ageing of culture and procedures.




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The list of main degradation mechanisms likely to affect structures and components is given in Table 3-1 below. Potential ageing mechanisms identified for the various types of components are listed in Appendix 3.  ,UUDGLDWLRQ (PEULWWOHPHQW

Materials exposed to neutron radiation undergo changes in microstructure and properties. The extent of the changes depends on the material, the neutron flux, the flux spectrum, the fluence, and the irradiation temperature.
46

The reactor pressure vessel, made in Low Alloy Steel, is subjected to neutron irradiation in the core region, which results in progressive embrittlement. This embrittlement results macrostructurally as hardness and yield stress increase, and a fracture toughness decrease. Fracture toughness is the property that governs the material resistance to fast fracture, which, for ferritic steels, is small at low temperature, where the material behaves in a brittle manner, and increases with the temperature until the material becomes ductile. It is generally accepted that the effect of irradiation is to shift this curve to higher temperatures, the shape of the curve being only slightly affected, with a small decrease of the upper shelf toughness in the ductile regime. Also organic materials (e.g. electrical cables) degrade due to irradiation embrittlement.

7DEOH  /LVW RI 0DLQ 'HJUDGDWLRQ 0HFKDQLVPV LQ /:5 Electronics X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Potential degradation for 1 2 3 4 Irradiation Thermal ageing Creep Fatigue 4,1 High Cycle Fatigue 4,2 Low Cycle Fatigue 4,3 Thermal Fatigue Corrosion 5,1 Corrosion without mechanical loading - Uniform Corrosion Attack - Local Corrosion Attack (Pitting, Wastage, Crevice Corrosion) - Selective Corrosion Attack (InterGranular Corrosion) 5,2 Corrosion with additional mechanical loading - Stress Corrosion Cracking (InterGranular SCC, TransGranular SCC) - Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking - Hydrogen Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking - Strain Induced Corrosion Cracking - Corrosion Fatigue 5,3 Flow Accelerated Corrosion (Erosion/Corrosion) 5,4 Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking 5,5 Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion Wear (Fretting, Abrasion, Vibration, Cavitation, ...) Loss of prestressing Environment effects - Freeze-Thaw Cycling, Wetting and Drying - Chemical Attack - Oxidation Concrete Degradation (Shrinkage, Leaching of Calcium Hydroxide, Reaction with Aggregates) Differential Settlement Polymers X X X X X Concrete X X X X X X X X X Metals X X
47

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Thermal ageing refers to gradual and progressive changes in the microstructure and properties of a material exposed at an elevated temperature for an extended period of time. For Ferritic Steels, the effect of thermal ageing results mainly from intergranular segregation of residual impurity elements (e.g. Phosphorous). This leads to a hardening of the material and a reduction of the fracture toughness. Cast Austenitic-Ferritic Stainless Steels (duplex structures) and Martensitic Stainless Steels are susceptible to thermal ageing in the normal operating temperature range of PWRs., by "unmixing" of chromium from its solid solution in the ferrite of the duplex structure and in martensite [102]. Also organic materials (e.g. electrical cables) degrade due thermal ageing leading to changes in mechanical properties (e.g. hardening) and cracks initiation.  &UHHS

Creep is the plastic deformation that occurs over a period of time in a material subjected to a stress, even below the elastic limit. It is considered to result from the competing process of work hardening and thermal recovery. The process is then thermally activated and is significant above 0.4 times the melting point of the material. Creep is a potentially significant ageing mechanism for pre-stressed or post-tensioned structures.  )DWLJXH

Fatigue is produced by periodic application of stresses by mechanical or thermal loading. The metal subjected to fluctuating stress will fail at stresses much lower than those required to cause fracture in a single application of load. The key parameters are the range of stress variation and the number of its occurrences. Technological conditions (i.e. surface roughness and residual stresses) and Environmental conditions (presence of deleterious chemical species) may also play a role. Low cycle fatigue, usually induced by mechanical and thermal loads, among which gamma-heating, is distinguished from high cycle fatigue, mainly associated with vibration or high number of small thermal fluctuations. At the design stage, all Class 1 components were qualified for stress and fatigue using the so-called "design transients" according to the design code. A re-assessment of some of these components may be necessary for one of the following reasons: the numbers of design transient are associated with a predetermined design lifetime of the components (30 or 40 years); in the older plants, the stress and fatigue analyses were performed with outdated techniques; differences between operation transient book keeping and envelope design transient, the design transient may be modified due to component replacement (e.g. SG), NPP uprating, or new operation modes (e.g. extended fuel cycle); newer version of the code may have different requirements (e.g. on material properties, on fatigue analysis), unexpected transient may show up (e.g. thermal stratification transients in the surge line or in the feed water lines, thermal transient in unisolated sections of piping connected to the reactor coolant system); and
48

 at the time of design, some components may be covered by a different design code (e.g. certain Class 1 pipes analysed according to the ANSI B31.1 Code which does not require explicit fatigue qualification).  &RUURVLRQ

Corrosion without mechanical loading Corrosion is the degradation of a material by chemical or electrochemical reaction with its environment. There are many forms or effects of corrosion, depending on the material and environment. Corrosion is characterised by material loss or deterioration of its mechanical properties. Corrosion reduces the component wall thickness, either uniformly or locally. General corrosion refers to a uniform attack over surfaces of the material and results in thinning of the material. (e. g. Corrosion of Carbon or Low Alloy Steels exposed to boric acid leakage). General corrosion rates vary with fluid oxygen content, temperature, flow rate. Localised corrosion includes pitting, crevice corrosion, etc. Pitting is commonly caused by the breakdown of the passive film on a metal, in local areas, by species such as chlorides. Crevice corrosion results from local environment conditions in the restricted region of a crevice being different and more aggressive than the bulk environment. Pitting may occur at critical location such as tube-to-tubesheet joints of the Steam Generators, SG, where fluid velocities are stagnant or low (i.e. impurity concentration can occur). Stress Corrosion Cracking Stress Corrosion Cracking, SCC, is a localised non-ductile failure which occurs only under the combination of three factors: tensile stress, aggressive environment, and susceptible material. The Stress Corrosion Cracking failure mode can be intergranular, IGSCC, or Transgranular, TGSCC. In a NPP, Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking, PWSCC, and Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking, IASCC, are also defined. Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking is associated with a sensitised material (e.g. Sensitised Austenitic Stainless Steels are susceptible to IGSCC in an oxidising environment). Sensitisation of unstabilised austenitic Stainless Steels is characterised by a precipitation of a network of chromium carbides with depletion of chromium at the grain boundaries, making these boundaries vulnerable to corrosive attack. Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking is caused by aggressive chemical species especially if coupled with oxygen and combined with high stresses. Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking is a form of IGSCC and is defined as intergranular cracking in primary water within specification limits (i.e. no need for additional aggressive species) (e. g. IGSCC of Inconel 600 Alloy in primary water). Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking refers to intergranular cracking of materials exposed to ionising radiation. As with SCC, IASCC requires stress, aggressive environment and a susceptible material. However in the case of IASCC, a normally non-susceptible material is rendered susceptible by exposure to neutron irradiation. IASCC is a plausible ageing mechanism for PWR internal components (e.g. baffle bolts).

49

Flow Accelerated Corrosion Flow Accelerated Corrosion, FAC, also called Corrosion-Erosion mechanisms, refers to the combined action of erosion (i.e. the mechanical action of a fluid on a metal surface) and corrosion. The severity of erosion vary with the material type, the fluid temperature, the fluid velocity, the oxygen content in the fluid, and the component geometry. The result of FAC is an increased rate of attack on metal because of the relative movement between a corrosive environment and the metal surface. Carbon and Low-Alloy Steels are susceptible to FAC. Another erosion process usually experienced on pump impellers is cavitation. Cavitation is a process that occurs when the local pressure in a flowing liquid is reduced without a change in temperature. Hence, vapour-bubbles form. within the flowing liquid. When these bubbles pass into a region of higher pressure, they collapse, producing high-localised fluid velocities and causing damage to material surface. Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion, MIC, is the accelerated corrosion of materials resulting from surface microbiological activity. MIC is characterised by the formation of microbial colonies and associated scale and debris on the surface of the metal. MIC affects Carbon Steels and, to a lesser extent, Stainless Steels and Nickel alloys. Any buried system or system using untreated water is susceptible to MIC. The major factors influencing the growth of MIC are temperature, pressure, pH, water content, and oxygen.  :HDU

Wear is defined as a loss of material as a result of mechanical contact between two solid surfaces due to vibration (e.g. wear was experienced on SG tubes due to contact with anti-vibration bars), sliding, or due to the presence of loose/foreign objects. It is referred as Fretting Wear if the surfaces are in the presence of a corrosive environment.  /RVV RI SUHVWUHVVLQJ

A material loaded to an initial stress may experience a reduction in stress over a period of time. Stress Relaxation occurs under conditions of constant strain. Stress relaxation is accelerated at elevated temperature and/or in the presence of fast neutron irradiation. Typical components subject to a loss of prestressing are the prestressed cables in the primary containment.  (QYLURQPHQW HIIHFWV

The ageing mechanisms of the structure such as fatigue resistance depend on environment. Various ageing mechanisms may also act simultaneously, like fatigue and creep, for example. The environment by itself may also cause the degradation of the structure, such as wetting-drying and freeze-thaw cycling, chemical attack, etc.  &RQFUHWH GHJUDGDWLRQ

Concrete SSC may be affected by several ageing mechanisms resulting in an alteration of the mechanical properties or the physical form of the concrete WKXV DIIHFWLQJ WKH structural integrity of the SSC (e.g. aggressive environment can increased porosity, perrneability, and reduced concrete strength; atmospheric carbon dioxide can cause concrete carbonation reducing the properties of the concrete; flowing water over concrete surfaces can remove significant amount of concrete).
50



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All structures settle to some extent during and after construction depending on the physical properties of the foundation material. Severe settlement can cause concrete cracking and/or misalignment of equipment and can lead to high stresses within the structure.




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Various approaches may be used to identify ageing in service, depending on ageing phenomena: Some are anticipated and lead to a specific in-service surveillance program: this is in particular the case of the neutron embrittlement of the reactor pressure vessel core shell, Others are not anticipated or are subjected to precautionary measures in order to avoid them: this is the case, for example, of the fatigue damage, for which detailed calculations are done and in-service transient follow applied in order to ensure that they remain within the design hypotheses. In this case nevertheless, periodic inservice examinations are conducted to verify if non-anticipated damage may nevertheless appear. These examinations may depend on the margins demonstrated during the above evaluations, Notwithstanding the above precautions, damage risks may appear during service, leading to leaks or failures. They may result from non anticipated phenomena (for example thermal ageing of cast parts), or from under-estimated phenomena (for example, fatigue under vibration or thermal transients). This leads to a progressive improvement of the construction choices and a complementary specific inspection program for existing plants likely to be affected by the phenomena. Material mechanical and/or physical properties measurements, Component integrity, Component functionality.

The physical methods used for ageing evaluation may concern:

These various concerns are developed in the following paragraphs.  0DWHULDO SURSHUWLHV VXUYHLOODQFH SURJUDPV

The best known material surveillance program is the one dedicated to the neutron embrittlement of the reactor belt line. Specific samples are placed between the core and the vessel and are tested according to a planning defined according to embrittlement prevision rules, permitting to anticipate the evolution likely to affect the vessel shell itself. Internal procedures or design codes give acceptable methods for establishing these programs, such as US Regulatory Guide 1.99 [103], [104], KTA [64], or ETC-M [105] standards. These programs include material test samples (tension and toughness specimens), neutron flux monitoring dosimeters, and thermal monitors. Such programs include provisions on material selection and test specimen sampling, capsule filling and positioning, capsule removal schedules, and eventual reference materials for comparisons or identification of particular operating conditions. Where other significant material ageing phenomena are anticipated, such as thermal ageing, a dedicated program may be required, in particular by the new French
51

"operation" Order dated November 10, 1999 [106]. Such programs do not necessarily imply the introduction of material samples within the component, but may include artificial ageing tests conducted under representative conditions. When a specific ageing effect is discovered, test samples may be taken from actual components in order to confirm the hypotheses of the generic justification files.  3HULRGLF LQVSHFWLRQ

The industrial and regulatory practices include periodic integrity tests, generally at a eight or ten years interval. At the occasion of these tests, or between two tests, an inspection program is applied, involving visual and volumic non-destructive examinations, which are described in codes, such as US ASME XI [61], German KTA [64], or French RSE-M [60]. In addition to these periodic "re-qualification", additional reduced examinations are conducted at each refueling shutdown. These code requirements are completed by particular examinations where specific ageing phenomena are anticipated, in particular following return of experience. These examinations are depending on the importance of the phenomena for the safety or integrity of the component, and they may concern primarily "precursor" components (even when they are not important from a safety point of view) in order to anticipate the phenomena likely to affect the most important components. The content of the inspection programs are modulated by the results of design studies, such as fatigue or fast fracture evaluations, some zones appearing more "sensible" to a given degradation phenomena than others. Nevertheless, the conclusions of these evaluations are completed by a minimum number of additional "random" examinations in order to detect non anticipated phenomena. The inspection strategy also depend if the plant under consideration is part of a series or not.  3HULRGLF WHVWLQJ

Component performance is periodically evaluated through functional tests. This concerns primarily active components such as pumps and valves, or snubbers and electrical equipment. Loss of prestressing or containment leaktightness are also subjected to periodic measurements.  0HWKRGV IRU $JHLQJ LGHQWLILFDWLRQ

Various destructive tests and expertises and non-destructive examination methods may be used for the evaluation of the physical ageing of materials and structures. They are summarised in Table 3.2. Some of the methods are still under development. This is in particular the case for DNPA, PTE, Barkhausen or annihilation of positrons effects. DNPA method was nevertheless used in the generic evaluation of thermal ageing of Austenitic-Ferritic cast elbows in France [107]. In addition, some of the methods do not give an absolute evaluation of ageing, but a relative information, implying that an initial measurement has to be made, which means that the ageing effect has to be anticipated. Detection of damage initiation may be obtained by the use of NDE methods allowing the detection of the corresponding cracks or by an indirect detection of the consequences of the existence of such defects, for example the acoustic emission of the material in the vicinity of these flaws, when subjected to loading. The interest of such an approach is to identify and locate damage, even in zones where it was not anticipated.
52

7DEOH  $JHLQJ PHFKDQLVPV Irradiation embrittlement

$JHLQJ HYDOXDWLRQ PHWKRGV (YDOXDWLRQ PHWKRGV Mechanical test samples taken according to given schedule Hardness tests Annihilation of positrons Mechanical test samples taken from actual components and expertise of replaced components Hardness and micro-hardness tests Small angles neutron diffraction (DNPA) Thermo-electric power (PTE) based on Seebeck effect Simulation in representative laboratory conditions Measurement of residual stresses and strain-hardening by Xray diffraction Eddy current Barkhausen effect Infra-red thermography Fatigue samples witnesses

Thermal ageing

Fatigue initiation phase

Detection of fatigue cracks or Corrosion (intergranular, stresscorrosion) cracks

Non-destructive examinations: - Surface examinations: visual or remote (TV) liquid penetrant magnetic particle - Volumetric examinations: Eddy current radiography and gammagraphy ultrasonic Acoustic emission Leak detection Thickness measurements by ultrasonic examination Strain and deformation measurements by means of strains gauges and dynamometers Visual inspection Topographical levelling Fissurometers Leaktightness tests Monitoring of mechanical and electrical characteristics Qualification under representative conditions Visual inspection

Uniform and local corrosion, Wear Loss of prestressing Concrete degradation Differential settlement

Electrical cables

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The effects of ageing on SSCs (Structure, System and Component) is detected through different mechanisms in Plant operation (preventive and corrective maintenance, inspections, monitoring, SSC performance monitoring). The mechanism that has given rise to the degradation of the behaviour or characteristics of SSC material can be determined through the subsequent analysis of these effects. The election of an efficient method for mitigating ageing in SSC material depends on an accurate determination and evaluation of the degradation mechanism that caused the ageing.
53

Table 3-3 contains the most usual ageing mitigation methods for SSCs in nuclear power plants. These mitigation methods can be grouped into three main categories: Change of SSC Design Change/Recovery of Material Characteristics Changes of Operating Parameters The following subsections describe these groups and their application to the different types of SSCs in a NPP.  &KDQJHV RI 66& 'HVLJQ

This group of mitigation method includes design modifications on components, systems and structures which do not involve a complete change or replacement but makes them immune to a degradation mechanism or minimises the effects of ageing caused by said mechanisms. In piping systems where Erosion/Corrosion has been detected, the definition of a new layout of specific piping sections minimises or even prevents this degradation mechanism. The purpose of this redesign is to obtain layouts where areas with high turbulence are avoided. In wet steam systems (two phases) it is usual to redesign the location of traps in order to ensure moisture contents of less than 2%. These design changes in piping layouts normally go together with material changes, replacing carbon steel sections with alloyed steel of at least 2.5% Cr, or stainless steel. In steam generators fretting wear appears in the tube walls in the curved area caused by their coming into contact with the Anti-vibration Bars (AVB). The mitigation of this degradation mechanism involves the modification of the design of the anti-vibration bars. This design modification is normally aimed at: 1) Reducing the gap between the tubes and the AVB in order to prevent badly supported tubes; 2) Increasing the tube/AVB contact area; 3) Changing the AVB material in order to improve the coefficient of wear of the tube material. Old plants with high cycle fatigue induced by vibration have modified their downward bypass flow scheme into an upward bypass flow scheme. In new reactors, the bypass flow enters the core baffle-core barrel region from the bottom region of the core barrel, and the bypass flow travels upward through holes in the former horizontal plates. Electrical components (motors, cable, MCC, chargers, inverters, etc) are subjected to the effects of thermal ageing during their operating life. Reanalysing their operating and ambient conditions based on historical data may give rise to design modifications to optimise the cooling and ventilation systems of the components and the room in which they are installed.

54



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The most common evidence of ageing in a component or structure is the degradation of the physical characteristics of its material. Consequently, a large number of mitigation methods are aimed at the recovery or improvement of material characteristics. Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) is a degradation mechanism that frequently occurs in the recirculation lines of BWR plants. Different mitigation methods, defined according to the stressor to be eliminated, have been used for this degradation mechanism. When the objective is to minimise the effect of fluid on the material, the Corrosion Resistant Cladding (CRC) method implies applying a metallic protective coat on the inside of the piping to protect the materials sensitised area. In other IGSCC mitigation methods the stressor to be minimised or eliminated is material susceptibility. An example of this method are solution treatments by means of which the sensitised area is heated and then subjected to quick cooling to retain carbon. When the purpose of the IGSCC mitigation is to eliminate tensile stress, Weld Overlay Stress Improvement (WOSI) and Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI) through external heating while passing cold water through the piping provides compression residual stresses. Reactor vessel annealing is the method used to recover the loss of vessel material toughness due to the effect of neutron embrittlement. Standard ASTM E 509-86 Inservice Annealing of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessel [109] establishes the general procedures for carrying out LWR vessel annealing and ensuring its effectiveness. This group of mitigation methods also covers all those that involve the application or renewal of the materials protective coating or lining with the aim of mitigating erosion, corrosion and erosion/corrosion. This includes: application of protective paint inside the service water and circulating water system piping that usually carry raw water; application of stainless steel weld overlay on piping elements affected by erosion/corrosion; installation of sleeves in the tubes of the steam generator and other heat exchangers; application of metallic coating on tanks that are vulnerable to corrosion. The mitigation of concrete structures is aimed at restoring the integrity of the affected component and stopping the degradation mechanism, ensuring as much as possible that the cause of the degradation is not repeated. The mitigation methods are defined according to the degradation effect observed (cracking, spalling, porosity). The objective of methods aimed at repairing and mitigating cracking is to prevent the entry of elements that are harmful to the structure. Depending on the characteristics of the structure and damage caused, these methods include: epoxy resin injection, crack stapling, flexible sealing, slurry injection and polymer soaking. Spalling and scaling mitigation methods consist in cleaning the surface, applying fixing agent, applying cement, epoxy resin or high quality concrete. Porosity is repaired by drilling smalldiameter holes that intercept the pore, cleaning with compressed air or water, and then injecting epoxy resin, slurry or epoxy foam, depending on the size of the pore.  &KDQJHV RI 2SHUDWLQJ 3DUDPHWHUV

For some components and specific degradation mechanisms affecting them, it is possible to optimise component operation, by means of operating parameters control, in order to get a mitigation of the degradation phenomena incidence. This strategy is possible only if the degradation has not risen to certain level for which the component must be repaired or replaced. Pressure, temperature and fluid chemistry control, among limit values previously fixed, are the most used method in order to mitigate the degradation during operation. In
55

general, parameters to be controlled and limit values are depending on the dominant degradation mechanism for each component, maintaining a balance between degradation minimisation and maximum performance. The main degradation mechanisms which ageing effects could be reduced by means of operating conditions optimisations are basically fatigue and corrosion. Following the three main methods regarding operating conditions optimisation are included and explained in more detail. &KDQJHV LQ IOXLG FKHPLVWU\

This mitigation method is basically used to reduced the effects of corrosion. It is well know that corrosion, and specifically stress corrosion cracking, is produced as a consequence of three causes: susceptible material, stress and aggressive environment. Therefore, the corrosion effects and incidence could be reduced avoiding or controlling the above mentioned causes, in particular reducing the environmental aggressivity and limiting the accumulation of corrosive products, pH, etc. Following, there are some of most common methods used in reactor pressure vessel, steam generator, piping, internals and heat exchangers. Control of secondary water chemistry Use of AVT (All Volatile Treatment, PWR). This method is applied to reduce, among other effects, the incidence of wastage/thinning in steam generator. Control of primary water chemistry Use of H2 and LiOH for oxygen and boric acid control. In pipes, the hydrogen injection is used to control oxygen concentration in the range of 10 to 20 ppb. Addition of products to maintain the materials on suspension (dispersion) and avoid deposition. Addition of inhibitors (phosphates, nitrites, etc.) and neutralisers. Impurities control: reducing chlorides, sulphurs and carbonates in order to obtain a conductivity below to 0,2 microS/cm (piping) control of Na/Cl rate (<0,7) (steam generator) avoid resins entrance (internals). Methods of conservation and polishing during outage: maintaining the systems drained and dries or using wet lay-up (steam generator) sludge and deposits polishing, using chemical and mechanical methods (sludge lancing) or evaporation (feed-and-bleed). control of hideout return and pollutant particles in the water-steam circuit on startup. optimisation of purge systems polishing of component within refuelling, avoiding contact with boric acid Establishment of chemical guidelines to supervising and control Addition of chlorides and biocides to control and reduce the microbiological development (open circuit).

56

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The modifications of operating conditions is other method used to mitigate degradation mechanisms as fatigue, corrosion, neutron embrittlement, as well as thermal ageing of electrical equipment. Following there is a brief explanation of the most common methods uses: Reduction of transients number and severity In order to reduce the incidence of thermal fatigue, it is a common practice to reduce the pressure and temperature transients affecting the component, as well as avoid stratification problems. Some critical components where this practice could be used are: reactor pressure vessel, steam generator (nozzle and shells), internals and piping. For instance, in the case of the RPV the operating conditions are controlled to limit the temperatures differences to 200F (110C) during heat-ups and cool-downs. Temperature decreasing Temperature is one of the factors affecting the corrosion process or thermal ageing of several components, as steam generator, RPV and internals. In the steam generator, a reduction of the temperature implies a decreasing in the reaction velocity and the evaporation rate, reducing at the same time the salts concentration and corrosive substances, and therefore the risks of different types of corrosion: IGSCC, pitting, etc. Nevertheless, its use is reduced to critical situations , because of efficiency decrease. In this case, a technical-economical study is recommended, in order to select the best cost-effective option. In RPV and internals, a temperature control is a key factor to avoid or reduce thermal ageing and corrosion. A reduction of the temperature in the heat branch from 315C to 290C has provide optimum results to avoid SCC. Related to thermal ageing, the reduction of temperature normally implies studies to change the distribution of flows and temperatures, to avoid local heating. It shall nevertheless be mentioned that a reduction of system temperature increases the susceptibility to neutron irradiation of the RPV. Reduction of neutron flux Degradation mechanisms as irradiation embrittlement or corrosion assisted by irradiation could be reduced at the vessel beltline and internals (core shroud) by means a reduction of neutron flux by fuel element management (low leakage core or using dummy fuel elements) Reduction of normal operating current This method could be used to mitigate the effects of thermal ageing in cables. 0RQLWRULQJ RSWLPLVDWLRQ

This methods does not produce a real mitigation of degradation mechanisms itself, but suppose an effective help in order to decide the most appropriated strategy to reduce its effects, by means a component ageing evaluation. For instance, operating conditions monitoring, specially temperature and pressure transients, could provide fatigue usage factor, and therefore determine critical areas and conditions that implies a degradation risk and should be avoided if possible. Similar objectives follow other types of systems focussed on monitoring chemical parameters, vibrations, etc.

57

In some component, for instance turbines, control systems limiting the heat-up velocity have been installed, in order to avoid critical start-ups.

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&20321(17 Piping '(*5$'$7,21 0(&+$1,60 IGSCC 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' *5283 Change/Recovery of Corrosion Resistant Cladding Material Characteristics (CRC) &200(176 Placing of metal filler coating on the internal surface of the piping adjacent to the weld flange to create a protective coating between the coolant and the sensitised area of the material. Heating up of the sensitised area and subsequent quick cooling to retain carbon. Minimises material sensitisation and creates compression stresses in the weld. Identical to HSW where water is circulated inside the weld during the last welding pass. An extra weld bead is applied with cold water running inside it. Similar to HSW where heating is by means of coils outside the piping while cold water runs inside it. Produces compression stress in the sensitised area by means of a hydraulic jack. Injection of hydrogen to reduce the oxygen content to 10 to 20 ppb

Carbide Solution Treatment (SHT) Heat Sink Welding (HSW) is applied to repair or replace a section Last Pass Heat Sink Welding (LPSHW) is applied to repair or replace a section Weld Overlay Stress Improvement (WOSI) Induction Heating Stress Improvement (IHSI) Mechanical Stress Improvements Process (MSIP) Hydrogen Water Chemistry

Changes of Operating Parameters

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&20321(17 Piping '(*5$'$7,21 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' 0(&+$1,60 *5283 Thermal Embrittlement Change/Recovery of Annealing Material Characteristics Fatigue Changes of Operating Parameters Reduction of temperature gradients Redesign of layout preventing flow stratifications Redesign of support minimising flow vibrations. Adjustment of water chemistry to values that minimise the possibility of E/C Use of more resistant coating, or improvement of material chemical composition &200(176 Annealing at 550C for 1 hour. The process has hysteresis and is limited by the size and shape of the component.

Erosion/Corrosion

Changes of Operating Parameters Change/Recovery of Material Characteristics

This method is limited by the cost-benefit evaluation of its installation and the requirements of the system itself. Application of stainless steel coatings by means of welding Painting of service water systems Minimum chromium content specified for ferritic piping

Change of SSC Design Corrosion, MIC Changes of Operating Parameters Change of SSC Design

Galvanic Corrosion

Redesign of the layout avoiding areas of high turbulence. Lay-up conservation methods Cathodic Protection

Wet conservation Dry conservation Inerting with nitrogen

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&20321(17 Steam Generator '(*5$'$7,21 0(&+$1,60 Denting 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' *5283 Changes of Operating Reduction of corrosion Parameters products &200(176 Mechanical or chemical cleaning of the tubes, optimisation of blowdown systems, use of corrosion inhibitors (phosphates or AVT), inverse flow control, elimination of copper components, control of NaCl ratio.

Wastage/Thinning

IGSCC/IGA/PWSCC

Changes of Operating Parameters Changes of Operating Parameters Changes of Operating Parameters Change/Recovery of Material Characteristics Change/Recovery of Material Characteristics Changes of Operating Parameters Change of SSC Design Changes of Operating Parameters Change of SSC Design Changes of Operating Parameters Changes of Operating Parameters

Use of All Volatile Treatment (AVT) Cleaning Reduction of the temperature of the primary at the inlet of the steam generators Stress relaxation Heat treatments or shot blasting. Installation of sleeves Temperature reduction Structural changes in tube supports Reduction of vibrations Reduction of vibrations Reduction of transients Cleaning Reduction and change of gaps between tubes and the AVB. Optimisation of flows to minimise vibrations, installation of baffle plates Optimisation of flows to minimise vibrations, installation of baffle plates Minimisation of load changes and other pressure and temperature transients Flashing, chemical cleaning

Pitting

Fretting

Fatigue Fatigue (nozzles) Fouling

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&20321(17 Reactor Pressure Vessel '(*5$'$7,21 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' 0(&+$1,60 *5283 Neutron Embrittlement Change/Recovery of Material Characteristics Changes of Operating Parameters IGSCC ( INCONEL Changes of Operating 600) Parameters Change/Recovery of Material Characteristics Fretting Changes of Operating Parameters Fatigue Changes of Operating Parameters IGSCC Change of SSC Design Changes of Operating Parameters Fatigue Stress relaxation Thermal ageing Thermal ageing BWR Internals IGSCC IASCC Changes of Operating Parameters Changes of Operating Parameters Change of SSC Design Changes of Operating Parameters Changes of Operating Parameters Changes of Operating Parameters 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' In service Annealing Neutron Flux Management Temperature reduction Surfacing of cracks Preventive Treatment of surfaces Rotate, shift or exchange components: thimbles, bolts, etc. Reduction of real loads &200(176

PWR Internals

Minimise pressure and temperature transients Modification of circulation to cool Change from down flow to up flow hot areas Adjustment of chemical parameters to minimise the aggressiveness of the medium Reduction of real loads Minimise pressure and temperature transients Modification of preloading to compensate relaxation Redistribution of cooling flow Exchange components Hydrogen Water Chemistry Neutron Flux Management Hydrogen injection to reduce oxygen content to 10 a 20 ppb Reduce flow on the core shroud.

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&20321(17 Concrete Structure '(*5$'$7,21 0(&+$1,60 Cracking 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' *5283 Change/Recovery of Injection of epoxy resins Material Characteristics Shaping and sealing Stapling Boring and Covering Flexible sealing Slurry injection Polymer soaking Change/Recovery of Application of cement, epoxy resin Material Characteristics or high quality concrete Change/Recovery of Injection of epoxy resins, slurry or Material Characteristics epoxy foam Change/Recovery of Control and renewal of coating Material Characteristics (painting) Change of SSC Design Cathodic Protection Change/Recovery of Application of coating Material Characteristics Changes of Operating Use of corrosion inhibitors in Parameters fluids Changes of Operating Cleaning Parameters Change of SSC Design Cathodic Protection Change/Recovery of Material Characteristics Change/Recovery of Material Characteristics Use of grafts and coating Recasing &200(176

Scalling/Spalling Porosity Metal Containment Corrosion

Heat Exchangers and Tanks

Corrosion

Painting on the outside and metallic or rubber lining in the inside Addition of sulphates in iron. It admits more inhibiting spectra in the closed cycle

Erosion

Impressed current, sacrificial and protective anode Limited use of metallic materials

63

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&20321(17 Motors Chargers and Inverters '(*5$'$7,21 0(&+$1,60 Thermal Ageing Thermal Ageing 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' 0,7,*$7,21 0(7+2' *5283 Change of SSC Design Optimisation of cooling systems Change of SSC Design Optimisation of cooling systems Change of SSC Design Installation of pressure transient dampers (dischargers, windings) at the equipment inlet Reduction of the normal operating current Change of SSC Design Modification of the cable layout in trays in order to optimise cooling Change of SSC Design Placing cables from local heat sources Change of SSC Design Optimisation of ventilation systems &200(176

Cables

Thermal Ageing

MCC and Load Centers

Thermal Ageing

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The safe management of NPP ageing is primarily dependent on managing the physical ageing of systems, structures and components (SSC). Basically, this calls for in-depth knowledge of the processes of degradation (particularly the kinetics and probability), the availability of on-site test equipment with which such deterioration can be diagnosed and methods and (material and human) means intended for repairing or replacing the parts whose serviceability has been impaired by the degradation. This also implies sustaining an industrial fabric that has the means of providing spare parts to secure replacement or repair of degraded components. But in addition to the ageing-induced material changes in the SSC features, other changes are of equal significance (particularly during regular safety reassessments): developments in techniques and documents since the creation of the power plant (changing design methods and computer codes, non-destructive testing methods, industrial codes and standards...), developments in technology/obsolete systems (example of analogue systems being replaced by digital systems), developments in safety regulations and standards and acceptable dose limits for staff in terms of radiation protection. developments in information relating to accidents caused by an external source (earthquake, flooding ... ) or an internal fault in the design or use. Further broader changes, associated with the industrial sector or society, are being investigated: safeguarding of skills and knowledge following the retirement of a number of experts who had been involved in the design, construction, commissioning and operation of power stations, training of new staff in the nuclear industry (experts and also non-specialised staff and complete plant suppliers), preservation of the scientific infrastructure (particularly R&D services) within a nuclear-hostile environment, developments relating to safety culture over long periods, with or without staff turnover, adaptation of organisation models, work methods (global industrial transformation). In addition to current technical management which has already improved the safety of plant units (through upgrading or modification of SSC), industrial management will also contribute factors of progress (ergonomics, streamlined organisations, greater emphasis on the human factor...). Sharing the feedback from these different areas with the various partners in the European nuclear industry should also contribute to strengthening and intensifying management of ageing and change in general.

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Obsolescence is a non-physical mechanism that could affect the capability of components, systems, or structures to perform their required functions. Obsolescence means the potential unavailability of spares due to the evolution of the market or/and the technical progress. Obsolescence is not only limited to SSC but is also applied to the knowledge and the know-how. This risk of loss of required knowledge and know-how could also affect the level of safety and efficiency of the NPP.   $*(,1* 2) &8/785( $1' 352&('85( +XPDQ DJHLQJ

After conception of the foetus - or after impairment due to an accident or disease - the number of cells in the human organism capable of self-regeneration is relatively limited. Typical continuously regenerating cells are the liver cells, blood cells and bone marrow cells; other examples include the scarring of injuries and the renewal of the skin, nails and hair. The human organism as a whole is subject to a still very poorly understood ageing process which degrades the performance of many human functions. In fact, the genetic code determines the life span and cell regenerability. Certain cells regress very early on, as for example, the nerve cells in the corpus callosum1, whose number drops significantly at the end of pregnancy, i.e. even before birth. The human organism attains its optimum development at the age of 20-25 years though the initial effects of ageing begin even before this time as the sensory receptors start to lose their sensitivity. The effects on the visual and auditory cells are however better known thanks to the systematic medical follow-up practised. In the forties (40-45), the eyes crystalline lens starts to harden and gives rise to presbyopia. As far as the loss in auditory sensorial sensitivity is concerned, the different tones are not affected in the same way: certain syllables and certain words are more frequently distorted than others. The human hearing system is also less able to synchronise sound stimuli in the two auditory tubes. Laboratory experiments have demonstrated that signals sent separately to the two ears are not always properly synchronised compared to the signal transmission sequence: this affects the ability to localise the exact direction of sound sources. From the age of 20-25, the short-term memory performance begins to regress very slightly. The working memory is less flexible which reduces intellectual agility. The long-term memory has a harder time encoding the information to be memorised, which has to be manipulated many more times before it is sufficiently salient and can located and extracted as easily as before. There are more "objects manipulated by the reasoning process" due to the greater amount of experience built up. Overall inferential reasoning becomes more efficient, more dependable and has a wider field of application. With age, the brain works better by intuition than when young. Nonetheless it should be noted that the memory development cycle starts from a very early age and is marked by phases with different mnestic capacities. In reality, it is more correct to speak of a continual evolution of the memory throughout the life of a person rather than ageing. Taken together, the different effects of ageing change the ability to study. This first becomes noticeable at about 25 and, after 30, the adult finds it hard to follow the pace of learning, perfectly suitable for students ten years younger. The decrease in learning capacity also seems related to the lack of practice in this kind of activity. With increasing age the learning ability - in scholastic terms - lessens; this should be taken into account in view of the increasing requirements for retraining and the development of training in the career cycle.
1

: The corpus callosurn is an arch connecting the two cerebral hemispheres and consisting of neurons.
66

As intellectual and sensorimotor agility decreases, certain types of knowledge acquisition become more laborious: one example is the use of computers, which simultaneously calls for learning keyboard data entry and assimilating a new thought process to match the logic and the manipulations required respectively by the commands and the software. The quality of sleep also lessens with age: the sleeping pattern is more fragmentary and the sleeper is more sensitive to noise and the surroundings. Falling asleep and going back to sleep are harder and take longer. Ageing affects the regulation of the metabolism: at the age of 50, the basal metabolism has decreased by about 5% and at 60 by 10%. This leads to an overall drop in the mobilisation of the organisms internal energy resources and an ensuing reduction in physical powers. Recovery is slower due to catabiosis (cell ageing) and the diminished renewal benefits of sleep; the individuals responsiveness and adaptability also regress. Moreover ageing influences the capacity to indulge in intense effort, to keep up with high work rates and to adapt to difficult conditions, such as night work. A study of female workers on a high-productivity assembly line detected this phenomenon as early as the age of 25. Thus the "coping response" acts, as it were, in the background. Despite the lower physiological performance, the human being regulates overall his activities better and allows for his capacities and reactions. A strategy of anticipation is adopted and work activities are organised differently by striving to optimise physical exertion. His life is organised differently by making more effective use of his power of recovery. As Welford said in 1973: "A full understanding of the task in question partly or entirely compensates for the effects of ageing". Mental processes are also subject to the same kind of adaptation. The lower effectiveness of the short-term and the working memories reduces the direct mental capacity for analysis. However this impairment is largely compensated for by a greater mastery in handling inferences and by a more extensive experience (including potential error sources). Logical algorithmic reasoning is more problematic and intuitive capacities expand, backed by a long experience. Diagnosis and heuristic reasoning processes are more complex, more cross-linked with more iterations, the checks more developed and the solutions considered in greater detail as to their effects.  6WDII DJHLQJ DQG VXEVWLWXWH LVVXHV

The operation life-time is the common factor contributing to the ageing process of components and structures and additionally it provokes a relevant impact in terms of the staff ageing and the need of retirements and substitutions by less experienced people. Most nuclear plant workers have left the industry during the past years, mainly retired but also because they have been hired by more promising industrial sectors. People, which are going to be retired during the next years, are an important aspect usually not considered in NPPs ageing plans. Criticality of this point increases if it is considered that, at the same time, the ageing plant will have need of higher efforts in equipment surveillance and maintenance. A different problem is time relaxation of worker habits and behaviours. Work practice trends to reduce the adaptation capability to the new situations: new instruments, uprating and design modifications, which could require different operators training, etc.

Theoretically the above-mentioned problems are covered by the requirements imposed by the Regulatory Authority concerning the qualification and training of the NPPs operators. In Spain, specific Safety Guides (GS-05.6 [100] and GS-07.04 [101]) issued by the Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Authority (Nuclear Safety Council, CSN) define the requirements for personnel selection, specific training adapted to the plant singularities and periodic re-evaluation of the

67

capabilities and skills of the staff members. However, preservation of the knowledge related to ageing, their contributing factors and their evolution, as well as the mitigation, control and monitoring methods and techniques should be part of the new staff training. To avoid the problems, the following actions could be performed: Periodical training for personnel requalification. Rotations of working places to reduce stresses and increase workers interest. Take on new staff in time, ensuring an overlap between new workers and elder ones. Use retired workers as a source of experience and advice. As example, some plants are using them during outages or to help with specific problems. Recruit expert staff from other industry, which could help to integrate new knowledge in the nuclear sector. 3ODQW DJHLQJ DQG VWDII DWWLWXGHV



Oldest plants need more attentive behaviour of staff in order to maintain operating performance. Competitiveness, safety levels and availability of plants are associated to plant staff culture. Some important ageing related aspects, among others, are: Decisions and actions of plant staff considers plant safety as a priority when plant ages: When conditions are outside procedures and policies, use of conservative approaches. Operational decisions based on safety analysis. Behaviours that contribute to excellence in human performance need to be reinforced: Strengthening of communications. Anticipate problems. Eliminate conditions that lead to human error. Correct procedure deficiencies, if any.

A line organisation is effectively implemented and maintained: Improvement in administrative controls, policies, procedures and schedules for activities affecting safe and reliable plant operation. Design, manage and improve key processes to contribute to safe and reliable plant operation. Organisation preparing utility personnel to mitigate the consequences of core damage and manage emergency situations.

Use training to achieve, improve and maintain high level of personnel knowledge skill and performance: Improve personnel performance. Maintain and improve job-related knowledge and skills. Identify similar precursor conditions and initiating proactive corrective actions Continuous training for periodic reviews of applied fundamentals. 7HFKQLFDO ,QIRUPDWLRQ WR VXSSRUW WKH VWDII DFWXDWLRQV



In this context, the Spanish NPPs have structured their Life Management Programmes in order to provide the information required performing the continuous condition evaluation. This information provides a powerful technical support to the staff in the ageing control field. The afore-mentioned information is obtained, among others, in the following sources: In service inspections, examinations and tests as required by the current Licensing Basis.
68

Data and information obtained during maintenance tasks. The maintenance evaluation and improvement for life management programmes have identified the required information. Specific ageing monitoring and condition evaluation systems. Analysis of the impact of operating experiences findings. New regulatory requirements, notices and bulletins generated by the finding of new technical aspects on ageing.

A well structured and updated information covering all the facets of the significant degradations is the best guarantee to support a precise condition evaluation keeping the historical data available for the NPPs staff along their service life.

69




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In Belgium, there is no predetermined lifetime for a nuclear power plant, either license life or either design life. Belgian nuclear power plants may be kept operational as long as they can operate safely (i.e. to maintain the operating license). Economical aspects will also define whether or not the Utility will continue operation.  ,1752'8&7,21

Seven nuclear reactors are operating in Belgium. They are located at two sites and have a total net capacity of about 5.7 GWe. All units are equipped with Pressurised Water Reactors (PWRs). Table 4.1 presents an overview of the reactors, their power and the year of commissioning. The Belgian producers (Electrabel and SPE) have a share (capacity reservation) of 25% of the B1 and B2 units of the French Chooz NPP.

7DEOH  133V LQ %HOJLXP 133 3RZHU 0:H &RPPHUFLDO 2SHUDWLRQ 1962 1974 1975 1982 1985 1975 1982 1985 'HFRPPLVVLRQLQJ 2SHUDWLRQDO SHULRG DW WKH HQG RI  \HDUV 26 25 18 15 25 18 15

BR3 Doel 1 Doel 2 Doel 3 Doel 4 Tihange 1 Tihange 2 Tihange 3

11 400 400 1000 1000 960 960 1000

1987



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Most of the regulations concerning nuclear installations in Belgium are contained in the Royal Decree of February 1963 for the Protection of the Population and of Workers and its subsequent updates (last update: October 1997). Operating licences for nuclear installations are granted by Royal Decree, countersigned by the Ministers of Interior Affairs, on the advice of the National Special Commission for Nuclear Safety. Two Government departments: the Radiation Protection Service and the Technical Safety Service for Nuclear Installations are responsible for the implementation and control of the regulations as well as the operating licences. Since the law of April 1994, the Federal Agency for Nuclear Control has been created and the two Government departments were incorporated in this organisation. This Agency is responsible for the inspection and surveillance of nuclear activities in Belgium. All permanent control tasks and monitoring of the activities of operators are performed by the Authorised inspection organisation (Association Vinotte Nuclear, AVN), licensed for this purpose by the Government.  /,&(16( /,)(
70

All Belgian nuclear power plants have no time-limited authorisation of operation; hence there is no predetermined license life. The safety behaviour is assessed on a continuous basis by the Safety authorities and, as required in the license of each nuclear power plant, an overall safety review must be performed every ten years. The list of the subjects to study during the safety review is established on a common agreement between Association Vinotte Nuclear and Electrabel / Tractebel Energy Engineering. The oldest plants (i.e. Doel 1&2 and Tihange 1) have gone through this process twice while the last four units (i.e. Doel 3&4 and Tihange 2&3) only once. The safety reviews, initiated by the Utility, must compare on the one hand the condition of the installations and the implementation of the procedures that apply to them, and on the other hand the regulations, codes, and practices in force in the United States and in the European Union. The differences found must be highlighted, together with the necessity and possibility of remedial action and, as the case may be, the improvements that can be made and the time-schedule for their implementation. This examination is dressed in a synthesis report identifying differences observed and assessing the necessity and possibility to put them right; plant modifications and procedures improvements are planned. The identified subjects are then arranged according to the structure of the Safety Analysis Report. For the next safety review, the subjects might be treated according to the IAEA Safety Guide N 50-SG-012 "Periodic Safety Review of Operational Nuclear Power Plants" [50]. The main objectives of the safety review are to ensure that the plant is still as safe as it was when its operating licence was granted; to take account of any possible future deterioration of equipment in order to ensure safety for the ten years to come; and to improve general safety by making any changes thought reasonable or necessary in the light of the most recent safety standards and practices. A systematic analysis of experience feedback from the Belgian plants and plants abroad results in improvements to systems and/or replacement of components, verification of the coherence of past modifications. Ageing is thus systematically investigated in order to demonstrate that the safety of the installations is guaranteed during the next decade. To minimise the economic impact, the replacements of large components (e.g. steam generator replacement) are usually executed at the same time as the implementation of the main changes resulting from these ten-yearly safety reviews.  '(6,*1 /,)(

Again, there is no predetermined design life for the entire nuclear power plant. Design life is merely used in the design specification of some components subjected to known degradation processes. Design life includes values such as 20, 30 and 40 years. The first value was taken into account in the first Belgian-French commercial nuclear power plant of Chooz A for the design of some components. In the more recent plants, component design life is 40 years. Component design life can be modified by re-qualification (e.g. fatigue analysis more detailed than that of the design) or by considering the real values of the parameters affecting the degradation process instead of the hypothetical design values (e.g. real transients, real number of occurrences of transients for components subjected to fatigue). Examples of components with a predetermined design life are: Components subjected to fatigue due to low cycle thermal and pressure transients, such as primary components and piping. The number of occurrences considered in the original design for those components corresponds to 40 years, except for Doel 1&2 and Tihange 1, where 30 years was originally considered. For Tihange 1 the power upgrading studies, during which the fatigue analyses were re-evaluated, have brought up this duration to 40 years for the major primary components; Components subjected to irradiation embrittlement, such as the reactor pressure vessel;
71

 Primary containment tendons subjected to pre-stress relaxation; and Electrical and mechanical equipment subjected to severe environment conditions and having a predefined qualified life. Those qualified lives have duration which are component dependent.




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The government, which is responsible for the safety of persons and property, sets objectives and acceptability limits as regards nuclear safety; the ministers for the environment and industry are currently jointly responsible for the technical regulations in this field. The requirements and prescriptions of the general technical regulations covering the nuclear safety of pressurised water reactors are formulated in two ministerial orders: that of 26 February 1974 specifies the way in which pressure vessel regulations are applied to the main primary systems of nuclear steam supply systems and that of 10 August 1984 deals with the design quality, construction and operation of major nuclear installations. As far as plant operation is concerned, the 1974 Order has been completed by the November 10, 1999 order, which also applies on the Main Secondary System of NSSS. Further to the review of the safety options open to nuclear units in the most recent standardised series, ministerial directives published in 1979 and 1983 established the obligations and principal features of installations in the 1300 and 1400 MWe series, particularly as regards safety. Certain letters and statements of position emanating from the Nuclear Installations Safety Directorate (DSIN) establish jurisprudence in the field of nuclear safety in France. Furthermore, the basic safety rules laid down by the Nuclear Installations Safety Directorate and its technical support bodies specify the conditions which have to be met if operation is to be considered as adequate and complying with regulatory practice. The Design and Construction Rules, which are codes and standards established by the French nuclear industry, express what is considered as good professional practice adapted to the nuclear industry, meeting the obligations associated with licences; likewise, there are Rules for Monitoring during Operation. These rules are periodically discussed with the Safety Authority and their acceptability is recognised through the issuing by DSIN of a Basic Safety Rule (RFS) dedicated to the use of each approved code. Codes are then accepted, but not mandatory. To support their applications for construction, start-up, commissioning and subsequent decommissioning licences, nuclear operators have to produce Safety Analysis Reports and General Operating Rules; guidance as to how these should be drafted and reviewed (safety analysis) is given in the ministerial instruction of 27 March 1973.  7+( &217(;7 ,1 :+,&+ $*(,1* ,6 021,725('

The Nuclear Installations Safety Directorate ensures that the level of safety of each unit is maintained despite the effects of ageing and that the inevitable shutdown of an installation is prepared sufficiently well in advance. The regulatory provisions concerning the lifetime of units are, however, fairly restricted at present; there is no limit as to how long units can go on operating but nuclear operators must be able to demonstrate the safety of their facilities whenever required to do so.  3HULRGLF UHYLHZV

A periodic review process exists but is not required by law.

72

The decree of 11 December 1963 on major nuclear installations was modified on 19 January 1990 by the introduction of a clause stating that the ministers of industry and the environment were free to require, conjointly at any time, that nuclear operators review the safety of their installations. In practice, the Safety Authority requires that nuclear power plant safety be reviewed every ten years, supplementing the safety analysis conclusions drawn from experience feedback from 58 relatively recent plants (at 1 January 2000, the 900 MW plants had an average age of 17 years and the 1300 MW plants an average age of 11 years: Table 4.2) and based on detailed technical dialogue with the single nuclear operator. 7DEOH  )UHQFK 3:5 3RZHU 3ODQWV Plant Name Chooz A &DSDFLW\ (MWe) 320 Type PWR &RPPHUFLDO 2SHUDWLRQ 4 1967 2SHUDWLRQDO SHULRG DW WKH HQG RI  \HDUV 24 (Plant decommissioned end of Nov. 1991) 13 12 19 18 17 17 22 22 21 21 14 13 10 9 18 17 14 13 4 3 3 1 17 16 16 16 20 20 20 19 23 23 15 14 10

Belleville 1 Belleville 2 Blayais 1 Blayais 2 Blayais 3 Blayais 4 Bugey 2 Bugey 3 Bugey 4 Bugey 5 Cattenom 1 Cattenom 2 Cattenom 3 Cattenom 4 Chinon B1 Chinon B2 Chinon B3 Chinon B4 Chooz B1 Chooz B2 Civaux 1 Civaux 2 Cruas-Meysse-1 Cruas-Meysse-3 Cruas-Meysse-2 Cruas-Meysse-4 Dampierre-1 Dampierre-2 Dampierre-3 Dampierre-4 Fessenheim 1 Fessenheim 2 Flamanville-1 Flamanville-2 Golfech-1

1363 1363 951 951 951 951 945 945 917 917 1362 1362 1362 1362 954 954 954 954 1516 1516 1516 1516 956 956 956 956 937 937 937 937 920 920 1382 1382 1363

PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR
73

10 1987 7 1988 6 1981 7 1982 8 1983 5 1983 5 1978 9 1978 3 1979 7 1979 11 1986 9 1987 7 1990 5 1991 11 1982 11 1983 10 1986 11 1987 8 1996 4 1997 12 1997 12 1999 4 1983 5 1984 9 1984 10 1984 3 1980 12 1980 1 1981 8 1981 4 1977 10 1977 12 1985 7 1986 6 1990

Golfech-2 Gravelines B-1 Gravelines B-2 Gravelines B-3 Gravelines B-4 Gravelines C-5 Gravelines C-6 Nogent-1 Nogent-2 Paluel-1 Paluel-2 Paluel-3 Paluel-4 Penly-1 Penly-2 Saint Alban-1 Saint Alban-2 St Laurent B-1 St Laurent B-2 Tricastin-1 Tricastin-2 Tricastin-3 Tricastin-4

1363 951 951 951 951 951 951 1363 1363 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1381 1381 956 956 955 955 955 955

PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR PWR

6 1993 3 1980 8 1980 12 1980 6 1981 8 1984 8 1985 10 1987 12 1988 6 1984 9 1984 9 1985 4 1986 5 1990 2 1992 8 1985 7 1986 1 1981 6 1981 5 1980 8 1980 2 1981 6 1981

7 20 20 20 19 16 15 13 12 16 16 15 14 10 9 15 14 20 19 20 20 20 19

This review compares the level of safety of an installation with: its original level of safety, making sure that the requirements of the original operating licence continue to be met through the identification of any damage and the review of weak points requiring further analysis or justification (review of conformity), the safety of the most recent plants in operation, the aim being to upgrade the safety of units beyond the initial design level in the light of progress made due to increased knowledge in fields for which little experience feedback is available and continuous analysis of operating experience (safety reviews). These regular reviews of plant series and the corresponding 10-yearly inspections of units should give the nuclear operator the opportunity to carry out in-depth reviews which are more exhaustive and far-reaching than those initially planned in basic preventive maintenance programmes. During these prolonged outages, the nuclear operator carries out, where necessary, any timeconsuming repair work or replaces large items of equipment, assuming that this was not required urgently beforehand. But in the eyes of the Safety Authority, this provides no more than a snapshot of the state of the components, systems, equipment and structures which contribute to the safety of the installation.  0RQLWRULQJ RI DJHLQJ

Since the nuclear operator must be in a position to demonstrate the safety of its installation at all times, the approach whereby safety and extended operating life are linked should be supplemented by a demonstration that the effects of ageing are under control until the next inspection is made, as well as during the inspection made at the time in question. When demonstrating that the effects of ageing are under control, the nuclear operator should be looking to the future as regards all aspects of its installation; the demonstration should be the subject of permanent technical dialogue with the nuclear operator and should be based on:
74

 the results of detailed experience feedback, organised horizontally throughout the plant, increased knowledge of ageing phenomena, their origins and the way they develop and the kinetics of deterioration, through R&D work; progress would appear to be possible, particularly as regards estimating loads and identifying sensitive areas, the development of qualified methods for decontaminating lines and equipment in preparation for inspection, repair and replacement operations, the implementation of non-destructive methods for inspecting components and structures and assessing materials, be they already available or still to be developed and qualified, the identification and monitoring of ageing indicators and criteria applicable to the plant, justification files and inspection reports for assessing whether equipment should be left in service or treated, modified, repaired and/or replaced, files indicating the technical and organisational feasibility of exceptional maintenance operations. Experience feedback has revealed that the first two preventive lines of defence, namely making allowance for ageing at the design stage and monitoring ageing, may fall short; the nuclear operator could then find itself torn between allowing operation to continue in degraded conditions or condoning outage for an indefinite period. The insistence of the Nuclear Installations Safety Directorate on the need to look sufficiently far ahead when envisaging possible repair, replacement or modification operations stems from the risk of conflict between availability and safety which would result if there were no such approach and results in a third line of defence. This risk is to be taken all the more seriously since around 80% of electricity is generated in units whose design is sufficiently standardised for them to be liable to be affected by generic degradation associated with ageing. Extension of the operating life of each installation, for a given period, could be envisaged in this context on the basis of examination of the results and conclusions of the highly-important third 10yearly inspection. Furthermore, as the units age, demonstrating that the effects of ageing are under control will increasingly form part and parcel of the operation monitoring files and will gradually become a daily preoccupation in the plants. It should, however, continue to constitute the best opportunity for bringing together the lessons learned from experience gained in the plants, analysis carried out by corporate departments and the results of research and development work. Each unit should be treated on a case-by-case basis, making allowance for the construction, manufacturing, operating and environment-related differences between reactors in the same series. Life management of units should take these special features into account but can only be undertaken in the context of generic problems considering the population of plants as a whole.




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In Spain, as in most European Union countries, the NPP operating license is open regarding its duration, there being no legal restrictions for extending the operational life of the NPPs by renewing their licenses. Spanish NPPs owners and Nuclear Regulatory Authority (CSN, Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear Nuclear Safety Council) are interested in realising an effective management of components ageing
75

processes. Therefore, CSN has introduced within its inspection and control functions specific requirements related to ageing management. Nowadays, the regulatory requirements related to NPP Lifetime Management are basically the following: NPP operation license requires preparing and submitting to the CSN an annually updated report on the Ageing Control Activities or the Lifetime Management Programme. Continuous NPP safety evaluation process by CSN is complemented with Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR), to be performed every 10 years, including: a) review of components behaviour (identify degradation mechanisms and current corrective measures adopted by the plant for ageing mechanisms control and mitigation) and b) updating of safety evaluation and improvement programmes (Lifetime Management Programme is included among them).

The following paragraphs describe in more detail the safety and regulatory aspects applicable to Spanish NPPs, which are listed in Table 4.3.

76

7DEOH  6SDQLVK 1XFOHDU 3RZHU 3ODQWV Plant Name Jos Cabrera (Zorita) Santa M de Garoa Almaraz 1 Almaraz 2 Asc 1 Cofrentes Asc 2 Vandells II Trillo  &DSDFLW\ (MWe) DV RI  'HF  160 466 974 983 979 1,025 1,014 1,081 1,066 Type PWR BWR PWR PWR PWR BWR PWR PWR PWR &RPPHUFLDO 2SHUDWLRQ August 69 May 71 September 83 July 84 December 84 March 85 March 86 March 88 August 88 2SHUDWLRQDO SHULRG DW WKH HQG RI  \HDUV 31 29 17 16 16 15 14 12 12

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Nowadays, the regulatory requirements related to NPP Lifetime Management are the following: Currently, NPP operation license require to prepare and submit to the CSN an annual report including a Lifetime Management Programme. Nuclear Regulatory Authority continuous safety revisions are complemented with Periodic Safety Reviews (PSR), performed every 10 years, including among other aspects: (YDOXDWLRQ DQG UHYLHZ RI WKH FRPSRQHQW EHKDYLRXU Identify the ageing or degradation mechanisms Submit the corrective measures adopted by the plant for ageing mechanisms control and mitigation.

8SGDWLQJ RI VDIHW\ HYDOXDWLRQ DQG LPSURYHPHQW SURJUDPPHV Lifetime Management Programme is included among them.  133 /,)(7,0( 0$1$*(0(17 352*5$00(6

Every year, NPPs report to CSN about Lifetime Management Programme status as well as activities performed within this Programme. In this way, in February 1998, a generic methodology, developed by the Electricity Sector (UNESA) was audited and accepted by CSN. This methodology covers the main aspects considered by the guide of IAEA-TRS-338 "Methodology for the Management of Ageing of Nuclear Power Plant Components Important to Safety" [37], and considers: Component selection and grouping Degradation mechanisms affecting components Evaluation of Maintenance practices.

The Spanish NPP are following the above-mentioned methodology in order to perform their specific Lifetime Management Programmes. In fact, the Spanish NPPs have developed and submitted to the CSN their specific Lifetime Management Programmes and/or ageing related activities from 1998 through 2000. These programmes have been audited and evaluated by the CSN in the frame of the CSN Safety Guide 1.10 point 4.4 "Status Updated of the Safety Evaluation and Improvement Programmes - Lifetime Management Programme".  3(5,2',& 6$)(7< 5(9,(:

77

Periodic Safety Reviews requirements are explained in a specific guide (CSN Safety Guide N 1.10 [110]) published by the Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Authority in December, 1995. The contents included in this guide are explained in more detail in the following sub-sections.  ,QWURGXFWLRQ

During NPP operation, the CSN realises a continuous safety revision, through its inspection and control function, and evaluation the following required analysis: New codes and standards applicability Operating experience analysis Safety analysis of design modifications The experience shows that these periodical reviews could be complemented considering new practices, ageing cumulative effects and new modifications performed, as well as new technologies developed. Therefore, the PSR have been introduced, with the objective to perform an integral safety review, taking into account different aspects as operation, maintenance programmes, equipment qualification and ageing management, in-service inspection results, codes changes and the results applying the Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA).  2EMHFWLYH

The PSR does not replace the normal analysis, control and surveillance practices, but realise each ten years a global evaluation of NPP safety and the potential improvements to be introduced, considering the components and structures status, as well as the new practices and codes applied in modern NPPs. The main objectives of the PSR are: 1. Guarantee the correct application of operating experience analysis process, including the modifications global revision. 2. Analyse the plant behaviour during a long operating period, including the results of surveillance requirements and equipment maintenance, in order to verify the safety level has not decreased and to guarantee the safety operation during the next period. 3. Plant Safety level evaluation, considering the new national codes and international recommendations, in particular those applied in the project origin country to the similar NPPs. 4. Update the safety evaluation and improvement programmes.  &ULWHULD

The PSR main criteria are: 1. Use of the project origin country codes and laws, complemented with international recommendations and new codes, when applicable. 2. Considers the current plant license basis. 3. The internal operating experience analysis will use as reference those events notified according to Technical Specifications of the plant. 4. The external operating experience analysis will use as reference those significant events defined by recognised organisations, according to the technology of project origin country and main supplier technical bulletins. 5. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PSA) is an important tool to analyse plant Safety, and therefore will be an important issue in the PSR.  6FRSH

The following four aspects have to be analysed in the PSR:

78

1. Operating experience The plant should demonstrate that it reviews continuously the operating data and maintain a high safety level with a feedback of operating experience, detecting and analysing and correcting adequately every potential dangerous conditions. The NPP should perform: Revision of operating experience, including personnel doses, operating indicators, waste generated and environmental impact. Revision of operating experience of other similar NPPs. Revision of suppliers communications, about deficiencies or faults detected in their equipment, and the correctives actions applicable. Revision of NPP documentation, including design, manufacture, construction, testing, maintenance, qualification, modifications, faults, incidents, etc. Analysis of tendencies to demonstrate that its behaviour follows the design previsions and the extrapolation of lifetime is acceptable. Revision of all corrective actions related to safety. Revision of safety analysis performed related to design modifications to guarantee that the design basis have not been affected.

2. Component behaviour analysis The NPP will check that the safety equipment status surveillance is appropriate to detect and correct its ageing during the service life. The following actions will be performed to verify the above mentioned: Analysis of regulated maintenance programmes results, including the application of the maintenance Rule or equivalent programme. Review of in-service inspections results, analysing the relations between the defects detected and the operating conditions and to propose corrective actions. Review of results of Technical Specifications monitoring and periodical tests. Review of equipment qualification status, including the qualified and dedicated spare parts management. Identification of degradation mechanisms and corrective actions performed of foreseen.

