CASE (Article VI: The Legislative Department ) Section 28 CIR v.

Santos

MAIN POINT

FACTS

ISSUE

HELD

Section 29 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works

The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. This is not to say that RTC has no power whatsoever to declare a law unconstitutional. But this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC have the power to declare the law unconstitutional but this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC can only look into the validity of a provision, that is whether or not it has been passed according to the provisions laid down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons for its existence. A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from such expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise.

Guild of Phil. Jewellers questions the constitutionality of certain provisions of the NIRC and Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. It is their contention that present Tariff and tax structure increases manufacturing costs and render local jewelry manufacturers uncompetitive against other countries. In support of their position, they submitted what they purported to be an exhaustive study of the tax rates on jewelry prevailing in other Asian countries, in comparison to tax rates levied in the country. Judge Santos of RTC Pasig ruled that the laws in question are confiscatory and oppressive and declared them INOPERATIVE and WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT insofar as petitioners are concerned. Petitioner CIR assailed decision rendered by respondent judge contending that the latter has no authority to pass judgment upon the taxation policy of the government. Petitioners also impugn the decision by asserting that there was no showing that the tax laws on jewelry are confiscatory.

WON RTC has authority to pass judgment upon taxation policy of the government.

No. The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. This is not to say that RTC has no power whatsoever to declare a law unconstitutional. But this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC have the power to declare the law unconstitutional but this authority does not extend to deciding questions which pertain to legislative policy. RTC can only look into the validity of a provision, that is whether or not it has been passed according to the provisions laid down by law, and thus cannot inquire as to the reasons for its existence. SC held that it is within the power of the legislature whether to tax jewelry or not. With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature (kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subject) and situs (place) of taxation.

Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA No. 920, which apropriates funds for public works particularly for the construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging

WON the incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying an expenditure of the

No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results

CASE (Article VII: The Executive Department ) Section 1 Soliven v. Makasiar

MAIN POINT

to private respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government. FACTS

government?

from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public. HELD

ISSUE

Section 4 Macalintal v. COMELEC

While the President is immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit. The privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. The proclamation of presidential and vicepresidential winners is a function of Congress and not of the Comelec.

President Aquino sued Beltran for libel for having written that the President hid under the bed during an attempted coup.

WON a President can sue, since she cannot be sued.

Affirmative. Privilege of immunity from suit pertains to the President by virtue of the office, and can be invoked only by the holder of the office, and not by any other person. An accused in a criminal case cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense. Also, nothing can stop the President from waiving said privilege.

Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law. The petitioner argues that Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the

Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.

YES. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps.

Section 13 Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office and employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when EXPRESSLY authorized by the Constitution itself.

constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress. Petitioners seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987 which according to them allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions. The petitioners are challenging EO 284s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.

Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is constitutional .

No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive Order No. 284 was declared null and void. In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition their primary position to not more that two positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself. The phrase unless otherwise provided in this constitution must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII. Yes. The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.

Section 16 Flores vs. Drilon

The appointing authority that the congress gives to the President is an exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no limitations may be imposed by the Congress.

The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this case. Paragraph (d) provides that the President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. Provided, however, that for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be

WON the provision in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 violatesl Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Section 17 LacsonMagallanes Co., Inc. vs. Jose Pao, et. al.

The power of control has been given to the President over all executive officers. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. At the case at bar, as the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President, his decision is that of the Presidents.

Section 17 Tondo Medical Center Employees v. CA

The express grant of the power of control to the President justifies an executive action to carry out the reorganization of an executive office under a broad authority of law.

appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority. One of the contentions of the petitioners is that it violates Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor (provision on the first year of operations) to the subject posts. In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Davao. On 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion of the above public land to the plaintiff. On 1954, the same was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land. On 1955, Jose Pao and nineteen other claimants applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area. The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on 1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation. When the case was elevated to the President of the Philippines, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, by authority of the president, declared that it would be for public interest that appellants, who are mostly landless farmers, be allocated that portion on which the petitioner have made improvements. DOH launched Health Sector Reform Agenda to reform the local health system. Executive Order 102 was the order to redirect the functions and operations of the Department of health which provided for the changes in the roles functions and organizational processes of the DOH. Under the assailed order, DOH refocused its mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and technical

May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources?

YES. The Presidents duty to execute the law and control of all executive departments are of constitutional origin. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. It may also be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the Presidents power of control over the executive departments. He may delegate to his Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person. As the Executive Secretary acts by authority of the President, his decision is that of the Presidents. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive.

WON EO no. 102 violates Section 17, Article 7 of the Constitution.

No. The argument that the EO 102 is in excess of the presidential authority due is without basis. The constitution clearly states that the president shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Furthermore, DOH is among the cabinet level departments enumerated under the Book IV of the Administrative code mainly tasked with the functional distribution of the work of the president.

Section 18 Randolf S. David v. Gloria MacapagalArroyo

The President may call the Armed Forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.

Section 19 Sabello v. DECS

Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Since the petitioner in the instance was actually reinstated and there are no circumstances that

assistance, as a result of being the devolution of basic services to local government units. Petitioners alleged that this EO is in excess of the Presidential Authority. On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger. Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the office of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence. Petitioner was a teacher with the rank of Principal I. Convicted of a criminal offense; he was sentenced to one year imprisonment and disqualification to hold public office. Subsequently he was given absolute pardon and restored to full civil and political rights. He applied for reinstatement and was given the position merely of classroom teacher.

Whether the issuance of PP 1017 is Constitutiona l.

PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress Lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power to issue decrees to direct AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as decrees promulgated by the President; and to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under section 17, article XII of the constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privatelyowned public utility and private business affected with public interest.

WON Sabello should be reappointed to the position he held prior to his conviction.

Yes. The absolute disqualification from office or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed under the penal code and that pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. Since the petitioner in the instance was actually reinstated and there are no circumstances that would warrant

Section 21 Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

would warrant the diminution of his rank, justice and equity dictates that he be given his former rank of Principal I. Extradition is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.

the diminution of his rank, justice and equity dictates that he be given his former rank of Principal I. On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States requesting for the extradition of Mark Jimenez for various crimes in violation of US laws. In compliance with the related municipal law, specifically Presidential Decree No. 1069 Prescribing the Procedure for Extradition of Persons Who Have committed Crimes in a Foreign Country and the established Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, the department proceeded with proceeded with the designation of a panel of attorneys to conduct a technical evaluation and assessment as provided for in the presidential decree and the treaty. The respondent requested for a copy of the official extradition request as well as the documents and papers submitted therein. The petitioner denied the request as it alleges that such information is confidential in nature and that it is premature to provide such document as the process is not a preliminary investigation but a mere evaluation. Therefore, the constitutional rights of the accused are not yet available. WON private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. Private respondent is not entitled of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. Extradition is a proceeding sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.