3. New safety codes and standards impact analysis It should be checked that the national and project origin country regulations, as well as the international recommendations, have been properly analysed. The analysis process is: Consider the following regulation: American project design NPPs: Title 10 of Code of Federal Regulations, NRC Regulatory Guides, NRC Generic Letters and NRC bulletins. Trillo NPP: Recommendations of German Reactors Safety Commission (RSK), Recommendations of Radiological Protection Commission (SSK), Nuclear Safety Technical Codes (KTA) and American regulation included in the license basis, All NPPs: Recommendations of international organisations, and in particular the documents of Nuclear Safety Codes (NUSS) of IAEA. Evaluate the detected deviations, producing a programme of corrective actions. Use the PSA to establish the importance of deviations and the benefit of corrective actions.

4. Updating of safety evaluation and improvement programmes

79

The PSR considers the on-going programmes, including the Probabilistic Risk Assessment, in order to identify the measures adopted for safety improvement. Among others, the programmes for safety evaluation and improvement considered in the CSN guide are: Management of severe accident License and non-license personnel training Organisation and human factors Application of Safety Culture concept Operating procedures, specifically Emergency operating procedures Improvement of Technical Specifications Lifetime management programmes Quality assurance Doses reductions Control and surveillance of radioactive effluents Environmental radiological protection Management of radioactive wastes Power plant configuration control Evaluation plans and systematic independent revisions. 365 'HYHORSPHQW



Periodic Safety Review results have to be reported in a specific document produced by NPP owner, including the analysis of all areas under the scope of the PSR, and identifying the safety improvements actions and its implementation schedule. Once the document has been reviewed and analysed by the CSN, a final report will be produced, including the conclusions and the programmes to be implemented. This final report will be the base for: Guarantee the adequate safety level. Following continuos and / or periodic safety reviews. CSN and NPP Action Plans, in safety significant areas.

The CSN Safety Guide 1.10 [110] have been prepared following international practices and recommendations, including IAEA Safety Guide "Periodic Safety Review of Operational NPP". In order to facilitate the application of CSN Safety Guide 1.10 "Periodic Safety Reviews of Nuclear Power Plants", UNESA has published a specific guide, titled Guideline for the development of Periodic Safety Review" [111] that is explained in the following chapter.  81(6$ *8,'(/,1( )25 3(5,2',& 6$)(7< 5(9,(: '(9(/230(17

The objective of this document is to establish the detailed scope and contents of Periodic Safety Reviews, that the Spanish NPPs should submit to the CSN, according to the requirements of the Operating License, and which criteria, objectives, responsibilities and basic scope have been included in the CSN Safety Guide 1. 10. The structure of UNESA document is similar to the CSN Guide, explaining in detail each area containing in the PSR and providing different types of forms to facilitate the compilation of required information. The areas considered within the UNESA guideline are the following: Operating experience Experience related to the radiological impact
80

Changes in the regulations and laws Equipment behaviour Installations modifications Probabilistic safety assessment Updating of safety evaluation and improvement programmes

The two areas related to ageing and lifetime management are: equipment behaviour and updating of safety evaluation and improvement programmes. Therefore, the following chapters have been focussed in these two areas, providing a brief explanation of the information to be collected by the NPP and the contents to be included in the reports of the PSR to be submitted to the CSN.  4.3.5.1.1. (TXLSPHQW EHKDYLRXU Revision period

In the case of the first PSR, the period has been defined from the beginning of plant operation until the date of this first PSR. For subsequent PSR, the period follows the general criteria, that means 10 years. 4.3.5.1.2. Revision scope

The PSR scope will include: maintenance, in-service inspection, technical specifications surveillance requirements, equipment qualification and lifetime management. 4.3.5.1.3. Information sources

0DLQWHQDQFH 5XOH (MR): The information needed is the project documents used for MR implementation and for monitoring the rule application. ,Q6HUYLFH QVSHFWLRQ : The necessities of information are: Last interval (10 years) evaluation reports, In-service inspection handbook, Reports of the In-service Inspection results, Regulatory body (CSN) audits and evaluations of results reports, documents of exemption requested. 7HFKQLFDO 6SHFLILFDWLRQV VXUYHLOODQFH UHTXLUHPHQWV: The documents of the compliance with the technical specification requirements are controlled by QA departments, as well as by CSN audits. (TXLSPHQW TXDOLILFDWLRQ 7KH required information includes: List of equipment, which requires environmental and seismic qualification, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Environmental qualification reports/dossiers, Plan for environmental qualification maintenance, seismic qualification documents, and component dedication documents. /LIHWLPH PDQDJHPHQW Documents of the four previous points, related to results and mitigation measurements, lifetime management preliminary activities, lifetime management programmes, as well as the annual reports required by the provisional Operating license. 4.3.5.1.4. Report content

0DLQWHQDQFH 5XOH The following data have to be included: In the first PSR report: Maintenance Rule implementation programme and current status of the MR implementation. In all PSR reports, the list of Structures, Systems and Components (SSC) includes in the scope of the MR, indicating the modifications in this lists as well as risk significance SSC, the surveyed SSC, the action taken and the SSC classification following 10CFR50.65 criteria [112]. In addition, trends and analysis results and future foreseen actions. Evaluations of the last finish interval (10 years).

,Q6HUYLFH ,QVSHFWLRQ. Related to In-Service Inspection programme, the PSR report includes:

81

Summary of modifications to the In-Service Inspection handbook in relation to the previous interval. Inspections performed in the current interval. List of reports generated. Exemptions requested ASME XI code cases Relevant event analysis. Results evaluation and future activities. Global analysis of barrier behaviour.

7HFKQLFDO 6SHFLILFDWLRQV VXUYHLOODQFH UHTXLUHPHQWV In addition to the ISI programme, the PSR reports include: Significant results of Surveillance requirements Approved exemptions Results evaluations and trends analysis. List of equipment contained in the Environmental qualification programme. Environmental qualifications report status. Environmental qualification maintenance programme. Qualified life. Seismic qualification in accordance with codes and applicable requirements. Qualified spare parts management. Component dedication programme. Results evaluation and future activities. Identification of transient. The transients are counted, quantified and trends analysis are performed in order to verify that plant behaviour is into design foreseen conditions and the plant life extrapolation is acceptable. Ageing and degradation processes are identified and the mitigation measurements have been taken. If a formal Lifetime Management Programme exists for the power plant, the following points are included: Lifetime Management Programme implementation status. More significant activities performed in the frame of the Lifetime Management Programme. Lifetime Management Programme future activities.

(TXLSPHQW TXDOLILFDWLRQ The PSR reports consider:

/LIHWLPH PDQDJHPHQW The PSR reports includes:

If the plant have programmed preliminary activities, which could allow to perform a Lifetime Management Programme, the report will inform about the evaluation of annual reports required in the provisional Operating license and the development of the above mentioned activities and their future programming. 8SGDWLQJ RI VDIHW\ HYDOXDWLRQ DQG LPSURYHPHQW SURJUDPPHV



The NPP should inform the CSN about the status of programmes related to safety evaluation and improvement. The Lifetime Management Programme has been included within these programmes. 4.3.5.2.1. Revision period In the case of the first PSR, the period has been defined from the beginning of plant operation until the date of this first PSR. For subsequent PSR, the period follows the general criteria, that means 10 years. 4.3.5.2.2. Revision scope

82

The revision applied to those programmes under development within the NPP as a consequence of technological updating needs. The performance of these programmes is based on technological innovation projects, results of research and development programmes related to safety, and the requirements established by the Authorities. In general, the areas to be considered for the development of specific programmes to be reviewed are those included in the following documents: CSN Safety Guide 1.10 (see point 4.3.4.4) Joint Action Plan of Spanish NPPs. Activities related to safety. 4.3.5.2.3. Revision criteria The criteria to be followed by the NPP in the revision and verification of safety evaluation and improvement programmes are the following: Programme status and compliance level Programme development at the moment of PSR initiation. For those finalised programmes: Objectives compliance Activities to be performed and their planing or execution schedule. Implementation process. Significant changes in the established conclusions as a consequence of international state-of-the-art evolution.

For those programmes under development, the objectives compliance will be considered and if the development is according to the foreseen planning. Revision procedures

4.3.5.2.4.

The revision process will take into account the following steps: Baseline checking: NPP initial situation, related documentation, references, etc. Verification of compliance of Authorities requirements, as well as justification of existing deviations. Analysis of subject evolution since the start of the programme, as a consequence of results of new research and development programmes. It will be considered if some programmes activities have to be modified due to the above-mentioned evolution. Review of activities performed and their planing and implementation status, in order to produced a programme updating. Report contents

4.3.5.2.5.

For each reviewed programme, a report will be produced, containing a summary of the obtained result: Foreseen initial programme Objectives and planing compliance analysis Modifications performed during the programme Deviations justifications Information about the programme status, explaining the actions performed and foreseen Identification of needed corrective actions, as a consequence of the revision.




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Due to differences in regulatory systems and the interest of evaluating existing practices for old plant management, the UK approach will be more particularly developed hereafter.
83

Concerning Germany, Ageing management programs exist, but, in the moving German nuclear political context, it is difficult to precise at the moment how ageing problems approach could be reassessed. Current discussions show that plant closure decision will not be justified by ageing management considerations.  81,7(' .,1*'20

The United Kingdom approach is given with some technical details (not reported elsewhere) that illustrate the methodology used to maintain a safety level on gas cooled design nuclear power reactors among the oldest NPP operated in the world. The 26 reactors of the first generation programme, using natural uranium fuel rods clad in a magnesium alloy, graphite as the moderator, and carbon dioxide as the coolant, known as "Magnox" reactors, were commissioned at 11 sites ; 20 of them are still operating, including the 8 oldest reactors at Calder Hall and Chapelcross which started commissioning in 1956. The 14 reactors of the second generation programme, known as the AGR advanced gas cooled reactors, built at 7 sites, use enriched ceramic uranium dioxide fuel clad in stainless steel ; their pressure vessels are pre-stressed concrete, and operate at higher coolant pressures and temperatures, giving greater power outputs ; the first of them was commissioned in 1976. The UK regulatory approach purpose is to ensure that the effects of ageing in nuclear power plants are fully taken into account at all stages of a plants life, thereby giving continued confidence that safety is properly addressed. The nuclear safety licensing regime in the UK is based upon a non prescriptive, goal setting approach in which licensees of nuclear installations have duties placed upon them through the 35 conditions attached to each licence. The Health & Safety Executive (HSE) is the licensing authority, and the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) is that part of the HSE which has the responsibility for granting nuclear site licences. There are two licence conditions which are particularly important in the consideration of ageing of UK NPPs. The first of these enables a specification to be issued which requires any plant on the nuclear licensed site to be shut down at periodic intervals for examination, inspection, maintenance and testing, as required by the plant maintenance schedule. When such a specification has been issued, the licensee must obtain the consent of HSE before the plant can be restarted. This is the principal method applied to reactors to ensure that the plant is adequately safe for a further period of operation. For most of the reactors the period between shutdowns is 2 years, although the licensees of some reactors have successfully argued for a periodicity of 3 years. Since all sites have a minimum of 2 reactors, the periodicity of shutdowns allows consideration of matters which could affect the safety of the other reactor at the site to be considered even more frequently. Whilst this approach provides considerable confidence in the safety of continued operation, it was recognised some years ago as the first generation of gas cooled nuclear reactors approached 20 years of operational life that a more comprehensive safety review was needed, independent of the pressures of routine biennial reactor periodic shutdown programme. The concept of periodic safety reviews (originally referred to as long term safety reviews) was therefore developed, and is the other standard condition of the nuclear site licences important to the subject of ageing. A programme of reviews has been specified for each reactor site, based on a 10 year periodicity.

The principal objectives of the PSR are:

84

i.

to review the current safety case for the plant, taking account of plant modifications which have been made over the years, the plants operational history, and the PSR findings themselves

ii. to undertake a comprehensive review of ageing mechanisms, with an objective of identifying any potentially long term mechanisms which may limit the life of the plant in the next 10 year period ; actions can be specified to strengthen, where appropriate, the routine inspection, maintenance and testing activities to monitor ageing and degradation effects in the plant iii. to undertake a comparison of the developments in safety standards since the time of design and construction, or within the time period since the previous review, and to identify any reasonably practicable improvements which should be made to further improve the safety of the plant. The PSR programme for the Magnox plants started in the early 1980s. Each plant was required to submit its PSR for consideration, and the NII published its findings of the initial reviews over the period 1987-1995 ; over this period, three of the Magnox NPP, comprising 6 reactors, were closed down because the safety improvements necessary to enable continued operation was not economical. Early in this programme of safety reviews, a number of generic safety issues were identified which the licensees were asked to act upon in advance of completing the reviews of the remaining Magnox plants. These issues became known as the Generic Issues programme, and the objective was to achieve early resolution of priority issues in order that effective improvements to safety could be introduced in advance of the completion of a plants PSR. The second 10 year PSRs round for the Magnox reactors have quite been completed with the exception of one, to be submitted to the NII in 2003 ; the findings are mainly related to ageing issues and will be discussed in more detail later. The UKs second generation NPPs (AGRs) have also now completed their initial PSRs. These evaluations have resulted in programmes of work, including technical studies and major plant modification work for the older plants. The NII findings have identified a number of safety issues requiring further attention, like completion of identified improvements to plant, further studies to consolidate the long term safety cases for some components in the pressure circuits where they penetrate the pre-stressed concrete pressure vessel, and improvements in the confidence in the long term integrity of the graphite cores. As indicated above, the issue of ageing and the potential for limiting the life of a NPP was identified as a generic issue at a very early stage in the PSR process. The NII concluded that some degradation processes would require more regular reviews than that implied by the 10 year periodicity of the PSR. In response to this, the licensees have established generic arrangements to undertake this important work at all installations, and the results of this ongoing programme are taken into account by the NII when making regulatory decisions such as issuing a Consent for a reactor to return to routine operation after its statutory shutdown. There are several factors which are taken into account in the management of ageing, and primary examples can be drawn from the UKs Magnox reactors. Early in the life of these reactors, oxidation of some steel components was identified as a safety concern. Considerable research into this issue was undertaken in order to gain a full understanding, and the licensees developed long term safety cases for continued operation. Inspections of potentially affected components are made at each biennial statutory shutdown and the results are reported together with the implications for the safety case to the NII prior to the reactor returning to power. This process has been in place from a very early stage of the Magnox reactors life, and has proved to be a very successful means of controlling ageing effects and carefully monitoring the actual plant state to confirm that the safety case remains valid. Another important ageing effect is that of irradiation induced degradation in the steel reactor pressure vessels. Surveillance specimens of the original RPV materials are withdrawn from the
85

reactors at regular intervals to enable various analyses to be undertaken to determine whether the material characteristics are still within the predicted limits, and that no previously unidentified, or new ageing mechanisms are taking place. Although the reactors were not originally designed for in-service inspection, limited inspections are undertaken at each statutory shutdown to confirm that no unexpected conditions have developed. These inspections are targeted at areas of the RPV where defect tolerance is least good, such as the outlet duct nozzles. This has required the development, by the licensees, of special non-destructive testing equipment capable of carrying out the required inspections in remote parts of the RPV. The safety case for the RPV is supported by detailed structural analyses, which are aimed at providing assurance that the vessels can tolerate very large defects without failing, setting operating conditions so that even if a defect were to develop and penetrate the RPV wall it would not lead to fast fracture, and would be detected by the carbon dioxide leak detection system before it could grow to a critical size. These analyses are regularly updated to incorporate the latest materials surveillance data, and are also used to determine the temperature limits which must be maintained in order to keep the RPV material in a fully ductile state during routine operation. Following the closure of the Trawsfynydd NPP a few years ago, material property prediction methods have been validated against samples taken from the reactor pressure vessels to provide additional assurance. The graphite used as the moderator is subject to various ageing mechanisms, including irradiation induced effects and other effects such as erosion. As in the case of the RPV, the integrity of the graphite core is kept under regular review and is reported upon prior to consent being granted following the statutory shutdown. Graphite samples are routinely removed from the reactor cores, and are analysed to determine whether the properties are still within the predicted limits. This is further supported by remote inspections of selected channels of the core to determine whether there has been any significant graphite distortion or movement which may inhibit the entry of the safety shutdown control rods. Finally, the results of control rod insertion tests are also examined to confirm that there is no impediment to control rod entry. The above discussion has been centered primarily on ageing factors specific to the Magnox RPVs steel and the graphite ageing factors generic to gas cooled reactors. There are many other items of plant important to safety to which attention is also given as part of the ongoing maintenance, inspection and test programme, and which have similarities with other reactor types. As part of NIIs requirements placed upon the reactor licensees from the periodic safety reviews, more information from maintenance activities is now being gathered in order to provide data for trend analysis and indicators for ageing effects in such plant. Finally, it is worth noting that the industry maintains a research capability to support its indigenous gas cooled reactor designs. This is achieved by the licensees having their own research arrangements, either within their organisation, or in collaboration with other bodies, including universities with the required expertise. In addition, the HSE has the responsibility for ensuring that a balanced nuclear safety research programme is in place and that adequate research projects are commissioned. This is administered by HSEs Nuclear Safety Directorate, which also has the power to require research to be commissioned which is then charged to the Nuclear industry licensees under a levy system.




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The main European Union countries which have nuclear power plants have a quite common approach of regulatory requirements related to NPP lifetime management. In particular, there are no limited time operating authorisation, and safety is the responsibility of the utility, under continuous surveillance by the regulatory authority.
86

However, according to the different countries, the authorisation given by the safety authority to the plant operator is not associated to the same formal process. It depends on the safety authority, its organisation and its relations with the nuclear power plant operators. Formal Ageing management evaluation processes exist in some countries, for quite short periods (i.e one year in Spain, two in the UK) ; in others, it appears through a requirement of ability for safety demonstration at any moment (in France and Belgium). In practice, three ways of safety ageing management are implemented. The first, clearly expressed, is the periodic safety review (PSR) approach, widely accepted in the international community, even if it is not always required by the regulation ; a ten years periodicity is also a common practice, at the moment. This is the principal method applied to reactors to ensure that the plant is adequately safe for a further period of operation. But it appears a need to strengthen this periodic approach by a continuous activity of ageing surveillance and management, taking into account safety and industrial anticipation needs. The second is often covered through the implementation of a Life-time Management Programme, often less accurate in its safety concerns. However, it could be the framework for an answer to the complementary need of an effective and efficient approach, periodically reporting ageing safety issues developments and improvements, able to prove that safety margins are maintained. The third one is sometimes constituted by generic evaluations of specific important issues, which may be covered by adapted procedures, with their own approach and program: this may concern cases like vessel failure assessment, stress corrosion cracking of 600 alloy, and thermal ageing of austenitic-ferritic cast parts. Comments on these three aspects are given in the following paragraphs.  3(5,2',& 6$)(7< 5(9,(:6

Periodic Safety Reviews are applied to numerous plants in different countries, and provide a comprehensive methodology for reviewing the safety of the plant, including ageing effects and regulatory evolutions, technical progress and technological obsolescence. Although the expression of objectives and practical evaluations may slightly differ, there is a global consensus on PSR objectives and content. The following aspects are considered in each country: the safety codes and standards evolutions, including international recommendations, and the identification of improvements to be made, the review of potential ageing mechanisms, with the objective of identifying effects likely to limit plant life during the next ten years period, and defining necessary actions on use, surveillance, maintenance or mitigation measures, the operational history of SSC, the in-service inspection results, and the lessons learn from return of experience on similar SSC. There is a consensus on the credit to be given to the existing programs and knowledge of component history for the definition of the subsequent surveillance programs or license renewals. The following aspects are more specific to some countries: formal updating of Lifetime Management Programmes in Spain, the results of Probabilistic Safety Analyses, which are more explicitly considered in Spain, more systematic reference to the regulatory evolutions in the project origin country in Belgium and Spain,
87

 the evaluation is generally based on the initial licensing basis in Spain and Belgium, except where justified by return of experience, where the French approach is more oriented to ensure consistency of approaches used for the various plants, thus referring to the last status of rules. In practice, nevertheless, upgrades are generally applied where reasonably achievable, on a case by case basis. The technical evaluation of the different ageing phenomena may include specificities in the various countries, depending on the expression of the regulatory objectives, for example: definition of the integrity objective concept: acceptability of crack-arrest phenomenon consideration for defect acceptance, definition of fatigue initiation objective [73], etc., prescribed safety margins (prescriptions are given in this field in the French November 10, 1999 order), which are implicitly related to an acceptable level of risk, differences on consensus on technical aspects such as warm-presstressing effect or acceptance of conditions leading to significant loading in the brittle-ductile transition, etc.  $*(,1* 0$1$*(0(17 352*5$06

In every country, there are ageing or "service-life" management programs. Their status is nevertheless different: in France and Belgium, it is under the responsibility of the Utility, which must operate safely taking also into account the economic aspects in order to reduce the operation costs. From a licensing point of view, the utility shall be able to demonstrate at any time the safety of its plants, in Spain, the license requires that each year plants owners prepare and submit to the Regulatory Authority an annual report including a Lifetime Management Programme, its status as well as activities performed within this Programme. As a result, plant operators generally follow UNESA methodology, in UK, a formal consent is needed to restart the plant after shutdown due to maintenance or refuelling, providing the opportunity to ensure, with a 2 to 3 years interval, that the plant is adequately safe for a further period of operation. Generic issues are considered in particular.  *(1(5,& (9$/8$7,216

Due to the standardisation of plant series in France, and the potential importance of generic ageing phenomena, since 80% of electricity is generated by NPPs, there is a strong economical interest for the Utility, and a strong strategic interest for the Safety Authority to anticipate these potential problems. Generic studies have consequently been conducted by the Utility to support the decisions taken for each individual plant, with a specific management and periodic discussions with the safety authority and its technical support. Examples of such generic studies are: the re-evaluation of the resistance to fast fracture of the RPV, the susceptibility to stress corrosion cracking of all 600 alloys parts, the thermal ageing of austenitic-ferritic castings. These studies consider the R&D progresses, the results of in-situ examinations, the detailed analysis of construction conditions, the service conditions, and lead to optimised in-service inspection and maintenance proposals, taking into account the possible anticipations through the examination of

88

"precursors" deduced from the conclusions of these studies, even where such precursors may not be important for plant safety by themselves.

89





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In Belgium, many aspects of plant life management have been incorporated in the every day management of the plants since the beginning of their life. These aspects include: the design, the quality assurance and control, in-service inspection, monitoring, testing, preventive and predictive maintenance, re-qualification, replacement, periodic safety reassessment, etc. A specific plant life management project, named "Continuous Operation of Belgian NPPs" also has recently started. Its main objective is to centralise all safety and economic aspects of plant life management. The two main outputs of the project will be: the determination, for each NPP unit, of the most probable cost required to maintain safely the unit in operation; the identification of the actions to be taken (e.g. predictive maintenance, monitoring) to achieve that at the minimum cost. 6<67(06 6758&785(6 $1' &20321(176 35,25,7,6$7,21 2) &20321(176



In order to focus on the most significant Systems, Structures, and Components, the components are classified into four categories: active safety-related components, passive safety-related components; non safety-related components but components important for the availability of the plant; and non safety-related components and not important components for the availability of the plant. For the active safety-related components (e.g. motors, pumps), maintenance programs were established. These programs define the actions to perform in order to guarantee the integrity and the availability of these equipments during the exploitation of the NPP. Thus, a low priority was given to these components and they are excluded from the scope of the current ageing management program2. A very low priority was also given to the last category (i.e. non safety-related components and not important for the availability of the plant). Hence, the current ageing management program focuses on the second and the third categories. In a first phase, Equipment Ageing Summaries, EAS, were established for the passive safety-related components. In a second phase these EAS will be extended to the major components important for the plant availability in order to address also economical concerns. Each Equipment Ageing Summary concerns an ageing phenomenon applied to a System, a Structure, or a Component. These EAS provide a status on the activities presently being undertaken

: An EAS was however established for IE electrical and I&C equipment describing the qualification programs
90

to follow up ageing phenomena of components in the Belgian Nuclear Power Plants. The typical EAS table of content is given in Table 5.1. 7DEOH 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
7.1. 7.2.

7\SLFDO ($6 WDEOH RI FRQWHQW

Equipment Problem description Problem category Problem significance Significant parameters Sketch or drawing Risks
Safety risks Economical risks

8.
8.1. 8.2.

Surveillance
Type Frequency

9. 10.
10.1. 10.2. 10.3. 10.4.

Acceptance criteria Remedies

Repairs Replacement unchanged Replacement with redesign Other remedies

11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Cognisant engineer Participation to international working groups Main references Situation in Belgian units Follow-up by Belgian Safety Authority Project references

After identification of ageing phenomenon-SSC pairs, a ranking will be performed in order to focus on the most important pairs. The method that will be proposed in Belgium to rank the pairs is to consult experts from the utility and from the engineering company. These experts will rate prioritisation criteria (See examples given below). The results for each category will be combined taking into account the relative importance of the criteria and a ranking will be done. Examples of criteria are given below. High potential (probability) that ageing degradation causes component failure; High susceptibility of the component to ageing; High replacement costs in case of failure (i.e. component cost, plant shutdown); Low replacement costs but high impact for the plant operation cost in case of failure; High impact for the risk level of the plant in case of failure (e.g. use of PSA studies); Probability to detect the ageing process before plant integrity is significantly degraded; Availability of data from direct observations on the plant (or from elsewhere if not available) to predict ageing; Level of confidence in future predictions; Feasibility and effectiveness of current practices in the industry in mitigating ageing (repair, replace); The component could become obsolete with an inadequate availability of spares;
91

 The component has required significant maintenance or / and has been replaced during its lifecycle; Operation or environmental conditions are different than those considered in the design. From the ranking, the most of important ageing phenomenon-SSC pairs will be identified and included in the ageing management program and new EAS will be established. For the identification of the important pairs, the following criteria will be used: all safety-related components will be included in the plant life management; non safety-related components will be included in the plant life management if their rank is above a determined threshold. The ranking will be performed for each Belgian Nuclear Power Plant to take into account the plants specificities. A first general tentative ranking of existing EAS (i.e. for passive safety-related components) was done and is given in Appendix 2.  6(/(&7,21  ,'(17,),&$7,21 2) $*(,1* 0(&+$1,606

Based on experience feedback from the Belgian and foreign nuclear power plants (e.g. technical meetings, articles, conferences), ageing mechanisms for components whose failure or malfunction may prove hazardous for the safety were identified. For each ageing phenomenon-SSC pair, an EAS was established. The list of all existing EAS is given in Appendix 3. Up to now, the content of the EAS addresses only the safety aspects; i.e. only the components important to safety are covered and the risk description is limited to safety risk. It is now intended to create new EAS and to complete them in order to address also economical concerns. This will produce new outputs, mainly the determination for each NPP of the most probable cost required in order to keep economical efficiency as well as safe operation. To identify all possible ageing mechanisms, Tractebel has conducted bibliography search and has established a list of main reference papers and reports. The main information of these articles is collected in a database: the "Plant Life Management Documentation". Also technical meetings will be organised with experts from both the Utilities (Electrabel) and the engineering company (Tractebel) in order to complete the list of ageing phenomenon-SSC pair.  $*(,1* 35(',&7,21 &5,7(5,$

Examples of rules for ageing prediction and of acceptance criteria are given in Appendix 3 of this document.  6859(,//$1&(  3(5,2',& 7(67,1*

Surveillance includes in-service inspection, monitoring, testing, etc. All classified pressure retaining components are inspected according to the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI. Moreover, complementary or voluntary inspections are decided by the operator on classified and non classified components according to variable aspects affecting the availability and the conventional security of the plant or depending on world feedback experience. Monitoring is also used in several instances. For example, the monitoring in type and frequency of low cycle thermal and pressure transients in order to control components subject to fatigue and eventually in order to justify the extension of their fatigue life. More examples of surveillance and periodic testing practices in Belgium are given in Appendix 3.  0,7,*$7,21 2) $*(,1* ())(&76

92

Examples of methods used to mitigate ageing effects in Belgium are described in Appendix 3 for selected Equipment Ageing Summaries.  0$,17(1$1&( 352*5$06  &20321(17 5(3$,5  5(3/$&(0(17  ,03529(0(17

Examples of remedies applied in Belgium are given in Appendix 3.




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The inventory of pressurised water reactor power plants (PWR) represents technical and financial capital of strategic importance, for the Owner and for France. It should be borne in mind, in particular, that 58 PWR units provide nearly 80% of national electricity production. The first main specificity of the French nuclear power plants is their standardisation. 34 CP0-CPY 900 MWe, 20 P4-P4 1300 MWe, and 4 N4 1450 MWe plants have been built. This quite standardised design and construction practice leads to risks of generic ageing problems, but also to possibility of in-depth generic studies on the significant ageing phenomena, and to define an inservice surveillance based on the evaluation of "precursors" defined following these studies. The second specificity results from the high percentage of French electric production being issued from nuclear power plants. This leads to the necessity of a power network follow, and consequently to specific potential fatigue ageing problems, and to a particular need for a continuous transient monitoring. The third specificity is the existence of only one major Utility permitting an harmonised life management at the set of plants inventory level. Chapter 4.2 has presented the consequences of these specificities on the safety organisation. This approach may be summarised as follows: a continuous technical dialogue between Utility and Safety Authority, the ability to make a safety demonstration at any moment (following for example return of experience), a periodic safety review in phase with the decennial inspection visits, with a possible reduction of this interval to a 5 years periodic evaluation at end of life.. The amount of electricity generated by nuclear power gives a strategic importance to a good management of the life duration of the plants, this consideration having a strong influence on future plant construction needs. For the past 20 years, the choice of the nuclear programme has allowed a large margin of competitiveness for production, to ensure energy independence and to reduce CO2 emissions. For this reason, for the next 20 years, the service life of nuclear power stations will be a deciding factor since design studies made it possible to contemplate a service life of 40 years. It must be stressed, however, that this service life is not regulatory in nature and does not constitute a guarantee. The Utility must therefore do all what is necessary from the safety and public acceptance point of views to justify and attain this service life, and if possible, to extend it in order to make the best use of the investments already made. The service life of a nuclear power plant can be affected by three factors: Normal wear and tear of its components and systems sometimes called ageing which depends, in particular, on their age, operating conditions and the maintenance operations they receive, The safety level, which must always conform to the safety level of reference applying to the plant under consideration, and which is likely to change with new regulations,

93

 Competitiveness, which must remain satisfactory, compared with that of other means of production. In practice, these three factors are closely linked. Ageing can degrade the performance of the power station and its safety level, and attempts to correct this problem create preventive and corrective maintenance costs that must be controlled. It is also necessary to pay attention to the industrial environment and to the strategies chosen insofar as maintaining knowledge, skills and manufacturing capacity is necessary for long term operation. Finally, the service life of the inventory in operation has direct repercussions on the plant replacement strategy. The topics linked to the nuclear plant service life can therefore be summarised as follows: understanding and anticipating ageing issues, maintaining the required level of safety and performances, controlling costs in order to maintain competitiveness, ensuring the better use of investments already made, and manage appropriately future investments linked to renewal of the existing production inventory, maintaining the publics trust. These stakes prompted the owner to deal with ageing issues very early on, and to start, in 1985, a vast study and research programme, which was named "Service Life" [108]. The "Service Life" programme had the following objectives: Identifying the different degradation phenomena likely to affect material and components, using national and international return of experience, Understanding the different ways in which these phenomena appear and the ways in which they spread (their kinetics), Identifying the components that may be subject to these phenomena, the replacement of which is impossible and for which all steps necessary must be taken to provide proof of their satisfactory behaviour over the course of time, defining a maintenance policy for other materials, making it impossible to level out the degradation phenomena, that can be prevented by monitoring, repair or replacement. This programme which combines all the skills of the owner and its main partners (manufacturers in particular), brings into play several fields of expertise in order to guarantee coherence and exhaustiveness of thought. It is, in addition, subject to extensive international exchanges. Studies undertaken have had to take into account design and manufacturing data, operating conditions, maintenance strategies, to rely on R&D actions, and, finally, to create a suitable industrial policy.  6<67(06 6758&785(6 $1' &20321(176 35,25,7,6$7,21 2) &20321(176

For each zone evaluated for the preparation of in-service surveillance programs, an evaluation of the gravity of the consequences of a potential failure was made, based on the "engineering judgement" of experts participating in the working groups. These consequences were classified in three classes: low, mean and high. The combination of the global number representing the probability of occurrence of a damage as determined in 5.2.3, and the class of its consequences permitted to identify inspection requirement classes, according to which a global appreciation of the current examination practices (as in 1976) was conducted, identifying possible needs for improvement. Four level of inspection needs were defined: no particular examination needed, limited examination accepted,
94

 mean examination level, satisfying examinations required. The "Service Life" program was more focussed on replaceability of components, identifying: Replaceable components, entirely or partly, sometimes at the expense of large operations. This is the case, in particular, for steam generators (SG of seven units have already been replaced), closure heads (30 have been changed), parts of instrumentation and control, generators, etc. Two components declared irreplaceable, the reactor vessel and containment, for which all possible measures must be taken to prove their satisfactory behaviour over the years. Components considered on the basis of the routine and/or exceptional preventive maintenance are listed in Appendix 2 with their prioritisation. Only the vessel and containment are considered as irreplaceable.  6(/(&7,21,'(17,),&$7,21 2) $*(,1* 0(&+$1,606

At the very beginning of the seventies, for the preparation of the in-service surveillance rules, various potential damages were identified on return of experience and engineering judgement bases. Factors related to mechanical or thermal loading (geometrical discontinuities, external loads, forces, vibrations, thermal gradients and residual stresses), to fabrication and examination (potential defects, metallurgical properties, manufacturing and examination difficulties) and to the environment (corrosion due to a low fluid speed, at a steam-water interface, due to local boiling, erosion, abrasion, matting, tearing, impact and shock possibilities, irradiation) were examined. For the particular case of the Main Primary System, 93 zones with 296 sub-zones were examined, a note being given for each sub-zone to each of these potential damages: 1 for a very small to small risk, 2 for a small to mean risk, and 3 for a mean to high risk. A global (arbitrary) appreciation of the damage risk of each zone was based on the sum of the above numbers. This permitted the identification of the "weak" zones of the system for which a particular evaluation of the available non-destructive examination methods was needed. After an average of 18 years of operation for the 34 units of 900 MWe, and 12 years for the 20 units of 1300 MWe, the French units may now be considered young and mature. A more in-depth evaluation of the various ageing mechanisms was made more particularly for components difficult or impossible to replace in the context of the "Service Life" study presented in 5.2.1. Accompanying sheets are given in Appendix 3 for the degradation mechanisms likely to affect: the reactor pressure vessel, the reactor containment, cast parts used for pipes, bends and primary pump casings, instrumentation and control, electric cables.

Large study programmes have been devoted, since 1985, to the understanding of the mechanisms and kinetics of degradation: embrittlement by irradiation, erosion, stress and fatigue corrosion, etc. They allow, first of all, maintenance and operating policies to be optimised. To confirm the hypotheses resulting from this work and to validate the non-destructive test results by additional inspections, expert appraisal programmes on materials taken from operation have been designed: they contribute to a better understanding of the updated phenomena. In this way, a large programme has begun on the Chooz A plant (300 MWe), the first PWR built in France, shut down in 1991, after 24 years of operation. Appraisals were carried out, in particular, on the reactor vessel and the internal structures, in order to better determine the effects of ageing under irradiation.  $*(,1* 35(',&7,21 &5,7(5,$
95

The national and international return of experience following service problems or resulting from the above approach is closely followed, and potential consequences on not (yet) affected plants is evaluated through generic ageing studies. A close analysis of the specificity of the part, material, loading environment, etc., permits to identify "precursors", to predict their ageing, and to verify through a close examination these predictions, permitting the definition of a global strategy at the level of the set of French NPPs. Examples of such approaches may be found for the fast fracture evaluation of the Reactor Pressure Vessels (RPVs), the Stress Corrosion Cracking in Inconel parts, or the thermal ageing of austeniticferritic cast parts.  6859(,//$1&(3(5,2',& 7(67,1*

The evaluation of the existing practices together with the damage probability/consequence balance evaluated at the beginning of the seventies did lead to examination practices discussed with the Safety Authority. After more than ten years of experience, a working group was established to standardise the resulting practice. This has led to the 1990 edition of the RSE-M [60] covering mechanical components, which is periodically updated. Other RSE standards are being prepared on other equipment. The acceptability of defects discovered is subjected in particular to detailed evaluation procedures described in this code, which take into account their potential evolution during the subsequent period separating two examinations. Acceptance criteria remain deterministic, but are based on reliability considerations, taking into account actual properties distributions, and include prescribed safety margins. Surveillance include continuous monitoring and partial or complete evaluations during shut-down periods. In view of the present state of knowledge, it appears in the context of the "Service Life" programme that in return of operating conditions, suitable monitoring and maintenance of components, the nuclear units should reach the desired objectives with regard to service life.

96

Regarding, in particular, the two irreplaceable components: The reactor vessel, owing to low content of residuals (copper, nickel, phosphorus) and optimised management of fluence, thus limiting embrittlement of the materials under irradiation, should reach 40 years without special operation. However, the studies have clearly shown the need for optimised irradiation monitoring and additional actions listed in Appendix 3 in order to validate and reinforce this service life potentiality. Monitoring by auscultation and reactor containment pressurisation routine tests show that some of them can have strength and/or leaks resistance problems. These problems result from deformations by shrinkage-creep, greater than that taken into account in the design. Moreover, the behaviour of the containment can differ considerably from one site to another, depending on the aggregates used during construction. An individual estimated follow-up is therefore necessary (See appendix 3).  0,7,*$7,21 2) $*(,1* ())(&76

The methods used to mitigate ageing effects in France are given in the accompanying sheets (See Appendix 3).  0$,17(1$1&( 352*5$06  &20321(17 5(3$,5  5(3/$&(0(17  ,03529(0(17

The industrial strategy is primarily function of the classification of the component according to its replaceability. The maintenance policy adopted for replaceable components may be, firstly, to monitor, repair a component before deciding to replace it when the performance-safety-costs appraisal requires this. This is, in particular, the policy adopted for steam generators. A reinforcement of the anticipation approach in exceptional maintenance has been decided on the replacement register of some components: the approach consists in demonstrating their operational replaceability ranging from the feasibility study to making available skilled servicing facilities. Beyond continuous checks, during operation and shut-down periods, it was agreed with the safety authority, within the context presented in 4.2, that every 10 years a re-examination of conformity of the units per plant series would be carried out. It is also an opportunity to reassess the reference framework of the safety requirements itself according to the knowledge acquired, feedback of experience, technical progress and to carry out a number of additional checks. The developments in national and international regulations (basic safety regulation on earthquakes, restriction of waste in normal and accident conditions, etc.) are considered for the development of the safety requirement reference framework. The 900 MWe units have thus been subject to a reassessment leading to a new safety reference framework which should remain stable for 10 years. It leads to technical modifications approved by the safety authority: hazards (fire, cold, earthquake) protection devices, automatic response to operating incident systems, or procedure improvements. These modifications are carried out consistently during the second decennial outage programs (VD2) of the 900 MWe plants, the first of which has taken place in 1998 at Tricastin 1. A detailed check of installations, maintenance operations and a set of safety improvements are conducted. Moreover, the VD2 of the 900 MWe units are the opportunity to carry out an additional action programme in order to check, by controls, hypotheses made on the absence of degradations in the non-controlled zones by way of the preventive maintenance programmes. A new safety reassessment will be programmed some years before the third decennials (VD3) that the older 900 MWe units will reach towards 2007. The third decennial will be very important for the plant service life and, consequently, its preparation will be essential: it will be necessary to have a file demonstrating very explicitly the control of safety and reliability of the main components and systems.
97



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As already stressed, the ageing of components and systems making up a nuclear power plant can have repercussions on the performance of the installation and on its level of safety (and therefore its service life) and must be overcome by adapted maintenance actions. 7KHVH DFWLRQV DUH RI WKUHH W\SHV Monitoring during operation and unit shut-downs. Repair of an existing piece of material, each time that it is possible to intervene at an acceptable cost and dosimetry on this material in order to restore its operating characteristics. These actions are considered as routine. Replacement of a material for which the projected wear, therefore in the future, no longer allows its operating characteristics to be restored. This is essentially "exceptional maintenance". The choice between these types of actions is not only technical. It is also economical, because the owner must, in a sufficiently prospective approach, be able to optimise the material maintenance by anticipating the time when repair will become too expensive compared with the cost of a replacement. The development of new monitoring techniques permits a conditional rather than systematic maintenance, the use of stricter analysis methods in order to design programmes (Optimisation of maintenance by reliability data) and the creation of anticipatory replacement strategies, allowing costs to be controlled, while efficiently maintaining the safety and reliability of the units. The second competition factor lies in the reduction of length and the dosimetry of the actions carried out during unit outages performed every 12 and 18 months. These outages, intended to partially replace the fuel and to carry out routine or exceptional (replacement of steam generators or closure head of a unit, for example) maintenance operations require perfect planning and organisation of actions and participants. This is, of course, even more important during decennial outage programs, where the number of operations to be carried out and of participants is far greater. Significant progress has already been demonstrated with regard to unit outages conditions. In this way, for example, the replacement period for steam generators is set at less than 35 days, with a well controlled dosimetry of 1 h..sv. Among the other actions carried out to increase the availability of nuclear power plants, one should also mention those undertaken for some years to increase the length of reactor operating cycles (length between two outages to partially reload fuel), This cycle length which was planned at 12 months in the design is today 18 months for most 1300 MWe units: This cycle increase could be gradually extended to all 1300 MWe units and to CP0 (Fessenheim, Bugey), after the agreement of the safety authorities. The availability of the inventory which was greater than 82% in 1997, should thereby earn some points and reach 85%, the objective set for the year 2000. Another essential factor of nuclear ageing management is industrial control. Whether this concerns national or regional suppliers which are contributing to the plants, specialised technical skills, necessary for engineering the park in operation, or the manufacturing of the most sensitive materials which require high-tech, unique industrial tools, the industrial and supply policy must be in line with the duration and for that must employ a partnership policy with suppliers without excluding judicious competition between suppliers. Through the results achieved over the past years in the context of the service life studies, the owner is today able to better anticipate and overcome ageing phenomena, and, consequently, to maintain its installations in a condition allowing a safe service life of at least 40 years.



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In Spain, NPP owners are increasingly concerned with optimising Plant Life Management. In response, they are setting up Lifetime Management Programmes. Strategic, economic and safety concerns and the close link between life management work and the improved maintenance practices that are so important today, will increase and globalise these programmes for monitoring and conservation or mitigation of ageing. These programmes are all based on knowledge of the precise condition of all components and populations with the greatest effect on the economics and safety of the plant, and trends in changes in their condition. The technical support for these programmes is: Methodologies and knowledge required identifying degradation mechanisms as a function of the characteristics of the components or populations, and servicing conditions. Techniques for determining condition and trends over time. Analysis of the efficiency of maintenance practices based on the above knowledge, techniques and methodologies. Improvement of maintenance practices for adequate mitigation and monitoring of ageing. Techniques and tools for collecting and ordering data about ageing and for condition assessment Exchange and feedback of domestic and foreign experience in lifetime management / ageing programmes, considering international practices and recommendations. The prediction of potential ageing and evaluation of the degree to which this affects the different components, and especially the monitoring of change in their condition and/or prediction of the change, as well as the definition of corrective or monitoring measures, require specialised engineering support in these fields. Figure 5.1 illustrates the structure and content of the Unesa methodology for NPP Lifetime Management. The following sections describe its structure and content, with special emphasis on engineering tasks.  6<67(06 6758&785(6 $1' &20321(176 35,25,7,6$7,21 2) &20321(176

This paragraph provides a summary of the UNESA standard method for selecting and prioritising plant components important to lifetime management of LWRs. Additional details on screening methodology and criteria definition are given in Appendix 2. The first requirement for adequate plant life management is to avoid dispersion and waste of the LCM Programme resources. These resources are always limited, and should not cover the whole population, indiscriminately. Prioritisation is necessary and needs to be slightly adjusted periodically, to adapt to the margin of uncertainty of all predictions. This prioritisation uses a weighted criteria methodology. Components having the greatest sensitivity to ageing, and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs will dictate the feasibility of Lifetime Management Programme for the plant and influence utility strategic planning. These components are termed the "important components and will be the object of further investigations and research to identify the parameters which affect their life cycle.

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The strategy of each plant affects the methodology through adjustments in the plant-unique weighting of each of the criteria. The selection and prioritisation methodology (Figure 5.2) is established in three steps: In the first step the systems are selected according to safety, availability and cost criteria. In the second step, the selection of components from the systems is performed based on a wide range of criteria such as: . Component is safety-related or required for safe shut-down, . Component failure has a significant impact on safety level, . Important component in licensing process, . Operating and environmental conditions are more aggressive than considered in design, . Significant effort in maintenance is required, . Component maintenance is not effective for ageing control and mitigation, . High cost or long period needed for component replacement. In the third step, the components are ordered following several criteria such as: service conditions and history, regulation factors, reliability considerations, programme effectiveness, etc. Different weights are assigned to the above factors and criteria. The establishment of grouping criteria allows inclusion in the same class of components with similar surveillance parameters and residual life evaluation methods. Therefore, the main reasons to group them is to make easier the ageing surveillance and management, based on similar parameters and techniques.

100

6WUXFWXUH 6\VWHPV 6FUHHQLQJ &ULWHULD IRU 6\VWHPV $YDLODELOLW\  &RVW  6WUXFWXUHV 6\VWHPV ,PSRUWDQW WR /LIH 'HILQLWLRQ RI &RPSRQHQWV DQG *URXSV 'LVFUHWLVDWLRQ RI 6\VWHPV &RPSRQHQW 6HOHFWLRQ 5HSODFHPHQW$YDLODELOLW\5LVN6HUYLFH &RPSRQHQWV ,PSRUWDQW )LJXUH  6HOHFWLRQ RI FRPSRQHQWV Lists of important component for PWR and BWR plants, according to this methodology, are given in appendix 2.  6(/(&7,21,'(17,),&$7,21 2) $*(,1* 0(&+$1,606

This task (Figure 5.3) consists of clearly differentiated stages. The LCM Programme begins with an initial condition evaluation, which serves as the basis for establishing the main corrective and monitoring actions, and for preparing the first cost/benefit analyses for Life Management. The LCM Programme continues to progress with periodic re-evaluation of condition to confirm the corrective measures are the right ones and to adopt new measures, if necessary, as a result of the monitoring established. The initial evaluation begins with a determination of potential degradation mechanisms and of the level of harshness of these on the selected components. Determining the importance of degradation mechanisms requires a study of the characteristics of the components (design, materials, manufacture, process and service conditions). This analysis is complemented by a rigorous study of the history of the operation and maintenance, and the results of diagnosis and monitoring, to detect incidents that might have affected the condition of the plant, or for evidence of degradations. Uncertainty about the severity of some of these ageing effects may require extra inspections or tests, to provide more precise data. The result of this analysis is an Evaluation Report for each component or group of similar components. Condition evaluation requires collection and ordering of the documentation and records of manufacturer, operation and maintenance that contain information needed for the analysis. This collection requires application of procedures that establish the data and records, with the periodicity of their acquisition clearly identified for successive re-evaluations, and the screening requirements for easier collection and analysis.

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The rules, parameters and tools for SSC condition evaluation and ageing prediction, and the criteria to fix on the limits for alarm or safe operation are given in Appendix 3 of this document.  6859(,//$1&(3(5,2',& 7(67,1*

The practices in Spain covering the inspection and periodic testing required by Technical Specifications, required by applicable codes and standard, and Plant specific surveillance programs are shown in Appendix 3 here in included.  0,7,*$7,21 2) $*(,1* ())(&76

In addition to the improvements in operation and service conditions, a substantial part of the causes and effects of ageing mechanisms have to be mitigated by maintenance work. The nature of these long-term ageing mechanisms has meant that, in certain cases, current maintenance practices do not prevent them. This requires these practices to be evaluated and modified where necessary to improve their efficiency in conservation and the mitigation of degradation. The engineering activities (Figure 5.4) followed in the evaluation process are:

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The tasks described above produce the component-degradation mechanism pairs that it is considered necessary to evaluate.  3URGXFWLRQ RI &RPSRQHQW 'HJUDGDWLRQ 'DWD 6KHHWV &''V

A component degradation sheet (Figure 5.5) is completed for each component selected. The data to be filled out on the CDDSs are: component description; functions; design parameters; operating experience; degradation mechanisms; and the part of the component affected by ageing.

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Description of the Structure, Component or Component Group

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For each of the programmes, practices and procedures that affect each component/degradation mechanism pair, a data sheet (Figure 5.6) is prepared, showing the following information about the practice: limitations on performing it, time when corrective action is taken, the data necessary, action to be taken to mitigate, detect and monitor the degradation and finally comments and experience resulting from the practice application. The purpose of this task is to take and inventory of all practices current at the Plant and to discover details of the application, to exploit them and improve their efficiency for life extension.

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Each Component Data Sheet is attached to all the Maintenance Practice Data Sheets that affect the component. With the information from both sources, the Maintenance Evaluation Checklist (Figure 5.7) is completed.

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Plant Name Structure, Component or Component Group Plant Identification No. YES 1. The significant degradation mechanisms identified on the component degradation data sheet will be detected as evident on the maintenance practices data sheet. 2. The features and/or action steps (content and frequency of the plant programmes will be successful for detecting ageing and monitoring performance 3. The subcomponents/parts which could affect the required function(s) are addressed 4. The thresholds/criteria for corrective action will result in timely mitigation of age-related degradation and restoration of degraded performance 5. Data recording requirements are acceptable to support trending, etc 6. Plant programmes and implementing procedures are documented and in current use 7. Maintenance effectiveness is demonstrated 8. Issue Resolution Forms have been prepared Prepared by: Checked by: Approved by: YES WITH COMMENT NO NOT SUPPORTING APPLICABLE REMARKS

)LJXUH  The evaluation shows the possible deficiencies in control of ageing of the maintenance of each component. When necessary, improvements to maintenance are proposed, documenting the details of the improvements using the tool developed for that purpose, the Maintenance Evaluation Proposed Improvement (Figure 5.8). Samples of the most common practices in Spain to mitigate the degradation of the affected components and structures are given in appendix 3. Changes in service condition, control of fluid chemistry or environmental conditions. Improvement or recovery of material characteristics, and modification in operating modes are the most extended actions.

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The tasks described above provide information about ageing and trends, and the degree of uncertainty in their evaluation, and also a determination of the efficiency of maintenance practices and their shortcomings. On the basis of this, it is possible to decide on the life extension measures to be applied. These measures fall into the following categories: Repairs, replacements or modifications and most efficient programming, of the components most severely effected and/or for which the improvement in availability or performance justifies the investment. It is important to remember that residual Life is only considered as such if it is safe (reliable) and economically viable Modifications to operating procedures and/or in service conditions to make them less harsh Improvements to Maintenance Practices, to achieve full efficiency, for safe and economically viable life extension Implementation of additional monitoring with some of the following criteria: Improve precision of condition evaluation and trends, for those component / degradation mechanism pairs for which forecasting is more uncertain Allow for continuous condition monitoring, or at least to reduce the effort required for collection and analysis of the information required during reevaluation This improves the flexibility and solvency of life management decisions

107

The type of monitoring and the parameter to represent ageing should be selected with realistic criteria of accessibility and efficiency

The maintenance evaluation methodologies to determine the weakness of the current maintenance practices, the suitability of their frequency and acceptance criteria to control the evolution of the degradation effects are shown in Appendix 3 of this document.




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The comparison of the practices of the three countries involved in this project, as described by Tractebel for Belgium, EDF for France, and Unesa for Spain, is covered in the following paragraphs. Organisational aspects are discussed in 5.4.2 and compared in greater details in Section 6, using the format of international IAEA recommendations. As far as the technological aspects are concerned, the practices may be compared at three levels : the approach for prioritisation of systems, structures and components, the practical organisation for identification and selection of ageing mechanisms, the management of ageing for given components and damage mechanisms.

These aspects are covered in 5.4.3, 5.4.4 and 5.4.5 respectively.  25*$1,6$7,21

The first main difference between countries lies in the global ageing management of plants. Two approaches are identified: The first one corresponds to the Spanish practice, where a dedicated organisation is devoted to ageing management, with annual reports identified in the licensing process and consequently a precisely defined structure, The second one corresponds to French and Belgium practices, where the various aspects of Plant Life Management have been incorporated in the every day management of the plants, with a periodic follow-up, which remains under the responsibility of the utility.

In all cases, specific syntheses have been prepared to summarise the knowledge gathered on the various topics, and the situation of the various units and components in front of the ageing phenomena: In Belgium, equipment ageing summaries are established with priorities based on importance for safety and availability, following a defined format in order to provide a status on activities undertaken. In France, due to the standardisation of plants, generic studies have been done on Plant Life, with detailed reports on main systems and components, and on various ageing mechanisms. Where needed, specific projects have been established for a given period on major ageing phenomena, the results obtained being then included in the plant management practices. In Spain, component degradation data sheets and maintenance practice data sheets are prepared to facilitate the systematic evaluation of existing practices and the eventual improvement proposals. 35,25,7,6$7,21 2) 6<67(06 6758&785(6 $1' &20321(176



There is a common approach to prioritise components, according to:

108

1. The evaluation of the safety risks, which depend on the potential degradation phenomena and their associated risk of component failure, and on the potential consequences of such a failure, 2. The difficulty or cost for component repair or replacement. Some components may determine the life of the plant itself, such as the reactor pressure vessel or the containment. The procedure is more particularly developed in this report for the Spanish practice, but corresponds to the general approach of the two other countries as far as the technical parameters are concerned. Consequently, there is a general agreement on the main classification of important components obtained according to these methodologies, with non-replaceable components at the top and differences on classification details which are essentially the result of differences on utilities strategies, and the corresponding weight given to the different aspects.  ,'(17,),&$7,21 $1' 6(/(&7,21 2) $*(,1* 0(&+$1,606

The identification and selection of ageing mechanisms is based in every case on systematic procedures which serves as the basis for the orientations given to the in-service surveillance and maintenance. This evaluation is further enriched by the consideration of the return of experience, including the evaluation of international information. The first in-service inspection programs were based on design assumptions and engineering judgement, quickly completed by ageing experience, which generally appears where not anticipated. There are good reasons for that: where ageing phenomena are anticipated, design choices, including system design, component drawing, material choice, tend to provide adequate resistance for the expected component life. The practical organisations for ageing mechanisms identification in the various countries for different components are consistent, with the following specificities: Belgium retains a systematic structure (given in Appendix 3) for components important from a safety point of view. Where several ageing mechanisms are identified for a given component, there are several EAS established accordingly. France establishes synthesis documents on component life component by component on one hand, and on the most important degradation mechanisms covering their effect on various components on the other hand. Spain follows a systematic process for the evaluation of ageing problems and corresponding corrective measures, establishing the adequate pairs of SSC and ageing mechanisms / degradations / mitigations. 0$1$*(0(17 2) $*(,1* 0(&+$1,606



The presentation of practices on typical ageing mechanisms is given in Appendix 3. Illustrated examples common to all three utilities are discussed below. They cover: neutron irradiation embrittlement (of reactor pressure vessel), thermal ageing (of austenitic-ferritic castings essentially), stress-corrosion cracking (particularly of 600 alloys), fatigue, reactor building ageing, electrical components and cables ageing.

Differences between practices are explicitly identified. Where no reference to a particular country is made, the corresponding practices are considered equivalent.  1HXWURQ IOXHQFH HPEULWWOHPHQW
109

The potential effect of neutron fluence on fast fracture risk of the reactor pressure vessel is evaluated in all three countries. The various aspects of this ageing mechanisms may be compared as follows: =RQHV FRYHUHG In all cases, the so-called "Belt Line" is considered for fast fracture evaluation. This zone may be defined with respect to the neutron fluence likely to be calculated or observed, or on the expected effect (for example, a minimum shift in transition temperature). The second definition was first used in France, which did lead to necessary evolutions and in some case difficulties when the knowledge of ageing behaviour evolved. This did lead to an evolution towards an irradiated zone defined as the zone subjected to a fluence greater than a given threshold. (IIHFWV FRYHUHG The effects of neutron fluence include a shift of the brittle-ductile transition temperature, as well as a decrease of the upper shelf toughness. All practices consider both effects, the second one being more explicitly considered where fast fracture prevention is not limited to non-ductile (brittle) failure risk, but also includes ductile tearing evaluation, as it is the case in France. 3UHGLFWLRQ Prediction of neutron fluence effects is obtained using US-NRC Reg. Guide 1.99, rev.1 [103] (included in RCC-M Appendix ZG) in France and rev.2 [104] in Belgium (for old plants) and Spain. French practice do not use rev.2 due to the fact that this formula is based on in-service surveillance of US materials not representative of materials with low residuals. This is the reason why more precise in-service evaluations are done using FIM and FIS formulas, based on data obtained on representative materials and codified in the RSE-M code. Belgium EAS recognises this fact by using FIS and FIM prediction formulas for more recent units. 6XUYHLOODQFH SURJUDPV Surveillance programs are defined according to rules generally based on US practices. Specimens representative of base materials, welds and heat-affected zones taken from the belt line region are included in capsules subjected to a neutron flux higher than the one applied to the RPV wall itself, leading to a given "anticipation factor". Two considerations may be applied here: requirements on the maximum anticipation factor in order to guarantee the representativity of ageing measured on test samples, like in France where the fluence on test specimens shall be lower than three time the one received by the RPV wall, or requirements maximising the anticipation factor, leading to a minimum value for this factor (> 3 in Germany, for example).

These capsules are withdrawn according to a pre-determined schedule in each country. There is a global consistency of practices on this topic. The embrittlement is generally monitored by measuring the transition temperature shift at a conventional Charpy V toughness level of 41 J. The material toughness curve is then shifted by the same value. There is nevertheless a general tendency towards including fast fracture specimens in the surveillance program, allowing a direct determination of the applicable toughness curve of the material, and a reduction of uncertainties, or instrumenting Charpy tests. Evaluation of Chooz A issue in France and of Doel 1&2 in Belgium particularly demonstrates the pessimism of ageing predictions based on the above conventional approach. In addition, reserve capsules are provided with the objective to cover life extension needs, in particular in France and in Belgium.
110

&ULWHULD For normal operation, two sets of criteria are used: The US approach used in Belgium and Spain, where a reference conventional defect is considered and a safety margin is applied on the part of the stress intensity factor which is due to primary loads (mainly due to pressure), and the French approach, which considers more realistic defects and margins applied to not only the primary part, but also to the secondary part. France also consider criteria for brittle failure prevention and ductile tearing. Partial safety coefficients are also codified in the RSE-M, based on semi-probabilistic considerations.

Also screening criteria to limit the risk of vessel failure due to pressurised thermal shocks are applied in countries whose practices are based on USA approach. These criteria, based on values of RTNDT at end-of-life, were prepared, but not accepted in France. Demonstrations shall cover the next ten-years interval, and demonstrations covering the whole life have been prepared, but have no regulatory value. There are no real limitations of the reactor vessel life, except if renewal of pressure tests has to be conducted at a pressure higher to the design temperature (1.20 Pc in France), with a minimum margin between test temperature and transition temperature, the test temperature being lower than 100C for safety reasons. This may lead to vessels which cannot be used for the reason they cannot be tested safely according to regulatory requirements. 0LWLJDWLRQ In all cases, mitigation of neutron fluence effects may be obtained through a reduction of fluence by increasing at design stage the vessel diameter, and by using at design and/or in-service stages a core loading pattern with a lower leakage. Another possibility is a vessel annealing, which is identified, but not used by the utilities of the three countries. The reduction of fast fracture risk may also be obtained through a reduction of thermal shocks and an increase of material temperature during an accident, which can be obtained by an increase of the temperature of the safety injection water (used in France and Belgium). In the case of the Chooz A issue, the criterion retained was a maximum difference between the transition temperature of the vessel material and the temperature of the safety injection system. Fast fracture risk is also reduced through qualified non-destructive examinations demonstrating the absence of defects or providing a good detection of potential defects in the most severe zone, i.e. the "first 30 mm" of the vessel shell, as retained in France.  7KHUPDO DJHLQJ

Thermal ageing may affect essentially austenitic-ferritic castings used for pump and valve casings and cast elbows. Thermal ageing may also affect pressuriser low alloy steel through the form of a small shift in brittle-ductile transition temperature. Thermal ageing of austenitic-ferritic castings are considered by all utilities. =RQHV FRYHUHG The surveillance concerns mostly the reactor coolant pump casing and the cast elbows. Specific files have been established in France for "hot" and "cold" elbows, ageing effects being strongly dependant on temperature. (IIHFWV FRYHUHG Thermal ageing leads to a reduction in material toughness (Charpy values and J tearing resistance properties). Practices in the various countries have a similar coverage.

111

3UHGLFWLRQ Prediction of ageing effects have been determined, based on temperature, chemical composition and equivalent ferrite content and on models validated on experiments. French and Belgium provisions are very similar. French studies are based in particular on a very important program including tests and calculations, justified due to the standardisation of French plants, which has no equivalent in the other countries. 6XUYHLOODQFH SURJUDPV Belgium and Spanish practices follow US practices. Belgium uses Code Case N-481 allowing the replacement of volumetric examinations, subject to material and fast fracture evaluation conditions, for the primary pump casing. French practice is described in the RSE-M, with additional specific provisions coming from the conclusions of the generic studies for the most affected components. &ULWHULD There are no specific criteria in Belgium and Spain on thermal ageing of cast stainless steel products. A leak before break evaluation may be acceptable. In France, margins against fast fracture have to be demonstrated, taking into account the defects likely to affect the components. Cast elbows replacement need shall more closely be evaluated when the next steam generator is replaced, when the equivalent ferrite content is larger than 25.5%. A LBB evaluation was only used for a complementary technical evaluation according to a "defencein-depth" approach, but not used as a safety criterion.

112

0LWLJDWLRQ There are no practical mitigation possibilities, which would reduce material ageing. The accident hypotheses remaining conventional, the only possibility to reduce the fast fracture risk is by reducing the defect probability through non destructive examinations, and by replacing the most aged components taking the occasion of the SG replacement.  =RQHV FRYHUHG Zones covered include all zones important for safety where return of experience has shown SCC risk, including in particular SG tubes and RPV head penetrations. Depending on the strategy used for prediction of ageing effects and surveillance programs, other zones which are less important for safety but which are considered "precursors" are subjected to inservice surveillance in France. This surveillance is part of a global surveillance of all Inconel zones. (IIHFWV FRYHUHG Stress corrosion cracking leads to a risk of crack initiation, which after propagation may lead to a leak, and in some cases to a failure risk. 3UHGLFWLRQ Different predictive models are established by the various utilities, based on statistical evaluation of historical results. 6XUYHLOODQFH SURJUDPV US-based (ASME XI) inspections are applied in Belgium and Spain. In France, the minimum requirements are included in the RSE-M. Complementary programs are applied in each country with a percentage of examination and a periodicity which depend on the prediction made for the unit/component. Eddy Current is generally used for SG tubes inspection. Leaktightness tests are also applied, and on-line monitoring of primary/secondary leaks through activity measurements allows following the evolution of an eventual leak. &ULWHULD Criteria on SG tube cracks include a percentage of the thickness (40% in general) and a length, both linked to rupture risks evaluation. Criteria on vessel penetrations are linked to the prevention of leak risks, taking into account the crack propagation risks during the next inspection interval. Tube plugging criteria are linked to SG required performance. The general acceptable percentage is 10%, but may be increased subject to justification. 0LWLJDWLRQ Methods for mitigation of stress corrosion cracking phenomena include an increase of initiation time by a reduction of temperature (vessel heads), a material heat treatment reducing SCC sensitivity, an improvement of water chemistry, and surface treatments creating compressive surface stresses, and last but not least component change. This last solutions was considered more economic for vessels heads in France. Steam Generators are also changed when performances due to tube plugging are no more compatible with plant requests.  )DWLJXH WKHUPDO IDWLJXH 6WUHVV FRUURVLRQ FUDFNLQJ

Stress corrosion cracking on 600 alloys is an important issue, considered in all countries.

113

Fatigue evaluations are conducted at design stage, leading to a usage factor which shall remain lower than 1.0 at end of life. Transient follow is done during the life of the plant to demonstrate that service conditions are consistent with design assumptions. This practice is common to all countries. Consequently, return of experience is essentially limited to components subjected to complex thermal loading, which were underestimated at design stage, and to components for which a detailed fatigue evaluation was not required due to their safety classification. =RQHV FRYHUHG Fatigue initiation under thermal loading is considered in zones where return of experience did show potential initiation risks, for example thermal barrier of reactor cooling pump, or zones with mixing of fluids at different temperatures. (IIHFWV FRYHUHG The final objective of fatigue prevention is the failure or leak risk. Every country agrees on this objective. Nevertheless, the best way to reduce fatigue risks is to reduce fatigue crack initiation risks. There is a difference on the importance given to this topic. Prevention of initiation is more strongly required by the safety authority in France, leading to practical criteria more stringent than US-based criteria 3UHGLFWLRQ Prediction of fatigue risks is conducted through fatigue analyses using standard procedures. Specific evaluations are applied where needed in zones with stratification or complex thermal loading. Evaluations of crack propagation risks in thermal barriers show that the number of cycles necessary for having a failure or even a leak risk is high and is compatible with optimised replacement program. 6XUYHLOODQFH SURJUDPV Transient monitoring is applied in all countries, though through slightly different practical implementations in order to evaluate applied transients and their numbers of occurrences. Periodic inspections are conducted according to ASME XI in Belgium and Spain, and according to RSE-M in France. No systematic surveillance programs are required for thermal barriers of primary pumps. &ULWHULD Prevention of fatigue is obtained through ASME III criteria in Belgium and Spain, and through similar RCC-M criteria in France. Initiation prevention is required in France. Prevention of leak or failure risk is required in all countries. Evolutions are under evaluation in the various countries in order to extend fatigue verification requirements to old class 1 piping not initially subjected to fatigue evaluation requirements, and to non-class 1 components subjected to severe loading, and to reevaluate the applicable fatigue design curves.

114

0LWLJDWLRQ Mitigation of thermal fatigue risks include recommendations on system use (residual heat removal system case), the suppression of leak sources, improvement of design details and surface condition in case of component replacement. A particular attention is paid to this last consideration in France.  &RQWDLQPHQW DJHLQJ

Containment functions covered in all countries include resistance and leaktightness. Resistance is affected by decrease of tension in prestressing cables. Ageing of concrete may lead to potential loss of leaktightness. Relative movements between structures are also addressed. =RQHV FRYHUHG Requirements cover essentially concrete buildings and particularly containment buildings with no lining for leaktightness aspects. (IIHFWV FRYHUHG Loss of tension of prestressing cables, cracks leading to leaks, relative movements. 3UHGLFWLRQ Containment evaluation is mainly based on kinetics derived from actual tests. 6XUYHLOODQFH SURJUDPV Surveillance programs include equivalent provisions in the various countries, covering: strain and deformation measurements of concrete walls, tension tests of cables, and inspection of anchors, absolute and differential settlement measurements, visual examinations, containment pressurisation tests and leaktightness tests mechanical and chemical tests are also conducted on test samples (Belgium).

Frequency of inspection depend on the country and on the test under consideration, but remain relatively similar. &ULWHULD Criteria include: minimal mechanical properties of the structure, design settlement values, leaktightness requirements, expressed as an allowable percentage of internal volume per day.

0LWLJDWLRQ Mitigation methods include repair of concrete and injections.  (OHFWULFDO DQG , & DJHLQJ

Electrical equipment classified 1E is qualified according to provisions equivalent in various countries, which shall include ageing risks (VISA procedure according to French RCC-E, US based practice in Belgium and Spain). IEEE standards are referred to in all rules. (IIHFWV FRYHUHG The objective is in all cases to be able to demonstrate the validity of the qualification tests. 3UHGLFWLRQ

115

This is obtained in all cases by the simulation of the significant parameters (ageing, irradiation, earthquake and simulated accident conditions) for the intended qualified life, which are applied during the qualification tests. In addition, a large generic study was conducted in France in the context of the plant life evaluation studies. 6XUYHLOODQFH SURJUDPV Qualification of components is covered by qualification programs. &ULWHULD Components have to be replaced when qualified life expires. Extension of qualified life may be possible subject to the verification that components have been subjected to less severe conditions than expected. 0LWLJDWLRQ By preventive maintenance / replacement programs. Obsolescence have to be particularly anticipated for these components. This is in particular the task of a large French study involving various potential suppliers.  &DEOHV DJHLQJ

Ageing of insulation is anticipated in qualification tests, except for older cables, where such tests were not done. All countries appear to conduct a specific evaluation of cable ageing and associated risk of loss of electric properties likely to affect their intended functions. (IIHFWV FRYHUHG Loss of electrical isolation due to thermal ageing and irradiation and risk of loss of function of K1 classified cables during accident. This concerns mainly PVC insulation. Reduction of strain at rupture for all materials. 3UHGLFWLRQ Anticipated ageing conditions are covered in the qualification tests conducted on representative components. Models have been established, based on collected experimental data, including international references and laboratory tests. 6XUYHLOODQFH SURJUDPV Monitoring of mechanical and electrical characteristics for original non-qualified cables + routine visual examinations or monitoring of representative samples, depending on condition severity. &ULWHULD Cables are replaced before the end of their qualified life. 0LWLJDWLRQ Extension of life is possible through a better evaluation of the environment severity.

116



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The above comparison conducted on some typical examples show the global consistency of the approaches chosen in the three countries, though the applicable criteria may differ on particular points, such as criteria or prescribed safety margins. The general tendency is for Belgium and Spain to refer as far as possible to the US methodology and criteria, where France tends to develop its own methodology due to the standardisation of its NPPs and specific regulatory requirements.

117



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The purpose of this analysis is to compare the approaches adopted by 3 countries, Spain, Belgium and France for an Ageing Management Process, with the international recommendations. Additional comparisons with US methodologies are given in Appendix 5. The methodology followed for this comparison was as follows: 1) 2) a description by each country representative of its own process, covered in Appendix 4, a general comparison that constitutes the purpose of this Section.



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In the interests of obtaining comparable descriptions, a standardised form of questioning was sought: the reference document for the IAEA Ageing Management Assessment Teams (AMATs dated March 1999 [44]) includes in part II (Supplementary Guidance for AMP programmatic review) a list of areas to be reviewed: as a reminder these are given in Table 6.1 below. 7$%/(   $5($6 2) 5(9,(:
,, $03 675$7(*< - Regulatory policy and requirements - AMP policy - International guidance - Scope of AMP ,, $03 25*$1,6$7,21 ,, $03 $&7,9,7,(6 ,, $03 5(68/76 ,, $03 021,725,1*

- AMP organisation - SSC screening method and programme description - List of SSCs - Resources: - Operational (a) human procedures (b) financial - Surveillance - Assessment - Maintenance (c) tools and equipment (d) external

- Physical condition - Self-assessment of SSC programme - EQ established and - Peer reviews maintained - Comprehensive - Performance reviews indicators - Continuous improvement process

- Data collection - Provisions for and record keeping understanding SSC NB: assessment ageing includes data analysis

The 3 countries filled in a form based on these areas, except for II.4 "results" which was not relevant. The completed forms are given in Appendix 4: Spain: completed by UNESA, Belgium: completed by Tractebel, France: completed by EDF



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Each country have defined or refer to existing documents on the following topics: Regulatory policy and requirements, covered in Section 4, Ageing Management Processes covered in Section 5, described in UNESA documents in Spain, in the context of the "Continuous Operation of Belgian NPPs" project in Belgium, and by the "Service Life and Ageing of Pressurised Water Power Plants" project in France, International guidance documents are considered in each case, these documents including contributions of contributors to the present study.  6$)(7< $1' 5(*8/$725< $63(&76

The Safety and Regulatory aspects are covered in Section 4. The life time of the units in the three countries is not limited by regulations: Spanish and Belgian units are subject to a licensing process, French units obtain their authorisation to operate through a dcret de cration.

In no case is a limit pre-determined and, provided that the safety level can be justified, the decision to continue to operate is taken by the Owner on economical grounds. The safety status of the units is subject to a continuous process of assessment in order to validate the conformity to the Safety Analysis Report. In addition Periodic Safety Reviews (P.S.R.) are performed and may include a Safety Reassessment. a P.S.R. is required under the terms of the licence for Spanish and Belgian units, in France, EDF has proposed and the Safety Authority has accepted to perform the review of conformity and the reassessment on a 10 year basis. $*(,1* 0$1$*(0(17 352*5$00( 32/,&<  6&23( 2) $03



With different levels of formalisation of criteria (safety, availability, economical) the principle is in every case to define a list of sensitive components that have a risk of failure due to ageing before the forecast life duration. The design life duration is given by figures such as 30/40 years: it can be mentioned in the Safety Analysis report; the value may be different for certain equipment. Sensitive equipment is ranked according to the degree of importance for lifetime management, taking into account the importance for safety and availability. It appears that the Ageing Management Programs of all countries go beyond the IAEA objectives, which are limited to safety aspects, to cover all components which have a significant impact on reliability, replacement and cost. For these components the scope of the programme includes: analysis of ageing phenomena, justification of behaviour, including rate of deterioration and determination of critical defects, assessment of maintenance practices.




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UNESA and Tractebel do not have direct responsibility for the units: they are in charge of methodologies, advice, studies which should be taken up and put into force by the management of the units. EDF has to manage series of units, so it imposes practices on all units of the same type from a corporate level. For Spain: each operator has its own organisation, which has to adapt the programme proposals and the results of the studies carried out by UNESA to its specific circumstances. Responsibility for discussion with the Safety Authorities is in the hands of each unit. For Belgium: the basic rules are given by Electrabel at a corporate level and then, on each site they are put into action by a local organisation. The engineering support is given by Tractebel. The responsibility for discussion with the Safety Authorities is in the hands of each site (i.e. Doel or Tihange). For France: EDF manages the programme at a corporate level of the Operating Division (DPN). On request, the EDF Engineering Team and Research Department provide the supporting activity. The responsibility for discussion with the Safety Authorities is in the hands of the corporate level of DPN. ,17(51$/ 25*$1,6$7,21 2) $*(,1* 0$1$*(0(17

The consequences:

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In the three companies the activity is managed by specific teams: in Tractebel and UNESA they are project type organisations. They submit their product to their respective clients, Electrabel or the Spanish Units, for decision and implementation. in EDF: it is a co-ordinating group, which puts recommendations to the Steering Committee in charge of making all decisions for modifications or maintenance (either basic design or detailed design and implementation of modifications). 0$1$*(0(17 2) 3(56211(/



The personnel in charge of the activities linked to lifespan, either directly involved in the specific teams or maintained in their original entities, have not been chosen according to specific criteria: as is the case for any other activity, they are chosen for their skill and experience in relation to the task assigned to the team they belong to. Life management in fact demands a wide variety of skills and it appears clearly that no dedicated organisation has been set up in the engineering teams. The specific team in charge is thus required to co-ordinate a large number of actions assigned to specialised teams. As a result no personnel is allocated; execution depends on the capacity of the teams, laboratories and subcontractors to handle the workload of the job assigned to them. As is the case in any engineering job, they have to anticipate and forecast their activity. Accordingly, training for personnel is decided in observance of the internal procedures of the entity.  (;3(57 $335$,6$/  $'9,&(

In addition to internal resources, each entity can decide to complement the skills needed by external support from specialised companies. Exchanges between utilities and engineering companies are numerous and organised. Periodic meetings or congresses are held within the scope of the EC, IAEA and WANO.



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Belgium, French and Spanish methodologies may be summarised as follows. These descriptions show that IAEA recommendations are fulfilled in every case, although the practices described go beyond IAEA methodology, which is limited to safety aspects.  ,$($ 0HWKRGRORJ\

The methodology defined in IAEA Technical Report Series N 338 [37] is oriented to ensuring safety during the service life of the plant by knowing, controlling and monitoring ageing mechanisms that could put to risk plant safety. The methodology is structured as follows: a. Selection of components important for safety and whose ageing must be analysed. The selection process includes the following steps: 1. 2. 3. 4. b. Selection of the systems and structures that contribute to plant safety Impact of component failure on system functions Probability that ageing can cause component failure Suitability of maintenance Methods to analyse said ageing effects, as well as the options for monitoring and mitigation.

Initial selection includes all SSC that are safety-related and those that are not safety-related and whose failure can prevent performance of safety functions. However, strict and systematic ageing assessment is only applied to the population which, exclusively in accordance to the experience gained by the industry and to the plant specific experience, are subject to failure by ageing and are not covered by appropriate maintenance for ageing mitigation and/or monitoring The purpose of ageing assessments is to detect ageing mechanisms that could prevent safety function performance in the course of the plant service life period The assessments are aimed at determining the severe effects of ageing on components and structures, and at confirming maintenance efficiency to mitigate andlor monitor said effects, keeping components within safety margins for them to fulfil their functions during service life. Lack of sufficient information or of precise knowledge of degradation mechanisms that generate uncertainties in the initial "provisional" assessment (phase I) of ageing effects require detailed analyses (phase II) to clear said uncertainties. Maintenance evaluation is performed with criteria similar to the ones in the other methodologies, but for the service life scenario.

121



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The UNESA methodology comprises the following steps: a. Selection of components, using life management criteria, b. Examination of ageing mechanisms and selection of components subject to severe degradation, c. Evaluation of maintenance for life management and proposal of improvements. Initial selection includes safety-related SSC as well as those that have significant impact on availability, replacement and cost. The entire population selected is submitted to systematic ageing assessment; when ageing effects are severe, maintenance efficiency is assessed. The purpose of ageing assessments is to detect ageing mechanisms that could prevent performance of the functions necessary for safe and economic operation during plant service life. The assessments are aimed at determining ageing effects on components and structures, and at identifying the ones that are severely affected and therefore require a detailed analysis of maintenance practices to confirm ageing control during service life. The entire process is summarised in the component degradation data sheets and in the maintenance practice data sheets that are prepared to facilitate the systematic evaluation of existing practices with the subsequent improvement proposal. Maintenance evaluation is performed with criteria similar to the ones in the other methodologies, but for the service life scenario.  %HOJLXP 0HWKRGRORJ\

In Belgium, the safety of nuclear power plants is based on compliance with fundamental safety principles which must be applied in everyday operation, following lessons learned from nuclear incidents, and on a regular and comprehensive review of safety in order to ensure that any necessary improvements are made. During safety reviews, ageing is systematically investigated in order to demonstrate that the safety of the installations is guaranteed during the next decade. For safety-related components, specific programs exist in order to guarantee the integrity and the availability of these equipments during the exploitation of the NPPs. For the passive safety-related components and the non safety-related components but important for the plant availability, a specific ageing management project was created. The main objective of this project is to centralise all safety and economic aspects of the plant life management in order to determine, for each unit, the most probable cost required to maintain, safely and economically, the unit in operation. The selection and prioritisation of SSC is performed with criteria similar to the ones in other methodologies (e.g. IAEA), although the IAEA methodology concentrate only on safety aspects. In order to facilitate ageing assessment, Equipment Ageing Summaries were created. These reports summarise the knowledge gathered on the various topics related to SSC ageing and the situation of each NPP with respect to these ageing phenomena.  )UHQFK 0HWKRGRORJ\

EDF Methodology is the following: 1. The purpose of ageing assessments covers three aspects closely interconnected: technical, economic and safety

122

7HFKQLFDO: equipment life may be jeopardized because of various deterioration modes inhibited required functions. Component ageing depends on operating and maintenance conditions. Therefore solving technical issues requires taking into account the following aspects : design and manufacturing file, operating conditions, maintenance strategy, experience feedback and support from R&D programmes. (FRQRPLF: the cost of nuclear power generation needs to remain competitive while integrating maintenance costs involved in dealing with ageing effects and those induced by compliance with increasing safety requirements. For example this means that it is important to correctly assess probable trends in "standard" and "exceptional" maintenance costs. 6DIHW\: the operation of installation needs to always comply with regulations. Ageing effects may reduce design-basis safety margins wich may in turn generate changes with operating conditions. These margins may decrease due to increased safety requirements. 2. The assessments are aimed at determining the potential life of components and structures by taking into account all available aspects (see "technical" in the above paragraph ). EDF gives priority to routine and exceptional preventive maintenance activities because both imply a socalled "anticipation approach". The objective is to identify and assess generic-type defects of components and systems. This relates to functional faults or degradation, component ageing, and manufacturer diminished skill. Exceptional maintenance involves sporadic though possibly generic activities, usually performed once in a plant life and involves significant resources and cost. Beyond the analysis of equipment ageing, overall generic approaches are being developed, focusing on specific generic-type damage : irradiation/embrittlement, vibration and wear, corrosion/erosion, non ductile failure, stress corrosion, and non destructive measurement of material degradation (through ageing).  23(5$7,1* 352&('85(6

Operating procedures are written in compliance with design data, such as the number of transients that items of equipment subject to fatigue analysis are to undergo. Further provisions have been added so as to limit ageing effects: limitation in terms of the profile of transients and their occurrence, improvement of secondary side chemistry, arrangement of core for low neutron losses...

A detailed list of these provisions has not been made (an analysis unit by unit would be necessary) but it is understood that the subject is handled by the three engineering organisations and the corresponding utilities. Of the topics checked through the list in the AMAT guide, this one is particular in that it aims to avoid ageing. All the other topics, without exception, try to detect and correct the effects of ageing.  6859(,//$1&( 352*5$00(

They exist in the three countries: include periodic tests and surveillance programme. The feeling is that they have been issued independently of the ageing programme. However, after specific reviews as explained for example by UNESA, it may be decided to complement them. In France the preventive maintenance basic programmes were decided subsequent to analysis of the failure rates. They are complemented by the feedback from experience on incidents (specific check point added) and progressively optimised to reduce cost a major factor with regard to life time .  0$,17$,1,1* (48,30(17 48$/,),&$7,21

123

The life time of qualified components is determined by the hypotheses adopted in their qualification programme: for components subjected to fatigue, reassessment is under way (real number of transient occurrences, less conservative methods of fatigue analysis), real conditions are also checked against qualification programme analysis, UNESA / NPPs focus on the problem of obtaining spare parts, as many suppliers are abandoning the production of nuclear-grade components. EDF is adding a process to inform the maintenance team of particular points needing care during maintenance operations, so as to avoid impairing qualification.



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The programmes have been presented to the Safety Authorities, which have given a favourable opinion. The results are included in the yearly review and, as such, are subject to review by the owner and submitted to the Safety Authorities for approval. In France specific "Groupe Permanent" meetings are held for this purpose.



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This analysis shows that: ageing management process is a huge activity in the three countries. No legal life time is imposed. Only design life times are mentioned for some components and are the starting point for analysis. specific teams have been created to manage the process, with either a project type or mission co-ordination type organisation. the engineering job is assigned to the teams according to their skills: no devoted entity has been established. The teams called upon may be from in-house engineering staff or subcontractors. For the moment, there is no apparent difficulty in modifying the resources. Only in some cases do difficulties arise in terms of spare part availability or engineering, as a result of companies abandoning a certain field. Responsibility is always borne by the operator: by the units in Spain, at a corporate level by Electrabel and EDF in Belgium and France respectively. The involvement of Safety Authorities is always strong: presentations of the programme are made, through PSR, ten-yearly assessments are performed and formalised. The working method is more or less formalised, but always includes: selection of sensitive equipment, identification of ageing phenomena, cross analysis with the maintenance and monitoring processes applied to the selected equipment in the units. Two levels of activity appear: major components (reactor vessel, primary loops, containment) for which in-depth analyses are necessary to justify life duration,
124

 smaller components for which analyses are required to detect and anticipate failure, in which case the links with planned surveillance programmes and preventive maintenance programmes are established. The aim of the utilities of the three countries is to operate their units as long as they can operate safely and economically, with the support of their own engineering forces and subcontractors. In this analysis, the question as to how to maintain the necessary skills over such a long period, as compared to other industrial processes, is not included. The communication of the process to maintain the confidence of the population should also be part of ageing management.

125



&21&/86,216 $1' 5(&200(1'$7,216



&21&/86,216

Safe control of ageing of nuclear power plants constitute an important concern for every plant Owner and Safety Authority. Since 20 years, this topic constitutes the subject of numerous studies which have led in particular the utilities to establish programs or projects specifically dedicated to the management of ageing of systems, structures and components (SSC). The study shows that Belgian, French and Spanish nuclear power plants are subjected to appropriate ageing monitoring programs or projects, which fulfil the IAEA international recommendations on this topic. The contributors of the present study agree on the conclusions of the international groups and consider that these recommendations are sufficient to help operators managing ageing aspects from a safety point of view. The study also shows the general consistency of the objectives in the different countries, which go beyond safety aspects, differences in organisational approaches resulting from differences in industrial and regulatory contexts. There is in particular a general agreement on the service life of the plant which is the life during which the plant may be operated safely and economically. Safety is then a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. Current ageing management programs aim essentially at managing the gradual evolution of systems, structures and components as a result of their physical ageing in order to ensure permanently satisfying the safety criteria. Apart from this physical ageing, other factors will sooner or later affect plant service, such as climate changes, evolution of electricity market competition and industrial context, organisation changes, conservation of human knowledge, evolution of safety criteria, management of human factor on a long period... Such parameters only start being considered in ageing studies. The various aspects leading to slow evolutions (management of physical ageing and general changes) are in particular evaluated during periodic safety reassessment (generally each ten years). Aspects related to more quick changes (in particular those affecting active components) are managed on a continuous basis, through an appropriate maintenance, and component qualification. It is possible to conclude that the "ageing" of LWR nuclear power plants can be put under control. Through monitoring and clear understanding of the different degradation mechanisms, which are common phenomena in an industrial facility, the operator is able to anticipate, via an adapted programme, the necessary measures (for instance, monitoring, servicing or replacement of material involved) in order to operate its plants safely and economically.



5(&200(1'$7,216

Considering the existing practices, the results obtained and the research programmes currently running, the ageing management field may be considered as being adequately covered. Nevertheless, one can suggest to particularly emphasise the efforts on the following topics:

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Regulatory aspects Electricity operators have more and more to compete in a de-regulated market with other countries and other energy sources and they are subjected in the nuclear field to national requirements which may be significantly different on some aspects. It is therefore recommended that exchanges between regulators be maintained at the European and International levels, and that harmonisation of general provisions be obtained in safety standards, particularly on the consideration of risk-informed aspects, which constitute one of the essential bases of any plant ageing management approach, and qualification methods. In the context of operator competition, it is also recommended to agree as far as possible, through European or international safety groups, on the expression of safety acceptance criteria (including probability figures, and/or safety margins objectives, where appropriate). Although a permanent attention to safety aspects is necessary, a certain stability of the safety requirements is recommended to permit full benefits from the analysis of return of experience and plant improvements. Management aspects of physical ageing Following the conclusions of the present study, it does not appear necessary to formulate particular recommendations related to ageing management of plants in general. It appears nevertheless useful for operators to issue periodic syntheses following IAEA format. The existence of such synthetic periodically updated evaluation may also play a role in the general context of public acceptance. In particular, it is recommended to consider the logical Demings Plan-Do-Check-Act approach described in [38] (See Appendix 1, B4 sheet). A particular emphasis shall be placed on a close follow up of what happens in the plant. In addition to IAEA reports recommendations concerning design information, the weight shall be put on detailed operating conditions book-keeping covering the entire life of SSCs. Ageing management shall not be restricted to the oldest plants, where improvements or mitigation measures may have a limited impact. It shall consequently be considered as early as possible in the daily operation of the plant. Prediction of ageing Damage can never be 100% anticipated. Design studies can only restrict (though significantly) the uncertainties. From this point of view, the developments concerning identified ageing mechanisms are considered adequate. The essential points where progresses are recommended concern: the evaluation of degradation kinetics, in order to avoid failures occurring earlier than expected, the description of uncertainties, problems of ageing evaluations being related to the accuracy of the description of the imposed loading or environment conditions, the improvement of the understanding of local loads and their variations as a function of operating modes, including the starting tests and eventual modifications, which shall be considered as part of the loading history, a better evaluation of the effect of fabrication process on ageing (for example surface optimisation intended to modify residual stress field), and the improvement of the knowledge on surface behaviour. As far as the majority of in-service damages appear at the component surfaces, it is useful to give a great attention to surface engineering, by exchanging knowledge between experts of various disciplines, such as chemists for the behaviour of oxide layers, manufacturers for the control of surface state and residual stresses, thermal-hydraulic experts for

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the determination of thermal loading, mechanical analysis experts for the determination of system and component behaviour..., the use of expertise conducted on decommissioned plants or replaced components in order to extend the available data and provide a better evaluation of existing safety margins, the integration of additional material where material ageing programs are conducted, to cover life extension or evolutions in ageing evaluation methods, Detection / follow of physical ageing Detection and knowledge of physical ageing may be improved through: a reinforcement of cooperation between plant operators in order to identify as soon as possible any signs of ageing precursors and their possible treatment. This does not necessarily signify the integration of every data in large databases, the practical applications to specific series being better based on specific narrower distributions, extending relations with other industrial sectors in order to exchange experience on ageing phenomena not specifically linked to irradiation, in particular concerning civil works, advance tools for monitoring and surveillance in order to permit a better evaluation of existing margins and a better allocation of available resources, continuing improvements of traditional non-destructive examination methods, in particular in concrete structures, and industrialisation of methods likely to detect ageing risks before occurrence of irreversible damage (during damage initiation), Ageing mitigation and repair / replacement Recommendations on mitigation of physical ageing concern the following aspects: to optimise operation and component qualification conditions following return of experience, to investigate the repair methods used in other industrial sectors, in order to adapt them, after qualification, to nuclear applications, and to share qualification costs, in order to optimise in particular the behaviour of surfaces, the importance of which was recalled in above paragraphs, to anticipate replacement where appropriate, through feasibility studies including consideration of potential impacts on safety, more generally, to support exchanges between users and manufacturers in order to better appreciate the relations between operation conditions and ageing. Concerning component replacement, additional work on criteria for possible equivalence (for example for I&C) to cover technical obsolescence is recommended. Other aspects of ageing management In addition to the consideration of technological aspects dealt with above, it is recommended to assess the management of the other aspects of ageing, which seem to present less acute direct consequences than physical ageing, but must nevertheless be evaluated. On these topics, the experience of other industrial sectors may give valuable information, even if the service life envisaged for nuclear power plants is longer than the design life of the major part of the other industrial installations. In particular, a significant part of recorded incidents are due to human factors. It is therefore essential to invest on human management aspects, and to the adaptation of safety culture and procedures, taking into account the evolution of people experience, of tools and of general industrial culture, which give more and more importance to economical aspects.

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Taking into account the objective of safe management during long periods, and the necessity to demonstrate compliance as a minimum to the initial safety requirements, it is also necessary to keep during a long period, not only the basic requirements, but also a good understanding of what is behind. Hence, the knowledge management is also an important point in the nuclear field. Economical considerations Production costs are related to plant availability factor and lifetime. Consequently, ageing anticipation and lifetime management are important from an economic point of view. Taking into account the necessity for competitivity, which is introduced by the international and European agreements on competition rules, while maintaining or increasing the safety of the plants and the safeguard of investments already done, there is a strong need for a sharing of costs for the above developments in the ageing management domain. Even under strong economic pressures, safety must continue to be the first priority in the management of ageing NPPs.

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5()(5(1&(6

[1] NEA 66 98 10 P Report "Future nuclear regulatory challenges" - November 1998. [2] NEA/CNRA/R(99)1 Report "Regulatory Aspects of Ageing Reactors" - March 1999. [3] NEA/CSNI/R(95)1 Report "State of the art on key fracture mechanics aspects of integrity assessment", 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)6). [4] NEA/CSNI/R(95)4 "Report on round robin activities on the calculation of crack opening behaviour and leak rates for small bore piping components", 1995 (also referenced as OCDE/GD(95)90) [5] NEA/CSNI/R(95)6 Report "Workshop on Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Failure Probabilities" (1992: Kln, Germany), 1995 (also referenced as OCDE/GD(95)91 [6] NEA/CSNI/R(95)17 Report "International Workshop on Aged and Decommissioned Material Collection and Testing for Structural Integrity Purposes" (1995 : Mol, Belgiurn), 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)10) [7] NEA/CSNI/R(95)18 Report "Leak before break in reactor piping and vessels specialists meeting (1995: Lyon, France), 1996, Vols 1-3 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)11) [8] NEA/CSNI/R(95)19 "Report of the task group reviewing national and international activities in the area of ageing of nuclear power plant concrete structures", 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)31) [9] NEA/CSNI/R(96)1 Report "FALSIRE : phase 2 : CSNI project for Fracture Analyses of LargeScale International Reference Experiments, 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE / GD (96) 187) [10] NEA/CSNI/R(96)4 Report "Probabilistic structure integrity analysis and its relationship to deterministic analysis (1996: Stockholm, Sweden), 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE / GD (96) 124) [11] NEA/CSNI/R(96)10 Report "Seismic shear wall ISP: NUPEC's seismic ultimate dynamic response test: comparison report", 1996 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)188) [12] NEA/CSNI/R(96)11 "Report of the task group on the seismic behaviour of structures : status report", 1997 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(96)189) [13] NEA/CSNI/R(97)1 Report "NDE Techniques capability demonstration and inspection qualification : proceedings of the Joint EC, OCDE, IAEA Specialists Meeting" (1997: Petten, The Netherlands), 1997 (also referenced as: EUR 17354 EN) [14] NEA/CSNI/R(97)8 Report "Fatigue crack growth benchmark" [15] NEA/CSNI/R(97)9 Report "Joint WANO/OECD-NEA Workshop: Prestress loss in NPP containments" (1997: Poitiers, France), 1997 (also referenced as: OCDE/GD(97)225) [16] NEA/CSNI/R(97)28 Report "Development priorities for NDE of concrete structures in nuclear plants (NEA Workshop, Risley, United Kingdom, Nov. 97) 1998 [17] NEA/CSNI/R(98)5 Report "Status report on seismic re-evaluation" - Nov. 1998 [18] NEA/CSNI/R(98)6 Report "Development priorities for non-destructive examination of concrete structures in nuclear plant", Nov. 1998 [19] NEA/CSNI/R(98)7 Report "Survey of organic components in nuclear power plants", 1998

130

[20] NEA/CSNI/R(98)8 Report "Experience with Thermal Fatigue in LWR Piping Caused by Mixing and Stratification" - December 1998 [21] NEA/CSNI/R(98)9 Report "PISC III: Final report", 1998 [22] NEA/CSNI/R(99)1 Report "Finite Element analysis of degraded concrete structure Workshop Proceedings - BNL, NY, USA, 29-30 Oct. 1998" - Sept 99 [23] NEA/CSNI/R(99)11 Report "NPP Containment Prestress loss. Summary Statement" - Sept. 99 [24] OECD/PWG 3 Report "Relation of ageing and seismic engineering Draft" - June 1999 [25] CSNI - PWG 3 Report "Plant Ageing Management - Providing a technical basis for long-term operation of light water reactors" Technical Position Document. Draft - May 1999 [26] A. MILLER and L. SMITH "Activities of the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency in the area of concrete containment ageing" Transaction of the SMIRT15- Seoul, Korea, August 15-20, 1999 [27] NEA/CSNI/R(95)9 Report "Evidence of Ageing Effects on Certain Safety-Related Components Volume 1 : Summary and Analysis (68 pages), Volume 2: Contributions - 2A: France, Sweden - 2B: Finland - 2C: Japan, US, UK" Septembre 1995. [28] NEA/CSNI/R(97)23 Report "Operating and Maintenance Experience with Computer-based Systems in NPPs" - Septembre 1998 (53 pages) [29] NEA/CSNI/R(98)10 Report "Reliability Data Collection Workshop Proceedings - Budapest, Hungary (21-23 April 1998)" - March 1999. [30] NEA/SEN/NDC(97)11, Rev. 1 Report "PLIM Workshop - 6th Meeting of the Expert Group on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management" - June 1997. [31] NEA/NDC Common Ageing Terminology - July 1999 (Joint work of NEA, CEC and IAEA; in five language) [32] NEA/NDC/DOC(99)1 Report "Refurbishment costs of Nuclear Power plants" January 1999. [33] NEA/NDC Policy and Effective Management of Nuclear Power Plant Life Management - First draft version 5, April 15,1999 [34] SESAR-FAP Report "Major Facilities and Programmes at risk Draft", 18 August 1999. [35] TECDOC-540 Report "Safety Aspects of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing", 1990. [36] Safety Series No 50-P.3 Report "Data collection and Record keeping for the management of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing - A Safety Practice", 1991. [37] Technical Reports Series No 338 "Methodology for the Management of Ageing of Nuclear Power Plant Components Important to Safety", 1992. [38] Safety Series No 15 Report "Implementation and Review of a Nuclear Power Plant Ageing Management Programme", 1999. [39] Safety Reports Series No 3 "Equipment Qualification in Operational Nuclear Power Plants", 1998. [40] TECDOC-981 Report "Assessment and management of ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety : Steam Generators", November 1997. [41] TECDOC-1025 Report "Assessment and Management of Ageing of Major Nuclear Power Plants Components Important to Safety : Concrete Containment Buildings", June 1998. [42] TECDOC-1120 Report "Assessment and management of ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety : PWR Pressure Vessels", October 1999.

131

[43] TECDOC-1119 Report "Assessment and management of ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety : PWR Vessel Internals", October 1999. [44] Services Series No 4 "AMAT Guidelines. Reference document for the IAEA ageing management assessment teams", March 1999. [45] TECDOC-932 Report " Final Report: Pilot Studies on Management of Ageing of Instrumentation and Control Cables, Results of a co-ordinated research programme 19931995", March 1997. [46] IAEA/NSNI - Report on the IAEA Research Coordination meeting "Co-ordinated Research Programme (CRP) on Management of Ageing of In-Containment Instrumentation and Control Cables", 8-12 June 1998, Bordeaux, France. [47] Safety Reports Series No 12 "Evaluation of the Safety of Operating Nuclear Power Plant Built to Earlier Standards - A common Basis for Judgement", 1998. [48] Safety Series No 50-C-0 (Rev. 1) "Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants : Operation", In course of revision ; draft April 1999. [49] Safety Series No 50-SG-09 "Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation : A safety Guide", 1994. [50] Safety Series No 50-SG-012 "Periodic Safety of Operational Nuclear Power Plants : A Safety Guide", 1994. [51] J. Pachner/IAEA "Systematic Ageing Management Process : a key element for Long Term Safety, Reliability and Economy of Nuclear Power Plants", Transactions of the 15th International Conference on Structural Mechanics in Reactor Technology (SMIRT15), Seoul, Korea, August 15-20, 1999. [52] L.M. Davies, A.D. Boothroyd and L. Ianko "Aspects of Plant Life Assurance and Plant Life Management", Paper IAEA-CN-59/40, Internat. Conference on the Nuclear Power Option, Vienna - 5-9 Sep. 1994. [53] TECDOC-1084 Report "Review of Selected Cost Drivers for Decisions on Continued Operation of Older Nuclear Reactors - Safety Upgrades, Lifetime Extension, Decommissioning", May 1999. [54] IWG-LMNPP-94/6 "International Database on Ageing Management and Life Extension Database Specification", 1994. [55] TECDOC-670 "Pilot studies on Management of Ageing of Nuclear Power Plant Components Results of Phase I", October 1992. [56] INSAG-14 Report "Safe management of the Operating Lifetimes of Nuclear Power Plants", November 1999. [57] CEC-ENV Contract 98/872/3040/DEB/C2. [58] P. Saint Raymond "Sret des installations anciennes" Journe SFEN du 8 dcembre 1998, Paris. [59] I. Marcelles, M.T. Aguado, L. Tauroni, D. Foster, M. Sladovic "Preparatory work for an indicative programme related to ageing issues to be handled by the WGCS" Final Report prepared by Tecnatom S.A. under Study contract B4-3070/96/000295/MAR/C2, December 1997. [60] RSE-M "In Service Inspection Rules For the Mechanical Components of PWR Nuclear Power Islands", AFCEN, Paris, 1997 Edition. Available in French and English. [61] ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 1998 Edition.
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[62] F. Alicino, E. Capurro, S. Reale, L. Tognatelli "Analytic evaluation of Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) acceptance criteria by fracture mechanics in the in-service inspection (ISI)", EUR Report 17573 EN, Contract RA1-0175-I, 1998. [63] A. Rogerson, R.J. Hudgell, J. Wessels, J.M. Tchilian, B.W.O. Shepherd, F. Hardie, S. Bryant "Review of Progresses in the harmonisation of European In-Service Inspection Codes", AEAT Report 0804, Contract RA1-0218-UK, January 1997. [64] KTA Safety Standards for ISI. KTA 3201.4 and 3211.4. [65] M. Duff, P. Lemaitre, B. Shepherd, J.M. Tchilian, J. Wessels Qualification of inspection techniques for manufacturing of components for NPPs" Framatome Draft Final Report QR DC 0179, Contract B4-3070/96/000714/MAR/C2. April 1999. [66] Common position of European regulators on qualification of NDT systems for pre- and inservice inspection of light water reactor components. EUR Report 16802 EN, 1996. [67] European Methodology for Qualification. ENIQ Report N2. EUR Report 17299 EN, 1997. [68] B. Shepherd, M. Serre, G. Engl, R. Martinez-Ona "Analysis and comparison of ISI programmes between western and eastern countries". Tecnatome Report Contract COSU-CT94-063-ES. 1997. [69] F. Braibant, E. Capurro, R. Martinez-Ona, B.W.O. Shepherd "Guidelines for Optimising Component Geometry to improve inspectability". Ansaldo Report Contract 95-D11-001155, June 1998. [70] B.W.O. Shepherd "The influence of material and manufacturing process on inspectability". EC Contract B4-3070/95/001168. June 1998. [71] I. Atkinson "Continuous On-Line Monitoring of NPPs Components" Final Report EUR 18 333 EN. November 1998.. [72] Directive 97/23/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of May 1997 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning pressure equipment", Official Journal of the European Communities July 9, 1997. [73] J.M. Grandemange, J. Hliot, J.A. Le Duff, C. Heng, E. Keim, S. Fricke, N.G. Smith, S.K. Bate, G. Marquis, K. Rahka, P. Zanaboni, C. Cuerto-Felgueroso, H. Hbel "Reevaluation of fatigue analysis criteria" Framatome Report EE/S 98.317. Contract B43070/95/000876/MAR/C2. October 1998. [74] O. Gelineau, J.P. Simoneau "Benchmark on thermal striping" Framatome Report NVMD DC 98.044 EC Study 95-D11-001119. May 1998. [75] A. Pellissier-Tanon "Transferability of data from specimens to structures for defect assessment in LWR components". Framatome Report EE/R DC 1368. Contract B43070/95/001027/MAR/C2. November 1998. [76] A. Pellissier-Tanon "Comparison of the approaches proposed to adjust the transferability of the toughness from specimens to structure on typical cases of part through cracks in LWR components". Framatome Report EE/R DC 1339. Contract B4-3070/96/000153/MAR/C2. November 1998. [77] E. Keim, W. Schmitt "Gathering of data from specimens to structures for defect assessment in LWR components". Siemens Report Contract B4-3070/96/000152/MAR/C2. May 1998. [78] K.A. May, S. Bhandari, E. Keim, D. Guichard "Benchmark studies on the treatment of residual stresses in fracture assessment of pressure vessels" AEAT Report 1374. Contract ETNU-93-0099-GB. March 1997.

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[79] D.G. Hooton, S.K. Bate, D. Moulin, G. Clement, C. Gregoire "Defect tolerance under level D loading". AEAT Report SPD/D(95)375. March 1994. [80] B. Houssin, R. Langer, D. Lidbury, C. Rieg, P. Soulat "Re-evaluation of KIC reference curve of pressure vessel materials for fracture mechanics analysis", Report EUR 17579 EN. [81] Langer, Ballesteros, Horsten, Kryukov "Screening of irradiation design curves for RPVs". Siemens Report CEC Contract COSU/CT-94/0067/D. June 1998. [82] S. Crutzen, B. Hemsworth, K. Kussmaul, M. Davies, P. Lemaitre, R. Hurst, U. von Estorff "The European Networks: NESC, AMES, ENIQ". Paper 95/701935. [83] J. Guinovart, A. Placenti, L. Villanueva, "Overview on pre-harmonisation studies conducted by the working group on codes and standards", Smirt 14, paper Nr.515 Lyon, August 1997. [84] S. Crutzen, R. Nichols "The effectiveness and reliability of in-service inspection", Int. Conf. under the auspice of the Int. Institute of welding, Glasgow, August 1993. [85] H. Schultz "Overview of the CSNI Project FALSIRE", IAEA/CSNI Specialists meeting on Fract. Mech. verification by large scale testing. ORNL, October 1992. [86] AMES Steering Committee "Important Items of Ageing Research". Revision 1. November 20, 1998. [87] T. Planman, R. Pelli, K. Trrnen, "Irradiation embrittlement mitigation" AMES Report EUR 16072 EN, 1995. [88] R. Pelli, K. Trrnen "State of the art on thermal annealing" AMES Report EUR 16278 EN. 1995. [89] J.M. Grandemange, C. Pichon "Les modes de dgradation des composants du circuit primaire des REP" Journe SFEN du 8 dcembre 1998 "Sret des installations anciennes", Paris. [90] Research and training programme in the field of nuclear energy. 5-th Euratom Framework Program 1998 to 2002. OJ L 26, 1.2.1999. [91] Risk-based approach for In-Service Inspection of NPP's components. Call for tender C2/ETU/980080. [92] G. Van Goethem "EU Research in Reactor Safety: Achievements of the 4-th and Prospects for the 5-th Framework Programme" Introductory lecture, Eurocourse-99 on Reactor Safety Advanced Nuclear Reactor Design and Safety, GRS Garching/Munich, 17-21 May 1999. [93] "Evaluation of nuclear expertise in Europe: Situation, trends and prospects" EC Study Report, 1999. [94] RCC-M "Design and Construction Rules for Mechanical Components of PWR Nuclear Islands", AFCEN, Paris, 2000 Edition.. [95] P. Lemaitre, G. Van Goethem "EU research activities in the field of plant life extension and management: Achievements of FP-4 and prospects for FP-5", ASME PVP Conference, Seattle, July 23-27, 2000. [96] Regulatory Approach to Maintaining the Safety case for Ageing NPPs. OECD/NEA, CNRA, NEA/SEN/NRA(93)10, Dec. 1993. [97] CONTROLE - Revue de l'autorit de sret nuclaire. N129, Juin 1999. [98] INPO 97-02, "Performance, Objectives and Criteria for Operating Nuclear Electric Generating Stations". [99] T.D. Martin, "People Challenges at Nuclear Power Plants in the Next Century", PLIM+PLEX 91 Conference Proceedings.

134

[100] CSN, Safety Guide GS-05.06, "Cualificaciones para la obtencin y uso de licencias de personal de operacin de instalaciones radiactivas". [101] CSN, Safety Guide GS-07.04, "Bases para la Vigilancia mdica de los trabajadores expuestos a las radiaciones ionizantes". [102] Y. Meyzaud, P. Soulat "In-Service aging of pressurised water reactor steam supply system materials" RGN Int. Edition-Vol A- July 1996. [103] US Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev.1 "Effects of residual elements on predicted radiation damage to reactor vessel materials". April 1977. [104] US Regulatory Guide 1.99, Rev.2 "Radiation embrittlement of reactor vessel materials". May 1988. [105] ETC-M "EPR Technical Code Mechanical Components". Appendix ZK project. Restricted Document. Issue December 1998. [106] French November 10, 1999 Order "relatif la surveillance de l'exploitation du circuit primaire principal et des circuits secondaires principaux des racteurs nuclaires eau sous pression". JO. du 5 Janvier 2000. [107] H. Churier-Bossennec "Vieillissement des produits mouls du circuit primaire principal. Coudes chauds des tranches 900 MWe. Synthse des tudes". EDF restricted document E-NM-RE-96, 1054, 1996. [108] L. Valibus "French perspective on life management of NPP", EDF Report, March 1996. [109] ASTM E509-86 "In-Service Annealing of Light Water Cooled Nuclear Power Reactor Vessel". [110] CSN Safety Guide GS-01.10 "Revisiones periodicas de la seguridad de las centrales nucleares, Madrid, December 1995. [111] UNESA "Guia para desarrollar las revisiones periodicas de seguridad", Madrid, 1996. [112] US Code of Federal Regulation, 10 CFR 50.65.

135

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This appendix contains data sheets relating to the various reports selected in Section 2.1.

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In the Chapter 2 "Technical issues with potential regulatory impact" the first issue presented is : ageing of plants and requests for plant life extension. Various forms of ageing are discussed, with the corresponding regulatory challenges reproduced below : physical ageing of components and structures, to have an adequate knowledge of the current design basis of the plant, to have a correct picture of the actual state of the plant, through periodic tests, in service inspection and feedback of operating experience, in order to repair or replace aged components and maintain the design basis, to define the analyses needed to support life extensions and demonstrate that the plant will still operate within its design basis. ageing of analytical techniques and documentation, how to ensure that complete documentation exist to describe the current plant design, to make sure that safety analysis is up-to-date, reflecting the actual plant in use and all modifications made to it, how to interpret results of advanced inspection techniques (are old defects being rediscovered or are they more recent ones) and what to do with defects unacceptable to modern standards, how to use PSA to complement the original deterministic analysis. ageing of rules and standards, applying current rules and standards to existing plants, decide which criteria should be applied, hence determining the extent of backfitting necessary. The crucial decision is defining the criteria beyond which operation will no longer be allowed, and the difficulties involved in implementing such criteria ; and checking if criteria, rules and standards developed for past technological applications remain valid for present technology. ageing of technology, to qualify new technologies, like the use of specific software in safety critical applications or off the shelf software for less critical ones ; to adapt qualification requirements without impacting on safety.

137

$ 5HJXODWRU\ $VSHFWV RI $JHLQJ 5HDFWRUV &15$ 6SHFLDO ,VVXH 0HHWLQJ  -XQH  1($&15$5    0DUFK   SDJHV
The report predominantly looks at answers to a questionnaire provided by the Members countries and the analysis performed by a task group established by the Organising Committee group. Additionally, insights from the CNRA discussions are provided in appropriate sections. It covers following specific issues of interest for the discussion on the topic : the relevant safety aspects (section 4), the related needs for research and development (section 5), actions actually taken in the different countries on related issues (section 6), what is thought to support necessary initiatives in the safety work (section 7), what strategies are used (section 8), the matter of communicating related information to the public (section 9), and certain specific questions are suggested for discussion (section 10). The "broad concept" of ageing management has definite merits but remains to be generally accepted and understood in order to serve constructively in discussions about developments in regard of nuclear safety. The importance assigned to "traditional" ageing management, as seen from the national reports, and issues related to hardware degradation problems is clearly very high. The other aspects, like engineering developments, or other types of management developments, in regard of general progress of the state-of-the art are considered important as well, but are less emphasised. Some countries see needs to develop the event reporting systems to reflect more accurately the ageing problems. There is common interest in enhanced practices for in-service inspections and maintenance as well as "risk informed" approaches, also as applied to selection of research projects. There may be reason, in regard of the need to establish safety requirements in terms of safety upgrading in ageing management, to consider developing the use of specific criteria for that purpose (safety goals). There is some notable shift in focusing the regulatory efforts, in some countries, in the direction from verifying that systems and equipment meet the requirements to verifying that proper organisational arrangements are in place , that they are used in the utility processes, and that there is also development going on based on learning from experience. Some countries, however, continue to rely primarily on verifying the state of the plant. Matters concerning communicating ageing related information to the public appear to be assigned special importance in most responses. Proper arrangements seem anyhow to be in place.

Among conclusions reached, the executive summary emphasises the following :

Some other interesting statements (for the purpose of the present study) are quoted below :
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Section 3 - The concept of ageing management The broad concept of ageing offers advantage in bringing "management of change" into focus in addition to the various specific issues as such which are affected by changes. No matter if changing conditions relate to ongoing degradation of hardware, to corresponding management practices, or to developing views and increased knowledge in regard of completely different issues, the management aspects clearly constitute a common dominator. It has been pointed out also the management of ageing, in the sense used in this report, may rather be seen as a pure matter of quality assurance (QA). It should be observed, however, that QA rests on quality systems, covering the relevant aspects, and that ageing management should essentially be seen as constituting a part of a total quality system.

Section 4 - Safety aspects $JHLQJ GHJUDGDWLRQ In nearly all responses priority is assigned at the highest level to managing the physical ageing of the plant components and structures. There are no real concerns expressed in regard of safety, however, but rather in regard of the service life of the various components and the amount of attention and efforts required for ensuring adequate management quality. .HHSLQJ XS ZLWK VWDWHRIDUW This concerns the gap that might be seen on viewing the current provisions for the safety and the defence-in-depth in the light of the state-of-art. Such gap may relate to general advances in various areas, such as the integrated treatment of man, technology, and organisation (MTO) ; safety approaches like integrated, plant specific PSA ; generally advancing safety standards and concepts in regard of what can be considered safe enough, etc. The importance assigned to this aspect of ageing management (management of change) is reflected in the regulatory processes, providing for comparisons to be made against modern standards and implementation of improvements as reasonably practicable. In some countries periodic safety reviews (PSR) are conducted as part of the regulatory process.

Section 5 - Research and Development needs $JHLQJ RI SODQW FRPSRQHQWV Needs for further research is seen primarily with regard to ageing phenomena affecting the pressure boundary of the primary systems. Important areas include fatigue, thermal and irradiation embrittlement (and annealing), thermal shock, corrosion, erosion and cracking, and crack initiation and propagation under the various environmental conditions prevailing and to be controlled (e.g. chemistry) in the various primary systems, particularly in the RPV, main coolant piping, steam generators etc ... 2WKHU VDIHW\ PDQDJHPHQW LVVXHV A general need for research in the area of human factors and the interplay between man, technology and organisations is pointed out. Specific issues include organisational matters and information systems in regard of control rooms and maintenance, and conservation of competence, in general and for decommissioning purposes.

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Section 10 suggests questions for discussions : 1. Views as to the meaning assigned to "ageing management". 2. Needs for generally enhanced assurance that the root causes of observed ageing degradation are indeed properly identified and verified and that all relevant information is secured prior to measures possibly preventing further observations. 3. Needs for enhanced feedback of information by improved reporting and recording of ageing degradation and associated data on a broadened, possibly international basis. 4. Attention paid to inspectability and maintainability in modernisation of nuclear plants. 5. Needs and possibilities for enhanced quality assurance for improved reliability and safety of the nuclear plants to further ensure observation of the technical specifications of operation, e.g., in regard of ensuring operability of the safety systems after maintenance outages. 6. Need for enhanced strategies and methods in performing various types of safety review (e.g. reviews of proposed plant modifications, PSRs, re-licensing reviews etc .). - Distinctive characteristics of efficient PSRs. 7. Distinctive characteristics of "properly balanced" regulatory inspection and reviewing to verify, on one hand that systems and equipment meet required standards and, on the other hand, that proper organisational arrangements are in place and used in the utility processes, including developments based on learning from experience. 8. The role of safety goals in establishing safety criteria. - is "continual improvement of safety" by itself a sensible goal in nuclear safety ? 9. Is ageing adequately addressed in PSAs regarding methods and data to support "riskinformed" approaches ? 10. Meeting the requirements of ageing management under increasing economic pressure.

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This workshop discussed about characterisation of mechanical properties of long time aged, irradiated materials originating from replaced, damaged, decommissioned or sampled metallic components (mainly RPV, but also : core structure, cast stainless pipe, cast valve body). It expressed the following conclusions and recommendations : &21&/86,216 A stage had been reached when a significant number of plants were starting to be shut down. In a very few of these cases embrittlement had been a factor in the discussion. The material from these reactors and the associated information will be lost unless steps are taken soon. Many material testing reactors are also being shut down. This increases the need for information from irradiated material from power plant. There were necessarily conservatisms in the arguments used in the decisions leading to plant shutdowns. It was felt that there were often significant over-conservatisms. One of the best ways of reducing these overconservatisms in future plant shutdown decisions was to test material from shut down plant, and to compare the properties with those predicted. This was the best way to address such issues for irradiation embrittlement as stress effects, dose rate effects, flux attenuation effects. Attention was often concentrated on RPV embrittlement, and the RPV was unique in the sense that it could not be replaced, and safety cases did not include failure of the RPV. However issues such as thermal ageing, corrosion (stress corrosion cracking, environmentally assisted cracking etc) and bad welding were of as much interest to operators and regulators. In terms of components, steam generators, piping, RPV penetrations, valves and internals should be considered. There was also a need for more information on defect distributions. It was necessary to know the fabrication and service history, and the start of life properties. The use of subsize specimens is important, and there is still a need for further development and validation of their use. There were already international groupings of decommissioners (OECD-NEA Liaison Committee and Technical Advisory Group, and CEC DG XII (Messrs Simon, Schaller). These should be used as forum to present the case for material testing. 5(&200(1'$7,216 Prepare a list of what was available (as in the AMES questionnaire). Such a questionnaire could be distributed to decommissioning groups. Prioritise this list with regard to the interests of operators and regulators and select a few items to maximise the probability of obtaining funding. State clearly the concerns which could only/best be effectively addressed by this means.

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Obtain the consensus of national experts for this list through meetings such as the present workshop, and present the case to senior groups of scientists and regulators (CSNI, CNRA) and groups of decommissioners (OECD-NEA Liaison Committee, CEC DG XII). Identify appropriate sources of funding (operators/regulators for operating problems, TACIS/PHARE for VVER safety problems, BRITE/EURAM for material/scientific problems etc). Specify clearly and succinctly to the decommissioners what was wanted, what was rejected, and how it might be financed. It was necessary to start with the arguments at a national level. Later the case could be made for cooperation by such means as the CEC JRC AMES network.

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This document has been established by a task group composed with representatives from Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Spain, USA. It summarizes the long-term performance of safety related concrete structures (primarily : containments) and the national (some OECD countries not represented on the task group answered a questionnaire : Belgium, Canada, Korea, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland) and international ageing programmes in this domain (IAEA, CEC, RILEM). A survey of structures that have exhibited degradation show that they are generally due to the effects of environmental stressors (see table). Primary mechanisms or factors that can produce premature deterioration of concrete structures include those that impact either the concrete or reinforcing steel materials. Degradation of concrete can be caused by adverse performance of either its cement-paste matrix or aggregate materials under chemical or physical attack. Chemical attack may occur in several forms : efflorescence of leaching, sulfate attack, attack by acids and bases, salt crystallization, and alkali-aggregate reactions. Physical attack mechanisms for concrete include freeze/thaw cycling, thermal exposure/thermal cycling, abrasion/erosion/cavitation, irradiation, and fatigue or vibration. Degradation of mild steel reinforcing materials can occur as a result of corrosion, irradiation, elevated temperature, or fatigue effects. Prestressing materials are susceptible to the same degradation mechanisms as mild steel reinforcement, plus loss of prestressing force primarily due to tendon relaxation and concrete creep and shrinkage. The conclusions and recommendations are reproduced below : &21&/86,216 In reviewing national and international activities addressing ageing management of safety related nuclear power plant reinforced concrete structures and liners, several conclusions can be derived : Performance - Performance of the structures has been good. Where problems have been identified, they initiated during construction (e.g., poor material quality control and premature stripping of formwork). As these structures age, degradation due to ageing may threaten their fitness for continued service. Material Data - Numerous data are available on the physical and chemical nature of concrete under various service conditions (e.g., freeze/thaw cycling and elevated temperature). However, insufficient data exist where more than one of these ageing factors is operating at the same time. In-Service-Inspection Methods - When properly used and applied, in-service inspection techniques are effective in detecting ageing and provide vital input for assessing the structural condition (e.g., relevant parameters or indications of ageing processes). Techniques for inservice inspection of thick sections and inaccessible areas require development. In-Service Monitoring - Instrumentation systems to routinely monitor performance provide valuable data for assessing the structural condition and detecting ageing phenomena. However, these systems should be used in conjunction with periodic condition assessments.

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Condition Assessment - General guidance exist for conducting condition assessments. However, criteria do not exist for interpreting the data provided (i.e., a definitive answer on when ageing has advanced to the point of degradation that requires implementation of a remedial measures activity). Repair Methods - Repair methods for general civil engineering reinforced concrete structures are well established and effective when correctly implemented. The long-term effectiveness or durability of remedial measures relative to their application to nuclear power plant structures has not been established. Service Life Models - Service life models have been developed for estimating the remaining life of concrete structures. However, experience-based data are not readily available in a form suitable for use to refine and validate the models. Applications of these models have been primarily to new structures with corrosion of steel reinforcement being the primary ageing factor considered. Analysis methods - Several activities are ongoing that continually provide improved analyses and modelling of non-linear and time-dependent conditions. Many of these developments should be applicable to analyses of nuclear power plant reinforced concrete structures. Structural Reliability Methods - Reliability-based methodologies provide a useful tool for quantitative assessments of current conditions and estimating future structural reliability and performance. The methodology can be used as a basis for selecting appropriate intervals for conducting in-service inspections and determining the extent of inspection and repair activities to help assure continued safe operation. Quantitative data for input into the methodology are limited and the reliability models for condition assessments have not been validated. Ageing Management Programmes - A number of national and international ageing management programmes are presently addressing ageing. The national programmes are driven by licensing arrangements, as opposed to design life considerations, and are application specific. Some information exchange has initiated at the international level through efforts of organisations such as IAEA, but are directed mainly at structures, systems, and components other than the concrete structures.

5(&200(1'$7,216 Ensuring the performance and function of nuclear power plant safety-related nuclear power plant concrete structures is important to continuing the reliable and safe production of electricity. A number of national and international programmes are addressing ageing issues associated with these structures, however, these studies are generally application specific, or in the case of international programmes, tend to be more general in that they are preparing state-of-art reports and not addressing specific issues in depth. As a result of this, the Task Group has prepared recommendations for a medium-to-long term CSNI programme of work. These recommendations are : Holding a series of workshops that address specific issues associated with ageing. These workshops have been prioritized by the Task Group as follows First Priority Loss of prestressing force in tendons of post-tensioned concrete structures In-service inspection techniques for reinforced concrete structures having thick sections and areas not directly accessible for inspection (a round robin testing activity could result from this workshop) Viability of development of a performance-based database
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Second Priority -

Response of degraded structures (including finite-element analysis techniques, possibly leading to an International Standard Problem) Instrumentation and monitoring3 Repair methods Criteria for condition assessment

Third Priority

The CSNI should review again in two or three years the topic of ageing of concrete structures.

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: Based on presentation of the Task Group report to the CSNI, it was recommended by representatives from Belgium and Spain that instrumentation and monitoring should be a higher priority, possibly a first priority.
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Based on a review of national and international activities in the area of seismic structural behaviour of nuclear power plants, the task group focused its discussion around several broad areas, one of which was the effects of ageing and degradation on the seismic performance of structures, systems and components. It was concluded that studies are needed to evaluate the effects of ageing and degradation. The results of such studies will be important for life extension and in evaluating maintenance practices. The specific issues of interest are : experimental evidence to identify localised failure modes and demonstrate margin, inspection guidance, how and when inspections are needed criteria for corrective actions.

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During this workshop a delegate of the Utility of each attending country4 gave a presentation of the prestress behaviour in their containments (or prestressed concrete reactor vessel). Some general papers on the creep and shrinkage of concrete were also presented. The main elements resulting from the synthesis are : The reports from 12 countries have provided a large variety of cases including (see table): grouted system (72 containments) and un-grouted system (88 containments), Freyssinet, BBRV, VSL and SH type cables. The accumulated ageing experience was ranging from 4 to 39 years. Prestress loss > Predicted on some containments in 3 countries. Prestress loss < Predicted on some containments in 5 countries. No report on loss vs prediction from 4 countries. It appears that the prestressing loss is not a generic problem and it can not be associated with a type of prestressing cables or prestressing system. it is not dependent on the geographical location either. More information is required in each case to define the reason for a higher loss than anticipated and its evolution in time. It is not clear yet if the loss is only quicker than anticipated or will also end up to be higher than anticipated at the end of the service life. Among the main reasons for higher than anticipated loss were: early application of prestressing, high temperature in the vicinity of the cables, inadequate codes provisions. Corrosion protective media: Presently available products are reliable. Risk factor: no risk identified. Action suggested: gather from Users the brand names used with feed-back of performance, create a database and distribute to interested parties, develop guidelines.

Three main topics were analysed:

: Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, Sapin, Ukraine, UK, USA.
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Lift-off test: Mechanical Procedures (callipers, gauges insertion) are not available. Computerised reading instrumentation is reliable and available. Pressure cells should be abandoned. Risk factors: no risk identified with proper instrumentation. Action suggested: gather from Users specific data on instrumentation used and performance feed-back, create a database and distribute to participate.

Loss of prestressing force: The loss of prestressing in containment is different from other concrete structures. The phenomena is local, not generic and can not be associated with a type of prestressing or cable system or geographical location. Additional and more specific data is required to understand each case and be able to draw general conclusions. Risk factors: it appears not to be a plant life limiting factor since its affects the leak tightness only, which can be controlled, there are so far no available repair methods for grouted cables. gather and harmonise data available to make it interchangeable, identify and fill gaps, distribute data to the participants.

Action suggested:

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Seismic re-evaluation, typically carried out at intervals of approximately ten years, applies in particular to older plants which may not have been designed to a lower standard. The status report is based on the responses to a questionnaire issued to all members of the Seismic Sub Group. It is to be noticed that seismic re-evaluation does not deal directly with ageing : any significant degradation is expected to be identified and rectified by other safety processes. Among the conclusions and recommendations drawn in this report those which are more relevant to older plants are listed below : Several different re-evaluation methods are employed in practice, including PSA, margins and deterministic analysis. A seismic walkdown is a key feature of re-evaluation in most countries, usually based on the SQUG (Seismic Qualification Utilities Group/US) criteria, or similar. Input motion levels, seismic categorisation, analysis methods and assessment criteria applied in re-evaluation are generally similar to those specified for new plant, ensuring that similar standards of seismic resistance are available for plants of all ages. To understand plant behaviour for severe accidents or risk estimates, more realistic criteria are used. All responding countries take account of the as-built situation, and the majority of countries include in situ inspection as part of this process. Most countries rely on the original specification for material properties rather than in situ evaluation. Although nearly all countries are satisfied with the evaluations which have been completed to date, several aspects of the process are identified which might be improved in the future. These include : Suitable hazard definition, Improvement in fragility determination, Improvement in equipment selection, Overall methods and criteria, including selection of structural models. The amount of modification carried out as a result of the re-evaluations can be extensive, including strengthening of buildings, walls, anchorages and equipment/pipework supports, and the removal of seismic interactions. The physical modifications resulting from the re-evaluation have led to significant improvements in the seismic ruggedness of older plant in most countries.

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This study suggests that there are several areas of the seismic re-evaluation process which could be considered in the future for the mutual benefit of the member countries. These include : The pursuit of a more detailed understanding of the benefits and disadvantages of the various methods of re-evaluation in particular circumstances. The definition of the scope of plant to be selected for the re-evaluation process, including the consideration of secondary hazards induced by the seismic event. Definition of the criteria for re-evaluation; including hazard and fragilities, and their relation to overall reliability. The role and scope of the peer review process, together with the qualification of experts in specialists fields. The strengthening of plant. The incorporation of operational and research data/experience into the re-evaluation process. Identification of areas on new research that could provide benefits and improvements for the re-evaluation process.

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The report focuses on the application of NDE to support the engineering assessment of the safetyrelated concrete structures found in nuclear power plants and nuclear chemical plants. These reinforced and prestressed concrete structures are characterised by thick sections, heavy reinforcement, liners and external cladding, and limited accessibility (often single sided access only). Corrosion of steel reinforcement is recognised as being one of the commonest causes of deterioration of reinforced concrete structures, which has resulted in significant research and development effort on methods to detect corrosion. Initiatives in this area have generally involved a combination of visual and electro-chemical techniques. However, these techniques may not be applicable to the thick-sectioned or inaccessible structures found in nuclear power plant, and it is this particular aspect which is covered in the report. NDE has potential applications in three key areas in the management of safety related concrete structures : determination of as-built structural details, detection of flaws, characterization and quantification of flaws (means for monitoring concrete ageing).

The report focuses on what was believed to be the more promising techniques (RADAR, acoustic, radiography) for assessing the condition of existing structures. Complementary assessment tools such as instrumentation/systems for continuous monitoring of structural performance or destructive/semi-destructive tests were not considered in any detail. 5DGDU In recent studies radar technology proved to be the cheapest and easiest method for mapping reinforcements but neither characterisation of flaws by dimension and material nor crack detection could be demonstrated. Nevertheless radar has significant potential for development by way of software for signal and image processing to improve resolution around and immediately beyond the first reinforcement. This can be expected to achieve a capability to detect and locate further reinforcement (depending on rebar spacing), and to resolve gaps in reinforcement. It thus offers considerable potential in dealing with thick sections, where reinforcement is not too heavy. Radar is unlikely to approach radiography in terms of detailed inspection of individual reinforcing bars, including loss of section. $FRXVWLF Acoustic wave transmission can be used to obtain information about the physical condition of concrete structures. They are used either to characterise the properties of the concrete by wave speed measurements or to locate and identify discrete objects and flaws in the concrete by transmission and reflection of stress waves.

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Acoustic testing methods or stress wave propagation methods encompass all forms of testing based on transmission and reflection of stress waves : Ultrasonic Pulse Velocity (UPV), Ultrasonic Pulse Echo, Surface Waves, Impact Echo, Acoustic tomography. 5DGLRJUDSK\ Radiographic techniques are not widely used in inspection of safety related concrete structures in nuclear plant because they are unsuited to penetration of the thick (> 1 m) sections commonly encountered, require dual sided access and can present significant operational difficulties. Nevertheless, gamma radiography (together with gamma scintillation techniques) has been effective for determining internal damage in thin, lightly reinforced structures. It is of particular value for detection and measurement of reinforcement/prestressing tendons and voids but can only be used for structures less than a metre or so in thickness. Newly developed high-energy x-ray accelerators are portable and compact. These allow practical inspection of concrete up to 1.2 m thickness. Real time radiography is a possible area for development which could be combined with tomographic techniques to obtain improved results. In its appendix 3 the report reviews a wide range of techniques applicable to inspection of concrete structures : mechanical : Schmidt Hammer, Falling Weight Deflectometer, Mechanical Gauges, electrical : Covermeter, electrochemical : Half-cells potential measurement, Resistivity, electromagnetic and nuclear : Radar, Radiography, X-Radiography, Gamma-Radiography and scintillation counting, Neutron radiography, Thermography, acoustic methods : Ultrasonics, Laser ultrasonics, acoustic emission, modal analysis, minor inspection and monitoring techniques : Holography, Strain gauging, Barkhausen noise, Automated Visual inspection, X-Ray tomography.

The main conclusions and recommendations are : &RQFOXVLRQV NDE techniques have been used successfully on a variety of reinforced and post-tensioned concrete structures, notably highway and reservoir structures. However, there is limited experience of their use to evaluate typical nuclear safety related structures having thick sections, steel liners or access to one side only. There is a general lack of confidence in the techniques because there is very little independent advice in their applicability, capability, accuracy and reliability. The information obtained by techniques such as RADAR, ultrasonics, stress wave and radiography appears qualitative rather than quantitative and there is concern that NDE procedures lack the necessary qualification to permit their use on safety critical structures. There is no authoritative international guidance or standard for NDE of concrete structures. NDE of concrete structures is often based upon equipment developed for other materials and technologies, e.g. examination of steel, evaluation of ground conditions. Other industries are developing equipment specifically for civil engineering applications and at the recent OECD workshop a number of relevant national and European programmes were identified. The nuclear industry maintain its awareness of developments and should seek to influence the development of equipment. 5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV

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More formal liaison with other industries that use NDE techniques should be established and opportunities to work with suppliers to influence the development of new equipment should be sought. Experts should be identified to monitor national programmes with the aim of improving the understanding of the availability and capability of NDE techniques within the nuclear industry. CSNI should review this topic in approximately 3 years. At the time of the review, consideration should be given to quantification of the capabilities of NDE techniques by means of a standard test specimen specification. As a longer term issue qualification should be considered.

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The objective of this report is to survey ageing problems, ageing management practices and research with regard to organic materials in NPPs and to identify areas where further work is required. Because of the complex nature of the subject the in depth survey is focused on electric insulations, seals and lubricants under normal operation. The structure of the reports is as follows : Section 2 covers the technical background of ageing of organic materials, including an overview of the types of organics materials used in NPPs (see fig.), a discussion of safety aspects of ageing, a characterisation of stressors and main ageing mechanisms as well as a brief review of international operating experience. Section 3 provides an overview of the range of ageing management methods which are currently in use. This includes qualification procedures, environmental monitoring, lifetime assessment, in-service inspections and maintenance. Section 4 covers information about national and international research programmes with regard to their objectives, the methodology for ageing testing and prediction, the compilation of data and co-operation.

The OECD/IAEA Incident Reporting System (IRS) Database gives a broad estimate of the safety significance of ageing of organic materials in NPPs. For the majority of organic materials used there has been little evidence of significant degradation. However some safety-related incidents were reported; in the order of their frequency, information was found about cases of ageing degradation of : Seals Lubrication Cable insulation Valve seats Valve Diaphragm Contactor Expansion Joints The degradation was primarily caused by thermal ageing. The conclusions and recommendations of the report are : &21&/86,216 The following general point have come out of this survey on the ageing of organic materials used in nuclear power plant. Most research and international collaborative programmes in the area of ageing and degradation studies have been on cable materials, and to a lesser extent, on sealing materials. Information of the ageing of other organic components is fairly limited and mainly arises from formal qualification procedures rather than any study of degradation mechanisms. Ageing behaviour is strongly dependent on the specific formulations used in the organic components. In many commercially available organic components, the formulations will include a high proportion of additives and fillers which will affect the ageing behaviour of the base organic material.

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Realistic accelerated ageing is complicated by a number of factors which need to be understood, both for research work on ageing degradation and for qualification of components for use in NPPs. These factors include : dose rate effects (which are known to be significant in some polymeric materials used in seals and cables) synergy between thermal and radiation ageing (the ageing observed is not always simply additive) interaction between different organic materials within the same component (e.g. jacket and insulation materials in cables are often of different materials). The degradation products from one polymer can affect the ageing behaviour of the other.

The development of practical condition monitoring methods for cables has made considerable progress over the last few years and work is on-going. There is still a need for in-plant assessment of these methods and work on their use in assessing residual life. Very little is currently available for condition monitoring of organic components used in NPPs other than cables. Despite the large body of research carried out on organic materials, there are still no definitions of end of life criteria that are realistic in terms of the functionality of a component.

5(&200(1'$7,216 There are several recurrent themes on requirements for future work in the replies to the questionnaire and in reports on research work on ageing of organics. There are : further development of condition monitoring methods, particularly those that are non destructive and can be used in-situ in NPPs methods for assessment of residual life from condition monitoring data and accelerated ageing comparison of lifetime prediction models with real-time ageing, using predictions based on actual service conditions not design basis data realistic failure criteria that relate to loss of functionality.

Application of organic materials in NPPs and important properties :

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This document presents the proceeding of a Specialists Meeting hosted by IPSN under the sponsorship of WANO and CSNI PWG1 and PWG 3 jointly. The conclusions are as follows : Thermal fatigue due to stratification and mixing of hot and cold water is a recurring phenomenon, but with a relatively low frequency. It can affect safety related piping of many different systems (ECCS, RHR, AFW, pressuriser surge line and safety/relief valve discharge lines) at various location. It may happen that these phenomena are not included in the design conditions. Recently, similar events have occurred in sections of piping in the primary circuit and therefore the plant owners and the safety authorities are now alerted over some conditions not being consistent with licensing basis and inspection commitments. Of particular concern are those problems arising from unanticipated thermal fatigue in unisolable piping connected to the reactor coolant system. None of the mentioned incidents led to radioactivity propagation to the environment, but the safety significance of these results from the leakage of primary coolant through the second barrier but inside the reactor containment. There is a need to develop further accepted methods to identify locations with potential risk of thermal fatigue. There are proposals for simplified screening criteria based on semi-empirical models to determine the areas where there is risk of thermal fatigue, but these are not generally accepted. As there are many uncertainties, it is possible to consider a probabilistic treatment, although the data for this are also limited. As first step in this direction, the use of best estimate analysis methods should be considered, so that attention is focused on the areas most at risk for thermal fatigue, although these may be difficult to define. Then, at those locations, monitoring of temperature and of pressure if necessary should be implemented. In addition, periodic verification of the leaktightness of the nearest valves could further reduce the risk of thermal fatigue. Monitoring of temperature fluctuations can be seen as an important part of the defence and, at present, it remains the most reliable method to avoid unanticipated incidents. At present, there are different strategies in use and no single method provides defence. There is a need for combining redesign and revised operating practices. A small internal cold water leakage into a hot section of pipe can lead to a quick propagation of cracks by thermal fatigue in some sensitive zones. Manufacturing process probably has a very important impact on the rate of crack initiation. It is not possible to draw up simple criteria for such parameters as allowable valve leak rates or limitating pipe diameters, as there is a great variety in the systems and operating procedures. Concerning the experience from non-destructive examinations, ultrasonic testing gave numerous false calls, and for certain geometries and material conditions, performance of present NDE methods to detect fatigue cracks is limited. If a greater reliance is to be placed in NDE, the development of qualified methods is needed. Thermal fatigue problems can be seen as challenging issues for plant owners. Because of the high potential impact on safety, cost and radiation exposure, these issues have to be addressed more effectively. This is possible only with a very close co-operation between designer and plant owner, and among plant personnel, between maintenance and operation staff. Having all these people working together is the key point to keep the risk of thermal fatigue under control and, more generally, to ensure safe and effective plant operation. There is a need to encourage co-operation between the different disciplines to solve the problem.

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Degradations refers to changes in the material with time and operation, and covers the concrete, steel and liner. Both functional and structural aspects are considered here. The conclusions and recommendations are as follows : &21&/86,216 Finite Element methods are widely used to meet regulatory requirements for assurance of structural safety. For most analyses of concretes structures, simplified methods or linear elastic analyses are adequate but for realistic response predictions non-linear analyses are often needed, especially for high temperature applications or prediction of local failures. The application of non-linear FE analysis to degraded concrete structures is considered to be a relatively new research subject. There is limited information available on non linear behaviour of concrete. A valid non-linear analysis depends on a constitutive model that can adequately represent the behaviour of concrete beyond its linear range, and appropriate materials data. Other industries are currently pursuing FE analysis of degraded structures. Some scatter and uncertainty in the results have been identified. Three dimensional FE calculations for reinforced concrete require a good understanding of the behaviour of concrete structures, and experience to judge the validity of the results. Degraded structures have special features of material behaviour and structural modelling that need to be considered. With few exceptions, analysis of initially degraded concrete containment structures has not been adequately investigated. There are very limited experimental data on degraded concrete structures to permit validation of non-linear FE analytical method.

5(&200(1'$7,216 Consideration should be given to future benchmarks/ISPs to improve the validation of the methods. Some improvement is needed in the analyses where thermal and mechanical processes must be coupled to permit specific applications to degraded structures. Test results for the shear transfer in cracked reinforced concrete panels would be useful to develop/refine models for degraded structures. The use of probabilistic methods, including stochastic FE methods, should be pursued. The use of instrumentation on real structures to validate FE codes is a topic that it would be useful to pursue in the proposed PWG3 workshop on instrumentation of concrete constitutive models.

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There is an need to do further work to better determine material property data and constitutive models. Consideration should be given to the development of indicators of local and global ageing.

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This document is based on the proceedings of the workshop on this topic held in 1997 (Joint WANO/OECD-NEA Workshop : prestress loss in NPP containments, NEA/CSNI/R(97)9). The conclusions and recommendations are as follows : 1. Present experience suggests that the current methods for the prediction of the loss of tendon prestress are generally satisfactory. 2. The nuclear industry has adopted regulatory and codified methods for predicting the loss of prestress in nuclear power plant (NPP) prestressed concrete containments from international and national standards that are not necessarily specific to nuclear design. The application of the different methods to a specific case is likely to lead to significant differences in the predicted losses. 3. Theoretical and experimental research have established the importance of understanding how chemical, hygral, mechanical and thermal factors influence the short term and long term behaviour of prestressed concrete. In particular, they have differentiated between creep, drying shrinkage and relaxation of prestressing steel and identified the interdependency of these phenomena. However, research has, as yet, failed to formulate a universal and reliable model for predicting both short and long term loss of prestress in actual prestressed concrete structures. Current and proposed activities aimed at improving the prediction of loss of prestress include : the creep behaviour of concrete in a biaxial or multiaxial stress field, standardisation of creep experiments to provide reliable data ; experiments on the effects of temperature on prestressing steels, and the development of approximate formulae and both empirical and semi-empirical models to improve the prediction of shrinkage and creep in concrete, and relaxation of steel. 4. Improved and simplified simulations of creep and shrinkage phenomena that can account for the environment and loading history of prestressed concrete containments and pressure vessels will assist : the development of design regulations/standards; the choice of concrete mix ; the development of relevant monitoring programmes, and ageing management including plant life extension. 5. Prestressed concrete containments and pressure vessels use both grouted (bonded) tendons and ungrouted (unbouded) tendons. The workshop considered the relative merits of both systems. Grouted tendons. The cementitious grout : surrounds the tendon in an alkaline environment that will inhibit corrosion of the steel, and prevents the ingress and circulation of corrosion fluids. In case of break of a tendon, due to the bond with the grout, part of the prestress remains transmitted to the concrete.Therefore grouted tendons are less vulnerable than ungrouted tendons to local damage. They reduce the risk of the containment being by-passed via tendon ducts, particularly important where the containment is unlined. However, grouted tendons can not be visually inspected, mechanically tested or re-tensioned in the event of greater than expected loss of prestress. Ungrouted Tendons. Prestressing force is transmitted to the concrete, primarily, at the location of the anchorages. Corrosion is prevented by organic, primarily, at the location of the anchorages. Corrosion is prevented by organic petroleum based greases or corrosion inhibiting compounds. These are either applied to the surface of the tendon prior to installation or injected into the tendon duct following completion of the stressing sequence.
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Some countries use a combination of both coating and injection. Tendons can be removed for visual inspection/replacement ; mechanically tested in-situ ; and retensioned to maintain prestress. Ungrouted tendons are more vulnerable than grouted tendons to local failure and corrosive fluids can circulate along the ducts. Ducts may provide a route for containment bypass in unlined containments, although the practice of keeping ducts filled with corrosion protection medium reduces the likelihood of by-pass. 6. Experience presented at the workshop indicates that comprehensive and regular monitoring of the behaviour of containments and pressure vessels at operational plant assist our understanding of the cause of loss of prestress. Containments around the world include instrumentations to measure : anchorage loads ; concrete strain ; structural geometry ; concrete temperature ; and surface cracking. Data collected from more than 150 structures aged between 3 and 40 years indicate that, for the majority, loss of prestress has been less than predicted. However, for some containments, losses have exceeded predictions. Measured losses vary from containment design to containment design but significant differences have also been observed between containments in the same design series. The variation in measured losses has been attributed to a number of factors including : concrete composition ; aggregate type ; the presence of a liner ; high relaxation of steel tendons ; concrete temperatures ; loading history and the environment. Regulatory and codified prediction techniques do not necessarily account for such factors. 7. Many plant include direct measurement of tendon loads at the anchorage. A number of papers reported problems with the reliability and accuracy of tendon load measurement. The use of tendon load to interpret loss of prestress requires careful consideration of the method used to measure the load and the design of the prestressing system. 8. Nuclear containments and pressure vessels are designed with large margins on structural integrity. Therefore, a higher than expected loss of prestress does not necessarily jeopardise the integrity of the structure. However, under accident conditions the margin on precompression of the concrete is reduced and therefore there is an increased risk of cracking. This may result in a corresponding increase in the leak rate of unlined containments. Periodic testing of the containment is used to evaluate its leaktightness. 9. The workshop discussed the corrosion protection media used for containments and pressure vessels having ungrouted tendons. For systems where the tendon duct is filled with protection media, greases have been developed that optimise : viscosity, resistance to penetrating concrete ; water displacement ; alkalinity and electrical conductivity. For systems using coated tendons, with time the grease looses its lighter oil component but the residue is still capable of providing corrosion protection to the tendons. 5(&200(1'$7,216 1. Information on direct load measurements (in particular their accuracy and reliability) should be considered at the future PWG 3 concrete group instrumentation workshop. 2. Current research activities and operational experience should be followed to ascertain whether present uncertainties in predicting losses can be reduce

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This question is still open. The conclusions and proposals of the document are as follows : Ageing is permanently present and its effect is globally to decrease the seismic resistance but the quantification is not easy. Structures seem to be less sensitive than equipment. It is believed that widespread ageing is necessary before there was an effect. Definition of a threshold could be interesting. Distinction should be made between normal and abnormal ageing ; the latter must be solved as an ageing question. Some parts, such as supports and anchorage, are loaded only by seismic loads and are more sensitive to this question. Maintenance and walkdowns decrease the effects of ageing. Plans must be adapted to seismic conditions. Inaccessible parts may be a problem.

In order to continue this topic, possible actions may be the following : Write a list of ageing sensitive structures and equipment, starting from existing PWG3 or other publications and give judgement about their seismic potential risk. Potential failure modes will be indicated. This list will drive future work on the subject. Irradiation embrittlement of internals must be examined. The assessment of inaccessible parts must be studied (EPRI is working on the subject). Maintenance programs should examined from a seismic point of view. Inspection techniques for anchorage and sensitive parts must be improved.

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This document takles the technical aspects of the basis for a long-term operation. It focuses on the safety related barriers and the internals of the pressure boundary. The management of ageing of active components is understood above all as a maintenance issue. It gives the following conclusions and recommendations : The safe and reliable operation of light water reactors has been proven for almost 30 years. It has been demonstrated that even for components with high field of radiation the access for repair methods is satisfactory. Although some serious damage mechanisms have limited the lifetime of some components, replacement could be performed without excessive burden to the availability of the units. In view of the general technical experience the factor of extrapolation with respect to time or usage are a factor of two or less if one considers operating times between 40 and 60 years. Due to the drastic changes in industry influenced by the declining demand for new nuclear power plants it is to be expected that in most countries the industrial infrastructure is being sized down to maintain the requested level of service only. In many technical areas continuous development will take place driven by other industrial development than nuclear. This is certainly to be expected for instrumentation and control but also in the areas of civil engineering, material production and welding technology along with the technologies for surveillance, testing and inspection. To provide a technical basis for long-term operation of nuclear power plants it is necessary to : update the individual plant documentation to avoid gaps in knowledge caused by the reorientation of industry, enforce clubs of users of similar technology internationally, establish a system of information retrieval to bridge gaps between todays and previous design and manufacturing standards, increase the flexibility of the quality assurance system to qualify products manufactured to other standards for plant specific use.

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In response to interest shown by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), Principal Working Group 1 (PWG-1) of the Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) conducted a generic study on the effects of ageing of active components in nuclear power plants. Representatives from France, Sweden, Finland, Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom participated in the study by submitting reports documenting ageing studies performed in their countries. This report consists of summaries of those reports, along with a comparison of the various statistical analysis methods used in the studies. The studies indicate that with some exceptions, active components generally do not present a significant ageing problem in nuclear power plants. Design criteria and effective preventative maintenance programs, including timely replacement of components, are effective in mitigating potential ageing problems. However, ageing studies (such as qualitative and statistical analyses of failure modes and maintenance data) are an important part of efforts to identify and solve potential ageing problems. Solving these problems typically includes such strategies as replacing suspect components with improved components, and implementing improved maintenance programs. The conclusions are reproduced below. &21&/86,216 All participating countries have reported ongoing activities in their countries related to investigating nuclear power plant ageing, indicating they recognise the importance of understanding and managing ageing. The Japanese report, however, makes clear their position that, for their plants, there are few events attributable to ageing, because deteriorated or malfunctioning components or parts are replaced when they are discovered during periodic inspection or are replaced as a result of preventative maintenance, often in response to problems experienced at other plants. The information provided by the participants indicates that for most cases, the overall maintenance and surveillance programs serve to produce relatively constant failure rates for the active components. In addition, information provided on the evaluation of plant performance and safety system reliability confirm that ageing of active components is being adequately managed at the plant and system level, in that degradation of plant performance or reduced reliability have not been observed. In a few cases, the failure rates increased with age, indicating a time-dependent contributor to the failure parameter. This is true particularly of the case of the 6.6-kV circuit breakers for the French Bugey plants, where the increase was significant. The problem was recognised, and then corrected by modifying the ageing part and implementing an improved maintenance program. In the other cases, the indications of an increasing trend of the failure was in the incipient stage and required

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qualitative and statistical analyses to infer the trend, or the increases were not great enough to produce a noticeable effect on the performance of the system. Several of the participants reported developments of statistical methods for evaluating failure data to provide early detection of increasing failure rates. The countries use similar statistical approaches. Use of estimates from binned data is natural. For modeling trends of failures in time, the nonhomogeneous Poisson process has been used most heavily, although some analysts wish to make the model more realistic. Finland developed analytic methods for qualitative analysis of failure modes at the item level and used statistical methods to identify the recurrence of failure modes. The various statistical methods were shown to have the potential for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance and surveillance programs; however, use of the methods does require extra attention to the mathematical detail. The researchers in one case reported that trend analysis tools need to be capable of considering the times between failures instead of the number of failures of different age groups. They also reported that an important step for the evaluation of ageing is to establish routines for merging and grouping age-related data sources and failure modes for later meaningful statistical treatment. Several reports indicated that accurate calculations of equipment failure rates are difficult because of problems inherent in failure data. The problems identified include: Difficulty in establishing the population or the total number of demands that serves as the base from which to calculate the failure rates. (Although the failures are reported, the number of pieces of equipment or the number of demands without failures are mostly not reported). Difficulty in establishing the time in service or the number of demands at failure. (Often the maintenance records are for an equipment function or location and do not provide data on time of installation or replacement). Difficulty choosing between obtaining a set of data that is fairly homogeneous but represents only a few failures, and obtaining a larger set of data that is less dominated by random variability but is more difficult to interpret because of differences in hardware characteristics, operating conditions, failure modes, etc. Difficulty in determining accurately the instances when preventative maintenance prevents failures from occurring. Use of periodic tests for determining the failure rate when the conditions for the safety function are much more severe than for the test. (Particularly for valves, the periodic tests may not be a good indication of their ability to open or close as required during an accident condition with higher differential pressure and temperature).

Several of the reports identified lack of component-specific data from installation to removal as the major obstacle to more specific ageing and maintenance studies. Ageing studies and maintenance programs could be more effective if failure reports included: the cause of the failure the date the equipment entered service or was replaced modifications, preventative maintenance, and corrective maintenance identification of the component that failed the function of the equipment degraded by the failure of the component.

One report, HPCI System Performance, compared system unreliabilities observed from experience with the corresponding unreliability estimates from the plant probabilistic risk assessment (PRAs). For a single injection without recovery, the observed unreliabilities for about half the plants were in reasonable agreement with those determined from the PRAs, but for the others the observed
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unreliabilities were greater than three times higher than those from the PRAs. If recovery is included, all observed unreliabilities are in good agreement with those from the PRAs. The report for the ageing assessment of circuit breakers and relays reported that the observed overall failure rate for relays in the French plants was 5.2 x 10-9 h-1, whereas the value adopted for the IPSN probabilistic safety studies was 3 x 10-7 h-1. However, the report cautions that because the consequences of failures of relays is often not large, it is possible that not all the failures were reported. Evaluation of the failure data indicated that in some cases the current testing and inspection may not be focusing on the dominant contribution to unreliability of the equipment. Also, in some cases there are recurring problems with reliability, in particular with steam-turbine-driven pumps and motor-operated valves, where additional effort for correction is warranted. The study indicates that detailed qualitative and statistical analyses of failure modes and maintenance dates can identify potential ageing problems in active components, and can provide a basis for preventive actions to manage those problems when adequate failure data are available and when the data are used for systematic analysis.

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This report was prepared by the Task Group on Computer-based Systems Important to Safety of the Principal Working Group No. 1. Canada had a leading role in this study. Operating and Maintenance Experience with Computer-based Systems in nuclear power plants is essential for improving and upgrading against potential failures. The report summarises the observations and findings related to the use of digital technology in nuclear power plants. It also makes recommendations for future activities in Member Countries. The conclusions are reproduced below. &21&/86,216 1. Feedback of operating and maintenance experience is recognised as an important input to failure analysis associated with complex systems such as computer-based systems. The process of feedback would provide designers with information on systems failures, unforeseen scenarios, or unanalysed configurations. Following plant start-up, the use of the operating experience have led to reconfiguration of system components. Several views on ways in which this feedback can be achieved have been presented. Safety Assessments by regulators use the operating experience in an assessing computerbased safety performance prior to installation in areas such as electromagnetic interference, software reliability or human-machine interface. Assessments were also extended to management of modifications after plant start-up. Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) appear to offer good potential for successful characterisation of software performance due to their widespread use in safety and non-safety related applications within and outside the nuclear industry. They can provide a sizeable population for observation. While computer-based system failures cause few significant safety events, they could cause common cause failures leading up to significant events. Software modification during operation is one of the major sources for software errors. Maintenance experience indicates that adequate documentation is essential in reliably performing changes in the software. Preventative maintenance concept extends to computer-based systems in different ways, such as the inclusion of self diagnostic capabilities or saving memory data on restart to analyse the cause of an initial stall. Computer equipment situated in a control room are more likely to be affected by environmental stressors than by design basis events. Primary initiating events could be loss of heating, ventilating, and air conditioning, water spills, or use of fire suppression water. While rising temperature, for an analogue system, causes a loss of calibration accuracy, it can cause more serious effects on digital equipment including failure to perform their function at all. More severe errors were found to be caused by EMI/RFI. A significant fraction of all errors resulting from the application of environmental stressors is communication errors. Many of these errors were time-out errors or corrupted transmissions,
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indicating failure of a computer to receive data from an associated multiplexer, optical serial link, or network node. 9. Ageing does not appear to pose a significant design concern for digital systems because the equipment is installed in a mild environment and because it is accessible for monitoring, calibration, and replacement. Consequently, the equipment can be expected to be serviced or replaced as necessary throughout the plant life. The installed equipment can thus be assumed to have like-new performance. Seismic qualification of digital components does not appear to pose any unique qualification issues. Surface-mounted integrated components are recognised as rugged components and are routinely used in applications such as automobiles, aircraft, and portable electronic equipment in which accelerations typically exceed that of a design basis earthquake. Software errors constitute a significant number of failures of software. They may include coding error, design error or V & V error. Maintainability of computer-based systems depends largely on the quality factors of traceability, completeness, consistency, simplicity, modularity and testability. The maintainer needs to be able to fully understand the software before it can be changed. Improving upon the deficient quality factors is required in order to improve maintainability. Regulatory assessments of digital upgrades focus on issues related to reliability of software electromagnetic capabilities (EMC) and training for human-machine interface.

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The report is based on the following considerations : 1. 2. The aim of this paper is to set out the NEAs view of why this subject is an appropriate one to be handled under the NDC and to provide an overview of preceding work on it. In 1987 there was a meeting of the NEA, held in co-operation with the IAEA, when it was fairly comprehensively demonstrated, if demonstration were needed, that extension of plant life ought to be a cheaper option than building new plants. At a time when competition in electricity supply is becoming more severe, and the capital cost of new nuclear plants is so much higher than, say, combined cycle gas turbine plants, the availability of the life extension option looks particularly desirable. The current difficulties of finding new sites for nuclear power plants, and in some countries for almost any type of new power plant, only add to the desirability. The preservation of nuclear capacity derives added attraction in the light of the wish to avoid disturbance to economic growth that can be generated by over-reliance on outside suppliers, as was the case in the 1970s, and of newer concerns to avoid increased dependence on power sources emitting carbon dioxide and other atmospheric pollutants. All these considerations feed back into governments policies on medium and long term energy supplies. Consequently governments are also concerned about the reality of the life extension option. There can be challenges to its reality from technical, regulatory and economic factors and, perhaps more importantly, from the interplay of these factors. Other parts of the NEA as well as the IAEA provide a forum for exploring what, if any, are the technical factors that will limit component and plant life. They also provide fora for discussion of the procedures for licensing older plants in the context of updated regulations. The Symposium already referred to was the start, as far as we know, of international consideration of the economic aspects. It appears clearly that one fourth of the reactors in the NEA Member countries, more than 100, are over 20 years old and more than 40 reactors are over 25 years old. The current status of the envisaged nuclear power plant life and some model calculation with different assumption are given in the report. Plant life extension and its implications can be found quite clearly. The retirement of these plants over the next few decades could pose significant challenges to the meeting of government policies on energy supply. Conversely, continued well-managed operation of existing nuclear power plants would be an enormous step towards fulfilling the goals of energy security with environmental protection. If we assume further development of nuclear power plants in addition to the plant life extension, the total sum of world nuclear power installation would be maintained for a considerable duration. In the period immediately after the NEAs first efforts in this field it became evident that, because of the limited numbers of actual plant life extension at the NPPs, the concept of plant life "management" was not well-developed. It also seemed that the reality of a relative cheap life extension was not always obvious. In some cases the cost of gaining sufficient confidence that regulatory requirements for continued operation could be met was seen as more than the expected return on investing in life extension. Thus it was not cost alone that mattered but the probabilities of the risks still remaining were very important. More information could reduce the uncertainties but acquiring information could itself be costly or might take such a time to
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acquire as to prevent application for licence renewal being made before the plant had to go out of service. 8. During the ten year since then, we have seen a number of plant life management programmes in Member countries, including major refurbishment works on the plants. The initial set of PLIM issues was closely related to the regulatory license renewal at the age of thirty years old, however, the PLIM concept has been developed with wider perspective, i.e. total life management of the NPPs, not only license renewal, has been identified and realised in number of countries. The development of thinking about these concepts is one of the reasons behind the setting up of the meeting.

6FRSH DQG 2EMHFWLYHV 9. The main scope and objectives of the PLIM Expert Group were to assist decision makers at the Member states government level in evaluating the economics and politics of plant life extension by providing a published report in which the following types of key issues are addressed in broad terms. Rationale for plant life extension in different NEA Member countries (economics, financial, reliability, availability, safety, etc.); Financial and economic concerns including intermediate results at incremental time periods of extension (5, 10, 15 and 20 years); Major technical concerns and constraints; Institutional issues in and public acceptance on the plant life extension; Need for and feasibility of creating data base which will encompass a wide range of data for plant life extension; Precedents in other NEA Member countries and IAEA Member states. (YROXWLRQ RI WKH 1'&
V 3/,0 VWXG\ 10. From 1993 onward, although a considerable gap in 1994-5, separate work was carried out on an International Terminology for PLIM in five languages, based on the US-EPRIs work published in 1993, with the co-operation of IAEA and CEC, and this work will be published later this year. The report consists of two different sections; i.e. a model approach, and national programme summaries. The former includes various model elements of PLIM programme for owners; critical items and components of NPP in different types of reactors; and safety assurance programme considerations including license renewal and periodic safety assessment issues. The latter consists of country report of their PLIM related activities. The report was aimed to satisfy the goals for phase I of the activity. It was envisaged that it would be followed by a phase II which was expected to analyse the current requirements and the feasibility of obtaining information necessary for plant ageing and life management decisions, and also to specify the areas where governments support and international co-operation are desirable. NEA Member countries have acquired number of PLIM experiences for different types of reactors with different histories. Ad-hoc sets of information are being stockpiled piecemeal in different countries and different companies. Some of this has appeared at specialist conferences and in the technical press. A wide range of information, has been presented together with more or less sophisticated ways of analysing plant life decisions. Nevertheless, it cannot be safely said that there is an established set of general rules or guidelines. Rather it still seems that there is a lack of integrated information for the future decision makers.

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In view of the general energy policy concerns expressed at the beginning of this paper, it can be argued that governments still have an interest in helping the development of efficient procedures for plant life management. Exchange of experience, transfers of lessons between different countries could help to reduce uncertainties, point to the scale of effort needed and what sorts of effort are most useful, and generally add to the solidity of understanding of the future course of nuclear energy. The presentations from experts from the following countries have been reviewed: Germany Spain the Netherlands France United Kingdom Czech Republic Japan Belgium Hungary Canada

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Given the present restructuring trend in the electric utility industry, the issue of maintaining the nuclear power plants in operation while competing effectively with other forms of electricity generation is becoming increasingly important. While leaving aside other considerations, such as global climate change or security of supply, on a purely cost basis, it is of the utmost importance for electric utilities to be able to prove the competitiveness of nuclear power. From this perspective, the sharing of knowledge on refurbishment costs which have been incurred or that are expected in the future is considered to be very valuable to countries with nuclear programmes. In order to achieve this objective, in 1997, a group of experts was set up within the OECD/NEA, inviting Member countries to participate. The study performed is a component of the OECD/NEA programme on Plant Life Management (PLIM) and the objective was to collect and evaluate nuclear power plant refurbishment costs data and experience accumulated over the last years in participating countries. This information may be useful to reactor operators faced with nuclear plant life cycle evaluations. This report presents refurbishment cost data derived from experience and plans to implement PLIM programmes in ten OECD countries (Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Mexico, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom). The information was collected by issuing a questionnaire prepared by the Expert Group and sent to Member countries in September 1997. The purpose of this questionnaire was to try and reflect the views and concerns of all members of the Expert Group. The data provided by most countries was from 1990 onwards and previous data was only given if country experts considered it to be relevant for the purpose of the study. Refurbishment activities were reported for 89 reactors (69 per cent PWRs, including VVERs, and the remaining 31 per cent shared by BWR, CANDU, Magnox and AGR types). Most countries attempted to provide one or more specific motives for the implementation of refurbishment activities. Motivations were reported almost evenly among the four major categories (regulation, upgrading, economics and life management/extension). Some countries added summaries of existing regulatory policies for plant life management. In relation to the scope of refurbishment, many different types of refurbishment activities were reported under equipment and systems. Under equipment, most of the activities are related to major works on sensitive equipment such as turbines, condensers and steam generators. Other replacements of ageing and inadequate equipment were also reported. Under systems, countries reported considerable improvements in fire prevention and cooling systems. Several countries provided very relevant information on costs of refurbishment activities which enabled the formulation of cost ranges for major items replaced or expected to be replaced as part of the life management programmes. However, not enough information has been provided to estimate manpower, financial resources and time for implementing regulatory policies on life extension.

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The analysis of the reported cost data is limited due to: the diversity of approaches towards refurbishment activities, related regulatory processes and life management among reporting countries; the difficulty in classifying data according to motivation; the different definitions used for refurbishment costs and its components; the different cost accounting methods used by nuclear plant operators; the difficulty in assigning the cost to a particular unit or a series of similar units; and the different periods in plant life for which data has been reported.

Given these constraints, the cost data are presented in summarised form on a country-by-country basis and they are analysed on a per unit, per net capacity (MWe) and per component basis. Whenever possible, the cost data are disaggregated into periodic and non-periodic costs. These two types of costs are considered to be the components of the overall reported cost. The costs are expressed in terms of 1997 US$ per net MWe capacity. The costs are presented by reporting country; by reactor type and by reactor age. 7KH FRVWV UHSUHVHQW RQO\ WKH UHSRUWHG FRVWV QRW WKH RYHUDOO WRWDO FRVWV DQG WKH\ DSSO\ RQO\ WR WKH VSHFLILF WLPHSHULRG FRYHUHG LQ WKH VWXG\ ). As the range illustrates the order of magnitude of the reported cost data, comparisons among countries or reactor types are not necessarily meaningful and should be avoided. The large ranges in costs illustrate the diversity of factors, criteria and approaches related to refurbishment activities and consequently the difficulty in performing detailed quantitative analysis. The study confirms diversity of criteria, procedures and regulations with respect to refurbishment activities and life management or life extension programmes among reporting OECD countries. Although some qualitative trends can be identified on the basis of collected data, quantitative conclusions are difficult to derive. In most cases, expenses related to refurbishment activities do not represent major cost components that could jeopardise the expected economic life of a nuclear power plant. In general, reporting countries have chosen to implement refurbishment activities in order to satisfy regulations, expand capacity, improve performance and safety, and extend the economic viability of nuclear power plants. Further studies should consider the analysis of the effects of deregulation and privatisation of the electricity sector at national and international levels in future plans for refurbishment activities and life management/extension. In addition, studies should consider the role that the debate on climate change could play in future refurbishment activities given the importance currently attached to this environmental factor. The conclusions and recommendations are reproduced below. &21&/86,216 Based upon the information collected and despite the fact that data from some OECD countries with major nuclear programmes have not been considered, the following conclusions may be derived: All reporting countries are implementing life management or life extension programmes which include refurbishment activities performed in the past, currently being undertaken or planned in the future. The study confirms diversity of criteria, procedures and regulations with respect to refurbishment activities and life management/life extension programmes among reporting countries.

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Although some qualitative trends can be identified on the basis of collected data, quantitative conclusions are difficult to derive given the diversity in definitions and approaches to refurbishment and the limited amount of reported data. Reporting countries have chosen to implement refurbishment activities in order to satisfy regulations, expand capacity, improve performance and safety, and extend the economic viability of nuclear power plants. These motivations are generally multiple or not mutually exclusive and therefore are not easy to classify or correlate. In general, nuclear units designed before 1975 and characterised by limited physical separation have incurred relatively high refurbishment expenses. Refurbishment activities due to obsolescence are mainly in the areas of instrumentation, computer and control systems, and to a minor extent in spare parts. In most cases, expenses related to refurbishment activities do not represent major cost components that could jeopardise the expected economic life of a nuclear power plant. Even when refurbishment activities represent in absolute terms considerable investments, in terms of $/kWe, this investment is significantly lower than investments for alternative electricity supply options. Although refurbishment activities have been successfully implemented in all reporting countries ensuring different types of benefits, it should be noted that political reasons can determine early retirement of nuclear power plants even if they are operated safely and economically. A representative example is the case of the Borssele nuclear power plant in the Netherlands where large expenditures have been incurred for upgrading according to the latest standards but nevertheless the lifetime of the plant is currently limited by a political decision.

5(&200(1'$7,216 Although this study has enabled the collection and evaluation of very valuable data, further studies may be necessary to permit a more comprehensive understanding of the evolution and trends in refurbishment activities and related costs. Such further studies should consider: More precise definitions of the type and scope of data relevant to the analysis of refurbishment costs. The effects of deregulation and privatisation of the electricity sector at national and international levels on planned refurbishment activities and life extension programmes. Analysis of the evolution of refurbishment costs incurred during the entire lifetime of each nuclear reactor. The role that the debate on global warning and climate change could play in future refurbishment activities given the importance currently given to these environmental factors.

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This document was aimed at giving a general knowledge on ageing to a wide technical and managerial audience. The contents is as follows : 1. Introduction 2. Definition of ageing 3. Ageing and its relationship to the safety of nuclear power plants 4. Equipment qualification : defence against common cause failures 5. Methods of determining safety significant components and systems susceptible to ageing degradation 6. Material ageing mechanisms 7. Detection and mitigation of ageing effects 8. Managing the impact of ageing on nuclear power plant safety - Examples of activities in member states. As relates to the safety section 3 very briefly describes the ways in which the ageing degradation may affect the integrity of the defence in depth : this is mainly due to the potential increase in the probability of component failures and to a higher probability of common cause failures. This is addressed by the equipment qualification (section 4). The practical methods outlined for investigating ageing problems (section 5) are : analysis of operating experience expert opinion probabilistic techniques for prioritization and for determining risk significance of ageing.

Section 6 presents in some extent the basic mechanisms of ageing degradation of metals, concrete structures and non-metals (plastics, elastomers, lubricants, ...) but the major NPP components are not addressed. Section 7 gives the general principles of the methods for timely detection and mitigation of ageing effects (preventive maintenance, predictive maintenance, scheduled maintenance, reliabilitycentered maintenance). While a little outdated this document still constitutes an introduction to the ageing concern.

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This document has two objectives : to provide advice on data needs and on an effective and practical systems for data collection and record keeping in connection with the ageing management, to facilitate the sharing and exchange of data on.

The data analysis and evaluation is outside its scope. The general data needs are divided into three categories (see table) : Baseline information, consisting of design data and conditions at the beginning of the service life of a component ; Operating history data, covering system and component level service conditions and component availability testing and failure data ; Maintenance history data, including data on the monitoring and maintenance of components conditions.

Examples of selection of component specific data need are given for a Reactor Pressure Vessel, an Emergency Diesel Generator and Electric Cables. Examples of effective data collection and record keeping systems and guidance for the implementation of an advanced data collection and record keeping system are given in appendices.

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This technical report presents methodologies both for selecting plant components important to safety whose ageing should be assessed and for performing ageing management studies. This methodologies are based on current practices of Member States leading in this field. The table of contents is as follows : 1. Introduction 1.1. 1.2. 1.3. 2. 2.1. 2.2. 2.3. 3. 3.1. 3.2. 4. 4.1. Background Purpose of the report Technical Safety Issues Grouping of NPP components General approach to the management of NPP ageing Equipment qualification : an example of an ageing management programme Selection process Approach to prioritization Phase I : Interim ageing study 4.1.1. Review of existing information relating to the understanding of component ageing 4.1.2. Documentation of current understanding of components ageing 4.1.3. Review of current methods for monitoring and mitigation of component ageing 4.1.4. Phase I - report : Interim ageing assessment and recommendations for followup work 4.2. Phase II : Comprehensive ageing study 4.2.1 Studies on understanding ageing 4.2.2. Studies on monitoring of ageing 4.2.3. Studies on mitigation of ageing 4.2.4. Phase II report : comprehensive ageing assessment and recommended application of results 5. Recommendations for ageing management pilot studies

Approach to the management of NPP ageing

Selection of NPP components important to safety for ageing management studies

Methodology for ageing management studies

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5.1. 5.2. 5.3. APPENDIX I APPENDIX II

Topical areas proposed for pilot studies Selection of NPP components for pilot studies Technical issues relating to the pilot studies Examples of ageing related component degradation and failure Ageing degradation mechanisms and susceptible materials and components Examples of summary results of ageing management studies from the UNNRCs nuclear plant ageing research programme Examples of condition indicator trending as a basis for mitigating component ageing

APPENDIX III APPENDIX IV

The ageing management process consists of the three basic steps : 1. 2. selection of safety important plant components for which ageing should be evaluated ; understanding dominant ageing mechanisms in the selected components and identifying or developing effective and practical methods for monitoring and mitigating ageing of components (ageing management studies); managing the ageing degradation in the selected components by effective practices and initiatives in surveillance, maintenance and operations (proper design, manufacturing, storage and installation are also significant in the management of ageing).

3.

This report focuses on documenting the methodologies used in Step 1 (selection of NPP components) and Step 2 (ageing management studies). It also provides recommendations for ageing management pilot studies of specific components. The technical safety issues addressed in the document are presented in the following : 1. Which NPP components are susceptible to ageing degradation that could adversely affect plant safety ? Which of these components are renewable (by maintenance, refurbishment or replacement) ? What are the degradation processes of materials and components that could, if unchecked (i.e. if components are improperly maintained and/or not replaced), affect plant safety ? Are current methods for testing, inspection, surveillance, maintenance and replacement adequate to detect and mitigate ageing problems before they significantly affect safety ? If not, what additional measures are needed ? Are current analytical models and criteria adequate to evaluate the residual life of key components and structures ? If not, what additional criteria and supporting evidence (data, analyses, inspections) are needed ? How should structures and components be selected for comprehensive assessments of ageing and evaluations of residual life ? What kinds of records and other documentation are needed to support effective ageing management ?

2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

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This Safety Report supplements the NUSS Code on Operation (No 50-0, Rev. 1, IAEA, Vienna (1988)) and the associated Safety Guides ("Management of Nuclear Power plant for Safe Operation: A Safety Guide" Safety Series No 50-SG-09, IAEA, Vienna (1984) ; "Periodic Safety of Operational Nuclear Power Plants : A Safety Guide", Safety Series No 50-SG-02, IAEA, Vienna (1994)). It provides information on effective practices relating to the implementation and review of an Ageing Management Programme (AMP) ; such a programme constitutes a systematic "umbrella" to coordinate the programmes relating to the maintenance, in-service inspection and surveillance as well as operations, technical support and external programmes such as R&D. It deals with the organizational and managerial aspects ; technical aspects and economic considerations are not addressed. It emphasizes the systematic ageing management of long lived passive components and structures that are not routinely inspected, maintained of replaced. Three elements are taken in account : material ageing, technological obsolescence and human aspects. An AMP model is proposed, based on the experience of several utilities (see fig.). The report details the responsibility of AMP participants, the implementation of an AMP and provides guidance for reviews of its effectiveness. An important contribution of this document is the identification of a systematic ageing management process which is an adaptation of Demings Plan-Do-Check-Act cycle to ageing management.

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Equipment Qualification (EQ) programmes provide an example of a potentially effective strategy for managing of NPP components important to safety covered by these programmes (see ref. 11, IAEA list). The objective of this report is to make available information on : EQ concepts and process, effective and practical methods and practices relating to upgrading and preserving EQ, and reviewing the effectiveness of EQ programmes in operational NPPs. References are provided which direct readers to more detailed literature (e.g; : regulatory documents, standards, technical and programmatic guidance). Ageing is particularly addressed in the following paragraphs : 2.4. Ageing and Qualified life (p 6) 3.3.2. Assessing ageing effects (p 29)

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The objective of this TECDOC is to document the current practices for the assessment and management of the ageing of nuclear power plants steam generators (SG). It emphasizes safety aspects and also provides information on current inspection, monitoring and maintenance practices for managing ageing of steam generators of the CANDU, PWR and WWER nuclear power plants. Twelve countries have contributed to this document : USA, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. The document is structured in 8 technical sections : Section2 : SG descriptions 3: SG design basis, fabrication and materials 4: SG degradation mechanisms 5: SG ageing management : operational guidelines 6: SG inspection and monitoring requirements and technologies 7: SG assessment methods and fitness for service guidelines 8: SG maintenance : mitigation, repair and replacement 9: SG ageing management programme

Recirculating steam generator tube (used in PWR) degradation mechanisms, discussed in Section 4, include (see fig.) : Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC), Outside Diameter Stress Corrosion Cracking (ODSCC) (which includes both Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking (IGSCC) and Intergranular Attack (IGA), Fretting, Wear and Thinning, Pitting, Denting, HighCycle Fatigue ; degradation process for SG shell, feedwater nozzle and tubesheet are : CorrosionFatigue, Transgranular Stress corrosion cracking, High-Cycle Fatigue, Erosion-Corrosion. Operational Guidelines for SG ageing management described in Section 5 are grouped into the following topic areas : Primary coolant system water chemistry control parameters, Secondary coolant system water chemistry control parameters, Measures to control secondary side impurity incursions Measures to remove secondary side impurities Measures to control SG deposits.

A very important aspect of SG ageing management is the use of a comprehensive inspection and monitoring programme and appropriate fitness-for-service guidelines to assess the current and future safety of these components. These topics are discussed in Section 6 et 7. Section 8 discusses mitigation and repair techniques for degradation mechanisms : in tubes :
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 primary side : to mitigate PWSCC Rotopeening and Shot Peening Stress Relieving Reducing the Hot-leg Side Temperature Control of the chemistry Reducing the Hot-leg Temperature

secondary side : to mitigate IGSCC and IGA

tube repair : Plugging, Sleeving, Nickel Plating vibration control in feedwater nozzles and piping : modifications to minimize thermal fatigue. The variety of maintenance actions available to manage ageing effects seems sufficient and the document does not suggest further development or research.

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Concrete Containment Buildings (CCB) need for systematic ageing management not only for the design life (30-40 years) or for the extended plant service life (60 years total being a quoted target) but also for the life after decommissioning if the containment is used as a "safestore" (up to 100 years). Moreover considerations developed for CCB are of interest for other safety-related concrete structure. The reports details the results of the Coordinated Research Programme (CRP) relating to the pilot study on concrete containment building (see paragraph 2.3) - Participating countries were : Belgium, Canada, India, Switzerland, UK, USA. It addresses potential ageing mechanisms, age-related degradation, and ageing management (i.e. inspection, monitoring, assessment and remedial measures) for the following materials and components for concrete containment buildings : concrete, reinforcing steel, prestressing systems, penetrations, liner systems, waterstops, seals and gaskets, protective coatings.

Structural steel piles and anchorages are also addressed to a limited extent. The TECDOC does not address life or life-cycle management of CCBs because it is written from the safety perspective and life management includes economic planning. The conclusions made are listed below. &RQFOXVLRQV The performance of the reinforced concrete structures in nuclear power plants has been good, with the majority of the identified problems initiating during construction and being corrected at that time. However, as these structures age, incidences of degradation due to environmental stressor effects are likely to increase the potential threat to their functionality and durability. The most commonly observed form of degradation has been concrete cracking. Degradation factors of primary concern would be corrosion of steel reinforcement due to carbonization of the concrete or presence of chloride ions, excessive loss of prestressing force, excessive containment leakage due to failure of the metallic of nonmetallic boundary (lined) or excessive concrete cracking (unlined), and leaching of concrete. Techniques for detecting the effects of concrete ageing (i.e. inspection and performance monitoring) are sufficiently developed to provide vital input for evaluating the structural condition of concrete containment buildings. Periodic application of these techniques provide data that can be used to trend performance and form the basis of an ageing management programme. Areas of concern where these techniques require additional development include
185

massive members that contain large quantities of steel reinforcement, such as the basemat, and members that are inaccessible, such as portions of the steel pressure boundary that are embedded in concrete and foundations. Methods for conducting condition assessments or reinforced concrete structures are fairly well established and generally start with a visual examination of the structures surfaces. Despite the usefulness of performing conditions assessments in maintaining the containment buildings fitness-for-service, with a few notable exceptions, the majority of the responses to the survey questionnaires sent to plant owners ant operators indicated that they do only limited evaluations beyond those mandated by codes and standards (e.g. visual examinations, leakage-rate testing, and prestressing tendon assessments). Application of supplemental examinations and testing have primarily been associated with assessments of degradation occurrence or suspected occurrence. Maintenance and repair techniques for concrete structures are well established and when properly selected and applied are effective. At present no codes or standards are available for repair of reinforced concrete structures, although some are being developed. Criteria that may be used to determine when a repair action should be implemented are limited (e.g. parameters that relate damage state such as crack with to environmental exposure). Data on the long-term effectiveness or durability of remedial measures are required. Effective implementation of a repair strategy requires knowledge of the degradation mechanisms, the environment of the structure at the macro and micro level, proper preconditioning of the structure to be repaired, correct choice of repair technique and material, and quality workmanship. Review of international practice has shown that many utilities worldwide have already responded to the potential for age-related degradation of CCBs and have implemented ageing management programmes. These programmes generally adopt an approach in which any effects of ageing are managed (as opposed to modifying operational environments to control the onset/rate of degradation). A characteristic of the most effective Ageing Management Programmes (AMP) was the clear definition and documentation of a systematic programme of activities aimed at understanding, effectively monitoring, and mitigating ageing effects. A particular feature was the routine trending of surveillance and test data to estimate future performance of the CCB. This has value in ensuring continued CCBs fitness-for-service and hence plant availability. Drawing on international experience, a framework for ageing management of CCBs has been defined (see figure). The proposed approach consist with existing IAEA guidelines. An understanding of the issues involved (based on both plant specific knowledge and external experience on concrete behavior) is the basis for an effective AMP. The AMP consists of the following key elements : (1) Definitions of the AMP to co-ordinate and integrate ageing management activities and to identify the inspection and monitoring requirements and acceptance criteria ; (2) Operation of plant within design limits to minimize age-related degradation, in particular that which is error-induced ; (3) Inspection, Monitoring and Condition Assessment to characterize significant component degradation before fitness-for-purpose is compromised ; and (4) Maintenance to correct any unacceptable degradation (i.e. to manage ageing effects). Technical guidance is provided for each of these tasks, together whit suggested indicators for measuring the overall effectiveness of an AMP for CCBs.

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This report provides the technical basis for managing the ageing of the PWR and pressurized heavy water RPVs to assure that the required safety and operational margins are maintained throughout the plant service life. The scope of the report includes the following RPV components : vessel shell and flanges, structural weldments, closure studs, nozzles, penetrations and top and bottom closure heads. The scope of this report does not treat RPV internals, the control rod drive mechanisms (CRDMs), or the primary boundary piping used in PWRs. All the various size and types of PWR pressure vessels are covered by this report including the WWER plants builts in Rusia and elsewhere. The technical information is mainly originated from US, Germany, Russia and France. The structure of the document is as follows : Description of RPV Design basis : codes, regulations and guides Ageing mechanisms : radiation embrittlement thermal ageing fatigue corrosion Inspection and monitoring requirements and technologies Ageing assessment methods Ageing mitigation methods RPV ageing management programme.

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This report presents and discusses the requirements and methodologies utilized for the assessment and management of ageing of PWR RVI (Reactor Vessel Internals). This report provides the technical basis for managing the ageing of th PWR reactor vessel internals to assure that the required safety and operational margins are maintained throughout the plant service life. The focus of the report is on RVI components important to safety, however, for completness, RVI components not important to safety are also addressed in the report. The structure is as follows : section 2 describes the RVI (Western and WWER types), including an overall characterization of the design, importance to safety, materials and physical features of the RVI. In Section 3 , the applicable design basis, codes, standards and regulations are addressed. Section 4 deals with operating conditions, Section 5 identifies dominant degradation mechanisms (embrittlement ; fatigue ; corrosion ; radiation induced creep ; relaxation and swelling ; mechanical wear), sites, consequences, and significance of degradation mechanisms. Section 6 addresses the application of inspection technology to assess the condition of the RVI. Section 7 summarizes the current knowledge on service experience and related maintenance. Section 8 describes an ageing management programme for PWR RVI utilizing a systematic ageing management process and outlines relevant national and international ageing research. The technical information is mainly originated from USA, Germany, Japan, Russia and France.

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The CRP on management of ageing in-containment I&C cables was initiated at the first Research Co-ordination Meeting (RCM) held in Vienna in December 1993. The general objective of the CRP was to identify the dominant ageing mechanisms and to develop an effective strategy for managing ageing effects caused by these mechanisms. The specific objectives were : (a) to validate prdictive cable ageing models accounting for synergistic effects that take place when radiation and thermal ageing occur over the long time period associated with real plant environments, and to provide practical guidelines and procedures for assessing and managing the ageing of I&C cables in real plant environments.

(b)

The scope of the CRP was limited to those materials and cables types which were considered to be of widest interest. The programme was therefore limited to low voltage (< 1 kV) I&C cables based on crosslinked polyethylene (XLPE), ethylene propylene based materials (EPR/EPDM) aand ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA). Because of their similarity in materials and construction, low voltage power cables were also included in the programme. The CRP was implemented in two phases. Result of Phase I CRP (1993-1995) are presented in IAEA-TECDOC-932 "Final report : Pilot Studies on Management of Ageing of Instrumentation and Control Cables". They include a summary of the relevant ageing mechanisms ; operating experience for a range of NPP types ; an overview of ageing management methods which are currently in use ; description of cable sampling and laboratory ageing methods and of monitoring and test methods ; the capabilities and the limitations of the various ageing management methods. The objective of Phase II CRP was to resolve the uncertainties in the relationship between cable condition monitoring techniques and DBE survivability and improve existing initial qualification procedures, and thus to provide a technical basis for the assessment and management of ageing incontainment I&C cables based on the concepts developed in Phase I CRP. Most of the CRP effort was aimed at : the identification of cables of concern in order to focus limited ageing management resources on a manageable sub-set of the total cable inventory in plant ; developing a 'tool box' of practical condition monitoring (CM) methods trough round-robin tests (to identify the most suitable CM methods and their limitations for different cable materials and applications, and to develop test procedures for these methods) ; and the correlation of CM methods with the survivability of cables in a DBE. Since PVC cables are used in many of the existing NPPs, they have been included in the scope of Phase II. A final report "Assessment and management of ageing of in-containment I&C cables : Technical basis" is planned for mid 2000. Countries participating in the CRP are : Canada, Czech Republic, France, Germany, India, Japan, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA.

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This Safety Report complements the Safety Guide No 50-SG-02 "Periodic Safety Review of Operational Nuclear Power Plants - It provides practical information for the Safety Assessment and judgment process, and a methodology for ranking safety issues identified by the review. In addition this report provides assistance on the prioritization of correctives measures and their implementation so as to approach an acceptable level of safety. It follows the recommendations of the INSAG-8 documents ("A Common Basis for Judging the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants Built to Earlier Standards" - IAEA, 1995). Several factors have to be considered in the scope of a complete safety review and the management of ageing is one of them.

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This publication establishes the requirements that must be met to ensure the safe operation of landbased stationary thermal neutron power plants and also includes this commissioning and subsequent decommissioning. It does not contain specific requirements relating to ageing.

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This Safety Guide provides guidance on the conduct of PSRs for an operational nuclear power plant. The Guide is directed at both owners/operators and regulators. Ageing aspects are dealt with in paragraphs 416 to 419 : Equipment Qualification and mainly in paragraphs 420 to 423 : Management of Ageing. It gives only general statements on this aspect and refers to specialized documents issued by IAEA ("Methodology for the Management of Ageing of NPP Components Important to Safety" Technical Report Series No 338 and "Data Collection and Record Keeping for the management of nuclear power plant ageing" Safety Series No 50-P-3).

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The purpose of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the conduct of PSRs for an operational nuclear power plant. It is directed at both owners/operators and regulators. PSRs are undertaken about every ten years and during this period significant changes may occur, among which are the consequences of ageing, and must be taken in account in order to obtain an overall view of actual plant safety. The management of ageing is dealt with in the paragraphs 420 through 423 and in the appendix on Elements of Review.

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This report represents a review of published information related to three cost categories that are part of cost-benefit analysis : costs upgrades necessary for continued operation of a nuclear unit, costs of lifetime extension measures, and costs of decommissioning. While each of these categories is subjected to detailed specialised cost studies, the report views the costs globally, mainly as input for subsequent overall economic analysis. Consistently with this approach, the report also discusses the applicability of the collected costs for decision making. Some emphasis is placed on the so-called "Soviet-designed" reactor models (WWER 440 and 1000 ; RBMK 1000 and 1500). The cost data presented are useful as information suitable for general understanding of the magnitude of the costs but, due to the large variability of the costs (by country, by model, by vintage ...), they cannot be used for a complete analysis of the economics of continued operation of older NPPs.

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The pilot studies, initiated in 1989, are being implemented in two phases using the methodology for ageing management studies in TRS N 338. This TECDOC gives the result of Phase I studies (interim ageing studies) ; the next step (Phase II) deals with comprehensive ageing studies, implemented through IAEA co-ordinated research programmes (CRPs). The work performed in Phase I consisted of a review of current understanding of ageing and methods for monitoring and mitigation of this ageing for the four selected NPP components : primary nozzle of a reactor pressure vessel, Motor Operated isolating Valve (MOV), concrete containment building, instrumentation and control cables within the containment.

3LORW VWXG\ RI 539 SULPDU\ QR]]OH Two types are considered : the RPV inlet and outlet nozzle region of a PWR, the RPV feedwater nozzle region of a BWR

for which are described the specifications, standards and regulations, the design and fabrication ; the potential degradation mechanisms and operating experience ; and monitoring techniques. The knowledge and technology gaps identified are mainly : understanding of environmental effects (oxygen contents and flow rates) on corrosion fatigue, measurement of the fatigue damage (no fully validated method), effectiveness and reliability of inspection techniques for crack detection, verification of assessment methods conservatism of fatigue design curves based on small scale specimens, effect of stress concentration, distribution of residual stresses, demonstration of the conservatism of simplified approaches and models , development of probabilistic failure analysis. 3LORW VWXG\ RI D W\SLFDO 029

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A rather qualitative overview is presented on the general background with the same contents as the pilot study on RPV primary nozzle. The knowledge and technological gaps identified are as follows : understanding of MOV ageing : development of a database on the failure and malfunction in plant operation, monitoring of MOV ageing : development of system of device, risk and reliability assessment : taking into account of the degraded MOV conditions and failure, improvement of qualification methods, improvement of maintenance procedures.

3LORW VWXG\ RI W\SLFDO , & FDEOHV After a general presentation the current understanding of ageing of concrete containment building is detailed (concrete / reinforced steel / prestressing system / liners and penetration / waterstop). The knowledge and technology gaps pointed out are : current experience and ageing management practices, state-of-the-art repair techniques, crack mapping and depth measurements, conditions indicators.

3LORW VWXG\ RI W\SLFDO , & FDEOHV Knowledge and technology gaps relating to significant service conditions that can influence cable ageing are : effects of temperature : well understood but practical in-situ methods for thermal degradation not currently available, lifetime assessment necessary for cables that face total dose more than 30 Kgy, quantification of the effect of oxygen content in a radiation environment.

196

% 6DIH 0DQDJHPHQW RI WKH RSHUDWLQJ /LIHWLPHV RI 1XFOHDU 3RZHU 3ODQWV ,16$*   ,$($9LHQQD  2FWREHU   SDJHV

This report is focused on the proper management of the operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants in order to help to minimise or eliminate avoidable or premature plant shutdowns. It complements the INSAG-8 report A common basis for Judging the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants Built to Earlier Standards. It covers mainly the treatment of physical ageing of structures and components in order to maintain operating plants consistent with their initial design basis but it also considers the infra-structural issues that influence the capability to provide adequate means for safe management of operating lifetimes of nuclear power plants (maintaining adequate competence, handling major organisational changes). It promotes safety reviews to provide an overall view of the actual safety status of a plant (effectiveness of the ageing management ; discussion on the possible evolution of the reference safety level).

197

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The various parameters considered for the prioritisation of components, taking into account safety and economic aspects appear to be similar in the three countries. The main difference between practices is on the respective weights placed on these various parameters, depending on utilities conditions and strategies. The classifications of systems, structures and components evaluated for the three countries are given in chapters 2, 3 and 4 for Belgium, France and Spain respectively. In order to illustrate more precisely how the various aspects may be considered in order to get a global classification of SSCs, the screening methodology developed by UNESA is given below.  6FUHHQLQJ 0HWKRGRORJ\

Plant structures, equipment, hardware, and components are compared to a common set of weighted evaluation criteria to identify those most important to the lifetime of the plant. These criteria and weights have been sensitised to reflect technical and non-technical issues affecting nuclear power plants. For example, technology for establishing the effectiveness of plant programs to manage ageing mechanisms has been applied. Six criteria categories are used: General Criteria, Service Conditions, Regulatory Factors, Service History, Plant Programs Effectiveness, and Reliability Considerations. Weighting factors are used to properly characterise the relative importance of criteria categories, and individual criteria, with respect to their threat or benefit to the lifetime of the plant. The category entitled plant programs effectiveness was added to previous screening criteria to factor in the importance of maintenance and ageing management programs to achieving lifetime related goals. Plant structures and hardware components are selected using the pre-screening process discussed in Sub-section 1.2.1. The pre-selected components are then organised into one of 13 groupings as listed in Table 1. Each of these groupings contains structural or hardware items, which may have an impact on plant life extension. 1.2.1. Candidate Selection Process

A complete criteria screening or evaluation for all of the structural and hardware items or types in a LWR plant would be a very major undertaking. A pre-selection process is therefore applied to generate a manageable listing of items to be included in the important components evaluation. A list of components important to Lifetime Cycle Management is obtained in two phases: Selection of systems Selection of components

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198

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Reactor Vessel Components Primary Containment Components Primary Concrete Structures Primary Steel Structures Secondary and Outbuilding Structures Pumps and Turbines Tanks and Heat Exchangers Piping Systems Valves Other Major Mechanical Equipment and Components Primary Electrical Equipment and Components Major Electrical Motors Primary I&C Equipment and Components 7DEOH  *URXSLQJ RI FRPSRQHQWV



6HOHFWLRQ RI 6\VWHPV &ULWHULD

6DIHW\ &ULWHULRQ A system or structure will be considered important to Lifetime Management whenever it falls under one of the following categories: Nuclear Systems: Systems that monitor or control core radioactivity, remove heat from the core or are directly involved in the safe operation of the reactor Safeguard Systems: Systems (excluding containment systems) that are used to mitigate reactor accident. Containment Systems: The containment and systems that prevent its overpressure or excess leakage through the containment to the environment

$YDLODELOLW\ &ULWHULRQ A system or structure will be considered important to Lifetime Management is it is essential to the production of electricity and does not have redundancies with respect to its basis functions and therefore, its failure would have a significant impact on power plant availability. 5HSODFHPHQW DQG &RVW &ULWHULRQ Systems important to Lifetime Management will be considered those systems with at least one element of high unit cost or difficult to replace (due to long shutdown period or procurement difficulties) and those structures whose reconstruction is not foreseen. Whenever a system or structure meets any of the above criteria, it will be considered potentially important to Lifetime Management.  &RPSRQHQW 6HOHFWLRQ &ULWHULD

Once the systems important to Lifetime Management have been defined, their components will be evaluated using a group of selection criteria to determine the components that are important to Lifetime Management. The components on the resulting final list will be ranked by their importance for Lifetime Management. 'HILQLWLRQ RI &RPSRQHQWV Listing system components according to their individual identifiers the plant would be lead to a laborious selection process and an excessively long and repetitive list inappropriate for setting
199

priorities for study, evaluation and effort in the plant LCM, which is the final objective of listing Important Components. To avoid this, before selecting LCM-important components, the selection and ranking processes must be optimised by defining the components of each system according to discretization or scope criteria. For example components of mechanical system will be listed as: Main equipment. Components that perform fundamental system functions (pumps, exchangers, large filters, tanks, evaporators, etc) These will be listed according to their function. Redundant equipment will be named in plural without specification of the trains to which it belongs (ie, RHR Pumps includes the RHR pump-train A, RHR pump-train B and RHR Pump-train C) Piping: Listed as a generic component Valves and Dumpers: Listed according to the following types: motorised, manual, check, solenoid and Safety and Special Instrumentation: Listed as a generic component &RPSRQHQW 6HOHFWLRQ &ULWHULD Once the Components Lists of LCM-Important Systems have been prepared, these will be selected according to the following criteria: 1. The component, if it were to fail, would have a significant impact on plant safety and availability 2. The component is of special and specific relevance to the plant licensing process 3. The component is safety-related or required for the cold shutdown of the plant and its maintenance 4. The operation or ambient conditions of the component are more aggressive than those considered in design 5. The component has required a significant maintenance effort during its lifetime 6. Maintenance of the component is not considered effective for the control and/or mitigation of ageing 7. Replacement of the component implies a large expense, associated with the cost of the component itself or the extended period of plant shutdown Fulfilment of any of the above criteria means that the component is important to Lifetime Management. 1.2.2. Screening Methodology

The screening methodology uses a systematic scoring process to establish a "total criteria score" for each of the candidate structural and hardware components. The screening process provides a method of quantifying an otherwise subjective selection process. Comparison of the total scores will lead to the determination of the important structures, equipment, hardware, and components. The dominant factors that influence the selected important components can be identified by reviewing the criteria scoring.

200

&ULWHULD &DWHJRU\ General Criteria Service Conditions Regulatory Factors Service History Plant Program Effectiveness Reliability Considerations  &ULWHULD 'HILQLWLRQ

This section provides definition for each criterion to be listed in the component matrices. 1.3.1. General Criteria

Five criteria are grouped in this general criteria category. These items deal with the discrete issues of replacement feasibility, plant outage duration, replacement cost, impact on adjacent plant structures and hardware, and case of disposal and transportation. As a group, these criteria will have a significant impact on the feasibility of achieving lifetime goals.  5HSODFHPHQW )HDVLELOLW\ Replacement means total removal of a structure or hardware item from its current location. The item would then be moved to a new location and restored to service, replaced by a new item of the same design, or replaced by a new item with a new design. The feasibility of replacing a structure or hardware item is established by considering the availability of a qualified replacement component, accessibility limitations, construction, radiation exposure levels, etc. Outage length, costs, disposal of contaminated wastes, and the effect on adjacent components are addressed in other criteria.  2XWDJH 'XUDWLRQ Outages are defined as the scheduled or planned shutdowns for refuelling, or for the other replacement, modification or inspection/surveillance reasons. It is fully expected that planned outages will be scheduled at refuelling periods. As such, the optimum outage length would be a normal refuelling outage duration. LCM program activities, which do not affect the normal refuelling outage critical path, would be acceptable. If the activity is expected to increase the outage duration, then an assessment of whether the outage length is tolerable is required. The aspects affecting this assessment would be the system reserve generating capacity, the availability factors of the other plants in the system, and the purchased power capacity/availability. In addition, the ongoing fixed plant costs (salaries, property taxes, etc.) and any lost revenue would be considered in the outage length assessment. The direct costs associated with the LCM activity and the replacement power costs are considered in the Subsection 1.3.1.3 criterion.  5HODWLYH 5HSODFHPHQW &RVW The term replacement is defined in Subsection 1.3.1.1. The cost magnitude of a structural or hardware replacement is to be weighed against the current and future cost to replace the entire plant. Structural or hardware replacement total costs in the range of 40% to 50% of the entire plant replacement cost could subjectively be considered a prudent upper limit when evaluating this criterion. All replacement costs other than outage costs are covered by this criterion. Outage cost is a consideration of Item 1.3.1.2, "Outage Duration".

201

 ,PSDFW RQ $GMDFHQW 6WUXFWXUHV  &RPSRQHQWV Adjacent structures and components can be generally categorised as direct attachments (that is, service water, air or electrical connections, and supporting structures, components or foundations) which must be removed or disconnected to perform the desired work. The work activities would include structural or hardware replacements, modifications, or enhanced maintenance and inspections. Structures, equipment or components, which must be removed to establish accessibility, material staging areas, and hardware removal and installation paths, would also be considered in this category. Other influencing factors would include lay-up, decontamination, and shielding requirements for adjacent structures and components.  'LVSRVDO DQG 7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ 'LIILFXOWLHV Replacements, modifications, decontamination, or destructive testing activities may lead to the generation of radioactive or hazardous wastes which pose special disposal and transportation problems. When considerable volumes or high level waste materials are involved, special transport equipment and onsite or offsite storage structures may need to be built. In the years to come, the ability to fully off-load the reactor core may be limited by the accumulation of spent fuel in the storage pools. Provision for long-term dry storage or temporary storage provisions may have to be designed and licensed to store activated materials or spent fuel. 1.3.2. Service Conditions

The six criteria described in this subsection acknowledge the impact on the potential remanent life of a component due to service conditions. A candidate structure or hardware item which must function under known adverse conditions is more likely to limit the lifetime than a comparable structure or hardware item operating under less severe conditions. The criteria are presented in terms of possible failure modes associated with the service conditions. The weighting factors assigned to these criteria reflect the uncertainty and severity of the possible failure.  %ULWWOH )UDFWXUH Failure in a non-ductile manner generally occurs without warning, and is usually catastrophic. Protection against brittle fracture is an important aspect in the design, construction, and operation of many components. However, conditions that increase the likelihood of brittle fracture include significant loading near the nil ductility temperature (NDT). Other conditions that tend to increase the NDT include exposure to significant neutron flux levels (Section 1.3.2.4) or strain hardening. Thermal embrittlement of cast stainless steel components and other materials is also included in this category.  &RUURVLRQ0,& Components that are subjected to corrosive environment will have obvious lifetime concerns. The increasing observation of microbiological corrosion in nuclear power plant water bearing systems and in other components suggests that it is an important factor to consider for long-term performance.  )DWLJXH,PSDFW9LEUDWLRQ Components, which are subjected to significantly changing loads over time generally, will have a shorter life than those subjected to only static loads. These conditions include suddenly applied loads such as those due to fast valve closure or opening, water hammer, or impact. Fatigue from thermal cycles or transients may also occur if not considered in design (or if design provisions have been exceeded). Components operating under cyclic or fluctuating loading conditions may be susceptible to various fatigue mechanisms. A distinction can be made between components subject to low cycle fatigue
202

(approximately 10,000 cycles or less) and those subject to high cycle fatigue (greater than 10,000 cycles). Generally, low cycle fatigue conditions are characterised by high amplitude load (stress, strain or strain rate) and shorter lifetimes.  ,UUDGLDWLRQ (IIHFWV Materials that are susceptible to radiation damage and located in a radiation field will have obvious service life concerns. Exposure to nuclear radiation may change the properties of certain component materials, such that the item cannot perform its design function. Failure modes associated with radiation damage generally include a loss of ductility and degradation of electrical or electronic performance. Loss of ductility sometimes enhances the strength properties of a material, but may lead to brittle failure as described in Subsection 1.3.2.1. For some materials, such as concrete and electrical cable, the effects of radiation on service life are not completely known. Irradiation effects are especially important to PWR reactor vessels.  6WUHVV &RUURVLRQ &UDFNLQJ Certain materials, such as sensitised stainless steel, in various environments and stress fields, are susceptible to stress corrosion cracking (SCC). Of particular concern are systems and components exposed to reactor coolant water or fluids containing resins or chlorides. The potential for SCC increases for components of welded fabrication, exposed to temperatures exceeding 100C, and under a continuous tensile stress field. SCC is particularly important, because it generally leads to a fast fracture risk in a normally ductile material.  :HDU (URVLRQ &UDFNLQJ Environmental exposure to the flow of fluids containing solids or vapour bubbles, other moving objects, or aggressive chemicals may lead to a loss of component material or cracking. Often times, these mechanisms occur over a fairly long period of time and display visible signs of material loss before reaching critical stages. Other times, such as during a chemical spill, flood or intrusion of solids / particles, the rate of attack may be enhanced. Within composites such as thermoplastics and concrete, these events and others also lead to the formation of cracks and loss of function. 1.3.3. Regulatory Factors

The three criteria described in these subsections acknowledge the potential impact that regulatory considerations or changes will have in lifetime evaluations and planning.  2ULJLQDO 3ODQW /LFHQVLQJ %DVLV Lifetime program evaluations will need to emphasise the systems, structures, and components which were key considerations during original plant licensing and subsequent updates. This would include balance of plant hardware whose failure could result in challenges to safety systems, or contribute to processing of radioactive waste.  6DIH 6KXWGRZQ 3DWK The operability and/or functionality of components that are required to safely shut down the plant during transient or accident conditions will be a key of lifetime evaluations and justifications. The structures, systems, and components involved are a subset of the items discussed in Subsection 1.3.3.1. Other factors such as redundancy, separation, and single failure assumptions are also important considerations for safe shutdown hardware. Therefore, lifetime considerations will likely affect many of the safe shutdown hardware types.  (&&6 &KDOOHQJHV The performance of certain systems, structures, and components, or lack thereof, has significant impact on the function of emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). Components whose failure
203

could result in loss of reactor coolant, reduced performance of an ECCS operating component (i.e., RHR pump bearing cooling, etc.), or would initiate an ECCS are important to evaluation in LCM programs. 1.3.4. Service History

The three criteria described in this subsection consider the factors, which characterise the performance of the structure or hardware item to date, and its potential remnant life.  ,GHQWLILHG +LJK 0DLQWHQDQFH Hardware items that have historically displayed a low availability and a high maintenance frequency will also have questionable life expectancies. The maintenance frequency will most probably be indicative of a severe environ-ment, severe cyclic duty, or an unavoidable material application problem. Should it be established that the hardware item is required for safe shutdown and is a important element in the LCM program, extensive evaluations and testing may be necessary to develop a remedy and to support the lifetime goal.  3RWHQWLDO 3UREOHP ,QGLFDWHG E\ ,QVSHFWLRQ6XUYH\ The in-service inspection programs include visual, surface, and volumetric examinations of pressure boundary materials. Other plant surveillance and inspections programs examine the condition of electrical, instrumentation, steel structures, foundations, etc. Defects, flaws or deviations identified during these examinations are subjected to evaluation criteria. The flaw or deviation may require corrective action including repair, or may be dispositioned as acceptable. Those flaws or deviations, which are found acceptable, are periodically monitored to ensure that the situation is not becoming worse. The known existence of flaws or deviations in a important structural or hardware item will undoubtedly lead to additional efforts to support lifetime goals. If a repair is not desirable or cost effective, then it will be necessary to rely upon analysis or experimental techniques to establish adequate safety margins.  3DVW RU 3ODQQHG 5HSODFHPHQW Previous regulatory, design or performance factors may have already led to a full or partial replacement of a structure or hardware item. If this is the case, it may be that the replacement has a life expectancy that exceeds the current service life goals for the plant. This will be a benefit to the LCM program. It is also possible that the replacement has a life expectancy the same as the original component. This will be of some benefit in the LCM program because of the experience gained from replacement activities (component improvements, etc.). 1.3.5. Plant Programs Effectiveness

The four criteria described in this subsection address the availability of plant programs and their effectiveness in monitoring, maintaining, and preserving the function of important plant components.  )RUPDOLVHG 3URJUDPV3URFHGXUHV The presence, availability, and usage of formalised maintenance, inspection, and surveillance procedures have a definite and positive impact on achieving remanent life goals. Plants, which have formalised procedures containing measures to mitigate ageing effects at early stages via preventive action will enjoy increased operating efficiency and reduced outage time. The importance of this criterion to long-term operation is noted as a weight of seven (7) has been assigned.  3UHYHQWLYH3URWHFWLYH 0HDVXUHV Certain plant procedures and programs contain elements or steps specifically to ensure that the subject system, structure, or component performs suitably in the future. Entitled
204

preventive/protective measure, these activities are often elements of a formalised program (Section 1.3.5.1) and supplement normal or corrective maintenance.  &RUUHFWLYH $FWLRQ %DVHG RQ $FFHSWDQFH &ULWHULD An additional element of prudent preventive maintenance and surveillance procedures is acceptance criteria upon which future performance is tied to. During the maintenance/surveillance activity, certain performance parameters (quantitative) are obtained and compared to a specified criteria range or value. If the criterion is exceeded, provisions to take corrective action are employed. Use of this type of activity results in increased effectiveness of maintenance practices and reduced component down time.  'RFXPHQW DQG 5HFRUGV 5HWHQWLRQ Preservation of key operating and maintenance history documents for systems, structures, and components has been found to be very important to technical justification of remaining life. Formalization of this activity should be a part of plant surveillance, maintenance, and other programs. The records should be retained in a method that is non-aggressive each medium type, protected from a natural hazard(s), and allows easy retrieval and usage. Similarly, it is important that the, records retained have the proper technical data needed for lifetime assessment. 1.3.6. Reliability Considerations

The five criteria described in this subsection address methods that are indicators or influence component reliability.  5HFRUG RI +LJK 5HOLDELOLW\ $YDLODELOLW\ Systems, structures, and components, which have a demonstrated track record of suitable performance, reliability, and availability, provide greater assurance that long-term plant operation is feasible. Conversely, components that are commonly out of service, or require constant attention or have suspect performance, have a reduced potential for long-term operation. This criterion is especially important to components having an "active" function. A credible service life of a component is very important to justifying long-term function.  0DOIXQFWLRQ &RQWULEXWHV WR )RUFHG 2XWDJH Systems, structures, and components whose malfunction may cause a forced outage of the plant are considered important to life cycle management. This criterion refers to safety-related SSC and any BOP components such as primary structures with important functional requirements.  5HTXLUHG )XQFWLRQ ,QVXUHG E\ 'HVLJQ2SHUDWLQJ )HDWXUHV The performance and function of certain plant systems, structures, and components (SSC) has been preserved by the addition of back-up or support systems and procedures. Existence of supplemental systems and procedures to improve performance or mitigate ageing, are attractive measures from a service life perspective. Redundancy to achieve safety requirements should not be considered in this context.  4XDOLILHG 9HQGRUV6XSSOLHUV In several areas of manufacturing, fabrication or support services, the number of qualified suppliers has been declining. The term "qualified" applies to the quality assurance, environmental qualification, code stamping, etc., requirements for structural and hardware items supplied to the nuclear industry. As the number of plants under construction continues to decline, some vendors have not maintained the required certifications, and have discontinued their product lines. As such, it may be difficult to replace or repair some structures or hardware items.
205

 /HDG 7LPH IRU 5HSODFHPHQWV In addition to the cost for replacing certain components (Section 3.1.3), there are reliability concerns for finding and obtaining replacement parts to keep components operational. As the nuclear industry increases in age without new nuclear generation capacity added obsolescence could cause significant difficulty in locating replacement parts. Already, components such as the BWR control rod drive hydraulic control units require significant maintenance, and spare parts are difficult to obtain. Without new plant orders, the timing to obtain such parts may introduce considerable economic penalties. 1.3.7. Other Considerations

Space has been provided on the matrix form to include other criteria should it be necessary during the evaluation process. Such additional criteria should be discrete. That is, they should be evaluated to determine whether or not already established criteria (Sections 3.1 through 3.6) can be applied. If this option is selected, the criterion and the basis for scoring shall be described and included in the evaluation records. Appropriate weighting factors will also have to be established and entered on the table. Care shall be exercised not to duplicate already established criteria.  ,PSOHPHQWDWLRQ

The screening procedure described in Section 1.3.2, combined with the established criteria of Sections 1.3.1 to 1.3.7, provides a suitable method for determining the relative sensitivity of systems, structures, and components important to ageing and the lifetime. These upgraded screening criteria also address the importance of maintenance and may be applied to BWR or PWR plants. Following use of this criteria document, a listing of important plant components is obtained for further technical review and given in Section 4 of this Appendix. Future tasks within the Life Cycle Management Program will define the requirements for these reviews, the technical issues and ageing concerns, and preparation of "licensing basis documentation. The following Lists are the results of UNESA methodology application in two pilot plants (PWR and BWR). Other application will provide different results.

206



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The table below gives the result of the general ranking tentative of existing Equipment Ageing Summaries.
6\VWHPV 6WUXFWXUHV DQG &RPSRQHQWV 5HDFWRU SUHVVXUH YHVVHO Core belt region &RQFUHWH VWUXFWXUHV Seismical category 1 6WHDP JHQHUDWRU 5HDFWRU FRROLQJ SXPS Thermal barrier 5HDFWRU SUHVVXUH YHVVHO Cover head penetrations 3LSLQJ 3ULPDU\ FRQWDLQPHQW 3UHVVXULVHU 9HVVHO LQWHUQDOV 3UHVVXUH YHVVHO 3LSLQJ ,( HOHFWULFD DQG , & HTXLSPHQW (OHFWULFDO FDEOHV 5HDFWRU SUHVVXUH YHVVHO 3LSLQJ 9HVVHO LQWHUQDOV Pre-stressed cables Surge line nozzle Bottom mounted instrumentation penetrations 3UREOHP FDWHJRU\ Irradiation embrittlement Leak tightness Corrosion, wear, vibration and fatigue Thermal fatigue Primary water stress corrosion cracking Stress and fatigue due to unexpected transients Loss of prestressing Cracking (Fatigue, Primary Water SCC) Wear Primary water stress corrosion cracking Flow accelerated corrosion 1 E qualification programs and preventive maintenance Cable ageing Stress corrosion cracking Micro biological corrosions Irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking Flow induced fretting wear Stress and fatigue Stress corrosion cracking of Inconel 750 Degradations due to concrete carbonation Thermal ageing Thermal ageing Stress and fatigue due to regulatory reconciliation Primary water stress corrosion cracking

Canopy seal welds Baffle bolts

&RQWURO URGV $60( 6HFWLRQ ,,, 'LY  $OO Class 1 components 9HVVHO LQWHUQDOV Guide tube split pins 2WKHU VWUXFWXUHV 3ULPDU\ SLSLQJ 5HDFWRU FRROLQJ SXPS Piping 3UHVVXULVHU Cast stainless steel elbows Cast stainless steel casing

Heating rods

207



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The table below gives the general ranking of Equipment obtained according to French methodology.
0$5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 /,67 2) &20321(176 7$.(1 ,172 $&&2817 Reactor Pressure Vessel Life Time Project Containment High diameter primary piping Class 1, 2 and 3 piping Steam generators Pressurizer Reactor Internals Instrumentation and control, Converters Electric cables Turbine Current Maintenance and Generators Exceptional Maintenance Primary coolant pump Control rod system Vessel supporting structure Anchor bolts Cooling towers Handling facilities In-core flux thimble Bimetallic connections Alloy 600 areas Charging pumps, SG feed pumps Nuclear heat exchangers Condenser Turbine heater & separators-reheaters Circulation pump speed reducer Feed pump Emergency diesels Transformers Civil works for nuclear island Valves

208



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The following lists are example results of applying the UNESA methodology to two pilot plants (PWR and BWR). Other applications would provide different results. 3:5 LISTING AND RELATIVE RANKING OF COMPONENT IMPORTANT FOR PLANT LIFE MANAGEMENT &RPSRQHQW6WUXFWXUH &RPSRQHQW *URXSLQJ 'HVFULSWLRQ Reactor Pressure Vessel Steam Generators Reactor Building Reactor Vessel Pedestal Metal Primary Containment Auxiliary Building Reactor Coolant Pumps Foundation Pressurizer Pedestal Steam Generators Pedestal Essential Service Water Piping Primary Containment Mechanical Penetration Assemblies Pressurizer Intake Structure Primary System Equipment Supports Electrical Building Fuel Building Turbine Peetration Building Componet Cooling Building Diesels Building Reactor Coolant Piping Diesel Generators Fundations Cables inside Primary Containment Essential Service water Pumps Foundations Turbine Bulding Fuel Pool Liner RHR Pumps Foundations Charging Pumps Foundations Turbine Foundation Reactor Coolant Pumps Fuel Transfer Tube Essential Diesel Generator (Engine) Emergengy Diesel Generator (Engine) Polar Crane Cables outside Primary Containment Main Turbine Intake Electrical Building Contaiment Spray Pumps Foundations High Pressure Safety Injection Piping Snubbers

5DQN 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

1XPEHU REWDLQHG 588 561 540 534 531 520 514 512 512 496 465 463 462 462 461 455 449 441 434 428 423 415 414 409 405 404 400 399 398 396 383 383 378 378 375 375 373 371 369

209

40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

RHR Piping Primary Containment Personnel Airlock and Equipment Hatches Component Cooling Heat Exchangers Foundations Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies Control Building to Auxiliary Building Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals Radwaste Tunnel Diesel Generators (Generator) Main Steam Isolation Valves Safety Inyection Piping Main Steam Piping Component Cooling Heat Exchangers Electrical Boxes Inside Contaiment Charging Pumps Main Steam and Feedwater Supports Diesel Generatos Electrical Cabinet RHR Pumps Containment Spray Piping Essential Service Water Pumps Feedwater Control Valves Main Condenser Bateries Auxilary Feedwater Piping 1E Distribution Centers 1E Motor Control Centers 1E Load Centers Control Rod Driver Refuelling Water Tank Main Steam Safety and Relief Valves Electrical Boxes Outside Contaiment Safety Inyection Accumulators Neutron Flux Detectors 24V Power Supplies Condensate Tank Component Cooling Pumps Low Voltage Motors DC Load Centers Boric Acid Tank Auxilary Feedwater Pumps Main Turbine Liquid Radwaste Tanks 1E Instrument Load Centers 1E Instrument Auxiliary Load Centers Primary Containment Isolation Valves 1E Intrument Inverter Power Supply Main Generator Reactor Coolant Drain Heat Exchanger 6,3 kV Motors Main Transformers
210

368 368 367 364 360 358 357 356 350 348 347 346 346 340 340 337 334 334 334 333 330 327 325 323 323 323 322 321 320 319 314 314 306 305 303 299 297 296 296 295 295 293 293 291 289 289 288 288 286

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138

Radwaste Monitoring Tank Safety Inyection Accumulator Check Valves No 1E Motors Control Centers Main Turbine Piping Motor Operated Valves No-1E Distribution Centers No-1E Load Centers Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Bateries Chargers Refuelling Handling Crane Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Radiation Monitors Volume and Chemical Control Piping Steam Extraction, Drain and Vent System Piping Boron Recycle System Tanks Refuelling Building Crane Essential Chillers Cathodic Protection Instrument Cabinets (electronic cards) Containment Low Capacity Filtering Unit Auxiliary Feedwater Tank Auxiliary Turbines Hydraulic Valves Auxiliary Transformers Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Volume Control Tank Equiment Drains Tank Circulating Water Piping Grouped Phase Buses Essential Chilled Water Pump Special and Instrument Cables Containment Sum Grids 400kV, 220kV, and 110kV Swtichgears Circulating Water Pumps Control Rod Driver Motor-Generator Sets Hydrogen Recombiner Circulation Water Movile Grids Mix Bed Desmineralizer Cathionic Bed Desmineralizer Main Generator Swtichgear Electrical Protection EDG Gas-oil Storage Tank Containment Blowdown Low Capacity Unit Heaters Drain Tank Reheater and Moisture Separators Transmisor Elements Fuel Pool Desmineralizer Isolated Phase Buses Reactor Make-up Piping Acid Boric Pumps Regenerative Heat Exchanger
211

283 282 282 282 282 282 282 280 278 278 277 275 274 273 271 270 268 268 268 267 267 265 263 263 262 261 261 260 255 254 253 251 250 250 243 240 239 239 238 237 236 236 235 235 234 234 234 232 231 228

139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179

Refuelling Water Heat Exchanger Temperature Elements Pressurizer Relief Tank Excess Let Down Heat Exchangers Let Down Heat Exchangers Containment High Capacity Filtering Unit Containment Spray Pump Plant Computer Refuelling Water Storage System Piping Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Steam Generator Blowdown Electromagnetic Filter Limit Swtiches Seal Water Heat Exchanger Reactor Make-up Storage Tank Steam Generator Blowdown Piping Containment Low Capacity Blowdown Ventilator Air Compressors High Pressure Feedwater Heaters Low Pressure Feedwater Heaters Fire Protection Water Tank Fire Protection Diesel Feedwater Pumps Containment Blowdown High Capacity Unit NaOH Pump Auxiliary Feedwater Hydraulic Valves Feedwater Turbines Solenoid Valves Essential Service Water Auxiliary Storage Tank Desmineralized Water Tank Feedwater Check Valves Containment High Capacity Blowdown Ventilator Seals Cleaning Water Storage Tank Air Compressed Post-Cooler Air Compressed Dryer Gas-oil Transfering Pumps Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps Main Turbine Control and Stop Valves Air Operated Valves Fire Protection Pump (Jockey) Fire Protection Pump ( Electrical) Fire Protection Pump (Diesel)

228 228 226 224 224 223 221 220 218 217 216 215 214 214 213 211 210 208 208 205 205 205 203 196 196 195 194 185 185 183 183 177 171 168 167 167 166 165 150 148 148

212

%:5 LISTING AND RELATIVE RANKING OF COMPONENT IMPORTANT FOR PLANT LIFE MANAGEMENT &RPSRQHQW6WUXFWXUH &RPSRQHQW *URXSLQJ 'HVFULSWLRQ Reactor Pressure Vessel Reactor Vessel Pedestal Drywell Metal Shell Foundation Reactor Building Basemat Suppression Chamber including supports Plant Control Center Biological Shield Fuel Pool Slabs and Walls Drywell Metal Shell Snubbers Sacrificial Shield Wall Reactor Recirculation Piping Control Rod Driver Reactor Vessel Core Shroud Reactor Vessel Nozzle Safe Ends Turbine Pedestal Reactor Building Floor, Slabs and Walls Reactor Vessel Core Support Plate ECCS Piping Inside Contaiment Reactor Vessel Core Top and Bottom Grid Suppression Chamber Vent Headers and Downcomers Drywell Vent Lines Including Bellows Reactor Vessel Jet Pumps Main Steam and Isolation Condenser Piping inside Contaiment HPCI Turbine Emergency Diesel Generator (Engine) Equiment Fundation CRD Insert and Withdraw Lines Intake Structure Cables in Primary Containment Primary Containment Mechanical Penetration Assemblies Feedwater Piping inside Primary Containment Reactor Vessel Feedwater and Core Spray Sparger Drywell Radial Steel Main Turbine LPCI Heat Exchangers Recirculation Pumps Main Steam Isolation Valves ECCS Piping Inside Secondary Contaiment Refuelling and Drywells Bellows Emergency Diesel Generator (Generator) Radwaate Building Main Condenser Isolation Condenser Piping Inside Secondary Containment
213

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45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

Essential Switchgear Cables outside Primary Containment Turbine Building Primary Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies Essential Relays Interrptible Bus to Uninterruptible Bus Switchgear Core Spray Pumps LPCI Pumps LPCI Service Water Pumps Primary Containment Personnel Airlock and Equipment Hatches HPCI Pump and Booster Pump Main Steam Safety and Relief Valves Isolation Condenser Reactor Building Structure Steel LPCI Service Water Piping Discharge Structure and Canal Primary Containment Isolation Valves Fuel Pool Liner Feedwater Pumps Offgas Stack RBCCW Pumps Moisture Separators RPS Motor-Generator Sets Reactor Recirculation Suction and Discharge Valves Neutron Flux Detectors Electrical Buses Bateries Moter Control Centers Reactor Building Crane Instrument Air Compressors Reactor Vessel Support RWCU Piping CS Pumps Motors Control Rod Driver Hydrulic Unit Control Room Panels Reactor Vessel Steam Separator and Dryer Assemblies SLC Pumps Circulating Water Piping LPCI Pumps Motors Underground Piping Large Check Valves Radation Monitors Turbine Building Structure Steel Motor Operated Valves HVAC Ducts Fire Protection Pumps Turbine Control and Stop Valves Gas-oil Transfering Pump Special and Instruments Cables
214

358 357 357 355 346 346 343 343 343 342 342 341 338 335 333 332 331 328 321 318 314 309 308 307 306 306 305 301 298 295 293 293 292 291 290 290 288 287 286 285 284 283 283 281 280 280 274 270 270

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Instrument Cabinet (electronic cards) Low Pressure and High Pressure Heaters Main Generator Shut Down Cooling Pumps LPCI Service Water Pumps Motors RWCU Regenerative Heat Exchanger and No-Regenerative Hx Transformers Drywell Cooling Water Pump Recirculation Pumps Motors Recirculation Pumps Motor-Generator Sets Bateries Chargers RBCCW Heat Exchangers Primary Containment HVAC Equipment Turbine Building Crane Transmisor Elements Emergency Filtering Trains Condesate Tank Shut Down Cooling Water Heat Exchangers Temperature Elements Plant Computer Essential Local Pannels Feedwater Pumps Motors DWR Floor Drain Collector,Sample and Chemical Waste Tanks Offgas Recombiner Oxygem Sampling Pump Condensate and RWCU Desmineralizers Gaseous Radwate Dumpers CRW Floor Waste Collector, Surge and Sample Tanks Reactor Building to Turbine Building Isolation Seal Essential HVAC Systems Dumpers Limit Switches Equipment Drains Collector Tank Fire Protection Dumpers Circulating Water Pumps Turbine Controls Cathodic Protection Shut Down Cooling Pumps Motors Lube-oil Reservoir and Storage Tank Fire Protection Pumps Motors Fire Protection Pumps Diesel Engine Circulating Water Pumps Motors Fire protection Instrumentation

270 269 267 267 267 263 263 260 256 256 253 251 244 242 242 239 236 236 230 230 226 226 224 224 224 221 220 220 219 219 216 214 204 204 201 201 197 182 176 175 159 157

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The following structure is retained for Belgium Equipment Ageing Summaries (EAS):
(TXLSPHQW $JHLQJ 6XPPDULHV 6\VWHPV 6WUXFWXUHV DQG &RPSRQHQWV 3UREOHP FDWHJRU\ Reactor pressure Core belt region Irradiation embrittlement vessel Cover head penetrations Primary water stress corrosion cracking Bottom mounted Primary water stress corrosion cracking instrumentation penetrations Canopy seal welds Stress corrosion cracking Vessel internals Wear Baffle bolts Irradiation assisted stress corrosion cracking Guide tube split pins Stress corrosion cracking of Inconel 750 Control rods Flow induced fretting wear Steam generator Corrosion, wear, vibration and fatigue Reactor cooling Cast stainless steel casing Thermal ageing Pump Thermal barrier Thermal fatigue Pressuriser Surge line nozzle Cracking (Fatigue, Primary Water SCC) ASME Section III, All Class 1 components Stress and fatigue Div. 1 Piping Stress and fatigue due to regulatory reconciliation Stress and fatigue due to unexpected transients Flow accelerated corrosion Micro biological corrosion Primary piping Cast stainless steel elbows Thermal ageing Primary Pre-stressed cables Loss of prestressing containment Concrete Seismical category 1 Leak tightness structures Other structures Degradations due to concrete carbonation IE electrical and 1 E qualification programs and preventive I&C equipment maintenance Electrical cables Cable ageing

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014 023 021 022 031 041 051 052 062 081 091 092 093 094 071 201 202 203 401 402

Examples of these EAS are given hereafter.

216




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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ Low alloy carbon steel embrittlement in the beltline region of the vessel. The fracture toughness curves (KIc: initiation, Kla: arrest) as a function of temperature are modified as follows: shift to the right or increase in transition temperature: RTNDT, corresponding to a decrease of fracture toughness at a given temperature. decrease of upper shelf values in the transition range.

6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ 5HJXODWRU\ WHVWV The surveillance program, is defined according to 10 CFR 50 Appendix H. Test specimens representative of the beltline region (shell, weld, heat affected zone) are encapsulated and placed in the RPV. Surveillance capsules are withdrawn according to a pre defined schedule in order to, have at all times experimental results for a fluence larger than the actual fluence received by the RPV wall. The embrittlement is monitored by Charpy impact tests and the shift of the fracture toughness curves is supposed to be identical to the shift of the Charpy curves measured at the conventional 41 J level. Fluence is monitored by dosimeters contained in the capsules. Irradiation temperature is monitored through low melting point eutectic alloys. 1RQ5HJXODWRU\ WHVWV Instrumented Charpy tests: Fracture toughness may be derived from. instrumented Charpy tests by means of a correlation between the NDT and the arrest force measured on the Charpy Load trace (force versus displacement). This is a new development not yet accepted in a regulatory context. Although test methods to evaluate the fracture toughness by means of small specimens (Charpy-size or smaller) are under active development world-wide; their use in a regulatory context is not accepted yet. An increasing use of such methods is however to be expected in the coming years. (QKDQFHG VXUYHLOODQFH 3URJUDP Since the welds of Doel 1&2 are sensitive to thermal ageing and due to uncertainty on Cu content of the welds; an enhanced surveillance program is used. This is a combination of the following techniques: Charpy specimen reconstitution (from broken Charpy remnants); Use of load curves from instrumented Charpy tests; Determination of fracture toughness on pre-cracked Charpy specimens tested in three point bending; Micro mechanical modelling and micro structural investigations (to understand the factors influencing the RPV mechanical properties under service condition).

$JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD

217

3UHGLFWLRQ Formulae used to predict the shift of transition temperature RTNDT as a function of various parameters are: The US-NRC Reg. Guide 1.99, rev. 2 formula (not appropriate for low Cu), used for Doel 1/2; The French FIS and FIM formula, used for all units, except Doel 1/2.

Surveillance results are used to confirm the conservatism of these formulae or identify deviations from the predictions. $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD Limits on operation: Pressure-Temperature limits for heat-up and cool down and low temperature over pressure protection defined on the basis of the reference 1/4 T flaw. Stress intensity factor at tip of reference flaw must remain < KIa at the given equivalent temperature T-RTNDT. (Criterion: 2KIp + KIt < KIa). Pressurised thermal shock (10 CFR 50 50.61): The risk of vessel failure of pressurised thermal shock remains acceptable as long as the following criteria are met: RTNDT < 132C for forging, plates, axial welds and RTNDT < 149C for circumferential welds. 0LWLJDWLRQ RI DJHLQJHIIHFWV Reduction of the neutron flux by using core loading pattern of the low leakage type. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW Heating of safety injection water to reduce thermal shock (implemented in Doel 1 &2). Modification of operating procedure to prevent excessive pressurisation.   ($6   5($&725 35(6685( 9(66(/  &29(5 +($' 3(1(75$7,216  35,0$5< :$7(5 675(66 &25526,21 &5$&.,1*

3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ Cracks in the penetrations made of Inconel 600. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ 5HJXODWRU\ LQVSHFWLRQV ASME VT2 inspections at each outage. 1RQ5HJXODWRU\ WHVWV Detailed inspections of all penetrations in all Belgian plants with Eddy Current Technique; and Ultrasonic inspection in case of indications. All heads have been at least inspected once and a new inspection program. was proposed: periodical inspections every 2, 4 or 8 years depending on the unit (if no indications) or more frequently if indications are detected. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD The pressure boundary must be still present: minimal ligament length of about 6 mm (4 mm for minimal thickness + 2 mm for the tolerance of the inspection technique) at the 'triple point' 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW Replacement of the cover at one unit (same design with Inconel 690 material).

218




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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ The baffle bolts are used to attach the baffle plates to the former plates in the Vessel Internals. The resulting structure forms a boundary for the flow of coolant and provides lateral support to the fuel assemblies. After an operating time of the order of 120 000 hours, some bolts exhibit cracking at the junction of the head and the shaft of the bolt. This cracking is attributed to a form of Irradiation Assisted Stress Corrosion Cracking (IASCC). 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ Ultrasonic inspections were performed on bolt head of some critical Belgian NPPs (type CPO). An inspection program should be set up in the future. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD Nowadays, cracked bolts are not allowed. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW Replacement of all cracked baffle bolts in one unit by new generation of bolts.




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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ Many degradation phenomena that may affect the safe operation of SGs have occurred world-wide. The following list includes those that have been detected or might potentially occur in the Belgian units: PWSCC of tubes (primary water stress corrosion cracking), IGA/SSCC of tubes (intergranular attack/secondary side stress corrosion cracking), Tube wear Tube fatigue/vibration TSP cracking and erosion - corrosion, Wrapper cracking and wrapper support block degradations Most degradation phenomena are generic in nature and are known to affect many steam generators world-wide, especially those equipped with Inconel 600 tubes. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ Tube inspection by eddy current (bobbin coil or rotating tube) and/or ultrasonic examination. Presently by sampling at each refuelling outage.

219

$JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD Percentage of plugged tubes (maximum value per SG, average value per unit) Plugging/repair criteria according to structural integrity (crack length, defect depth or signal amplitude), leakage (maximum allowable leakage per SG in normal operation, maximum allowable radiation dose at the site limit in case of secondary pipe break).

0LWLJDWLRQ RI DJHLQJ HIIHFWV Temperature reduction, Chemical cleaning, Chemistry improvements 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW Tube plugging, Tube sleeving, Nickel plating of the tubes, Tube reexpansion, Tube shot or rotopeening U-bend thermal treatment. SG replacement.




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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ The ferrite (10 to 25%) phase of cast duplex stainless steel (austenitic-ferritic) is susceptible to hardening and decrease of ductility, impact strength and fracture toughness under long term exposure to operating temperature. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ ASME Code Case N-481 ("Alternate Examination Requirements for Cast Austenitic Pump Casings" - Section XI, Division 1 - March 5, 1990) was introduced to allow the replacement of volumetric examination on pump casing welds by visual examination. To allow the elimination of volumetric examinations, this Code Case requires: an evaluation of the material properties (including toughness) in aged condition, taking into account the degradation by thermal ageing; the demonstration of the stability of one-quarter thickness reference flaws, with a length six times the depth postulated at limiting locations.

Re-evaluation of the prediction method during the safety review (every 10 years). $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD 3UHGLFWLRQ Mechanical properties of aged material necessary for the fracture mechanics evaluations are indirectly estimated; these evaluations are based on: the chemical composition and the ferrite content of the materials as found in material test certificates; the use of lower bound experimental correlation curves provided in the specialised literature; the use of property values at saturation.

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220

There are no specific regulatory criteria regarding the thermal ageing of cast stainless steel products. The acceptability of the mechanical properties in aged condition was justified by comparing with the properties given in a generic Westinghouse report (WCAP -13045) applicable to similar NPPs.  ($6   5($&725 &22/,1* 3803  7+(50$/ %$55,(5  7+(50$/ )$7,*8(

3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ French pump manufacturer Jeumont Industries has observed cracks at three different locations on the 93 D type RCP thermal barrier and one location in the shaft, under the thermal sleeve, at the interface of the pump shaft with the thermal barrier labyrinth. The thermal barrier assembly is intended to provide a thermal buffer between the pumps radial bearing / shaft seal system. and the hot primary coolant pumped, in order to limit the bearing and seals temperature. It is constituted by a stainless steel confinement welded to the pump, main flange, encasing a heat exchanger fed by the intermediate cooling system (component cooling). The thermal sleeve is intended to protect the pump, shaft in an area where great temperature discontinuity exists. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ In service monitoring installed to control. shaft displacements in one NPP (not relevant for all type of cracks). No surveillance program related to these specific problems. In Belgium, no frequency defined so far. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD No criteria developed on a generic base for the 93 D type pumps. However, a specific approach has been developed in 1999 for Doel 3 to justify the continuous operation of the pumps in service at that time, after discovery cracks during the 1999 UT inspection performed on the thermal barrier cover of the spare pump hydraulic, which was removed from a loop in 1993. The analysis evaluated the crack propagation and the maximal acceptable crack size and showed that the, number of cycles necessary to reach this depth starting from the detected crack size was sufficiently high to allow a further operation for several years, allowing the implementation of an optimised replacement program. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW New thermal barrier cover design developed in order to remove the geometrical discontinuity causing crack initiation. Repair by welding for defect in the flange. Repair by machining for cracks in the shaft under the thermal sleeve, or replacement in case of excessive machining.




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221

3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ Cast duplex stainless steels contain typically 10 to 25% ferrite in an austenitic matrix. These two phases have different chemical composition. The ferrite phase is susceptible to hardening and decrease of ductility, impact strength and fracture toughness under long term exposure to operating temperature. Aged ferrite is susceptible to cleavage fracture, while austenite is unaffected by thermal ageing. The failure mode of aged duplex stainless steels remains ductile tearing (no brittle fracture), but with reduced tearing resistance. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD 3UHGLFWLRQ: Mechanical properties of aged material necessary for the fracture mechanics evaluations are indirectly estimated; these evaluations are based on: the chemical composition and the ferrite content of the materials as found in material test certificates; the use of lower bound experimental correlation curves provided in the specialised literature; the use of property values at saturation.

$FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD There are no specific regulatory criteria regarding the thermal ageing of cast stainless steel products. Thermal ageing of duplex stainless steel elbows is deemed acceptable if a leak before break (LBB) analysis performed on these elbows, using properties of aged material, proves successful. In LBB analysis, the stability of large through wall cracks under accident loading is demonstrated. The cracks are located in the circumferential and longitudinal welds of the elbows. The analysis is performed with weld and base material properties. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW The cast stainless steel components present in the primary loop piping of the Belgian units have relatively low or moderate ferrite content; in this respect, the situation is more favourable than for some French units where some sensitive components had to be replaced. Thus no replacement is expected to be necessary for the Belgian units.




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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ The ASME Section III, Division 1 Code requires that all Class 1 components be qualified for stress and fatigue when subjected to operational pressure and thermal transients classified as service levels A (normal), B (upset) and test loading conditions. At the design stage, this qualification is performed using so-called "design transients"; these transients and their corresponding number of occurrences are specified in the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) for each component. However, a re-qualification of some of these components may be necessary for several reasons. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ During operation, transient book keeping must be performed. This monitoring uses the pressure and temperature sensors existing in the plant. Plant operators record each operational transient having a
222

correspondent design transient as well as all similar variations of operational parameters. Threshold values are defined for those parameters, under these the variations are not recorded. The process is purely manual and the way to affect operational transients to closest design transients is purely cause-based. For the oldest units, for which very limited number of transients were considered, the transient list has been extended to those events considered in the other units. And, for transients not considered during the initial period, number of occurrences have been assumed by extrapolation. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD 3UHGLFWLRQ Stress and fatigue analysis according to ASME 111. $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD At the design stage: The cumulative fatigue usage factor for all transient combinations must be 1. During operation: The number of transients experienced by the components cannot exceed the number of occurrences assumed in the qualification analysis. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW For most units, design transients have been completed and modified for SG replacement and/or power uprating. Large primary components have been requalified with the new design transients for a 40 years lifetime (if this was not considered in the original design (e.g. Tihange 1)). Original design calculation are generally very conservative; the main objective of the designer was not to, minimise the cumulative fatigue usage factor U, but to get one less than the unity. Therefore, in many cases where U exceeds unity, the most efficient remedy may be to redo the stress and fatigue analysis of the concerned area, using less conservative assumptions and more modem techniques than those used in the original design.




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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ According to the ASME Section III code, Class 1 components must be qualified to sustain fatigue due to design thermal and pressure transients. The qualification analyses are made for a design life of 30 or 40 years. Operation beyond the design life must be justified. In old vintage plants, certain Class 1 pipes and equipment were not explicitly qualified to fatigue (e.g.: old vintage Class 1 pipes were analysed to the ANSI B3 1.1 Code which does not require explicit fatigue qualification). In those situations some kind of reconciliation must be performed, let alone when extension beyond the original design life is envisioned.

223

$JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD 3UHGLFWLRQ The equivalence of the design requirement of the ASME III - 68, B31.7 and B31.1 codes with the ASME 11183 Code has been established at the first decennial revision of old vintage plants. This demonstration allows to function to 30 years without reanalysing those piping and equipment not covered by explicit fatigue analysis in the original design. At the third decennial revision (if any) one subject item should be devoted to: the review of the reasoning which led to the demonstration of equivalence between the original construction codes and the ASME 11183 code, to check if it applies to the extended lifetime; the evaluation of the significance of the requirements of the new ASME III edition applicable at the time of the Y decennial revision with respect to those of the 83 edition.

$FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD ASME NB-3600 type of stress and fatigue analysis (NB-3200 procedure may also apply when those of NB-3600 are not sufficient). 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW See EAS 081.  ($6   3,3,1*  675(66 $1' )$7,*8( '8( 72 81(;3(&7(' 75$16,(176

3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ Nuclear plants throughout the world have reported incidents involving cracks, leaks or abnormal large deformations in some piping systems. After analysis, some of those phenomena were attributed to thermal transients unknown at the time of the Plant Design. The integrity of the concerned piping systems and piping supports to these unexpected thermal transients must be verified. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ The following transients were observed at least once in at least one Belgian unit, i.e.: Thermal stratification transients in the pressuriser surge line, in the main Feed Water lines when the Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) lines are directly connected to them. Thermal transients in unisolable section of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) piping that is connected to the RCS.

Transient monitoring through long term temperature measurement directly onto the concerned pipes has been performed in some Belgian NPP (e.g. Main Feed Water Lines, Surge Line). This type of surveillance allows to determine the time history characteristics of the transients and their number of occurrences. Transient monitoring must be continuous over at least one fuel cycle because some of these transients only show up for some specific combination of plant operation. Local fatigue monitoring was installed to control the fatigue usage factor at the point where the stress and fatigue analysis was not satisfactory (e.g. welds between SG nozzles and MFW pipes). Inspections according to ASME XI. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD

224

3UHGLFWLRQ: Based on long term temperature measurements, stress and fatigue analysis were performed for most of Belgian NPPs. $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD The acceptability of unexpected thermal transients must be checked through a stress and fatigue analysis made in accordance with the rules of the ASME Code, Section III, Division 1: Subsection NB (NB 3200 or 3600), for Class 1 piping components; Subsection NC, for Class 2 piping components.

It should however be recognised that the rules contained in Subsection NC to evaluate the fatigue strength of Class 2 piping components are crude and cannot take into account the local effects of unexpected thermal transients. Therefore, in severe situations, the rules of Subsection NB may also be applied to those components. The acceptability of cracks must be evaluated with the rules of the ASME Code, Section XI, using fracture mechanics evaluation technique. 0LWLJDWLRQ RI DJHLQJ HIIHFWV System modifications to avoid or mitigate unexpected transients were implemented in some Belgian NPP: a system was devised to depressurise the ECCS portion comprised between leaky ECSS block valve and ECSS check valve near the RCS. anti-waterhammer baffle boxes have been placed on the main feed water lines near the SG nozzles and avoid the propagation of direct flow lower stratification (which occurs when the system is reinitiated after a reactor emergency shutdown.

0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW Repairs and replacements have been applied to Main Feed Water piping components subject to upper stratification (which occurs when low flow of Auxiliary Feed Water is injected into the SG at plant hot standby condition). Cracked piping components (e.g.: elbow) were replaced in unisolable piping section located near the RCS. Replacement with redesign has been used to MFW piping components such as nozzle to achieve smoother geometrys with reduced stress raisers (during the Steam Generators Replacement). Based on problems observed in foreign NPPs, the inspection program may be adapted to inspect as soon as possible critical zones.  ($6   3,3,1*  )/2: $&&(/(5$7(' &25526,21

3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ Increasing of the rate of corrosion or material dissolution, caused by relative movements between corrosive fluid and a material surface. This is encountered in both single and two-phase flow. It leads to piping wall thinning. Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) occurs in many piping systems, mainly FW (Feed Water System), AFW (Auxiliary Feed Water System), BD (Blow-Down System), most of the lines going to condenser and surge lines. A lot of damaged items have been detected and replaced. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ

225

Wall thickness measurements by Ultrasonic Testing (UT) of the most susceptible elements are regularly inspected. Inspection campaigns are planned every years with a variable examination frequency depending on the severity of FAC of the concerned elements. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD 3UHGLFWLRQ Use of computer codes (checworks) for FAC surveillance. $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD The criteria for evaluating piping wall thinning are derived form the ASME code requirements. They permit to accept "as is" and for a minimum period of time, wall thinning produced by erosion or by grinding to remove cracks observed during In Service Inspection. These criteria are: the average thickness of wall thinning in axial and hoop directions and the extent of wall thinning. 0LWLJDWLRQ RI DJHLQJ HIIHFWV Modification of water chemistry. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW Replacements of thinned pipe portions. Sometimes this replacement was performed using another pipe material (more resistant to FAC). In few cases: new design of the line.




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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ The function of these tendons is to sustain the load due to the internal pressure in case of accident in the containment (design pressure of about 3.5 bar). If the prestress level decreases too quickly, extra lifetime of the containment will not be allowed. This problem is non-relevant for the Doel 1 and Doel 2 (steel containment). 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ Evolution of the initial pre-stress applied at the primary structures on basis of a minimal period of 30 years. A follow-up is defined in the Regulatory Guide 1.90 and in the Safety Report, containing the following requirements: Strain and deformation measurements of the concrete walls by mean of strain cells located in the concrete or with vibrating wire gauges (permanent monitoring system). These measurements are performed every 6 months. Tension tests for witness cables (lift-off tests). These tests are performed every 5 years. Inspection of the protection parts of the anchors of the prestressed cables. These inspections are performed every 5 years. Containment pressurisation tests. These tests are performed every 10 years.

226

$JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD 3UHGLFWLRQ General trend of the results of the lift-off tests. $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD Acceptance criteria are those from the ASME III Division II CC 3000, the Regulatory Guide 1.90, and the Safety Report. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW In some Belgian units, the monitoring system by mean of strain cells was replaced by a monitoring with vibrating wire gauges.  ($6   &21&5(7( 6758&785(6  6(,60,& &$7(*25< ,  /($. 7,*+71(66

3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ Identification of defects concerning leak tightness due to ageing or absence of lining and loss of resistance of structures by corrosion of reinforcing bars under action of water. Protection of the risks related to settlements and relative movements between structures. Risks related to the integrity of the structures due to insufficient reinforcement cover or cracks in reinforced concrete; potentially leak of tightness or confinement due to the joint degradations. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ The surveillance is included in "In Service Inspection" program, it consists on: absolute and differential settlement measurements of the structures and their foundations (fissurometers for relative movements, topografical levelling for general settlement); and visual inspection of structures submitted to thermal and dynamic effects.

The frequency of these inspections depends on the structural importance of the inspected zones (control every year of every 3 years). If necessary, samples are taken to perform mechanical and chemical tests (e.g. pH measurement). $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD Minimal mechanical properties of the concrete. Design settlement values. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW LPSURYHPHQW Repair of concrete and injections.

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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ It is imperative to know the qualified life of each equipment or its components to determine the date of replacement. The qualified life of a 1E equipment is the period during which it is installed and capable of functioning correctly even in the case of an accident. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ 1E qualified equipment refers to any electrical or I&C equipment that must be qualified according to the regulations in force for Belgiums nuclear power stations (e.g. the IOCFR50 and a number of RGs and IEEE regulations) so that this equipment may perform its safety function within the system of which it is part. An electrical or I&C equipment is considered 1E qualified when it is of identical manufacture to an equipment which has successfully undergone the qualification tests. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD 3UHGLFWLRQ Ageing tests simulating the three significant parameters (temperature, mechanical ageing, irradiation) allow to set a qualified life. $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD It is imperative to replace equipment or their components before their Qualified Life expires. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW Qualification programs permit to create data base which will support Preventive Maintenance programs by allowing to plan replacements at the time best suited to minimise the economic impact. When a qualification program has been implemented by the relevant tests having been performed in an approved laboratory, at the manufacturers or perhaps even at the utilitys premises, the results will be recorded in a Qualification Report established by the entity that was responsible for performing the tests. Based on this report, a Synthetic Qualification Report will be drawn up. This report will contain an evaluation of the qualified equipment life, which may vary depending on the location of the equipment. Extension of Qualified Life: It is interesting to check whether there is a possibility of extending the life of an equipment by renewing some of its components or by reassessing its life in the light of the severity of the environment the equipment was exposed to in reality. This approach makes it possible to have to replace only the equipment exposed to the severest conditions. Qualification of new equipment: In the case of obsolescence, the Utilities do not have the possibility to replace different components before the qualified life of the equipment expires. Therefore when qualified equipment has become obsolete, new equipment has to be found which is already qualified or which we can qualify or have qualified by others under our supervision. The qualification process may be extremely protracted depending on the required qualification level.

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3UREOHP GHVFULSWLRQ The cabling of equipment and motors, including that of safety-related equipment and motors, of the oldest units, was done with the PVC cables that were available at the time (1970), without qualification and without projected lifetime. The risk exists that a non-qualified cable cannot yet be replaced, simply because an adequate substitution for it is not yet available in Belgium. For lack of a qualified supply cable the equipment itself loses its qualification as it may not be able to correctly operate in the accidental conditions it was itself qualified for. 6XUYHLOODQFH  SHULRGLF WHVWLQJ 1E qualified cables refer to any electrical or I&C cables that must be qualified according to the regulations in force for Belgiums nuclear power stations (e.g. the 10CFR50 and a number of RGs and IEEE regulations) so that the cable may perform its safety function within the system of which it is part. An electrical or I&C cable is considered 1E qualified when it is of identical manufacture to a cable which has successfully undergone the qualification tests. For the original non-qualified cables of the oldest units, the evolution of the mechanical and electrical characteristics is monitored. $JHLQJ SUHGLFWLRQ FULWHULD 3UHGLFWLRQ Ageing tests simulating the three parameters (thermal ageing, moisture ageing, radiation exposure ageing) allow to set a qualified life. $FFHSWDQFH FULWHULD It is imperative to replace cables before their qualified life expires. 0DLQWHQDQFH SURJUDPV  FRPSRQHQW UHSDLU  UHSODFHPHQW  LPSURYHPHQW Qualification programs permit to create data base which will support Preventive Maintenance programs by allowing to plan replacements at the time best suited to minimise the economic impact. When a qualification program has been implemented by the relevant tests having been performed in an approved laboratory, at the manufacturers or perhaps even at the utilities premises, the results will be recorded in a Qualification Report established by the entity that was responsible for performing the tests. Based on this report, a Synthetic Qualification Report will be drawn up. This report will contain an evaluation of the cable life, which may vary depending on the location of the equipment. These reports are regularly reviewed to assess whether the cable life can be extended when taking into account the exact location and the functionality, new parameters, etc. The reports are annually distributed to the utilities. Extension of Qualified Life: It is interesting to check whether there is a possibility of extending the life of a cable by reassessing its life in the light of the severity of the environment the cable was exposed to in reality. This approach makes it possible to have to replace only the cable exposed to the severest conditions. Qualification of new cables: When qualified cable has become obsolete, new cable has to, be found which is already qualified or which we can qualify or have qualified by others under our supervision.

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Cable replacement is in progress in the oldest Belgian NPPs. Cable selection is based according to the precise location and the function of the equipment supplied through the cables. It follows from these criteria that not all the cables have to be systematically replaced, and, therefore, replacement is evaluated on a case per case basis.




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In the component service life assessment approach, the vessel is dealt with separately, owing to its special safety nature which is linked to its role as a secondary barrier, which leads to its rupture being excluded and, besides, to the fact that its replacement is very difficult to conceive. Regarding the vessel service life, the main ageing factor concerns the embrittlement under neutron irradiation of the core region. The difference in ductile-brittle transition temperature which results from it is assessed, using prediction formulae derived from tests in the research reactor and feedback of experience. Embrittlement has been taken into account from the design stage of the first French PWR units, by preventive measures aiming to reduce the content of embrittling elements, such as copper, phosphorous and nickel. The predictions are then checked for each vessel with the aid of the monitoring programme, based on the use of test specimens of material representative of the shell and welded joints; these are irradiated at the edges of the core, so that the real evolution of the transition temperature can be anticipated. The extrapolation of the results, combined with all the studies and R&D work conducted up till now, confirms the in-service behaviour of 900 MWe unit reactor vessels for a service life of at least 40 years, without implementing restrictive protective measures, but requiring additional actions (optimised in-service inspection, treatment of irradiation surveillance programme anomalies, 3D mechanical thermohydraulic calculations, design of certain state-oriented approach procedures etc.). The scientific work conducted, notably concerning ageing mechanisms by irradiation of the vessels, has resulted in a large acquisition of knowledge on the evolution of the transition temperature in view of irradiation (RTNDT) until the end of service life of the reactors, linked to the fluence received by the vessel in the core region. The method used to assess fluence is today qualified, as a result, in particular, of the special monitoring programme and the autodosimetry of the CHOOZ A vessel. Moreover, fuel loading patterns at reduced flux, making it possible to limit vessel embrittlement, are implemented on most of the 900 MWe CP1-CP2 units and extended to CP0 units. This optimised management of fluence is also being developed on units 1300 MWe. It will allow, in addition to limitation of vessel embrittlernent to compensate, the flux effects linked, to long series. A summarised document confirming the inservice behaviour of REP 900 MWe vessels for et least 40 years, was drawn up and submitted to the safety authorities at the beginning of 1998 (1). the same will be done for the REP 1300 MWe vessel file. The briefing book issued includes, in particular, the following points: The "available margins" have been updated from the actual fluence level, with the computing sequence which today constitutes the reference for flux calculations, and the calculated fluence values of each vessel are lower than the design value, owing to setting up of optimised management. The "available" margins are increased. The thorough knowledge of the evolution of RTNDT up to the end of reactor service life linked to the fluence received by the core region. All of the estimated reactor end of life RTNDT ,
230

according to their commission date, show that the values are much lower than 1000C, especially in view of the saving of fluence achieved by optimised fuel management. The margins with regard to fast fracture obtained in mechanical analysis, demonstrate the acceptability, in relation to code criteria (RCC-M, RSEM), of assumed underclad cracking, as well as the harmlessness of assumed faults in the cladding for all loading situations. The confirmation, by specific studies, of rare indications detected on some vessels, has been given for the different loading situations.

A reactor service aptitude criteria has been suggested, in line with the approaches and criteria internationally selected in the assessment of reactor integrity (USA - screening criteria, Germany etc.) and is based on the results obtained within the scope of the briefing book and additional studies. This reactor service aptitude criterion, indexed in terms of measurable parameter RTNDT, is intended to look at the acceptability of a 130C value. The methods selected for the in service inspection applied for the examination of vessel walls and the internal condition of the core shells, have been used with the checking device termed "Thirty First Millimetres" fitted onto die in-service inspection machine. The aim is to guarantee the detection and characterisation of indications of height greater than 6mm under cladding whatever the surface condition of the latter (the vessels shall be examined during the service visit after 20 years of operation at the latest). Given what is known about the resilience of the materials following the studies relating to embrittlement under irradiation, the good assessment of fluence at the end of service life and margins identified in the mechanical analysis for the most severe loading situations, a service life beyond 40 years is conceivable. Therefore, an extension to the present vessel monitoring programme has been decided. It consists of inserting, in place of irradiation capsules which have been removed, reserve capsules, in order, in respecting regulatory requirements, to supply the necessary factors for a possible service life extension, and to reinforce the embrittlement assessments made and to reduce uncertainties. The comparison of the French approach to embrittlement by irradiation with that of those practised abroad, has made it possible to foresee that the vessels in our inventory possess a real potential in terms of service life, owing, in particular, to the materials used, the quality of the monitoring programme and the fluence management policy implemented. EDFs participation in different international programmes currently underway confirms this analysis.



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Some parts of the main primary system, In particular the bends, are in moulded cast stainless steel. Those components are created in a foundry, by a static casting or centrifugation process, resulting from technical and economic considerations in the 1970's. In the early 1990's, it was noticed that those moulded products could present thermal ageing, after being maintained for a long time at main primary system service temperature (hot leg at 320C or cold leg at 285C). This results in a modification of the material structure, and the effect of this is to make the mechanical properties become hard and embrittled, which is demonstrated by a weakening of resilience and resistance. The materials concerned by the phenomenon are: the moulded bends of the hot and cold legs, and the primary coolant pump casing, the injection line shut-off valves, the inclined tap and pressurizer spray valves. Large scale work has been undertaken for a number of years with the aim of assessing their service life. They can be grouped around two large themes:
231

The search for ageing mechanisms and the parameters that govern it, with determination of forecasts of the resistance characteristics at rupture at end of life. The demonstration of the strength of the parts in service by calculations and tests, completed by a defence in depth following a leak before break approach,

The scientific programme has rapidly progressed since 1993. The ageing mechanism of these products moulded in cast stainless steel has been perfectly identified. Tests on large-scale models and test specimens have shown that this steel, even aged, remains ductile, which rules out any risk of brittle fracture. The formulation of tearing strength at end of life forecasts has been established from the ageing monitoring programme results. This consists of ageing, in an accelerated way, representative products (cast ingots moulded at the same time as the parts) as well as "casing" products of the components in service, on account of their chemical compositions. In order to validate these forecasts, a large expert assessment programme has been started. It includes, in particular, the removal of sensitive bends during steam generator (SG) replacements. The bends removed in 1995 for the DAMPIERRE unit 3 (3 hot bends and 2 cold adjacent to the SGs) are being expertly assessed, The first results show that the measurements are either confirmed, or better than the forecasts. Five other bends, considered as the most aged, will be expertly assessed during future SG replacement operations. The checking by gamma radiography of the bends at input and output of the most sensitive SG revealed no abnormality questioning the quality of the manufacturing. The non destructive control method R&D work has made it possible to calculate the readings from the radiograms and showed that they were small. The mechanical strength of the moulded bends has been demonstrated by a number of calculations and tests on age bonds at range 1 and 2/3. These tests have led to a very limited opening of faults. This work, which has no international equivalent has made it possible to confirm the operating fitness of all the hot and cold bends for the most unfavourable mechanical load situations for 900 MWe units, for a service life, of at least 40 years. In EDFs opinion no bend replacement is therefore necessary for safe operation. Nevertheless, accompanying measures have been taken and begun in order to confirm the acceptable behaviour of these components, notably the non-development of their real defects, and in order to assess the severity of the ageing predictions. Among these, besides the removing of hot and cold bends for expert assessment during SG replacement operations, an ageing monitoring programme of the most representative hot bends has been selected, based on the ageing monitoring in a furnace of cast ingots and coupons taken from the removed bends. Furthermore, at each decennial outage program. an inspection programme by gamma radiography of some of the most representative SG input and output bends will be carried out in order to confirm the absence of development of the defects previously detected. The 900 MWe unit bend justification documents were presented to the safety authorities in 1996 and 1997, who noted large-scale work presented by the owner. It reached a favourable conclusion for cold and hot bends, except for eight of them, considered as being the most sensitive to thermal ageing, and for which the maintaining in operation is still dependent on an additional analysis to be provided in three years time. With regard to 1300 MWe unit moulded bends, the operating fitness justification for at least 40 years has been supplied, and the justification documents have been submitted to the safety authorities. This documentation was established using the same methods that were selected for the 900 MWe plant: the results are similar. As an accompanying measure, inspection by radiography was selected for a SG input and output bend at each decennial outage program for one unit. The

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ageing monitoring program, begun for components of 900 MWe units, has been extended to some components representative of the 1300 MWe plant. At the end of 1997, a document demonstrating the operating fitness, for at least 40 years, of primary coolant pump casing, of some tap and valve casing and inclined nozzles of the Safety Injection System (RIS) injection lines in the primary system, was submitted to the safety authorities. This document, which is the last justification section for the strength of primary system moulded components service life is currently being examined. Additional requests could be formulated by the safety authorities on the part of the document relating to inclined nozzles.



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With regard to service life, the problems likely to affect control have very different origins: ageing, obsolescence of components and material, operating developments. Up until now, none of these problems has caused any considerable difficulties, even if some partial reorganisation/recasting operations have been necessary. The aim of forecasting in this area, in order to control the safety of the unit, is to guarantee the medium or short term maintenance of the systems, by looking for a technical and economic optimum. The lasting quality problematic of the nuclear unit instrumentation and control systems has been considered, since 1987, within the general framework of the "service life" programme, which defined instrumentation and control as one of the high stake components for unit service life. The inspection report derived from these studies considers the possibility of retaining instrumentation and control equipment for a period of 20 to 25 years after the industrial commissioning of the units. To reach this objective, an action programme and policy, forming the approach termed "lasting quality", have been set up. In addition to this approach, studies have been conducted in order to identify the different possible scenarios for the updating of instrumentation and control systems. The conclusion of this phase, presented in 1993, lead to the following recommendations: A limited redevelopment, carried, out in stages and in line with a coherent target architecture diagram. The launch of preliminary opportunity and feasibility studies of the "Instrumentation and control redevelopment" of 900 MWe units (R2C project).

The R2C project strategy studies were conducted, from 1993 to 1995, in preparation for the 900 MMe plant second decennial outage programme. Using the R2C project results, the 1300 MWe unit study, equipped with digital instrumentation and controls more sensitive to obsolescence, was launched at the end of 1996. It is subject to the ACCORD project (Instrumentation and control analysis, decennial redevelopment optimisation) for which conclusions have been drawn. 7KH ODVWLQJ TXDOLW\ DSSURDFK From the risk analysis, the lasting quality strategy has distinguished two groups of instrumentation and control system suppliers: The main equipment suppliers for which long term. agreements arc desirable Other suppliers for which the use of existing maintenance structures arc desirable.

For each supplier of the first group, the following actions have been taken:

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Negotiation of a lasting quality protocol, for a 25 year period, which defines the activities to be perpetuated. The setting up of protocol application contracts, generally renewable every three years, allowing the activities defined in the protocol to be ensured.

For the suppliers in the second group, the strategy consists mainly of forming spare part supplies, to consider, when necessary, the equipment replacement by functionally equivalent systems and sometimes to ensure, by contract, maintenance over 5 to 10 year duration. Within this framework, some 30 contracts have been negotiated with 900 and 1300 MWe plant instrumentation and control system suppliers. The corresponding strategies are currently being defined for the N4 plant equipment. In practice, the feedback in experience of these lasting quality actions shows that the forecasting carried out has a wider spectrum than. that originally considered. This is the case, for example, in the field of training of owners in maintenance and management. In fact, the concentration of skills contract which plans for remote control "technical support", from the designer to the plant operator allows, by analysing either the number of requests, or the same content of these requests, to get an accurate idea of the level of competence of the on-site participants. This analysis, which is carried out on a yearly basis, allows deviations to be demonstrated It is then possible to alert the management of the plant concerned and thus anticipate, before an operating incident, any possible bringing up to scratch of skills. This loop period should expand insofar as the reliability of modem instrumentation and control systems is better, by one to two decades, than that of our older systems and that they are in general a lot more complex. Improvement in the reliability and increased complexity means that skills "refresher" courses are necessary, the analysis of technical support is an indicator that allows this training to be judiciously anticipated. 7KH 5& SURMHFW The objective of the R2C project was to establish a master plan for the 900 MWe unit instrumentation and control for the period of their second decennial overhaul (1998 2007). The studies concerned the large-scale industrial computing, instrumentation and control, of which the redevelopment can only be contemplated during an outage of long duration. With regard to the electronic components (mainly analogue on these units), the "agemonitoring body" concluded on the maintenance feasibility of most of the equipment, up to the date set for the third decennial outage progams. These conclusions are based on the lasting quality approach which guarantees at the least the support of the suppliers during this period. Additions have been made to the lasting quality contracts in order to reinforce the forecast of the treatment of obsolescence of the electronic components. The maintenance average annual cost forecast linked to this extension remain a lot lower than the equipment updating investment assessments. However, some updating has been decided on, in order to resolve the ageing problems of some sub-assemblies. The cause of some of the ageing observed is excessive overheating due either to bad equipment design, or to inadequate air conditioning in the

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building. According to the additional functional requirements to be taken into, account, the redevelopment strategy has lead to the following: For the reactor protection threshold detection systems, to conserve the technology and rebuild functionally identical analog modules. For the flux measuring system, to adopt numerical equipment that improves the test and maintenance facilities.

The power component ageing expert assessments (diodes, thyristors) also showed that some of these components were nearing their end of life, on account of design or production defects. Preventative replacements were organised before these components brought about the failure of the equipment in operation. Besides, operating modifications have been included in the project conclusions: updating of the level control of the CP0 unit steam generators and extension of the number of alarms for all 900 MWe units. 7KH $&&25' SURMHFW The objective of the studies forming part of the ACCORD project, in preparation for the second decennial outage programmes for the 1300 MWe plant units, is to analyse the lasting quality of the instrumentation and control systems and to propose maintenance or redevelopment strategies for this equipment. The digital systems, used for the 1300 MWe plant, were designed in the late 1970s. The analysis of the list of components implemented allows a short term obsolescence to be expected (5 to 10 years) for all these components. The treatment at irregular intervals of obsolescence, practised up until then within the scope of lasting quality contracts is no longer adapted to deal with the extent of these obsolescences. However, the stability context looked for the whole series does not allow the "concentration of skills" of the lasting quality contracts to be maintained in good conditions, owing to the very small volume of modifications to be studied. The maintaining in the long term of these design skills, still existing with suppliers, therefore seems very difficult. These observations encourage the equipment to be fixed and to guarantee their hardware maintenance by storage in advance of all the components. This storage, by EDF, of all the components necessary for identical repair of the electronic equipment, until the end of life of all units, bas been decided (design, organisation). The first assessments of this strategy lead to a purchase cost, validation and management of the stock in the region of 1% of the equipment price. In order to cover the possible failure of perpetuated suppliers, which today carry out the repairs, an analysis of the transfer conditions of these repair contracts to another service provider is currently underway. The expert assessment of electronic equipment has underlined the risks linked to the wear of the plug-in type connection. No servicing industrial solution seems available to correct this wear, The only means of action available are to strictly limit preventive maintenance operations and to improve the breakdown diagnostic facilities and procedures, in order to limit the number of connection/deconnection manoeuvres of the electronic cards. Providing that the functional requirements are fixed and the obsolescence problems am anticipated by storing components, the maintenance of 1300 MWe unit instrumentation and control equipment must therefore be equipped to be extended at least until the third decennial outage program, for an estimated overcharge of about 10% of the average maintenance cost observed today. It is not the same for industrial computerised systems,

235

whose functions are still developing in a very dynamic industrial context (computer rate of obsolescence increasingly rapid). Strategic redevelopment studies have been launched for the sub-assemblies with industrial computers or for materials that are not covered by lasting quality contracts. 2WKHU DFWLRQV XQGHUZD\ DQG DUHDV RI SURJUHVV In line with actions recommended for the 900 and 1300 MWe plants, an analysis is currently underway to anticipate the storage of components necessary and the repair of instrumentation and control equipment of the N4 plant. More generally, consideration has begun to incorporate, in future equipment contracts, clauses to take into account maintenance in operating conditions, from the design of the systems. This approach requires these aspects to be included in the specifications and to the offer analysis criteria to be defined. The objective would be to obtain, for consultation, an assessment, on the same basis for all offers, of the ownership costs of the system to be supplied. A particular skill must be developed at EDF in order to cover, in the best possible conditions, these important stages of the purchasing process. Considerations and feasibility studies are currently being launched, within the scope of R&D, in order to assess the methods allowing to maintain the functions of the instrumentation and control systems by a succession of small changes/developments of the equipment, while ensuring the control of downtime and maintenance of skill. The periodical reassessment of the partial updating and maintenance strategies must allow to reliably retain the quality of the instrumentation and control functions, without having au impact on the unit service life. Up until now, there seems no need to contemplate a major revision of the instrumentation and controls of the 900 and 1300 MWe units. However, on the third decennial outage program the possibility that more sizeable operations may be required should, not be ruled out.



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The pressurised water reactors are inside of a reactor building, which ensures containment, and in this way protects the public and the environment against radioactive products likely to be scattered inside the enclosure in an accident situation. To this end, the reactor containments have been designed to withstand accidents leading to maximum pressure values and to present acceptable leakage in these conditions. Thus, with regard to the reactor containments of different plants, two aspects are to be considered when assessing service life : resistance and leaktightness, The inventory containments are of two types: CPY plant containments, made up of a single prestressed concrete wall, lined on its internal face with a metallic leakproof coating. The P4, P4 and N4 plant containments made up of a double wall : the internal wall in prestressed concrete and the external wall in reinforced concrete. Possible leaks from the internal wall are collected in the inter-wall area maintained under negative pressure and treated before being discharged into the atmosphere by means of the suction and filtration circuit.

The phenomena likely to influence the service life of the structures are mainly linked to the shrinkage-creep of the prestressed concrete which results in a reduction in tension of the prestressing cables throughout the life of the units.

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In view of the impossibility of re-intervening on the cables to restress the building as they are cement grouted, in ail areas of the internal wall the residual stress at the end of the theoretical operating life of the units should be known in order to ensure that the containments do not exceed the leaktightness criterion in an accident situation. 0RQLWRULQJ The monitoring of reactor containment behaviour is carried out for leaktightness and the strength of the structure: During containment pressurisation, by measuring the leak rates and by checking deformations and displacements under the effect of pressure variations. During normal operation, to increase knowledge about the kinetics of the concrete shrinkagecreep phenomena directly influencing the prestressing losses and to make clear the integrity status of the internal containment around the penetrations.

Mechanical behaviour, both during tests and over time, is monitored with the aid of the testing device, made up strain gauges, pIumblines, invar wire and dynamometers, whose distribution on the structure allows the results obtained from different types of sensors to be compared, and a resulting statement to be made. Dynamometers intended to measure prestressing cable tension are fitted on four vertical cables, injected with grease, of the first unit of each site (the "lift-off" technique, implemented in 1996 by way of experiment on the CIVAUX and FLAMANVILLE sites, has made it possible to state the real tension-of the corresponding cables). The measuring frequency of the whole of the test device is done quarterly at a minimum. But with the aim of improving knowledge about the behaviour of some containments, telemetering systems have been installed. In addition to the fact that they allow more measurements to be made in normal operating conditions and during containment tests, during particular episodes in the unit life (reactor outage and start-up, exceptional atmospheric conditions etc.), measurements can be performed more frequently and in this way knowledge of containment thermal behaviour can be considerably improved. With regard to measuring the leak rate in operation, the SEXTEN system essentially makes it possible to detect leaktight faults at the level of penetrations. Version 2 makes it possible not only to increase system availability but also to obtain greater efficiency in the leak search.

237

,QYHQWRU\ RI IL[WXUHV VHUYLFH OLIH SHUVSHFWLYHV CPY plant containments The behaviour of the 900 MWe unit containments is satisfactory. An exemplary respect for the leaktight criteria is shown, a consequence thought to result from the presence of the metallic leaktight coating. Results obtained in tests have clearly demonstrated satisfactory mechanical behaviour of the containments under the effect of pressure variations. With regard to evolutions over time, a good overall homogeneity can be observed on the plants, with acceptable ranges compared with the tension loss in the prestressing cables, and a clear reduction of the phenomenon on most units. Some of them demonstrate lower ranges. It appears, therefore, that there are no notable evolutions likely to challenge the respect for the 40 year criteria. Nevertheless, endeavours will be made to check that the shrinkage-creep phenomena observed on these containments have no consequence on the performance of the leaktight coating. N4 and 1300 MWe plant double-wall containments The results obtained up till clearly show shrinkage-creep phenomena greater than those taken into account in the design and, consequently, also greater prestressing losses. The first studies conducted. on the P4 and P14 containments had demonstrated that, the residual compressive stress would respect for almost all units, at 40 years, the minimum value set by the safety reports. However, in recent tests, some containments presented an internal wall leak rate which exceeds the test criterion of the safety report. On these containments were observed cracking around the equipment access hatch. This cracking is brought about by prestressing losses linked to the large concrete shrinkage-creep in an area where the initial prestressing is weaker than in the continuous wall-bead owing to the deviation of the cables around the equipment hatch. On the other hand two containment have presented since they were constructed, leak rates which stem from leaks distributed over the whole of the structure. In view of these recent observations, a containment ok grading has been carried out, which has lead to three structure categories being defined: Confirmed sensitive containments: those which do not respect the test criterion for internal wall leak rate set by the safety report (1% / day of the air mass contained in the containment), Potentially sensitive containments: those which are considered likely to exceed the 1 %/day criteria in the next test, non-sensitive containments. those which, given either smaller shrinkage-creep ranges or a restrained leak rate, measured in the last test performed, have a low probability of exceeding criterion in the next test. However, on the one hand, current studies show the capacity of the Containment Annulus Ventilation System to deal (in case of accident) with sizeable leaks of the internal wall, at least up to 5% / day, and on the other hand, all the measurements made have made it possible to check that the leak rate, not passing through the area between the walls, has still remained lower than the threshold set to respect the direct leak rate (with embedded basemat). This makes it possible to demonstrate that, despite the performance losses observed, the safety criteria, notably in terms of radiological consequences, would be respected. Moreover, the nature of the cracks, and their behaviour in accident situations, makes it possible to demonstrate that except in exceptional cases, the leaktight criteria set in the stress report. The treatment of the problems identified is subject to:
238

 Resistance studies of the structures to determine, unit by unit, the tension areas likely to appear before the end of the 40 year limit in the sensitive parts of the containment (equipment access hatch areas, the dome-cylinder valve body crotch, the runners. The definition, for the remaining unit service life, of a servicing method to reduce leaks by applying a composite clad on the areas where cracks have appeared. The material and functional demonstration of reliability and efficiency of the Containment Annulus Ventilation System. The overall analysis in the long term of the containment of the double-wall reactor containments. It better determines the correspondence between the air leaks measured in tests and those in air and steam which occur during an accident in order to confirm the respect of the authorisation decrees which set the acceptable leak criteria of the internal containment at 1.5%/day in case of accident. The start of a R&D programme, running over several years, and intended to: On the one hand, better grasp the modelling of the different prestessed concrete deformations under biaxial loading. On the other hand, to validate, on the scale of a structure of industrial dimensions, the leak transposition in air compared with the air and steam leaks, as well as the resistance of a composite clad in the thermal conditions of a MAEVA model project.

&21&/86,21 The ability of reactor containments to fulfil, for 40 years, the functions for which they were designed, is globally achieved for 900 MWe plants. For double-wall containments (P4, P4 and N4), the results obtained lead one to believe that the leaktightness observed on the internal wall of some units is likely to occur before 40 years (in the equipment hatch area as well as in other areas that are considered sensitive). The Containment Annulus Ventilation System has demonstrated its ability to deal with, in case of accident, internal wall leaks at least up to 5%/day. The studies begun, since the discovery of certain discrepancies, must, however, make it possible to suggest lines of defence which will ensure that adequate leaktightness and integrity is maintained for structures and that the stress report is respected with the objective of a 40 year service life. Nevertheless, individualised forecasts and follow-ups are necessary.



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&RQWH[WXDO VXPPDU\ Cables were originally considered as "sensitive equipment". This is not due to the direct cost of recabling a unit (estimated at 2.5% of the unit price), but to the length of such an operation, estimated a nearly 1.5 year, which would result in a very high indirect cost (without counting all the requalification tests).

239

Two sets of cables can be differentiated by the material making up the casing and the insulation: The function of which is required in reactor building during and/or after accidental condition (said K1) cables, insulated with ethylene-propylene rubber (EPR) and cased in chlorosulfonated polyethylene (CSPE). There are much smaller in number, with a total length of less than 50km per unit. The other cables, insulated and cased in PVC. They represent most cables, with a total length of about 1000 km for a 900 MWe unit.

Since this time, another material has appeared for cables "without halogens", ethylene vinyl acetate (EVA). Although the feedback of experience for conventional units may lead one to expect a cable service life greater than 40 years, some doubts remain: Thermal ageing under irradiation of PVC cables. Ability of K1 cables to carry out their function during a thermodynamic accident occurring at end of life.

In this context, specific studies have been conducted in order to find out the service life for these cables in nuclear environments. The objectives can be summarised in the following way: Search for parameters sensitive to ageing of material from which the cables are formed. Determination of the prominent degradation mechanisms. Determination of long term behaviour in normal conditions, on mechanical operating criteria (by modelling on the strain property at rupture) and on electric operating criteria (insulation, dielectric resistance), Determination of long term behaviour in accident conditions, on electric operating criteria (insulation, dielectric resistance). Search for non destructive inspection tools for expert assessments. Creation of a cable surveillance methodology.

/RQJ WHUP SUHGLFWLRQ PRGHO The characterisation (mechanical/electric/physical and chemical) of cable samples is carried out on parameters sensitive to ageing. The sensitiveness of numerous parameters has been studied for constituent material. The two main conclusions are: The ageing of the materials studied does not significantly affect the electric criteria linked to the functionality of the cable, with the exception of PVC, for which the evolution of insulating resistance is mainly attributed to the migration of plasticizers, in some formulation patterns (presence of phosphate, of chlorinated paraffin. at the level of the insulating enclosure). Strain at rupture is a parameter sensitive to ageing for all materials.

The experimental data, collected in the different test series accelerated under thermal and radiative stress, have made it possible to model the evolution of strain at rupture according to time, temperature and dose rate variables and to 6 parameters characteristic of the material studied. The knowledge of this mathematical function allows a predominance diagram to be constructed which provides direct access, depending on the dose rate and temperature conditions applied, to the type of

240

degradation to which the material is subject. The model has been validated on the four materials studied. We have also shown that this kinetic model, averaging some adaptations, perfectly describes the prediction models developed by S.Burnay and KT.Gillen whose work is referred to internationally in the field of cable ageing. Knowledge of the model parameter values allows the material service life in normal operating conditions to be calculated (temperature and dose rate fixed respectively at 50C and 0.1 Gy/hr) for an end of life criteria of 50% absolute of the strain property at rupture. For the four existing materials on the French units, the estimated service life considerably exceeds 50 years. For the Kl cables, which must carry out their function in case of thermodynamic accident, we have stimulated the accident conditions according to the design basis accident (DBA) specification and have analysed their behaviour. These analyses were done both on new and aged cables, in a natural way, taken in the plant after 12 years of operation. For the cables studied in EPR-CSPE and without halogen, the DRA resistances are acceptable on complete cables. Thus, the cables studied can withstand an DBA after 50 years under normal operating conditions. 6XUYHLOODQFH PHWKRGRORJ\ IRU FDEOHV The control of cable ageing, mainly those installed in the reactor building, relies on: Qualification tests in accident conditions, Laboratory tests and studies to establish a prediction model, The many expert assessments carried out on suite in response to an incident or during updating operations of conventional thermal unit instrumentation and control.

It is on the basis of these results that we have created our cable surveillance methodology and defined two groups of cables, according to the environmental conditions in which they are used. The first group is that of cables operating in normal conditions (air temperature lower dm 50"C, dose rate lower than 0.1 Gy/hr, dose accumulated over 40 years less than 35 kGy, chemical environment neutral). In these conditions, the cable service life is at least 50 years, Monitoring for these cables consists of a routine visual examination of the ends which are the areas most subject to degradation. This is done during servicing of the sensors or actuators and electric panels, or the instrumentation and control cabinets or bushing. The second group is that of cables operating in more severe conditions than normal. In this case, routine monitoring of a representative sample shall be carried out in order to ensure that their operating capacity is maintained. &21&/86,21 The ageing models, established from laboratory accelerated ageing tests, the expert assessments, the accident and ageing tests performed on cables taken from the power station, have confirmed that , under normal operating conditions, power station cables have a service life greater than 50 years, including K1 cables, which are able to withstand an accident after 50 years of normal nuclear operating conditions, Studies have been started with the aim of examining the ageing of cables used on an irregular basis outside the conditions planned in the original specifications. Consequently, no large-scale replacement of cables is to be considered. for a 50 year period. Nevertheless particular attention should be paid to the identification of the most stressed cables which are subject to a harsh environment and to their replaceability en a forecast basis.

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The possible change of a limited number of cables, further to operation in harsher conditions than normal, does not appear to pose major technical problems. A briefing book, stating the strategy for qualification in accident conditions, ageing modelling and maintenance methodology, is currently being drawn up.




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The following degradation mechanisms have been identified for Spanish Plants:

&RPSRQHQW Reactor Pressure Vessel Steam Generators Pressurizer RPV Internals Containment Mechanical Penetration Assemblies RPV Support Emergency Diesel Generators (Engine) Main Turbine Main Generator Reactor Coolant Pump Feedwater Pumps Essential Service Water Pumps Charging Pumps Feedwater Turbine Essential Service Water Piping Reactor Coolant Piping Control and Volume Piping Residual Heat Removal Piping Safety Injection Piping Main Steam Piping Feedwater Piping Main Turbine Piping Circulating Water Piping Steam Extraction, Drain and Vent Piping Main Steam Isolation Valves Main Steam Relief Valves FeedWater Control Valves Safety Injection Accumulator Check Valves Main Steam Safety Valves Componente Cooling Heat Exchangers Main Condenser Radwaste Monitoring Tank

'HJUDGDWLRQ 0HFKDQLVPV Neutron Embrittlement, Fatigue, IGSCC, Wear Fretting, SCC, Fatigue, Fouling Fatigue, IGSCC, Electrical Aging Wear, IGSCC, IASCC Galvanic Corrosion Corrosion, Fatigue, SCC Wear, Fatigue, Corrosion, Stress Relaxation, Fouling, Erosion, MIC Fatigue, Erosion/Corrosion, SCC, Wear Fatigue, Electrical Aging, Wear Fatigue, Thermal Embrittlement, Acid Boric Corrosion, SCC Fatigue Corrosion, Acid Boric Corrosion Corrosion, SCC, Fatigue Galvanic Corrosion Thermal Embrittlement, Fatigue Fatigue Fatigue Fatigue Fatigue Fatigue Fatigue, Erosion/Corrosion Erosion, Corrosion Fatigue, Erosion/Corrosion Erosion/Corrosion, Erosion, Fatigue, Wear Fatigue, Erosion, Corrosion Erosion, Wear Acid Boric Corrosion, Erosion Fatigue, Corrosion, Erosion, Stress Relaxation Erosion/Corrosion, MIC MIC, Fretting, Crevice, Galvanic Corrosion Pitting

242

Essential Chillers Motors MCC and Load Centers Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies Transformers Cables Reactor Building Intake Structure Discharge Structure

MIC, Crevice Wear, Electrical Aging Wear, Electrical Aging Electrical Aging Electrical Aging, Fouling Electrical Aging Cracking, Armature Corrosion Erosion, Armature Corrosion Erosion, Armature Corrosion

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SCOPE OF MAINTENANCE PRACTICES EVALUATION &RPSRQHQW Reactor Pressure Vessel RPV Internals Containment Mechanical Penetration Assemblies Metal Containment Drywell Vent Lines Including Bellows Reactor Building Crane Turbine Building Crane RPV Support Emergency Diesel Generators (Engine) Main Turbine Main Generator Recirculation Pump Feedwater Pumps HPCI Turbine RBCCW Pumps Circulating Water Pumps LPCI Pumps Core Spray Pumps HPCI Booster Pump Service Water LPCI Pumps Shut Down Cooling Pumps Fire Protection Pumps ECCS (LPCI, HPCI, CS) Piping inside Containment Main Steam Piping inside Containment Isolation Condenser Piping Recirculation Piping Underground Piping CRD Insert and Withdraw Lines Feedwater Check Valves Recirculation Suction and Discharge Valves Main Steam Isolation Valves 'HJUDGDWLRQ 0HFKDQLVPV Neutron Embrittlement, Fatigue, IGSCC Wear, IGSCC, IASCC, Fatigue Galvanic Corrosion Corrosion, Galvanic Corrosion Fatigue Overload Wear Fatigue Wear, Fatigue, Corrosion, Stress Relaxation, Fouling, Erosion, MIC Fatigue, Erosion/Corrosion, SCC, Wear Fatigue, Electrical Aging, Wear Fatigue, Thermal Embrittlement, Acid Boric Corrosion, SCC Fatigue, Wear SCC, Fatigue Wear, Fatigue Wear Wear Wear Wear Wear Wear Wear. Fouling Fatigue, IGSCC Fatigue Fatigue, IGSCC Fatigue, IGSCC Galvanic Corrosion, MIC IGSCC Erosion/Corrosion, Erosion, Fatigue, Wear Thermal Embrittlement, Fatigue, IGSCC Erosion/Corrosion, Erosion, Fatigue, Wear

243

Main Steam Safety and Relief Valves RBCCW Heat Exchanger Main Condenser DWR Floor Drain Collector, Sample and Chemical Waste Tanks Motors MCC and Load Centers Containment Electrical Penetration Assemblies Transformers Cables

Fatigue, Erosion, Corrosion, Stress Relaxation Crevice, MIC Galvanic Corrosion,Pitting, Erosion/Corrosion, Crevice MIC, Crevice Wear, Electrical Aging Wear, Electrical Aging Electrical Aging Electrical Aging, Fouling Electrical Aging



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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ Irradiation embrittlement is the consequence of the alteration of crystalline metal net due to neutronic effects. The main variables controlling the damage are: Ni content, Cu and P content in beltline materials and integrated neutron flux. The effect is quantified by means of two variables: USE (upper shelf energy) and RTNDT. Both variables could be obtained from charpy tests. The affected area within the vessel is the beltline region.  6XUYHLOODQFH  3HULRGLF 7HVWLQJ The main techniques that allow surveying and monitoring the vessel condition are: Plant instrumentation and transient register, surface inspection, UT inspection, eddy current testing (mainly for thimbles tubes), vessel surveillance programme, integrity analysis and acoustic emission (loose parts). In addition, other techniques which could be used in the future are: Integrity monitors, X-Ray diffraction, fatigue fuses and potential drop. Surveillance programs based-on capsules are used to evaluate the irradiation embrittlement. Spanish NPPs are following designer country codes and norms to apply the above mentioned surveillance programs. In particular, N.R.C. issued a Generic Letter 92-01 Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, 10 CFR 50.54(f). This G.L. is aimed to: Verify the surveillance program of reactor vessel material: 10 CFR 50, App. H and ASTM E185. Evaluate and limit damage, especially within beltline and flange: 10 CFR 50 App.G. Control irradiation effects and applying the results to predict embrittlement level and determine the credibility of data coming from capsules: G.L. 88-11. Assure the fulfillment of toughness requisites against pressure thermal shock (PTS): 10 CFR 50.61.

 $JHLQJ 3UHGLFWLRQ &ULWHULD Theoretical evolution of RTNDT and decreasing of USE are required in NRC G.L 92-01 according to the methodology of Regulatory Guide 1.99 Rev. 2. Appendix G of 10 CFR 50 and 10 CFR 50.61 provide the maximum and minimum values acceptable for both parameters. In case of actual data availability, provided by the analysis of extracted capsules, the real values of the parameter should be calculated. Then, with a minimum of two values, it is possible to extrapolate the behavior of RTNDT and compare with the limits provide by the norms.

244

The requirements for the pressure and temperatures limits, P-T curves, are given in Appendix G of 10 CRF 50, and the corresponding methodology in Appendix G of Section XI of the ASME Code.  0LWLJDWLRQ 2I $JHLQJ (IIHFWV Core re-design: Reduction of the neutron flux by using core-loading pattern of low leakage type. Applied in several Spanish reactors. Vessel anneal, if needed.

 0DLQWHQDQFH 3URJUDPV  &RPSRQHQW 5HSDLU  5HSODFHPHQW  ,PSURYHPHQW In addition to irradiation embrittlement surveillance programs above mentioned, there are additional actions within the Spanish NPPs / electricity sector focussed on the optimisation of irradiation embrittlement surveillance: UNESA Database on PWR surveillance data. Contribution to the IAEA Coordinated Research Programs III and IV. Reconstitution of specimens and Master Curve evaluation (under consideration by UNESACSN).

 2WKHU &RQVLGHUDWLRQV Irradiation embrittlement is one of the main problems presented in the life extension process of a vessel. That is the reason NRC generates an Information Notice, IN- 90-52 recommending the plants to preserve broken Charpy specimens already used. Such an action allows to reconstruct and data use to keep information uncertainty to a minimum level in what refers material embrittlement of a specific material. Then it is possible to reduce the conservative margins adopted in irradiation calculation.



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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ The degradation mechanisms typically affecting steam generator are the following: Denting: plastic strength of tubes. Denting affects penetration diameters of tube sheets that are reduced and closed by corrosion products. Intergranular corrosion: it affects non-stabilised austenitic steal and Inconel 600 MA. The intergranular corrosion may present different kinds such as intergranular attack, SCC, and intergranular penetration. Pitting: it affects the secondary side of steam generator tubes in the sludge contacting area accumulated on tube sheets. This mechanics may produce drilling on materials without any material properties losses. Wastage or thinning: external surface tube corrosion. It affects areas with high level of sludge on tube sheets. Fretting: Mechanic effects produces this kind of corrosion; there are not electrochemical factors involved. Fatigue: Associated with cyclic service. Erosion-Corrosion: affecting inside (corrosion) and outside (erosion) of the tubes. Fouling mechanics: it assists corrosion mechanisms.

245

Most common degradation mechanisms affecting Spanish steam generator are PWSCC (Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking) in the roll transition zone and ODSCC in the tubes support plate intersection, as well as fretting due to AVB (anti-vibrations bars).  6XUYHLOODQFH  3HULRGLF 7HVWLQJ The methods to determine degradation mechanics effects are based on inspection techniques. Following are stated the main methods: Eddy Current: It is the most extended technique and allows determining numerous parameters related to structural integrity of the tubes such as thickness or defect typology. It is applied to detect denting, intergranular corrosion, pitting, wastage, fretting, fouling and erosion-corrosion. Ultrasonic testing and radiography: Both methods allow detecting internal cracks and sizing them. Applied in nozzles and shell welds. Degradation mechanisms studied by UT are mainly intergranular corrosion, fretting and fatigue. Dye penetrant and magnetic particle testing: Applied to detect and size surface cracks produced by any degradation mechanism mainly within the SG shell and welds. Visual inspection, to determine the status of internal components. Hydrostatic test: Applied to detect full thickness cracks. It is limited due to fatigue risks involved within this test. Helium leakage: This method is used to demonstrate the hermetic status of a component, including secondary and primary sides of SG. Parameters (pressure drop, temperature, hydrogen, etc.) monitoring: Applied to know generalised corrosion risk and fatigue usage by cycle counting. Sludge analysis, to determine the corrosion risk and susceptibility. Metallographic analysis of tubes to determine the dominant degradation mechanisms.

 $JHLQJ 3UHGLFWLRQ &ULWHULD The acceptance criteria normally used in Spanish NPPs are the following: Tubes are plugged when thickness loss rise 40%. Maximum acceptable plugged tubes is 10%.

Lifetime prediction methods more common used are based on the evolution of affected and plugged tubes for each degradation mechanism. Different predictive models have been developed, using mathematical and statistical approaches and considering historical results from Spanish steam generators, in order to predict the evolution of tubes plugged and numbers of tubes to be plugged in next outage.  0LWLJDWLRQ 2I $JHLQJ (IIHFWV Mitigation techniques that can be applied to prevent ageing effects are: Secondary chemistry control: The application of this technique leads to minimising environment aggressivity, reducing corrosion risk. It could be complemented by the surveillance of parameters as conductivity, pH, cupper content, etc. Transient minimisation. Clearly, it is aimed to reduce fatigue risks. The appropriate surveillance of transient facilitates lifetime calculations. Operating temperature decrease: This measure contributes to minimise transient severity as well as decrease the effect of degradation mechanism assisted by temperature. It must be evaluated the associated performance losses.
246

Sludge areas cleaning: It contributes to obtain better performance and avoid corrosion risks. Cupper components replacement: This action is aimed to minimise chloric compounds, air and cupper entrance. Tube sleeving: protect tubes affected areas. Tube plugging: It prevents all degradation mechanisms, especially PWSCC. It should be evaluated performance reductions. Plug replacement: in case of Inconel 600 plugs, due to the problems associated to this material. Stress relaxation: To reduce SCC risk. SG replacement: last measure.

Most common mitigation methods used in Spain, before the replacement of steam generator in four units have been: chemical polishing, sludge lancing, use of coordinated Li/B primary water chemistry and thermal treatment of tube-U for stress relaxation.  0DLQWHQDQFH 3URJUDPV  &RPSRQHQW 5HSDLU  5HSODFHPHQW  ,PSURYHPHQW Steam generator have been replaced in four units: Almaraz I and II and Asc I and II. Before the replacement, additional studies and actions were performed: Maximum acceptable plugged tubes criteria was changed, from 10% to approximately 18%, based-on manufacturer studies. Specific plugging criteria were determined for each type of degradation, in order to guarantee the steam generator structural integrity and the prevention of in-service leakage.

In addition, other minor replacement have been produced, as example the AVB (anti-vibrations bars) at Vandells II NPP to avoid fretting degradation.




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Operating experience shows that some plants (Farley2, Tihange and Genkai) have had total penetration cracks in non-isolable sections of piping that are connected to the Primary System. The analysis of these failures show that these faults are basically caused by thermal stratification in piping caused by leakage in isolation valves.  6XUYHLOODQFH  3HULRGLF 7HVWLQJ The following actions have been established in order to assess the potential impact of thermal stratification: Identification of piping sections that may be subjected to thermal stratification and pipe swings caused by valve leakage. Inspection of welds, heat affected zones (HAZ) and stress concentration zones. Establishment of a mitigation plan to prevent faults in the identified sections.
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Instruments with sufficient gain that are capable of distinguishing cracks of other insignificant reflector elements. Transducers with rays in different angles.

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Records of all indications, including minimum amplitude signals.

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1.1.1.2.1.1. Prediction

Due to the small number of incidents due to cracking caused by thermal stratification, it is necessary to develop a prioritisation process to allow selection of the most critical locations that will consequently be subjected to UT inspection. The criteria used are: Probability of leakage through the non-isolable section during normal operation. Value of temperature difference on both sides of the valve. International operating experience regarding leakage or cracking. Sensitivity to thermal stratification (function of the piping inside diameter).

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Cracks detected during the inspection are accepted in accordance with the ASME XI criteria, which imply an assessment of the increase of fatigue in the crack detected, comparing it with the calculated size of the critical crack in the corresponding section.  0LWLJDWLRQ RI DJHLQJ (IIHFWV The results of the inspections have shown that the elements inspected are in good condition, and the additional stress and fatigue analyses that consider thermal stratification transients give an acceptable result of the current piping layout and support. Consequently, there has been no need for a medium long-term solution.



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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ Erosion-corrosion is a well-understood cause of degradation in pipes. It causes loss of thickness in pipe walls, resulting in degradation of pipe components in carbon and low alloy steel lines until they no longer operate safely. For this reason there is widespread concern that erosion-corrosion should be monitored. It has become clear that erosion-corrosion occurs when a flow of water or wet steam erodes or destroys the oxide layer that protects the surface of the pipe; new oxide form and exposed material dissolves. The following parameters govern the erosion-corrosion process: Thermohydraulic conditions in the fluid. Water chemistry. Chemistry of the pipe material. Geometry of the component and exposure time.
Surveillance / Periodic Testing

1.1.1.3.

Elements vulnerable to Erosion/Corrosion are identified through the evaluation of the abovementioned parameters that characterise this degradation. After identifying these elements, inspections are defined that check their condition by means of thickness measurements using ultrasonic techniques (UT). The determination of the frequency and scope of these inspections is based on the results of previous inspections and the evaluation of the characteristic E/C parameters.

248

1.1.1.4.

Ageing Prediction Criteria

1.1.1.4.1.1. Prediction

Several researchers have produced mathematical models of the influence of each degradation parameter on material loss. These models have allowed the formulation of computer codes that are now widely used. An initial selection of lines and components most subject to degradation by erosion-corrosion is based on a rough analysis. There are two ways to make this selection: Use a computer code to predict the erosion rate. Draw on experience, engineering data and expert judgement. This is the practice in many plants.

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The acceptance criteria are taken from the ASME code. The next inspection and the date to replace the damaged element can be determined through the analysis of inspection results and the use of a predictive programme. When the inspection results show that the minimum thickness will be reached before the next inspection, and there are replacement limitations, the element is reevaluated applying ASME Code, i.e. Code Case N597.
1.1.1.5.  1.1.1.7. Mitigation of ageing Effects 0RGLILFDWLRQ RI ZDWHU FKHPLVWU\ Maintenance Programs/ Component Repair/ Replacement/ Improvement

Replacement of the affected elements. Replacement normally involves a change of material, being the new elements of high alloy steel or stainless steel.



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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ Spanish NPPs have been defining the ageing control programmes for concrete structures since the 1990s. Said programmes are aimed at monitoring the condition of these structures in order to anticipate ageing by taking measures to monitor it, if necessary, throughout the lifetime of the plants. These structure condition monitoring programmes have been completely generalised with the implementation of 10 CFR 50.65 Maintenance Rule
1.1.1.8. Surveillance / Periodic Testing

The structure monitoring programmes follow the general outline below: Identification of critical structures. Determination of the type of inspection for each critical structure (initially differential settlement measurement and visual inspection, and samples, mechanical test and chemical analysis if needed). Determination of frequency of inspection (3, 5, or 10 years). Determination of repair methods according to the type of damage and degradation mechanism.
Ageing Prediction Criteria

1.1.1.9.

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The results of the visual inspection are evaluated by civil engineering experts. The results of the mechanical test and chemical analysis are evaluated with respect to the properties included in the technical specification for the concrete.

249

1.1.1.10.

Maintenance Programs/ Component Repair/ Replacement/ Improvement

The concrete and/or steel frame repair method is defined according to the type of damage and the degradation mechanism.



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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ The wiring of equipment are under several degradations phenomena: Thermal Ageing: it is caused by environment temperature and wiring heating due to Ohmic losses. Humidity: higher humidity reduces wiring dielectric properties and insulation. Radiation: it causes degradation in mechanic and dielectric insulation characteristics. Electric gradient: it produces dielectric degradation.

Electrical cables installed in the Spanish NPPs belongs to different manufacturers, materials and age. Thus the use of generic methodologies for age assessment is not feasible. Plants more concerned by cable ageing are those which belong to the first generation of reactors which have been operating in the 25 years range. In these plants, due to the old technology of the original cables designs and the accumulated operation of the plant cable ageing is an issue which is being addressed at this moment.  6XUYHLOODQFH  3HULRGLF 7HVWLQJ The most common methods to perform wiring surveillance are electric and mechanical testing and visual inspection. Some of them are: Insulation resistance measurement / Polarisation index. Tg delta measurement and capacitance test (MT). Partial discharges testing (MT). Elongation and tensile strength. Indentation test. Visual inspection to detect damage in the wire insulation, ending and terminals.

Limited systematic activities regarding cable testing and surveillance have been addressed by the Spanish plants up to the recent years. Safety related cable ageing was addressed by the environmental qualification programs implemented as required by IEEE standards. These cables have been subjected to accelerated ageing test, addressing thermal and radiation induced degradation and then subjected to LOCA simulation test. The results from these programs provided an in-sight of cable capability during the life of the plant. In recent years a systematic approach to the management of cable ageing has been started by different plants. Some of these plants are implementing electrical inspection activities in important cable ( in terms of safety or availability) using the ECAD system and methodology. One plant has implemented cable sample in hot spots (temperature and irradiation) for periodic inspection of cable materials degradation. Our oldest power plants are starting to define systematic ageing managing programs. In addition electrical cables are being included as a significant item in the life management program being developed at the moment by the pool of the nuclear power plants.
250

 $JHLQJ 3UHGLFWLRQ &ULWHULD Ageing prediction methodology will be started to be implemented within the life management program being developed. This methodology will be based on the criteria developed abroad , basically in the US, where an ageing model which relates cable degradation to different test parameter (tensile strength, indentation, Oxidation Induction Temperature, etc) is established.
1.1.1.11. Mitigation Of Ageing Effects

Keep to a minimum cover material and insulation temperature in values, is the way to mitigate the ageing effects. The actions to avoid the premature thermal ageing are: Intensity reduction in normal operation. Apart wiring near to heat sources. Modify the wire situation in order to improve the refrigeration. Selective monitoring in order to survey temperature and voltage. In case wire must to be changed due to environment degradation it is necessary to reduce the environment conditions. Check environment qualification test in order to detect wires that must to be changed.

Nevertheless, significant cable ageing is normally addressed by cable replacement. In some cases, typically hot-spots, cable re-routing or protection is implemented to prevent further degradation.  0DLQWHQDQFH 3URJUDPV  &RPSRQHQW 5HSDLU  5HSODFHPHQW  ,PSURYHPHQW In the older plants extensive efforts has been performed during years to replace old cables which were considered as age-sensitive. Nowadays approach to cable ageing management focuses in an early identification of cable degradation in order to be able to implement corrective measurements, normally cable replacement.

251

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 111/ Regulatory policy and requirements 112/ AMP policy Spanish Nuclear Safety Authority (CSN) Regulatory Guide 1.10, Operating Licensee, Periodic Safety Review (PSR) Spanish NNP approach, which is described in UNESA documents NPP Life Management in Spain.- Description of Methodology and Licensing and Regulatory Aspects on Lifetime Management in Spain included in Sections 4.3 and 5.3 respectively. IAEA Safety Series No.15, 10CFR50.54 The UNESA methodology includes a procedure for the SSC selection: Guideline for Selecting Critical Components, and for each component or group of components a detailed dossier allow to select the pairs area/component and degradation phenomena which are most critical.

113/ International guidance 114/ Scope of AMP

  5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 121/ Policy of the N.S.A. on AMPs Refer to result of "Nuclear Safety Group" analysis The RG 1.10 requires a surveillance of ageing issues. To obtain the renewal of the Operating Licensee, Lifetime Management Plans are mandatory. CSN can ask for some plant specific requirements on AMP after Periodic Safety Review. When the plant life be next to the design life (40 year), additional requirements could be required. Currently NSA does not define additional requirements. Following UNESA methodology, a specific Lifetime Management Programme is generated for each NPP.

122/ Additional regulatory requirements and guidance by the N.S.A. 123/ The AMP policy document of the owner/operator

124/ Available international guidance and good IAEA, US-NRC, EPRI, INPO, WOG (PWR), BWROG. practice 125/ The scope of the AMP Selected SSC, considering the high susceptibility to degradation phenomena. The main activities include the degradation phenomena studies and the maintenance practices evaluation.

253

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 'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 211/ AMP organization and program description 212/ Resources: (a) human (b) financial (c) tools and equipment (d) external 213/ Provisions for understanding SSC ageing NPP Life Management Programme includes multidisciplinary teams with engineering companies support. Utilities/NPP funds for its specific Programme. Electricity Sector/UNESA coordinates common NPP methodology and approaches, and addresses R+D programmes for projects on Materials, supporting the NPP Life Management Programmes. Databases, inspection/surveillance equipments, maintenance tools, etc. A specific support tool: Integrated Lifetime Management System (SIGEVI) is being developed by UNESA. External resources are from engineering and inspections companies, main equipment suppliers, etc. Base documents generated by UNESA. Additionally, specific documents developed by supplier working groups are being used, i.e. WOG and BWROG. Specific documents for each plant, including Lifetime Management Programme description, responsible and organization. Some plants have a specific procedure on AMP organization.

  5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 221/ Organizations participating in AMP and their interfaces. 222/ The division of responsibilities UNESA, CSN, Utilities, NPP staff and external consultants (engineering, suppliers, services and inspection companies).

CSN (safety), UNESA (methodology and coordination), NPP owners (AMP responsible) see figures 2-1 and 2-2, Engineering, Inspection, Supplier companies (external support). Specific for each NPP (Plant staff availability, experience in different areas covering, among others, equipments maintenance and operation, degradation phenomena, etc.). 254

223/ Criteria used to determine the AM organization

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  5HYLHZ 7RSLFV FRQWG 224/ Resources allocated to the AM organization 225/ The independance of AMP funding 226/ The qualification required for staff 227/ The previous experience of AM organization staff 228/ Training program to ensure the competency of staff 229/ The adequacy of the equipment and tools Specific for each plant (Experts for different services covering main degradation phenomena and components).

Methodology (Electricity Sector/UNESA), Plant specific programmes funded by the Utilities / NPP. Multidisciplinary teams (experts in materials, ageing, analysis, inspection, maintenance, operation, quality assurance, etc.). The expert must have previous experience in the area of their knowledge. Not specific requirements are obligated.

The training programmes are related to the specific knowledge matter of the expert.

There are a high number of available tools. Most of them are being optimised for Lifetime Management objectives and integrated with other related tools. The Lifetime Management Programme of each NPP is feed backing the results of the Programme application. Component analysis modifications are examples of the continuous improvement and feedback of results.

2210/ Feedback of relevant operating experience and research results 2211/ and their application ...

2212/ External expert advice when necessary 2213/ Advice from national and international organizations

Usually, engineering companies and equipment suppliers are considered when necessary.

Good practices, advises, reports and documents from UNESA, IAEA, OECD/NEA, US-NRC, EPRI, NEI, VGB, etc. are considered in NPP AMP. 255

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Nuclear Safety Authority (CSN)

LIFE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

(Utility-NPP)

Life Management Programme Manager (Utility-NPP)

Responsible for Activity 1

Responsible for Activity 2

Responsible for Activity N

NPP Sections

External Engineering Support

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256

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Nuclear Safety Authority (CSN)

LIFE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

(Utility-NPP)

Life Management Programme Manager (Utility-NPP) Specific LM Activities NPP Sections Technical Manager for LM Basic Activities

(Engineering Support)

External Engineering Support

External Engineering Support

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257

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 311/ SSC screening method Procedure included in the UNESA methodology and in the specific LM programme developed by each NPP based on this methodology (UNESAs documents were provided to the Project: Description of Methodology and Guidelines for Selecting and Prioritising Important Components, summaries of which are in Chapter 5, Section 5.3). Important SSC selection following the UNESA procedure Guideline for Selecting and Prioritising Important Components (example lists are provided in Appendix 2, Section 4: Lists of Important Components.- Results from UNESA Methodology). Each selected component or group of components is analysed in a detailed dossier, covering: component design and operation characteristics, maintenance and inspection history, degradation phenomena affecting, evaluation methods, and possible measurements for degradation control and mitigation. Each selected component or group of components is analysed in a detailed dossier, covering: component design and operation characteristics, maintenance and inspection history, degradation phenomena affecting, evaluation methods, and measurements for degradation control and mitigation. In order to increase SCC surveillance, specific equipment and programmes have been designed, i.e., vessel head penetration inspection tool, vessel bottom penetrations inspection device, predictive maintenance of steam generators developments, etc.. Each selected component or group of components is analysed in a detailed dossier, covering: component design and operation characteristics, maintenance and inspection history, degradation phenomena affecting, evaluation methods, and measurements for degradation control and mitigation. As key stage of the UNESA methodology, an important activity is the Maintenance Evaluation to assess the degree to which the degradation mechanisms are covered by the maintenance, inspection and testing practices currently implemented at the NPPs. The procedure developed for the Maintenance Evaluation allows all the activities related to maintenance (preventive, corrective, testing, inspections, operating shift plant walkthroughs, etc.) to be analysed in an integrated manner as a means of controlling and mitigating ageing. The Spanish Nuclear Safety Authority (CSN) requires NPPs to implement equipment qualification programmes. These follow the regulations of the plant design origin country (i.e., US design plants use IEEE-323 for environmental qualification and IEEE-344 for seismic qualification). Equipment qualification programmes are considered in the NPP Periodic Safety Reviews and Lifetime Management Programmes. Each plant use its own procedure and system to collect and record data, using plant process computer, maintenance and inspection databases, chemistry analysis database, etc. Policy of spare part management is plant/utility specific. At this moment, groups of plants with unified management are establishing an unified spare part management policy, in order to optimize resources and minimise stocks based on spare parts shares between plants. Spare part management is considered in the NPP Periodic Safety Reviews and Lifetime Management Programmes.

312/ List of SSCs 313/ Operational procedures

314/ Surveillance

315/ Assessment

316/ Maintenance

317/ Equipment qualification program procedures

318/ Data collection and record keeping 319/ Spare parts

258

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  5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 321/ SSC screening methodology document, the list of SCCs and examples The plant SCCs are selected based on different criteria, including Safety, Availability, Replacement and cost, Service conditions, Regulatory considerations, Operating history, Effectiveness of plant programmes, among others (summary on UNESA SSC screening methodology was provided in Project Task 3: Procedure for Selecting and Prioritising Important Components).

322/ Safety margins and/or acceptance (fitness Refer to results of "Technology Group Analysis". In accordance with regulations of the plant design origin country. Specific studies for service) criteria specified for the SSCs could be required in certain cases. Typical criteria examples are: 323/ Ageing assessment methodology fo SSCs and examples Admissible design transient Minimum wall thickness

Refer to results of "Technology Group Analysis". The assessment includes reports/dossiers on degradation phenomena studies for each component or group of components (vessel, pressurizer, steam generators, turbine-generator set, containment, tanks, piping, pumps, heat exchangers, valves, motors, etc.). Examples are described in UNESA documents provided in Project Task 3: Description of methodology and Licensing and Regulatory Aspects on Lifetime Management in Spain. Operating procedures are adapted considering design data; i.e., transient reduction, corrosion mitigation by chemistry control, etc. The surveillance programmes are plant specific. The procedures used are plant specific and consider the best available techniques. Inspection are adapted considering plant history and state-of-the-art methodology: As examples: Ultrasonic test for RPV welds and BWR shroud. Eddy current test for SG tubes. Specifically designed equipment for RPV head bolts.

324/ Operating procedures for SSCs 325/ Plant surveillance program 326/ Inspection and surveillance procedures

Surveillance of operating parameters, pressure, temperature, valve position, etc., is used for automatic fatigue monitoring in several NPPs. Vibration and noise detection allows to minimize damage on main pumps and other primary components, etc.

259

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G 327/ Operational limits and conditions controlling the rate of ageing 328/ Maintenance programs 329/ Preventive maintenance programs 3210/Schedule of minimum preventive maintenance 3211/Basis for adjusting testing, surveillance and maintenance 3212/The changes to the AMP in response to unanticipated ageing phenomena Methodologies used for maintenance evaluation are in UNESA methodology for NPP Lifetime Management. Also, RCM. is implemented in most of the plants. AMP is in continuous process of review, improvement and feedback. If problems are plant specific, the plant adopts the adequate measurements to evaluate the incidence and to control and mitigate them. ,I SUREOHPV FRXOG DIIHFW WR VHYHUDO SODQWV DQ (OHFWULFLW\ 6HFWRU81(6$ SURMHFW LV DJUHHG LQ ZKLFK SKHQRPHQD DUH DQDO\VHG DQG WHFKQLTXHV IRU VXUYHLOODQFH DQG HYDOXDWLRQ DFFHSWDQFH FULWHULD DQG LQVSHFWLRQ WHFKQLTXHV DUH GHYHORSHG ([DPSOHV DUH WKH 6WHDP *HQHUDWRU 3URMHFW 9HVVHO 3HQHWUDWLRQV 3URMHFWV HWF 3213/Data collection and record keeping system Conventional methods and other specific for lifetime management (fatigue monitoring, SIGEVI, etc.). Spanish NPPs are required to prepare and send to the Spanish Nuclear Safety Authority (CSN) different license documents and information, which need to be collected and recorded in appropriate way. To manage the plant SSC and the associated documents, databases for configuration control are used by the NPP as requirements of Quality Assurance. NPPs maintain history records, including information on faults reports, repair, replacement and refurbishment performed. Most of them use software programmes for maintenance management. According to the licensing requirement US-NRC 10CFR50.49 for environmental qualification. NPPs have specific procedures to maintain EQ based on equipment qualification reports. In accordance with the conclusions of periodic safety reviews (RPS), the EQ maintenance programme could be modified, i.e. if environmental conditions change. Several plants follows the US-NRC 10CFR21, which requires to perform a fault cause analysis and to distribute it to other plants, suppliers, etc. which could experience the same failure mechanisms. Refer to results of "Technology Group Analysis". Only if excessive degradation has been detected and it is necessary to mitigate it. Operating procedures limits for pressure temperature, chemistry parameters, etc. and preventive maintenance, including refurbishment, mitigate SSC degradations. Several plants have reviewed their maintenance programmes in order to improve frequencies in preventive maintenance, reducing preventive actuations and increasing predictive maintenance.

3214/Maintenance histories, including: 3215/Procedures and mechanisms in place to maintain EQ 3216/Systematic analyses and corrective action taken

260

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 411/ Physical condition of SSC 412/ EQ established and maintained This is not adapted to the review performed by the 3 Utilities (UNESA / TRACTEBEL and EDF) now. 413/ Performance indicators Corresponding information is already given in activity.   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 421/ Major findings, conclusions and recommendations resulting from plant walkdowns 422/ Special attention given to certain SSCs 423/ Degree to which condition and/or functional indicators conform to the acceptance criteria 424/ Records of ambient environmental conditions 425/ Records of system parameters including transients, trends and deviations 426/ Qualification reports or other documents 427/ Statistical information about failures 428/ Routine reports from the maintenance and surveillance organizations 429/ Trends of AMP process indicators 261 The understanding of the group in this chapter is included in the AMAT guideline to record during the audit the information obtained.

CE. DE XI "Ageing" UNESA / EDF / TRACTEBEL AREA OF REVIEW:  021,725,1*

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 511/ Self-assessment program 512/ Peer reviews 513/ Comprehensive reviews 514/ Continuous improvement process   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 521/ Regulatory requirements for the AMP review 522/ 523/ 524/ 525/ Policy for the AMP review and improvement Performance indicators Updates of performance indicators Records of self-assessments

Each NPP has established its own process to review, update and control the AMP. In the UNESAs Working Group on NPP Lifetime Management & Materials, NPPs exchange information, agree common projects, and follow the respective Life Management Programmes. No yet between Spanish NPPs on ageing management programmes. Spanish Nuclear Safety Authority (CSN) has audited the UNESAs Methodology for NPP Life Management, with favourable result. Also, CSN audits the individual NPP Life Management Programmes. They are foreseen in the NPP Lifetime Management Programmes. Requirements, including Operating License and PSR, are described in UNESA document provided to the Project: "Licensing and Regulatory Aspects on Lifetime Management in Spain" (summary in Chapter 4, Section 4.3). Plant specific. Considered in the plant AMP and not in the methodology. Plant specific. Considered in the plant AMP and not in the methodology Plant specific. Considered in the plant AMP and not in the methodology. Plant specific. Considered in the plant AMP and not in the methodology. It is understood that it usually requires external expert support.

526/ Plans and procedures of self-assessment 527/ Capability of the NPP owner operator to evaluate AMP effectiveness 528/ Records of peer reviews 529/ Independence of the peer review teams 5210/Results of the peer reviews 5211/Effectiveness of corrective actions or improvement programs 5212/Records of any comprehensive reviews 5213/Roles of the operator and national regulatory authority 5214/Procedures of the comprehensive AMP review 5215/Corrective actions arising 5216/A commitment of all members of the NPP staff to continuous improvement 5217/Relationship between the periodic safety review program and any comprehensive AMP review

Spanish Nuclear Safety Authority (CSN) audits the NPP Lifetime Management Programmes, specifically or as a part of Periodic Safety Review (PSR).

Each NPP Lifetime Management Programme involves appropriate staff of all the plant sections, coordinated by the LM Manager. A direct commitment exits from the top NPP/Utility Management, being more strong with the particular NPP age. Described in the UNESA document provided to the Project: "Licensing and Regulatory Aspects on Lifetime Management in Spain" (summary in Chapter 4, Section 4.3).

262

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 111/ Regulatory policy and requirements 112/ Ageing Management Program policy 113/ International guidance 114/ Scope of Ageing Management Program   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 121/ Policy of the Nuclear Safety Authority on AMPs 122/ Additional regulatory requirements and guidance by the N.S.A. 123/ The AMP policy document of the owner/operator Refer to results of "Nuclear Safety Group" analysis. The license of each NPP, which requires the Utility to reassess the safety of the plant after each 10-year, specifies that the items to be handled during each decennial review are identified in a report written in common by the Utility, its Engineering Organisation, and the technical support organisation of the safety authorities. Plant Life management is thus integrated in a permanent review process. However, particular concerns are also addressed on a specific basis (e.g. potential for cracks in the reactor pressure vessel head). There is no predetermined lifetime for a nuclear power plant either license life or either design life. The Belgian nuclear power plants will be kept operational as long as they can operate safely and economically. The operating license of each NPP Refer to project "Continuous Operation of Belgian NPPs". International guidance and good practices were considered in order to propose an integrated project (See 112/). See 112/

124/ Available international guidance and good See 113/ practice 125/ The scope of the AMP The current ageing management program focuses on the passive safety-related components and the non safety-related components but important for the availability of the plant; since specific programmes exist for active safety-related components: maintenance programs were established to define actions to perform in order to guarantee the integrity and the availability of these equipments during the exploitation of the NPPs, special programmes for procurement of qualified spare and replacement parts and for defining strategies for replacement of pieces of equipment which have become obsolete for commercial or technological reasons.

263

CE. DE XI "Ageing" AREA OF REVIEW:  25*$1,=$7,21   'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 211/ AMP organization and program description

AGEING PROGRAM ASSESSMENT / REVIEW CHART (refer to AMAT Guideline) 75$&7(%(/ A specific plant life management project, named "Continuous Operation of Belgian NPPs" has been set up to summarise the knowledge gathered on the various topics related to Systems, Structures, and Components ageing and to summarise the situation of each nuclear unit with respect to these ageing phenomena. Those summaries are reported in the Equipment Ageing Summaries. No specific approach for the project "Continuous Operation of Belgian NPPs". Resources are managed as for other Tractebel projects and this project is performed according to the internal QA procedures of Tractebel (as for other projects).

212/ Resources: (a) human (a) financial (b) tools and equipment (c) external 213/ Provisions for understanding SSC ageing   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 221/ Organizations participating in AMP and their interfaces. 222/ The division of responsibilities

See 212/ The main organisations involved are: - The Federal Nuclear Inspection Agency, responsible for the inspection and surveillance of nuclear activities in Belgium; - The mandated private companies, responsible for making safety analyses, for carrying out all permanent control tasks, and for monitoring the activities of operators. - Electrabel, the electric utility, responsible for operating the plants. - Tractebel, the engineering organisation, responsible for the design, construction and engineering support to the operation (including periodic safety evaluation), and is in charge of co-ordination. - SCKCEN, The Belgian Nuclear Research Center and Laborelec, the Research laboratory of the utilities, responsibles for testing. At each site of Electrabel, the management and the concerned sections (i.e. safety section, maintenance section, ...) realise most of the activities related to the plant life management based on the informations from the concerned sections of the site and the advises from the Nuclear Safety Authorities. The management of Electrabel takes then the decision and defines the basic rules to be followed by the utilities taking into account the strategy of Electrabel. The engineering organisation (Tractebel) is in charge of the support and the co-ordination of the plant life management activities. See 212/ See 212/

223/ Criteria used to determine the AM organization 224/ Resources allocated to the AM organization 225/ The independance of AMP funding 226/ The qualification required for staff 227/ The previous experience of AM organization staff 228/ Training program to ensure the competency of staff 229/ The adequacy of the equipment and tools 2210/Feedback of relevant operating experience and research results 2211/and their application... 2212/External expert advice when necessary 2213/Advice from national and international organizations

See 212/

See 212/

264

CE. DE XI "Ageing" AREA OF REVIEW:  $&7,9,7,(6   'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 311/ SSC screening method 312/ List of SSCs

AGEING PROGRAM ASSESSMENT / REVIEW CHART (refer to AMAT Guideline) 75$&7(%(/ The screening method and a list of passive safety-related components are given in the internal documents of the project "Continuous Operation of Belgian NPPs". Information regarding to those components (e.g. surveillance, acceptance criteria, remedies, ...) are summarised in the Equipment Ageing Summaries. Due to the high quality standard applied to the design, operation, and maintenance of NPPs, many aspects of plant life management have been incorporated in the everyday management of the plants since the beginning of their life. These aspects include: the design, quality assurance, in service inspection, monitoring, testing, preventive maintenance, re-qualification, replacement, and periodic safety reassessments. These aspects are well documented and, for passive safety-related components, the major references are summarised in the Equipment Ageing summaries (See 311/)

313/ Operational procedures 314/ Surveillance 315/ Assessment 316/ Maintenance 317/ Equipment qualification program procedures 318/ Data collection and record keeping 319/ Spare parts   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 321/ SSC screening methodology document, the list See 311/ of SCCs and examples 322/ Safety margins and/or acceptance (fitness for Refer to results of "Technology Group Analysis". See 313/ Criteria are given in the design documents (e.g. the number of transients experienced by service) criteria specified for the SSCs a component cannot exceed the number of occurrences assumed in the qualification analysis) or are determined by specific analysis (e.g. minimal ligament length for cover head penetrations). 323/ Ageing assessment methodology for SSCs and Refer to results of "Technology Group Analysis". See 311/ examples 324/ Operating procedures for SSCs See 313/ e.g. improvements of the water chemistry to control the Steam Generator degradation 325/ Plant surveillance program See 313/ e.g. steam generator tube inspection by Eddy Current and/or Ultrasonic examination by sampling at each refuelling outage. 326/ Inspection and surveillance procedures 327/ Operational limits and conditions controlling Refer to results of "Technology Group Analysis". See 313/ e.g. pressure and temperature limits for heat-up and cool down (RPV) the rate of ageing 328/ Maintenance programs See 313/ e.g. control of degradation due to erosion-corrosion by wall thickness measurements of the most susceptible elements which the 329/ Preventive maintenance programs inspection frequency depends on the severity of the degradation in order to replace in time the thinned pipe portions 3210/Schedule of minimum preventive maintenance 3211/Basis for adjusting testing, surveillance and All Classified pressure retaining components are inspected according to the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI. Moreover, maintenance complementary or voluntary inspections are decided by the operator on classified and non-classified components according to variable aspects affecting the availability and the conventional security of the plant or depending on world feedback or experience. 3212/The changes to the AMP in response to See 313/ e.g. local monitoring was implemented to characterise thermal stratification transients unanticipated ageing phenomena 3213/Data collection and record keeping system Results of the maintenance programs are kept and are used, among other things, in order to optimise the preventive maintenance programs (using a 3214/Maintenance histories method based on the Reliability Centred Maintenance). 3215/Procedures and mechanisms in place to e.g. for electrical and I&C components, during quality audits which occur every 3 years, manufacturers are questioned on the evolution of their 1E maintain EQ qualified products and on the obsolescence of their products. This audit allows to check if the material presently offered still meet the requirements 3216/Systematic analyses and corrective action of the original qualification. taken

265

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 411/ Physical condition of SSC 412/ EQ established and maintained This is not adapted to the review performed by the 3 Utilities (UNESA / TRACTEBEL and EDF) now. 413/ Performance indicators Corresponding information is already given in activity.   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 421/ Major findings, conclusions and recommendations resulting from plant walkdowns 422/ Special attention given to certain SSCs 423/ Degree to which condition and/or functional indicators conform to the acceptance criteria 424/ Records of ambient environmental conditions 425/ Records of system parameters including transients, trends and deviations 426/ Qualification reports or other documents 427/ Statistical information about failures 428/ Routine reports from the maintenance and surveillance organizations 429/ Trends of AMP process indicators 266 The understanding of the group in this chapter is included in the AMAT guideline to record during the audit the information obtained.

CE. DE XI "Ageing"

AGEING PROGRAM ASSESSMENT / REVIEW CHART (refer to AMAT Guideline)

AREA OF REVIEW:  021,725,1* 75$&7(%(/   'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 511/ Self-assessment program 512/ Peer reviews 513/ Comprehensive reviews 514/ Continuous improvement process   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 521/ Regulatory requirements for the AMP review 522/ Policy for the AMP review and improvement 523/ Performance indicators 524/ Updates of performance indicators 525/ Records of self-assessments 526/ Plans and procedures of self-assessment 527/ Capability of the NPP owner operator to evaluate AMP effectiveness 528/ Records of peer reviews 529/ Independence of the peer review teams 5210/Results of the peer reviews 5211/Effectiveness of corrective actions or improvement programs See 212/

No specific regulatory requirement for the AMP review See 212/ See 212/ See 212/

See 212/

5212/Records of any comprehensive reviews See 212/ 5213/Roles of the operator and national regulatory authority 5214/Procedures of the comprehensive AMP review 5215/Corrective actions arising 5216/A commitment of all members of the NPP staff to continuous improvement 5217/Relationship between the periodic safety review program and any comprehensive AMP review Plant-Life management is integrated in the periodic safety review. However, specific concerns are addressed on a specific basis (e.g. potential cracks in reactor vessel head)

267

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 111/ Regulatory policy and requirements 112/ AMP policy

113/ International guidance 114/ Scope of AMP   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 121/ Policy of the NSA on AMPs 122/ Additional regulatory requirements and guidance by the N.S.A. 123/ The AMP policy document of the owner/operator

See Safety Group Refer to Service life and ageing of pressurized water power plants (EDF ref. 1) Situation end of june 1998 This overall generic program makes use of all skills available within EDF and the manufacturers, and guarantees consistent and complete follow up analysis by making use of numerous expert areas. Beyond most pieces of equipment which can be maintained during maintenance activities, there are what EDF consider as non-replaceable components. The former can usually be replaced within a given time period at a controlled radiation exposure and a reduced cost. For instance, at the end of 1997, EDF replaced the steam generators in seven units and twenty four reactor vessel heads. IAEA SRS 15 (it has included EDF contributions). Refer to (EDF ref. 1). Refer to results of "Nuclear Safety Group" analysis. This policy is defined by official letters and recommandations written after Groupe permanent meeting devoted to Ageing. These GP are leaded by French Safety Authority and include expert from all parties involved. The design of the nuclear steam supply system was based on a technical service life of 40 years, the period taken into account in the safety reports. However, from the point of view of the regulations, French legislation does not specify a time limit for the operation of installations within the framework of the enactment authorising their creation. With respect to the Safety Authorities and the general public, EDF must therefore strive to be able to justify and to achieve this service life and, if possible, to prolong it in order to benefit to the full from the investments already made. Three main factors have an influence on the service life of a nuclear power unit: - normal wear on its components and systems, sometimes referred to as ageing, which depends particularly on their age, their operating conditions and the maintenance operations performed on them; - the safety level, which must conform at all times to the safety reference system applicable to the unit and which is likely to evolve according to new regulations; - cost-effectiveness, which must remain satisfactory in comparison to other means of power generation. In this context, obtaining a service life of 40 years depends on the control, on one hand, of a safety level that must conform at all times to the reference system and, on the other, of all the technical and industrial aspects that make it possible to operate the units safely and cost-effectively. From a technical point of view, this entails gaining an understanding of the problems of ageing, defining and implementing suitable measures to maintain the performance of the units at their current level. From an industrial point of view, this entails mastering the evolution of the industrial fabric so as to have the necessary skills, know-how and tools on hand when required. In all cases, it is in the interests of EDF to ensure that the industrial skills exist in France or elsewhere in the world to contribute to the operation of the units, even in the absence of prospects for renewal. On account of these elements, the overall strategy is founded firstly on the quality of daily plant operation, and subsequently on the following points: - the ten-yearly reassessment of the safety level;

268

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  5HYLHZ 7RSLFV FRQWG  the implementation of two structured programmes so as to ensure that all the technical and industrial actions allowing a service life of at least 40 years to be achieved have indeed been put into effect: . the anticipation and exceptional maintenance programme; . the service life programme. Obviously, this process and these programmes are the subject of continuous exchange with the Safety Authorities. AIEA documents: SRS n 15 : Implementation and review of a nuclear power plan ageing management programme. SS n 4 AMAT Guidelines : Reference document for the IAEA Ageing Management Assessment Teams. These documents are not referenced in EDF document (due to their issuing date but EDF specialists have been involved). The aim of the service life programme, initially set up by EDF in 1987, is to understand and anticipate the problems of ageing. This programme serves as an active observatory to ensure that everything is done to achieve the expected service life. Within its scope, all the aspects that have an impact on the service life of installations are reviewed, whether these are purely technical, i.e. associated with the equipment, or of an industrial, economic or regulatory nature. The service life programme also serves to identify the progress required to gain a better understanding of ageing phenomena and to undertake research and development allowing the link between operating conditions, maintenance and service life of the components to be more clearly established. The programme makes the distinction between: - two irreplaceable components: the reactor vessel and the containment buildings. A summary document demonstrating the serviceability of 900 megawatt PWR vessels, for at least 40 years, is currently being investigated by the Safety Authorities. This document makes provision for closer monitoring of irradiation behaviour and for consideration of the specific characteristics of each vessel. As regards the containment buildings, a service life of at least 40 years has been established overall for the 900 megawatt standardised plant series. The monitoring and actions on the containment buildings of the 1300 megawatt series have to be individualised, given that loss of leaktightness has occurred on the internal walls of certain containment buildings (Belleville, Flamanville, Cattenom); - components that can be wholly or partially replaced, sometimes requiring onerous operations that are nevertheless fully mastered nowadays, such as steam generators (already replaced on 7 units) or vessel heads (already replaced on 30 units). The corresponding actions are integrated in the exceptional maintenance strategies while observing the objective of at least 40 years. Obviously, ambitious research and development programmes are dedicated to the investigation of the mechanics and kinetics of deterioration: erosion, corrosion, fatigue, wear, ageing under the effects of heat and irradiation Indeed, a thorough understanding of these phenomena is required in order to optimise strategies throughout all the French plants in service. To confirm this work, a series of expert appraisals has been carried out on the Chooz A plant (300 megawatt), the first pressurised water reactor to be built in France and decommissioned in 1991 after 24 years of service. Furthermore, EDF monitors feedback from foreign nuclear power plants older than the French units attentively and organises collaboration with the plant operators concerned. In particular, the plants in service in the United States, totalling approximately one hundred PWR units with an average age 10 years older than those run by EDF, are a major source of feedback on the service life of equipment. The performance of the majority of these plants continues to improve, which lends weight to the argument that considerable margins exist as regards the end of the service life of such units. The service life programme also addresses the question of the perpetuity of the nuclear industry, in order to monitor the situation of industrial organisations that may be both sensitive owing to the indispensable nature of their skills for EDF and fragile owing to the absence of new construction for a certain number of years. -

124/ Available international guidance and good practice 125/ The scope of the AMP

269

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 211/ AMP organization and program description 212/ Resources : (d) human (e) financial (f) tools and equipment (g) external 213/ Provisions for understanding SSC ageing   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 221/ Organizations participating in AMP and their interfaces. 222/ The division of responsibilities The PDV is in a position of advisor for the Production Division Head. It has no specific means except for the expert to attend the meetings. The decision to launch an action (either studies or modification) is decided by the Steerring Committee of Operating division. As such each action is individually managed by the Division in charge. Organisations participating : see Table 1 Decision making / interfaces : see Table 2 223/ Criteria used to determine the AM organization 224/ Resources allocated to the AM organization 225/ The independance of AMP funding 226/ The qualification required for staff 227/ The previous experience of AM organization staff 228/ Training program to ensure the competency of staff 229/ The adequacy of the equipment and tools 270 The division of responsibility is the same for AMP as per any study or modification. Some Engineering department have a key contribution. Resources are managed at Department and Division level depending of the part of the job they are responsible for. The ageing activity is only a part of their activity and, as such, participates in load and budget evaluation. Qualification of personnel is also decided at department division level depending on the field of activity and the requested skill as per any other activity. People in charge of ageing studies are managed, trained in the same way as per any other engineering activity (according to the field of activity). Research Division is performing a huge program linked to ageing mechanisms. A committee Projet Dure de Vie was set up in 1985 to make synthesis about ageing and life time management. For implementation of modification, the normal process as per any modification is used : based on budget estimation decision to perform is made and activity is done by a Technical Division in charge of the field. They are mobilized in the Engineering, Research and Operation Division as per any other matter. No specific approach has been necessary : decision were taken by the Steering Committee of the Operation Division as per any study or modification decided on EDF units.

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  5HYLHZ 7RSLFV FRQWG  2210/ Feedback of relevant operating experience and research results 2211/ and their application... The feedback is organized by two levels: a NPP level: for each incident or failure local Engineering team analyses and corrects if it is a local problem, if the problem may be generic, enquiry is extended to similar units and the problem is managed by a corporate level for strategic decision.

It is the same for ageing related problem for which PDV has an overall coordination mission. 2212/ External expert advice when necessary 2213/ Advice from national and international organizations Technical divisions are used to ask for external support: from original supplier in particular Nuclear boiler supplier, other companies in the world in particular the original licenser. In addition, EDF participate in many common research programs developped by international organizations such as WANO, FROG and INPO

271

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CE. DE XI "Ageing" UNESA / EDF / TRACTEBEL AREA OF REVIEW:  $&7,9,7,(6

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 311/ SSC screening method 312/ List of SSCs 313/ Operational procedures 314/ Surveillance The method is based on identification of sensitive equipment depending one ageing possible damage estimate, impact on operation of the plant in term of safety, availability and replacement costs. A list of sensitive equipment having a major impact on life duration has been devided in changeable or not equipment. The list is ???. They include from the beginning the impact of transient taken into account in design for fatigue analysis. They are complemented by chemical procedures. EDF has developped a set of Preventive maintenance Programmes based on an optimization process, called "OMF-Structures". The principles of the OMF-Structures process include "Risk-Based Inspection" concepts within an RCM process. Two main phases are identified : - The purpose of the first phase is to select the risk-significant failure modes and associated elements. This phase consists of two major steps: potential consequences evaluation and reliability performance evaluation. For consequence evaluation, both quantitative PSA and deterministic aspects are used. For performance evaluation, degradation models are used to select "sensitive elements" where degradation mechanisms may occur. - The second phase consists of the definition of preventive maintenance programs for elements that are associated with risksignificant failure modes. The tasks and frequencies are proposed depending on the nature of the element and the degradation mechanism attributes (attributes, kinetics, ...). For high risk failure modes, a probabilistic optimization is to be proposed. 315/ Assessment 316/ Maintenance 317/ Equipment qualification program procedures A large program for qualification has been developped: it starts from the list of functions to be qualified: this list has been based on functional analysis of incident / accident situation and how to bring the boiler to a safe state.

- Equipment necessary to perform such a function are indentified and each component participating also noted in a list of equipment to be qualified. 318/ Data collection and record keeping 319/ Spare parts They are managed by a specific division which distribute information to sites. Spare parts linked to qualified equipment are identified. 275 A list of qualified equipment.

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  5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 321/ SSC screening methodology document, the list of SCCs and examples The list of sensitive SS components (from life duration point of view) is attached to EDF ref. 1 and regularly updated, depending on result of analysis (ageing speed Faisability of changing the equipment).

322/ Safety margins and/or acceptance (fitness Refer to results of "Technology Group" analysis : for service) criteria specified for the SSCs - Criteria were given in the design documents i.e. : number of transient for 40 years operation minimal thickness hypothesis on toughness. Refer to results of "Technology Group" analysis : Criteria have been determined later on by specific analysis i.e.: analysis of cracks propagation in material (inconel) analysis of embrittlement of austenitic cast iron products.

323/ Ageing assessment methodology for SSCs This chapter shall be linked with technological group analysis, refer to ref. 1: the attached sheet description for the main sensitive and examples equipment the trends and the methodology to assess them: 324/ Operating procedures for SSCs i.e. : Reactor vessel

Initial set of procedures takes into account design criteria such as profile of transient, operation domain; chemistry of fluids. i.e.: - thermal shock on reactor vessel, - material (i.e.: low C content stainless steel) adapted to primary corrosion. After commissionning some additional studies have given complementary criteria and operation has been adapted: i.e.: - temperature of reactor vessel upper part lowered to reduce cracking of inconel weldings, - smooth start-up of diesel generator set to reduce wear of internal parts.

325/ Plant surveillance program

PBMP (Programme de Base de Maintenance Preventive). This programs, issued by equipment, give the maintenance tasks, their frequency. They are the result of the methodology given in 314.

276

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(')   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV FRQWG 326/ Inspection and surveillance procedures Inspection is developped and adapted to the forecast type of wear: I.e.: - ultrasonic test of reactor vessel weld to detect crackings, - magnetic test for steam generator tube cracking, - ultrasonic test for thickness reduction of carbon piping under erosion corrosion. - Surveillance (during operation): in some particular cases equipment to check some parameters have been installed: I.e.: - vibration surveillance of reactor vessel internals to detect any damage, - electrical parameters of motorized valve motors to detect any increase in operating efforts, - computerized transient identification system (SYSFAC). Refer to results of "Technology Group" analysis : Initial set of operational limits and conditions were settled in accordance with design: refer to operating procedures chapter. After commissionning some additional limit have been decided to take into account additional studies: i.e.: - ageing of non metallic parts has been studied and systematic changes are included in maintenance procedures for membranes of pneumatic valves. See 325 See 325 See 325 RSEM This has been done in few cases: i.e.: stress corrosion of inconel zones: in some case cracking occurs before expected: in the case of reactor vessel head penetration this has pushed to change the heads. All incidents are recorded in an incident log for follow up, analysis and information of Safety Authorities Information about function and equipment to be qualified are given to maintenance people of NPPs. -

327/ Operational limits and conditions controlling the rate of ageing

328/ Maintenance programs 329/ Preventive maintenance programs 3210/Schedule of minimum preventive maintenance 3211/Basis for adjusting testing, surveillance and maintenance 3212/The changes to the AMP in response to unanticipated ageing phenomena 3213/Data collection and record keeping system 3214/Maintenance histories, including: 3215/Procedures and mechanisms in place to maintain EQ 3216/Systematic analyses and corrective action taken

In addition, qualified equipment maintenance sheets are being writen in order to point-out the particular point (a torque of a bolt, a radius of a cable) which are sensitive for qualification tests and shall not be changed during normal maintenance interventions. Time to time checking of some functions are done: a large checking has been done before second ten year long outage.

277

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  'RFXPHQWDWLRQ 411/ Physical condition of SSC 412/ EQ established and maintained 413/ Performance indicators   5HYLHZ 7RSLFV 421/ Major findings, conclusions and recommendations resulting from plant walkdowns 422/ Special attention given to certain SSCs 423/ Degree to which condition and/or functional indicators conform to the acceptance criteria 424/ Records of ambient environmental conditions 425/ Records of system parameters including transients, trends and deviations 426/ Qualification reports or other documents 427/ Statistical information about failures 428/ Routine reports from the maintenance and surveillance organizations 429/ Trends of AMP process indicators The understanding of the group in this chapter is included in the AMAT guideline to record during the audit the information obtained. This is not adapted to the review performed by the 3 Utilities (UNESA / TRACTEBEL and EDF) now. Corresponding information is already given in activity.

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523/ 524/ 525/ 526/ 527/

Performance indicators Updates of performance indicators Records of self-assessments Plans and procedures of self-assessment Capability of the NPP owner operator to evaluate AMP effectiveness 528/ Records of peer reviews 529/ Independence of the peer review teams 5210/Results of the peer reviews 5211/Effectiveness of corrective actions or improvement programs 5212/Records of any comprehensive reviews 5213/Roles of the operator and national regulatory authority 5214/Procedures of the comprehensive AMP review 5215/Corrective actions arising 5216/A commitment of all members of the NPP staff to continuous improvement 5217/Relationship between the periodic safety review program and any comprehensive AMP review

None The program is improved by the PVD permanent activity. Reviews are decided time to time by high level management. Presentations are also made on request to Safety Authorities (Specific Groupe Permanent). As EDF has developped and obtained the agreement of French Safety Authorities for a 10 years reassessment period, the results of ageing programs are included in the overall checking launched prior to a ten year outage. At the moment such a checking has just been made for second ten years outage of 1300 PW units forecast (in 2004, head of the serie). But mainly no important decision in that matter will be made before VD3 (third ten year outage) None Internal progress report, topic by topic are existing

None

Systematically done if any review As per any problem the regulatory make decisions on proposal issued by the operator. Not applicable Not applicable

The reviews are performed in parallel to get the results at the same time, in order to be in position to implement any modification during the long outage requested by regulation for hydraulic test of primary circuit.

279

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The initiatives of the nuclear power industry to improve life cycle management of nuclear power plants, and those aimed at the safe and profitable extension of their design life, both share the need for specific methodologies and must comply with the regulatory requirements established for the purpose. This has given rise to the development of guides and general documents defining suitable methodologies for life management and for life extension. However, the difference in the objectives pursued leads to differences in the methodologies. Indeed, it would seem unreasonable to demand full coincidence in terms of scope and requirements between the licensing of life extension programmes and programmes aimed at ensuring safety and economic soundness during design life. Nevertheless, the technological basis of the methodologies, which is the knowledge of their state and of monitoring and control methods, features common factors that can be of use in the fulfilment of the different objectives.
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The purpose of this report is to compare the methodologies designed by NEI, IAEA and UNESA for life extension and for ageing control of components that are important for safety and for life management, respectively. This report examines and compares the requirements and methodologies defined in the following documents: NEI (Nuclear Energy Institute) Guide 5- 10 Industry Guideline for Implementing the Requirements of 10 CFR Part -54 License Renewal Rule IAEA Technical Report series N 338 Methodology for the Management of Ageing of NPP components important to Safety UNESA Methodology for NPP Life Management (Metodologia para Gestion de Vida de UNESA)

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Following is a summary of the different methodologies in terms of objectives, requirements, structure and task sequence, as well as a comparison of their basic aspects to highlight existing differences.  *XLGHOLQH  5HY  -DQXDU\ 

The NEI guideline, the regulatory requirement that gave rise to it (10 CFR Part 54, May 1995) and the associated regulatory documents the draft Standard Review Plan for License Renewal dated April 2000, and Regulatory Guide DG-1047 dated August 1996, will be issued as soon as the NEI

281

guideline be accepted, while waiting for completion of the revision process of current requests and of other documents from Owners Groups. The analysis included herein is based on the current issue of these documents, although the topics that are open for discussion are also indicated. As a prime consideration, it should be noted that the purpose of application of this guideline is not life management, nor the establishment of an ageing monitoring programme for the entire service life of the power plant. The only purpose of this document is to address compliance with the license renewal requirements indicated in 10CFR54 for a maximum period of twenty (20) years, based on and following a design life of forty (40) years maximum, which explains the strictness of some of the requirements. This guideline is structured around the following steps of the License Renewal Rule: a. b. 1 2 c. d. Identification of the systems, structures and components (SSC) comprised in the scope and functions envisaged Integrated Plant Assessment Identification of the structures and components that will be subject to ageing assessment Assessment of ageing effects Time Limited Ageing Analyses (TLAAs) License Renewal request documentation and contents

The most relevant aspects of implementation requirements and methods contained in Guideline NEI 95-10 are briefly described and analysed below, for the purpose of comparison with the UNESA and IAEA methodologies. D ,GHQWLILFDWLRQ RI WKH 66& LQFOXGHG LQ WKH VFRSH DQG IXQFWLRQV WR EH HQYLVDJHG

The Guideline defines the following: a1. Safety-related SSC, as per 10CFR 50.49 (b) (1) a2. Non safety-related SSC whose failure can impede items defined under al to perform their function, including those that could cause seismic interaction with a 1 items a3. According to safety analyses, all SSC that support functions covered by the following regulatory requirements: Fire protection Anticipated Transients Without Scram (ATWS) Environmental qualification Station Black-Out (SBO) Pressure Temperature Shock (PTS)

corresponding to 10CFR 50, 48, 49, 61, 62 and 63 respectively. The functions considered in the scope selection are plant processes, conditions or actions that must be fulfilled by the SSC in order to effect or support a safety function or required to comply with the five regulatory requirements listed above. If licensing bases include redundancy, diversity or defence-indepth criteria, said criteria must be maintained in the identification of functions included in the scope. E ,QWHJUDWHG 3ODQW $VVHVVPHQW
282

b1. Identification of structures and components that will be subject to ageing assessment In this respect, the Guideline establishes that ageing assessment will be performed, on passive and long-lived structures and components that perform or support the aforementioned functions "Passive" applies to structures and components that cover the function without mobile parts or configuration changes; "long-lived" applies to SSC that are not subject to replacement before forty years, in accordance with a qualified life programme b2. Assessment of ageing effects The population selected in bl must be assessed to ensure that ageing effects, if any, are under control so that their functions are assured; in their absence, improvements must be integrated in ongoing programmes or specific programmes established for the purpose. This analysis includes the study of the industrys operating experience and of its applicability to the plant. The document establishes the following guidelines to demonstrate that existing monitoring and maintenance practices are efficient to control ageing blow the limits established for compliance of the licensing bases during the life extension period Practices cover the structure or component analysed They would enable detection of ageing effect before loss of the structure or failure of the component to perform its function They establish acceptance criteria and the obligation of appropriate corrective actions if such criteria are not respected Monitoring ensures reliable prediction with time for corrective actions Practices are submitted to sufficient administrative controls

If these guidelines are not fulfilled, then the practices require improvement or the integration of new ones. F 7LPH /LPLWHG $JHLQJ $QDO\VHV 7/$$V

The Guide requires the identification and evaluation of these analyses to confirm that they are still acceptable for the life extension period, either proceeding to a re-analysis for a sixty-year period with positive result, or refining the analysis by eliminating conservatisms, or demonstrating by means of ageing monitoring that the evolution of ageing over time is not critical during the sixty-year period. 2SHQ LWHPV IRU GLVFXVVLRQ EHWZHHQ 15& DQG 1(, ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKLV *XLGH The NEI guide 95-10 (rev. 1, January 2000) and the Standard Review Plan for License Renewal (April 2000) show discrepancies between NRC and Nuclear Industry. Once resolved, the NRCs support to this NEI guide will be established in Regulatory Guide 1047 (currently in draft revision dated August 1996). The open items are: Credit to programmes for inspection, condition monitoring and mitigation of existing degradations, whose validity and efficiency need further justification, in the eyes of the NRC; while the industry argues that said justification, which is logical, should not lead to questioning the current validity of these programmes and start together with the License Renewal a "relicensing" process equivalent to the process that took place prior to the current commercial operation. The industry also argues that the justification of said programmes, which were imposed by applicable regulatory requirements, should be small, if any, such as signalling its connection to the ageing control programme.
283

The GALL (Generic Ageing Lessons Learnt) report, issued in December 1999, will provide good references to identify the credited programmes. As in the case of the programmes, it is the understanding of the industry that the acceptance criteria employed in current programmes to ensure compliance with the licensing bases are also valid for life extension and require no further justification. In the case of new ageing control programmes not required in the current licensing bases, said criteria should be established and justified by means of what Guide NEI 95-10 defines as alarm values. This goes against the regulatory standpoint of justifying all criteria, including the ones included in the FSAR of the facility. Controversy continues regarding the level (system or component) of the functions to be maintained. The value of operating experience is debated, since the industry considers it as information of optional use in determining the efficiency of ageing control programmes, while the NRC makes it of mandatory use for the specific License Renewal programme. ,$($
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This study has been carried out by the IAEA within the framework of an international cooperation programme for better understanding of the degradation mechanisms that affect nuclear power plants and for the development of efficient control methods. The study includes methods for the selection of components important for safety and whose ageing must be analysed. It also contains methods to analyse said ageing effects, as well as the options for monitoring and mitigation. The methodology defined in this study is oriented to ensuring safety during the service life of the plant by knowing, controlling and monitoring ageing mechanisms that could put to risk plant safety. The methodology is structured as follows: a. Selection process 1. Selection of the systems and structures that contribute to plant safety 2. Impact of component failure on system functions 3. Probability that ageing can cause component failure 4. Suitability of maintenance b. Method for ageing assessment and control Contents and development of the IAEA methodology are examined below, to, facilitate comparison with the ones defined in Guide NEI 95-10 and by UNESA. D 6HOHFWLRQ SURFHVV

The selection process laid out in this method is carried out in two stages. The first corresponds to the selection of systems and structures that contribute to nuclear safety, while the second establishes which components will be submitted to ageing assessment. To implement the selection stage, this method makes use of the safety classifications established in each country and/or of the probabilistic safety analyses (if any). The purpose of the second stage is to determine which components are more susceptible to ageing and insufficiently taken into account in the monitoring and maintenance programmes implemented in the power plant. Component selection takes into account direct contribution to safety functions or the risk to impede such functions entailed by component failure.
284

Redundancy and diversity are not considered as exclusion criteria, since ageing is considered as a common failure mode. In the IAEA methodology, the preliminary selection of components, based on their contribution to safety functions, is followed with the identification of the components among the list that are submitted to degradations that could cause their failure, in accordance with current knowledge and operating experience of the plant and of the industry; it must also be established that these components are covered by inappropriate monitoring and maintenance practices with respect to the type of ageing indicator, data acquisition techniques or delay in detection. The conclusion of this selection based on simple criteria and on operating experience is the identification of the component population that will be submitted to the systematic and stringent assessment that constitutes the second stage of the methodology, and which is described below. E $JHLQJ DVVHVVPHQW DQG UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV IRU FRQWURO

This task is performed on the population selected in item a) above. Its purpose is the detailed analysis of the components, of their characteristics, ageing mechanisms that affect them and gaps in the monitoring and mitigation practices implemented at the plant. The first phase of this task is provisional, and its purpose is the identification of ageing effects, and the proposal of immediate solutions, while establishing the areas requiring further inspection, analysis or research. The second phase serves to confirm the conclusions reached in the first phase, or to detail the assessment and rectify the practices defined therein.  a. b. /LIH 0DQDJHPHQW 0HWKRGRORJ\ HVWDEOLVKHG E\ 81(6$

The UNESA methodology comprises the following steps: Selection of components, using life management criteria Examination of ageing mechanisms and selection of components subject to severe degradation c. Evaluation of maintenance for life management and proposal of improvements The most relevant aspects of the methodology as regards objectives, criteria, application requirements and work guidelines are described below. D 6HOHFWLRQ RI FRPSRQHQWV IRU OLIH PDQDJHPHQW

It is carried out at two levels: Selection of systems according to global criteria of safety, availability, replacement and cost Selection of components according to seven different criteria covering nuclear safety, costs for maintenance replacement or unavailability, and severe operating conditions The criteria established in the Guide that are applied at the system level and those for components correspond, in terms of nuclear safety, to the ones classified as safety -related in 10 CFR 50.49 (b) 1). As a rule in Spanish nuclear power plants, this classification also extends to systems that are not related to safety but whose failure may prevent or impede performance of safety functions. E $JHLQJ DVVHVVPHQW DQG VHOHFWLRQ RI FRPSRQHQWV VXEMHFW WR VHYHUH GHJUDGDWLRQ

This assessment is performed on the component population selected in item a) above. The assessment is based on the analysis of the construction and operating characteristics of each component or group of components, supported by the knowledge and systematic analysis of ageing effects gained in the operating experience of the industry and in the specific experience of the plant,
285

as well as by what research programmes on ageing mechanisms (NPAR of the NRC, EPRI/DOE and US Owners Groups, mainly) assign to these components or component groups. The assessment also identifies the most suitable monitoring and/or mitigation methods, as direct reference for the subsequent evaluation of maintenance. The conclusions obtained are significant component/ageing mechanism pairs that will constitute the scope of maintenance evaluation. F (YDOXDWLRQ RI PDLQWHQDQFH IRU OLIH PDQDJHPHQW

The purpose of this task is to evaluate the efficiency of maintenance practices for ageing control and/or monitoring, based on the inventory of practices and the systematic evaluation of the suitability of said practices in respect of each component/ageing mechanism pair identified. Aspects to be evaluated are indicated in the following checklist: The degradation mechanisms identified in the component degradation data sheets are easily identified in the maintenance practice data sheets Maintenance actions and their frequency, as defined in plant programmes, are sufficient to detect ageing and control proper operation of the component The subcomponents subject to degradation are properly listed Criteria or limits established for corrective actions are appropriate for the timely mitigation of the degradation, thus preventing a potential loss of function The data required by the programme are sufficient to support the assessment methods All programmes are properly implemented and documented Maintenance efficiency has been proven The corresponding improvement proposals have been prepared

Non-compliance with one of the above items would lead to the preparation of the corresponding improvement proposal.  &RPSDULVRQ RI WKH 0HWKRGRORJLHV

The following comparison outlines the common points (objectives and requirements) of the abovedescribed methodologies, as well as the most significant differences among them. The analysis will first deal with the objectives covered by the methodologies, and follow with their comparison in terms of contents, scope and requirements, in accordance with the sequence common to all three methodologies, i.e.: Selection of scope Ageing assessment Evaluation of current maintenance and monitoring programmes and practices

2EMHFWLYHV Guide NEI 95-10: the purpose of this guide is to interpret and develop on the requirements stated in 10 CFR. Part 54 for license renewal for a period of twenty years maximum, upon expiry of the current license (in the USA, usually corresponds to a forty-year design life). The severity of the 10 CFR. Part 54 requirements is justified by the need to guarantee compliance with the current licensing bases after design life has finished.

286

IAEA Methodology: its purpose is to define actuation requirements to ensure that nuclear safety will not be affected during the plant service life (i.e.. design life) by ageing mechanisms in structures, systems and components. UNESA Methodology: the objective pursued in this methodology is to establish requirements and their terms of application to ensure the safe and economic management of plant life. Comparison of all three methodologies leads to the observation of the following differences in the basic objectives they pursue: Guide NEI 95- 10 IAEA Methodology UNESA Methodology 6HOHFWLRQ RI VFRSH Table 3.4-1 lists the basic criteria and requirements of the selection process in each methodology. The main differences in the selection process of the three methodologies are summarised below: Guide NEI 95-10 Initial selection includes all SSC that are safety-related and those that are not safety-related and whose failure can prevent performance of safety functions, in addition to those supporting compliance with complementary regulatory requirements (see Table 3.4-1). However, ageing assessment is applied only to passive and long-lived structures and components Initial selection includes all SSC that are safety-related and those that are not safety-related and whose failure can prevent performance of safety functions. However, strict and systematic ageing assessment is only applied to the population which, exclusively in accordance to the experience gained by the industry and to the plant specific experience, are subject to failure by ageing and are not covered by appropriate maintenance for ageing mitigation and/or monitoring Initial selection includes safety-related SSC (see section 3.4.a) as well as those that have significant impact on availability, replacement and cost. The entire population selected is submitted to systematic ageing assessment; when ageing effects are severe, maintenance efficiency is assessed $JHLQJ DVVHVVPHQW Table 3.4-2 compares the basic requirements of the ageing assessment process in each of the three methodologies. The analysis of these differences is carried out in two steps: in the first, the assessment of potential ageing and its effect on the components and their functions is studied, while the second examines the assessment criteria for maintenance practices and programmes, and their suitability for ageing control and/or monitoring.
287

Safety assurance against ageing effects during life extension period Safety assurance against ageing effects throughout service life Safe and economic operation during service life

IAEA Methodology

UNESA Methodology

The differences among the three methodologies are summarised below: *XLGH 1(,  The purpose of ageing assessments is to detect ageing mechanisms that could prevent safety function performance in the course of the life extension period. The assessments are aimed at determining the severe effects of ageing on components and structures, and at confirming maintenance efficiency to mitigate and/or monitor said effects, keeping the components in conditions to fulfil the functions imposed in the licensing bases during the life extension period. Lack of sufficient information to accurately assess ageing effects and their evolution requires the establishment of a specific inspection programme for license renewal. The identification and revalidation of the Time Limited Ageing Assessments (TLAAs) are also mandatory for the life extension period. Maintenance evaluation is performed with criteria similar to the ones in the other methodologies, but for the life extension scenario. ,$($ 0HWKRGRORJ\ The purpose of ageing assessments is to detect ageing mechanisms that could prevent safety function performance in the course of the plant service life period The assessments are aimed at determining the severe effects of ageing on components and structures, and at confirming maintenance efficiency to mitigate and/or monitor said effects, keeping components within safety margins for them to fulfil their functions during service life. Lack of sufficient information or of precise knowledge of degradation mechanisms that generate uncertainties in the initial "provisional" assessment (phase I) of ageing effects require detailed analyses (phase II) to clear said uncertainties. Maintenance evaluation is performed with criteria similar to the ones in the other methodologies, but for the service life scenario. 81(6$ 0HWKRGRORJ\ The purpose of ageing assessments is to detect ageing mechanisms that could prevent performance of the functions necessary for safe and economic operation during plant service life. The assessments are aimed at determining ageing effects on components and structures, and at identifying the ones that are severely affected and therefore require a detailed analysis of maintenance practices to confirm ageing control during service life. The entire process is summarised in the component degradation data sheets and in the maintenance practice data sheets that are prepared to facilitate the systematic evaluation of existing practices with the subsequent improvement proposal. Maintenance evaluation is performed with criteria similar to the ones in the other methodologies, but for the service life scenario.

288

7DEOH  6FRSH 6HOHFWLRQ 3URFHVV &RPSDULVRQ

5HTXLUHPHQW SSC selection criteria 1(,  Safety-related, Non safety-related. whose failure could prevent or impede performance of safety functions (includes seismic interactions) SSC supporting compliance with specific regulatory requirements (PC, EQ, PTS, ATWS and SBO) ,$($ 0HWKRGRORJ\ Safety-related (classification of each country) Non safety-related. whose failure could prevent or impede performance of safety functions (includes seismic interactions) 81(6$ 0HWKRGRORJ\ Systems classified as safety-related Systems with significant impact on availability, replacement and cost Components according to criteria of safety, maintenance, replacement or unavailability cons and severe operating conditions

It is recommended to supplement: the deterministic selection with probabilistic analyses, if any. Redundancy and diversity are not considered exclusive Systematic ageing assessment applied. only to components subject to failure by ageing and not covered by efficient maintenance according to operating experience of the plant and of the industry

Additional selection criteria

Redundancy and diversity are not considered exclusive Only passive and long-lived structures and components are submitted to ageing assessment

Redundancy and diversity are not considered exclusive All components selected are submitted to ageing assessment. Only severely affected components are submitted to maintenance evaluation.

Selection of structures and components for ageing assessment

289

7DEOH  &RPSDULVRQ RI $JHLQJ $VVHVVPHQW 3URFHVVHV

5HTXLUHPHQW Analysis of ageing mechanisms (purpose) 1(,  Analyse ageing mechanisms to, determine which could impede or prevent safety function performance during life extension period Demonstrate whether ageing effects are efficiently controlled and/or monitored to ensure function performance within licensing bases during life extension period Review and evaluate available information regarding design, materials, operating conditions, performance, operation and maintenance history and information regarding operating experience and international research on degradation mechanisms affecting each component Lack of such information makes it necessary to use exclusively information based on industry experience, trend calculations or historical analyses; in case these prove to be insufficient, an inspection programme is additionally required. Identification and revalidation for the life extension period of applicable Time Limited Ageing Assessments (TLAAs) are also mandatory ,$($ 0HWKRGRORJ\ Analyse ageing mechanisms to determine which could impede or prevent safety function performance during service life Demonstrate whether ageing effects, are efficiently controlled and/or monitored to ensure function performance within licensing bases during service life Review and evaluate available information regarding design, materials, operating conditions, performance, operation and maintenance history and information regarding operating experience and international research on degradation mechanisms affecting each component Such assessments, which are considered provisional, must systematically take all of the above in consideration for each component or structure, and conclude with the identification of severe ageing effects, location of incidence and the necessary parameters for follow-up 81(6$ 0HWKRGRORJ\ Analyse ageing mechanisms to determine which could impede or prevent performance of the functions necessary for safe and economic operation during service life Demonstrate whether ageing effects are efficiently controlled and/or monitored to ensure performance of the functions necessary for safe and economic operation during service life Review and evaluate available information regarding design, materials, operating conditions, performance, operation and maintenance history and information regarding operating experience and international research on degradation mechanisms affecting each component Such assessments, which are considered provisional, must systematically take all of the above in consideration for each component or structure, and conclude with the identification of severe ageing effects, location of incidence and the necessary parameters for follow-up

Analysis of maintenance efficiency (purpose)

Contents and detail level of ageing assessments

290

7DEOH  &RPSDULVRQ RI $JHLQJ $VVHVVPHQW 3URFHVVHV

5HTXLUHPHQW 1(,  As an alternative to these specific assessments, the Guide admits other options based on strict justification: Evaluation criteria for maintenance practices Analysis based on applicable references (eg, Technical Reports from Owners Groups) Through condition and/or performance monitoring programmes ,$($ 0HWKRGRORJ\ Uncertainties in the knowledge and growth of ageing mechanisms should be completed by more detailed analyses confirming provisional assessments and allowing better definition of trends and monitoring parameters 81(6$ 0HWKRGRORJ\ The assessments include identification of the mitigation and monitoring methods in accordance with industry experience. All of the above is gathered in Component Degradation Sheets to facilitate the maintenance evaluation process The checklist applied to assessment is: Degradation mechanisms identified in Component Degradation Sheets are clearly identified in the Maintenance Practice Data Sheets. The actions and action frequencies established in plant programmes are sufficient to detect ageing effects and control proper component operation Subcomponents that are subject to degradation are listed The criteria and limits established for the implementation of a corrective action ensure timely mitigation of the degradation mechanism that could lead to a possible loss of function

List of necessary attributes to prove the suitability of Aspects evaluated are: the practices: Monitoring The component or structure is included in the Suitability of parameters maintenance programme or instruction analysed Accuracy and reliability of data Ageing effects are detected before failure acquisition techniques and analysis of parameters The practice includes acceptance criteria and ensures the implementation of corrective actions Provenness of ageing assessment whose extent is sufficient in scope and in time techniques Trend monitoring makes appropriate prediction Mitigation. possible Analysis of the efficiency of the The practice is placed under appropriate practices in mitigating degradation administrative controls so that performance of the functions is not at risk

291

7DEOH  &RPSDULVRQ RI $JHLQJ $VVHVVPHQW 3URFHVVHV

5HTXLUHPHQW 1(,  ,$($ 0HWKRGRORJ\ 81(6$ 0HWKRGRORJ\ The data required in the programme are sufficient to support assessment methods All programmes are correctly implemented and documented Maintenance efficiency has been demonstrated Corresponding improvement proposals have been prepared The characteristics and scope of maintenance practices, their frequency and acceptance criteria are summarised in the Maintenance Practice Data Sheets to facilitate this evaluation

292

  &21&/86,216

The methodologies defined in the Guide NEI 95-10 and in the IAEAs Technical Report present contents and requirements that are shallow, preventing the detailed analysis or comprehensive comparison of some aspects. This explains why the comparison was established at a level permitting definition of the requirements and application examples of both documents, avoiding risky interpretations. In the case of Guide NEI 95-10, as mentioned before, there is an open debate between the industry and the NRC regarding some of the requirements and accuracy with respect to 10 CFR Part. 54. The following basic conclusions were obtained based on the above, and as described in Chapter 3 of this report: 1. In respect of the objectives, while the UNESA methodology is designed for the safe and economic management of plant service life, the IAEA methodology confines itself to safety assurance against ageing during service life and the Guide NEI 95-10 to license renewal, assuring safety during the life extension period As regards the scope of the respective programmes, there are no significant differences (see Table 3.4- 1), although the UNESA methodology covers the components and structures with significant impact on availability, complexity of replacement, ALARA effects, and cost of repair or replacement. It should be noted that, within the Selection chapter, the UNESA methodology includes the systematic ageing assessment of all components and structures selected, while the IAEA methodology limits said assessment to the components; and structures pre-selected from industry and plant experience, and the Guide 95-10 restricts ageing assessment to the selected components and structures that are passive and long-lived. 3. With respect to ageing assessment, application examples seem to indicate a certain similarity in their level of detail (with the scope exceptions indicated above), although Guide NEI 95-10 is more comprehensive and rigorous in terms of documentation and presentation. This Guide also requires compensating lacks of information for variables that are representative of ageing effects, and of precise knowledge of their evolution, with a specific inspection programme prior to license renewal. This requirement, which seems sensible for license renewal, is not justified for life management or ageing monitoring programmes during the plant service life, since the evolution of ageing effects is controlled so that additional inspection and monitoring measures are intensified as required. Finally, the evaluation of the suitability of maintenance practices and programmes with respect to the monitoring and control of ageing effects is approached follows very similar steps in all three methodologies (see Section 3.4). Again, the scope exceptions indicated above must be taken into account, as well as the fact that in the case of Guide NEI 95-10 they are limited to passive components, giving credit to the programmes and requirements; (such as the Maintenance Rule) applicable to active components.
  5()(5(1&(6

2.

The documents used as references for this report are listed below. 5.1 5.2 5.3 UNESA, Gua de Seleccin de Componentes. Documento n GVR-EA-GU-00101. UNESA, Gua de Evaluacin de Prcticas de Mantenimiento. Documento n GVR-EAGU-04101. UNESA, Estudios de Mecanismos de Degradacin de las Centrales Piloto. Documentos n GVR-EA/IN-IT-03301 a 03317.

293

5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.8

UNESA, Evaluacin de Prcticas de Mantenimiento de las Centrales Piloto. Documentos n GVR-EA-IT-04401 and 04402. International Atomic Energy Agency, Methodology for Ageing Control in Components Important for Nuclear Safety. Technical Report Series N 338. Nuclear Energy Institute, Industry Guideline for Implementing the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 54. NEI 95-10 Rev. 1, January 2000. US NRC, Working draft Standard Review Plan for License Renewal. WD-SRP-LR, April 2000. US NRC, Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1047. August 1996.

294

$33(1',;  %,%/,2*5$3+< 21 $*(,1* 0$1$*(0(17



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This appendix includes a bibliography listing the various documents identified in the course of the present study. They are classified in two groups: Reports, classified according to author or organisation, with title, date, number of pages, report reference and status mentioned. Where known by the authors, the status of the documents is mentioned, Publications, classified according to their first author, with the company, title, conference or journal, page, date and place mentioned. The identification number corresponds to the identification given in the list of Section 8, which is limited to the references explicitly referred to in the main text of this report. A short summary is given for a selected number of papers or reports. Where reports have been developed in Appendix 2, the information in this column is limited to a reference to the appropriate sheet.  '2&80(176 Pages 296 330,

Reports:

Publications: Pages 331 362.

295

Appendix_6: Rapports ,GHQWLI $XWKRUV 1XPEHU 7LWOH 2UJDQLVDWLRQ 'DWH 5HSRUW 6WDWXV SXEOLVKHU 3DJHV UHIHUHQFH Nuclear Power plant Common Aging EPRI 01/11/1992 EPRI TR-100844 Terminology - Final Report Nuclear Engineering Institute Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Canada Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Czech & Slovak Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Finland Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - France Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Germany Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - India Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) 01/04/1992 6KRUW VXPPDU\

01/04/1992

01/04/1992

01/04/1992

01/04/1992

01/04/1992

296

Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Korea Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Netherlands Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Spain Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Sweden Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - US

Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM)

01/04/1992

01/04/1992

01/04/1992

01/04/1992

01/04/1992

AEOD Engineering Evaluation OECD/NEA Report - A Review of Water Hammer Events after 1985 Completion of the Fatigue Action Plan Cracking in Feed Water piping system Pressuriser surge line thermal stratification Service Water System Problems affecting safety-related equipment (July 18, 1989) + Supplement 1 US NRC US NRC US NRC US NRC

01/02/1991 AEOD/E91-01

SECY-95-245 16/10/1979 NRC-IE Bulletin N79-13 20/12/1988 NRC-Bulletin N88-11 04/04/1990 NRC-Generic Letter 89-13 24/03/1993 NRC-Information Notice N93-20 13/06/1991 NRC-Information Notice N91-38

Thermal cracking of Feed Water US NRC piping to steam generators Thermal stratification in Feed Water US NRC piping system

297

Thermal stress in piping connected to reactor coolant system (June 22, 1988) + Supplement 1 (June 24, 1988) + Supplement 2 (August 4, 1988) + Supplement 3 Unexpected piping movement attributed to thermal stratification Aging Management Evaluation for Class 1 Piping and Associated Pressure Boundary Components

US NRC

11/04/1989 NRC-Bulletin N88-08

US NRC WOG Report

07/10/1988 NRC-Information Notice N80-88 01/08/1996 Westinghouse Report 01/02/1997 Westinghouse Report

Aging Management Evaluation for WOG Report Class 2,3, and Nonsafety Class Valve Bodies, Pump Casings, Piping and Supports, and Ductwork Aging Management Evaluation for Electrical Distribution, Control, and Monitoring Equipment Aging Management Evaluation for Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Structure Aging Management Evaluation for Seismic Category 1 Structures License Renewal Evaluation: Aging Management for Reactor Coolant System Supports Abbott S.L. , B.A. Bishop, S.L. Anderson, M. Blaszkiewicz, E. Blocher, C. Child, D. Kurek, T.R. Mager AMES Steering Committee Atkinson I. Aging management evaluation for reactor pressure vessel WOG Report

01/07/1997 Westinghouse Report 01/12/1996 Westinghouse Report 01/02/1997 Westinghouse Report 01/02/1997 Westinghouse Report 01/05/1997 Westinghouse Report

WOG Report

WOG Report WOG Report

WOG Report

Important Items of Ageing Research AMES Report Continuous on-line monitoring of NPPs components AEA Technology, European Commission

20 November 1998 01/12/1995 EUR 18333 EN

Rev.1

Bedzikian G.

Tenue en service des cuves des EDF tranches REP 900 Mwe. Dossier de synthse

01/10/1997 D4002-4210/97.0676

298

Benchmark Qualification Group (qualification of electro-mechanical equipment) Benchmark Qualification Group (qualification of electrome-chanical equipment)

Guideline for the evaluation of European practices on the harsh environment qualification of electrical and I&C equipment A comparison of European practices for the qualification of electrical and I&C equipment important to safety for LWR nuclear power plant

Nuclear science and technology, European Commission Nuclear science and technology, European Commission SANDIA Laboratories SANDIA Laboratories

1998 EUR 17563 EN

1996 EUR 16246 EN

Berg R. , J. Shao, G. Aging Management Guideline for Krencicki, R. Giachetti Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Stationary Batteries Berg R., M. Stroinski, Aging Management Guideline for R. Giachetti Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Battery Chargers, Inverters and Uninterruptable Power Supplies Bolvin M. Projet Dure de vie - Tours des arorfrigrants principaux - Rapport de synthse Aging management guideline for commercial nuclear power plantspumps

mars-94

SAND93-7071

Feb 94

SAND93-7046

Final report

EDF

avr-92

Ref EDF: F92SE1338 SAND-93-7045

Booker S. , D. Katz, N. Daavettila, D. Lehnert Carlson R. W. Carlson R.W.

SANDIA Laboratories

mars-94

Aging Management Evaluation of WOG Report the residual heat removal system Aging Management Evaluation of EPRI the Residual Heat Removal System for Westinghouse PWRs EDF DSIN

01/03/1995 Westinghouse Report mars-96 TR-105135

Final Report

Chauvel D., M. Bolvin Dure de vie des tours de rfrigrants Chevet P.F. Projet "Dure de vie" des REP Churier-Bossenec H.

31/03/1992 F92SE1018 Ref. EDF: F93SE2049 02/09/1996 E-N-M-RE96,1054 sept-93

Vieillissement des produits mouls EDF/Septen du circuit primaire principal. Coudes chauds des tranches 900 Mwe. Synthse des tudes

Internal report (restricte d)

The reports presents the justification of the inservice acceptance of cast elbows used in the hot legs of the main primary system of French 900 Mwe NPPs, for a 40 years operation. It presents the physical aging process, the previsions of toughness reduction, and the fast fracture analyses made to demonstrate the acceptability of cast elbows. A leak-before-break evaluation is included as a complement.

299

Clark R.L.

Effects of aging and service wear on ORNL main steam isolation valves and valve operators

mars-96

NUREG CR-6246 ; ORNL-6814

CO/CP

Operating feedback of EDFs cooling EDF towers: civil work and equipment Conklin J.E. Aging Management Evaluation for WOG Report Heat Exchangers Conte M., G. Deletre, Approche des problmes de sret CEA J.Y. Henry lis au vieillissement des composants des ecntrales nuclaires Davies L.M. , A.D. Boothroyd, L. Ianko Aspects of Plant Life Assurance and IAEA Report Plant Life Management

31/08/1989 F89RT0035 01/05/1997 Westinghouse Report 30/08/1988 Ref. EDF: E1989E130512

Int. Conf. On Paper IAEA-CNthe Nuclear 59/40 Power Option, Vienna, 5-9 Sep. 94 30/03/1998 CONDE-MON97-0065F dc-94 TR-103858

De Bauw K.

Arbre de dcision pour les alarmes vibratoires des turbines nuclaires Doroshuk B.W., B.M. Nuclear Plant Life Cycle Tilden, D.R. Hostetler, Management Information Systems C.A. Negrin Doroshuk B.W., B.M. Tilden, D.R. Hostetler, D.J. Klein, C.A. Negrin Calvert Cliffs NPP Life Cycle Management License Renewal Program: System, Structure and Component Screening

Laborelec Report EPRI

Final Report This report describes and documents the "screening method" and procedures to determine those systems, structures and components within the scope of licence renewal for the Calvert Cliffs NPP License Renewal Application. This work was performed based on the initial Licence Renewal published in 1991, however the results are of value since scoping is similar in many aspects between the initial and current license renewal rules. Final Report

EPRI Report

September 1994

TR-103158

Doroshuk B.W., G.R. Calvert Cliffs NPP Life Cycle Doughty, S.J. Management/License Renewal Marmaroff Program: Nuclear Plant Asset Management Case Study Doroshuk B.W., M.E. Calvert Cliffs NPP Life Cycle Bowman, S.A. Hardin, Management / License Renewal M.D. Lusby Program: RPV Evaluation

EPRI

sept-95

TR-104615

EPRI

sept-95

TR-104509

Final Report

300

Dorosshuk B.W., G.R. Calvert Cliffs NPP Life Cycle Doughty Management/License Renewal Program: Steam generator decision analysis case study Dragunov Y.G. Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Russia

EPRI

mars-96

TR-104732

Final Report

OKB Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM)

01/04/1992

Feinroth H., R.S. Walker, C.A. Negin, M.A. Rowden, J.R. Kraemer

Regulatory Considerations for Grove Engineering, extending the Life of Nuclear Power National Environm. Plants Studies Project of the Atomic Ind. Forum WOG Report

01/12/1986 AIF/NESP-040

Forsyth D.R., B.L. Aging Management Evaluation for Silverblatt, T.R. Reactor Internals Mager, W.A. Bamford, J.A. Tortorice, J.T. Crane, I.L.W. Wilson Fournier I. Recherche des dfaillances sur le circuit primaire des tranches amricaines Belgian approach to steam generator tube plugging for primary water stress corrosion cracking Managing aging in nuclear power plants: insights from NRC maintenance team inspection reports 16th steering committee minutes of meeting Baffle-Former Bolt Program for the Westinghouse Owners Group Phase 1: Plant categorization

01/04/1997 Westinghouse Report

EDF-DER Report

25-avr-90 HP-16/90,16

In the context of the Sysfac project, the report presents the synthesis of the localisation and origin of fatigue degradations observed on US PWR NPPs.

Frederick G., P. Hernalsteen Fresco A., M. Subudhi, W. Gunther, E. Grove, J. Taylor, S.K. Aggarwal Frog members: P. Namy Goossen J.E., J.C. Matarazzo, R.J. Maceyak, C.H. Boyd Guerra D.

Belgatom (TEE/LB)

01/03/1999 EPRI NP-6626SD dc-93 NUREG CR-5812 / BNL-NUREG 52309

NRC Brookhaven Nat. Lab.

FROG, TEE Report WOG Report

29/10/1998 CNTKCD/6F/154413 01/08/1993 Westinghouse Report 15/04/1994 F94RT0344

Arorfrigrant - Etude conomique EDF sur la maintenance du corps d'change.

301

Guillas J.

Vieillissement des condensateurs electrolytiques hors tension et sous tension. Elements techniques pour l'volution de la doctrine de maintenance des centrales nuclaires

EDF

juil-96

Ref EDF: E1996H502253

Restricte d

Hasemian H.M., D.W. Long term performance and aging Mitchell, R.E. Fain, characteristics of nuclear plant K.M. Petersen pressure transmitters Hassan M., S. Uryas'ev, W.E. Vesely Heep W., P. Vgtlin, P. Ami, D. Steudler Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses in aging risk-based prioritizations Guide Manual for Maintenance Certification of Structural Engineering

NRC

mars-93

Ref. EDF: E1995E100154 BNL-NUREG49610 The engineering structures classified according to Guidelines R04 of the Swiss Nuclear Inspectorate in BK1 are considered. The engineering structures considered are established in the safety report. The maintenance plan addresses structures and components which can decisively impair the functions relevant to safety as a result of the aging process of technical material. Ref. EDF: F97SE3065 Ref. EDF: F95SE1840, F95SE1838 Rapport d'essais

Brookhaven National Lab. Group of Swiss Nuclear Power Plant Operators

1993 31/10/1997

Huet M.

Huet M.

Essais de vieillissement prolong sur une baie bulliomtre et deux afficheurs Essais d'irradiation de vieillissement sur des liaisons coaxiales des chanes neutroniques intermdiaires CNI

CEFSE

janv-96

NMEL

07/04/1995, 20-01-1995

Ithurralge G. Kaushansky M.M., K.R. Balkey, B.A. Bishop, T.A. Meyer Kisisel I.T., R.L. Kurtz, J. Sinnappan Kisisel I.T., R.L. Kurtz, J. Sinnappan, T.V. Narayanan Klanica F., C. Gay

Projet "Dure de vie" - Rapport de EDF constat sur le puits de cuve - REP. The nuclear power plant aging 5/POWERGEN-C management process POWER-GEN Europe'93. Volume 6: nuclear power plant operations and maintenance Plant systems / components aging management - 1993 Plant systems/ components aging management 1994 1993 PVP Conf. 1994 press. Vess. And piping Conf.

juil-93

Ref EDF: F89SE1480 janv-93 Ref. EDF: E1994H200730

25-29 Jul CONF-9307/021993 Vol.252 1994 CONF-940613

Proceedi ngs

License Renewal Evaluation: Aging WOG Report Management for Class 1 Piping and Associated Pressure Boundary Components

01/08/1996 Westinghouse Report

302

Lacoste A.C. Langlois R.

REP - Programme "dure de vie"

DSIN

EDF R2C project: results of the EDF studies related to the observation of the behavior and the ageing of the process control equipment installed in EDF 900 Mwe PWR units Aging Management Evaluation for safety Class 1 Piping Supports Aging Management Evaluation for Reactor Coolant System Supports Aging Management Evaluation of Reactor Coolant System Supports for Westinghouse PWRs Non-destructive fatigue damage assessment using ultrasonic and magnetic measurement on metallic materials WOG Report

18/10/1996 Ref. EDF: F96SE2658 01/08/1995 EPRI Congress Ref. EDF: E1995E100810

Lapay W.S., R.E. Funkhouser, C.C. Kim, R.T. Jozwiak Lapay W.S.; C.Y. Yang Lapsay W.S., C.Y. Yang Le Brun A., F. Billy

01/07/1999 Westinghouse Report 01/03/1995 Westinghouse Report mars-96 TR-105272

WOG Report EPRI

Final Report The paper deals with indicators of damage of metallic structures based on non-destructive measuring methods. Degradation mechanisms are basically due to mechanical fatigue damage, thermal aging, radiation embrittlement and corrosion. The paper exposes the results obtained using two types of techniques: magnetic and acoustic, with a view to assessing damage by mechanical fatigue.

EDF Report

October 1993 94NB00056, ISSN 1161-0611

Lee B.S.

The effects of aging on BWR core isolation cooling systems Public perception on ageing plants Approche conceptuelle des problmes de sret poss par le vieillissement des centrales nuclaires

Brookhaven National Lab.

oct-94

NUREG CR-6087 / BNL-NUREG 52390

Lee T.R. Levy D.B. , C. Feltin

IAEA Congress

Ref. EDF: E1992E130094 01/01/1988 Ref. EDF: E1988H548695

fvr-92

Liu W.C. , P.T. Kuo, S.S. Lee Meyer L.C. Moinereau D., J. Cl. Masson

Aging management of nuclear power NRC plant contaiments for license reneval Nuclear Plant Aging research on NRC high pressure injection systems Comportement en Fatigue thermique Collection de notes de composants de centrales internes de la DER, nuclaires EDF

sept-97 aot-89

NUREG 1611

Ref. EDF: E1990E150065 13/06/1905 ISSN 1161-0611

303

Monteiro P.J.M., J.P. Moehle

Stiffness of reinforced concrete walls resisting in-place shear. Tier 2: Aging and durability of concrete used in NPPs. Aging of control and service air compressors and dryers used in nuclear power plants Nuclear safety - Diagnosis, safety and aging of concrete structures in NPPs - Thermal properties and mechanical behaviour of the Penly high resistance concrete ORNL NRC

EPRI

dc-95

Ref. EDF: E1997E100329

Final Report

Moyers J.C.

juil-90

NUREG/CR-5519-Vol.1 ORNL-6607-Vol.1 Ref. EDF: F97SE2860

Nad L.

NTMS

juin-95

Namy P. Narayanan T.V.

RHRS elbow cracking at Civaux 1 Framatome Criteria for Approving Equipment for WRC Bulletin Continued Operation

11/08/1998 FRA OG 536 WRC Bulletin 380

145 reports were reviewed and various experts consulted. The report proposes conclusions and recommendations for ASME Code-related activities related to continued operation methods and criteria.

Naus D.J. , C.B. Aging of concrete containment Oland, B. Ellingwood, structures in nuclear power plants Y. Mori, E.G. Arndt Naus D.J., C.B. Oland, B.R. Ellingwood Newton R.A., T.A. Meyer Nichols R.W. Report on aging of nuclear power plant reinforced structures

ORNL

1992 CONF-920541-2

NRC Johns Hopkins Univ.

mars-96

NUREG:CR-6424

Life Cycle Management - License WOG Report Renewal Program - Program Plan A state of-the-art review of EC continuous monitoring and surveillance techniques in relation to reactor pressure circuit integrity Safety aspects of the ageing and maintenance of NPP (Symposium overview) NPP ageing and life extension safety perspectives Statistical models for thermal ageing of steel materials in NPP IAEA Report

01/05/1996 1991 EUR-13409

Novak S., M. Podest Pachner J. Persoz M.

janv-87 Ref EDF: E1988H547233 fvr-92 Ref EDF: E1992E130091 mai-96 Ref. EDF: E1996H400932

EDF

304

Ramirez I.M., M.T. Preparatory work for an indicative Tecnatom Aguado Esteban, L.T. programme related to ageing issues Roa, D. Foster, M. to be handled by the WGCS Sladovic

December 1997

Study contract Final B4Report 3070/96/000295/ MAR/C2

The aim of the report is to collect the work on ageing conducted by the international organisations, research institutions, utilities, etc., identifying and evaluating the objectives, progress and results. The programs related with ageing of LWRs are analysed, detecting the status and the monitoring techniques and ISI activities performed to support continuous operation of components, as well as identifying the technical issues that need R&D effort and work on their resolution.

Rotival

Analyse de linfluence, sur le vieillissement des tranches, des modes dexploitation et de gestion

EDF

27/08/1987 F87SE1176

Rousseau M. Schinazi C.

REP de 1300 et 1450 Mwe DSIN Enceintes de confinement Rapport de runion relatif la TEE Report prsentation des rsultats d'inspection US d'une barrire thermique de pompe primaire Doel 3 Fissuration des barrires thermiques TEE Report et autres composants des pompes primaires. Note d'information sur l'tat de la problmatique en France et proposition d'action pour les centrales belges. CSNI, PWG-3 Technical Position CSNI Document. Plant Ageing Management. Providing a technical basis for long-term operation of light water reactors. Policy and effective management of OECD/NEA Report nuclear power plant life management Review of industry efforts to manage Idaho National pressurized water reactor feed water Engineering nozzle, piping and feed ring cracking Laboratory and wall thinning

09/07/1998 Ref. EDF: F98SE2640 08/02/1999 KCD/4NT/20317/ 00

Schinazi C., J.M. Cherasse

07/04/1997 CNTKCD/4NT/7450/0 0

Schulz H.

May 30, 2000

Secretariat of OECD/NEA

15 April, 1999

First General Framework. draft, version 5

Shah V.N., A.G. Ware, A.M. Porter

01/03/1997 NUREG/CR-6459

305

Shah V.N., S.K. Smith, U.P. Sinda Simola K.

Insights for Aging management of light water reactor components: Metal Containment

Idaho Nat. Eng. Lab.

mars-94

NUREG/CR5314-V5

Techn. Report

The role of reliability methods in NPP ageing management Stirzel C.W., J.E. Aging management Evaluation for Conklin Pressure Vessels Suzuki M., H. Arai, T. Answer to the National Profil Hidaka Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension - Japan

WOG Report JAERI, JAPEIC, Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM)

janv-98 Ref. EDF: E1999E100177 01/07/1997 Westinghouse Report 01/04/1992

Syvester R.L., M.A. Gray Toman G., R. Gazdzinski, E. OHearn Toman G., R. Gazdzinski, K. Schuler Valibus L. Vandenbussche R.

Aging management Evaluation for WOG Report Pressurizers Aging Management Guideline for SANDIA Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Laboratories Motor Control Centers Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Electrical Switchgear SANDIA Laboratories

01/07/1996 Westinghouse Report Feb 94 SAND93-7069

Final report

juil-93

SAND93-7027

French perspective on life EDF-Septen management of NPP Rvaluation de la dure de vie TEE Report qualifie des indicateurs de position CROSBY Evaluations of core melt frequency NRC effects due to component aging and maintenance Integrity Evaluation of the Primary Loop piping including the effects of thermal aging using LBB technology for a typical EDF 3 loop NPP Westinghouse

20/03/1996 01/06/1994 KCD4/4NT/7770/ 01 juin-90 NUREG/CR-5510 SAIOC-89/1744 EDF Cl. Nr: F96SE0725

Vesely W.E., R.E. Kurth, S.M. Scalzo Vora V.V., D.E. Prager, D.C. Bhowmick, K.R. Hsu

dc-95

Wagner-Rousseau D. Mcanismes de vieillissement et d'endommagement dans quelques alliages pour application nuclaire WGCS Compte-rendu de la runion du Working Group Codes and Standards Aging Management Evaluation for Steam Generators

Thse CNRS / Ecole Centrale EC - DG XI

15-janv-99

30/06/1998 CNTKCD/4AR/8525/0 0 01/05/1997 Westinghouse Report

Whiteman G.W.

WOG Report

306

Wolford A.J., C.L. Atwood, W.S. Roesener

Aging data analysis and risk assessment: development and demonstration study Assessment of Aging Countermeasures of Electric Utility Compa-nies for Nuclear Power Plants and Future Appro-aches to Management of Plant Aging

Idaho Nat. Eng. Lab.

Aug 92

NUREG/CR-5378 Techn. EGG-2567 Report The paper describes the key points of the Report on "Basic Policy on Aged Nuclear Power Plants" issued by the MITI in Japan. The assessment of reports provided by Electric Utility Companies is addressed and future approaches to management of plant aging are presented including: comprehensive facility management system, development of technical codes/standards in response to aging, and promotion of technology development. The objective of the report is to provide a survey of national standards used in European countries to perform and to evaluate test results in order to describe degradation of reactor pressure vessel steels and welds of light water reactors during service. This document is the second of a series, which is being developed by a multidisciplinary ASME research task force. Vol.2 is the first specific application directed at the inservice testing of LWR nuclear power plant components, particularly for pumps and valves.

Agency of Natural resources and Energy Ministry of International Trade and Industry

Feb. 1999

Survey of existing, planned and required standards

AMES Report

1995 CD-NA-16313 EN Public

Risk-Based Inservice Testing: Development of Guidelines

ASME Research Report

1996 CRTD-Vol. 40-2

Public

A REVIEW OF FORMULAS FOR PREDICTING IRRADATON EMBRITTLEMENT OF REACTOR VESSEL MATERIALS EFFECT OF IRRADATION ON WATER REACTOS INTERNALS Common ageing terminology

CEA

nov-96

CD-NA-16455EN-C

CEA/TECNATOM/V juin-97 TT Common NEA, CEC July 1999 and IAEA report CSN EPRI 1996 juil-97

CD-NA-17694EN-C A glossary useful for understanding and managing the ageing of Nuclear Power Plant systems, structures and components. GS-1.10 TR-107451 Final Report Final Report

Revisiones Peridicas de la Seguridad de centrales nucleares A Risk-Informed Flaw Tolerance Approach for Increasing ASME Section XI, App. G PT Limits Cable Aging Management Program for DC Cook NPP Unit 1 and 2

EPRI

mai-97

TR-106687

307

Calvert Cliffs NPP Life Cycle Management/License Renewal Program:System, Structure and Component Screening Calvert Cliffs Nuclear plant License Renewal Application Technical basis Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Application Condition Monitoring Program for 4kV Environmentally Qualified Motors Crack Growth and Microstructural Characterization of Allow 600 Head Penetration Materials Demonstration of the Management of Aging Effects for B&W Pressurizers Demonstration of the Management of Aging Effects for Reactor Coolant System Piping Effect of NPP, Thermal Stability, and Corrosion Properties of Allow 718 and 718-Based Superalloys End-of-Cycle-11 Examinations at Farley Unit 2 EPRI Fatigue Management Handbook, Vols. 1-4 EPRI PWR Fuel Cladding Corrosion (PFCC) Model, Vol.2: Corrosion Theory and Rate Equation Development Evaluation of Cable Polymer Aging Through Indenter Testing of In-Plant and Laboratory Aged Specimens Evaluation of Environmental Qualification Options and Costs for Electrical Equipment for a License Renewal Period for Calvert Cliffs NPP

EPRI

janv-95

TR-103158

Final Report

EPRI EPRI EPRI

janv-98 janv-98 sept-97

TR-106843 TR-11031-CD TR-107524

Interim Report

Final Report Interim Report

EPRI

mai-96

TR-105958

EPRI

janv-98

TR-106106

EPRI

juil-97

TR-106931

Final Report Final Report

EPRI

mai-96

TR-104829

EPRI EPRI

sept-97 sept-95

Final Report TR-104534-V1- Compute V4 r Manual TR-105387 Final Report

TR-107904

EPRI

mai-97

EPRI

janv-97

TR-104705

Final Report Final Report

EPRI

janv-95

TR-104063

308

Evaluation of Thermal Aging Embrittlement for Cast Austenitic Stainless Steel Components in LWR Reactor Coolnt Systems Evaluation of Thermal Fatigue Effects on Systems Requiring Aging Management Review for License Renewal for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Generic License Renewal Technical Issues Summary I&C Life Cycle Management Plan Methodology, Vols. 1 and 2 IASCC Susceptibility of Low-Fluence Stainless Steels Evaluated by InFlux Slow Strain Rate Tests Instrumentation and Control Upgrade Evaluation Methodology, Vols. 1 and 2 Microstructural Characterization of RPV Steels: Phase 1 (Joint EPRICRIEPI RPV Embrittlement Studies) Multivariable Analysis of the Effects of Li, H2 and pH on PWR Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking Natural Versus Artificial Aging of Electrical Components NPP License Renewal Environmental Compliance Program Plan Manual NPP License Renewal Environmental Life Cycle Management Plan Manual: License Renewal Envrionmental Compliance Nuclear Plant Life Cycle Management Economics

EPRI

janv-98

TR-106092

Final Report

EPRI

janv-98

TR-107515

EPRI EPRI EPRI

janv-98 mars-96 janv-97

TR-107521 TR-105555-V1V2 TR-106299 Final Report Final Report Final Report Final Report Final Report Interim Report Final Report Final Report

EPRI

janv-97

TR-104963

EPRI

juil-97

TR-107535

EPRI

janv-97

TR-105656

EPRI EPRI

sept-97 oct-94

TR106845 TR-104291

EPRI

mars-96

TR-104733

EPRI

juil-95

TR-104326

Final Report

309

Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Environmental Compliance Program Donald C.Cook Nuclear Plant Case Study, Phase 2 Strategic Planning and Data Gathering Nuclear Power Plant License renewal Environmental Compliance Program: Donald C. Cook NPP Case Study. Phase 1 Operating NPP Fatigue Assessments Proceedings: Specialists Meeting on Environmental Degradation of Alloy 600 Property Damage Risk Assessment Scoping Study for South Texas Project Electric Generating Station Recommendations for and Effective Flow-Accelerated Corrosion Program Reduction of Oxidation Induction Time Testing to Practice as a Life Assessment Technique for Cable Insulation RPV Thermal Annealing Assessment for Two PWR Plant Designs Statistical Analysis of Steam Generator Tube Degradation: Additional Topics Steam Generator Tube Fatigue Evaluation Stress Corrosion Cracking of RPV Steels Supplemental RPV Surveillance Program Guidelines: Joint EPRICRIEPI RPV Embrittlement Studies

EPRI

janv-98

TR-107868

EPRI

sept-97

TR-106844

Final Report

EPRI EPRI

sept-95 mars-97

TR-104691 TR-104898

Final Report Proceedi ngs Final Report Final Report Final Report

EPRI

sept-97

TR-108261

EPRI

mars-97

NSAC-202L-R1

EPRI

janv-97

TR-106370

EPRI

juil-95

TR-104934

Final Report Final Report Final Report Final Report Final Report

EPRI

dc-94

TR-103566

EPRI EPRI EPRI

mars-97 mars-97 dc-94

TR-107263 TR-103160 TR-103086

310

A Resource Guide to Nuclear Plant Life-Cycle Management

EPRI Report

01/12/1993 TR-103054

Forecasting the useful economic life of a nuclear unit and addressing the complementary issue of licensing renewal are complex undertakings. This guide provides a resource document that emphasises the technical elements of LCM, focusing on determining adequate maintenance programs, and identifying data and records necessary to support them. Age-related degradation inspections (ARDI) will be required for license renewal in some cases. This report documents an approach developed by BGE to determine when an ARDI is required and establishes a standard process to be used to develop inspection requirements for specific component/ageing mechanisms combinations. The ARDI is then applied to five piping systems and on structure systems to demonstrate the process. Final The effect of most age-related degradation Report mechanisms were found to be covered . Exception are: aggressive chemical attack on below-grade BWR containment concrete structures or corrosion of reinforced steel or embedded steel in belowgrade BWR containment steel structures; and corrosion of inaccessible liner plate regions, or local corrosion of embedded containment shells and free-standing steel containments. This report is one of a series of reports documenting an extensive, 4-year examination of the Monticello (BWR) Plant for operation beyond the initial 40-year licensed term. Ageing management evaluations of critical systems, components, and structures, econmic analyses and analysis of plant data were undertaken. This study confirmed the feasibility of operating Monticello for 70 years or more. Final The effect of age-related degradation mechanisms Report were found to be covered by limits established by the CLB or managed by current program of incpection, testing, repair, refurbishment and analytical evaluation.

Age-Related Degradation Inspection EPRI Report Method and Demonstration on Behalf of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant License Renewal Application

27/05/1998 TR-107514

BWR Containment License Renewal EPRI Report Industry Report, Rev.1

mars-95

TR-103840

BWR Pilot Plant Life Extension Study at the Monticello Plant

EPRI Report

01/05/1987 NP-5181 M

BWR Pressure Vessel License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1

EPRI Report

mars-95

TR-103836

311

BWR Primary Coolant Pressure EPRI Report Boundary License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1

mars-95

TR-103843

Final The effect of age-related degradation mechanisms Report were found to be covered by limits established by the CLB or managed by current program of incpection, testing, repair, refurbishment and analytical evaluation. Final The effect of most age-related degradation Report mechanisms were found to be covered . The exception were related to creviced locations and to difficulty of inservice examinations for these locations. BG&Es Life-Cycle Management Program was implemented in 1991, to achieve successful long term operations of Calvert Cliffs. The report documents the lessons learned by BG&E in this process, both administrative and technical. This is the information required by 10CFR54 in order to extend the operating license of Calvert Cliffs beyond its current 40-year licensed term of operation. It is the first complete license renewal application of a commercial NPP and likely to be the first license renewal application submitted to the NRC. CD-Rom limited to EPRI NPG member This product is a users guide for a CD-ROM which contains 100 documents consisting of the Calvert Cliffs License Renewal Methodology and NRC SER, procedures for evaluation of systems and structures, Ageing management Review Reports for systems, structures and commodities, license renewal application technical reports... Issuance of the NRC Final Safety Evaluation for the Calvert Cliffs license renewal application maks a significant milestone in the demonstration of a viable and predictanle process for nuclear power plant license renewal and preserving the nuclear option in the United States. Final This report documents the plant-specific process Report used for conducting the integrated plant assessment for aging and time-limited ageing analyses. This report also incorporates the resolution of comments and request for additional information for the NRC final safety evaluation.

BWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1

EPRI Report

mars-95

TR-103839

Calvert Cliffs LCM Implementation and Lessons learned

EPRI Report

31/12/1999 TR-107544

Calvert Cliffs License Renewal Application

EPRI Report

21/11/1997 MI-107543

Calvert Cliffs License Renewal EPRI Report Application Technical Basis (Rev.1)

31/12/1999 TN-110163

Calvert Cliffs License Renewal Application: NRC Final Safety Evaluation

EPRI Report

30/06/2001 TR-107542

Calvert Cliffs NPP Integrated Plant Assessment Methodology

EPRI Report

juil-97

TR-104734

312

Calvert Cliffs NPP life cycle EPRI Report management /license renewal program: containment system component evaluation and program evaluation Calvert Cliffs NPP Life Cycle Management-License Renewal Program Structure Scoping and Aging Management Review EPRI Report

mars-95

TR-104777

Final Report

mars-96

TR-105420V1,V2,V3

Final This report documents the identification of Report structures and their components within the scope of license renewal for Calvert Cliffs and the results of the aging management evaluation for these structures and components. There are three volumes which provide the results of scoping and component aging management evaluations of six structures: containment, condensate storage tank, fuel oil storage tank enclosure, turbine building, intake structure, and auxiliary building structure. Final The effect of most age-related degradation Report mechanisms were found to be covered . Exception are: aggressive chemical attack on below-grade Class I concrete structures, corrosion of inaccessible or below grade, Class I steel structures, and intergranular stress corrosion cracking or crevice corrosion of austenitic stainless steel liners of Class I concrete structures ou austenitic stainless steel tanks. This report documents industry technical positions on generic license renewal technical issues. For each issue, the background is reviewed, the industry position is presented, and the technical basis for the industry position is provided. This report updates a previous report (EPRI TR107521). The LCM Primer provides information on the background, developments, issues, and sources of information on Life Cycle Management. LCM is the systematic integration of activities that determine the useful life. It combines a diverse set of issues: economics, operations, material aging, licensing, environmental, public relation, spent fuel disposal, low level waste and others.

Class 1 Structure License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1

EPRI Report

mars-95

TR-103842

Generic License Renewal Technical EPRI Report Issue Summary (Rev.1)

01/09/1999 TR-110902-SI

LCM primer

EPRI Report

01/12/1998 TR-106109

313

License renewal Industry Report Summary

EPRI Report

22/06/1998 TR-104305

This report summarises the conclusions and technical findings of the 10 license renewal industry reports, and the NRC staff position on these issues. It includes a comparison with the results reported in Nureg 1557, and identifies significant differences on license renewal technical issues. This report documents the initial results of the NEI License Renewal Implementation Guideline Task Force over the period August 1994 to July 1995 to develop guidance for complying with the technical requirements of the License Renewal Rule 10 CFR 54. This EPRI report also contains an "Identification of potential time-limited ageing analyses inherent in the common codes and standards and generic regulatory compliance documents for NPPs". Final The effect of age-related degradation mechanisms Report were found to be covered by limits established by the CLB or managed by current program of inspection, testing, repair, refurbishment and analytical evaluation. This report documents interim results of two life extension pilot studies at Surry and Monticello. Final This report summarises license renewal evaluation Report activities from the Monticello Lead Plant License renewal project that were conducted between October 1988 and December 1992,The lessons learnd during this first plant specific license renewal evaluation were instrumental in leading to a change in the License Renewal Rule (10CFR54). This brief report and CD-ROM contain the complete Oconee License Renewal Application submitted to the NRC in early July, 1998, It is the second License Renewal Application submitted for a commercial nuclear power plant.

License Renewal Technical Implementation Guide

EPRI Report

01/08/1995 TR-105090

Low-voltage environ-mentally qualified cable license renewal industry report, Rev.1

EPRI Report

mars-95

TR-103841

LWR Plant Life Extension Monticello Lead Plant License Renewal Project: Summary Report

EPRI Report EPRI Report

01/01/1987 (592p) janv-97 TR-103963

Oconee License Renewal Application

EPRI Report

01/03/2001 TR-111030-CD

314

PWR Containment Structures License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1

EPRI Report

mars-95

TR-103835

Final The effect of most age-related degradation Report mechanisms were found to be covered . Exception are: aggressive chemical attack on below-grade PWR containment concrete structures or corrosion of reinforced steel or embedded steel in belowgrade PWR containment steel structures; and corrosion of inaccessible, or below-grade steel, steel structures including both liners for PWR concrete containment and freestanding steel shells for PWR steel containment.

PWR pilot plant life extension study at Surry Unit 1: Phase 2 PWR Reactor Coolant System License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1

EPRI Report EPRI Report

01/03/1989 NP-6232-SD (451p) mars-95 TR-103844

Final The effect of age-related degradation mechanisms Report were found to be covered by limits established by the CLB or managed by current program of incpection, testing, repair, refurbishment and analytical evaluation. Final The effect of most age-related degradation Report mechanisms were found to be covered . The exception were related to stress relaxation effects on bolts, pins and fasteners that are not readily accessible for visual examination, and IASCC of austenitic stainless steel internals subjected to relatively-high levels of tensile stress, neutron fluence and aggressive coolant environment. Final The effect of age-related degradation mechanisms Report were found to be covered by limits established by the CLB or managed by current program of incpection, testing, repair, refurbishment and analytical evaluation. This report documents a review of all NRC generic communications to determine those that involve both long-lived passive components and structures requiring ageing management review and an agerelated degradation mechanism or ageing effect, and therefore may be potentially applicable to license renewal.

PWR Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1

EPRI Report

mars-95

TR-103838

PWR Reactor Pressure Vessel License Renewal Industry Report, Rev.1

EPRI Report

mars-95

TR-103837

Review of NRC Generic Communications for License Renewal

EPRI Report

12/03/1998 GC-107944

315

Risk-Informed Inservice Inspection Evaluation Procedure

EPRI Report

May 1997 June 1996 Mai 1997

TR-106706

Interim report

This report describes evaluation procedures for using risk to define inspection locations for safety significant piping in nuclear power plants. PSA insights, deterministic evaluations, and plant inservice experience are integrated in a practical format. Procedures in the report are intended to support ongoing pilot plant application studies. Lessons learned will be incorporated into a final report. This is one of several reports documenting the results of a life extension study for Virginia Powers Surry Unit 1. These studies determined that a 60year operating period was technically achievable and economically attractive. This report documents the identification and evaluation of time ageing analysis for Plant Hatch. A complete design basis review will be performed in order to identify calculations, evaluations, analyses, committments and any other documentation, which involves the assessment of the functionality of a plant system, structure or component for a specified time period.

Surry Unit 1 Plant Life Extension Program

EPRI Report

01/09/1987 NP-5289SP

Time Limited Ageing Analysis (TLAA)

EPRI Report

01/12/1999 TR-110042

Utility Activities for Nuclear Power Plant Life Cycle Management and License Renewal

EPRI Report

sept-95

TR-104751

Final This is a key EPRI LCM report which provides Report guidance to nuclear utilities on steps to take, industry activities undertaken and in progress, and products developed for LCM and License Renewal activities. It provides information to assist utilities in establishing LCM programs.

Research and Training programme in the field of nuclear energy (1998 to 2002) Answer to the National Profil Questionnaire on Nuclear Plant Ageing, Life Management, and Plant Life extension -Belgium AMAT Guidelines

EURATOM

Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting (OECD/NEA/PLIM) IAEA

01/04/1992

March 1999

Assessment and management of IAEA Report ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety: PWR vessel internals.

IAEA Services Series N4 October 1999 IAEA TECDOC 1119

316

Assessment and management of IAEA Report ageing of major nuclear power plant components important to safety: Steam Generators Assessment and Management of Ageing of Major Nuclear Power Plants Components Important to Safety: Concrete Containment Buildings Assessment and Management of Ageing of Major Nuclear Power Plants components important to Safety: Pressurized Water Reactor Pressure Vessels IAEA Report

November 1997

TECDOC-981

June 1998

TECDOC-1025

IAEA Report

October 1999 IAEA - Tecdoc 1120

Code on the Safety of Nuclear IAEA Report Power Plants: Operation Co-ordinated Research Programme IAEA Report (CRP) on Management of Ageing of In-Containment Instrumentation and Control Cables Data collection and Record keeping IAEA Report for the management of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing - A Safety Practice Equipment Qualification in IAEA Report Operational Nuclear Power Plants Evaluation of the safety of operating IAEA Report nuclear power plant built to earlier standards - A common basis for judgment Implementation and Review of a Nuclear Power Plant Ageing Management Programme International database on ageing management and life extension Database specification Management of Nuclear Power Plants for Safe Operation: A safety Guide IAEA Report

1988 Safety Series No 50-C-0 (Rev.1)

December 1991

Safety Series No 50-P.3

1998 Safety Reports Series No3 Safety Reports Series No 12

avr-99 Safety Series No 15 1994 IWG-LMNPP94/6 1994 Safety Series No 50-SG-09

IAEA Report

IAEA Report

317

Methodology for the management of IAEA Report ageing of nuclear power plant components important to safety Periodic Safety of Operational Nuclear Power Plants: A safety Guide Pilot Studies on Management of Ageing of Instrumentation and Control Cables Pilot studies on Management of Ageing of Nuclear Power Plant Components - Results of Phase I Regular meeting of the int. WG on Life management of NPP (IWGLMNPP) IAEA Report

juil-92 Technical Reports Series No 338 1984 Safety Series No 50-SG-12 TECDOC-932

IAEA Report

IAEA Report

October 1992 TECDOC-670

IAEA Report

25-28 May, 1999 May 1999

Minutes of meeting TECDOC-1084

Review of Selected Cost Drivers for IAEA Report Decisions on Continued Operation of Older Nuclear Reactors - Safety Upgrades, Lifetime Extension, Decommissioning Safe Management of the Operating IAEA Report Lifetimes of Nuclear Power Plants Safety Aspects of Nuclear Power IAEA Report Plant Ageing Operating experience to apply to INPO Report advanced light water reactor designs

November INSAG 14 1999 1990 TECDOC-540 March 1996 INPO 93-004, Rev. 04 Limited The information in this document complements the distribu- Utility Requirements Document and other ongoing tion effort by designers to review and apply valuable lessons learned from industry operating experience to advanced LWR designs. Designers should review the problems addressed in the reports and strive to overcome them in the designs.

AMES REFERENCES LABORATORY JRC-IAM/ECN PETTEN A COMPARASION OF WESTERN AND EASTERN NUCLEAR REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL STEELS SURVEY OF EXISTING, PLANNED AND REQUIERED STANDARDS

JRC-IAM/ECN

juin-96

CD-NA-16409EN-C CD-NA-17327EN-C

L.M.Davies

avr-97

MPA STUGART

dc-95

CD-NA-16313EN-C

318

Boraflex Degradation In Spent Fuel Pool Storage Racks Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism And Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations Degradation Of Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve Pressure And Exhaust Diaphragms Electrical Penetration Assembly Degradation Potential For Degradation Of The Emergency Core Cooling System And The Containment Spray System After A Loss Of Coolant Accident Because Of Construction And Protective Coating Deficiencies And Foreign Materials In Containment Snubber Lubricant Degradation In High-Temperature Environments Unexpected Degradation Of Lead Storage Batteries Industry Guideline for Implementing the Requirements of 10CFR Part 54 - The License Renewal Rule

NCR NCR

juin-96 avr-97

Gl 96-04 Gl 97-01

NCR

oct-94

IN 94-71

NCR NCR

avr-93 juil-98

IN 93-025 Gl 98-04

NCR NCR NEI

juin-94 avr-95 mars-96

IN 94-48 IN 95-21 NEI 95-10

Industry Guidelines for Implementing NEI Report the Requirements of 10CFR Part 54 - The license Renewal Rule Application of NUREG/CR-5999 interim fatigue curves to selected Nuclear Power Plant components Assessment of thermal embrittlement of Cast Stainless Steels Degradation in small-radius U-bend regions of steam generator tubes Degradation of ventilation system charcoal resulting from chemical cleaning of steam generators Detection of pump degradation Draft Regulatory Guide DG-1047 NRC NRC

Rev.1 NEI 95-10 January 2000 mars-95 NUREG/CR-6260

Approach to implement the requirements of 10CFR part 54, the license renewal rule, based on industry experience and expertise in implementing the LRR.

NRC

dc-93

NUREG/CR-6177

NRC NRC

juil-98 sept-95

IN-97-26 IN 95-41

NRC

aot-95 NUREG/CR-6089 August 1996 DG-1047

319

Interim fatigue design curves for carbon, low-alloy and austenitic stainless steels in LWR environments

NRC

avr-93

NUREG/CR-5999

Working Draft Standard Review Plan NRC April 2000 WD-SRP-LR for License Renewal 1995 Consensus Document on Nuclear science and 1997 EUR 16803 EN Safety of European LWR technology, European Commission Common position of European regulators on qualification of NDT systems for pre- and in-service inspection of Light Water reactor components Periodic safety reviews of NPPs in EC Member states, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland: a review of current practices Seismic re-evaluation of operating nuclear power plants in European countries - Comparative study of national practices BWR Containments License Renewal Industry Report BWR Pressure Vessel License Renewal Industry Report BWR Primary Coolant Pressure Boundary License Renewal Industry Report BWR Vessel Internals License Renewal Industry Report Class 1 Structures License Renewal Industry Report Low Voltage EnvironmentallyQualified Cable License Renewal Industry Report PWR Containment Structures License Renewal Industry Report PWR Pressure Vessel Internals License Renewal Industry Report Nuclear science and technology, European Commission Nuclear science and technology, European Commission Nuclear science and technology, European Commission NUMARC NUMARC NUMARC 1997 EUR 16802 EN

1995 EUR 13056 EN

1996 EUR 16245 EN

juil-94 juil-94 juil-94

IR-90-10 IR-90-02 IR-90-09

NUMARC NUMARC NUMARC

juil-94 juil-94 juil-94

IR-90-03 IR-90-06 IR-90-08

NUMARC NUMARC

juil-94 juil-94

IR-90-01 IR-90-05

320

PWR Reactor Coolant System License Renewal Industry Report PWR Vessel License Renewal Industry Report License Renewal Industry Reports

NUMARC NUMARC Numarc Report

juil-94 juil-94

IR-90-07 IR-90-04 The ten Industry reports (IR) provide a generic technical basis for evaluation of Nuclear Power plants components for license renewal Restricted It is of utmost importance for electric utilities to prove the competitiveness of nuclear power. The study performed is a component of OECD/NEA programme on Plant Life Management and the objective was to collect and evaluate nuclear power plant refurbishment cost data and experience. This information is useful to reactor operators faced with nuclear plant life cycle evaluation.

1990 IR-90-01 to 10

Refurbishment costs of nuclear power plants

OECD Report

January 1999 NEA/NDC/DOC 76p (99)1

Regulatory Aspects of ageing Reactors Report on future nuclear regulatory challenges

OECD/CNRA OECD/CNRA

March 1999 November 1997, 47p

NEA/CNRA/R (99)1 Final draft For nuclear regulatory bodies, the first challenge is to ensure that economic pressures do not erode nuclear safety. The report identifies the challenges that regulators are likely to be confronted with over the next ten years

Development priorities for NDE of OECD/CSNI concrete structures in nuclear plants (NEA Workshop) FALSIRE: phase 1: CSNI project for OECD/CSNI fracture analyses of large-scale international reference experiments Comparison report FALSIRE: phase 2: CSNI project for OECD/CSNI fracture analyses of large-scale international reference experiments Fatigue crack growth benchmark OECD/CSNI

Risley, UK, Nov. 1997 1998

NEA/CSNI/R(97) 28

1997 OECD/GD(97)24

International Workshop on Aged and OECD/CSNI Decommissioned Material Collection and Testing for Structural Integrity Purposes

1996 NEA/CSNI/R(96) 1 OCDE/GD(96)18 7 1997 NEA/CSNI/R(97) 8 1995; Mol, NEA/CSNI/R(95) Belgium 17 1996 OCDE/GD(96)10

321

Joint WANO/OECD-NEA Workshop: OECD/CSNI Prestress loss in NPP containments

1997: Poitiers, France 1997

NEA/CSNI/R(97) 9 OCDE/GD(97)22 5

Leak before break in reactor piping and vessels: specialists meeting

OECD/CSNI

1995: Lyon, NEA/CSNI/R(95) France 18 1996, Vol 1-3 OCDE/GD(96)11 1997: Petten, NEA/CSNI/R(97) The 1 Netherlands EUR 17354 EN 1997 1996: Stockholm, Sweden 1996 NEA/CSNI/R(96) 4 OCDE/GD(96)12 4

NDE technique capability OECD/CSNI demonstration and inspection qualification: proceedings of the joint EC OCDE IAEA specialists meeting Probabilistic structure integrity analysis and its relationship to deterministic analysis Report of the task group on the seismic behaviour of structures: status report OECD/CSNI

OECD/CSNI

1997 NEA/CSNI/R(96) 11 OCDE/GD(96)18 9 1996 NEA/CSNI/R(95) 19 OCDE/GD(96)31 1995 NEA/CSNI/R(95) 4 OCDE/GD(95)90 1996 NEA/CSNI/R(96) 10 OCDE/GD(96)18 8 1996 NEA/CSNI/R(95) 1 OCDE/GD(96)6 1992; Kl, Germany 1995 10 Feb - 2000 NEA/CSNI/R(95) 6 OCDE/GD(95)91 Third Draft, ver.4

Report of the task group reviewing OECD/CSNI national and international activities in the area of ageing of nuclear power plant concrete structures Report on round robin activities on the calculation of crack opening behaviour and leak rates for small bore piping components Seismic shear wall ISP: NUPECs seismic ultimate dynamic response test: comparative report State of the art on key fracture mechanics aspects of integrity assessment Workshop on Reactor Coolant System Leakage and Failure Probabilities Status report on Nuclear Power Plant Life management OECD/CSNI

OECD/CSNI

OECD/CSNI

OECD/CSNI

OECD/NEA

322

Aging Management Guideline for Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Power and Distribution Transformer Aging management guideline for commercial Nuclear Power plants tanks and pools CONVERSION TABLE OF MATERIAL DAMAGE INDEXATION FOR ALL DIFFERENT EUROPEAN REACTOR TYPES DOSIMETRY AND IRRADATION PROGRAMMES OF AMES EUROPEN NETWORK

SANDIA Laboratories SANDIA Laboratories TECNATOM

1993

SAND93-7068

fvr-96

SAND96-0343 / UC-523 CD.NA-18693EN-C

dc-98

TECNATOM

dc-97

CD.NA-17744EN-C

DOSIMETRY AND NEUTRON TECNATOM TRANSPORT METHODS FOR RPV SURVEY OF NATIONAL TRACTEBEL REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS Comportamiento frente a la UNESA irradiacion neutronica de los materiales de vasijas de reactores de agua ligera

nov-96

CD-NA-16470EN-C juin-95 CD-NA-16305EN-C 1995 ISBN: 84-7834186-2

Spanish The purpose of this document is to present the activities, results and conclusions of the Research Project Behaviour with regard to Neutron Irradiation of Light-Water Reactor Vessel Materials. Its objective is the optimisation and enhancement of the embrittlement surveillance procedures, directly related to an adequate management of the remaining life of the reactor.

Analisis fenomenos degradatorios en generadores de vapor

UNESA /CIEMAT

February 1993

GVR-CI-IT-03202 Spanish The document covers a survey on the degradation mechanisms which can affect the steam generators at Vandellos II NPP. It covers several problems, the reasons for formation and propagation, identification and follow-up parameters, and control and mitigation methods. GVR-CI-IT-03202 GVR-CI-IT-03201 FINAL FINAL

Anlisis Fenmenos Degradatorios en Generadores de Vapor Anlisis Fenmenos Degradatorios tuberas Recirculacin Reactores BWR Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. Dossier Bombas, Turbinas y Compresores

UNESA/CIEMAT UNESA/CIEMAT

FEB-93 NOV-92

UNESA/EA

JUN-93

GVR-EA-IT03312

FINAL

323

Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. Dossier Componentes de ventilacin

UNESA/EA

JUN-93

GVR-EA-IT03317 GVR-EA-IT03308 GVR-EA-IT03315 GVR-EA-IT03310 GVR-EA-IT03316 GVR-EA-IT03306 GVR-EA-IT03313 GVR-EA-IT03304 GVR-EA-IT04402-1 GVR-EA-IT04402-2 GVR-EA-IT04402-3 GVR-EA-IT04401-1 GVR-EA-IT04401-2 GVR-EA-IT04401-3 GVR-EA-GU04101 Rev.1

FINAL

Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/EA Dossier Contenciones Metlicas Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/EA Dossier Equipo Elctrico Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/EA Dossier Generador Diesel Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/EA Dossier Instrumentacin y Control Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/EA Dossier internos Vasija BWR Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/EA Dossier Tuberas y Vlvulas Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/EA Dossier Vasija Reactor BWR Evaluacin de Mantenimiento de UNESA/EA CNSMG Vol. I: Mecnico Evaluacin de Mantenimiento de UNESA/EA CNSMG Vol. II: Elctrico Evaluacin de Mantenimiento de UNESA/EA CNSMG Vol. III: I&C Evaluacin de Mantenimiento de UNESA/EA CNV II Vol. I: Mecnico Evaluacin de Mantenimiento de UNESA/EA CNV II Vol. II: Elctrico Evaluacin de Mantenimiento de UNESA/EA CNV II Vol. III: I&C Guia de evaluacion de practicas de UNESA/EA maintenimiento

APR-93 JUN-93 JUN-93 JUN-93 MAY-93 JUN-93 MAY-93 MAY-94 MAY-94 MAY-94 MAY-94 MAY-94 MAY-94 September 1993

FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL Spanish Demonstrating that ageing and performance are being effectively managed is a key element of a successful lifetime management program. The purpose of the evaluation guide is to provide a standardised approach for the maintenance effectiveness evaluations. Three parts are described: identification of degradation mechanisms, collection of information, maintenance evaluation.

324

Guia de seleccion de componentes importantes para la gestion de vida de centrales nucleares

UNESA/EA

January 1993 GVR-EA-GU00101 Rev.1

Spanish The objectives of this document is to provide a standard method for selecting and prioritising plant structures, systems and components important to evaluating the lifetime of LWR nuclear plant components. These components have the greatest sensitivity to ageing, and O&M costs will dictate the feasibility of Life Cycle Program for the plant. FINAL

Hojas de Datos de Prcticas de Mantenimiento de CNSMG Vol II. Elctrico Hojas de Datos de Prcticas de Mantenimiento de CNSMG Vol. III. I&C Hojas de Datos de Prcticas de Mantenimiento de CNSMG Vol.I Mecnico Hojas de Degradacin de Componentes de CNSMG Vol. I. Mecnico Hojas de Degradacin de Componentes de CNSMG Vol. II. Elctrico Hojas de Degradacin de Componentes de CNSMG Vol. III. I&C Recomendaciones de vigilancia y monitorizacin. Definicin de alcances

UNESA/EA

MAR-94

GVR-EA-IT04302-2 GVR-EA-IT04302-3 GVR-EA-IT04302-1 GVR-EA-IT04202-1 GVR-EA-IT04202-2 GVR-EA-IT04202-3 GVR-EA-IT05101 GVR-EA-IT05201 GVR-EA-IT02202 GVR-EA-IT02102 GVR-FI-IT-03206

UNESA/EA

MAR-94

FINAL

UNESA/EA

MAR-94

FINAL

UNESA/EA

MAR-94

FINAL

UNESA/EA

MAR-94

FINAL

UNESA/EA

MAR-94

FINAL

UNESA/EA

MAY-94

FINAL

Requisitos fundamentales de UNESA/EA vigilancia y monitorizacin Seleccin de Componentes Crticos UNESA/EA C.N.S.M.G. Seleccin de Componentes Crticos UNESA/EA C.N.V.II Cuantificacin Modos Degradacin UNESA/FRAMATO por irradiacin, envejecimiento ME Trmico y fatiga Fenmenos Degradatorios. Componentes Pesados UNESA/FRAMATO ME

MAY-94 JAN-93 JAN-93 FEB-93

FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL

FEB-93

GVR-FI-IT-03204

FINAL

325

Fenmenos Degradatorios. Generadores de Vapor y Presionador Fichas de Evaluacin de Fenmenos Degradatorios Informe de Sntesis para la Evaluacin de Vida Remanente de los circuitos Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. Dossier Cambiadores de Calor y Depsitos

UNESA/FRAMATO ME UNESA/FRAMATO ME UNESA/FRAMATO ME UNESA/INITEC

JAN-93

GVR-FI-IT-03203

FINAL

FEB-93 MAR-93

GVR-FI-IT-03207 GVR-FI-IT-03205

FINAL FINAL

MAY-93

GVR-IN-IT-03314

FINAL

Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/INITEC Dossier Estructuras Hormign Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/INITEC Dossier Generador de Vapor Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/INITEC Dossier Internos Vasija PWR Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/INITEC Dossier Presionador Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/INITEC Dossier Soportes Principales Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/INITEC Dossier Turbogrupo Estudio Fenmenos Degradatorios. UNESA/INITEC Dossier Vasija Reactor PWR Hojas de Datos de Prcticas de UNESA/INITEC Mantenimiento de CNV II Hojas de Degradacin de UNESA/INITEC Componentes de CNV II Application of SAT: systematic UNIPEDE approach to training of nuclear Publications power plant operators

APR-93 MAY-93 APR-93 MAY-93 MAY-93 JUN-93 MAY-93 APR-94 APR-94 1997 - 17p EN

GVR-IN-IT-03307 GVR-IN-IT-03302 GVR-IN-IT-03305 GVR-IN-IT-03303 GVR-IN-IT-03309 GVR-IN-IT-03311 GVR-IN-IT-03301 GVR-IN-IT-04301 GVR-IN-IT-04201 01004Ren9757

FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL FINAL Public The group "Training of operational personnel in nuclear power station composed of experts and managers responsible for operator training and development from 12 european companies, has examined the objectives, rules, methods, policies and approaches to training activities. This has resulted in a series of documents covering aspects essential for promoting safety and improving performance of the nuclear generating park.

326

At your own risk - an inquiry about risk management in the ESI

UNIPEDE Publications

1996 - 40p EN

00300Ren9609

Public

The paper explains what is understood by Risk Management and gives an overview of the results of the inquiry carried out in 1995 on how Risk Management is being applied in the Electricity Industry. The analysis was based on 85 replies to a questionnaire, received from 81 electricity companies in 31 countries. Systems for condition monitoring of equipment and components in nuclear and non-nuclear generating stations are reviwed. The report covers monitoring of vibrations (rotating components, structures), loose parts, leakage, fatigue, noise; electrical and I&C systems are also discussed. The report includes the resulys of a survey among utilities on the present status of the art and addresses future trends. At the Unipede congress (Montreux, May 1997), the Unipede nuclear generation and thermal generation study committees held a joint session on "Power advances in their operations". This session document covers power advances and trends in improved availability, power upgrading, safety performance, plant life extension, modernisation programmes, radioactive operational waste, spent fuel and decommissioning. The report contains detailed informations on the design and operating experiences of both PWRs and VVERs. It is a simultaneous updating of the state of the art for PWR/VVER primary circuit chemistry and a document that can be used as a basis for defining the chemical requirements for the design of primary circuit of future PWRs. It is Unipedes aims that training should be provided to improve the safety culture in European power reactors. This report will assist in this aim.

Condition monitoring for power plants

UNIPEDE Publications

1997 - 20p EN

01002Ren9751

Public

Experience and progress in nuclear UNIPEDE power production of Unipede Publications member countries

1997 - 14p EN

01000Ren9793

Public

Primary circuit chemistry of Western UNIPEDE PWR and VVER plants Publications

1996 - 148p - 02004Ren9653 EN

Public

327

Safety evaluation of nuclear power UNIPEDE plants designed to earlier standards Publications

1996 - 22p EN

01005Ren9636

Public

The European Utility Requirement (EUR) document in 1997: progress and near term objectives"

UNIPEDE Publications

1997 - 4p EN

01000Ren9797

Public

Nuclear power plants designed to earlier standards must have an adequate level of safety. Most regulators are now seeking additional assurance that NPPs sre continuing to be operated at reasonable levels of safety when compared with the safety standards which would apply to a NPP designed and constructed today. This is reflected by principle 25 of the Safety Fundamentals of the IAEA. The objective of the report is to update previous versions of defining common ground, acceptable to utilities, the public and the administrations, on the design of standard LWR nuclear power plants in Western Europe. The safety approaches, targets and criteria of the future plants, their design conditions, their performance targets, their systems and equipment specifications are being harmonised under the leadership of the electricity producers.

COMPARISON OF SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF RUSSIAN AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES FOR EVALUATING IRRADATION EFFECTS IN REACTOR PRESSURE VESSELS

VTT

fvr-95

CD-NA-16279EN-C

IRRADATION EMBRITTLEMENT VTT MITIGATION STATE OF THE ART REVIEW ON VTT THERMAL ANNEALING Aging and service wear of air-operated valves used in safety-related systems at nuclear power plants

sept-94 dc-94 aot-94

CD-NA-16072EN-C CD-NA-16278EN-C NUREG CR-6016

Aging and service wear of spring-loaded pressure relief valves used in safety-related systems at nuclear power plants Aging assessments of bistables and switches in nuclear power plant

mars-95

NUREG CR-6192 ; ORNL-6791

janv-93

NUREG CR-5844 / BNL-NUREG 52318

328

Aging assessments of lange electric motors in nuclear power plant Aging of safety class 1e transformers in safety systems of nuclear power plants Component unavailability versus inservice test (IST) interval: evaluations of component aging effects with applications to check valves

mars-96

NUREG CR-6336 / BNL-NUREG52460 NUREG CR-5753

nov-97

juil-97

NUREG CR-6508 ; ORNL- 6909

Development priorities for NDE of concrete structures in nuclear plants Draft conclusions and recommendations from the workshop on the finite elements analysis of degraded concrete structure

1998 NEA/CSNI/R(98) 6 April 1999

Draft conclusions and recommendations on containment tendon prestress loss Effect of dynamic strain aging of nuclear ferritic piping at LWR temperatures Estimation of FractureThougness of Cast Stainless Steels During Thermal Aging in LWR Systems Evidence aging effects on certain safety-related components Evidence of Ageing effects on certain safety related components Volume 1: summary and analysis Volume 2: contributions

April 1999

juil-94

NUREG CR-6226 ; BMI-2176 NUREG CR-4513

aot-94

janv-96

NUREG CR-6442 ; INEL95/0654 ; NEA/CSNI/R(95)9 NEA/CSNI/R(95) 9

Septembre 1995 Vol.1: 68p

Experience with thermal fatigue in LWR piping caused by December mixing and stratification 1998 Long-term aging and loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) testing of electrical cables oct-96

NEA/CSNI/R(98) 8 NUREG CR-6202 ; SAND0485 ; IPSN 94-03

329

Nuclear power plant genneric lessons learned (GALL) Operation and Maintenance Experience with computer-based Systems in NPP's PISC III: Final report Plant Ageing Management - Providing a technical basis for long-term operation of light water reactors

dc-96

Septembre 1998 53p 1998 NEA/CSNI/R(98) Final 9 report May 1999 CSNI-PWG3 Draft Technical Position Document June 1997 229p June 1999 NEA/SEN/NDC(9 7)11, Rev.1 OECD/PWG3 Draft

NUREG CR-6490 ; ANL 96/13 V 1 NEA/CSNI/R(97) 23

PLIM Workshop - 6th Meeting of the Expert Group on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management Relation of ageing and seismic engineering Safety practices. Data collection and record keeping for the management of NPP ageing Status report on seismic-reevaluation Survey of organic components in nuclear power plants

janv-91 Ref. EDF: E1992E150084 NEA/CSNI/R(98) 5 1998 NEA/CSNI/R(98) 7

330

Appendix_6: Publications ,GHQWLI $XWKRUV 1XPEHU &RPSDQ\ 7LWOH ANERI IAEA &RQIHUHQFH  SXEOLFDWLRQ 3DJH 'DWH 1 October 1997 17 June 1991 3ODFH 6KRUW VXPPDU\

Current Status of Nuclear Power Plants in Japan (copy of slides) IAEA Program on the Safety 1st meeting of Aspects of Nuclear Power Plant Expert Group on Ageing Plant Life Management Meeting, Paris, 1819 June 1991 Nuclear Power Plant Life Management in Japan (Copy of slides) 1st meeting of Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting, Paris, 1819 June 1991 1st meeting of Expert Group on Plant Life Management Meeting, Paris, 1819 June 1991 EPRI

JAPEIC

17 June 1991

OECD/NE Brief Overview of the Plant Life A Management decision making process

EPRI

Joint DOE-EPRI strategic research and development plan to optimise US NPP - Volume 1Executive summary and Volume 2 - table of content. Life time management/Life extension (copy of slides)

20 March 1998

EDF

European Executive Advisory Board, N5 - Panel Discussion on the Topic "Life Extension to 60 years", 2/10/97

2 October 1997

NOK

Aging Management KKB (copy of European Executive slides) Advisory Board, N5 - Panel Discussion on the Topic "Life Extension to 60 years", 2/10/97

2 October 1997

331

IAEA

Implementation and review of nuclear power plant ageing management program - A safety report (Final Draft)

IAEA

1 March 1998

IAEA

IAEA Consultants Report on the IAEA, Vienna, Meeting on Nuclear Power Plant Austria, April 17-21, Ageing and Life Management 1989 French 900 MW PWR unit Meeting on the Incident on Seismic Stops (Copy seismic behaviour of of slides) structures, December 2-3, 1996, OECD/NEA/CNRA/P WG-3

17 April 1989 2 December 1996

ASME

Draft Non-Mandatory Appendix x Members SubGroup Environmental effects on Design (SC III) components Technical Meeting on Ageing Management (copy of slides) Magnox Electric Approach to continued operation of nuclear power plants (OECD/NEA International Workshop On Nuclear Power Plant Life Management) Seguimiento de vida remanente en base a sistemas inteligentes de gestin de inspecciones RSWG Task Force on Ageing, Brussels 6th Meeting of the Expert Group on Nuclear Power Plant Life Management, Paris, April 14-15, 1997 21 Sociedad Nuclear Espaola Annual Meeting

5 May 1997 24 March 1998 14 April 1997

RSWG Stokoe T. Magnox Electric

Aguado M.

25-28 October 95 February 1995

Tarragon a (Spain) Bilbao (Spain)

Aguado M.

Inspeccin y analisis de International Seminar integridad. Herramientas bsicas "Alargamiento de Vida de para la gestin de vida Equipos e Instalaciones" remanente Ageing, Surveillance and PLIM +PLEX 95 Remanent Lifetime Evaluation Based on an Intelligent Inspection Planner and Management System

Aguado M.

Page 489, 27-30 Nice Poster November (France) Session 1 95

332

Aguado M. , I. Marcelles

Towards the integration of IAEA Specilist remanent lifetime and Meeting maintenance based on condition monitoring techniques Seguimiento de la degradacin y Revista de la evaluacin de vida remanente de Sociedad Nuclear componentes de centrales Espaola nucleares Hacia la Integracin de Herramientas en los Ambitos de Gestin de Vida, Mantenimiento e Inspeccin Towards the integration of remanent lifetime, maintenance and inspection tools Improvement of NPP Life management using advanced NDT techniques: A look to the future

Page 121 2-5 June 1998

Lyon (France)

Aguado M., C. Cueto

February 1997

Madrid

Aguado M., I. Marcelles

23 Sociedad Nuclear Page 455, 5-7 La Espaola Annual Session November Corua Meeting 23-10 97 (Spain) Top-Safe 15-17 April Valencia 1998 (Spain) Page 231, 8-10 Prague (Czech Republic) Session II: December Monitoring 97 , Surveillan ce, Inspection

Aguado M., I. Marcelles Aguado M., J. Ortega, I. Marcelles

PLIM +PLEX 97

Ahmed I., W.M. Butt, Kanupp Z.H. Siddiqui, J. Iqleem Allen R.P., J.J. Burns

Plant life extension at Kanupp: an update Shippingport station aging management lessons

Nuclear Engineering 1 June International 1997 Aging research inf. Nureg/CP 24-27 Mar Rockville conf. -01221992 Vol.2 p. 151-164 VGB Technical Association of Large Power Plant Operators NEINBF p. 20-22 ISSN: 0029-5507 7th International Paper Conference On 7119 Nuclear Engineering (ICONE) 1 Septembe r 1997

Alt M., M. Fuchs, H. Krapf, U. Peter, H. Schalk, M. Seevers, M. Wenk Anon Antonov A.V., A.V. Dagaev, I.S. Volnikov

GKN, PE, Plant Life Management in KKG, German Nuclear Power Plants RWE-E, KKP, HEW, KWO NEI (UK) Dukovany: investing in a long term future for V-213s INPE The development of techniques for determining the residual life time prediction of NPP equipment

Dec. 1994 April 19- Tokyo, 23, 1999 Japan

333

Aubry P., J-P. Goffin

Gec Alsthom, TEE

Rnovation des rotors B.P. des turbines nuclaires - Application deux turbines vapeur de 1000 MW en Belgique Primary System maintenance Strategy

Confrence SFEN: Le parc Nuclaire: sa gestion dans la dure, Paris, 10-11 dcembre 1996 ABB Nuclear Service Symposium, Saltsjbaden, June 16-18

10 December 1996

Aye L.

EDF

Badlan M. , R. Gonzlez, L. Luccardi

Eliminacin de Tensiones 23 Sociedad Nuclear Page 440, 5-7 La Residuales por Procedimientos Espaola Annual Session November Corua Mecnicos (MSIP). Un Medio Meeting 23-01 97 (Spain) para Prevenir la Corrosin Bajo tensin en las Cabezas de Vasija Tipo PWR Tecnatom RPV Dosimetry Activities: Project FISA 99 - EU JRC-IAM, AMES Dosimetry and MADAM Research in Reactor NRG, VTT, Safety BNFL, SKC-CEN GKK Neckar Jonas inc. AMTEC Quantification of the safety status ASME Conf. of PWR steam generators PVP 332, p. 59-65 29 Nov,-1 Luxembo Dec, 1999 urg

Ballesteros A., L. Debarberis, W. Voorbraak, C. Sciolla, M. Valo, T. Lewis, H. At Abderrahim Bartonicek J., O. Jonas, F. Schoeckle

21-26 Jul Montreal 1996

Bartonicek J., W. Zaiss NeckarWes Guarantee of component integrity KT/KTA Winter theim as a basis of aging power plant seminar: Aging life management management in NPPs Bedzikian G., Ensel C., EDF Prise en compte de la cintique RGN, Revue Churier-Bossennec H. Framatome du vieillissement thermique dans Gnrale Nuclaire les tudes de dure de vie Bedzikian G., J.P. Massoud, S. JayetGendrot, H. ChurierBossennec, P. Le Delliou Berto D.S. EDF Life evaluation of cast duplex stainless steel elbows in French PWRs

pp. 25-65 (German)

25-26 Jan Salzgitter 1996 Germany

nov-99 France

7th International Paper Conference On 7320 Nuclear Engineering (ICONE) 1993 PVP Conf. p. 33-39

April 19- Tokyo, 23, 1999 Japan

ABB-CE

Demonstrating safety during license renewal should not be a large task Evaluation of piping damage in German nuclear power plants

25-29 Jul New1993 York 1997

Bieniussa K.W., H. Reck

GRS

Nucl. Eng. And Design, 171

pp. 15-32

334

Bollini G.J., J. Navarro

Optimizacin de Tcnicas de Inspeccin en Servicio como Paso Previo para su Validacin B&W License renewal rule / maintenance rule - It's too soon to talk about changes U.S. NPAR approach to managing aging in operating nuclear power plants Cooz-A expert assessment program Programa Integral de Vigilancia de las Estructuras de Hormign de Centrales Nucleares

21 Sociedad Nuclear Page 306, 25-28 Espaola Annual Session October Meeting 21-04 95 1993 PVP conf. p. 41-44

Tarragon a (Spain)

Borsum R.B.

25-29 Jul New1993 York 18-23 Aug Tokyo, 1991 Japan NewYork Valladolid (Spain)

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